Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rdij20 Digital Journalism ISSN: 2167-0811 (Print) 2167-082X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rdij20 Paying Attention to Attention: A Conceptual Framework for Studying News Reader Revenue Models Related to Platforms Merja Myllylahti To cite this article: Merja Myllylahti (2020) Paying Attention to Attention: A Conceptual Framework for Studying News Reader Revenue Models Related to Platforms, Digital Journalism, 8:5, 567-575, DOI: 10.1080/21670811.2019.1691926 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2019.1691926 Published online: 13 Nov 2019. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 4857 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 38 View citing articles CONCEPTUAL ARTICLE Paying Attention to Attention: A Conceptual Framework for Studying News Reader Revenue Models Related to Platforms Merja Myllylahti School of Communication Studies, Auckland University of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand ABSTRACT Digital journalism has become entwined with the platform ecosystem as news companies distribute their news through platforms to gain audience attention and reader revenue. To understand where, how, and by whom individual user interaction is collected, measured and monetised, the concept of attention is critical. However, attention is a scarce and fluid commodity. It shifts between platforms and news sites, and is affected by new technologies and algorithmic changes. All this makes extracting monetary value from platform attention challenging. This article explores attention as a core concept to study digital journalism revenue models which are dependent on harvesting user attention on platforms. Three aspects of attention are considered as a part of the conceptual framing offered: attention as a scarce and fluid commodity; attention as a unit for measurement; attention as a source of monetisation. This framework is especially useful for understanding evolving attention patterns for news; news content monetisation opportunities, shifts in power balances between platforms and news companies, and associated risks with platform news distribution. CONCEPT DEFINITION: Attention KEYWORDS Digital journalism; attention; commodity; platforms; news organisations; metrics; monetisation Introduction News revenue models remain an important area of research in digital journalism studies while news companies continue to search for long-term financial sustainability. Digital journalism has increasingly become entangled with the platform ecosystem while news organisations continue to rely on them for news distribution and marketing. Van Dijck, Poell, and De Waal argue that academia needs a better understanding of “monetisation of news through the platform ecosystem” (2018, 71). This article aims to contribute to our knowledge by utilising attention as a core concept to investigate digital news revenue models which are dependent on harvesting user attention on platforms. Earlier research in the fields of digital journalism and digital news business studies has looked at platform attention as a source of engagement, traffic, and CONTACT Merja Myllylahti mmyllyla@aut.ac.nz This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article. ß 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group DIGITAL JOURNALISM 2020, VOL. 8, NO. 5, 567–575 https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2019.1691926 revenue, but the concept of attention itself is still relatively poorly examined and understood, especially in the context of news companies’ reader revenue models (Cornia et al. 2018; Myllylahti 2018). The premise of this article is that we cannot understand monetary relations between platforms and news companies without considering attention. A recent digital inquiry in the United Kingdom, the Cairncross Review, noted that attention has become essential for the sustainability of journalism – a statement which validates the importance of this kind of article aiming to conceptualise attention (Cairncross Review 2019). To understand where, how, and by whom individual user interaction is collected, measured and monetised, the concept of attention is critical. It allows us to understand evolving attention patterns of news consumption, news content monetisation opportunities, shifts in power balances between platforms and news companies, and associated risks with platform news distribution. As this paper deals mainly with the interchange between money and attention, its focus is on the economic rather than psychological or neurological aspects of attention. A foundation for the attention economy was laid in the 1970s when researchers linked audience attention to psychological and neurological aspects of it. Herbert Simon attested that humans have limited time and stamina to absorb information because the human brain can only select and process a certain amount of information. He observed that “a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it” (Simon 1971, 40). The concept of attention economy re-emerged in the 1990s with the arrival of the internet and the fragmentation of audiences. It was then linked to macroeconomics rather than just to psychological and neurological aspects of it, and attention was increasingly considered as a source of revenue (Goldhaber 2006; Kessous 2015; Vaidhyanathan 2018). The concept of attention itself is not new. However, it has evolved with time, and has remained hard to define. Goldhaber states that “no one can really define attention”, but he situates attention in an economic context, and this paper draws from this point of view (2006, para 10). Attention is often described as a commodity of which there is a shortage (scarcity), or as a source of commodification and monetisation (Webster 2014; Van Dijck 2013; Van Dijck, Poell, and De Waal 2018). Van Dijck notes that “attention means eyeballs or (unconscious) exposure, and this value is an important part of internet advertising” (2013, 61). According to her, attention on social media platforms appears in interactions such as the number of shares, likes or comments a news item gains on a platform (Van Dijck 2013). Similarly, Martin and Dwyer observe that “attention is mostly measured as hits, clicks and page views” (Martin and Dwyer 2019, 68). As this article aims to aid our understanding of the concept of attention, it offers an alternative definition for it - the earlier scholarly definitions are somewhat vague, especially when explaining interrelations between audiences, platforms, and news media. In this paper, attention is defined as a scarce and fluid commodity which carries monetary value; is based on individual user interaction which can be harvested, measured, and exchanged for revenue on a platform, on a news site, or an online site. The suggested definition aids conceptualising of attention which is based on three key dimensions: attention as a scarce and fluid commodity, attention as a unit 568 M. MYLLYLAHTI for measurement, and attention as a source of monetisation. These three dimensions will be scrutinised below as a part of the conceptual framework proposed. Webster (2014) suggests that media users are the ones that power the attention economy and that their decisions about what to read or watch or share shapes ‘the marketplace of attention’. However, many other factors affect audience behaviour and where media users pay attention to news content, or where the attention is collected and monetised. Attention is also determined by news companies and platforms’ own strategies and policies as well as technological actants such as algorithms (Lewis and Westlund 2015). While the focus in this paper is not on technological actants, their role should not be ignored, as they do have a significant impact on how and whose news gains attention on any given platform. To exemplify, Facebook controls its users’ news feeds and what kind of prominence news companies’ content receives on the platform via its algorithms, and this can have severe consequences for news publishers. Attention as a scarce and fluid commodity Wu attests that attention is both a scarce and necessary commodity as it creates demand for products or political influence (Wu 2017). By the definition offered here, attention is also a fluid commodity, and this aspect of attention allows us to examine how the attention for news constantly moves between platforms and news sites also affecting user interactions. As Wu states, attention is a fluid commodity which “cannot be stored or hold its value to be used later in time” (2017, 12). Similarly to Simon, Wu argues that attention is a scarce commodity as the human brain has limited processing power. Therefore, people have to make “attentional decisions” all the time – we either pay attention to news or we don’t (Wu 2017, 13). In their study, Newman et al. found that people were actively avoiding the news because it had “a negative effect on their mood” (2019, 10). As media businesses and platforms “rely solely on the resale of attention to make money”, news avoidance can propose a significant challenge for news monetisation (Wu 2017, 18). To understand why and how attention has become a scarce and hotly competed commodity, it is useful to revisit the past, and how the competition for the audience attention has evolved. Before the 2007–2008 global financial crisis print newspapers in the Western media markets were profiting greatly from the attention of their readers because they effectively had a monopoly over the print audience which they were able to sell advertisers. The emergence of the internet and social media companies meant that news companies lost their near monopoly over their audiences and their audiences’ attention. Ekstr€om and Westlund argue that the arrival of the internet and platforms dislocated news journalism as “the established order surrounding news” was altered due to the redistribution of power from news companies to platforms (2019, 261). Platforms such as Facebook have become powerful enterprises with their vast user bases and ability to collect detailed data about their users which they sell to advertisers and other third parties for profit. The more platforms know about their users, the more lucrative they are to advertisers who want to tailor and target their marketing effectively. When moving from a print to a digital media environment, news media companies believed that they would maintain their readers’ attention. DIGITAL JOURNALISM 569 However, they ended up fiercely competing for it with multiple other websites, search engines and social media outlets. Despite news companies’ best efforts, they have failed to earn significant revenue from their digital audiences because advertising has shifted to social media platforms and search engines. In this context, it is not surprising that some news companies’ revenue models are increasingly focusing on harvesting, retaining and monetising individual users’ attention on and off platforms. With the emergence of new platforms, audience attention has also to some extent moved between platforms. This fluid nature of attention makes it increasingly hard to harvest and monetise. While the news is still consumed on social media platforms, news reading keeps shifting within news and platform ecosystems. A 2018 study demonstrated that on average 36% of people, surveyed in 37 countries, used Facebook for news reading. However, in some mature markets, such as the United States, social media usage for news has started to decline (Newman et al. 2018, 10). To an extent, news reading has shifted from Facebook to other platforms such as Apple News app, which has approximately 90 million users, and therefore some news companies are now considering it as a possible next target for attention monetisation (Newman et al. 2019). Attention as a unit for measurement As defined here, attention is based on individual user interaction which can be collected, analysed and measured. For a long time, audience ratings (television, radio, newspapers) have been used to “calculate audience commodity” (Martin and Dwyer 2019, 64). Vaidhyanathan notes that “the mania to capture our attention began with the penny press” as newspapers started to trade subscriptions and newsstand sales for advertising revenue (2018, 84). Kessous (2015) argues that the arrival of the internet led to new kind of competition for attention and new market dynamics, meaning that “those who successfully capture audience attention necessarily gain the rewards of that economy” (Moore and Tambini 2018, 16). To capture the attention of fragmented audiences, news companies had to develop ever more sophisticated tools to measure audience interactions in real-time. There is increasing evidence that attention metrics have become tightly intertwined with newsrooms operations, editorial strategies and performance evaluation (Cherubini and Nielsen 2016; Martin and Dwyer 2019). Newsrooms have employed armies of professionals to relentlessly record and analyse user’s interactions. The harvested data is quantified, repackaged and sold to advertisers or it can be churned into reader revenue. To exemplify, Swedish evening newspaper Expressen has installed 280 screens in its newsroom to display data about news content and sales goals to its employees (INMA 2019). Access to data requires newsroom workers to constantly monitor and analyse this data, and the information provided affects editorial decisions and “encourages journalists to rethink how they write stories” (INMA 2019). Carlson argues that this kind of ‘measurable journalism’ aggregates “news consumption behaviours and attitudes, ideally making journalists more responsive to their audiences” (2018, 408). Additionally, a study by Chua and Westlund of two Singaporean news companies found that both incorporated user metrics into their news production by creating new roles and responsibilities, and both used metrics to follow the performance of their 570 M. MYLLYLAHTI content (2019, 161). At the same time, newsroom workers were concerned about how metrics affect their news values. As we have seen in the past, news companies ‘click’ chasing strategies eroded their news values and chasing attention carries a similar risk. As said, measuring attention has become a necessity for news companies because “every form of user interaction can be captured as data” to be exchanged for advertising dollars or reader revenue via digital subscriptions (Van Dijck, Poell, and De Waal 2018, 37). Carlson (2018) argues that audience measurements are products of collaboration between different economic actors such as platforms and news organisations. However, as long as news companies continue to distribute their content on platforms, they are, to some extent, reliant on the platform data as well as accuracy and quality of their attention metrics. The quality of the data received affects news companies’ revenue; decisions about how and where to monetise their content; and how to invest capital on new products or personnel. Therefore, an important question related to measuring platform attention arises: what happens if the attention metrics and data provided by platforms are not accurate? In 2018, the media reported that Facebook had measured its video viewership numbers wrongly, which resulted in overstated metrics about time spent on videos on the platform. Before the revelations, Facebook urged news companies to pivot to video, and many followed. As the real video figures were revealed, some news companies lost the bulk of their advertising income (Myllylahti 2019). Attention as a source of monetisation By the definition, attention carries monetary value, and it can be commodified by exchanging it for advertising dollars or reader revenue harvested on a platform, on a news site, or another online site. Van Dijck, Poell, and De Waal note that “the mechanism of commodification involves platforms transforming online and offline objects, activities, emotions, and ideas into tradable commodities” (2018, 37). The commodification of attention happens via ‘attention brokers’ which sell human attention to third parties for revenue (Wu 2016, 2017). According to Wu (2016, 2017) these brokers include media businesses such as broadcasters, newspapers and platforms such as Facebook and Google. To monetise their audiences, ‘attention brokers’ create “addictive distractions that maximise the user engagement on which revenue and profits ultimately depend” (Naughton 2018, 387). These distractions include tailored content, text message services, e-mails, and newsletters. A recent study by Mele, Skibinski, and Spector found that e-mail products and newsletters were aiding news publishers’ digital subscriptions (2019, 4). Festre and Garrouste also believe that certain features on the news websites, such as tweets and updates, are designed to make readers feel that they are being paid attention to (2012, 12). Previous academic studies in digital journalism and digital media business studies have examined how successful news companies have been in transforming user attention into revenue. These studies have explored how individual interactions such as likes and shares can be turned into revenue (Cornia et al. 2018; Myllylahti 2018). However, what exactly is the monetary value of platform attention is up for debate. Some media analytic companies and consultancy firms have introduced models for DIGITAL JOURNALISM 571 calculating a value for single website visits or social shares, but the accuracy and validity of these calculations are yet to be verified. Nevertheless, they have been used as a basis when attempting to estimate Facebook-related revenue (Myllylahti 2018). Sharing news content and posts on social media can drive news companies’ website traffic and increase page views which can appeal to advertisers. As recent academic studies demonstrate, news companies have gained substantial engagement and traffic from social media platforms, but monetary benefits have not been significant, making social media news distribution strategy questionable. A study of four New Zealand media companies found that a quarter of their traffic came from social media, but revenue raised from the traffic (including social shares on Facebook) was negligible yielded hardly any revenue (Myllylahti 2018). Similarly, a study of 12 newspapers and commercial broadcasters in six European countries found that the news companies received substantial traffic from social media platforms, and especially from Facebook (Cornia et al. 2018). The research found that news organisations have continued to invest in social media news distribution because of the short-term benefits, although they acknowledged that “direct monetisation on social media is still a challenge” for them (Cornia et al. 2018, 28). Some news companies believe that Facebook offers a cost-effective way to gain user attention for digital offerings, a view which can be contested. While some companies have reported substantial increases in their digital subscriptions raised via platforms, others have noted that converting platform users’ attention into reader revenue comes with a high cost (Cornia et al. 2018; Myllylahti 2019). Polish Gazetta Wyborcza, for example, has admitted that the usage of paid campaigns on Facebook has dented its revenue from platform subscriptions (Cornia et al. 2018). So far academic research has paid little attention to the costs related platform user acquisition, but there is some evidence that associated costs are rising rapidly. For example, The New York Times has reported a substantial increase in its marketing costs on promoting content and content packages on platforms (Myllylahti 2019). Platform companies are reported to dominate digital advertising in many Western media markets controlling 70–80% of total advertising spend, and as a result multiple news publishers have built their revenue models on reader revenue. However, platform companies such as Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple have all introduced their own digital subscription services targeted at news companies, potentially increasing competition between the two, or conversely, their interdependency. If news companies sign on to platform subscriptions services and revenue sharing arrangements, their dependency on platforms will increase. If they don’t, they will compete more fiercely for reader revenue against the four platform companies mentioned. Chua and Westlund (2019) argue that approaching audiences as sellable commodities may “lose significance as platform companies continue to take over the advertising market and as news publishers focus more on reader revenue” (2019, 162). They believe that news publishers have started to counterbalance platform power by reducing their dependency on them. It is true that many news organisations are building their direct traffic and subscriptions services away from Facebook, but on the other hand, they may wean themselves off one platform, and shift to another one. 572 M. MYLLYLAHTI Conclusions This paper argues that there is an urgency to explore attentional reader revenue models as news companies are increasingly using platforms for attention monetisation, and as platforms are moving to the same space to take their share of reader revenue. The subscription businesses of the two parties are becoming increasingly interlinked. Hundreds of news companies have already signed for Apple News þ subscription service, and recently Facebook launched its newest News tab which pays a ‘license fee’ for a handful of news publishers such as News Corp. The conceptual framework put forward here proposes that we need to investigate further where and how news content gains attention; how it is collected, analysed and measured; and by whom it is monetised and how. First, the proposed framework is useful to research how the monetary and power relations between platforms and news companies are structured. If we accept that attention is a scarce commodity of which both compete, it has implications to how and by whom attention is monetised. Second, while accepting that attention is also a fluid commodity, shifting from platform to platform, news site to news site, or between news sites and platforms, we can examine evolving patterns of attention. It enables us to track in which platforms news companies’ monetisation opportunities lie, or if they perhaps lie outside the platform ecosystem. Where attention is gained also affects the value of the attention, bringing us back to monetisation and reader revenue. It can be argued that individual users behave differently on platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Snapchat or Twitter, and therefore how their interactions are monetised also differs. Academia and the news industry itself lack empirical evidence of the value of attention on each platform, and therefore assessing news companies’ revenue derived from them is challenging. Third, the fluid nature of attention also affects how and by whom attention is measured, and the nature and quality of those measurements. News companies have built their own data analysis tools and metrics, but still partly rely on the information provided by platforms. As discussed, in some cases that information has proven untrustworthy, putting news companies’ revenue models at risk. In this context it is crucial to scrutinise how attention is measured and by whom and what is the quality of platform and news companies’ own metrics when they aim to build their revenue models based on attention harvesting. Fourth, the framework suggested also enables researchers to contextualise how platform news distribution, marketing, measuring and monetising affects news companies’ news values and newsroom practices. To research reader revenue in an attention economy requires multiple approaches and mix-methods to tackle complex issues. In the context of the suggested framework, we need to systematically map and analyse corporate data and documents to explore which news companies are signing for platform subscription services, what are the revenue sharing arrangements, and how the reader revenue market is structured as a consequence. We also need case studies to understand how contemporary metrics aid news publishers’ subscription revenue. For example, news companies have built increasingly sophisticated audience data systems that use hundreds of parameters to analyse their users’ attention, engagement, and even emotions, but how they link to the reader revenue is unknown to us. DIGITAL JOURNALISM 573 The framework proposed here has limitations as it considers only a number of aspects of attention. For example, Hindman (2018) argues that the attention economy threatens the public sphere and functioning of a democratic society – an aspect that was not addressed in this framework. The paper did not consider the problematic assumption that gaining newsreaders’ attention leads to informed citizens, which is not necessarily the case. The past studies have shown that chasing readers with attention-grabbing headlines has in many cases lead to ‘low quality’ - clickbait – news and less informed citizens (Thurman and Myllylahti 2009). Additionally, the framework does not address issues such as what happens if people are not paying attention to things. The issue of news avoidance is becoming relevant for further studies in this field. If people actively avoid news – do not pay attention to it - how are news companies going to monetise it? Acknowledgements The author appreciates unwavering support and encouragement from the journal editor Oscar Westlund and constructive comments from reviewers. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. 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