MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 22
Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds
july 2014
ISIS Governance in Syria
Cover: Members loyal to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) wave ISIL flags as they drive
around Raqqa June 29, 2014. REUTERS/Stringer
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MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 22
Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds
ISIS Governance in Syria
4 www.Understandingwar.org
Executive Summary
Middle East Security Report 22 | ISIS Governance in Syria | Charles C. Caris & Samuel reynolds | july 2014
4
Executive Summary
The Islamic State’s June 2014 announcement of a “caliphate” is not empty rhetoric. In fact, the idea of
the caliphate that rests within a controlled territory is a core part of ISIS’s political vision. The ISIS grand
strategy to realize this vision involves first establishing control of terrain through military conquest and
then reinforcing this control through governance. This grand strategy proceeds in phases that have been
laid out by ISIS itself in its publications, and elaborates a vision that it hopes will attract both fighters and
citizens to its nascent state. The declaration of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria, however, raises the question:
can ISIS govern?
Available evidence indicates that ISIS has indeed demonstrated the capacity to govern both rural and urban
areas in Syria that it controls. Through the integration of military and political campaigns, particularly
in the provincial capital of Raqqa, ISIS has built a holistic system of governance that includes religious,
educational, judicial, security, humanitarian, and infrastructure projects, among others. Raqqa is the
central city in ISIS’s territorial network and thus it offers the most fully developed example of ISIS’s
Caliphate vision. However, Raqqa is not the only striking example of ISIS governance. Towns in Aleppo
province, in particular al-Bab and Manbij, are also host to a number of governance programs, as are select
towns in other provinces to varying degrees.
ISIS divides governance into two broad categories: administrative and service-oriented. Administrative
offices are responsible for managing religious outreach and enforcement, courts and punishments,
educational programming, and public relations. ISIS begins by establishing outreach centers and
rudimentary court systems first because these are less resource-intensive and less controversial among
the Syrian population. After consolidating militarily, ISIS generally progresses towards religious police,
stricter punishments, and a concerted educational system. These types of programs require more dedicated
personnel, resource investments, and greater support from the population.
ISIS’s service-oriented offices manage humanitarian aid, bakeries, and key infrastructure such as water
and electricity lines. In a similar fashion to its administrative offices, ISIS begins by offering humanitarian
aid, particularly during Ramadan, and coordinates with religious outreach events to provide food aid to
attendees. This is seen as less threatening and requires little personnel or resources from ISIS. As ISIS
takes sole control over territory, it expands to provide more services, often operating the heavy equipment
needed to repair sewer and electricity lines. ISIS has also attempted to manage large industrial facilities,
such as dams and a thermal power plant in Aleppo province.
In conjunction with these governance projects, ISIS has worked to legitimate its vision for a caliphate
as laid out in publications such as the English-language magazine Dabiq. ISIS has argued that it has
the duty to govern both the religious and political lives of Muslims. Under this model, ISIS leader Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi is both ISIS’s chief religious official and its senior statesman. ISIS sees itself as an allencompassing
entity, one that eventually is meant to shoulder all the responsibilities of a traditional state.
Though maintaining some practical state functions that derive from effective urban management may not
be within his capacity.
ISIS’s sweeping yet exclusionary method of governance is potentially one of the organization’s greatest
strengths, but it may also become one of ISIS’s greatest weaknesses. ISIS maintains social control by
5www.Understandingwar.org
Executive Summary
Middle East Security Report 22 | ISIS Governance in Syria | Charles C. Caris & Samuel reynolds | july 2014
eliminating resistance, but this in turn places technical skills that are essential to run modern cities in
shorter supply. In the process of establishing its governance project, ISIS has dismantled state institutions
without replacing them with sustainable alternatives. The immediate provision of aid and electricity, for
example, does not translate into the creation of a durable economy. The consequence of ISIS’s failure,
however, may not be the dismantling of the Caliphate, but rather the devastation of the cities and systems
that comprise Iraq and Syria such that they never recover.
Thus far in Syria, ISIS has provided a relative measure of organization in a chaotic environment. This may
prompt assessments which overstate ISIS’s efficacy in conducting state functions. Though ISIS certainly
has demonstrated intent to commit resources to governance activities, it is yet to demonstrate the capacity
for the long-term planning of state institutions and processes. Translating broad military expansions from
the summer of 2013 into a well-governed contiguous zone will be ISIS’s most daunting task yet, and may
prove to be a critical vulnerability.
5
Executive Summary
About Our Technology Partners
ISW believes superior strategic insight derives from a fusion of traditional social science research and innovative technological
methods. ISW recognizes that the analyst of the future must be able to process a wide variety of information, ranging from
personal interviews and historical artifacts to high volume structured data. ISW thanks its technology partners, Palantir
Technologies and Praescient Analytics, for their support in this innovative endeavor. In particular, their technology and
implementation assistance has supported creating many ISW maps and graphics.
Praescient Analytics is a Veteran Owned Small Business based in Alexandria, Virginia.
Our aim is to revolutionize how the world understands information by empowering
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unstructured, relational, temporal and geospatial.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Charlie Caris is a Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, focusing on Syria. He lived in Alexandria, Egypt,
where he studied Arabic in 2011. He has also served as an intern with ISW’s Egypt and GCC portfolios. He holds a Bachelor’s
Degree with majors in Arabic and Government from Georgetown University.
Samuel Reynolds is an undergraduate at Hamilton College. He has a major in World Politics with a concentration in
International Security and a minor in Computer Science. He served as a research intern at ISW in the Spring 2014 semester.
This is his first publication.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Jessica Lewis, Aaron Reese, and Isabel Nassief for their insight and
guidance. An additional thanks to Alex Bilger, Syria and Iraq team interns for translation, and Nichole Dicharry for graphics
and formatting support.
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances
an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research,trusted analysis, and innovative education. ISW is
committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve
U.S. strategic objectives.
table of contents
Executive Summary................................................................................... 04
introduction............................................................................................. 09
The Islamic State of Iraq Expands into Syria..................................... 10
ISIS Eliminates Competitors in Raqqa City.......................................... 11
Rebels Conduct Surprise Attacks on ISIS........................................... 12
ISIS Takes an Offensive Posture............................................................ 12
The Context of the Fall of Raqqa......................................................... 12
ISIS Governance Structure ................................................................... 14
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS.................................................................. 15
islamic services........................................................................................ 20
ISIS Relations With the Syrian Population.......................................... 23
Foreign Fighters in ISIS Governance Positions.................................. 23
conclusion................................................................................................ 24
appendix..................................................................................................... 26
nOTES........................................................................................................... 31
Maps
ISIS Sanctuary as of July 28, 2014 ......................................................... 10
ISIS on the offensive: january 2014....................................................... 13
Middle East Security Report 22 | ISIS Governance in Syria | Charles C. Caris & Samuel reynolds | july 2014
9www.Understandingwar.org 9
ISIS Governance in Syria
By Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds
MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 22
Following the seizure of Mosul, ISIS Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi publicly announced the formation of
an “Islamic Caliphate”,1
articulating a political vision to justify ISIS’s ongoing military campaign to
consolidate territory across Iraq and Syria.2
The announcement of the Caliphate seems to realize ISIS’s
grand strategy of first establishing control of terrain through military conquest and then reinforcing this
control through governance. This grand strategy proceeds in phases that have been laid out by ISIS itself
in its publications, and elaborates a vision that it hopes will attract both fighters and citizens to its nascent
state.3
The declaration of a “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria, however, raises the question: can ISIS govern?
By the time Baghdadi officially announced the Islamic
Caliphate in June 2014, ISIS had already been conducting
governance activities in parts of Syria for at least seven
months. A joint political and military campaign by ISIS has
been underway in Syria, particularly in the northeastern
provincial capital of ar-Raqqa4
where ISIS has built a holistic
system of governance that includes religious, educational,
judicial, security, humanitarian, and infrastructure projects,
among others. Raqqa is the central city in ISIS’s territorial
network, the first city where ISIS established exclusive
control, and thus it offers the most fully developed example
of ISIS’s Caliphate vision in practice.
From a theoretical perspective, the ISIS governance project
is an extension of what it calls imamah, or leadership.5
As ISIS
argued at length in a recent English-language periodical,
the concept of imamah extends to both religious and political
affairs.6
Not only is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the professed
leading religious authority in the newly-declared Caliphate,
but he is also the senior statesman of ISIS, overseeing all
political and governance-related activities that will cause
ISIS to become a permanent fixture. Like the ISIS military
strategy, these campaigns reflect thoughtful design, to
transition from military control to political control. ISIS’s
Caliphate, although it was seized through military force, must
perform many of the internal functions of a traditional state
in order to remain.
As ISIS conducts its military campaign in Iraq and Syria, it is
important to observe how ISIS pursued this transition inside
Raqqa and other Syrian cities. Their example may serve as a
roadmap for what to expect from ISIS in Mosul and other
locations in Iraq where ISIS has established military control.
The degree to which ISIS can adapt its Syrian solutions to
an Iraqi context will be an important test of the Caliphate’s
ability to erase modern borders, a clear and often repeated
goal.7
ISIS demonstrated the importance of this message in
a literal way when it bulldozed a portion of the Sykes-Picot
border separating Syria and Iraq in June 2014.8
ISIS will
have to contend with resistance from some Iraqis and Syrians,
though ISIS has also fashioned several ways to do this in Raqqa
and other cities in Syria. Despite much of its messaging about
idyllic life in the Caliphate, ISIS social control is brutal and
comprehensive, as this report will demonstrate.
Information compiled for this report is largely drawn from
ISIS self-reporting, which is both a primary source and a
clear propaganda tool (see, for example, Appendix).9
ISIS
has been broadcasting its military and social programs with
photos, videos, graphic art, and print media as part of a
sophisticated political campaign. The political campaign
is linked to ISIS statecraft, and it provides an important
window into what ISIS chooses to emphasize as primary
elements of its governance. Moreover, the proliferation of
ISIS English-language print media beginning in May 2014
and describing life within Raqqa speak to the intent of ISIS
to recruit not only fighters, but also citizens, to come and live
in a functioning and thriving community. In reality, life in
Raqqa is likely not thriving, and this report will explore ISIS
representation with real estimates for events on the ground.
Nevertheless, this report will carefully examine the photos
and videos posted by ISIS that demonstrate the structure and
scale of their governance and social programs.
Combined with other sources, this paper will examine
how ISIS came to establish urban control in Raqqa and
other parts of Syria. First, the paper will describe how ISIS
consolidated military control over Raqqa by eliminating
10 www.Understandingwar.org
Middle East Security Report 22 | ISIS Governance in syria | Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds | july 2014
rivals and eventually through military victory in early January
2014. Second, the paper will document the ISIS governance
programs that followed its military campaign and which form
the basis of ISIS statecraft. Taken together, this paper answers
the question of whether ISIS is capable of establishing
governance and eliminating resistance in the areas that it
controls. The Caliphate is not only a military conquest and
not only a governance plan, it is an active and integrated
endeavor to build an alternative to modern states from the
remains of Iraq and Syria.
The Islamic State of Iraq Expands into Syria
From the time that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the
formation of ISIS in April 2013, expanding the Islamic State
of Iraq (ISI) to include Syria, ISIS has demonstrated the
intent to control territory through military force. Meanwhile,
Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), the other al-Qaeda affiliate operating in
Syria,10
pursued an alternate path. JN appeared to adopt alQaeda’s
methodology for social integration, fighting with the
Syrian opposition in order to bolster its credibility and gain
greater popular legitimacy, thereby securing a foothold in
Syria’s post-war future. Ostensibly because Baghdadi moved
into Syria without the authorization of al-Qaeda emir Ayman
al-Zawahiri,11
and remained there against Zawahiri’s orders, alQaeda’s
general command disavowed ISIS in February 2014.12
This break likely occurred because of ISIS’s divergent
methodology, characterized by the overt pursuit of physical
control prior to gaining social acceptance. Al-Qaeda’s
general command may also have been concerned that ISIS’s
prominence in Syria was diluting the appeal of JN, its official
Syrian affiliate. Capitalizing upon its military and political
successes, ISIS is now pursuing its caliphate without Jabhat alNusra
and al-Qaeda. Their future relationship is uncertain,
however, JN played a prominent role in ISIS’s rise to power
in Syria and it is therefore important to understand this
fractured relationship.
The above map depicts the terrain within Iraq and Syria that ISIS controls as well as its support zones and attack zones.
ISIS Sanctuary as of July 28, 2014
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Middle East Security Report 22 | ISIS Governance in syria | Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds | july 2014
necessarily share an ideological affiliation with the al-Qaeda
affiliate, but were attracted by Abu Saad, who had been an
influential and well liked commander in Raqqa before his
departure. Despite Abu Saad’s summer absence, which he
claimed allowed him to consolidate strength outside the city,
and the addition of 11th
Division groups to JN’s ranks, ISIS
fighters kidnapped Abu Saad shortly after his reemergence on
September 12.21
The next month, on October 14, 2013, ISIS
invited 300 leading social and religious figures to discuss
ISIS policies in the city, but later executed two among the
crowd who had expressed dissenting opinions. According
to the pro-opposition organization Syria Untold, after this
event the last remaining activists were pushed out of the city.22
ISIS’s decisive power play in Raqqa city came November 20,
2013, when rebels launched a major offensive against the
17th
Division Base, one of the Syrian regime’s last remaining
positions in Raqqa province.23
Four days into the offensive,
amid fierce clashes with regime forces, JN was forced to send
fighters away from the front lines in order to reinforce its
headquarters building at the Provincial Building against ISIS
fighters who were massing in the vicinity.24
According to the
pro-opposition Damascus Bureau website, which interviewed
locals in Raqqa, the force dispositions of ISIS and JN were
quite different during this period. JN allocated the majority
of its forces to northern Raqqa city near the front lines of
the battle for the 17th
Division as well as various checkpoints
throughout the city. ISIS, on the other hand, concentrated its
forces around its headquarters building and at checkpoints
inside the city, having largely withdrawn from the front
lines in August, 2013, according to activists.25
The different
force dispositions of JN and ISIS demonstrate the different
priorities of the two groups. JN’s main effort during this time
period was fighting the Syrian regime, as it oriented many
of its fighters near the 17th
Division north of the city. ISIS,
however, was seemingly more concerned with consolidating
its position inside Raqqa city.
One of ISIS’s final acts before the January 2014 rebel uprising
occurred on December 2, when its fighters finally seized the
Martyrs Church (Armenian Orthodox) and converted it
to an outreach headquarters building in the city.26
This act
indicates ISIS felt unchallenged in Raqqa city, both by the
civilian population and by other rebel groups (one of whom
had prevented ISIS from seizing the church previously).27
An article published by Damascus Bureau on December 18 called
the situation in Raqqa prior to the rebel revolt a “cold war”
between JN and ISIS, alluding to the growing tension between
the groups.28
All other rebels groups at this point had already
been marginalized with the exception of Ahrar al-Sham, who
still maintained a role in Raqqa’s governance operations.29
ISIS Eliminates Competitors in Raqqa City
After Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s failed merger attempt with
Jabhat al-Nusra in April 2013, ISIS devoted significant
resources towards gaining control of Syrian territory, and
more recently Iraqi territory, in order to create the necessary
conditions for governance. Raqqa, which fell out of Syrian
regime control in March 2013,13
is a central feature of this
plan. From ISIS’s perspective, Raqqa is the prototype for
Islamic governance, and it showcases the full spectrum of ISIS
governance tactics. The situation in Raqqa demonstrates the
level of governance that is possible when ISIS has established
full territorial control. Therefore, Raqqa is a valuable
benchmark by which to measure ISIS capabilities elsewhere in
Syria and Iraq. ISIS did exercise limited governance in Raqqa
in 2013, but could not begin to fully integrate its governance
projects until after it expelled its competitors in the city in
January 2014.
The ISIS intimidation campaign began shortly after ISIS
announced its intended merger with JN on April 9, 2013.
After a period of a month in which ISIS and JN were nearly
interchangeable inside Raqqa city while the merger was being
debated in leadership circles,14
ISIS’s first public act in the city
was to execute three civilians in the city’s main square.15
ISIS
continued targeting activists and rebel groups throughout
the summer and fall of 2013 under the rule of the notorious
ISIS provincial emir for Raqqa, known as Abu Luqman.16
This eventually prompted Abu Saad al-Hadrami and Abu
Dajana, the leading JN emirs in Raqqa who had initially been
subsumed within ISIS leadership after the merger, to defect
from ISIS and withdraw from Raqqa entirely along with a
group of core followers.17
In Abu Saad’s absence during the midsummer months, ISIS
continued nearly unopposed, detonating multiple VBIEDs
(Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device) at the FSA
(Free Syrian Army)-affiliated Ahfad al-Rasul headquarters
building in the Raqqa train station on August 13.18
The
explosion killed Ahfad al-Rasul’s leader and top commanders
in the city, causing Ahfad al-Rasul to end its official presence
in Raqqa.19
For ISIS, this was nothing short of a declaration of
war against a rival rebel group, and marked a major escalation
in ISIS’s campaign in Raqqa city.
On September 12, 2013, the JN emir Abu Saad returned
to Raqqa city and absorbed the leading groups in the FSAaffiliated
11th Division, formed earlier in the summer of
2013, into JN. The groups which joined JN, including Jabhat
Thuwar Raqqa and the Muntasir Billah Brigade,20
did not
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Middle East Security Report 22 | ISIS Governance in syria | Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds | july 2014
Rebels Conduct Surprise Attacks on ISIS
throughout Northern Syria
The rebel uprising against the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham
(ISIS) began in Idlib and Aleppo provinces on January
3, 2014,30
the same day ISIS seized most of Fallujah, in Iraq’s
Anbar Province.31
Rebel infighting spread to Raqqa Province
three days later, on January 6, when rebels led by JN freed
50 prisoners from a large ISIS detention center in eastern
Raqqa city.32
Other rebel groups including Ahrar al-Sham,
Liwa al-Tawhid, and smaller FSA-linked brigades continued
to overrun ISIS positions throughout the day, prompting an
anonymous FSA Eastern Front source to report to Asharq alAwsat
that “ISIS may lose control of Raqqa at any time.”33
By
January 7, ISIS held only one position in all of Raqqa –– the
fortified Governor’s Palace located in the center of the city.34
ISIS responded quickly and decisively to attacks against itself
in northern Syria by ordering strategic withdrawals of its
forces and signing temporary ceasefires until it could recover.
ISIS quickly retracted from the Tal Abyad border crossing on
January 6 after Turkey closed its border gate temporarily.35
On January 7, senior ISIS emir Abu Omar al-Shishani signed
a temporary truce with senior Ahrar al-Sham commander
and al-Qaeda emissary Abu Khalid al-Suri at Jarrah Airbase,
near Maskana in southern Aleppo province. ISIS broke the
truce less than two weeks later on January 20, when it took
control of the base from Ahrar al-Sham fighters.36
In Aleppo,
after JN brokered a last minute agreement with ISIS, ISIS
fighters abandoned their main headquarters building at the
Children’s Hospital in the Qadi Asker neighborhood, along
with a number of other checkpoints in the province.37
ISIS Takes an Offensive Posture
By January 9, ISIS fighters who had been expelled from Raqqa
regrouped, and began blocking the main bridges leading
south out of Raqqa in order to set the stage for a ground
offensive inside the city. The Syrian Observatory for Human
Rights reported many civilians even attempted to flee across
the Euphrates River by rowboat.38
On January 10, ISIS seized
most of the Mashlab district in eastern Raqqa and continued
towards the city center.39
January 12 marked a decisive turning point for ISIS as it
reportedly received a “large group” of reinforcements from
the desert near the Iraq-Syria border, according to an
anonymous Western military attaché cited by McClatchy.40
Another group of ISIS fighters was sent from Deir ez-Zour
province, according to IHS Janes.41
The additional manpower
allowed ISIS to mount an attack on a JN headquarters
building in eastern Raqqa, located at the Oweis al-Qarni
Shrine, on January 13.42
The following day ISIS secured full
control over the city and reached besieged fighters in the
Governor’s Palace. The quick advance was made possible in
part by an arrangement with salafi Ahrar al-Sham, who agreed
to leave the city in order to prevent additional casualties.43
Among ISIS’s first acts upon seizing Raqqa was executing Abu
Saad al-Hadrami, the prominent JN Emir in Raqqa who had
been imprisoned by ISIS since September, 2013, along with
roughly 100 other prisoners.44
ISIS also retook towns outside of Raqqa city during this
period. After regaining control over Tal Abyad from Ahrar
al-Sham on January 13, ISIS reportedly executed the
remaining Ahrar al-Sham fighters and burned their homes.45
On January 14, ISIS reentered Taqba, just west of Raqqa city,
after Liwa al-Tawhid fighters agreed to cede the area.46
AlBab,
in northeastern Aleppo province on the road to the
Turkish border, fell also on January 14 to fighters under the
command of senior ISIS emir Abu Omar al-Shishani.47
It is
likely that some of the troop strength for the al-Bab assault
was drawn from ISIS fighters who had recently withdrawn
from Aleppo city.
Now with unparalleled control over Raqqa city, on January 21
ISIS issued its first round of religious decrees since retaking
the city. New regulations included bans on smoking and
dress requirements for women.48
Meanwhile, ISIS continued
pressuring the remaining opposition groups north of Raqqa
city, near the regime’s 17th Division, prompting first Ahrar
al-Sham and then local group Jabhat Thuwar Raqqa to
surrender their positions and retreat from the area.49
By January 23, Lebanese al-Akhbar reported basic services
had been restored to Raqqa and the city had resumed daily
business.50
The same day, ISIS forces led by Abu Omar alShishani
seized Manbij in northeastern Aleppo province,
after reportedly receiving reinforcements from Raqqa city.51
This indicates ISIS no longer felt threatened by other rebel
groups in Raqqa city and had additional manpower on hand
it could allocate to Manbij.
The Context of the Fall of Raqqa
The ISIS response to the rebel uprising was sophisticated,
well-executed, and conducted in parallel to a large ISIS
offensive operation in Fallujah, Iraq. The organization
managed, in many cases nearly bloodlessly, to withdraw forces
quickly from multiple fronts and array them defensively in
strategic locations. From these staging areas, ISIS undertook
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Middle East Security Report 22 | ISIS Governance in syria | Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds | july 2014
offensive operations to reassert itself in northern and eastern
Syria. If reports are true that ISIS sent reinforcements
from Raqqa city to Manbij on January 23, then it was able
to transition from defense to offense in fewer than 10 days,
a short operational pause. ISIS withdrawal from Idlib and
Latakia provinces, although it occurred later in March 2014,52
was also largely bloodless. This explanation, however, risks
giving too little weight to the extent of ISIS dominance in
Raqqa city before the rebel uprising in January 2014. When
ISIS finally established sole control of Raqqa city, it was not
merely the result of a single successful military campaign.
Rather, ISIS’s seizure was the culmination of a months-long
process of gradual intimidation and disenfranchisement of
rivals in Raqqa.
Since January, ISIS has continued to maintain relative
dominance over Raqqa city and other Syrian territories
behind ISIS front lines. In late June 2014, ISIS staged a large
military parade inside Raqqa to showcase its capabilities. Many
of the vehicles participating in the parade were tanks and U.S.
Humvees first seized in Iraqi territory.53
In addition, ISIS has
erected strict checkpoints around every entrance to Raqqa
city. ISIS members reportedly check every entering vehicle
to ensure compliance with ISIS shari‘a standards as well as
to ensure fighters from other factions are prohibited from
entering the city.54
Most importantly, however, ISIS has capitalized on its sole
dominance of Syrian towns by expanding its governance
operations. ISIS now maintains offices in its major towns
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Middle East Security Report 22 | ISIS Governance in syria | Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds | july 2014
that manage almost every aspect of administrative and
service-oriented operations, which the following section
will detail. Establishing governance structures is one of the
most important reasons ISIS attempts to take sole control
over towns in the furtherance of its vision for its Caliphate.
Clearly there are military benefits to this as well, such as
creating safe havens and secure staging grounds for future
attacks. For ISIS, however, political control is equally
important. Although JN has successfully cooperated with
other groups and organizations to implement governance,
the ISIS project is more ambitious and exclusionary. To
maximize the success of its initiatives, ISIS must establish
military dominance. Indeed, military conquest is one of the
key ways ISIS legitimizes itself. Once that is accomplished,
ISIS is able to implement its program, the best example of
which can be seen in Raqqa.
ISIS Governance Structure
In Raqqa and elsewhere, showcased through ISIS social
media, ISIS divides governance into two broad categories:
administration and Muslim services. Islamic outreach, Shari‘a
institutes, elementary education, law enforcement (both local
and religious), courts, recruitment, and tribal relations fall
under the administrative category. The provision of services,
including humanitarian aid, bakeries, water and electricity
falls under what ISIS calls the “Department of Muslim
Services.”55
The level of sophistication of the governance programs
that appear in a given area are determined most directly by
ISIS’s level of control over that area. Where ISIS maintains
greater dominance, it tends to deploy more sophisticated
governance, making a substantial investment in developing
lasting institutions. Raqqa city is an example of a town that
ISIS fully controls and in which it has demonstrated its most
fully-formed governance programs. Where ISIS has not yet
establishedfulldominance,ittendstodisplaylesssophisticated
governance. For example, ISIS currently pursues limited
governance in Deir ez-Zour56
province because it is engaged
in an active military campaign.57
This may change however, as
ISIS succeeds in eliminating competition in Deir ez-Zour city
and other towns in the province.58
Which types of governance programs appear in an area is
influenced most by the size and strategic location of the target
area. In rural areas and in areas not strategically vital for ISIS,
it tends to display more temporary and less resource-intensive
governance. For example, when ISIS was conducting outreach
in Latakia province during the fall of 2013, it demonstrated
a low-level governance capacity that was focused mostly on
one-time religious outreach programs59
and the provision of
humanitarian aid.60
Latakia was an important province for
ISIS, as it provided access to the Alawite homeland, but it was
not strategically vital to the ISIS military campaign in Syria
and it did not contain a large population. Therefore, despite
its relative freedom of movement in the northern reaches of
Latakia, ISIS governance was limited in Latakia.
In urban and centrally-located areas, on the other hand,
ISIS tends to develop more robust governance structures.
In Aleppo city in the fall of 2013, for example, ISIS created
a large organization to undertake major infrastructure
projects.61
Aleppo is Syria’s largest city and it is located in
northern Syria proximate to a number of border crossings.
Despite not exhibiting full control over the city, ISIS pursued
a number of programs in Aleppo such as an electricity office
and a traffic office.62
In order to administer the territory under its control, ISIS
has implemented a Wilayat system. The word wilaya(t) means
“state” or “mandate” in Arabic. ISIS uses a Wilayat system to
divide its territory in Syria and Iraq. In Aleppo and Raqqa,
Wilayat actually refers to bounded territory defended by ISIS,
but in other areas it can refer simply to terrain in which ISIS is
active. Within the Wilayat are Qata‘a(t), or sectors, which divide
territory even further. When ISIS refers to particular Wilayat,
such as Aleppo, it does not include all the territory within
Aleppo Province, only territory in which it claims to be active
or maintains control.63
For example, ISIS has created a Wilayat
Damascus despite only maintaining control over a small
pocket of rural territory.64
The Wilayat system has been referred
to by ISIS in social media posts and official statements since
mid-2013,65
but the structure has become more formalized
ISIS Provincial Governance in Syria as of July 2014.66
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in 2014 since ISIS has expanded its governance activities in
Syria in particular.
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS
Religious Outreach and Proselytization (Da‘wa)
ISIS conducts religious outreach as one of its first actions
upon entering territory. In many cases, this takes the form
of official Da‘wa events. In Arabic, al-Da‘wa literally means
“the call,” and involves formally calling others to Islam
(or in this case, to ISIS’s particular brand of Islam). The
Da‘wa events, complete with tents, Quranic recitations, and
religious sermons are designed to educate participants about
ISIS core beliefs. In other cases, outreach is more limited and
less visible; it may involve only disseminating pamphlets or
hosting small-group study sessions at local mosques. Da‘wa
events can be single sessions and require little investment
in resources, so it is a logical first choice for ISIS when it
seeks to establish a foothold in a particular area. In addition,
because the Da‘wa events are unthreatening and often involve
providing food and drink to the population, they are unlikely
to cause a popular backlash against ISIS.
In Aleppo, Da‘wa sessions were held as early as June 2013, in
al-Bab, Manbij, Darat Izza, and other areas, corresponding
multiple anti-ISIS demonstrations in the towns mentioned,71
so it is significant that ISIS chose to pursue religious outreach
first, over other governance-related alternatives. ISIS also
conducted religious outreach in Raqqa, hosting Quranic
memorization workshops in June, 2013.72
However, because
of the complexity of the relationship between ISIS and JN
during this period, it is difficult to determine the extent of
ISIS outreach activities in the early summer of 2013.
Since ISIS expanded its governance activities in January 2014,
it has held frequent Da‘wa sessions across Wilayat Aleppo73
and
Wilayat Raqqa,74
its two most important and well developed
territories. As previously mentioned, ISIS maintains a
Da‘wa headquarters building in Raqqa city in a confiscated
Armenian church. In Wilayat Aleppo, which contains more
towns and a greater population than Wilayat Raqqa, ISIS has
claimed to have 11 separate Da‘wa offices.75
Another important part of ISIS’s religious outreach program
is its management of Shari‘a institutes. According to ISIS
self-reporting, Shari‘a institutes are some of the most
common ISIS institutions within its territory. In June 2014,
ISIS claimed to have established 22 Shari‘a institutes in
Aleppo province alone.76
In practice, the institutes function
much like adult education centers, providing a space where
Muslims can learn about “matters of their religion.”77
ISIS has
also established specialized institutes for women only. One
institute for women in Manbij was decorated with flowers and
light colors, with the phrase “the Hijab is an obligation like
Prayer” written in bolded black lettering.78
Religious Police (al-Hisba)
The third element of ISIS’s shari’a administration program is
its religious police. Unlike local police forces, al-Hisba have a
mandate to “promote virtue and prevent vice to dry up sources
of evil, prevent the manifestation of disobedience, and urge
An ISIS member hands out religious pamphlets to children and residents
during a Da‘wa session in Aleppo province in the summer of 2013.67
Armenian Church converted into ISIS Da‘wa Headquarters in Raqqa city.79
with the start of Ramadan. 68
ISIS also held Quran recitation
competitions in Azaz, another northern Aleppo town, over
the same period.69
In early July 2013, al-Furqan, a top ISIS
media outlet, devoted two full length productions in its
“Messages from the Land of Epic Battles” series to Da‘wa
events in Aleppo province.70
ISIS was still a relatively weak
and unwelcome force in northern Syria, as evidenced by
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Muslims towards well-being.”80
A similar organization,
known as al-mutawa, currently exists in Saudi Arabia, and was
infamous for carrying clubs in order to beat shari‘a violators
until this practice was discontinued. Al-Furqan Foundation
outlined some of the main duties of al-Hisba in a May 28,
2014, video entitled “The Best Ummah.”81
Al-Hisba members
were filmed reminding Muslims to attend Friday prayers,
enforcing the prohibition on business transactions during
prayer time, and overseeing the demolition of “polytheistic
monuments” such as statues. The video also shows al-Hisba
members responding to a call they received about a stash of
illicit drugs hidden in a “den of corruption.”82
Al-Hisba members are also responsible for documenting
alleged violations of shari‘a in order to “rectify issues and
find suitable solutions.”83
At the religious police headquarters
building in Raqqa, an ISIS member claimed his office had
documented more than 470 violations in the first month of
operations.84
The violations were organized graphically, and
delineated by type of violation, indicates a detailed recordkeeping
system. Serious violations such as insulting God
(there were five reported) were all referred to an Islamic court
for adjudication. ISIS also recorded the number of al-Hisba
patrols on a daily basis. During the one-week period shown
on-screen, ISIS conducted 60 patrols, averaging between 9
and 10 per day.85
Al-Hisba patrol vehicles, which are painted
and branded with an ISIS logo, are also outfitted with
loudspeakers.86
Activists in Raqqa report that al-Hisba patrols
often broadcast religious guidance over the loudspeakers
during patrols.87
Once a violations report has been compiled,
it is then sent to the Wilayat leadership on a weekly basis.88
According to ISIS, there are currently 10 al-Hisba headquarters
buildings in Aleppo province alone,89
and likely additional
headquarters in Raqqa province as well.90
Judging by the
meticulous nature of ISIS reporting on al-Hisba activities and
the volume of patrols it is able to send out, ISIS has made a
substantial investment in the al-Hisba infrastructure both in
Aleppo and Raqqa provinces. The program, more than nearly
any of ISIS’s other governance programs, directly infringes
on the lives of civilians and violently punishes them if they
fail to conform. In that sense, al-Hisba is one of ISIS’s most
ambitious methods of governance because it risks alienating
entire civilian populations. This explains why a widespread
al-Hisba presence was not established in both Aleppo and
Raqqa until the spring of 2014. ISIS would have wanted to
establish firm territorial control and boost popular support
for itself with other governance activities before instituting a
robust al-Hisba program.
More than anything, the widespread presence of al-Hisba
shows how deeply ISIS is concerned about establishing and
maintaining religious legitimacy. It would have been much
less resource intensive for ISIS to create only one police force
inside Syria, or even to create two police forces occupying the
same building. Instead, ISIS devoted resources towards the
development of a specialized force just to uphold shari‘a. The
two forces, al-Hisba and the local police, fall under completely
separate jurisdictions, and there are no indications that they
have an overlap in personnel.91
A religious patrol enters a Syrian market to ensure compliance with ISIS
religious standards.
Related to the religious police and enforcement of Shari‘a is
the issue of the treatment of minorities, specifically Christians
who live under ISIS’s rule. Although the vast majority of nonMuslims
have already fled ISIS-controlled areas, the small
number of religious minorities remaining are subject to an
Islamic dhimmi pact. Although historically the dhimmi status
was used as a protection for religious minorities, in the case
of Raqqa city it has been used to disenfranchise minorities.
Instituted February 26, 2014, at the express command of
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the dhimmi pact places a number of
restrictions on Christians.92
In addition to being prohibited
from repairing or building new houses of worship, Christians
in Raqqa cannot display any aspect of their religion outside
churches, they cannot disparage Islam in any way, and they
cannot display any religious symbols in public places. Most
importantly, Christians must pay jizya, a form of taxation on
non-Muslims, twice per year, in order to be permitted to
live in Raqqa city. Like al-Hisba, instituting a dhimmi pact is an
ambitious undertaking which required uncontested control
of Raqqa city. The pact also risks drawing the attention of
the larger Christian community as well as the international
community.
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Taken together, ISIS’s Da‘wa offices, Shari‘a institutes, and alHisba
stations constitute what ISIS calls its shari‘a Department.
If its self-reporting is accurate, the shari‘a Department
currently maintains 43 separate offices in Aleppo province
alone, and likely a lower number in Raqqa province (due to
population). This is a tremendous demonstration of ISIS
capacity and points to the central role that shari‘a plays in
ISIS’s long term Caliphate vision. Currently, there is not a
single other governance area which manages as many offices
as the shari‘a Department, or even comes close.
Education (al-Ta‘lim)
Education outreach is another cornerstone of ISIS’s
governance campaign, and is the most effective method
for influencing children. ISIS educational curriculum is
focused on the Islamic sciences, such as study of the Quran,
rather than physics or mathematics.93
There is no evidence
of instruction in secular subjects or in any technical skills,
nor is there any indication of ISIS formal schooling beyond
the elementary level as of July 2014. A program of study at a
mosque in Jarablus, northeastern Aleppo, posted online on
March 10, 2014 indicates a specific focus on aqida (creed), fiqh
(jurisprudence), and sira (life of the Prophet).94
Unlike Da‘wa events, which ISIS conducts soon after
announcing its presence in a town, a concerted education
program requires access to consistent human and material
resources. ISIS only reopens classrooms and organizes lesson
plans if it is making a substantial investment in governing that
space. In areas where ISIS chooses not to pursue a long-term
educational plan, it connects with children through one-off
Da‘wa events, which are significantly less resource intensive.
For example, in late 2013, ISIS delivered targeted religious
lessons to groups of fifteen to thirty boys at events where food
aid was also distributed in Latakia.95
These one-time outdoor
events in Latakia are representative of ISIS’s relatively
restrained governance strategies in those provinces in contrast
to Raqqa and Aleppo provinces, where ISIS manages a much
larger population of students in multiple cities.
Some of the first evidence of the scale of ISIS educational
programming comes from a video released by al-Furqan on
September 6, 2013, depicting an entire lesson on the Quran
taught by a sheikh in Raqqah city identified as Abu Omar “the
Syrian.” Participating in the lesson were nearly 50 children,
all identified by a black ISIS headband and all clutching a
personal Quran.96
Written on a nearby dry-erase board were
priorities for the lesson, which included the reasons for
praying, how to pray, and the importance of expressiveness in
prayer. ISIS also developed the capacity to administer schools
in Aleppo province during the fall of 2013. Photos spread
by activists in the province in September show a schoolhouse
purportedly managed by ISIS, including backpacks for
Children attend a Quran lesson in Aleppo.103
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students branded with the ISIS logo.97
In December 2013,
ISIS in Raqqa confirmed it had established at least one
dedicated educational facility when it posted a picture of the
facility to Twitter.98
Since January 2014, ISIS has expanded the reach of its
educational programs even more. In April, its Raqqa branch
provided picture evidence of a new school it had founded in
Raqqa city.99
The school was advertised as a school for “high
achievers,” indicating it is highly specialized. If ISIS has
the capacity to re-open specialized schools, it likely already
manages a core number of traditional schools as well. In
March 2014, a well-known unofficial ISIS account in Raqqa
even solicited resumes from prospective teachers in “various
fields and disciplines” to fill teaching vacancies in the city.
These projects are resource intensive, requiring dedicated
school buildings, school supplies, and multiple teachers.
Many ISIS schools have been adapted from existing Syrian
schools, as evidenced by the uniform appearance of desks,
wall-mounted chalk boards, and the physical layout of the
buildings.100
ISIS also provides short textbooks to enrolled
students.101
Dedicated schools support larger class sizes, in
some instances approximately sixty students being taught by
a single teacher.102
The ISIS educational program in Syria reaffirms the
organization’s long term strategy to govern Syrian territory.
ISIS does has other motivations for claiming to operate
schools in Syria, such as winning local support and attracting
followers. However, both ISIS rhetoric and the resources
it has devoted to educational programming suggest its core
motivation is to train the next generation of ISIS members,
the actual citizenry of the Caliphate. ISIS sees itself not as
a terrorist organization indoctrinating children, but as a
sovereign state educating its citizens. With that said, the
apparent lack of technical training or other professional
training programs may be a weakness in ISIS long-term
education strategy. In the short and medium term, ISIS may
be able to meet its substantial technical requirements with
local recruits (either voluntarily or under duress) and foreign
emigrants who settle in Syria. However, in order to effectively
govern Syrian territory over the long term, ISIS must provide
education in areas outside the Islamic sciences.
Courts
The establishment of Islamic courts is another first priority
for ISIS as it seeks to govern a space. Instituting Islamic
law as the sole source of authority is a major component of
ISIS’s Caliphate vision. Although ISIS legal rulings, which
are based on the most uncompromising form of shari‘a, are
likely to engender negative sentiments within the population
in the long term, in the short and medium term they may be
relatively popular. Idlib civilians interviewed about the court
system spoke highly of its rulings in an ISIS video posted
in November 2013.104
Although many among the Syrian
population do not share ISIS’s beliefs, ISIS courts are often
less subject to corruption than more secular courts. Court
systems established by other rebel groups are more likely to be
temporary, ad hoc, and subject to competing interpretations
of Islamic law. For this reason, ISIS sees establishing Islamic
courts as a relatively innocuous act, and will pursue them even
in areas it does not fully control.
As ISIS extended its influence in northern Syria over the
summer of 2013, it established Islamic courts in a number
of towns. One of the first documented ISIS Islamic courts
appeared in Jarablus, northern Aleppo province, in early July
2013.105
By November, the court system had expanded into
Idlib province. During a November 2013, al-Furqan interview
with an ISIS judge in al-Dana, Idlib, the judge discusses
how ISIS was able to fill a major vacuum in the area after
establishing a court system.106
He implies that when ISIS
entered the area of al-Dana, crime and looting were a major
problem, but after rulings from the court the area saw a major
drop in crime. In a later interview with a civilian outside the
courthouse, the man claimed he had traveled from nearby
Darat Izza in Aleppo province to ask for a ruling.107
Although
it is important to consider these types of reports within the
context of ISIS propaganda and messaging, the narrative
presented by ISIS is not altogether false. It is important not
to underestimate the extent to which residents of war torn
areas may see the imposition of any law and order, even
ISIS’s particularly strict brand of shari‘a, as an improvement
from a lawless, chaotic state. ISIS has allocated tremendous
resources and personnel to imposing its state vision.
By the spring of 2014, ISIS had expanded the scope of its court
system. Although it had been evicted from much of Latakia,
Idlib, and Aleppo city, ISIS strengthened its courts in other
areas such as Aleppo province and Raqqa city. In Aleppo,
ISIS claims to have established five separate courthouses (one
head courthouse and the rest sub-courthouses) across the
province.108
ISIS has also estabilished specialized courthouse
offices with dedicated employees. For example, in an April
6, 2014 video release by al-Furqan, one judge is identified as
an employee of the office of personal dispute resolution.”109
In a follow up interview with one of the beneficiaries of the
office, the man claims ISIS judges had ruled in his favor in a
personal dispute in which he had been assaulted by another
man. Later in the video release, al-Furqan also conducts an
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interview with a judge identified as an employee of the office
of “personal cases.” According to the judge, he rules on cases
dealing with divorce and inheritance issues.110
With ISIS’s strengthened judicial system also came an increase
in more serious forms of punishment, known as hudud, which
are reserved for the most egregious offenses under Islamic
law. In Raqqa especially, hudud are carried out on a weekly
basis, sometimes in the form of public executions in Raqqa’s
main square.111
In February, 2014, a well-known ISIS account
was deactivated for live-tweeting a hudud punishment in Raqqa
city in the form of the amputation of a thief’s hand.112
Hudud
punishments have also been documented in Aleppo province,
in al-Bab,113
Manbij,114
Maskana,115
and Deir Hafer.116
the large number of hudud punishments recorded since early
2014. The punishments, even if carried out against a known
criminal, are likely to produce a backlash both from local
Syrians and from the international community.
Local Police
In order to carry out its legal rulings, ISIS maintains a local
police force in Aleppo and Raqqa provinces. According to a
provincial report for Aleppo released in June, 2014, the main
function of the police forces is to serve as the “executive body
for the court.”121
Additionally, the police forces are tasked
with maintaining internal security through the deployment
of regular patrols inside towns. According to a well-known
unofficial ISIS account, ISIS provides local police patrols
with dedicated vehicles as well as branded uniforms.122
The
local police, as previously mentioned, fall under a completely
different jurisdiction than ISIS religious police. ISIS
currently claims to maintain 10 police stations in Aleppo
province,123
with additional offices in Raqqa province.
Despite ISIS claims that its officers “do not rule on any
case, but rather transfer cases to the court,” the reality is
that extrajudicial detainment and torture are commonplace
in ISIS-held territory. According to a report released by
Amnesty International in December 2013, ISIS maintains
at least seven large detention facilities throughout Raqqa and
Aleppo provinces.124
Although ISIS prisons in Aleppo city
were surrendered to other rebel forces in January 2014, ISIS
has likely established new facilities in the meantime. Inside
its detention centers ISIS holds common criminals who have
been sentenced by its judicial branch, but it also detains
political opponents, activists, and even children as young as
eight years old.125
On April 28, 2014, an activist movement in
Raqqa city publicized a protest by women demanding to know
the fate of their male family members, who had been detained
by ISIS for some time.126
The continued presence of large-scale ISIS detention
facilities throughout its territory underscores the grim reality
of the organization; one that ISIS attempts to conceal in its
official publications. Behind ISIS messaging about its just
court system and impartial officers of the law lies a brutal
organization that can leave no room for political, religious,
or civil dissent. ISIS may claim that its police officers do not
arbitrarily detain civilians, but local activists and international
organizations such as Amnesty International continue to
report human rights violations. After being the target of a
rebel uprising against it in January 2014, ISIS cannot afford
to allow serious dissent among the population.
ISIS carries out hudud punishments in the town square in Manbij, Aleppo
province.
Another facet of the ISIS court system is known as the “Court
of Grievances” and functions similar to a complaints office.
These courts have been documented in some form in both
Raqqa and Aleppo provinces during the spring of 2014.118
Members of the population who have grievances against
either ISIS fighters or local emirs may present a claim at the
office. The ISIS court in Tal Abyad, in northern Raqqa, even
invited members of the community to come forward with
complaints at a designated time each week.119
Both the expanding number of issues ISIS courts have claimed
to adjudicate and the increasing severity of punishments
handed down indicate that ISIS is becoming secure in its
position vis-à-vis the population. By setting up multiple
specialized offices tailored to specific issues such as divorce or
complaints against fighters, ISIS is making a large resource
investment in the judiciary branch. In contrast to temporary
court systems backed by Syrian rebel groups,120
ISIS actually
believes its legal rulings can form lasting judicial institutions
in Syria. Another indicator that ISIS feels more secure is
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Office of Recruitment
ISIS maintains multiple offices of recruitment for military
service in Aleppo province and likely other areas as well.127
The office of recruitment “welcomes any Muslim that
wants to enter the fighting corps of the army of the Islamic
State.” One office is located in al-Bab, northern Aleppo,
conveniently close to the Turkish border as well as to the front
lines of fighting with the regime and other rebel groups.128
The recruitment offices handle registration of potential
candidates, who are then put through the phases of “shari‘a
and military preparation” before being sent to the battlefront.
It is likely that some candidates are sent to ISIS training
camps spread throughout Syria, to undergo more intensive
training. ISIS also maintains dedicated training camps for
kids, including one named “Cubs of Zarqawi” in the Eastern
Ghouta region of Damascus.129
Unlike a typical jihadist group, ISIS is openly broadcasting the
locations of its recruitment centers in Syria. This is because
ISIS sees itself not as a terrorist organization, but as an actual
state attempting to recruit citizens into its standing army.
Although ISIS likely recruits some of its members in secret
to protect sensitive information, a portion of its recruitment
drive in Syria is being conducted completely in the open. One
reason ISIS has chosen to publicize its recruiting offices is
that it aims to normalize its “fighting corps” among civilians.
Military service members are often held in high regard in
traditional states, and ISIS would like to create a similar
relationship between its civilian population and its army.
It is also important to consider the possibility that ISIS is
using forced conscription to recruit military-age males.
ISIS is known to use intimidation tactics among the civilian
population, and residents may be fearful of the consequences
of not enlisting at the recruitment centers.
Public Relations / Tribal Affairs
In Aleppo province, ISIS claims to operate a bureau of
public relations and tribal affairs.131
The office “responds to
the demands of the citizenry, liaises with community elders,
and conducts tribal outreach.” Tribal relations have been
particularly important for ISIS recently, and the group’s most
recent English-language periodical entitled Dabiq discusses
Aleppo tribal outreach extensively. By establishing and
officially naming a Public Relations / Tribal Affairs office,
ISIS has again indicated its intent to create lasting institutions
in Syria. Whereas other armed groups no doubt conduct
significant outreach to tribal confederations and other key
stakeholders, they do not consider this part of a specific
“department.” ISIS, on the other hand, wants to portray itself
as a fully formed polity with administrative offices.
ISLAMIC SERVICES
Providing for the Muslim community of the Caliphate is an
integral part of the long-term strategy. Towards that end, ISIS
has pursued a broad range of aid and infrastructure projects
in almost every city it has entered. Aid projects especially are
unlikely to be met with resistance from the local population,
particularly if that population cannot meet its basic needs
independently. ISIS was able to provide aid across Syria
during the latter half of 2013, in Latakia,132
Damascus,133
Deir
ez-Zour,134
and Idlib,135
in addition to core provinces Aleppo
and Raqqa.
These projects began to emerge on a small scale over the
summer of 2013 as ISIS moved into new terrain, and on a
largerscaleinAleppocity,withtheestablishmentoftheIslamic
Administration of Public Service (IAPS) in the late spring.136
IAPS, along with its later iterations in Aleppo province and
Raqqa city, have an expansive mandate covering dozens of
different services provided to the Muslim community. AlFurqan
provided an in-depth look at IAPS in a December
12, 2013, release. The production, entitled “Services alDawla
Provides,” includes interviews with the heads of some
of IAPS’s main offices: bakeries, cleanliness and sanitation,
electricity, and transportation. Additionally, videos published
by IAPS itself demonstrate the large scale of its operations in
Aleppo city, where it was engaged in repairing water mains,137
fixing power lines,138
operating bread factories,139
manning
hospitals,140
conducting traffic,141
and clearing debris from
roads,142
among other undertakings.
Although IAPS was shut down in January 2014 as ISIS
surrendered its bases inside Aleppo city, ISIS has since
Middle East Security Report 22 | ISIS Governance in syria | Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds | july 2014
Baqia Foundation films recruits at the Zarqawi Cubs Training Camp in the
Eastern Ghouta region of Damascus.130
21www.Understandingwar.org
regeneratedandimproveditscapacitytopursueinfrastructure
and aid projects in the province. According to a June 2014,
ISIS report on its operations in Aleppo, the organization
currently maintains seven different service branches in the
province, including a labor and employment office.143
In
Raqqa, ISIS’s largest single governance undertaking, it has
maintained a similar structure since at least March, 2014.144
The more complex infrastructure projects demand significant
resources from ISIS, particularly skilled personnel and heavy
machinery. These projects often require technical expertise
needed to manipulate existing electrical infrastructure,145
locate major water lines, 146
or operate heavy machinery.147
The use of heavy machinery, including cherry pickers,148
bulldozers,149
cranes,150
backhoes,151
and water trucks,152
requires a major investment to transport and maintain. In
terms of personnel requirements, this indicates ISIS is either
recruiting skilled workers internationally or using local
laborers with existing skills. Again, these may be local laborers
who volunteered or were forced into service. According to
employees in Raqqa interviewed by the New York Times, ISIS
frequently replaces local management with ISIS personnel in
order to ensure compliance.153
The ISIS managers, who are
often non-Syrians, threaten the skilled workforce to prevent
them from leaving their jobs. This mechanism allows ISIS
to undertake technically demanding infrastructure-related
projects without having to devote much of its own manpower
resources.
Like its administrative functions, ISIS prioritizes the
provision of certain services over others for a variety of
Middle East Security Report 22 | ISIS Governance in syria | Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds | july 2014
The official logo of the now-defunct Islamic
Administration of Public Services (IAPS).
A local worker repairing a sewer line wears a uniform provided by IAPS.
ISIS repairs the electricity lines in al-Bab sector of Wilayat Aleppo.154
reasons. In areas where it is militarily dominant, ISIS is more
likely to open permanent Muslim services offices. In Raqqa
city, for example, ISIS has a large services headquarters
building in the center of town. ISIS also tends to pursue
more ambitious and resource intensive service projects in
areas with larger populations. For example, even though
ISIS controls an expanding swath of territory in the Deir ezZour
countryside, this area does not have enough residents to
justify a large investment in infrastructure. For this reason,
in rural areas of Syria ISIS is more likely to provide food and
gasoline rather than infrastructure repair.
Humanitarian Aid
Humanitarian assistance is normally the first exposure a local
population has to ISIS’s Muslim Services division. Many
times this aid, in the form of food, clothing, gasoline, or
medical services, is pursued in concert with early forms of
administrative governance such as Da‘wa meetings. Another
reason ISIS provides humanitarian aid early on is that it is an
easy way to facilitate a relationship of dependency on ISIS. If
ISIS is able to provide assistance to those who would not get
assistance otherwise, or even if it is able to provide belowmarket
rates to civilians who are suffering financially, ISIS
can gradually establish a monopoly over critical services. In
22 www.Understandingwar.org
Raqqa, this has largely been the case since January 2014, with
ISIS controlling bread factories and other critical services.
In areas with an established and enduring ISIS presence,
ISIS focuses on lowering costs over direct charity. In Aleppo,
before its withdrawal in January 2014, ISIS claimed to provide
lower food prices for families shopping in certain stores155
and
opened at least one convenience store through the IAPS.156
On March 24, 2014, ISIS advertised reduced-price of beef
for the “poor and needy” in Maskana, in southern Aleppo
province.157
Civilians report ISIS has made bread cheaper and
more readily available in Raqqa city as well.158
These reduced
prices may reflect ISIS’s control over means of production,
threats towards business owners, or direct subsidy, though a
combination of all three is the most likely.
ISIS structures many of these programs as means of ensuring
longevity as well, by creating a dependence on ISIS for
necessities. In Raqqa, ISIS has already established itself
as the primary source of wheat, oil, and foreign currency
by controlling the flow of goods through the city159
and
producing fuel and bread on its own. ISIS has also signaled
an interest in controlling medical services by briefly running
a public hospital in Idlib160
and providing free medical care
in Jarablus.161
Bakeries
Industrial bread factories are critical supply elements of
ISIS’s aid campaigns because they are the cheapest and most
efficient way of feeding large urban populations. ISIS at
one point controlled at least three industrial bakeries, with
at least one in Aleppo162
and another in Raqqa.163
IAPS in
Aleppo alleged its bakery was capable of producing upwards
of 10,000 flatbreads an hour.164
The bakeries require a
significant personnel investment from ISIS; approximately
sixteen people can be seen working in the bakery and the high
output likely requires a number of maintenance and logistics
personnel.165
Staff is a mix of local Syrians166
with supervision
from ISIS personnel.167
Most of the bread is directed towards ISIS-subsidized markets
in Raqqa,168
though it has been distributed for free in Aleppo
province.169
It is logical to assume ISIS also uses the bakeries
to feed its fighters on the front lines. However, based on the
distance between ISIS bakeries and distribution centers, this
is probably not the case. ISIS tends to distribute bread quite
close to where it operates bakeries, indicating that the bread
it produces likely has a short shelf-life. For that reason it is
likely to be an ineffective means of supplying ISIS personnel
Middle East Security Report 22 | ISIS Governance in syria | Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds | july 2014
IAPS workers man an ISIS-administered bakery in Aleppo.170
located outside the immediate vicinity. The bakeries’ main
purpose is providing a common staple food to the nearby
population.
Water and Electricity
Some of ISIS’s most ambitious service-oriented projects have
focused around water and electricity. In addition to repairing
sewage lines, power lines, and electrical power stations in
Aleppo and Raqqa provinces, ISIS also manages three dams
and two power plants.171
ISIS placed these facilities on a list of
“vitally important locations” in a recently released report on
Aleppo province.172
Tabqa Dam in Raqqa province has housed
one of ISIS’s largest detention facilities since 2013, and may
serve as a military headquarters location as well. In addition
to the military value in a fortified position such as a dam, the
facilities also allow ISIS to provide water and electricity on an
industrial scale. This further enforces the ISIS narrative that
it is a Caliphate rather than a rebel group, and that it intends
to govern Syrian territory over the long term. However, there
are indications that lack of technical capability may be creating
damaging and unanticipated consequences. ISIS’s use of the
dam to ensure electricity in its areas of control has caused
water levels in the adjacent Lake Assad to drop precipitously,
threatening drinking water supplies for areas of Aleppo and
Raqqa provinces.173
In Aleppo province, just west of Kuweiris Airbase, ISIS
has managed an entire thermal power plant complex since
November 2013.174
Footage released by IAPS shows the facility
to be apparently clean, orderly, and fully operational, and
from the outside the building housing the thermal power
plant is enormous, containing five smokestacks.175
This
is likely one of ISIS’s largest governance undertakings, as
operating the plant requires dozens of dedicated employees
23www.Understandingwar.org
and a high level of technical expertise. ISIS would have no
reason to undertake such a large project if it did not expect to
remain in the area for an extended period of time.
Future Areas of Expansion for ISIS Governance
In parts of Syria, ISIS has achieved a relatively sophisticated
level of governance, especially in Wilayat Raqqa and Aleppo,
whereitmaintainsawidevarietyofadministrativeandservicerelated
offices. These range from religious enforcement
to adjudication of disputes to infrastructure repair to
humanitarian aid. In other cities in Syria which are either
in rural areas or not fully controlled by ISIS, ISIS does not
develop the full spectrum of its governance activities. Instead,
it focuses on less intrusive and more innocuous forms of
governance both in the administrative and service-oriented
categories. In Homs, Damascus, Deir ez-Zour, and Hasaka,
ISIS governance activities include Da‘wa events, humanitarian
aid, and limited infrastructure repair.
As ISIS continues to expand in Syria – in Deir ez-Zour,
western Aleppo Province, and other areas – it will seek to
expand its governance activities as well. There are already
early indications of this expansion, as evidenced by large
humanitarian aid projects coinciding with Ramadan in
Aleppo, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zour. As ISIS consolidates
control over Deir ez-Zour in particular, it is likely to establish
more permanent offices such as courts or religious police
stations.
Another area where ISIS will expand its governance is Iraq.
In addition to large Ramadan events in Anbar and Ninewa
provinces, ISIS has also begun operating a local police
department in Mosul city. As ISIS begins to eliminate rivals
in these areas, it will attempt to establish more sophisticated
forms of governance. The blueprint for this process is Raqqa,
and ISIS is likely to pursue a similar strategy in Iraq if it is
able to set the necessary conditions.
ISIS Relations With the Syrian Population
Opposition groups and JN mobilized against ISIS in northern
Syria in January 2014 because of the group’s assassination
of rebel leaders, seizure of key terrain, and unwillingness
to work with other rebel groups. Although ISIS continues
to maintain a firm hold on Raqqa, its brutal treatment
of political activists and civilians has spawned an online
campaign known as “Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently.”176
There is little indication the protest group has a large physical
presence on the ground in Raqqa, but it has succeeded in
gaining international attention and was featured in a story on
CNN in May 2014.177
Based on its founding document, released April 17, 2014, the
movement aims, among other things, to shed light on “the
marginalized province of Raqqa” and “exposed the violations
and crimes against the people of Raqqa” committed by ISIS.178
On April 25, 2014, Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently
organized a day of protest against ISIS rule.179
The main driver
of protest against ISIS is its detainment practices; activists
assert that ISIS held more than 1,000 Syrian prisoners in
Raqqa province as of April 28, 2014. 180
ISIS has responded
harshly to the Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently campaign
as well as other opposition movements and media activists.
On April 17, 2014, ISIS reportedly placed a large bounty
of 20 million Syrian pounds on the head of one prominent
journalist who had revealed the names of ISIS’s top religious
and military leaders in the city.181
Foreign Fighters in ISIS Governance
Positions
Unlike JN, which has shown a willingness to coopt the local
population and other rebel groups in providing governance,
ISIS often places foreign members in important governance
roles within its organization. A general hierarchy has emerged
in Raqqa city, according to a report from Agence FrancePresse,
with Iraqi, Saudi, and Tunisian military and religious
figures occupying the top posts. Egyptian, European,
Chechen, and Syrian fighters are typically assigned to posts
of secondary importance.182
This hierarchy was confirmed
by a New York Times writer who visited Raqqa in July 2014.
According to interviews with Raqqa citizens who work in the
ISIS governance office, ISIS’s head of the Electricity Office
in Raqqa is Sudanese and one hospital is administered by a
JordanianwhoreportsuptoanEgyptianmanager.Additionally,
ISIS regularly staffs its various checkpoints around the city
with foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, and
Libya.183
There are exceptions to this structure, however, as the
Middle East Security Report 22 | ISIS Governance in syria | Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds | july 2014
ISIStoursacapturedthermalpowerplanteastofAleppocityinthefallof2013.
24 www.Understandingwar.org
provincial emir for Raqqa province as well as his top religious
official are reported to be of Syrian descent.184
Chechen foreign fighters are especially prevalent in Raqqa
city, and are more likely to bring their families with them than
other groups. Local activists claim Chechen fighters and their
families frequent markets in the city. They allegedly buy the
most expensive goods and carry the latest in mobile phone
and computer technology.185
Pictures posted by one Chechen
jihadist group even shows them opening up a Russian grocery
store and a Russian elementary school with courses in Russian
language.186
This indicates that the Chechen contingent in
Raqqa city intends to settle in Raqqa city long term and does
not feel that it faces external threats in the city.
Many other nationalities have begun to arrive in Raqqa as
well. The foreign contingent now occupies almost every
hotel in the city as well as an upscale neighborhood named
al-Thukna. According to one resident cited by the Wall Street
Journal, ISIS fighters have begun requesting that those who
own extra houses make room for arriving foreigners.187
Until now, reports indicate most foreigners, especially those
accompanied by their families, have been largely segregated
from the rest of the Syrian population. A video released by alFurqan
showed dozens of Kazakh emigrants living together in
a large walled compound in an unidentified town in Syria.188
Foreign fighters also fill administrative governance positions
outside of Raqqa city. Since December 2013, social media
reportinginnorthernSyriaalsosuggestedthatforeignfighters
had been present in the ISIS governance staff in Aleppo, with
multiple Egyptians leading classes in Jarablus,189
an ad-Dana
judge identified as a foreign militant,190
and Moroccan and
Chechen interrogators in an Aleppo prison.191
One reason why foreign fighters have been segregated from
local populations is the tremendous backlash against them
from Syrians. Many major fighting groups to include even the
hardlinesalafiAhraral-Shamhavereleasedstatementsdecrying
the presence of foreign fighters inside Syria.192
However, as
foreign fighter families become more normalized in Raqqa
and other cities, they will likely become more integrated with
the local population. This fits well into ISIS’s global Caliphate
vision, which intends to break down pre-existing cultural and
ethnic boundaries.
While foreign fighters appear to hold more administrative
leadership positions than their Syrian counterparts in ISIS,
in Muslim services positions the ratios appear to be more
even. This may be because infrastructure projects require a
technical aptitude that ISIS must necessarily draw from the
local community (for the time being). In addition, local
Syrians are likely easier to co-opt into service-oriented
projects, which are more innocuous and less ideological.
As the ISIS Caliphate vision matures, however, ISIS may not
need to continue drawing so heavily from the local Syrian
population to pursue service-related and infrastructure
projects. The June 5, 2014 issue of Dabiq, ISIS’s Englishlanguage
periodical, featured calls for skilled professionals to
immigrate to Syria in addition to fighters.193
This sentiment
was echoed by a July 11, 2014 al-Hayat Media release featuring
an English-speaking Canadian.194
The man, identified as
Abu Muslim, said “So this is more than just fighting, this
means more than just fighting. We need the engineers, we
need doctors, we need professionals, we need volunteers,
we need fundraising. We need everything. There is a role for
everybody … Your families will live here in safety, just like
how it is back home. We have wide expanses of territory here
in Syria, and we can easily find accommodation for you and
your families.”195
These statements underscore the fact that
in one sense ISIS has already adopted a post-war mentality.
ISIS has already developed the military capacity to defend the
borders of its territory such that it can now focus on actually
populating its Caliphate with like-minded Muslims.
Conclusion
ISIS has functionally erased the border between Syria and
Iraq and installed in its place a caliphate that extends over
300 miles from east to west. Absent a substantial campaign
to defeat ISIS, the Islamic State is poised to become an
enduring presence in Syria and Iraq. ISIS is continues to
wage concurrent military offensives in both Syria and Iraq as
of July 2014. Military conquest is a key part in ISIS’s longterm
strategy, and it derives core legitimacy from seizing hard
power assets. Thus far, it has demonstrated its capacity to
capture areas from the Syrian regime, the Iraqi government,
and other competing rebel groups, whether by negotiations
or by force. It has certainly proved itself to be a formidable
military adversary.
As the Syrian city of Raqqa shows, however, gaining military
superiority is only one phase of the ISIS program. As part of
its imamah concept, by which ISIS aims to oversee the religious
and political lives of the Muslims inside its Caliphate, ISIS
established robust governance structures in Raqqa and the
Aleppo countryside and is working to expand that governance
through other areas it controls, such as Mosul. Programs such
as the Shari‘a institutes and al-Hisba religious police have been
set up to enforce ISIS religious norms, while courthouses,
local police, and infrastructure repair offices have been set
Middle East Security Report 22 | ISIS Governance in syria | Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds | july 2014
25www.Understandingwar.org
up to establish the governance required for the day-to-day
functioning of the state.
As ISIS deepens its control in parts of Deir ez-Zour, alHasaka,
and western Aleppo provinces, it is pursuing similar
methodologies. For example, while engaged in a major
offensive to seize Deir ez-Zour city which began in March
2014,196
ISIS strengthened governance programs in its key
staging grounds in al-Hasaka province such as Markada.197
After its military offensive culminated and it established
sole control over rebel-held parts of Deir ez-Zour city,
ISIS immediately initiated governance programs in the
city.198
If ISIS successfully seizes the remaining regime-held
neighborhoods as well as the military airport in Deir ez-Zour
city, it is likely to expand its governance activities even further.
Comparable to its strategy in Raqqa city, ISIS establishes
relatively simple governance structures while it works to
eliminate rivals and consolidate control over territory. After it
has full control, ISIS deploys more substantial and resourceintensive
programs.
The strategic expansion of ISIS governance, however, is into
Iraq.199
As of July 2014 there were strong indications ISIS was
pursuing similar governance structures specifically in Ninewa
and Anbar provinces. In addition to offering humanitarian
aid during Ramadan, which ISIS did across all its territories,
ISIS has established two courthouses200
and a local police
force201
in Mosul city. ISIS has also attempted to repair and
maintain water lines in Mosul,202
although the attempt has
been met with government airstrikes.203
As it works to further
its governance, ISIS is simultaneously working to establish
the vision of the state it desires, expelling Christians and
other religious minorities and confiscating their property
for its use.204
Given what ISIS has accomplished in Syria,
it is important not to underestimate the social control that
ISIS will be able to instill in Iraq if their program is not
interrupted.
Until now, ISIS’s programs have not engendered enough
publicresentmenttopresentasignificantchallenge.However,
as ISIS expands into other areas in Syria and especially Iraq, its
strict and brutal administration of territory may become a key
vulnerability.205
ISIS has succeeded in Syria, but this is partly
due to the absence of other capable actors. In Iraq, which
maintains a functional central government – however weak
– ISIS governance will likely be more susceptible to popular
discontent. On the other hand, until now the majority of
opposition groups in Iraq have fought alongside ISIS rather
than against it. Another challenge for ISIS governance in the
future will be manpower and technical expertise. On July 24,
2014, the New York Times reported that, despite its attempts, in
Raqqa city ISIS is only able to keep electricity running for
an average of four hours per day and has also struggled to
provide clean drinking water to the population.206
These
shortcomings have been repeated in Mosul, where ISIS
struggles to keep electricity running.207
These difficulties will
only become more pronounced as ISIS attempts larger and
more technically demanding projects.
This difficulty in successfully implementing infrastructure
requirementsisindicativeofafundamentalchallengetoISIS’s
larger governance project. In order to run a functioning
state, more than courts, police, and schools are required.
ISIS has thus far pursued short-term, populist gains at the
expense of long-term sustainability. In Syria, this is evident
in its approach to a variety of governance requirements. For
example, ISIS’s management of the previously mentioned
Tabqa Dam relies on shortcuts to provide immediately desired
electricity and has undone the long-term planning intended
to supply drinking water to the area. As ISIS dismantles much
of the essential structures of the Syrian and Iraqi states, it is
not replacing them with a comprehensive structure of its own.
Rather, piecemeal undertakings provide propaganda victories
but fail to create enduring and sustainable institutions and
processes.
For this reason, ISIS’s ambitious governance program is both
a demonstration of ISIS’s greatest strength and potentially its
greatest weakness. The transition from war-making, at which
ISIS has already proved adept, to state-making, at which it
has had only limited experience, will be the most significant
hurdle to the success of the ISIS Caliphate in the long term.
It may also constitute the greatest threat to Iraq and Syria
that ISIS can inflict, if ISIS mismanages essential urban and
economic infrastructure.
Middle East Security Report 22 | ISIS Governance in syria | Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds | july 2014
26 www.Understandingwar.org
Appendix: ISIS Report on Aleppo Province
The below text and images are taken from a report released on June 25, 2014 through the Islamic State’s “Wilayat Aleppo” Twitter account. The
report is over 20 pages long, and contains a broad-ranging description of the province as ISIS wishes to portray it. It includes images describing
pastoral scenes of nature, as well as information describing the land, people, areas, and industry of the province. The full report is an excellent
example of the strategic messaging campaign conducted by the Islamic State to encourage immigration and promote an image of normalcy. Below are
selected portions of the report, translated by the author.
Wilayat Aleppo
In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate
The history, situation, borders, statistics, and the [fighting] fronts:
The media office for Wilayat Aleppo [from the Arabic word meaning “state” or “province”] presents a comprehensive
report on Wilayat Aleppo, discussing the history, situation, borders, statistics, the [fighting] fronts, and so on.
In order that Muslims be fully informed and fully aware of the reality of the Islamic Wilayat generally, and Wilayat
Aleppo in particular, and to form a deeper understanding of future events in all their dimensions, and to connect
this to geography and the reality in which the Wilayat lives.
www.Understandingwar.org
Appendix: ISIS Report on Aleppo Province
27
Width – 110 Km
Length – 120 Km
Bordering it from the North: Turkey
And from the West (from North to
South): The Sahawat al-Sham in the
northern countryside and the regime of
Bashar al-Assad in the southern country-
side
And from the south: Wilayat Homs
And from the East: Wilayat Raqqa and
Ayn al-Arab (in which the PKK is con-
centrated)
5 Courts: One Main court and the
remainder Sub-courts. They govern by
the laws of God, implement the hudud
punishments, ensure rights, and extend
justice; dozens of cases are dealt with
daily, and it is based upon a legal and
administrative cadre.
10 Religious Police Headquarters: They
promote virtue and prevent vice to dry up
sources of evil, and prevent the manifestation
of disobedience, and urge Muslims
towards well-being.
11 Da‘wa Offices: They carry out da‘wa
in the state through the publication of
brochures, establishment of da‘wa tents
and so on.
10 Police Stations: They maintain internal
security and administer the patrols to
protect people, family, and money.
5 Service Offices: They administer services
of the people in various fields from
electricity to water to bakeries to municipal
services to traffic to humanitarian aid
offices.
22 Shari‘a institutes: Muslims learn in
the institutes the most important issues of
their religion from Aqida [creed] and Fiqh
[jurisprudence] and Quran.
The State contains
water supplies from the
Euphrates Dam that fill
a need for water and
irrigation.
The Power Generating
Stations work to provide
electricity in the State.
Front Lines
130 Km
60% of this is on the
front lines against the
regime
Area: 10,000 Sq Km
Greater than the area
of 48 other countries
in the world
5 Main Cities
450 Villages
Population:
1,200,000
Wilayat Aleppo: It returned to the dominion of the Muslims and was governed with
Sharia under the rule of the Commander of the Faithful (Amir al-Mu’minin) Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi since April 2014
28 www.Understandingwar.org
Appendix: ISIS Report on Aleppo Province
Introduction:
Wilayat Aleppo is a wide area that includes a number of ancient historical cities; civilizations succeeded each other in
itformorethan6,000years,endingwiththeOttomanCaliphate.ThenitwasseizedbytheFrenchduringthecolonial
period after World War I. Then after the French withdrawal and the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Wilayat Aleppo fell into
the lot of what is today called Syria, precisely in the northwestern part. And after the Syrian Revolution the Islamic
State, with its Sham branch under the name Jabhat al-Nusra, moved into Aleppo. It was one of the most important
fighting forces and liberated large portions [of Aleppo]. After the official declaration of the extension of the Islamic
State,thebattlefieldwasrenownedinal-Safiraandthesurroundingareasinthesoutherncountryside.Thenthebattle
was moved by the Islamic State to Aleppo’s center by means of a ghazwat al-fath [raid of conquest] which aimed to cut
the supply lines of New Aleppo which are under the control of the regime because of an attack on the Sheikh Said area
and Khan Touman. And after the betrayal of the Sahawat and the withdrawal of the Islamic State from the fighting
frontstodefenditssoldiers,whatensuedwasawithdrawalwesternandthentothenortherncountrysidetoconsolidate
forces in the eastern countryside, which is considered the center of the Wilayat presently. The result of this was that
the Islamic State took control over new areas and succeeded in securing the borders and achieved internal stability.
Area and Borders:
Width: 110 km
Length: 120 km
Area: 10,000 Sq Km
Bordering it from the North: Turkey
And from the West (from North to South): The Sahawat al-Sham in the northern countryside and the regime of Bashar alAssad
in the southern countryside
And from the south: Wilayat Homs
And from the East: Wilayat Raqqa and Ayn al-Arab (in which the PKK is concentrated) [See the map]
A map clarifying the borders of Wilayat Aleppo, a component of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (The borders are
approximate and variable).
www.Understandingwar.org
Appendix: ISIS Report on Aleppo Province
29
Areas and Partitions:
The Wilayat is divided in the era of the Islamic State into two Sectors:
1.	 Sector of Manbij
a.	 The city of Manbij
b.	 The city of Jarabulus
c.	 The city of Maskanah
2.	 Sector of al-Bab
a.	 The city of al-Bab
b.	 The city of Deir Hafer
A map clarifying the sectors and areas in Wilayat Aleppo
30 www.Understandingwar.org
Appendix: ISIS Report on Aleppo Province
The Fighting Fronts and Enemies:
The border areas that the Islamic State protects has reached more than 130 km and is divided between
the Sahawat, the regime, and the PKK, of which almost 60 km is directly against the Nusayri regime.
The Most Important Fronts [against the regime]:
al-Ta’ana, Shamer, Tal Rahal, Tal Bilat, al-Radwaniya, al-Safira
As for the section of the border which is against the Sahawat, it has reached about 30 km.
The Most Important Front [against the Sahawat]:
Dudyan, Turkman Berih, Akhtarin, Maria
The section of the border against the PKK has reached about 40 km where the Islamic State besieges the town of
Ayn al-Arab.
[See the Map]
A map clarifying the places of the active front with the enemies of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
NOTES
31 www.Understandingwar.org
1. This paper will use the acronym “ISIS” to represent the group
now calling itself the Islamic State (IS) because the events discussed
in the paper occurred before the announced name change.
2. Charlie Caris, “The Islamic State Announces Caliphate,”
Institute for the Study of War, June 30, 2014, http://iswsyria.
blogspot.com/2014/06/the-islamic-state-announces-caliphate.
html.
3. Harleen Gambhir, “Dabiq,” Institute for the Study of War,
Forthcoming July 2014, http://www.understandingwar.org;
Jessica D. Lewis, “A Counterstrategy for a Counterstate,” Institute
for the Study of War, Forthcoming July 2014, http://www.
understandingwar.org/.
4. Henceforth, this paper will use the spelling “Raqqa” for
simplicity.
5. “al-Ḥayat Media Center presents a new issue of the Islamic State’s
magazine: ‘Dabiq #1’,” Jihadology, July 5, 2014, http://jihadology.
net/2014/07/05/al-%E1%B8%A5ayat-media-center-presents-a-
new-issue-of-the-islamic-states-magazine-dabiq-1/.
6. “al-Ḥayat Media Center presents a new issue of the Islamic State’s
magazine: ‘Dabiq #1’,” Jihadology, July 5, 2014, http://jihadology.
net/2014/07/05/al-%E1%B8%A5ayat-media-center-presents-a-
new-issue-of-the-islamic-states-magazine-dabiq-1/.
7. “ISI Leader Rebrands ISIS and al-Nusra Front as ‘Islamic State
in Iraq and the Levant’,” SITE Intelligence Group. April 9, 2013,
http://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Multimedia/isi-leader-releases-
new-audio-speech.html.
8. “al-Ḥayat Media Center presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘The End of Sykes-Picot’,”
Jihadology, June 29, 2014, http://jihadology.net/2014/06/29/al-
%E1%B8%A5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-the-end-of-sykes-
picot/.
9. Due to the volatile nature of ISIS Twitter accounts and the
frequency with which ISIS social media outlets are shut down, much
of the information and images originally hosted by ISIS is no longer
available in its original form. Where possible, ISW has preserved
the original images and re-hosted them to make them available for
this report.
10. Rania Abouzeid, “The Jihad Next Door,” Politico Magazine,
June 23, 2014, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/
al-qaeda-iraq-syria-108214.html#.U7VjpfldWgZ.
11. “Zawahiri Reiterates Demand to ISIL to Return to Iraq, Answers
Ideologues’ Questions,” SITE Intelligence Group, May 24, 2014,
http://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/zawahiri-reiterates-
demand-to-isil-to-return-to-iraq-answers-ideologues-questions.
html.
12. Liz Sly, “Al-Qaeda disavows any ties with radical Islamist
ISIS group in Syria, Iraq.” Washington Post, February 3, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/al-qaeda-
disavows-any-ties-with-radical-islamist-isis-group-in-syria-
iraq/2014/02/03/2c9afc3a-8cef-11e3-98ab-fe5228217bd1_story.
html; Aaron Y. Zelin, “Al-Qaeda Disaffiliates with the Islamic State
of Iraq and al-Sham,” The Washington Institute , February 4, 2014,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/al-qaeda-
disaffiliates-with-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham.
13. Joseph Holliday, “The Opposition Takewover in al-Raqqa,”
Institute for the Study of War, March 15, 2013, http://www.
understandingwar.org/backgrounder/opposition-takeover-al-
raqqa.
14. Aymenn Al-Tamimi, “Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State
of Iraq and ash-Sham: Raqqah Governorate,” Jihadology, June
4, 2013, http://www.aymennjawad.org/13388/jabhat-al-nusraRaqqah-governorate.
[NOTE: A recent Business Insider article
has challenged the credibility of this author based on reported
conversations he had with opposition members on social media.
Despite this, nothing has led us to doubt the accuracy of his
research. The article is available here: http://www.businessinsider.
com/tamimi-2014-7.]
15. Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “The ar-Raqqa executions ~ Confirmation
of the Islamic State in Iraq and as-Sham,” pietervanostaeyen
Blog, May 15, 2013, http://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.
com/2013/05/15/the-ar-raqqa-executions-confirmation-of-the-
islamic-state-in-iraq-and-as-sham/.
16. Wa’il Essam, [Causes for the unexpected fall of ar-Raqqa at the
hands of the Islamic State… the relationship between Jabhat alNusra
and ‘Daesh’ in the city … from a solid alliance to a relentless
war], al-Quds al-Arabi, January 30, 2014, http://www.alquds.
co.uk/?p=128801.
17. Wa’il Essam, [Causes for the unexpected fall of ar-Raqqa at the
hands of the Islamic State… the relationship between Jabhat alNusra
and ‘Daesh’ in the city … from a solid alliance to a relentless
war], al-Quds al-Arabi, January 30, 2014, http://www.alquds.
co.uk/?p=128801.
18. Firas al-Hakkar, “The Mysterious Fall of Raqqa, Syria’s
Kandahar,” al-Akhbar, Novermber 8, 2013, http://english.alakhbar.com/node/17550;
“Syria: Islamist infighting sweeps Raqqa,”
Asharq al-Awsat, August 15, 2013, http://www.aawsat.net/2013/08/
article55313705.
NOTES
32www.Understandingwar.org
19.AliceMartins,“WatchingSyrianRebelsFightAmongThemselves
for the City of Raqqa,” VICE UK, September 23, 2013, http://
www.vice.com/en_uk/read/ar-Raqqah-syria-isis.
20. Firas al-Hakkar, “The Mysterious Fall of Raqqa, Syria’s
Kandahar,” al-Akhbar, Novermber 8, 2013, http://english.al-
akhbar.com/node/17550.
21. Firas al-Hakkar, “The Mysterious Fall of Raqqa, Syria’s
Kandahar,” al-Akhbar, Novermber 8, 2013, http://english.alakhbar.com/node/17550;
Terrorist Groups In Syria: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and
Trade of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 20,
2013, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20131120/101513/
HHRG-113-FA18-Transcript-20131120.pdf.
22. Joanna Paraszczuk, “Syria: How Did Raqqa Fall To The Islamic
State of Iraq & ash-Sham? (Syria Untold),” EA WorldView, January
14, 2014, http://eaworldview.com/2014/01/Raqqah-fall-islamic-
state-iraq-ash-sham-syria-untold/.
23. Barbara Surk, Associated Press, “Battle for Syrian army base
kills 24 rebels,” Yahoo News, November 22, 2013, http://news.
yahoo.com/battle-syrian-army-kills-24-rebels-090300118.
html; [“‘Jabhat al-Nusra’ and ‘The Islamic State’: Open War in
Raqqa”], The Damascus Bureau, December 12, 2013, http://www.
damascusbureau.org/arabic/?p=6309.
24. [“‘Jabhat al-Nusra’ and ‘The Islamic State’: Open War in
Raqqa”], The Damascus Bureau, December 12, 2013, http://www.
damascusbureau.org/arabic/?p=6309.
25. Michael Weiss, “The Southern Front, Part II,” NOW
Lebanon, August 17, 2013, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/
commentaryanalysis/the-southern-front-part-ii.
26. Syrian Observatory For Human Rights Facebook post, “Raqqah
province: SOHR members and several other activists in Raqqah
city have confirmed that the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
(ISIS) has converted the Church of Armenian Martyrs into an ISIS
proselytizing office,” December 2, 2013, https://www.facebook.
com/syriahroe/posts/456799337761743; “ISIS Seizes Armenian
church in Raqqa,” Daily Star, December 5, 2013, http://www.
dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Dec-05/239954-isis-
seizes-armenian-church-in-Raqqah.ashx#axzz34uTSXgUR;
Chris Looney, “Al-Qaeda’s Governance Strategy in Raqqa,” Syria
Comment Blog, December 8, 2013, http://www.joshualandis.com/
blog/al-qaedas-governance-strategy-Raqqah-chris-looney/.
27. Wa’il Essam, [Causes for the unexpected fall of ar-Raqqa at the
hands of the Islamic State… the relationship between Jabhat alNusra
and ‘Daesh’ in the city … from a solid alliance to a relentless
war], al-Quds al-Arabi, January 30, 2014, http://www.alquds.
co.uk/?p=128801.
28. “Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: a Cold
War in Raqqa,” Damascus Bureau, December 18, 2013, http://www.
damascusbureau.org/?p=6176.
29. Marlin Dick, “ From north to east, ISIS losses outweigh
‘victories’,” Daily Star, November 9, 2013, http://www.dailystar.
com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Nov-09/237288-from-north-to-
east-isis-losses-outweigh-victories.ashx#axzz38ul5WunE.
30. Valerie Szybala, “Syrian Rebels Attack ISIS,” ISW Syria Blog,
January 5, 2014, http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2014/01/syrianrebels-attack-isis.html;
Joshua Landis, “The Battle between ISIS
and Syria’s Rebel Militias,” Syria Comment Blog, January 4,
2014, http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/battle-isis-syrias-rebel-
militias/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_cam
paign=Feed%3A+Syriacomment+%28Syria+Comment%29%20
,%20.
31. Ahmed Ali, “Iraq Update 2014 #2: Al-Qaeda in Iraq Patrols
Fallujah; Aims for Ramadi, Mosul, Baghdad,” ISW Iraq Blog,
January 5, 2014, http://iswiraq.blogspot.com/2014/01/iraq-
update-42-al-qaeda-in-iraq-patrols.html.
32. Anne Barnard and Rick Gladstone, “Rebel Infighting Spreads
to an Eastern Syrian City,” New York Times, January 6, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/07/world/middleeast/rebel-
infighting-expands-to-eastern-Syrian-city.html?_r=0.
33. “Syria: ISIS besieged by opposition fighters in Raqqa,” Asharq
al-Awsat, January 7, 2014, http://www.aawsat.net/2014/01/
article55326743.
34. “Syria: ISIS besieged by opposition fighters in Raqqa,” Asharq
al-Awsat, January 7, 2014, http://www.aawsat.net/2014/01/
article55326743.
35. Ruth Sherlock and Richard Spencer, “Syrian rebels launch
attack on al-Qaeda,” The Telegraph, January 6, 2014, http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10554651/
Syrian-rebels-launch-attack-on-al-Qaeda.html; “Turkey shuts
border gate amid clashes in north Syria,” supplied by BBC
Worldwide Monitoring Middle East – Political, January 7, 2014,
Available from LexisNexis.
36. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Facebook post, “
Aleppo province: ISIS have taken over Al-Jarah military airport,”
January 20, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/121855461256134/
posts/477677575673919.
37. Jad Yateem, “Aleppo free of ISIS control, rebel commander
says,” NOW Lebanon, January 8, 2014, https://now.mmedia.
me/lb/en/nowsyrialatestnews/529206-aleppo-free-of-isiscontrol;
“Syria rebels capture ISIS headquarters in Aleppo,” BBC,
January 8, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
NOTES
33 www.Understandingwar.org
25652381#TWEET1006780; Syrian Observatory for Human
Rights Facebook post, “Aleppo province: 19 civilians, including
2 children, 3 women and an elderly man were killed by regime
bombardment,” January 7, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/
syriahroe/posts/472093536232323. For a discussion of the scale
of ISIS checkpoints in Aleppo city prior to 2014, see: “Mapping
the conflict in Aleppo, Syria,” Caerus Associates, February 2014,
http://caerusassociates.com/ideas/mapping-conflict-in-aleppo/.
38. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Facebook post, “Raqqah
province: Raqqah city has been suffering from a humanitarian
catastrophe,” January 9, 2014, https://www.facebook.
com/121855461256134/posts/472919966149680.
39. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Facebook post,
“Raqqah province: Clashes continue between islamist battalions
and Jabhat al-Nusra against the ISIS in Raqqah city,” January
10, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/121855461256134/
posts/473312916110385?stream_ref=10; Syrian Observatory for
Human Rights Facebook post, “Approximately 500 people killed in
a week of intense clashes between the ISIS forces against islamist
and rebel battalions,” January 10, 2014, https://www.facebook.
com/photo.php?fbid=473196532788690&set=a.15049512839
2167.28686.121855461256134&type=1&stream_ref=10; Agence
France Presse, “Jihadists advance on Syria’s Raqa: activists,” Yahoo
News UK, January 10, 2014, http://uk.news.yahoo.com/jihadists-
advance-syria-39-raqa-activists-094723141.html?#POvlE1K.
40. Mitchell Prothero, “Al Qaida’s ISIS takes 2 Syrian cities,
executes scores of rivals,” McClatchy, January 13, 2014, http://
www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/01/13/214335/al-qaidas-isis-takes-2-
syrian.html.
41. “Pro-Al-Qaeda Jabhat al-Nusra to become main insurgent
beneficiary from Syria’s rebel infighting,” IHS Janes Global Insight,
January 13, 2014, available at LexisNexis.
42. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Facebook post , “Raqqah
province: Violent clashes by ISIS against islamist and rebel battalions
in al-Tabqa city,” January 12, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/
syriahroe/posts/474220356019641; Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Al
Qaeda Syria unit executes dozens of rivals in Raqqa: activists,”
January 12, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/13/
us-syria-crisis-Raqqah-idUSBREA0B0MX20140113; “Al Qaeda’s
ISIL retaliates from Islamist rebels in Raqqa, gains recorded,”
Zaman al-Wasl, January 11, 2014, http://www.zamanalwsl.net/en/
news/3240.html; Hazem Dakl, [“‘The Islamic State’ announces
killing the emir of ‘Jabhat al-Nusra’ in ar-Raqqa”], All4Syria,
January 12, 2014, http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/124938; Abd
al-Majid al-Aluwani, [“Daesh imposes control over Raqqa and
attacks a base for ‘al-Nusra’”], Orient News, January 12, 2014,
https://orient-news.net/?page=news_show&id=7158.
43. “ISIS, Opposition Factions in Raqqah Discuss Captive
Exchange,” translated from al-Quds al-Arabi by The Syrian
Observer, March 11, 2014, http://syrianobserver.com/News/News/
ISIS+Opposition+Factions+in+Raqqah+Discuss+Captive+Exchan
ge.
44. “ISIS Kills Nusra Front Emir in Raqqa,” translated from
All4Syria by The Syrian Observer, January 14, 2014, http://www.
syrianobserver.com/News/News/ISIS+Kills+Nusra+Front+Emir+in
+Raqqah
45. Mitchell Prothero, “Al Qaida’s ISIS takes 2 Syrian cities,
executes scores of rivals,” McClatchy, January 13, 2014, http://
www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/01/13/214335/al-qaidas-isis-takes-
2-syrian.html; Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Facebook
post, “Raqqah province: Trusted sources have informed the SOHR
that the ISIS have taken over the Tal Abyad border crossing with
Turkey,” January 11, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/syriahroe/
posts/473723546069322.
46. Firas al-Hakkar, “ISIS Brings Life Back to Raqqa, in Its Own
Way,” al-Akhbar, January 23, 2014, http://english.al-akhbar.com/
node/18354.
47. Joanna Paraszczuk, “Syria: Umar Al-Shishani & Isis Claim
Advance From Al-Bab To Manbij, Capture Base,” From Chechnya
To Syria Blog, January 20, 2014, http://www.chechensinsyria.
com/?p=18077; “ISIL Jihadists seize ‘most’ of Al Bab city
near Aleppo,” Zaman al-Wasl, January 13, 2014, https://www.
zamanalwsl.net/en/news/3255.html.
48. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Facebook post,
“ISIS release 4 statements to its subjects in ‘Wilayat al-Raqqa’,”
January 20, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/syriahroe/
posts/477714635670213.
49. “Regime advances near Aleppo, ISIS tightens grip on Raqqa,”
Daily Star, January 15, 2014,
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Jan-
15/244084-regime-advances-near-aleppo-isis-tightens-grip-onRaqqah.ashx#axzz34uTSXgUR;
“A-Raqqa Activist: ‘Most Citizens
Have Rejected ISIS…But Are Afraid’,” Syria Direct interview
conducted by Mohammed al-Haj Ali, January 23, 2014, http://
syriadirect.org/main/36-interviews/1081-a-Raqqah-activist-mostcitizens-have-rejected-isis-but-are-afraid;
Syrian Observatory for
Human Rights Facebook post, “Raqqa province: trusted sources
confirmed to SOHR that ISIS have taken over the western section
of the 17th division,” January 21, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/
syriahroe/posts/478145042293839;SyrianObservatoryforHuman
Rights Facebook post, “ISIS release 4 statements to its subjects in
‘Wilayat al-Raqqa’,” January 20, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/
syriahroe/posts/477714635670213; Syrian Observatory for Human
Rights Facebook post, “Raqqa province: violent clashes took place
last night between ISIS against regime forces in the outskirts of 17th
division,” January 18, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/syriahroe/
posts/476653695776307?stream_ref=10.
NOTES
34www.Understandingwar.org
50. Firas al-Hakkar, “ISIS Brings Life Back to Raqqa, in Its Own
Way,” al-Akhbar, January 23, 2014, http://english.al-akhbar.com/
node/18354.
51. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Facebook post, “Aleppo
province: Parts of the Jalloum and Aqaba neighborhoods of Aleppo
were bombarded by regime forces,” January 17, 2014, https://www.
facebook.com/121855461256134/posts/476344165807260; “Al
Qaeda militants seize Manbij east Aleppo: activists,” Zaman al-Wasl,
January 23, 2014, https://www.zamanalwsl.net/en/news/3381.
html.
52. Alexander Dziadosz, Reuters, “Al-Qaeda splinter group in Syria
leaves two provinces: activists,” Daily Star, March 14, 2014, http://
www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Mar-14/250272-
al-qaeda-splinter-group-in-syria-leaves-two-provinces-activists.
ashx.
53. “Isis militants parade military muscle in Raqqa, Syria – video,”
Raqqa Media Center video posted by The Guardian, July 1, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/jul/01/isis-
militants-military-syria-raqqa-video.
54. Hadil Aarja, “ISIS enforces strict religious law in Raqqa,” alSafir
article translated by al-Monitor, March 21, 2014, http://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/03/isis-enforces-islamic-
law-raqqa-syria.html.
55. Assessments about how ISIS structures its governance are
primarily based upon a Wilayat Aleppo provincial report released on
June 24, 2014, and available here: http://justpaste.it/HalabReport.
However, the division between what ISIS considers administrative
and service-oriented governance is also demonstrated by the Aleppo
Administration of Public Services, which ISIS set up in Aleppo city
in 2013 primarily as a service-related organization. Interviews with
former head of the IAPS office can be found here: http://jihadology.
net/2013/12/12/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-theland-of-epic-battles-14/.
Because no officials from the courts,
police, schools, etc…, were interviewed, we assume their office falls
under a different jurisdiction.
56. For example, on June 26 ISIS Wilayat al-Khayr Twitter account
posted a field report documenting the provision of humanitarian
aid in Deir ez-Zour city. See: Wilayat al-Khayr Twitter post, [“On
the occasion of the blessed month of Ramadan The Islamic State
provides aid to the city of Khayr”], June 26, 2014, http://justpaste.
it/igatha_5ir2.
57. For ISIS’s military campaign in Deir ez-Zour starting in March
2014, see: Valerie Szybala, “The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
and the ‘Cleansing of Deir Ez-Zour’,” ISW Backgrounder, http://
www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/islamic-state-iraq-and-
al-sham-and-%E2%80%9Ccleansing%E2%80%9D-deir-ez-zour;
58. ISIS has already eliminated its major competition among rebel
forces in Deir ez-Zour. See Jennifer Cafarella, “Resistance Emerges
as ISIS Consolidates in Deir ez-Zour,” ISW Syria Blog, July 15,
2014, http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2014/07/resistance-emerges-
as-isis-consolidates.html.
59. Wilayat Latakia Twitter post, November 17, 2013, available
here: http://justpaste.it/gfei.
60. Wilayat Latakia Twitter post, November 25, 2013, available
here: http://justpaste.it/gfei.
61. “ al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of Epic
Battles #14’,” Jihadology, December 12, 2014, http://jihadology.
net/2013/12/12/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-the-
land-of-epic-battles-14/.
62. “ al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of Epic
Battles #14’,” Jihadology, December 12, 2014, http://jihadology.
net/2013/12/12/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-the-
land-of-epic-battles-14/.
63. The borders and sectors within Wilayat Aleppo are shown here:
http://s01.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d91/a4896920/cities_areas_
small.jpg. From: ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history,
situation, borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25,
2014, http://justpaste.it/HalabReport. For the use of sectors in
Wilayat Raqqa and Baraka, see: http://justpaste.it/gfei. Social
media posts from Wilayat Raqqa . This indicates that ISIS uses the
“Sector” system in other territory outside of Aleppo province.
64. The Wilayat Damascus Twitter account as of July 29, 2014, can
be found here: https://twitter.com/Damsstate, but such accounts
are frequently suspended.
65. Al-Furqan Foundation’s first full-length release about ISIS
activities in Syria mentioned “Wilayat Aleppo.” See: “al-Furqan
Media presents a new video message from the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham: ‘Press Coverage of One of the Da’wah Tents in the
State of Aleppo’,” Jihadology, July 11, 2014, http://jihadology.
net/2013/07/11/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-press-coverage-of-
one-of-the-dawah-tents-in-the-state-of-aleppo/.
66. “[Map illustrates the borders of Wilayat Aleppo according to the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham],” Image posted online, http://
s01.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d91/a4896920/______________________
___1.jpg.
67. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: “Press Coverage of One of
NOTES
35 www.Understandingwar.org
the Da’wah Tents in the State of Aleppo #2,” Jihadology.net, July
25, 2013, http://jihadology.net/2013/07/25/al-furqan-media-
presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-
and-al-sham-press-coverage-of-one-of-the-dawah-tents-in-the-
state-of-aleppo-2/.″
68. Aymenn Al-Tamimi, “The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
Expands Into Rural Northern Syria,” Syria Comment Blog, July
18, 2013, http://www.aymennjawad.org/13562/rural-northernsyria;
Aaron Zelin, “Al-Qaeda in Syria: A Closer Look at ISIS
(Part I),” Washington Institute, September 10, 2013, http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/al-qaeda-in-syria-a-
closer-look-at-isis-part-i.
69. Aymenn Al-Tamimi, “The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
Expands Into Rural Northern Syria,” Syria Comment Blog, July 18,
2013, http://www.aymennjawad.org/13562/rural-northern-syria
70. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Press Coverage of One of the
Da’wah Tents in the State of Aleppo #2’,” Jihadology, July 25, 2014,
http://jihadology.net/2013/07/25/al-furqan-media-presents-
a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-
sham-press-coverage-of-one-of-the-dawah-tents-in-the-state-
of-aleppo-2/.
71. Aymenn Al-Tamimi, “The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
Expands Into Rural Northern Syria,” Syria Comment Blog, July 18,
2013, http://www.aymennjawad.org/13562/rural-northern-syria.
72. Aymenn Al-Tamimi, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of
Iraq and ash-Sham: Raqqah Governorate , pundicity Blog, June
4, 2013, http://www.aymennjawad.org/13388/jabhat-al-nusra-
raqqah-governorate.
73. Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“Muslims in Deir Hafer aid the
men of the Islamic State in destroying the idols and polytheistic
shrines”], May 30, 2014, http://justpaste.it/dw_89.
74. Raqqa Media Center, [“the Islamic State Sabran ya Nafsi Nashid
at a Dawa Tent in Wilayat Raqqa”], April 24, 2014, YouTube -
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rNA2flWyY_k
75. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
s02.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d91/a4896920/__________________
____3__small.jpg , full report available here: http://justpaste.it/
HalabReport.
76. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
s02.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d91/a4896920/__________________
____3__small.jpg , full report available here: http://justpaste.it/
HalabReport.
77. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
justpaste.it/HalabReport.
78. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014,
http://s02.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d91/a4896920/
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn_small.jpg, full report available here: http://
justpaste.it/HalabReport.
79. http://www.twitt-book.com/wp-content/uploads/2014
/05/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AA%D8
%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D
9%8A-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9--620x330.
jpg ]
80. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
justpaste.it/HalabReport.
81. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘The Best Ummah’,” Jihadology, May
28, 2014, http://jihadology.net/2014/05/28/al-furqan-media-
presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-
and-al-sham-for-the-good-of-the-ummah/.
82. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘The Best Ummah’,” Jihadology, May
28, 2014, http://jihadology.net/2014/05/28/al-furqan-media-
presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-
and-al-sham-for-the-good-of-the-ummah/.
83. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
justpaste.it/HalabReport.
84. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘The Best Ummah’,” Jihadology,
May 28, 2014, http://jihadology.net/2014/05/28/al-furqan-
media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-
iraq-and-al-sham-for-the-good-of-the-ummah/.
85. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘The Best Ummah’,” Jihadology, May
28, 2014, http://jihadology.net/2014/05/28/al-furqan-media-
presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-
and-al-sham-for-the-good-of-the-ummah/.
86. [“Pictures spread by ISIS spokesmen of one of the Hisba cars for
‘promotion of virtue and prevention of vice’ in Raqqa Province”],
Syrian Documents, March 29, 2014, http://documents.sy/image.
php?id=2728&lang=ar.
NOTES
36www.Understandingwar.org
87. John Rossomando, “ISIS Inflicts Saudi-style Religious Police on
Syrians,” The Investigative Project on Terrorism, March 4, 2014,
http://www.investigativeproject.org/4303/isis-inflicts-saudi-style-
religious-police-on.
88. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘The Best Ummah’,” Jihadology,
May 28, 2014, http://jihadology.net/2014/05/28/al-furqan-
media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-
iraq-and-al-sham-for-the-good-of-the-ummah/.
89. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
justpaste.it/HalabReport.
90. ISIS Wilayat Raqqa Twitter post, [“What a visitor sees of Wilayat
Raqqa”], April 23, 2014, http://s01.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/
d71/a4242161/bjgmfuecyaaj80h_jpg_large_small.jpeg, full report
available here: http://justpaste.it/f7pt.
91. See ISIS’s Aleppo provincial report, which lists the two entities
separately. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history,
situation, borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25,
2014, http://justpaste.it/HalabReport.
92. Aymenn Al-Tamimi, “The Islamic State of Iraq and ashSham’s
dhimmi pact for the Christians of Raqqa province,” Syria
Comment blog, February 26, 2014, http://www.joshualandis.com/
blog/islamic-state-iraq-ash-shams-dhimmi-pact-christians-raqqa-
province/.
93. Aymenn Al-Tamimi, “Lessons in Islamic Learning in the Islamic
State of Iraq and ash-Sham’s Stronghold of Jarabulus,” pundicity
Blog, March 20, 2014, http://www.aymennjawad.org/2014/02/
lessons-in-islamic-learning-in-the-islamic-state.
94. Aymenn Al-Tamimi, “Lessons in Islamic Learning in the Islamic
State of Iraq and ash-Sham’s Stronghold of Jarabulus,” pundicity
Blog, March 20, 2014, http://www.aymennjawad.org/2014/02/
lessons-in-islamic-learning-in-the-islamic-state.
95.ISISWilayatLatakiaTwitterpost,hostedbyAll4Syria,November
17, 2013, http://all4syria.info/Archive/114782.
96. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of Epic
Battles #5’,” Jihadology, September 6, 2013, http://jihadology.
net/2013/09/06/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-
message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-
from-the-land-of-epic-battles-5/.
97. “Islamic State Of Iraq And Syria (ISIS) Opens Elementary
Schools In Aleppo,” Middle East Media Research Institute Jihad
and Terrorism Threat Monitory, September 9, 2013, http://
www.memrijttm.org/islamic-state-of-iraq-and-syria-
isis-opens-elementary-schools-in-aleppo.html.
98. ISIS Wilayat Raqqah, hosted at The Middle East Media
Research Institute, December 13, 2013, http://www.memri.org/
image/18053.jpg.
99. ISIS Wilayat Raqqa Twitter post, March 23, 2014, available
here: http://justpaste.it/gfei.
100. “al-I’tiṣam Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘A Window Upon the Land of Epic
Battles #28’,” Jihadology, November 20, 2013, http://jihadology.
net/2013/11/20/al-iti%E1%B9%A3am-media-presents-a-new-
video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-a-
window-upon-the-land-of-epic-battles-28/.
101. ISIS Wilayat Raqqa Twitter post, available here: http://
justpaste.it/gfei.
102. “al-I’tiṣam Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘A Window Upon the Land of Epic
Battles #28’,” Jihadology, November 20, 2013, http://jihadology.
net/2013/11/20/al-iti%E1%B9%A3am-media-presents-a-new-
video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-a-
window-upon-the-land-of-epic-battles-28/.
103. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014,http://
s01.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d91/a4896920/atfal_small.jpg, full
report available here: http://justpaste.it/HalabReport.
104. Idlib civilians interviewed in an ISIS video about the court
system spoke highly of its rulings. See: “al-Furqan Media presents
a new video message from the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham:
‘Messages from the Land of Epic Battles #12’,” Jihadology,
November 23, 2013, http://jihadology.net/2013/11/23/al-furqan-
media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-
iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-the-land-of-epic-battles-12/.
105. Aymenn Al-Tamimi, “The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
Expands Into Rural Northern Syria,” Syria Comment Blog, July 18,
2013, http://www.aymennjawad.org/13562/rural-northern-syria.
106. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of Epic
Battles #12’,” Jihadology, November 23, 2013, http://jihadology.
net/2013/11/23/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-the-
land-of-epic-battles-12/.
107. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of Epic
Battles #12’,” Jihadology, November 23, 2013, http://jihadology.
NOTES
net/2013/11/23/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-the-
land-of-epic-battles-12/.
108. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
justpaste.it/HalabReport.
109. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘But Who Is Better Than God
In Judgement’,” Jihadology, April 6, 2014, http://jihadology.
net/2014/04/06/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-
message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-but-who-
is-better-than-god-in-judgement/
110. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘But Who Is Better Than God
In Judgement’,” Jihadology, April 6, 2014, http://jihadology.
net/2014/04/06/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-
message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-but-who-
is-better-than-god-in-judgement/
111. Aymenn Al-Tamimi, “Butchers: Syria’s ISIS Crucifying
Opponents, Justifying Horror with Quran Passages,” PJ Media,
March 27, 2014, http://www.aymennjawad.org/14852/isis-use-ofhudud-punishments;
Olivia Becker, “Islamist Rebels Are Allegedly
Crucifying People in Syria,” VICE News, April 30, 2014, https://
news.vice.com/article/islamist-rebels-are-allegedly-crucifying-
people-in-syria/.
112. Liz Sly and Ahmed Ramadan, “Syrian extremists amputated
a man’s hand and live-tweeted it,” Washington Post, February
28, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/
wp/2014/02/28/syrian-extremists-amputated-a-mans-hand-and-
live-tweeted-it/.
113. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
s02.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d91/a4896920/1zaza_small.jpg, full
report available here: http://justpaste.it/HalabReport.
114. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, 2014, http://4.bp.blogspot.
com/-xgn0I4nRHHo/U5HdqNpc9pI/AAAAAAAAA7w/
p4JW8m1oZio/s1600/BpdLDqkCcAIyJNx+(1).jpg.
115. [“Applying the had of apostasy to 3 Shabiha fighting with the
Nusayri regime”], Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, 2014, http://
justpaste.it/dw_69.
116. Aymenn Al-Tamimi, “Butchers: Syria’s ISIS Crucifying
Opponents, Justifying Horror with Quran Passages,” PJ Media,
March 27, 2014, http://www.aymennjawad.org/14852/isis-use-of-
hudud-punishments.
117. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
s02.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d91/a4896920/manbig_small.jpg,
full report available here: http://justpaste.it/HalabReport.
118. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
justpaste.it/HalabReport; ISIS Wilayat Raqqa Twitter post, [“What
a visitor sees of Wilayat Raqqa”], April 23, 2014, http://justpaste.
it/f7pt.
119.AymennAl-Tamimi,“AnnouncementfromIslamicStateofIraq
and ash-Sham’s Tel Abyad Islamic Court,” pundicity Blog, March
9, 2014, http://www.aymennjawad.org/2014/02/announcement-
from-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-ash.
120. Matthieu Aikins, “A Tale of Two Courts,” New York Times
Latitude Blog, April 11, 2013, http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.
com/2013/04/11/a-tale-of-two-courts/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_
r=0.
121. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
justpaste.it/HalabReport.
122. @MuntherJazrawi Twitter post, [“Islamic police patrols in alBab”],
March 26, 2014, available here: http://justpaste.it/gfei.
123. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
justpaste.it/HalabReport.
124. “Rule of Fear: Isis Abuses in Detention in Northern Syria,”
Amnesty International, December 19, 2013, http://www.
countercurrents.org/amnesty201213.pdf, p. 6.
125. “Rule of Fear: Isis Abuses in Detention in Northern Syria,”
Amnesty International, December 19, 2013, http://www.
countercurrents.org/amnesty201213.pdf, p. 4-5, 8, 10-11; “People
of Raqqa vow rebellion against ISIS, no more servility,” Zaman alWasl,
April 22, 2014, https://www.zamanalwsl.net/en/news/4635.
html.
126. [“Liberation: Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently”],
Liberation (Fr) article translated to Arabic by All4Syria, April 28,
2014, http://all4syria.info/Archive/144223.
127. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
s02.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d91/a4896920/b1_small.jpg, full
report available at: http://justpaste.it/HalabReport; @msn291
Twitter post, [“The office of recruitment in Manbij”], March 12,
2014, available here: http://justpaste.it/gfei.
128. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
37 www.Understandingwar.org
NOTES
s02.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d91/a4896920/b1_small.jpg, full
report available at: http://justpaste.it/HalabReport.
129. [“Zarqawi Cubs Camp”], Baqiya Foundation YouTube posted
by “‫ةسسؤم‬ ‫,”ةيقاب‬ January 2, 2014,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kncRJhAm2cI.
130. [“Zarqawi Cubs Camp”], Baqiya Foundation YouTube posted
by “‫ةسسؤم‬ ‫,”ةيقاب‬ January 2, 2014,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kncRJhAm2cI.
131. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
s01.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d91/a4896920/ashaerbab_small.
jpg, full report available at: http://justpaste.it/HalabReport.
132. ISIS Wilayat Latakia Twitter post, November 25, 2013, available
here: http://justpaste.it/gfei.
133. ISIS Wilayat Damascus Twitter post, September 17, 2013,
available here: http://justpaste.it/gfei.
134. ISIS Wilayat Deir ez-Zour Twitter post, October 1, 2013,
available here: http://justpaste.it/gfei.
135. [“Providing relief materials”], ISIS Wilayat Idlib Twitter post,
December 9, 2013, available here: http://justpaste.it/gfei.
136. Early statements from IAPS appear in May, 2013. See:
[“Among the first acts of our foundation yesterday”], ISIS IAPS
Facebook post, May 19, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/photo.
php?v=128701053997369.
137.[“SwitchingthemainsewerpipesintheSalhinneighborhood”],
ISIS IAPS YouTube video, November 20, 2013,
h t t p s : / / w w w. y o u t u b e . c o m / w a t c h ? f e a t u re = p l a y e r _
embedded&v=9U7546JfpUQ#t=94.
138. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of Epic
Battles #14’,” Jihadology, December 12, 2013, http://jihadology.
net/2013/12/12/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-the-
land-of-epic-battles-14/.
139. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of Epic
Battles #14’,” Jihadology, December 12, 2013, http://jihadology.
net/2013/12/12/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-the-
land-of-epic-battles-14/.
140. [“A field tour of one of the health centers”], ISIS IAPS
YouTube video, June 25, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?feature=player_embedded&v=CoTPKkquxws.
141. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of Epic
Battles #14’,” Jihadology, December 12, 2013, http://jihadology.
net/2013/12/12/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-the-
land-of-epic-battles-14/.
142. [“Opening the road for ambulances in the area of al-Bab
road after shelling”], ISIS IAPS YouTube video, November
23, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_
embedded&v=mb2v--FpbvU#t=46.
143. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
justpaste.it/HalabReport.
144. @omti1 Twitter post, March 22, 2014, https://twitter.com/
omti7/status/447470834559377409.
145. [“Providing converted electric cables after their theft in the
Salhin neighborhood”], ISIS IAPS YouTube video, November 21,
2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRVRnP4gh34.
146.[“SwitchingthemainsewerpipesintheSalhinneighborhood”],
ISIS IAPS YouTube video, November 20, 2013,
h t t p s : / / w w w. y o u t u b e . c o m / w a t c h ? f e a t u re = p l a y e r _
embedded&v=9U7546JfpUQ#t=94.
147. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of Epic
Battles #14’,” Jihadology, December 12, 2013, http://jihadology.
net/2013/12/12/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-the-
land-of-epic-battles-14/
148. @ajaltamimi Twitter post, January 21, 2014, https://twitter.
com/ajaltamimi/status/425656210595909632.
149. [“Opening the road for ambulances in the area of al-Bab
road after shelling”], ISIS IAPS YouTube video, November
23, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_
embedded&v=mb2v--FpbvU#t=46.
150. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
s01.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d91/a4896920/babkhrbaa_small.
jpg, full report can be found here: http://justpaste.it/HalabReport.
151.[“SwitchingthemainsewerpipesintheSalhinneighborhood”],
ISIS IAPS YouTube video, November 20, 2013,
h t t p s : / / w w w. y o u t u b e . c o m / w a t c h ? f e a t u re = p l a y e r _
embedded&v=9U7546JfpUQ#t=94.
38www.Understandingwar.org
NOTES
152. Aaron Zelin, “46 Scenes from the Islamic State in Syria,”
BuzzFeed, October 12, 2013, http://www.buzzfeed.com/
aaronyzelin/46-scenes-from-the-islamic-state-in-syria-dski.
153. Ben Hubbard and Anonymous, “Life in a Jihadist Capital:
Order With a Darker Side,” New York Times, July 23, 2014, http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/world/middleeast/islamic-state-
controls-raqqa-syria.html?_r=2.
154. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
s01.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d91/a4896920/babkhrbaa_small.
jpg, full report can be found here: http://justpaste.it/HalabReport.
155. ISIS IAPS Twitter post, October 28, 2013, https://twitter.
com/ServicesIslamic/status/394811520695029760.
156. [“A report on the foundation of the market for family
shopping”], ISIS IAPS YouTube video, November 20, 2013, http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wacp0kWhYQ0.
157. @MuntherJazrawi Twitter post, [“Providing meat for a nominal
fee to help the poor and needy”], March 24, 2014, available here:
http://justpaste.it/gfei.
158. José Ciro Martínez and Brent Eng, “Islamic State works to win
hearts, minds with bread,” al-Monitor, July 29, 2014, http://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/islamic-state-bread-
subsidies-syria-iraq-terrorism.html.
159. Chris Looney, “Al-Qaeda’s Governance Strategy in Raqqa,”
Syria Comment Blog, December 8, 2013,
http://www.juancole.com/news/2013/12/qaedas-governance-
strategy.
160. [“A field tour of one of the health centers”], ISIS IAPS
YouTube video, June 25, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?feature=player_embedded&v=CoTPKkquxws.
161. Aaron Zelin, “Al-Qaeda in Syria: A Closer Look at ISIS
(Part I),” Washington Institute, September 10, 2013, http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/al-qaeda-in-syria-a-
closer-look-at-isis-part-i.
162. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of Epic
Battles #14’,” Jihadology, December 12, 2013, http://jihadology.
net/2013/12/12/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-theland-of-epic-battles-14/;
[“This is how bread is produced in the
ovens of the Islamic Administration of Public Services”], YouTube
video posted by “[Ya Toba lil-Sham],” July 22, 2013, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=6CrNWMv8trw.
163. [“A story of the production of a loaf of bread illustrated by
the ovens of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham”], ISIS Wilayat
Raqqa Twitter post, March 21, 2014, http://justpaste.it/etow.
164. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of Epic
Battles #14’,” Jihadology, December 12, 2013, http://jihadology.
net/2013/12/12/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-the-
land-of-epic-battles-14/
165. [“A story of the production of a loaf of bread illustrated by
the ovens of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham”], ISIS Wilayat
Raqqa Twitter post, March 21, 2014, http://justpaste.it/etow.
166. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of Epic
Battles #14’,” Jihadology, December 12, 2013, http://jihadology.
net/2013/12/12/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-theland-of-epic-battles-14/;
[“This is how bread is produced in the
ovens of the Islamic Administration of Public Services”], YouTube
video posted by “[Ya Toba lil-Sham],” July 22, 2013, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=6CrNWMv8trw.
167. @ajaltamimi, Twitter Post, April 21, 2014, https://twitter.
com/ajaltamimi/status/458208936730976256/photo/1.
168. Rani Geha, “ISIS rules in Raqqa,” al-Hayat article translated
by al-Monitor, February 26, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/security/2014/02/syria-isis-raqqa-quasi-government-
opposition.html.
169. @A_dawlah Twitter post, [“Wilayat Aleppo, City of al-Bab,
providing food aid to the poor and displaced”], March 1, 2014,
available here: http://justpaste.it/gfei.
170. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of Epic
Battles #14’,” Jihadology, December 12, 2013, http://jihadology.
net/2013/12/12/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-the-
land-of-epic-battles-14/
171. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
justpaste.it/HalabReport.
172. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
justpaste.it/HalabReport.
173.DanyaChudacoff,“’Waterwar’threatensSyrialifeline,”Aljazeera,
July 7, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/
water-war-syria-euphrates-2014757640320663.html.
39 www.Understandingwar.org
NOTES
174. Islamic Administration of Public Services (IAPS), [“One
of the thermal plant turbines”], YouTube video posted by
“[The Islamic Administration of Public Services]”, November
16, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_
embedded&v=wIQl3mfVaoM; IAPS, [“Inspecting the room
used to run the thermal power plan and safety systems”],
YouTube video posted by “[The Islamic Administration of Public
Services],” November 16, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ufS3N5SqkuM.
175. ISIS Wilayat Aleppo Twitter post, [“The history, situation,
borders, statistics, and the fighting fronts”], June 25, 2014, http://
s02.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d91/a4896920/_______________small.
jpg, full report can be found here: http://justpaste.it/HalabReport.
176. The movement’s Facebook page as of July 2014 can be found
here: https://www.facebook.com/Raqqa.Slaughtered2. Its Twitter
account can be found here: https://twitter.com/RaqqaSlaughtere
177. Salma Abdelaziz, “Death and desecration in Syria: Jihadist
group ‘crucifies’ bodies to send message,” CNN, May 2, 2014,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/01/world/meast/syria-bodies-
crucifixions/.
178. [“Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently… For How Long?!”],
statement from the Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently
movement posted by the Raqqa Media Office, April 17, 2014,
http://raqqa-media-office.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1
%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B0%D8%A8%D8%AD%
D 8 % A 8 % D 8 % B 5 % D 9 % 8 5 % D 8 % AA -
%D8%8C%D8%8C%D8%8C-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-
%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%89-%D8%9F/.
179. “Free Syrian Army and Activists take on Al Qaeda in Eastern
Syria,” Syrian Coalition Press Release, April 25, 2014, http://www.
etilaf.us/fsa_al_qaeda; People of Raqqa vow rebellion against ISIS,
no more servility,” Zaman al-Wasl, April 22, 2014, https://www.
zamanalwsl.net/en/news/4635.html.
180. Serene Assir, Agence France Presse, “Disappearances fuel
backlash in jihadist-ruled Raqqa,” Daily Star, April 28, 2014,
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Apr-
28/254609-disappearances-fuel-backlash-in-jihadist-ruled-
raqqa.ashx#axzz38qwStOPP.
181. Tarous al-Diyan, [“Daesh offers 20 Million for who finds out
about the activist who revealed the persona of the Emir of Raqqa”],
Orient News, April 17, 2014, http://orient-news.net/index.
php?page=news_show&id=78690.
182. Agence France-Presse, “Iraqis, Saudis call shots in Raqqa,
ISIL’s Syrian ‘capital’,” pundicity Blog, June 19, 2014, http://www.
aymennjawad.org/14925/iraqis-saudis-call-shots-in-raqqa-isil-
syrian.
183. Ben Hubbard and Anonymous, “Life in a Jihadist Capital:
Order With a Darker Side,” New York Times, July 23, 2014, http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/world/middleeast/islamic-state-
controls-raqqa-syria.html?_r=2.
184. [“The Emir of al-Tanthim in the city who was imprisoned by the
regime was released at the beginning of the revolution”], al-Quds
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185. Hadil Aarja, “ISIS enforces strict religious law in Raqqa,” alSafir
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al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/03/isis-enforces-islamic-
law-raqqa-syria.html.
186. Joanna Paraszczuk, “Lokalizatziya: Dagestani Jamaat in ISIS to
Open Russian Store in Raqqa,” From Chechnya To Syria Blog, May
21, 2014, http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22053.
187. Maria Abi-Habib, “Jihadists Step Up Recruitment Drive,” Wall
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jihadists-step-up-recruitment-drive-1403739743.
188. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of
Epic Battles #10’,” Jihadology, October 14, 2013, http://jihadology.
net/2013/10/14/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-the-
land-of-epic-battles-10/.
189. Aymenn Al-Tamimi, “Lessons in Islamic Learning in the
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham’s Stronghold of Jarabulus,”
pundicity Blog, March 20, 2014, http://www.aymennjawad.
org/2014/02/lessons-in-islamic-learning-in-the-islamic-state.
190. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: ‘Messages from the Land of Epic
Battles #12’,” Jihadology, November 23, 2013, http://jihadology.
net/2013/11/23/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-the-
land-of-epic-battles-12/.
191. “Rule of Fear: Isis Abuses in Detention in Northern Syria,”
Amnesty International, December 19, 2013, http://www.
countercurrents.org/amnesty201213.pdf, p. 8.
192. “Revolutionary Covenant,” Islamic Front Twitter
statement, May 17, 2014, https://twitter.com/IslamicFront_En/
status/467651278605414401. [“Statement from Ha’ia Hamaya alMadaniyeen”],
text provided by All4Syria, June 4, 2014, http://
www.all4syria.info/Archive/150659.
193.“al-FurqanMediapresentsanewaudiomessagefromtheIslamic
State’s Abū Bakr al-Ḥussaynī al-Qurayshī al-Baghdadī: ‘Message To
the Mujahidīn and the Islamic Ummah In the Month Of Ramadan’,”
40www.Understandingwar.org
NOTES
Jihadology, July 1, 2014, http://jihadology.net/2014/07/01/al-
furqan-media-presents-a-new-audio-message-from-the-islamic-
states-abu-bakr-al-%E1%B8%A5ussayni-al-qurayshi-al-baghdadi-
message-to-the-mujahidin-and-the-islamic-ummah-in-the-
month-of-rama/.
194. “Canadian Fighter Urges Muslims to Travel to Syria in
Posthumous IS Video,” SITE Intelligence Group, July 11, 2014.
(al-Hayat Media)
195. “Canadian Fighter Urges Muslims to Travel to Syria in
Posthumous IS Video,” SITE Intelligence Group, July 11, 2014.
(al-Hayat Media)
196. Valerie Szybala, “The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and
the ‘Cleansing of Deir Ez-Zour’,” ISW Backgrounder, http://www.
understandingwar.org/backgrounder/islamic-state-iraq-and-al-
sham-and-%E2%80%9Ccleansing%E2%80%9D-deir-ez-zour.
197. Wilayat al-Baraka Twitter post, [“Delivering Zakat to its
beneficiaries in Wilayat al-Baraka”], July 9, 2014, http://justpaste.
it/zeket.
198. ISIS Wilayat al-Khayr Twitter post, [“Providing Benzine to the
people of al-Khayr city”], July 24, 2014, http://justpaste.it/alkhir6.
199. Jenna Lefler, “Life Under ISIS in Mosul,” ISW Iraq Blog,
July 28, 2014, http://iswiraq.blogspot.com/2014/07/life-underisis-in-mosul.html;
[“‘Daesh’ hands over the security portfolio of
Ninewa to the Islamic police and prohibits vehicles without plates”],
al-Sumaria News, July 15, 2014
200. Jenna Lefler, “Life Under ISIS in Mosul,” ISW Iraq
Blog, July 28, 2014, http://iswiraq.blogspot.com/2014/07/
life-under-isis-in-mosul.html; [“‘Daesh’ hands over the
security portfolio of Ninewa to the Islamic police and prohibits
vehicles without plates”], al-Sumaria News, July 15, 2014,
http://www.alsumaria.tv/news/105657/%D8%AF%D8%A7%
D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%
D 9 % 8 5 % D 9 % 8 4 % D 9 % 8 1 -
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%
86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%84%D9%84%D
8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5
%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7/ar.
201. [“Daesh develops police apparatus in Wilayat Ninewa and
opens the door for volunteers”], Shafaq News, July 12, 2014, http://
www.shafaaq.com/sh2/index.php/news/iraq-news/79954------
q-q---.html.
202. Wilayat Ninewa Twitter post, [“Repairing water pipes damaged
by bombing”], July 17, 2014, http://justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d94/
a5001380/6.jpg.
203. Nadia Massih, “ISIS gains highlight ‘aggressive’ use of
water as weapon of war,” Daily Star, July 21, 2014, http://www.
dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Jul-21/264554-
isis-gains-highlight-aggressive-use-of-water-as-weapon-ofwar.ashx#axzz38DVD5TIG;
[“The interruption of drinking
water on the right side of Mosul after aerial bombardment”],
al-Sumaria News, July 15, 2014, http://www.alsumaria.tv/
news/105646/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B7%D
8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%
AD-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8-
%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%
D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%8A%D9%85/ar.
204. Jenna Lefler, “Life Under ISIS in Mosul,” ISW Iraq Blog, July
28, 2014, http://iswiraq.blogspot.com/2014/07/life-under-isis-
in-mosul.html.
205. The Islamic Caliphate: Developing a Counter-Strategy for a
Counter-State, By Jessica D. Lewis
206. Ben Hubbard and Anonymous, “Life in a Jihadist Capital:
Order With a Darker Side,” New York Times, July 23, 2014, http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/world/middleeast/islamic-state-
controls-raqqa-syria.html?_r=2.
207. Yuka Tachibana, “What Life Is Like in Iraq’s City of Mosul
Under ISIS Rule,” NBC News, July 9, 2014, http://www.nbcnews.
com/storyline/iraq-turmoil/what-life-iraqs-city-mosul-under-
isis-rule-n151461.
41 www.Understandingwar.org
NOTES
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