

## 2. Relative Deprivation and the Impetus to Violence

Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,  
*Wage Labor and Capital*

BENEATH the complexity of human motivation neurophysiologists have identified two great “appetitive systems” that provide the motivating feelings against which everything that happens to us is measured and judged. Stimulation of one of these systems provides our feelings of elation, satisfaction, and love. Stimulation of the other leads to sensations of anxiety, terror, depression, and rage. These feelings color our perceptions of the world and energize our actions. Learning is based on these appetitive systems, first directly, then indirectly: we learn to do and to seek out those things that bring satisfaction, and to avoid those that have noxious effects.<sup>1</sup>

Men’s circumstances change, however, and what they have learned does not always prove suitable for deriving satisfactions from changed circumstances. “We become frustrated,” Cantril writes, “when we sense a conflict between the significances we bring to a situation and which have worked in the past but seem to have no correspondence . . . to the emerging situation we face. . . .”<sup>2</sup> This conflict or tension is fundamentally unpleasant: to be avoided or overcome if possible; to be released in expressive, “nonrealistic” ways if not. It is the fundamental source of both innovation and destruction in human affairs. Why innovative behavior should occur in response to tension is clear enough: the socialization process teaches men to learn to avoid unpleasant stimuli, and only severe new conflicts are likely to paralyze the adaptive capacities men acquire in that process. Destructive behavior may be explained by reference to another fundamental property of the human organism: if men are exposed to noxious

<sup>1</sup> A brief introduction to the neurophysiological literature, and an interpretation of its implications for motivation generally, are provided by Hadley Cantril, “*Sentio, ergo sum: ‘Motivation’ Reconsidered,*” *Journal of Psychology*, LXV (January 1967), 91–107. The appetitive systems were located by neurophysiologists in the mid-1950s and have been identified and studied in both man and other mammals.

<sup>2</sup> Cantril, p. 99.

stimuli that they cannot avoid or overcome, they have an innate disposition to strike out at their sources. Striking out may or may not reduce the frustration, but it seems to be an inherently satisfying response to the tension built up through frustration.<sup>3</sup> The desire to release tension is not the only source of aggression, however. Innovative responses to tensions may themselves include the resort to violence. Most important, the choice of tactical or "realistic" violence as an innovative response to tension is reinforced by the innate disposition to aggression created by the tension. Distinctions between "realistic" and "nonrealistic" conflict or aggression thus may be analytically useful, but the physiological and psychological evidence suggests that elements of the latter are almost always present.<sup>4</sup> It is likely to be absent only among those who are coerced into participation in collective conflict.

These principles operate in a wide range of individual behavior, including the actions of those in rebellion against their political community. We need concepts and hypotheses better suited to analyzing the social and psychological transactions that provide the impetus to political violence among members of a collectivity. "Relative deprivation" (RD) is the term used in the preceding chapter to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the "ought" and the "is" of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence. The term's definition is distinct from its conventional sociological usage, but not so different as to warrant using a neologism like "cramp" or "exigency." This chapter examines the RD concept and its subordinate concepts: values, value classes, value expectations, value capabilities, and value opportunities. The frustration-aggression relationship provides the psychological dynamic for the proposed relationship between intensity of deprivation and the potential for collective violence; consequently it is examined in some detail. Other conceptual interpretations of the impetus to political violence are

<sup>3</sup> The drive properties of frustration-induced aggression are examined and documented by Norman R. F. Maier, *Frustration: The Study of Behavior Without a Goal* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949), passim, and Leonard Berkowitz, "The Concept of Aggressive Drive: Some Additional Considerations," in Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Psychology*, Vol. II (New York: Academic Press, 1965), 307-322, among others. Like the appetitive systems, it appears to be characteristic of man and of higher-order animals generally.

<sup>4</sup> Considerable significance has been attached to the distinction between realistic and nonrealistic conflict by Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1956), 48-55 and passim. The distinction is commonly made in conflict theory, as pointed out by Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder, "The Analysis of Social Conflict: Toward an Overview and Synthesis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1 (June 1957), 221-248.

related to the relative deprivation model, including notions of dissonance, anomie, and social conflict. Finally three patterns of disequilibrium between value expectations and value capabilities are proposed to facilitate dynamic analysis.

### Relative Deprivation Defined

*Hypothesis V.1:* The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity.

*Relative deprivation* (RD) is defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping. (These concepts are more precisely defined below.) The emphasis of the hypothesis is on the perception of deprivation; people may be subjectively deprived with reference to their expectations even though an objective observer might not judge them to be in want. Similarly, the existence of what the observer judges to be abject poverty or "absolute deprivation" is not necessarily thought to be unjust or irremediable by those who experience it. As Runciman puts it, "if people have no reason to expect or hope for more than they can achieve, they will be less discontented with what they have, or even grateful simply to be able to hold on to it."<sup>5</sup> The concept of RD was first used systematically in the 1940s by the authors of *The American Soldier* to denote the feelings of an individual who lacks some status or conditions that he thinks he should have, his standards of what he should have generally being determined by reference to what some other person or groups has.<sup>6</sup> The concept is widely used in sociological research, where it is usually assumed for operational purposes that value standards are set by reference to some group or status with which an individual does or is thought to identify.<sup>7</sup> It is more gen-

<sup>5</sup> W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 9.

<sup>6</sup> See note 27, chap. 1.

<sup>7</sup> See for instance Runciman, 11 ff; David F. Aberle, "A Note on Relative Deprivation Theory," in Sylvia L. Thrupp, ed., *Millennial Dreams in Action: Essays in Comparative Study* (The Hague: Mouton, 1962), 209-214; Gordon Rose, "Anomie and Deviation: A Conceptual Framework for Empirical Studies," *British Journal of Sociology*, xvii (March 1966), 29-45; Peter Townsend, "The Meanings of Poverty," *British Journal of Sociology*, xiii (September 1962), 210-227; and the status-inconsistency literature beginning with Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," *American Sociological Review*, xix (August 1954), 405-413.

erally recognized, however, that value standards can have other sources. An individual's point of reference may be his own past condition, an abstract ideal, or the standards articulated by a leader as well as a "reference group." The definition used here makes no assumptions about the sources of value expectations; it is similar to Aberle's definition of RD as "a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and actuality."<sup>8</sup>

*Values* are the desired events, objects, and conditions for which men strive.<sup>9</sup> The values most relevant to a theory of political violence are the general categories of conditions valued by many men, not those idiosyncratically sought by particular individuals. In psychological terms, values are the goal objects of human motivation, presumably attributable to or derived from basic "needs" or "instincts." There have been innumerable attempts to identify and categorize "needs," "goals," or "values" for purposes of psychological, sociological, and political analysis. Freud postulated a single basic need, Eros; Henry Murray listed 12 "viscerogenic" and 28 "psychogenic" needs.<sup>10</sup> Three influential and reasonably parsimonious lists are summarized in table 1 and related to one another. A three-fold categorization that includes *welfare values*, *power values*, and *interpersonal values* is used here. There is no need for originality in such a scheme; it is a composite typology, representing values common to other schemes and relevant to the genesis of collective RD.

*Welfare values* are those that contribute directly to physical well-being and self-realization. They include the physical goods of life—food, shelter, health services, and physical comforts—and the development and use of physical and mental abilities. These two classes of welfare values are referred to below as *economic* and *self-actualization* values. Self-actualization values may be instrumental to the attainment of other welfare values and vice versa. Aside from this, however, Maslow and Davies have argued persuasively that "self-actualization" is an end in itself for many men: we take intrinsic satisfaction in exercising our intellects and our hands.<sup>11</sup> *Power values* are those that determine the extent to which men can influence the actions of others and avoid unwanted interference by others in their own actions. Power values especially salient for political violence include the desire

<sup>8</sup> Aberle, 209.

<sup>9</sup> Following the usage of Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 55-56.

<sup>10</sup> Summarily listed and discussed in James C. Davies, *Human Nature in Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1963).

<sup>11</sup> Maslow, *passim*; Davies, 53-60.

TABLE 1  
Four Lists of Value Categories

Maslow's Need Hierarchy <sup>a</sup>	Lasswell and Kaplan's Values <sup>b</sup>	Runciman's Dimensions of Social Inequality <sup>c</sup>	Composite Typology
WELFARE VALUES			
Physical	Well-being, wealth	Economic class	} Welfare values
Self-actualization	Skill, enlightenment	—	
DEFERENCE VALUES			
Safety, order	Power	Power	} Power values
Love, belongingness	Affection	—	
Self-esteem	Respect Rectitude	Status —	

<sup>a</sup>A. H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review*, L (1943), 370-396, summarized and discussed in James C. Davies, *Human Nature in Politics: The Dynamics of Political Behavior* (New York: Wiley, 1963), 8-63. Maslow postulates a hierarchy among needs: safety and order needs will not emerge until physical needs are satisfied, love needs emerge only after safety needs are satisfied, etc. The needs are listed here in Maslow's proposed order with the exception of self-actualization, which he suggests emerges after love needs are satisfied.

<sup>b</sup>*Power and Society*, 55-56.

<sup>c</sup>*Relative Deprivation*, chap. 3. Runciman does not treat these explicitly as values or needs but as conditions that groups have in varying degrees, and with respect to which people judge their relative satisfaction or deprivation.

to participate in collective decision-making—to vote, to take part in political competition, to become a member of the political elite—and the related desires for self-determination and security, for example freedom from oppressive political regulation or from disorder. These two classes of power values are referred to below as *participation* and *security* values. *Interpersonal values* are the psychological satisfactions we seek in nonauthoritative interaction with other individuals and groups. These values include the desire for status, i.e., occupancy of a generally recognized role by virtue of which we are granted some measure of prestige by those with whom we interact; the related need to participate in stable, supportive groups—family, community, associations—that provide companionship and affection; and the sense of certainty that derives from shared adherence to beliefs about the nature of society and one's place in it, and to norms governing social interaction. These three classes of interpersonal values are labeled *status*, *communality*, and *ideational coherence*.

The *value expectations* of a collectivity are the average value positions to which its members believe they are justifiably entitled. *Value position* is the amount or level of a value actually attained. Value expectations refer to both present and future conditions. Men ordinarily expect to keep what they have; they also generally have a set of expectations and demands about what they should have in the future, which is usually as much or more than what they have at present. It is important to note that value expectations are defined with reference to *justifiable* value positions, meaning what men believe they are entitled to get or maintain, not merely what they faintly hope to attain. Hoselitz and Willner make a precisely comparable distinction between expectation and aspiration:

Expectations are a manifestation of the prevailing norms set by the immediate social and cultural environment. Whether expressed in economic or social terms, the basis upon which the individual forms his expectations is the sense of what is rightfully owed to him. The source of that sense of rightness may be what his ancestors have enjoyed, what he has had in the past, what tradition ascribes to him, and his position in relation to that of others in the society. Aspirations, on the other hand, represent that which he would like to have but has not necessarily had or considered his due. . . .<sup>12</sup>

The *value capabilities* of a collectivity are the average value positions its members perceive themselves capable of attaining or maintaining. Value capabilities also have both present and future connotations. In the present, value capabilities are represented by what men have actually been able to attain or have been provided by their environment: their *value position*. In the future, value capabilities are what men believe their skills, their fellows, and their rulers will, in the course of time, permit them to keep or attain: their *value potential*. It is possible to distinguish between perceived and actual value potential: men's capacities for attaining their value expectations may be substantially greater or less than they believe them to be. However, it is perceived value potential that determines present behavior. It is also likely that perceived value potential is considerably more important than present value position in determining how people assess their capabilities. The attained value positions of a group may

<sup>12</sup> Bert Hoselitz and Ann Willner, "Economic Development, Political Strategies, and American Aid," in Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *The Revolution in World Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1962), 363.

be quite low with respect to value expectations, but perceived deprivation and manifestations of discontent will tend to be low to the extent that potential is perceived to be high. The obverse relationship characterizes some prerevolutionary societies: attained value positions appear relatively high with respect to value expectations, but the potential for increasing or even maintaining value positions is perceived to be declining. These assertions are documented in the following chapters.

The courses of action people have available to them for attaining or maintaining their desired value positions are their *value opportunities*, three types of which can be distinguished: personal, societal, and political. *Personal opportunities* are individuals' inherited and acquired capacities for value-enhancing action. Inherited capacities are normally distributed in most collectivities and thus have little relevance to a theory of collective violence. The technical skills and general knowledge acquired through education, however, can greatly increase men's sense of personal competence, particularly in improving their material value positions. *Societal opportunities* are the normal courses of action available to members of a collectivity for direct value-enhancing action. Societal opportunities for economic value attainment include the range and number of remunerative occupations, the ease of access to those occupations, and the economic resources available to compensate those engaged. Participation values can be attained through routinized channels for political participation and recruitment to the political elite; the attainment of security values is largely a function of the capacity of the political system for simultaneously minimizing detailed regulation of human activity and maintaining internal order. Interpersonal values are enhanced to the extent that familial and communal life is free from external disruption, and to the extent that there are generally accepted norms on the basis of which status and respect are accorded in interpersonal relations. *Political opportunities* are the normal courses of action available to members of a collectivity for inducing others to provide them with value satisfactions. Political opportunities refer to political actions as means rather than ends; opportunities for political participation as an end in itself are comprised under societal value opportunities. The same procedures and institutions that provide the latter usually also provide the means by which collectivities can demand welfare and power benefits from a government. There are other kinds of opportunities that are "political" in the sense intended here, including collective bargaining procedures by which workers can demand greater welfare benefits from their employers, and as-

sociational activity by subcultural groups designed to increase their members' status in dealing with members of other groups.

The *scope* of RD is its prevalence with respect to each class of values among the members of a collectivity. Some deprivations are characteristic of some members of all groups. Deprivation is relevant to the disposition to collective violence to the extent that many people feel discontented about the same things. Unexpected personal deprivations such as failure to obtain an expected promotion or the infidelity of a spouse ordinarily affect few people at any given time and are therefore narrow in scope. Events and patterns of conditions like the suppression of a political party, a drastic inflation, or the decline of a group's status relative to its reference group are likely to precipitate feelings of RD among whole groups or categories of people and are wide in scope. Aberle dichotomizes what is here called scope into two general classes of deprivations, those that are personal and those that are group experiences.<sup>13</sup> Scope is better regarded as a continuum: it should be possible to identify, for example by survey techniques, the proportion of people in any collectivity that feels deprived with respect to any specified class of values.

The *intensity* of RD is the extent of negative affect that is associated with its perception, or in other words the sharpness of discontent or anger to which it gives rise. Runciman similarly speaks of the "degree" of deprivation, defined as "the intensity with which it is felt."<sup>14</sup> Intensity, like scope, is subject to direct empirical assessment: one can infer the intensity of men's feelings about RD using interview, projective, and content analytic techniques, among others.<sup>15</sup> Moreover it is possible to specify a number of properties of value expectations and value capabilities that increase or decrease the scope and intensity of deprivation, and that can be examined without necessarily relying on survey techniques. Some determinants of the scope and intensity of RD are examined in the following chapter.

*Potential for collective violence*, the dependent variable of the hypothesis stated at the outset of this section, is defined as the scope and intensity of the disposition among members of a collectivity to take violent action against others. For many research purposes this potential may be treated as a hypothetical construct, a disposition to act inferred to exist in the minds of many members

<sup>13</sup> Aberle, 210.

<sup>14</sup> Runciman, 10.

<sup>15</sup> One appropriate interviewing technique, the self-anchoring scale, is used in Hadley Cantril, *The Pattern of Human Concerns* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965).



of a collectivity but measured only in terms of its antecedents, the intensity and scope of RD, or in terms of its consequences, the magnitude of collective violence. If it could not conceivably be assessed more directly there would be no point in stating hypotheses about it; the only testable hypothesis would be that the greater the intensity and scope of relative deprivation, the greater the magnitude of collective violence. In principle, however, the potential for collective violence *can* be independently assessed. One means is the use of interview techniques that specifically ask people whether they are prepared to participate in a riot, or that allow them to project violent sentiments in response to ambivalent stimuli. These techniques can be used in structured or laboratory situations. They also can be and have been employed in natural populations. Louis Harris, for example, has polled black Americans about their willingness to riot.<sup>16</sup> It also is possible to construct simulation studies of prerevolutionary situations and assess the responses of players, an approach being developed by Schwartz.<sup>17</sup> This diversity of approaches seems to justify treating potential for collective violence as a crucial intervening variable between deprivation-induced discontent and political violence, rather than as a merely hypothetical and superfluous construct.

### The Sources of Aggression<sup>18</sup>

Psychological theories about the origins of human aggression provide an explicit motivational explanation for the proposed causal link between relative deprivation and collective violence. There is a variety of theoretical writings on this question, some of it speculative, some of it based on empirical research. Some psychological "theories" about the sources of aggressive behavior can be disregarded at the outset. There is little support for pseudopsychological assertions that most or all revolutionaries or conspirators are deviants, fools, or the maladjusted.<sup>19</sup> Psychodynamic explanations of the "revolutionary personality" may be useful for

<sup>16</sup> William Brink and Louis Harris, *Black and White: A Study of U.S. Racial Attitudes Today* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 266.

<sup>17</sup> David Schwartz, "Political Alienation: A Preliminary Experiment on the Psychology of Revolution's First Stage," paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (1967).

<sup>18</sup> Portions of this section first appeared in Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, xx (January 1968), 247-251.

<sup>19</sup> See for example Kurt Riezler, "On the Psychology of the Modern Revolution," *Social Research*, x (September 1943), 320-336; portions of Eric Hoffer's generally useful *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Harper, 1951); and Donald J. Goodspeed, *The Conspirators: A Study of the Coup d'Etat* (New York: The Viking Press, 1962).

microanalysis of particular events, but contribute relatively little to general theories of collective action.<sup>20</sup> Aggression-prone victims of maladaptive socialization processes are found in every society, and among the actors in most outbreaks of political violence, but they are much more likely to be mobilized by strife than to constitute it in its entirety. Nor can a general theory of political strife be based solely on culturally specific theories of modal personality traits, though it should take account of their effects (discussed in chapter 6). The most generally relevant psychological theories are those that deal with the sources and characteristics of aggression in all men, regardless of culture. Such psychological theory provides a motivational base for theory about political violence and provides a means for identifying and specifying the operation of some explanatory variables.

There are three distinguishable psychological assumptions about the generic sources of human aggression: that aggression is solely instinctive, that it is solely learned, or that it is an innate response activated by frustration.<sup>21</sup> One or another of these is implicit in most theoretical approaches to civil strife that have no explicit motivational base. The instinct theories of aggression, represented among others by Freud's qualified attribution of the impulse to destructiveness to a death instinct and by Lorenz's view of aggression as a survival-enhancing instinct, assume that most or all men have within them an autonomous source of aggressive impulses, a drive to aggress that, in Lorenz's words, exhibits "irresistible outbreaks which recur with rhythmical regularity."<sup>22</sup> Although there is no definitive support for this assumption, its advocates, including Freud and Lorenz, have often applied it to the explanation of collective as well as individual aggression.<sup>23</sup> The assump-

<sup>20</sup> A recent study of this type is E. Victor Wolfenstein, *The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

<sup>21</sup> A threat-aggression sequence is discussed below.

<sup>22</sup> Konard Lorenz, *On Aggression* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1966), chap. 4, quotation from xii. The aggressive instinct in animals and man is said ordinarily to be triggered by the presence or approach of another creature. In the absence of such an activator, however, aggression will occur spontaneously. Such assertions are supported by somewhat idiosyncratic observational reports on animal behavior.

<sup>23</sup> See for example Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. Joan Riviere (London: The Hogarth Press, 1930); Lorenz, chaps. 13, 14; and Franz Alexander, "The Psychiatric Aspects of War and Peace," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVI (1941), 504-520. Freud's instinctual interpretation of aggression is advanced in his later works; his early view was that aggression is a response to frustration of pleasure-seeking behavior. For reviews and critiques of other instinct theories of aggression see Leonard Berkowitz, *Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), chap. 1, and Ralph L. Holloway, Jr., "Human Aggression: The Need for a Species-Specific Framework," in Morton Fried and others, eds., *War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression* (Garden City, New York: Natural History Press, 1968), 29-48.

tion is evident in Hobbes' characterization of man in the state of nature, and perhaps implicit in Nieburg's recent concern for "the people's capability for outraged, uncontrolled, bitter, and bloody violence,"<sup>24</sup> but plays no significant role in contemporary theories of civil strife.

Just the opposite assumption, that aggressive behavior is solely or primarily learned, characterizes the work of some child and social psychologists, whose evidence indicates that some aggressive behaviors are learned and used strategically in the service of particular goals—aggression by children and adolescents to secure attention, by adults to express dominance strivings, by groups in competition for scarce values, by military personnel in the service of national policy.<sup>25</sup> This assumption, that violence is a learned response, rationalistically chosen and dispassionately employed, is common to a number of recent theoretical approaches to collective conflict. Among theorists of revolution, Johnson repeatedly, though not consistently, speaks of civil violence as "purposeful," as "forms of behavior *intended* to disorient the behavior of others, thereby bringing about the demise of a hated social system."<sup>26</sup> Timasheff regards revolution as a "residual" event, an expedient "resorted to when other ways of overcoming tensions have failed."<sup>27</sup> Morrison attributes rural discontent and strife in developing nations to "relative deprivation," defined as it is here, but he explicitly assumes rationality in the behavior of the deprived when he hypothesizes that "all attempts to reduce discontent are selected on the basis of the actor's perception of the probability of the attempt's reducing the discontent."<sup>28</sup> Parsons attempts to fit political violence into the framework of social interaction theory, treating the resort to force as a way of acting chosen by the actor(s) for purposes of deterrence, punishment, or symbolic demonstration of capacity to act.<sup>29</sup> Schelling represents those conflict theorists who explicitly

<sup>24</sup> H. L. Nieburg, "The Threat of Violence and Social Change," *American Political Science Review*, LVI (December 1962), 870.

<sup>25</sup> A characteristic study is Albert Bandura and Richard H. Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963).

<sup>26</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 12, 13, italics added.

<sup>27</sup> Nicholas S. Timasheff, *War and Revolution* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 154.

<sup>28</sup> Denton E. Morrison, "Relative Deprivation and Rural Discontent in Developing Countries: A Theoretical Proposal," paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (1966), 6.

<sup>29</sup> Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process," in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 34–35.

assume rational behavior and interdependence of adversaries' decisions in all types of conflict.<sup>30</sup>

The third psychological assumption is that much aggression occurs as a response to frustration. "Frustration" is an interference with goal-directed behavior; "aggression" is behavior designed to injure, physically or otherwise, those toward whom it is directed. The disposition to respond aggressively when frustrated is part of man's biological makeup; there is a biologically inherent tendency, in men and animals, to attack the frustrating agent. This is not necessarily incompatible with the preceding two assumptions. Frustration-aggression theory is more systematically developed, however, and has substantially more empirical support than theories that assume either that all men have a free-flowing source of destructive energy or that all aggression is imitative and instrumental.

The most influential formulation of frustration-aggression theory was proposed by Dollard and his colleagues at Yale in 1939. The basic postulate is "that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression." It is clear from the remainder of the study that the second part of the postulate was not intended to suggest either that aggression was the only possible response to frustration, or that there was no difference between the instigation to aggression, subsequently called "anger," and the actual occurrence of aggression.<sup>31</sup> Miller later offered a clarification: frustration produces instigations to various responses, one of which is aggression. If the non-aggressive responses do not relieve the frustration, "the greater is the probability that the instigation to aggression eventually will become dominant so that some response of aggression will occur."<sup>32</sup> Empirical studies identify fundamental responses to frustration other than aggression. Himmelweit sum-

<sup>30</sup> Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 4.

<sup>31</sup> John Dollard and others, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), quotation from p. 1. Major summaries of the experimental and theoretical literature include Hilde T. Himmelweit, "Frustration and Aggression: A Review of Recent Experimental Work," in *Psychological Factors of Peace and War*, ed. T. H. Pear (London: Hutchinson, 1950), 161-91; Elton D. McNeil, "Psychology and Aggression," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (June 1959), 195-294; Arnold H. Buss, *The Psychology of Aggression* (New York: John Wiley, 1961); Aubrey J. Yates, *Frustration and Conflict* (New York: John Wiley, 1962), especially chaps. 2-4; and Berkowitz, *Aggression*.

<sup>32</sup> Neal E. Miller and others, "The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis," *Psychological Review*, XLVIII (July 1941), quotation from 339.

marizes experimental evidence that frustration in children can lead to regression in the form of lowering intellectual performance, and to evasion.<sup>33</sup> Four response patterns were found in an examination of frustration-induced behaviors in a New Guinea tribe: submission, dependence, avoidance, and aggression. The primary emotional response to frustrations among children is rage or anger, modified by later learning experiences.<sup>34</sup> Prolonged frustration, in the form of continuous unemployment, has been observed to result in apathy.<sup>35</sup>

These findings and observations are qualifications of the basic frustration-aggression thesis, not refutations of it. The basic explanatory element that frustration-aggression theory contributes to the understanding of human conflict, and specifically to the analysis of political violence, is the principle that anger functions as a drive. In the recent reformulation of the theory by Berkowitz, the perception of frustration is said to arouse anger. Aggressive responses tend to occur only when they are evoked by an external cue, that is, when the angered person sees an attackable object or person that he associates with the source of frustration. This argument, and the experimental evidence that supports it, suggests that an angered person is not likely to strike out at any object in his environment, but only at the targets he thinks are responsible. The crucial point is that occurrence of such an attack is an inherently satisfying response to anger; if the attacker has done some harm to his frustrator, his anger is reduced, whether or not he succeeds in reducing the level of frustration per se.<sup>36</sup> If frustration continues, aggression is likely to recur. If it is reduced as a result of the attack, the tendency to attack is reinforced, and the onset of anger in the future is increasingly likely to be accompanied by aggression.

Maier has undertaken many studies which support the thesis that innate frustration-induced behaviors become ends in themselves for the actors, unrelated to further goals, and qualitatively different from goal-directed behavior. He suggests that there are four frustration-induced responses, including regression, fixation, and resignation as well as aggression. Frustration-instigated behavior is distinguished from goal-directed behavior by a number of

<sup>33</sup> Himmelweit, 172.

<sup>34</sup> J. M. V. Whiting, "The Frustration Complex in Kwoma Society," *Man*, XLIV (November-December 1944), 140-144.

<sup>35</sup> Marie Lazarsfeld and Hans Zeisel, "Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal," *Psychologische Monographien*, v (1933), summarized in Himmelweit, 172.

<sup>36</sup> On the drive properties of anger see Berkowitz, "The Concept of Aggressive Drive," and S. Feshbach, "The Function of Aggression and the Regulation of Aggressive Drive," *Psychological Review*, LXXI (July 1964), 257-272.

characteristics: it tends to be fixed and compulsive; it is not necessarily deterred by punishment, which may instead increase the degree of frustration; it takes the form most readily available, little influenced by anticipated consequences; and it is satisfying in itself.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore the original goal which suffered frustration may become largely irrelevant to behavior. "Aggression then becomes a function of the frustration, the previously existing goal response having been replaced by behavior which is controlled by an entirely different process."<sup>38</sup>

The threat-aggression sequence is another behavioral mechanism that a number of psychologists have argued is as fundamental, if not as common, as the frustration-aggression relationship. Clinical and observational evidence suggests that the greater the perceived threat to life, the greater the violent response. According to Wedge, "When the value directly at stake is life, violent response occurs as reaction to fear rather than expression of anger."<sup>39</sup> Surveys of the effects of bombing on Japanese, German, and English civilian populations during World War II show that heavy bombings—including those of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—first produced acute fear, not anger, but also generally led to increased hostility toward both the enemy and the government that failed to prevent the bombings.<sup>40</sup> Experiments with animals provide substantiating evidence: events that immediately and actively threaten the continued existence of the organism trigger avoidance-survival mechanisms, which can include extraordinarily violent behavior. The threat-aggression sequence can be interpreted as a special case of the frustration-aggression relationship, as Berkowitz does. A threat to life is an anticipated frustration; as the degree of threat increases, fear and anger rise simultaneously, and the extent to which fear predominates may be "a function of the individual's perceived power to control or hurt his frustrater relative to the frustrater's power to control or harm him."<sup>41</sup> It nonetheless seems likely that people have a fundamental disposition to respond ag-

<sup>37</sup> Maier, 92-115, 159-161; also see Yates, 24-30, 36-56.

<sup>38</sup> Norman R. F. Maier, "The Role of Frustration in Social Movements," *Psychological Review*, LXIX (November 1942), 587.

<sup>39</sup> Bryant Wedge, "The Case Study of Student Political Violence: Brazil, 1964, and the Dominican Republic, 1965," *World Politics*, XXI (January 1969), 195-196. Also see Jerome Frank, *Sanity and Survival: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 75.

<sup>40</sup> I. L. Janis, *Air War and Emotional Stress; Psychological Studies of Bombing and Civilian Defense* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951), 4-152. Comparable reactions have been observed in many disaster studies. See for example George W. Baker and Dwight W. Chapman, eds., *Man and Society in Disaster* (New York: Basic Books, 1962).

<sup>41</sup> Berkowitz, *Aggression*, 42-46, quotation from 45.

gressively to extreme fear itself; if so, the response can reinforce and be reinforced by frustration-induced anger. The relationship appears especially relevant in evaluating the effect of police and military actions in precipitating and prolonging collective violence.

The frustration-aggression and the related threat-aggression mechanisms provide the basic motivational link between RD and the potential for collective violence. They are not inconsistent with the presence of learned and purposive elements in acts of individual and collective violence, however. Men feel deprived with respect to what they have learned to value and to what they have learned to do. The beliefs and symbols that determine the timing, forms, and objects of violence are learned. If their anger is powerful and persistent, men can employ much reason and inventiveness in devising ways to give it violent expression. Some such men may learn to value violence for its own sake. But much of this learning takes place after anger has already been aroused; individuals who are dispassionately violent often are using techniques that proved useful and satisfying in response to past frustrations.

There also is an evident sense of purpose among many of the participants in most outbreaks of collective violence, in the sense that they expect violent action to enhance their value position. Revolutionary leaders put their followers' anger to their purpose of seizing power; rioters take advantage of disorder to loot stores for food and furniture; demonstrators hope to persuade their rulers to take remedial action. The nature and strength of these purposes are major determinants of the form and tactics of collective violence. But in most instances they appear to reinforce or channel the impetus to violence, and are infrequently an autonomous motive for violence. This assertion is made without an attempt to support it, but it is susceptible to empirical test. It is true, and the frustration-aggression relationship is significant for political violence, to the extent that actors in political violence manifest or admit to some degree of anger.<sup>42</sup>

In summary, the primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be the frustration-aggression mechanism. Frustration does not necessarily lead to violence, and violence for

<sup>42</sup> Anger is quite often accompanied by other affective elements, notably excitement; the test proposed here is whether anger is present in substantial degree. Excitement does not seem to be an independent affective state but a general emotional arousal that precedes and accompanies goal-consummatory activity; the angry man who anticipates a riot is excited for much the same reasons that a starving man is excited at the smell of food cooking.

some men is motivated by expectations of gain. The anger induced by frustration, however, is a motivating force that disposes men to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities. If frustrations are sufficiently prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is quite likely, if not certain, to occur. To conclude that the relationship is not relevant to individual or collective violence is akin to the assertion that the law of gravitation is irrelevant to the theory of flight because not everything that goes up falls back to earth in accord with the basic gravitational principle. The frustration-aggression mechanism is in this sense analogous to the law of gravity: men who are frustrated have an innate disposition to do violence to its source in proportion to the intensity of their frustration, just as objects are attracted to one another in direct proportion to their relative masses and inverse proportion to their distance. A number of other variables influence the behavior of men, and of objects, in such circumstances: for men, their beliefs, inhibitions, and social environment; for objects in a gravitational field, their energies, configuration, and the properties of the medium in which they are situated. But it seems even less feasible to account for political violence without reference to the properties of men that dispose them to violence than it is to construct a theory of flight without reference to the law of gravitation. On earth, gravity can be assumed a constant; among men, levels of frustration vary greatly.

### **Relative Deprivation and Analogous Causes of Political Violence**

Relative deprivation, defined as perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities, is sufficiently general to comprise or be related to most of the general "preconditions of revolution" identified in other theoretical analyses. Some of these conceptual relationships are examined here, not to demonstrate that RD is somehow a "correct" concept and that others are not, but to show that in addition to its relatively clear definition it can synthesize diverse other notions.

For Aristotle the principal cause of revolution is the aspiration for economic or political equality on the part of the common people who lack it, and the aspiration of oligarchs for greater inequality than they have, i.e. a discrepancy in both instances between what people have of political and economic goods relative to what they think is justly theirs.<sup>43</sup> Edwards, writing some twenty-three centuries later, asserts that all revolutions are due to "repression of

<sup>43</sup> *The Politics of Aristotle*, trans. J. E. C. Welldon (New York: Macmillan, 1883, 1905), 338-342.



elemental wishes” and that the violence of any revolution is proportional to the degree of such repression. The sense of repression, or “balked disposition,” develops when “people come to feel that their legitimate aspirations and ideas are being repressed or perverted, that their entirely proper desires and ambitions are being hindered and thwarted. . . .”<sup>44</sup> Pettee’s concept of “cramp” similarly resembles RD. People feel “cramped” when they find that satisfaction of their basic needs for liberty and security is interfered with, and moreover regard this repression as unnecessary and avoidable, hence unjustified. “A revolution takes place when the great majority of the society feel cramped beyond tolerance.”<sup>45</sup>

Analogous concepts are used by contemporary theorists. Lasswell and Kaplan attribute political instability to the discrepancy between expectations and the “degree of . . . realization of value for the mass. . . . It is a low degree of realization—disparity between value position and value demanded and expected—which is most directly effective.”<sup>46</sup> Zollschan argues that all activity, including revolutionary activity, begins with “exigency,” defined as “a discrepancy (for a person) between a consciously or unconsciously desired or expected state of affairs and an actual situation.”<sup>47</sup> Both of these concepts make assumptions about states of mind of revolutionary actors, as do the concepts mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Johnson makes no such assumptions in identifying a “disequibrated social system” as a necessary precondition for revolution, which is explicitly a macro-analytic concept. Its manifestations at the individual level of analysis may be readily interpreted in terms of RD, however: it constitutes a discrepancy between men’s value expectations (collectively, their “value structures”) and their means for attaining those values (collectively, the social system’s “pattern of adaptation to the environment” and its capacity to “fulfill functional requisites”).<sup>48</sup>

Some theorists explicitly use the terms “frustration” or “deprivation” to represent the impetus to collective violence. Davies attributes revolutionary outbreaks to the frustration which results

<sup>44</sup> Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), 3–4, 30–33.

<sup>45</sup> George S. Pettee, *The Process of Revolution* (New York: Harper, 1938), chap. 2, quotation from 33.

<sup>46</sup> Lasswell and Kaplan, 264.

<sup>47</sup> George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch, eds., *Explorations in Social Change* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), xxv, 89.

<sup>48</sup> Johnson, chap. 5. For a similar analysis see Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), chaps. 2, 3.

from a short-term decline in achievement following a long-term increase that generated expectations about continuing increase.<sup>49</sup> Lerner similarly describes the gap between what people want and what they get as “frustrating” and suggests revolutionary consequences. “The spread of frustration in areas developing less rapidly than their people wish can be seen as the outcome of a deep imbalance between achievement and aspiration . . . aspiration outruns achievement so far that many people, even if they are making some progress toward their goal, are dissatisfied because they get so much less than they want.”<sup>50</sup> Crozier says that the one element common to all rebels is frustration, defined as “the inability to do something one badly wants to do, through circumstances beyond one’s control.”<sup>51</sup> The Feierabends associate political instability with aggressive behavior, which is said to vary with the extent of “systemic frustration.” The extent of systemic frustration is the ratio of social want satisfaction to social want formation, or, in RD terms, the discrepancy between present value position and value expectations.<sup>52</sup>

Relative deprivation is related to frustration by Coser, and applied to the explanation of suicide rates.<sup>53</sup> Hoselitz and Willner, extending their distinction between expectations and aspirations, link deprivation with the potential for revolution.

Unrealized aspirations produce feelings of disappointment, but unrealized expectations result in feelings of deprivation. Disappointment is generally tolerable; deprivation is often intolerable. The deprived individual feels impelled to remedy, by whatever means are available, the material and psychic frustrations produced in him. Whereas disappointment may breed the seeds of incipient revolution, deprivation serves as a catalyst for revolutionary action.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>49</sup> James C. Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” *American Sociological Review*, xxvii (February 1962), 5–19. The Davies thesis is also used by Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, “A Theory of Revolution,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, xi (September 1967), 264–280, who characterize the discrepancy as a “revolutionary gap.”

<sup>50</sup> Daniel Lerner, “Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization: A Set of Considerations,” in Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 327–350, quotations from 330–335.

<sup>51</sup> Brian Crozier, *The Rebels: A Study of Post-War Insurrections* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1960), 15–16.

<sup>52</sup> Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, “Aggressive Behaviors Within Politics, 1948–1962: A Cross-National Study,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, x (September 1966), 250–251.

<sup>53</sup> Lewis A. Coser, *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 56–62.

<sup>54</sup> Hoselitz and Willner, 363.

The anthropological literature on American Indian response to white conquest also makes use of the deprivation concept. Nash, for example, shows how deprivation may occur either through acceptance or rejection by Indians of white values and skills, and proposes that the aggressive components in Indian revivalism are a response to that deprivation.<sup>55</sup> Geschwender attributes the American Negro revolt of the 1960s to "relative deprivation," defined in its conventional sociological sense of status discrepancy vis-à-vis a reference group.<sup>56</sup> Galtung, although he does not use the concept of relative deprivation per se, attributes aggression within and among societies to status discrepancy, or "rank disequilibrium," in what is essentially a generalized rephrasing of the Aristotelian thesis with which this catalog of concepts began. If men or groups are high on one dimension of a stratification system, but low on another, e.g., if they have high power or education but low income, they are said to be disposed to use aggression to attain a high or equilibrated position on all dimensions.<sup>57</sup>

This catalog could be extended at length, but only at the risk of belaboring the obvious. Almost all theories that purport to explain violent collective behavior assign a central place to a variable or concept that generally and often specifically resembles RD as it is defined here. Some salient characteristics of the RD variable are not necessarily incorporated in these other concepts, however. Some of them, particularly those making use of "want/get" formulations, make no reference to the justifiability or intensity of men's value expectations, nor to the theoretical desirability of taking into account both actual and anticipated discrepancies between goals and attainments. Moreover, while many of them specify by illustration the kinds of societal and political conditions that constitute the variable or increase its magnitude, few include specific propositions about its determinants, and only some suggest categories for classifying the variable's manifestations. Finally, many theories do not provide a motivational rationale for the causal connection they propose between the variables and the violent events toward which it is supposed to dispose men.

<sup>55</sup> Philleo Nash, "The Place of Religious Revivalism in the Formation of the Intercultural Community on Klamath Reservation," *Social Anthropology of North American Tribes*, ed. Fred Eggan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), 377-442.

<sup>56</sup> James A. Geschwender, "Social Structure and the Negro Revolt: An Examination of Some Hypotheses," *Social Forces*, XLIII (December 1964), 248-256.

<sup>57</sup> Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 2, 1964, 95-119. Galtung also posits several variables that intervene between rank disequilibrium and aggression, including lack of alternative means and the extent of cultural experience in aggression.

There are three other concepts frequently employed in the analysis of disruptive collective behavior that are not directly analogous to RD but that appear to be alternatives to it: dissonance, anomie, and conflict. Without passing judgment on their analytic usefulness in other contexts, it can be suggested that they relate to conditions either more or less specific than RD.

Dissonance is a concept widely used in individual psychology. In Festinger's formulation of cognitive dissonance theory, the term refers to inconsistency between two cognitive elements or clusters of elements. Cognitive elements, "the things a person knows about himself, about his behavior, and about his surroundings," are dissonant if "the obverse of one element would follow from the other."<sup>58</sup> For example, a citizen who believed that his government would begin a war only if attacked and then learned through news media that it had initiated a war without provocation is said to experience dissonance. The assumption is that people sensing dissonance are motivated to reduce or eliminate it, which they can do by changing their behavior or beliefs, by changing the corresponding situation, or by seeking new information to reduce dissonance while avoiding information that would increase dissonance.<sup>59</sup> Depending on the magnitude of dissonance, i.e. the importance or value of the dissonant elements to him, the citizen may change his views about the government, attempt to change the personnel or policies of the government through political action, or, most likely in this instance, deny the validity of the evidence that the war was begun without provocation and be receptive to any evidence of provocation, however flimsy. Many hypotheses have been proposed and considerable empirical research done on effects of dissonance in decision-making, compliance, receptivity to information, social support for mass phenomena, and the influence process in small groups.<sup>60</sup>

The dissonance and RD concepts neither comprise nor subsume one another but overlap. RD is perceived with reference to individuals' welfare, power, and interpersonal value expectations; dissonance can obtain among any set of cognitive elements, not only those that relate to valued goods and conditions of life. Moreover only some perceptions of deprivation entail dissonance, in its original sense of contradiction among cognitive elements.

<sup>58</sup> Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), quotations from 4, 13. The perception of contradiction can arise on logical, experiential, cultural, or other grounds, according to Festinger.

<sup>59</sup> Festinger, 18-24.

<sup>60</sup> Festinger, *passim*; Jack W. Brehm and Arthur R. Cohen, *Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance* (New York: Wiley, 1962).

Most black Americans know very well that their expectations of economic and social equality will be only grudgingly and gradually satisfied, if at all; the failure of the political system to take massive remedial action is “dissonant” only for those Negroes who at one time thought that it would. For the great majority the lack of action merely confirms prior cognitions of the system and intensifies discontent. The dissonance concept and hypotheses seem directly applicable to only one particular aspect of the processes by which the perception of RD develops: when an individual first perceives inadequacies in value opportunities he had thought were appropriate and sufficient for attainment of his value expectations, he can be said to experience dissonance. The onset of RD through increasing value expectations, or the existence of a discrepancy between expectations and capabilities per se, does not itself constitute dissonance, however, nor as Festinger pointed out does dissonance exist whenever an individual encounters resistance or frustration in trying to achieve an objective.<sup>61</sup>

Anomie, in the sense Durkheim used it in *Suicide*, is a situation in which either ends (value expectations) outstrip men’s means, or ends remain constant while means are severely restricted, and corresponds quite closely to the RD concept. The more generalized sense that Durkheim gave the term in *The Division of Labor in Society*, one which Merton popularized in his essay on “Social Structure and Anomie,” is that anomie is a breakdown of social standards governing social behavior, or normlessness. It is specifically a sociological concept: “the degree of anomie in a social system is indicated by the extent to which there is a lack of consensus on norms judged to be legitimate, with its attendant uncertainty and insecurity in social relations.”<sup>62</sup> Manifestations of normlessness within individuals are characterized as anomia. Rose, summarizing the literature, identifies three kinds of anomie: weakness of norms per se, the existence of several strong but conflicting norms, and ignorance of norms. All three situations lead to the pervasive sense of uncertainty to which is attributed much deviant behavior, including criminality, suicide and drug addiction, and gang behavior. Merton originally suggested that anomie could lead to widespread deviant behavior and the establishment of alternative norms, which constitutes “rebellion.” “When rebel-

<sup>61</sup> Festinger, 278.

<sup>62</sup> Robert K. Merton, “Social Structure and Anomie: Continuities,” *Social Theory and Social Structure*, rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1957), quotation from 266–267. This discussion of the anomie concept makes substantial use of Gordon Rose, “Anomie and Deviation,” 29–45. A more comprehensive summation of work making use of the concept is Marshall B. Clinard, ed., *Anomie and Deviant Behavior: A Discussion and Critique* (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

lion becomes endemic in a substantial part of the society, it provides a potential for revolution, which reshapes both the normative and the social structure." There seem to have been no substantial later attempts to relate anomie to the occurrence of collective violence other than gang behavior, however.<sup>63</sup>

Anomie can be related to the RD concept, as defined here, in two ways. If group norms are weak or in conflict about how members can satisfy value expectations, value opportunities are thereby limited. This is particularly the case with respect to personal and societal opportunities; the less certain people are about what ways of acting are appropriate for attaining their goals, i.e. the greater their anomia, the lower their value capabilities are likely to be and hence the greater is RD. It should be noted that men can experience normlessness or norm conflict in any social role and outside social roles, for example as subordinates in an authority relationship or as passengers on a jet flight. Thus anomie constitutes or increases RD only when it relates to norms of value-maintaining or value-enhancing activities.

It also can be argued, partly on the basis of cognitive dissonance theory, that sets of internally consistent norms are intrinsically valued and that the breakdown of systems of norms therefore constitutes RD with respect to "coherence" values. The argument is not that everyone who suffers from anomia is therefore deprived; it is that RD is experienced by those persons who at one time accepted an internally consistent set of norms as valid guides to action but have subsequently felt those norms to be seriously challenged, without being replaced by another internally consistent set of norms. Deprivation in this instance results from value loss, i.e. a declining value position with respect to the ideational coherence category of interpersonal values. In an anomic society, however, there are likely to be many people who have never held one unquestioned, consistent set of norms. Never having had a consistent set of norms, they are less likely to be discontented over its lack than those who experience a threat to or loss of strongly held norms.

The most potent effect of anomie on RD probably is its impact on value opportunities. Whether normative systems are intrinsically valued in the sense that economic goods, security, and

<sup>63</sup> Merton, 191. One application to political violence is Elwin H. Powell, "Reform, Revolution, and Reaction as Adaptations to Anomie," *Review of Mexican Sociology*, xxv (1963), 331-355. David C. Schwartz has developed a process model of revolutionary behavior which uses the related concept of alienation and specifies the circumstances in which political alienation occurs, in "A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior," in James C. Davies, ed., *When Men Revolt and Why* (New York: The Free Press, 1970).

status are valued is an empirical question most directly answered by ascertaining the extent to which threats to norm systems anger people. Generally, the anomie and anomia concepts are related to RD in a way comparable to dissonance: they overlap RD, but they cannot be subsumed by it nor do they incorporate all or most aspects of it.

“Conflict” in its collective sense is sometimes defined as a condition, sometimes as a process, and sometimes as an event. Galtung defines it as a condition: “An action-system is said to be in conflict if the system has two or more incompatible goal-states.”<sup>64</sup> Coser initially defines it as a process, “a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals.”<sup>65</sup> In conventional usage conflict is an event, a violent or nonviolent clash between two groups. By either of the first two definitions conflict resembles the RD concept more closely than either dissonance or anomie.<sup>66</sup> One difference is that RD refers both to individual states of mind and their collective distribution, whereas social conflict is generally treated as a property of collectivities without reference to its manifestations in the minds of the individuals involved. Galtung identifies a more consequential difference:

Conflict should . . . be distinguished from *frustration*, which is the more general case where goals are not achieved (needs are not satisfied, gratification not obtained, values not fulfilled, etc.) for *some* reason. A very simple case is that of scarcity. . . . Another simple case is when something is *blocking* the access to the source of gratification. . . . But the most important special case . . . is the case of *conflict* where efforts by oneself or others to obtain some value can be seen as the source of frustration.<sup>67</sup>

Conflict defined as a condition is essentially a special case of RD in which the source of the discrepancy between value expectations and capabilities is another group competing for the same values. Conflict defined as a process refers to the interaction between groups in their respective attempts to alleviate RD.

<sup>64</sup> Johan Galtung, “Institutionalized Conflict Resolution: A Theoretical Paradigm,” *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 4, 1965, 348.

<sup>65</sup> Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, 8.

<sup>66</sup> Conflict also has a psychological usage not examined here, namely the presence in an individual of two (or more) competing and incompatible motives. For a review of this concept and the literature see Yates, esp. chap. 5.

<sup>67</sup> Galtung, “Institutionalized Conflict Resolution,” 349.

The conflict concept is less appropriate than RD for the analysis of political violence for several reasons. One is simply that in its connotations of process or class of events it includes by definition some of the variables that this analysis proposes to explain. I hope to account for the forms and extent of violent political conflict by proposing some of their general determinants, not to "explain" them by defining them as conflict. Moreover, conflict defined as a condition in which group X has what group Y wants refers to a particular kind of RD, but by no means exhausts the RD concept. RD refers to any collectively felt discrepancy between a sought and an attainable value position, whether or not some other group has the value sought and whether or not group Y tries to seize it from group X. There are psychological grounds, suggested in the preceding section, for expecting collective violence to result from any RD that is of wide scope and intensity. It also seems evident that many acts of political violence, revolutionary movements in particular, do not involve a struggle for values so much as a demand that systems be reshaped so that they can create new values. In this connection, one difficulty that arises if political violence is treated as a category of conflict is that political violence is thereby assumed to entail a struggle for scarce values, an assumption that forecloses examination of other causal factors.

One last limitation of conflict theory for our purposes is the distinction commonly made by conflict theorists between what is called "realistic" and "nonrealistic" conflict (Coser), or "rational" and "nonrational" conflict (Schelling), or "destructive behavior" and "conflict behavior" (Galtung). The essence of the distinction is between actions instrumental in securing the values sought and actions destructive for their own sake. The analytic usefulness of the distinction is not in question; what is questionable is attempting to account for political violence using theoretical approaches that assume that only the instrumental manifestations of violence are relevant or subject to analysis. Coser and Galtung, among other conflict theorists, recognize that both elements are present in most conflict. Coser criticizes others for failure to realize that "conflict may be motivated by two distinct yet intermingled factors—a realistic conflict situation and the affective investment in it. . . ." Galtung similarly makes the theoretical point that underlies this entire discussion: "conflict behavior tends to become destructive behavior (because of the frustration-aggression cycle) and destructive behavior tends to be self-reinforcing."<sup>68</sup>

Despite this recognition, most of the concepts and hypotheses

<sup>68</sup> Coser, 59; Galtung, 349. Also see Mack and Snyder, 219, 222–223.



of conflict theory are concerned with the instrumentalities of strife. This analysis gives equal weight to its nonrational origins and manifestations.

### Patterns of Relative Deprivation

In static terms, RD is a discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities, its intensity and scope determinable in any accessible population by the use of survey and other techniques. Dynamic analysis requires conceptual tools that take into account patterns of changes in value expectations and value capabilities over time. One can begin with the assumption that, because RD is a psychically uncomfortable condition, men tend over the long run to adjust their value expectations to their value capabilities. Societal conditions in which sought and attainable value positions are in approximate equilibrium consequently can be regarded as "normal," however uncommon they may be in the contemporary world, and provide a base-line from which to evaluate patterns of change. Three distinct patterns of disequilibrium can be specified: *decremental deprivation*, in which a group's value expectations remain relatively constant but value capabilities are perceived to decline; *aspirational deprivation*, in which capabilities remain relatively static while expectations increase or intensify;<sup>69</sup> and *progressive deprivation*, in which there is substantial and simultaneous increase in expectations and decrease in capabilities. All three patterns have been cited as causal or predisposing factors for political violence.

#### DECREMENTAL DEPRIVATION

The model shown graphically in figure 1 represents settings in which group consensus about justifiable value positions has varied little over time, but in which the average attainable value position or potential is perceived to decline substantially. Men in these circumstances are angered over the loss of what they once had or thought they could have; they experience RD by reference to their own past condition. The value position of an entire society may fall because of declining production of material goods, declining capacities of the political elite to provide order or resolve crises, imposition of foreign rule, or loss of faith in the society's integrating structure of beliefs and attendant norms of action. Value capabilities also may fall among one or more segments of society because its members lose out in absolute terms in conflict with other groups over scarce values. Examples in-

<sup>69</sup> These patterns are labeled and described briefly by Morrison, 5.




Figure 1. Decremental deprivation.

clude the effects of progressive taxation on the wealthy and of regressive taxation on the poor; the loss of political influence by elites and oppositional groups newly barred from political activity; and the decline in status and influence felt by middle-class groups as the status of working-class groups increases. The value position or potential of a particular group also may seem to decline not because of any diminution or redistribution of total values available in a society but because of the declining number or appropriateness of opportunities, for example the shrinking number of employment opportunities for unskilled labor in highly industrialized societies and the lack of stable communal relationships open to migrants newly arrived in the city from rural villages. The systemic sources of declining value capabilities are examined in more detail in chapter 5.

A number of theorists have attributed political violence wholly or in part to decremental deprivation. The revolutions that Aristotle held to be characteristic of democracies and oligarchies were said to result partly from deprivations of this type. "The main cause of revolutions in Democracies is the intemperate conduct of the demagogues who force the propertied class to combine partly by instituting malicious prosecutions against individuals . . . and partly by inciting the masses against them as a body," whereas in oligarchies one of the two general causes of revolution is seen as the oppression of the masses by the oligarchs.<sup>70</sup> In democracies the relatively high, stable value position of the oligarchs is threat-

<sup>70</sup> Aristotle, *The Politics*, Book v, chaps. v and vi. Quotation from J. E. C. Well-don, trans., *The Politics of Aristotle* (New York: Macmillan, 1883, 1905), 355.

ened, in oligarchies it is the low, stable value position of the masses that suffers interference. In 1925 Sorokin advanced a general thesis about the significance of "repression" in the genesis of revolution that influenced a number of later writers. The immediate cause of revolution, he wrote, "is always the growth of 'repression' of the main instincts of the majority of society, and the impossibility of obtaining for those instincts the necessary minimum of satisfaction." If the desire for food of a substantial number is "repressed" by famine, riots result. If the "reflexes of individual self-preservation" are "repressed" by arbitrary executions, total war, or terror, the result is the same. Other repressed instincts which dispose men toward violence are said to include collective self-preservation, want of housing, the "instincts of ownership" and of self-expression, and so forth.<sup>71</sup> The Marxian view in its original dispensation is similar. Marx and Engels argued the inevitable growth of profound dissatisfactions in the proletariat as a consequence of absolute deprivations or oppressions: the destruction of the worker's pride through his subjection to the machine and the market; economic deprivation because of minimal wages and job insecurity, the latter a consequence of crises in the economic system; and repressive measures of the bourgeois state.

Decremental deprivation is probably most common in "traditional" societies and in traditional segments of transitional societies. Natural disasters in traditional societies often gave rise to collective violence, as Norman Cohn observes in his study of violent millenarianism in medieval Europe:

Again and again one finds that a particular outbreak of revolutionary chiasm took place against a background of disaster: the plagues that precluded the First Crusade and the flagellant movements of 1260, 1348-1349, 1391, and 1400. . . . The greatest wave of chiliastic excitement, one which swept through the whole of society, was precipitated by the most universal natural disaster of the Middle Ages, the Black Death. . . .<sup>72</sup>

Hobsbawm says that social banditry was most pervasive in the precapitalist peasant societies of Southern Europe "when their traditional equilibrium [was] upset; during and after periods of abnormal hardship, such as famines and wars, or at the moments

<sup>71</sup> Pitirim A. Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolution* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1925), 367-369.

<sup>72</sup> Norman R. C. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millenium*, 2nd edn. rev. (New York: Harper, 1957, 1961), 315. Also see Smelser, chap. 6.

when the jaws of the dynamic modern world seized these static communities in order to destroy and transform them.”<sup>73</sup> Such irresistible events inflicted decremental deprivations on and led to banditry by peasants who had no effective methods of social agitation, i.e., no political value opportunities. The imposition of alien authority on non-Western peoples had similar effects. Colonialism to varying degrees disrupted interpersonal relationships and undermined tribal and other traditional authority. Interpersonal and power deprivations were inflicted on many newly conquered people at the same time that traditional value opportunities, especially political ones, were disrupted. These conditions often generated violent traditionalist resistance that subsequently was transformed into nationalist rebellion.<sup>74</sup>

Decremental deprivation may be less common than other forms of RD in societies undergoing socioeconomic transformation, but it is not uncommon and it can have virulent effects. The great human and material sacrifices of the Russian people during the first World War provided the basic potential for the first Russian Revolution; the refusal of the Kerensky regime to terminate Russia's involvement in the war led directly to the Bolshevik seizure of power and indirectly to the civil war that followed. Almost all analyses of the post-war fascist movements emphasize the absolute deprivations that motivated most of their adherents. In a comparative study of fascist movements in nine countries Carsten concludes that

certain social groups responded much more strongly to the Fascist appeal than others. This is particularly true of those who were uprooted and threatened by social and economic change, whose position in society was being undermined, who had lost their traditional place, and were frightened of the future. These were above all [segments of] the lower middle classes. . . . Perhaps even more important in the early stages were the former officers and non-commissioned officers of the first world war for whom no jobs were waiting, who had got accustomed to the use of violence, and felt themselves deprived of their “legitimate” rewards.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>73</sup> E. J. Hobsbawm, *Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), 23-24.

<sup>74</sup> See, for example, William Kornhauser, “Rebellion and Political Development,” in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 145.

<sup>75</sup> F. L. Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 232.

Cantril's social psychological analysis of the roots of Nazism is similar. Nazism was capable of succeeding as a movement because "old norms, old cultural standards, were no longer able to provide the framework necessary for a satisfying adjustment of the individuals who composed the culture." Decremental deprivation was intense for a variety of groups on many values; there was economic distress, many people had suffered status reductions, and most felt a profound sense of personal insecurity because of the disintegration of both social structures and normative systems.<sup>76</sup>

Any absolute decline in the value position or value potential of a social group constitutes decremental deprivation, and many additional cases of political violence attributable to this pattern of RD could be cited. Some others are examined in chapter 5. Despite the considerable emphasis given in contemporary social analysis to "revolutions of rising expectations," examined below, over the long run of human history decremental RD has probably been a more common source of collective violence than any other pattern of RD. And one can speculate that decremental RD of a given degree probably instigates men to greater intensities of violence than an equivalent level of aspirational RD. Men are likely to be more intensely angered when they lose what they have than when they lose hope of attaining what they do not yet have.

#### ASPIRATIONAL DEPRIVATION

The aspirational RD model, sketched in figure 2, is characterized by an increase in men's value expectations without a concomitant change in value position or potential. Those who experience aspirational RD do not anticipate or experience significant loss of what they have; they are angered because they feel they have no means for attaining new or intensified expectations. An "increase" in value expectations may reflect demands for a greater amount of a value already held in some degree, for example for more material goods and a greater degree of political order and justice. It may be a demand for new values never previously held, such as political participation for colonial peoples and personal equality for members of lower class and caste groups. Third, it

<sup>76</sup> Hadley Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements* (New York: Wiley, 1941), 228-269, quotation from 266. Also see Frederick L. Schuman, *The Nazi Dictatorship: A Study in Social Pathology and the Politics of Fascism* (New York: Knopf, 1935). Individual documentation of the nature and severity of these frustrations is provided by the autobiographical essays of Nazi Party members which are analyzed by Theodore Abel, *The Nazi Movement: Why Hitler Came to Power* (New York: Atherton Press, 1938, 1966).




Figure 2. Aspirational deprivation.

may represent intensification of the commitment to (salience of) a value position that earlier was weakly sought, for example intensifying demands for welfare goods among those who experience breakdown of communal life during the early stages of modernization, and intensified demands for access to political elite positions among the upwardly mobile bourgeoisie of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. Degrees and saliences of value expectations quite often increase simultaneously, but no necessary relation holds between the two. For example, the contemporary demands of black Americans for social equality compared with demands made in the 1940s appear to reflect an increase in the salience of status values among Negroes, a shift from faintly held aspirations for equality to an intensely held belief that equality is deserved now, rather than an increase in the degree of equality sought.

Many sources of increasing value expectations are identified in studies of RD and of political instability. For some traditional peoples mere exposure to, or knowledge of, a better material way of life is assumed to raise expectations. In medieval and early Renaissance Europe the growth of industrial and commercial centers demonstrated new possibilities beyond any that life had to offer the peasant. The new ways attracted the surplus population in particular, but also those who were in some way dissatisfied with manor life. "As social and economic horizons expanded, hardship and poverty and dependence ceased to appear the ineluctable fate of common folk."<sup>77</sup> A special case of the demonstra-

<sup>77</sup> Cohn, 27-28. Also see Neil J. Smelser, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).

tion effect is “relative deprivation” in its narrow sense, that is, setting one’s value expectations by reference to the higher value position of some other individual or group. In particular, expectation levels are often accelerated by the demonstration effect of other groups that are improving while one’s own group is not. Brogan observed that the new ways and new wealth of the Industrial Revolution impelled many intellectuals to revolutionary fervor. Men like Friedrich Engels “were struck by the paradox that the means of wealth were vastly increasing and that the benefits of that wealth seemed to be more and more narrowly bestowed.”<sup>78</sup> Discrepancy between an individual’s or group’s relative share of welfare, power and interpersonal values also is specifically related to political violence by a number of theorists, among them Aristotle, who wrote that the source of disposition to revolution

is the aspiration after equality which provokes the commons to sedition when they suppose that they have a small share . . . although they are the equals of the privileged Few, and it is the aspiration after inequality or in other words after superiority which provokes the Oligarchs to sedition, when they imagine that despite their inequality their share is not greater than that of others but is equal or even smaller.<sup>79</sup>

These and other conditions that increase expectation levels beyond the capacities of men to satisfy them, and hence dispose men to collective violence, are examined more closely in chapter 5. Some comparable effects of new beliefs and ideologies are considered there and in chapter 7.

#### PROGRESSIVE DEPRIVATION

The third pattern of RD, sketched in figure 3, is a generalized version of a model proposed by Davies, who refers to it as the “J-curve” hypothesis: “revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal.”<sup>80</sup> It can be regarded as a special case of aspirational RD, one in which long-run, more-or-less-steady improvement in peoples’ value position generates expectations about continued improvement. If value capabilities stabilize or decline after such a period of improve-

<sup>78</sup> Denis W. Brogan, *The Price of Revolution* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1951), 30.

<sup>79</sup> *The Politics*, Welldon trans., 343–344. For a restatement of the Aristotelian position see Fred Kort, “The Quantification of Aristotle’s Theory of Revolution,” *American Political Science Review*, LXVI (June 1952), 487.

<sup>80</sup> Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” 6.




Figure 3. Progressive deprivation.

ment, progressive RD is the result. Such a pattern is most common in societies undergoing simultaneous ideological and systemic change. Economic depression in a growing economy can have this effect. So can the articulation of an ideology of modernization in a society that has structural inflexibilities that prevent expansion of value output beyond a certain point. The model also can be used to subsume some “social change” theories of revolution, which in their general form postulate that political violence is a consequence of decreasing responsiveness of social structures, beliefs, norms, or all three to objective change.

Davies emphasizes that the revolutionary state of mind requires “the continued, even habitual but dynamic expectation of greater opportunity to satisfy basic needs,” by which he includes all types of values, physical, social, and political. In addition, what is needed

is a persistent, unrelenting threat to the satisfaction of these needs: not a threat which actually returns people to a state of sheer survival but which puts them in the mental state where they believe they will not be able to satisfy one or more basic needs. . . . The crucial factor is the vague or specific fear that ground gained over a long period of time will be quickly lost.

The political system is perceptually related to these fears; they are generated “when the existing government suppresses or is blamed for suppressing such opportunity.”<sup>81</sup> In support of the the-



sis, Davies identifies a J-curve pattern of progress followed by relative decline in case studies of the preconditions of a number of revolutions and rebellions, including the French, Russian, and Nazi Revolution, the American Civil War, and the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. For example, he shows that Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842 occurred after a forty-year period of improving economic conditions and expanding political suffrage. Economic depression in 1835–40 and the rejection by an oligarchic state government of demands for further extension of suffrage led to the drafting of a People's Constitution, an attempt to seize state buildings, and sporadic violence. There also is evidence of a progressive deprivation pattern in the economic status of American Negroes relative to whites in the two decades preceding the "black rebellion" of the 1960s. The income of Negroes relative to whites of comparable education increased rapidly towards equality between 1940 and the early 1950s but then began to decline, so that by 1960 half the relative gains of the earlier period were lost.<sup>82</sup> In this study's terminology, both cases were characterized by rising value expectations, set in motion by prolonged experience of improving value positions. Diminishing capabilities, evident in politicians' reluctance to extend political rights and in irremediable economic decline, provided the background conditions necessary for the outbreak of violence.

Le Vine's explanation of mob violence by African colonial peoples against their rulers resembles the J-curve argument. Such turmoil is said to be a consequence of psychological conflict generated when colonial officials encouraged expectations of self-rule by their stated policies and practices, but then accompanied or followed those policies with others which, Africans thought, interfered with the attainment of those expectations. Le Vine describes seven cases that appear to support the hypothesis.<sup>83</sup> The J-curve hypothesis is also implicit in Deutsch's interpretation of the relationship between governmental capability and political stability in societies in the early and middle stages of modernization. Increasing capabilities, as an object of government policy, require increasing mobilization of citizens for participation in the market economy and political life. "Such mobilization,

<sup>82</sup> Case studies of the Russian and Egyptian Revolutions and Dorr's Rebellion appear *ibid.* The other studies are included in James C. Davies, "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfaction as a Cause of some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969), 547–576.

<sup>83</sup> Robert A. Le Vine, "Anti-European Violence in Africa: A Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (December 1959), 420–429.

however, is usually accompanied by rising needs and expectations, which must not be frustrated if stability is to be preserved." To preserve stability—that is, to minimize progressive RD and the consequent impetus to violence—outputs must continue to increase. Deutsch cites only two types of value outputs, increasing per capita income and expanding governmental activity, but his argument is readily extended to other value classes.<sup>84</sup>

Progressive RD is a common theme in many old and some new theories that attribute revolutionary potential to general social change. Simple versions of these theories emphasize structural inflexibility, i.e. the inability of social and political institutions to adapt their value outputs rapidly enough to changing conditions. Yoder proposes, for example, that change in social life is continual, and that the organized group must and ordinarily does constantly readjust to changing situations, resulting from inventions, discoveries, culture contact, and so forth. In some cases, however, groups within the society desire to preserve the old order—"the traditional institutions, the time-tried folkways, mores, conventions, and customs"—even though irrelevant to present situations. The end of adaptation is the beginning of revolution.<sup>85</sup> Johnson's "social-dysfunction" theory of the origins of political violence is of the same genre, though its vocabulary has a more contemporary ring. One necessary condition of revolution is said to be a disequibrated social system, i.e. a discrepancy between the belief structure of a society and its division of labor, which may result from any combination of internal or external changes in values or technology. The second necessary cause is elite refusal ("intransigence") to take action designed to relieve the disequilibrium. The consequence is a loss of authority by the elite and its reliance upon force to maintain its position. The sufficient cause of revolution in such a situation is an "accelerator of dysfunction," any condition that decreases the ability of the elite to control its armed forces.<sup>86</sup>

These and other social change theories refer to systems that were able to adapt value outputs to changing environmental require-

<sup>84</sup> Karl Deutsch, "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," *American Political Science Review*, XIV (March 1960), 39.

<sup>85</sup> Dale Yoder, "Current Definitions of Revolution," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXII (November 1926), 440-442. Comparable explanations are proposed by Charles A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society: An Introduction to Sociological Theory* (New York: Appleton, 1925), chap. 8; Rex Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements," *Social Forces*, XXVIII (March 1950), 270-271; and Pettee, *passim*.

<sup>86</sup> Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, *passim*. An earlier and briefer statement of the theory is his *Revolution and the Social System* (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 1964).

ments and to men's changing value expectations up to some point in time, but gradually or abruptly lost their adaptive capacities. In societies that have experienced positive social change, the conditions described in these theories fit the J-curve or progressive deprivation model; in static societies, they more closely resemble the absolute deprivation model. The point is that the RD models correspond generally to many of the abstract theories of the preconditions of political violence.

### **The RD Models: Some Qualifications and Uses**

No one of the RD models is necessarily characteristic of a particular type of society, although absolute RD seems more likely to be found in static societies, while aspirational and progressive RD appear most often in societies undergoing substantial socioeconomic change. In any given society at any given time, however, some groups are likely to experience RD of each type. Moreover, some groups can experience different patterns of RD with respect to different classes of values. For example, large segments of the working classes of the defeated European countries after World War I simultaneously experienced decremental deprivation with respect to security and participation values, and progressive deprivation on welfare values. A complete profile of RD in a society requires specification of the extent and patterns of RD with respect to each class of values for every consequential socioeconomic group.

One operational use of the RD models is that they facilitate systematic inferences about the effects of changes in various indices of economic and political performance. Indicators of economic performance and of governmental fiscal activity provide examples. Rather than resorting to inferences about economic discontent based on such measures as per capita income in country X compared with country Y, or their relative rates of growth, one can infer it more accurately from such patterns as short-term declines in productivity following a period of stable production (decremental RD) and short-term changes in inflation rates, commodity prices, or total productivity relative to rates in the more distant past (decremental or progressive RD). Time-series wage and salary data for various occupational groups are available for many modern and some modernizing societies, from which welfare and in some instances status RD can be inferred. One also can search systematically for evidence of conditions associated with rising expectations, such as rates of increase in schooling and literacy, announcement of programs of reform, articulation by political leaders of ideologies of modernization, and mobilization of previously non-

participant citizens for purposes of political and associational activity. To assess the effects of governmental action one can examine the changing balance over time between value-depriving and value-satisfying decisions, giving special attention to *relative* increases in the former. Interpersonal RD of various patterns also can be inferred from changes over time in measures of conditions as diverse as internal migration, religious affiliation, changing size and composition of occupational groups, and social origins of elite groups. Procedures for making systematic, comparative inferences of these kinds are not examined here; examples of some of them are reported in other published studies.<sup>87</sup>

The three models of RD proposed do not exhaust all the logically possible relationships between value expectations and value capabilities.<sup>88</sup> Declining expectations might be found in some groups, for example among members of a well-disciplined colonial elite who expect gradually to lose their political authority to indigenous rulers, or among members of a millenarian religious group who expect the social order to deteriorate and collapse as a prelude to the coming of a new order. Somewhat more common may be a "boom and bust" set of expectations about value satisfactions, for example among some traditional societies, under some totalitarian regimes, and perhaps among some groups and isolated individuals in modernized societies. Resigned anticipation of a "time of troubles" following the death of a king was as common in feudal kingdoms of tropical Africa as it was in medieval Europe. Those whose livelihood depends on the land tend to develop a similar tolerance for the vagaries of weather: two years of plenty and one of scarcity is the way of the seasons. The Bemba of South Central Africa, like many other people living near the margin of subsistence, build their way of life around a cycle of nine months of abundance followed by a hunger season of three months.<sup>89</sup> But in all such cycles there is an element of predictability, and if this predictability vanishes RD is the likely result. If, for example, conditions in such a

<sup>87</sup> See Ted Gurr, *New Error-Compensated Measures for Comparing Nations: Some Correlates of Civil Strife*, Center of International Studies (Princeton: Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 25, 1966); Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, *The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model*, Center of International Studies (Princeton: Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 28, 1967); and Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (December 1968), 1104-1124.

<sup>88</sup> A more comprehensive set of models of social change, including variations on the three basic models proposed here, appears in Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in Graham and Gurr, eds., 497-542.

<sup>89</sup> See Audrey I. Richards, *Land, Labour, and Diet in Northern Rhodesia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), especially chaps. 1-3.

cycle deteriorate and remains bad, the result is decremental RD; and if value positions stabilize at a high level substantially beyond the expected onset of the next cyclical decline, any subsequent decline would be likely to generate the potential for violent protest.

At the outset of the discussion of the models it was suggested that over the long run men's value expectations tend to adapt to their value capabilities; the discrepancies caused by rising expectations or declining capabilities are temporary. Eventually men collectively either succeed in raising their value capabilities to meet their expectations or, if their circumstances prove impervious to change, lower their expectations. For intensely felt expectations, however, "eventually" may be measured in years, decades, or even generations, which are likely to be characterized by both constructive and destructive struggle. Some of the variables that affect the persistence of RD and typical modes of response to it are examined in subsequent chapters. If any single sentence can summarize the arguments advanced in this chapter, it is that men are quick to aspire beyond their social means and quick to anger when those means prove inadequate, but slow to accept their limitations.