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# Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes

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**Abstract** This paper appraises the state of the field on hybrid regimes by depicting the tensions and blurred boundaries of democracy and authoritarianism "with adjectives." An alternative conceptualization and ordering of regimes are subsequently introduced using a configurative approach. Rather than place regimes on a linear continuum from authoritarianism to democracy, it highlights the multi-dimensional arrangements possible for the construction of regime types. The configurative approach also provides an analytically useful way to measure and integrate hybrid regimes into our classificatory schemes. As a result, it helps alleviate the conceptual confusion in the literature and contributes to a discussion of hybrid regimes beyond the framework of authoritarianism. The paper concludes by presenting a list of all hybrid regimes in the world between 1990 and 2009 identified with this method.

**Keywords** Authoritarianism · Hybrid regimes · Regime classification · Concept building and measurement

> "The boundary between democratic and nondemocratic is sometimes a blurred and imperfect one, and beyond it lies a much broader range of variation in political systems."
>
> Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1988) *Democracy in Developing Countries*

The imperfect conceptual boundary between democratic and nondemocratic regimes has been the focus of much scholarly attention and debate at the turn of the

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twenty-first century. The third wave of democratization and the end of the cold war dramatically increased the global number of regimes that hold multiparty elections with the full adult franchise. Yet these democratic features have appeared alongside the persistence of authoritarian forms of rule in many countries, posing significant challenges for typological classification. As a result of this dilemma, scholars created a host of concepts to capture the mixed, or "hybrid," nature of these regimes.[1]

The attachment of modifiers to established political regime types has become the dominant method employed by the field.[2] In the 1990s, democracy served as the basis from which new terms were derived, producing a trend commonly referred to as "democracy with adjectives" (Collier and Levitsky 1997). A countervailing trend has emerged in the new century in reaction to the democratic biases of the first. Shifting their attention to the nondemocratic aspects of rule in hybrid regimes, scholars replaced the term "democracy" with "authoritarianism" as the focal point of classification.

The conceptualization of hybrid regimes has occurred, however, in a manner that has only added to the emergent confusion. The proliferation of modified terms and the conflicting definitions of each is testimony to this claim (Armony and Schamis 2005). The shift from democracy with adjectives to authoritarianism with adjectives, rather than resolving the conceptual difficulties of regime classification, displaced the site of contestation from one position to another. While the source of conceptual confusion was initially based on the boundary between democratic and nondemocratic regimes, today confusion instead stems from the blurred boundary between authoritarian and non-authoritarian ones.

This paper attempts to engage in the discussion and conceptualization of hybrid regimes beyond the framework of authoritarianism. Accordingly, we advocate the use of the term "hybrid regime" for nondemocratic, non-authoritarian regimes instead of the use of democratic or authoritarian labels. Furthermore, rather than call for the abandonment of the concept of hybrid regimes altogether as some scholars have done (Armony and Schamis 2005; Brownlee 2007), it proposes an alternative perspective from which to re-design the conceptual field of political regimes. The majority of work accomplished on hybrid regimes today proposes a continuum view (Diamond 1999, 2002; Schedler 2002, 2006, 2009; Munck 2006; Howard and Roessler 2006; Roessler and Howard 2009). Our perspective, building on the work of Juan Linz, is rooted in a multi-dimensional understanding of regimes. Such a perspective accounts for a variety of regime types due to differences in kind rather than degree.

At the same time, we acknowledge the many challenges inherent to classification and concept building. Because classificatory systems are social constructions that can never truly reflect reality, they will always be imperfect. Despite these inherent limitations, we argue that the further clarification of regime classification is both necessary and possible. The conceptual confusion in the hybrid regime literature

[1] Terry Lynn Karl (1995) introduced the term "hybrid regime" to refer to a state that contains both democratic and authoritarian forms of rule. This paper uses the concept of "hybrid regime" to highlight the multiple ways in which regime attributes can be configured. The term also serves as a general frame of reference to discuss work dealing with regimes that cannot be easily classified as full instances of authoritarianism or democracy. Thus, the notion of "hybrid regime" will be applied to work that may not explicitly use or acknowledge the term.

[2] A political regime refers to "the particular set of procedures and structural arrangements that govern a country….[and] establishes both the formal and informal rules of a political game" (Remmer 1985: 65).

must be addressed because the cases one selects and the attributes they contain are critical for both causal theory and policy formulation.

Two principal objectives guide our endeavor. First, we seek to not only illustrate the sites of conceptual confusion in the literature but to also lay the grounds for overcoming many of these difficulties. The paper begins with an analysis of the variety of hybrid regime concepts in the field, highlighting the persisting discord between them despite the field's shift from adjectival variants of democracy to authoritarianism. We then direct our attention to an important source of conceptual confusion identified in the analysis: the overarching concept of electoral and non-electoral regimes. To bring greater clarity to classificatory schemes, we argue for a shift in the definition of an electoral regime from one that simply holds multiparty elections to one that holds *competitive* multiparty elections. This paper discusses how and why this re-definition emphasizes as well as systematizes the conceptual space that hybrid regimes occupy.

Second, this paper seeks to develop an innovative means for conceptualizing and ordering regime types using a configurative approach. Rather than place regimes on a single continuum from authoritarianism to democracy, a configurative approach provides scholars with an alternative view of political systems by highlighting the multiple dimensions of regimes. Building on the findings from the paper's conceptual literature review, we propose that competitiveness, civil liberties, and tutelary interference constitute the three main axes by which contemporary regimes can be most clearly and effectively classified. While it would be ideal to have dimensions that can classify all regimes, the possible combinations of these three dimensions provide a nuanced framework for mapping the relationship between *multiparty* regimes and for clarifying and organizing the conceptual space for hybrid regimes. The paper finally proposes a suitable method of regime measurement and subsequently presents a list of all hybrid regimes in the world between 1990 and 2009 using this method.

As a result, this paper makes four main contributions to the field of regime theory. First, it reduces the conceptual confusion present in the classification of regimes by better theorizing the relationship of regime types to one another across multiple levels. Second, it revives a multi-dimensional and configurative method for conceptualizing regimes. Consequently, more attention is placed on a variety of institutional features that distinguish regimes from one another rather than the more common underlying dimension of competitiveness. Third, our multi-dimensional method sheds light on possible ways for conducting comparisons across regimes based on their cross-cutting institutional properties, opening new avenues for future empirical research. Finally, this paper provides innovative visual depictions of regime relationships, allowing for the clarification of abstract theoretical discussions.

## A Conceptual Map of the Hybrid Regime Field

Since the end of the cold war, hybrid regimes have been defined and measured in a number of conflicting ways. The resulting confusion is not necessarily a product of any one individual's work, as many scholars are quite clear, explicit, and consistent in the concepts they employ. Rather, it is the absence of a standardized conceptualization among scholars that creates difficulties for the field (Munck 2001; Armony and Schamis 2005).

In order to make sense out of the large array of concepts, we analyze the two dominant approaches to the classification of hybrid regimes: variants of democracy or authoritarianism.[3] The central aim of this review is to present a conceptual map of the current state of the field. This map, including visual diagrams of popular regime concepts, demonstrates that current classifications now have the problem of authoritarianism with adjectives in addition to democracy with adjectives. Notably, this conceptual map will form the basis for our argument in the proceeding section that identifies the electoral regime concept as a major source of conceptual confusion.

Conceptual disagreements have been at the heart of the hybrid regime literature, defining the fault line between diminished subtypes of democracy and diminished subtypes of authoritarianism.[4] In the 1990s, scholars most commonly classified hybrid regimes as diminished subtypes of democracy as a response to the complexities of democratization during the third wave. The dominant trend of classifying hybrid regimes changed course after the new millennium by favoring diminished subtypes of authoritarianism (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010; Schedler 2002, 2006; Ottaway 2003). Thus, while the first approach stresses the democratic nature of hybrid regimes, the second emphasizes their authoritarian form of rule despite the "guise" of democratic institutions.

Different and conflicting definitions of hybrid regimes, however, persist within each approach. Both include concepts with broad and narrow intensions[5] that overlap at multiple discrepant points. We begin with the diminished democracy approach. Examples include widely divergent concepts such as Zakaria's (1997) "illiberal democracy" and Diamond, Linz and Lipset's (1988) "semi-democracy." Zakaria's concept of "illiberal democracy" refers to regimes that combine the adult franchise and multiparty elections with a failure to protect civil liberties. Because the definition of illiberal democracy does not have many attributes, its extension is broad from "modest offenders like Argentina to near tyrannies like Kazakhstan or Belarus" (Zakaria 1997:23).[6] In comparison, Diamond et al.'s concept of "semi-democracy" includes a greater number of attributes such as competitive elections and the effective power of elected officials.[7] As such, the cases Diamond et al. label

[3] Another approach of regime classification differs substantially from the first two by giving hybrid regimes neither a democratic nor an authoritarian label. Examples of this approach include concepts such as "hybrid regime," "managed pluralism," and "liberalized autocracy." See Karl (1995), Balzer (2003), and Brumberg (1995). It is interesting to note that Balzer and Brumberg's concepts refer to uncompetitive multiparty regimes and Karl's to competitive multiparty regimes. Also, while Morlino (2009) uses the term democracy in her conceptualization of a hybrid regime, she argues uniquely that the prior regime type of a hybrid regime is essential to its classification.

[4] A diminished subtype is a concept that does not meet the full definitional requirements of a root concept as it lacks "one or more of its defining attributes" (Collier and Levitsky 1997: 438).

[5] The most basic way to compare and analyze concepts is to focus on their intension and extension. The intension of a concept refers to its defining attributes, while the extension of a concept indicates the breadth of empirical cases to which it applies. As we increase the intension of a concept (number of attributes), we decrease its extension (number of empirical cases) (Goertz: 10).

[6] Other similarly broad categories include terms such as "weak democracy" and "partial democracy." See Carothers (2002: 10).

[7] Semi-democracies are: "those countries where the effective power of elected officials is so limited, or political party competition is so restricted, or the freedom and fairness of election so compromised that electoral outcomes, while competitive, still deviate significantly from popular preferences; and/or civil and political liberties are so limited that some political orientations and interests are unable to organize and express themselves" (Diamond et al. 1988: xvii).

semi-democracies comprise only a small proportion of Zakaria's "illiberal democracy" category. These two examples are reflective of the larger conceptual confusion and boundary fuzziness of the diminished democracy approach, a topic that has been well documented (Collier and Levitsky 1997).

While the shift to authoritarianism sought to alleviate conceptual confusion, conflicting definitions of hybrid regimes persist. As examples, we compare Levitsky and Way's (2002, 2010) "competitive authoritarianism" and Schedler's (2002, 2006) "electoral authoritarianism." Despite these scholars' contribution to standardizing the fine line between democracy and nondemocracy, they disagree on the boundary between authoritarianism and hybrid regimes. According to Levitsky and Way (2010: 5), competitive authoritarian regimes regularly hold inclusive, competitive elections that occur on an uneven playing field, i.e., "competition is real but unfair." Schedler's concept of electoral authoritarian regimes is similar, but has a much thinner intension and broader extension. As in competitive authoritarian regimes, elections in electoral authoritarian regimes are un-free or unfair.[8] These regimes need not be competitive in the sense described by Levitsky and Way; instead they need only allow multiparty elections for the executive or legislature (Schedler: 47 2006: 5; Way 2004: 146–147). For example, many of the regimes that Schedler considers to be hybrid regimes, such as Egypt, Singapore, and Kazakhstan, are deemed full-scale authoritarian by Levitsky and Way (54).[9] These examples highlight the general fact that there is still considerable debate about the definition of a hybrid regime and its conceptual boundary with authoritarianism.

Figure 1 presents a conceptual map, arranging regime concepts relative to one another on a spectrum from democracy to authoritarianism. Diamond's (2002) regime typology serves as the foundation for the spectrum.[10] The regimes located below Diamond's classification are those analyzed in this section. We place them relative to the spectrum based on their conceptual intensions. Looking at the figure, it becomes evident that electoral authoritarianism can capture both the hegemonic electoral authoritarian and the competitive authoritarian type, while illiberal democracy spans from electoral democracy all the way to the hegemonic electoral authoritarian type. Furthermore, each approach includes concepts with broad and narrow intensions that overlap at multiple discrepant points. Competitive authori-

[8] Ottaway's (2003) concept of "semi-authoritarianism" is similarly broad.

[9] This variation is not only limited to these three states. A comparison of country lists reveals the following potential examples: Burkina Faso, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia. See Schedler (2002: 47); Diamond (2002: 34–35); Levitsky and Way (2006: 213). These differences have not disappeared over time. For example, Levitsky and Way (2010) specifically mention Egypt, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan as cases of electoral authoritarianism, but not competitive authoritarianism. Levitsky and Way (2010: 16) explicitly state that their conceptualization of competitive authoritarianism is more restrictive than Schedler's.

[10] Generally, Diamond's regimes have the following definitions (for more nuanced definitions see Diamond (2002: 29–33): Closed Authoritarian regimes do not hold multiparty elections; Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarian regimes hold uncompetitive multiparty elections that are not free or fair; Competitive Authoritarian Regimes hold competitive, albeit unfair or un-free multiparty elections; Electoral Democracy holds free and fair multiparty elections although civil liberties are not fully protected and enforced; Liberal Democracies hold free and fair multiparty elections and broadly protect civil liberties. We exclude his residual category of ambiguous regimes.




**Fig. 1** Conceptual map of the current field of regime types

tarianism is narrow, while electoral authoritarianism is broad; semi-democracy is narrow, while illiberal democracy is broad.

Overall, Fig. 1 demonstrates that, regardless of the approach taken thus far, the blurred boundaries of hybrid regimes persist. This situation has resulted in authoritarianism with adjectives in addition to democracy with adjectives, creating a number of problems for the field. Scholars are in disagreement about how authoritarian a hybrid regime can be, as some equate multiparty elections with a hybrid form of rule, while others do not. Should countries such as Kazakhstan and Singapore be considered hybrid regimes, as characterized by Schedler? Or, should they be viewed as full instances of authoritarianism, as argued by Levitsky and Way? These questions highlight the fragmented nature of the field, posing obstacles for the accumulation of knowledge.[11] Stated differently, it is difficult to evaluate causal claims based on diverse conceptualizations of hybrid regimes. In addition, since regime classifications have important policy implications, problematic conceptualizations can impede proper policy decisions and jeopardize expected outcomes. Consequently, there is a need to more fully standardize the relationship between regime types, as the cases one selects and the attributes they contain are critical for both causal theory and policy formulation.

## Conceptualizing Electoral and Non-electoral Regimes

Drawing on Sartori's (1970) ladder of abstraction, we conduct a multi-level analysis of regime types that builds on the conceptual map in the prior section. This analysis reveals a major source of conceptual confusion within regime classification, and we subsequently propose a useful remedy. We argue that the current definition of an electoral regime prevents the drawing of a clear boundary between authoritarianism and hybrid regimes since many deem the presence of multiparty elections as an indicator of a hybrid regime. However, multiparty elections do not in and of themselves challenge existing classifications of

[11] On the point of fragmented knowledge, see Brownlee (2007: 27).

authoritarian regimes. Instead, *competitive* multiparty elections that take place in a nondemocratic context do, and their presence is a helpful way to define an electoral regime in order to separate hybrid regimes from their authoritarian (non-electoral) counterparts.

A multi-level analysis of regimes allows us to place greater attention on the concept of an electoral regime, a concept that has been infrequently discussed in the literature. Electoral and non-electoral regimes are meta-level concepts that organize and distinguish lower-tiered regime concepts.[12] The presence of multiparty elections is the defining factor of an electoral regime. For example, the Soviet Union was *not* an electoral regime because it did not hold multiparty elections. Instead it was a non-electoral regime, or a regime that does not hold elections or only holds single party elections. Figure 2 illustrates how electoral and non-electoral regimes structure and organize the root level concepts of democracy and authoritarianism as well as their respective subtypes in the field today.

Figure 2 reveals that the electoral regime level is the cause of much of the conceptual confusion about authoritarianism. The current definition of an electoral regime prevents the drawing of a clear boundary between authoritarianism and hybrid regimes, creating tension within the authoritarian type as shown in Fig. 2. When looking at the figure, we see that democracy and its respective subtypes conceptually refer up the ladder of generality to the electoral regime category. This is because these regimes all hold multiparty elections. In contrast, authoritarianism and its subtypes refer up the ladder of generality to *both* the electoral and non-electoral regime categories, as some hold multiparty elections whereas others do not. For example, some authoritarian regimes, such as Belarus, can be electoral regimes and others, such as Syria, can be non-electoral regimes.

We argue that the current definition of an electoral regime is not useful for present day classification. This outdated definition is the precise source of the implicit conceptual tension we detect within the authoritarian type. First, after the end of the cold war, there has been an unprecedented expansion in the number of countries that hold multiparty elections. As a result, the distinction between electoral and non-electoral regimes has come to produce less and less meaningful differentiation over time as both democratic and nondemocratic multiparty regimes have become common. Second, the current definition of an electoral regime only obfuscates the fact that multiparty elections do not in and of themselves challenge existing classifications of authoritarian regimes. While some see the presence of multiparty elections as an indicator of a hybrid regime, other scholars have astutely pointed out that Linz's definition of authoritarianism accounts for multiparty elections and limited levels of pluralism (Diamond 2002: 24; Armony and Schamis 2005: 122–124; Snyder 2006: 227–228; Brownlee 2007: 26).[13]

A brief analysis of the Egyptian political system prior to the ousting of President Mubarak in the wake of popular protests in 2011 illustrates the continued relevance

[12] Collier and Levitsky (1997: 449) write that the most general and overarching level of a concept is the meta-level, followed by the root and then the subtype. For example, the concept "blue" is at the root level, whereas "color" is at the meta-level. A possible subtype of "blue" is "navy blue."

[13] Linz (2000: 159) defines authoritarianism as a regime with limited levels of pluralism, a mentality rather than ideology, weak political mobilization, and a relatively unrestrained leadership.




**Fig. 2** Conceptual map of electoral and non-electoral regimes. Source: The regime subtypes reflect Diamond's (fn. 6, 2002) understanding of the regime spectrum based on the works presented in the hybrid regime symposium in the *Journal of Democracy*

of Linz's definition of authoritarianism. Many scholars have classified Mubarak's Egypt as a hybrid regime because of the emergence of multiparty elections in the 1970s (Schedler 2006; Ottaway 2003). Yet these elections were never competitive. The National Democratic Party (NDP), the ruling hegemonic party, had monopolized the executive and legislature for decades. While opposition parties and movements, including the officially banned Muslim Brotherhood, were given limited space in the electoral arena, they never threatened the ruling party's dominance in the legislature. The Egyptian political situation, despite the changes it experienced over time, did not defy the authoritarian ideal type discussed by Linz. It had limited pluralism, a relatively unrestrained leadership, a demobilized populace, and the regime lacked an ideology—all the quintessential elements of the authoritarian type. Therefore, to classify pre-2011 Egypt as a hybrid regime, or a diminished subtype of authoritarianism, is problematic.

We do not wish to belittle the fact that many authoritarian regimes, including our example, have changed in substantially complex ways since the third wave of democratization. Scholars have correctly pointed to the manner in which authoritarianism has evolved (Heydemann 2007). While these changes and subtleties matter in important ways, we maintain that such regimes have not experienced a transition to a different regime type. Considering such regimes as hybrid regimes rather than authoritarian ones only produces conceptual confusion and inhibits proper cross-national comparison.

## Redefining Electoral Regimes

In order to standardize the application of Linz's definition of authoritarianism within the field of hybrid regimes, we recommend a shift in the definition of an electoral and non-electoral regime. We do so following one of the conceptual strategies

outlined by Collier and Levitsky (1997: 445–8). The purpose is to bring greater consistency to the field and to disperse much of the conceptual fog that surrounds the study of hybrid regimes. Specifically, we argue that electoral regimes need to be re-defined to those that hold *competitive* multiparty elections. This shift clarifies the conceptual space within which hybrid regimes belong and identifies its unique institutional features.

We define competitive multiparty elections using the insights gained from the writings of Sartori and Levitsky and Way. Competitive elections are those in which more than one center of power with different socio-economic interests can participate and "present a serious electoral threat to incumbents" (Levitsky and Way 2002: 55).[14] The greater the competitiveness, the greater the closeness of the electoral returns should be between different centers of power (Sartori 1976). Thus, elections in competitive arenas distribute power between different political groups. In contrast, uncompetitive elections take place in an environment in which there are no serious threats to the ruling party's monopoly of power.

In our view, turnover is a crucial indicator of competitive elections. Along with Huntington (1991), Geddes (1999), Przeworski et al. (2000), and Gandhi (2008), we maintain that turnover confirms incumbent defeat and hand over of power. It therefore both indicates a real challenge to the incumbent and it concretely impacts the distribution of power amongst the political elite. We argue that a regime that experiences an alternation of power is critically different from a regime in which a single party rules for a substantial period of time because of the broad implications that alternations of power can have on regime dynamics such as the formulation of public policy and state-society relations. Although we recognize that turnover could be appropriately used as an indicator of democracy before the end of the cold war, the emergence of competitive multiparty elections under nondemocratic conditions complicates this task today. In other words, we assert that turnover does not necessarily indicate a democratic regime.[15] Instead, it is an indicator of an electoral regime, or a regime that has competitive multiparty elections.[16] Both a democracy and a hybrid regime are consequently subtypes of an electoral regime.

[14] By center of power, we mean an individual, faction or institution, such as a party, with a distinguishable political platform and resource base. Centers of power can be distinguished from one another based on Lijphart's (1999) seven key issue dimensions that structure partisan conflict: socioeconomics, religion, culture and ethnicity, the urban and rural divide, degree of regime support, foreign policy, and materialist and post-materialist values. While it is clear that most countries in the world will have multiple centers of power, we argue that it is essential to ask whether these centers of power compete against each other in the electoral arena. This builds upon Sartori's cogent argument that intraparty elite competition in a single party system is not a functional equivalent of a multiparty system. Sartori (1976: 49) maintains that citizen involvement via interparty competition is essential to multiparty systems because it forces them to "vie with each other with an eye to the voters—and this entails far-reaching consequences."

[15] Schedler (2009: 303–304) argues that alternations in power do not necessarily indicate a democratic regime, rather there can be thee different types of alternations. Levitsky and Way (2010: 23–24) also assert that many electoral turnovers in the post-cold war period did not inspire a democratic transition. Instead "the removal of autocratic incumbents brought little institutional change, and successor parties did not govern democratically. Such cases are too numerous to be ignored or treated as exceptions."

[16] Intrusive tutelary institutions also affect whether a regime is classified as an electoral regime. Some, such as the military in Turkey, may veto policies or ban parties but are not active in day-to-day governance. This situation contrasts with the extensive governing authority of other tutelary institutions, such as King Mohammed VI of Morocco. Based on this distinction, regimes that have multiparty elections and even turnover, such as Morocco, are non-electoral regimes, whereas those such as Turkey are electoral.

An electoral regime requires a turnover in at least four consecutive electoral cycles or twenty years in either the presidency or the legislature, distinguishing it from the length requirement of a dominant party system.[17] We concede turnover is not a perfect measure of competitiveness like other scholars,[18] but it appears to be better than the alternatives and it produces an alternation of rulers that can be significant for regime dynamics. Turnover is also an observable indicator and does not require relying on an artificial threshold (Przeworski et al. 2000). Thresholds above 50% can be useful when differentiating between authoritarian regimes rather than between authoritarian and hybrid regimes. For example, we agree with Howard and Roessler's (2006; Roessler and Howard 2009) 70% threshold but, reflecting our understanding of an electoral regime, see it as an appropriate threshold within the non-electoral category. The 70% threshold can help distinguish hegemonic parties that exercise a firm grip on the electoral arena from those whose hold on power is weaker or may be slipping, yet do not experience turnover. This distinction sheds light on cases such as the PRI in Mexico where competitiveness increased in the latter part of the twentieth century, as opposed to its more hegemonic past. It did not become an electoral regime, however, until the PAN's electoral victory in 2000.

The new conceptual map following the shift is presented in Fig. 3. This strategy codifies Linz's conceptualization of nondemocratic rule, standardizing the threshold separating hybrid regimes from authoritarian ones. Authoritarian, totalitarian, and sultanistic regimes are non-electoral regimes because they do not have competitive elections. As the figure illustrates, the tension surrounding the authoritarian type is alleviated, reducing a source of confusion.

Significantly, the re-definition of electoral regimes points to the main conceptual space of hybrid regimes. The hybrid regime type, as represented by the label "competitive authoritarian" in Fig. 3, has not been accounted for in classical conceptualizations of political regimes due to its competitive nature. As such, nondemocratic regimes with competitive multiparty elections are absent in Linz's classification. A similar theoretical gap can be found in the writings of Sartori (1976) as well. In the past, it was generally assumed that regimes that held competitive multiparty elections were democracies, while those that did not were authoritarian. Diamond (2002: 24) correctly notes that:

> Certainly Linz does not identify, among his seven principal authoritarian regime types, anything like the 'competitive authoritarian' regime type discussed by Levitsky and Way—and for good reason. This type of hybrid regime, which is now so common, is very much a product of the contemporary world.

The difference that Diamond highlights is also illustrated in Sartori's (1976: 217–221) discussion of competitive and non-competitive party systems.[19] According to Sartori, competitive party systems are those in which the rules of the game fairly structure competition among parties during elections. In contrast, non-competitive

[17] For a thorough discussion of this point, see Greene (2007: 16).

[18] The case of a highly satisfied populace complicates the use of turnover as an indicator. Here turnover as an indicator falters and this situation has been well documented by Przeworski et al. (2000). With any type of measurement there will be error, and we, like Przeworski et al., have decided to err on calling potentially competitive regimes non-competitive.

[19] While not explicitly stated as such, competitive party systems are considered democratic. Systems that are uncompetitive are considered nondemocratic.




**Fig. 3** Conceptual map of overarching shift

party systems do not have rules of the game that fairly structure competition and lack competitiveness. Sartori's classification does not account for regimes that have unfair competition but demonstrate competitiveness. Contemporary hybrid regimes occupy this key theoretical space whereby competitive multiparty elections occur despite an uneven political playing field (Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010).

The above discussion highlights two important regime dimensions for classification—"competitiveness" and "competition" as defined by Sartori. Democracies are competitive regimes with fair competition whereas authoritarian regimes are uncompetitive regimes with unfair competition. Hybrid regimes occupy the conceptual void of competitive regimes with unfair competition. Consequently, and as we argued earlier with the re-definition of an electoral regime, emphasizing the boundary between competitive and non-competitive regimes is essential to distinguish democracies and hybrid regimes from authoritarian ones. In contrast, the quality of competition is an important element to differentiate democracies from nondemocratic regimes (e.g., hybrid and authoritarian regimes).

In addition to the quality of competition, another key element that establishes the boundary between democratic and nondemocratic regimes is tutelary interference. Scholars such as Diamond (1999, 2002) and Schedler (2002, 2006) have valuably established the minimum requirements a country must meet in order to be considered a democracy.[20] An

[20] Schedler (2002: 39) discusses the chain of democratic choice, which is based on the idea that "democratic elections are mechanisms of social choice under conditions of freedom and equality." The chain of democratic choice includes seven essential elements or links (39–41): (1) *Empowerment*: elections select the highest decision-makers who are unconstrained by tutelary power. (2) *Freedom of supply*: citizens must be free to associate. (3) *Freedom of demand*: alternative sources of information must be available. (4) *Inclusion*: elections are based on universal suffrage. (5) *Insulation*: citizens must be able to express their votes freely. (6) *Integrity*: election results are counted fairly. (7) *Irreversibility*: in accordance with constitutional rules, the winners of elections must be able to take office as well as govern until the conclusion of their term.

important element in these requirements, besides the quality of competition, is that unelected bodies, such as the military, religious authorities, or a monarch, must not unduly constrain the agency of elected leaders or veto national legislation. Accordingly, the three dimensions of competitiveness, competition, and tutelary interference form the main axes of a configurative approach to political regime classification, a topic that will be discussed in greater detail later in the paper.

The re-definition of electoral regime, therefore, advances the literature on hybrid regimes in a number of ways. First, it provides clarity by keeping with classical understandings of nondemocratic rule. Authoritarian, totalitarian, and sultanistic regimes are non-electoral regimes because they are monopolized by a single center of power that does not face strong opposition in the electoral arena. Second, this change emphasizes the new conceptual boundary of hybrid regimes by highlighting their competitiveness. As scholars have critically advised, it is important to maximize the conceptual potential of prior typologies (Armony and Schamis 2005; Snyder 2006: 227). In other words, the conceptualization of hybrid regimes is only justified when prior classifications prove problematic or inadequate. Therefore, the shift we call for highlights those regimes that are truly "hybrid" and cannot be classified by previous scholars due to competitiveness and some form of undemocratic rule. This shift also prevents authoritarianism from becoming a residual category for various nondemocratic regime types. Hybrid regimes are nondemocratic, non-authoritarian regimes that must be conceptualized on their own. Third, since the new classification excludes hybrid regimes from the non-electoral and hence authoritarian category, the number of mistaken conceptual and empirical classifications will be limited. If a country has uncompetitive multiparty elections, it is a non-electoral regime and, consequently, not a hybrid.

### Hybrid Regimes

We argue that nondemocratic, non-authoritarian regimes be called "hybrids" rather than democracy or authoritarianism with adjectives. First, this general name without reference to authoritarianism or democracy is appropriate because it prevents conceptual confusion and conceptual stretching. Referring back to Fig. 2, competitive authoritarianism and a segment of electoral authoritarianism refer up the ladder of generality to electoral regimes, not aligning with the non-electoral regime category of authoritarianism. To improve conceptual clarity, these regimes should not be categorized as diminished subtypes of authoritarianism, particularly when they are electoral regimes. Second, a general name without reference to authoritarianism or democracy will better match the theoretical understanding of hybrid regimes, as many scholars assert that they are neither democratic nor authoritarian (see Diamond 2002; Ottaway 2003). We believe that our terminology should reflect this claim. Lastly, the term "hybrid" highlights the configuration of electoral competitiveness along with possible undemocratic regime attributes, such as unfair competition or the presence of tutelary bodies.

## The Configurative Approach and Regime Conceptualization

A configurative approach can provide scholars with fresh insight about the field of hybrid regimes. While a multi-dimensional approach was often used in the past, as

illustrated in the work of Linz, it has been overshadowed by the conceptualization of regimes on a single continuum spanning from liberal democracy to closed authoritarianism. We argue that a multi-dimensional view needs to be revived in order to clarify the field of hybrid regimes and to provide a fuller understanding of the relationship of regimes to one another. In addition, the concepts formed through a configurative approach are better suited for the formulation and testing of causal theory because of the stress this method places on the variety of institutional features that cut across regime types.

The configurative approach is suitable for constructing complex concepts based on the multiple combinations in which different attributes, or the defining characteristics of an object, combine. The resulting object concepts are viewed in a dichotomous fashion as their features are uniquely configured to form a variety of meaningfully distinct entities. Besides the graded approach, the dichotomous position is a major ontological view used to conceptualize regimes (Linz 2000; Sartori 1984, 1991; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000; Gandhi 2008).[21] Scholars who have a dichotomous view consider concepts to be contradictories. A phenomenon either belongs to a concept or it does not: a person is pregnant or not pregnant; a regime is a democracy or nondemocracy (Sartori 1984). Thus, the defining attributes that comprise a concept tie it into a bounded whole, or an object concept such as "regime." The emphasis of this method rests on differences in kind rather than degree. This is particularly the case for political regimes, as they are complex phenomena that can be constructed through various combinations of possible regime attributes and dimensions.

Therefore, one of the central premises of the configurative approach is that regimes are not compared or measured in terms of other regimes. Consequently, we do not measure nondemocracies by their degree of democracy. This is because we assert that it is equally nonsensical to ask the following two questions: How totalitarian is a democratic regime? How democratic is an authoritarian regime? Instead, we apply Linz's insightful recommendation to systematically analyze different types of regimes in their own right and not view them as merely deviations from a single ideal type (Linz 1970: 253).

We instead argue that regimes can only be compared to one another based on their specific properties. A property concept is a single attribute, such as pluralism or competitiveness in the case of political regimes, rather than a combination of attributes bound as a whole (Sartori 1984, 1991). The configurative approach emphasizes the multiple ways in which properties can combine to determine regime type. For example, in his path-breaking work on nondemocracies, Linz uses the three dimensions of mobilization, ideology, and leadership constraint in order to construct regime ideal types. Later, the attribute of pluralism is added to his model (Linz 2000; Linz and Stepan 1996). Figure 4 illustrates Linz's conceptualization of regimes based on the particular configurations of these four dimensions.

[21] A third approach less common in the political regime literature constructs concepts with a "fuzzy logic" perspective. Here the distinction between dichotomous and continuous concepts is less pronounced than the one developed in the current regime classification literature. The distinction we place between dichotomous and graded approaches does not preclude a fuzzy logic approach. Our goal is to emphasize the importance of differences in kind rather than degree in a language appropriate for and commonly understood by the political regime field. See Goertz (2006) for a discussion of the fuzzy logic approach to concept building.




**Fig. 4** Property concept continuums for regime types (Linz 2000; Linz and Stepan 1996)

In contrast, a graded approach understands object concepts in terms of degree. It considers a concept to be comprised of a linear continuum connected to two opposite poles—democracy and authoritarianism in the case of the contemporary regime continuum (Bollen and Jackman 1989; Elkins 2000). Although, we are not necessarily critical of graded measurements, we argue that graded measures can be problematic for complex concepts such as political regimes. As we will show, multiple combinations of significant regime features may produce different concepts that cannot be accurately placed upon a single continuum. A configurative approach enables and highlights unique institutional characteristics that may be crucial for both proper case selection and the testing of causal theory.

The field of hybrid regimes includes many scholars who employ thresholds in conjunction with the traditional continuum view (Diamond 1999, 2002; Schedler 2002, 2006; Munck 2006; Howard and Roessler 2006; Roessler and Howard 2009; Epstein et al. 2006; Bogaards 2009; Brownlee 2009a, b).[22] This more nuanced approach intrinsically contains a graded position, even if it attempts to capture the dichotomous nature of a concept with the addition of thresholds (Collier and Adcock 1999). In other words, although there is a difference in kind between two different regimes separated by a threshold, the concepts only relate to one another based on the unified continuum underlying the specific classificatory scheme used.

While many scholars who use a continuum approach have mapped the relationship of various regimes, including hybrid types, to one another, those with a configurative view have only infrequently done so. For example, although

[22] While Brownlee (2009a, b) uses Geddes' approach for the classification of closed regimes, his conceptualization and measurement of hybrid regimes are based upon a continuum with thresholds view.

Levitsky and Way (2002, 2010) accept that multiple types of hybrid regimes exist, they do not conceptualize them formally or contextualize them within the larger field of political regimes. The brief attention they give to other types of hybrid regimes adds to conceptual confusion. Hadenius and Teorell (2006, 2007) also employ a configurative approach to hybrid regimes and build upon Geddes' (1999) work. Nevertheless, their detailed classification lacks parsimony, and they add to conceptual confusion by introducing multiple regime types without adequately contextualizing them within the literature.[23]

Outside of the field of hybrid regimes, the configurative approach has been extensively used to conceptualize other regime types. As mentioned previously, Linz (1970, 2000) employs a configurative approach to conceptualize authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Later, Geddes (1999) innovatively creates a variety of non-electoral typologies with this method, while Coppedge and Reinicke (1990) do the same for democratic regimes. However, these classifications do not capture the conceptual notion of contemporary hybrid regimes due to the time period examined.[24] Indeed, while Linz's work provides us with a particularly useful method for conceptualizing nondemocratic regimes, the dimensions he identifies are better attuned for conceptualizing and differentiating between different types of non-electoral regimes, such as totalitarianism, sultanism and authoritarianism.

An alternative set of dimensions is needed in order to capture the more recent phenomenon of hybrid regimes. Theory should guide us in the selection of important regime features necessary for proper and effective regime classification. Furthermore, these new attributes should reflect the theoretical developments accomplished by scholars of hybrid regimes over the last two decades as discussed earlier in the paper.[25] This will not only promote the accumulation of knowledge but will also help clarify the conceptual field by highlighting the important advancements made in hybrid regime classification.

## Competitiveness, Tutelary Interference, and Civil Liberties

Drawing from our conceptual analysis of the relation between hybrid regimes to both democracy and authoritarianism, we assert that competitiveness, competition, and tutelary interference are the three dimensions that are important for regime classification today.[26] More specifically, these dimensions are necessary to place

[23] Likewise, while Storm's (2008) configurative approach of the elements of democracy is innovative, her method risks undermining the importance of nondemocratic regime types. This is because all regimes are conceptually classified as diminished subtypes of democracy to varying degrees. Rather than missing a single element as is typical of the diminished approach, regimes may lack multiple elements that may combine in a number of ways.

[24] For example, Hadenius and Teorell (2007: 145) note that Geddes' classification does not incorporate competitive non-dominant party regimes. Geddes (1999) classifies regimes within the non-electoral category.

[25] For example, while Wigell (2008) incorporates a two-dimensional approach for the conceptualization of hybrid regimes, his framework does not clearly depict the relationship between his new types and those previously created by the field. In addition, it is unclear how Wigell's conceptual schema can be measured empirically.

[26] Wolfgang Merkel (2004) uses similar dimensions in the study of democracy. He theorizes that "liberal democracy consists of five partial regimes: a democratic electoral regime, political rights of participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the guarantee that the effective power to govern lies in the hands of democratically elected representatives" (36).

multiparty regimes into democratic, hybrid or authoritarian categories. Based on our analysis of the hybrid regime field in the proceeding sections, competitiveness produces an alternation of rulers and concretely impacts the distribution of power in a regime. It is verified by at least one turnover in four electoral cycles for the executive or legislature. Reflecting our understanding of electoral and non-electoral regimes as summarized by Fig. 3, we maintain that competitive multiparty elections produce a qualitatively different type of regime than one with uncompetitive multiparty elections. Indeed, as we showed previously in the section "Conceptualizing Electoral and Non-electoral Regimes," competitiveness is the key component absent in previous classifications of authoritarian regimes (Linz 2000; Sartori 1976), and at the same time competitiveness is astutely identified as a defining attribute of hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010; Schedler 2002). Building on this significant insight, we regard those regimes with competitive multiparty elections for the executive and legislature to have "elections as a regime dimension." In other words, elections play an important role in the distribution of power.

In contrast, in those regimes that hold uncompetitive multiparty elections, the electoral arena does not play an important role in the distribution of power. Rather, elections are a means by which rulers ensure their own survival. The possibility for change in the status quo through the electoral mechanism is severely curtailed. These regimes can be considered to have "elections as a strategy." Thus, while we may witness an opening and closing of the electoral arena depending on the strategies of the ruler or ruling party (Brumberg 1995, 2002), the regime type will not change as a result of this often cyclical process.[27] Furthermore, limited political suffrage produces uncompetitive elections as broad sectors of the population are effectively excluded from the electoral arena.

The quality of competition, understood as the broad rules of the electoral game, is the second dimension in our regime classification. Building on our earlier discussion of Sartori (1976), "competition" differs from the first dimension of "competitiveness" we present in this section. For the sake of clarity, we label this dimension as "civil liberties," building on Dahl's (1971) understanding that civil liberties provide the minimum conditions of procedural democracy by ensuring fair competition. The degree of civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, assembly, and the right to alternative sources of information, is indicative of particular liberal/illiberal state-society relationships. In respect to competition, the strong enforcement of civil liberties creates a fairer electoral playing field for competing parties. In other words, those regimes that protect civil liberties provide a broad arena in which citizens can participate and thus have fair competition. In contrast, those regimes that poorly protect civil liberties constrain the possible avenues of meaningful citizen participation in social, economic, and political life and accordingly have unfair competition. Furthermore, the protection of civil liberties not only sheds light on the way rulers govern but impacts empirical research in areas such as civil society and democratization.[28]

[27] On this latter point, we were inspired by Henry Hale's (2005) insightful discussion of cyclical changes in presidential patronal regimes.

[28] For an example, see Howard (2003). An example on democratization is O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) discussion of *dictablanda*.

The degree of tutelary interference is also an important dimension of regime classification. Tutelary bodies, or reserved domains of power, refer to non-elected institutions such as militaries, monarchies, or religious authorities that engage in politics. Multiple scholars have highlighted the role of tutelary bodies that circumvent the political mechanisms of democratic decision-making, effectively disqualifying such regimes from being classified as democracies.[29] Bolstering the line between democracy and nondemocracy, Schedler (2002: 39) argues that tutelary institutions that constrain the agenda of elected officials or veto their decisions violate essential links in the chain of democratic choice. In addition, the institutional make-up of tutelary bodies must be taken into consideration when identifying regime type, as different nondemocratic institutions have important implications for comparative research. For example, Haggard and Kaufmann (1995) and Geddes (1999) make significant contributions to regime theory by showing that various types of authoritarian regimes, such as military and single party systems, produce different regime life spans and transition pathways.

## A Multi-Dimensional Map of Regimes

In contrast to a one-dimensional and linear classification of regimes, Fig. 5 shows a multi-dimensional matrix of regime types. The cube is constructed on the theoretically identified axes of competitiveness, tutelary interference, and civil liberties. The three dimensions on the cube measure only *multiparty* regimes, political regimes that have multiple parties and factions present in the electoral arena. Non-multiparty regimes are not classified by these regime attributes and are outside the purview of this paper.

We maintain that these three dimensions are incommensurable and cannot be combined into a single continuum, even though for presentation purposes the sides of the cube are equal in length. As will be illustrated below, each dimension impacts regime classification in unique ways. Reflecting our discussion of the re-definition of electoral regimes and its significance for conceptual clarity, the competitiveness dimension is key to separating electoral regimes (democracy and hybrid regimes) from non-electoral regimes (authoritarianism). The other two dimensions are important for distinguishing regimes within the electoral and non-electoral categories.

The competitiveness dimension is the *x*-axis of the diagram and differentiates electoral and non-electoral regimes located at the left and right sides of the cube respectively (see Fig. 6). Electoral regimes are those that hold competitive multiparty elections, while non-electoral regimes do not. The tutelary interference dimension is the *z*-axis and differentiates tutelary regimes from non-tutelary ones. Multiparty regimes that have active monarchical, military, or clerical domains are found on the front side of the cube and those that lack or have inactive tutelary institutions, such as the British monarchy, are on the back side (see Fig. 7). The *y*-axis represents the civil liberties dimension, separating liberal multiparty regimes at the top of the cube from illiberal multiparty regimes at the bottom (see Fig. 8).[30]

[29] Some examples include Karl (1990), Schmitter and Karl (1996), Levitsky and Way (2002), and Schedler (2002).

[30] The illiberal regime category approximates Zakaria's (1997) concept of "illiberal democracy."




**Fig. 5** Configurative regime dimensions

Composite scores, such as those from either Freedom House or Polity IV, cannot be used to measure concepts constructed with a configurative approach. Aggregating or averaging sub-indicators into a single measure inhibits regime identification based on particular combinations of dimensions (Gleditsch and Ward 1997; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Hadenius and Teorell 2006, 2007). Multiple types of regimes, in other words, may receive the same score, blurring their diverse institutional features. As a result, a single continuum cannot account for institutional differences or similarities that span across distinct regime types. This difficulty is particularly acute when studying concepts at the middle range of the continuum, where hybrid regimes are located (Goertz 2008).[31]

For example, to create the commonly used polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset, the scores of different measurements of democracy or autocracy are combined into a unified score for the purposes of regime type classification. Interestingly, Marshall et al. (2010: 16–17) caution users about the implications of this measurement method, stating that such a method runs counter to the original theory proposed by Eckstein and Gurr. Eckstein and Gurr did not accept that autocracy and democracy are opposites in a unified spectrum. And they warn that the polity2 score should not be used to study the middle of the Polity spectrum, as various combinations of the democracy and autocracy sub-indicators are masked. Similarly, Freedom House's system of regime classification cannot capture institutional configurations, as it combines both civil liberties and political rights scores to produce a single score.

Important works that create cross-national datasets of hybrid regimes with a continuum approach encounter these measurement difficulties as well. Epstein et al.'s (2006) measurement, for example, is unable to account for conceptual variations in hybrid regime types as they only have a single category, partial democracy, measured by a middle range of the aggregated Polity IV score. In comparison, while

[31] Goertz's (2008: 109) analysis of the variance of Polity and Freedom House at the middle range of their scales leads him to conclude: "In particular, the gray zone needs to be examined independently of the two extremes" (109).




**Fig. 6** Competitive dimension of regimes

Howard and Roessler (2006) have a conceptually nuanced understanding of different regimes, they are inhibited by the continuum with thresholds approach as well. Their method cannot present the overarching similarities and differences across regime types. Likewise, each of their concepts captures a variety of distinct institutional configurations.

In contrast, surprising overarching patterns that may have previously been overlooked are highlighted with our configurative approach through a comparison of regimes located in the different regions of the cube. For example, as shown in Figs. 6, 7, and 8, liberal, tutelary, and competitive dimensions can each be used to compare different multiparty regime types to one another. The ability to do so is important, as Goertz (2006: 6) incisively illustrates, because the attributes of concepts are important in the formulation and testing of theory. For example, Dahl's (1971) two dimensions of contestation and participation comprising the democracy type can be used separately to develop causal theory. In our case, liberal regimes can be compared to illiberal ones, tutelary regimes to non-tutelary ones, and competitive




**Fig. 7** Tutelary interference dimension of regimes




**Fig. 8** Civil liberty dimension of regimes

regimes to non-competitive ones. This condition also holds true for an analysis of regime subtypes as will be demonstrated further below. A configurative approach, therefore, is well-suited to account for the multiple dimensions of regime types as it does not aggregate or average these secondary attributes into a single score.

It is important to note that our logic does not preclude the use of properly constructed dataset sub-indicators that measure a single regime property. In other words, a configurative classification could be constructed in a methodologically proper manner by using the disaggregated dimensions of continuum-based datasets, such as Polity. For example, either the civil liberties measurement in the case of Freedom House or POLCOMP in the case of Polity can be used to measure the civil liberties (i.e., competition) dimension of the cube. Indeed, we use Freedom House's civil liberties score to measure the quality of competition present in a country, drawing from Dahl's work on the importance of civil liberties in the assessment of political competition.

While dataset sub-indicators can be used for proper concept measurement, not all sub-indicators are useful for the purposes of regime classification. Regime theory must first guide our selection of the minimum key attributes necessary for concept building. Only once these regime properties have been identified can the task of measurement begin. This paper argues that the three necessary conceptual dimensions for regime classification are competitiveness, civil liberties (i.e., competition), and tutelary interference. Consequently, any dataset variable that provides a proper measurement of one of these dimensions can be used for the purposes of regime classification. In contrast, other dimension measurements can be useful for the creation of regime subtypes or for the testing of causal theory. This is because such variables would mostly provide variance *within* each regime category rather than *between* regime categories. For example, indicators that measure the strength of the executive or the degree of political party polarization will theoretically produce variance within each regime type. For the purposes of regime classification, we need regime dimensions that can create variance between regime categories. Otherwise, we would not be able to properly identify and separate authoritarian, democratic and hybrid regimes from one another in a theoretically grounded manner.

Returning to our discussion of the cube, our configurative approach reveals a variety of regime ideal types that have been previously unaccounted for in graded approaches. By definition, an ideal type may not represent an actual regime, which in reality falls somewhere between these extreme points on the cube. Instead, it serves as a useful analytical tool for differentiation. Although the three dimensions we propose for regime classification are continua, we employ dichotomous measurements of each to create parsimonious ideal types.[32] A graded measurement could be used in this task, but we fear that without a dichotomous measurement the proliferation of types and subsequent classification would become overly complex and unwieldy, and would undermine the central goal of this paper to bring greater conceptual clarity to the field. This insight builds on Dahl's persuasive discussion of the difficulties scholars face in making both a conceptually valid as well as parsimonious and useful regime typology. Consequently, in his discussion of contestation and participation, Dahl (1971: 6–7) creates only four ideal regime types within a matrix that may have included many more.

Returning to the figures, the non-competitive face of the cube in Fig. 9 presents multiparty authoritarian regime subtypes in the year 2006. These regimes represent electoral authoritarian regimes as conceptualized by Schedler excluding competitive regimes, such as Levitsky and Way's competitive authoritarian regime. Looking at the bottom right hand of the figure at the back of the cube, we see an authoritarian regime with the label (0, 0, 1). This means that this regime is uncompetitive, has low civil liberties, and does not have a tutelary institution. In other words, it is a non-electoral, illiberal, non-tutelary regime. Real world examples include Mubarak's Egypt and Kazakhstan. This subtype has been identified as "hegemonic electoral authoritarian" by Diamond (2002). Our multi-dimensional representation, however, reveals three additional subtypes. Moving to the authoritarian regime with the label (0, 0, 0), we see that this type is very similar to the previous one, as it is uncompetitive and has low civil liberties. It differs however in that it has an active tutelary institution. Morocco and Jordan are examples of this type as they both have monarchies. These two authoritarian subtypes have liberal counterparts as well; examples are Singapore (0, 1, 1) and Fiji (0, 1, 0).

On the other hand, the electoral regime category includes both democratic and hybrid regimes (see Fig. 10). As the cube shows, there are three different subtypes of a hybrid regime. They are all similar in that they hold competitive elections. They differ based on their particular arrangement of nondemocratic attributes, such as low civil liberties and/or tutelary institutions. One subtype is the "illiberal hybrid regime" (1, 0, 1), which is the most similar type to Levitsky and Way's concept of competitive authoritarianism.[33] These regimes hold competitive multiparty elections

[32] Note that a dichotomous measurement of a regime dimension is distinct and separate from the topic of a dichotomous understanding of a regime concept itself, as the former only deals with a single property concept (a regime attribute) and the latter with an object concept (a regime type).

[33] While an illiberal hybrid regime is essentially competitive authoritarianism as conceptualized by Levitsky and Way, we differ in measurement by excluding dominant party systems (Greene 2007). A dominant party system is one in which a single party or the same coalition of parties has ruled a country over four electoral cycles or twenty years. We exclude dominant party systems even if they win by bare majorities because they represent a single center of power that dominates the electoral arena. Elections should not be considered competitive until the incumbent actually loses power, thus allowing another center of power to rule the country.




**Fig. 9** Configurative model of non-electoral regimes in 2006

but have low civil liberties. They also do not have reserved domains of power. Sri Lanka is an example of an illiberal hybrid regime. While experiencing multiple turnovers and divided government, the Sinhalese-dominated regime uses the Tamil insurgency as a pretext to employ violent and repressive measures against their own Sinhalese critics in political and civil society (Devota 2004: 311–312). Therefore, the rules of competition are unfairly skewed toward regime insiders, as opponents are deprived of adequate civil liberties to meaningfully campaign and organize.




**Fig. 10** Configurative model of electoral regimes in 2006

Another subtype is the "illiberal tutelary hybrid regime" (1, 0, 0). These regimes are competitive, illiberal and have tutelary institutions. Iran is an example of this subtype. First, clerical authorities ban secular parties and veto policies deemed un-Islamic. Second, civil liberties are poorly enforced, as some opposition figures are jailed and the freedom of expression is limited by state censorship. Yet, despite these elements, multiple political factions competitively vie with one another over state institutions through electoral means (Moslem 2002; Sadowski 2006: 230). While evidence of turnover is frequent, notable elections that spot the uncertainty and competitiveness of the electoral arena include the shock presidential elections of Mohammad Khatami, of the republican left in 1997, and that of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, of the theocratic left, in 2005.[34] Both represent unpredictable and substantial victories against regime insiders who have considerable power and influence.

The last subtype is the "tutelary hybrid regime" (1, 1, 0). While these regimes broadly protect civil liberties and have competitive elections, tutelary institutions interfere in politics. Chile in the 1990s is illustrative of this subtype. As a result of its "pacted transition" from authoritarian rule, critical vestiges of military power remained in Chile (Haggard and Kaufmann 1995). The military appointed members of the Senate, made its own budgetary decisions, and received judicial immunity. These features demonstrate the continued influence of the military on politics in Chile. Tutelary hybrid regimes like Chile as well as other electoral and non-electoral regime types are presented in Fig. 11, providing a comprehensive picture of multiparty regime classification using a configurative approach.

Finally, Table 1 presents all hybrid regimes according to our classification from 1990 to 2009. Although our method of measurement is also used to measure and identify democratic and multiparty authoritarian regimes, we only present a list of hybrid regimes for the purposes of this paper. The only limitation of these three dimensions is that they cannot account for nondemocratic regimes that do not have multiparty elections. Single party regimes such as Cuba and North Korea as well as some sultanistic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are consequently unaccounted for by our method. But due to the ever increasing number of multiparty regimes in the world, particularly since the end of the cold war, the number of cases that evade our classification system is few in number.

Furthermore, while our typology is geared towards capturing the electorally competitive yet nondemocratic hybrid regime that has become widespread after the cold war, it is not necessarily limited to this time period. Some regimes such as Turkey, Iran, and Thailand, to name a few, have been hybrids much earlier than the end of the cold war. That being said, the cold war is an important turning point for regime classification. If the number of hybrid regimes had remained relatively small after the cold war, the field would not have the practical justification to conceptualize a new regime type without adding to conceptual confusion. Under these circumstances, understanding the pattern of regimes in the post-cold war world is significant and worthy as many regimes important for scholarly study cannot be properly classified. Without abandoning classification schemes prior to the end of

[34] "Republican" and "theocratic"' refer to Islamist commitments, while "right" and "left" refer to economic preferences.




**Fig. 11** Configurative model of regime types in 2006

the cold war, this paper creates the conceptual space with which to understand the position and properties of these new hybrid regimes independently and in relation to both democratic and authoritarian ones.

## Conclusion

Classifying political regimes has always been a difficult enterprise. As Diamond, Linz, and Lipset insightfully noted in 1988, there is an incredible range of nondemocratic regimes and their relationship with each other and democracy is often imperfect and unclear. While it is certain that the complex realities of political life will always pose significant challenges for the conceptualization and classification of regime types, we maintain that a configurative approach is well-suited to address some of these difficulties as it provides a multi-dimensional view of regimes.

After presenting the source of much conceptual confusion in contemporary classification at the electoral regime level, this paper argues for a re-definition of the overarching concept of electoral and non-electoral regimes. Such a re-definition allows us to underscore the contribution and continued relevance of scholars such as Linz and Sartori in classifying regimes today. At the same time, it shows the theoretical gap in older work that creates the conceptual space for nondemocratic, non-authoritarian regimes, which we call hybrid regimes. Second, by highlighting the possible multi-dimensional configurations that may comprise regime types, a

**Table 1** Hybrid regimes 1990–2009

| Illiberal Hybrid Regime | Tutelary Illiberal Hybrid Regime | Tutelary Liberal Hybrid Regime |
|---|---|---|
| Albania (1992-2001) | Brazil (1993-1995) (Military) | Brazil (1990-1992) (Military) |
| Armenia (1991-2009) | Cambodia (1993) (International) | Chile (1990-1998) (Military) |
| Bangladesh (1991-2006) | Comoros (1992-1998, 2004-2009) (Military) | Ecuador (1997-1999, 2002-2006) (Military) |
| Belarus (1991-1995) | Guatemala (1990-1996) (Military) | Honduras (1990-1993) (Military) |
| Brazil (1995-1999) | Guinea-Bissau (2005-2009) (Military) | Sierra Leone (2003-2005) (International) |
| Cambodia (1994-2009) | Indonesia (1999-2004) (Military) | Thailand (1996-2005) (Monarchy-Military) |
| Colombia (1990-2009) | Iran (1990-2009) (Clergy) | Turkey (2004-2009) (Military) |
| Croatia (1991-1999) | Lebanon (1992-2004) (International) | |
| Georgia (1995-2009) | Nepal (1991-2001) (Monarchy) | |
| Guatemala (1997-2009) | Nicaragua (1990-1995) (Military) | |
| India (1991-1997) | Pakistan (1990-1998, 2004-2009) (Military) | |
| Kyrgyzstan (1991-2009) | Sierra Leone (2002) (International) | |
| Lebanon (2005-2009) | Thailand (1992-1995, 2007-2009) (Monarchy-Military) | |
| Madagascar (1993-2002) | Turkey (1990-1996, 1999-2003) (Military) | |
| Malawi (2002-2009) | Zimbabwe (2008-2009) (Military) | |
| Moldova (1991-2009) | | |
| Papua New Guinea (1993-1997) | | |
| Peru (1995-1999) | | |
| Romania (1990-1993) | | |
| Russia (1991-2009) | | |
| Slovakia (1993-1997) | | |
| Sri Lanka (1990-2009) | | |
| Ukraine (1991-2003) | | |
| Venezuela (1999-2009) | | |
| Serbia and Montenegro (1991-2000) | | |

different ordering of democratic, hybrid, and authoritarian regime relationships can be posited. While contemporary regime classification is predominantly based on a one-dimensional continuum, we revive the multi-dimensional conceptualization of regimes based on competitiveness, tutelary interference, and civil liberties. As a result, our conceptual perspective may help standardize the meaning of a hybrid regime and alleviate some of the conceptual confusion in the literature.

In addition, this paper innovatively incorporates diagrams into the theoretical discussion of regime types. We believe that the visualization of theoretical concepts can play an important role not only in providing greater understanding of the literature on regime concepts but also in establishing a common ground from which scholars can constructively engage in debate and discussion (Brady 2011). By offering a more tangible sense of the relationship of regime concepts to one another, it may inspire future improvements and revisions of our diagrams and the theoretical state of the field. Furthermore, the cubic representation of regime types provides an alternative multi-dimensional visualization of regimes to a continuum-based view.

Finally, our paper has the potential to open the door for new comparisons, possibilities and puzzles for research. By stressing the importance of multiple dimensions of regime types, previously unnoticed similarities and differences between countries are highlighted. The sides of the cube, based on competitiveness, civil liberties, and tutelary interference illustrate the ways in which countries can be

grouped together for comparative study. These distinctions may enable innovative cross-regional analysis and help answer important questions such as who rules and how they govern (Snyder 2006). This paper is an initial step towards conceptualizing hybrid regimes with a configurative approach. We hope that it will spark conceptual debate among scholars to advance the field.

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