East European Politics and
Societies and Cultures
Volume 36 Number 1
February 2022  118­–140
© 2020 Sage Publications
https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325420950800
journals.sagepub.com/home/eep
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com
Counter-Elite Populism and
Civil Society in Poland:
PiS’s Strategies of Elite Replacement
Stanley Bill
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
This article shows how Poland’s ruling party, Law and Justice (PiS), is attempting to
apply its general strategy of “elite replacement” in a modified way to civil society.
Since independent civil society organizations are not subject to arbitrary state control
of appointments (unlike public institutions), this strategy has required a more complex
dual approach of pressure and promotion. Organizations perceived as hostile to
the party and its values have been subject to the withdrawal of state support and
smear campaigns. By contrast, organizations that are politically or ideologically
linked to the party have found support in the form of new public funds and other
institutional assistance. This article examines the practical functioning and consequences
of these processes through two main examples: (1) a state-sponsored campaign
against one of Poland’s largest independent charity organizations, the Great
Orchestra of Christmas Charity and (2) the funding of multiple right-wing NGOs
friendly to PiS by the newly established National Freedom Institute. The article
shows how PiS’s dual strategy in civil society reinforces its political narratives
through support of the broader right-wing cultural narratives that underpin them. At
the same time, it demonstrates how funding of friendly organizations directly
strengthens party structures by fostering the development of new political and
administrative cadres. By analysing PiS’s specific methods of pressure and promotion
in the sphere of civil society, the article shows the intertwining of political and
cultural narratives and goals within a right-wing populist framework.
Keywords:  Poland; populism; elites; civil society; Law and Justice (PiS)
Since coming to power in 2015, Poland’s United Right (Zjednoczona Prawica)—
led by Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS)—has implemented a
program it calls “the good change.” Alongside flagship social spending initiatives
and a right-wing cultural agenda, the coalition has made sweeping personnel
changes in the judiciary, civil service, public media, state-owned companies, cultural
institutions, and other public bodies. In accordance with a partially populist logic,
the coalition has sought to remove a “bad” establishment elite from state institutions,
replacing it with a “good” elite supposedly representing the interests of “the
nation.”1 This process of “elite replacement” has emulated Viktor Orbán’s earlier
Hungarian practices of state “occupation” or “colonization.”2 Yet the ambition of
950800EEPXXX10.1177/0888325420950800East European Politics & Societies and CulturesBill
research-article2020
Bill / Counter-Elite Populism and Civil Society in Poland  119
PiS’s program of change—like Orbán’s—extends far beyond institutions under government
control. Indeed, party leader Jarosław Kaczyński has called for the establishment
of a “new social hierarchy” that would reach deep into civil society.3 From
his point of view, only a total reconstruction of Poland’s social elites can complete
the country’s “unfinished” post-1989 transition.
Kaczyński and PiS claim that an “old-new elite” constituting an alliance of postcommunist
and liberal post-Solidarity forces has monopolized political, economic,
and cultural power since 1989. According to the party’s 2014 program, this negative
“pseudo-elite” is beholden to foreign interests, showing a “distaste . . . for the [Polish]
state” and a “suspicious attitude towards the nation.”4 This outlook also supposedly
dominates among liberal civil society, media, and cultural elites for whom “the very
use of the word ‘nation’is unwelcome.”5 As Kaczyński explains, all these groups are
submissively peripheral, “aping” western trends in betrayal of authentic Polish interests
and values.6 This treacherous “pseudo-elite” must be replaced by what he calls
the “counter-elite,” a set of PiS-affiliated groups more committed to the promotion
of national interests.7 In this sense, PiS’s populism is a “counter-elite” populism: not
hostile to elites per se, but positing a fundamental conflict between the wrong elite
and “the people”—represented, in turn, by the true (counter-)elite.8
In its purges of state institutions, PiS has used existing appointment powers, repeating
the practices of earlier governments on a larger scale and at a more rapid pace.9
However, in the cases of the civil service and public media, the party has introduced
new legislation to accelerate this process.10 In the judiciary, its repeated attempts to
replace judges under new laws have been partially stymied by a combination of
domestic resistance and external pressure from the European Commission and the
European Court of Justice.11 In this respect, the Polish case has differed from Orbán’s
earlier implementation of similar practices in Hungary, as the lack of a constitutional
majority and a more determined EU response have created additional obstacles for
PiS. Nevertheless, the party has successfully used a raft of ad hoc measures to achieve
many of its aims, facilitating what Wojciech Sadurski characterizes as an informal
system change through the cumulative “breakdown” of constitutional norms.12
But how can these strategies of elite replacement or “colonization” be implemented
in areas not directly under the government’s power? Since independent civil
society organizations are not subject to arbitrary state control, PiS has adopted a
more complex dual approach of negative pressure and positive promotion. Once
again, these responses follow an earlier Hungarian playbook of harassment of civil
society opponents and support of friendly organizations.13 PiS has exploited a wide
variety of formal and informal instruments of state power to deliver its dual strategy.
Organizations perceived as hostile to the party and its values have been subject to the
withdrawal of state support, smear campaigns mounted by party-controlled public
media, and even police raids. By contrast, organizations that are politically linked to
the party or share its ideological proclivities have found generous support in the form
of new public funds and other institutional assistance.
120  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
This article examines the practical functioning and wider consequences of these
processes through two main examples: (1) a state-sponsored campaign against one of
Poland’s largest independent charity organizations, the Great Orchestra of Christmas
Charity (Wielka Orkiestra Świątecznej Pomocy) and (2) the funding of multiple
right-wing NGOs friendly to PiS by the newly-established National Freedom
Institute—Center for Civil Society Development (Narodowy Instytut Wolności—
Centrum Rozwoju Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego). The article shows how PiS’s
strategies of pressure and promotion in civil society reinforce the party’s political
narratives through support of the broader right-wing cultural narratives that underpin
them. However, it also demonstrates how funding of friendly organizations directly
strengthens party structures by fostering the development of new political and administrative
cadres. In both cases, the article shows the intertwining of political and
cultural narratives and goals within a right-wing populist framework.
Marta Kotwas and Jan Kubik have argued that an ongoing “symbolic thickening
of public culture” in Poland has helped to put ideological flesh on the bones of PiS’s
“thin” populist political narrative.14 Specifically, the intensification of pre-existing
nativist and national-religious tendencies in some sections of Polish society has
offered opportunities for the ideological elaboration of PiS’s basic post-transition
dichotomy between “bad establishment elite” and “the nation.” In turn, PiS’s own
“thickened” rhetoric has further contributed to the general “thickening” of public
culture as part of an “iterative” process.15 Weronika Grzebalska and Andrea Pető
have shown how opposition to “gender ideology”—a vague term denoting advocacy
of women’s and LGBT rights—has constituted another key thickening agent in the
“illiberal transformation” of both Poland and Hungary.16
In all cases, these “thickened” narratives function to exclude minority groups,
narrowing the scope of who belongs to the national community. The specific effect
of PiS’s rhetoric on public opinion is beyond the scope of this article, which will
concentrate on analysis of the party’s discourse and changes to state funding of civil
society. However, it is worth noting that some correlative evidence suggests a
strengthening of anti-LGBT views and national prejudices among Poles during PiS’s
time in government.17
According to Kotwas and Kubik, the earlier coalescence of right-wing subcultures
created a “discursive opportunity structure” for PiS’s political narrative.18 This
process must be understood in the context of a longer-term “cultural backlash” in
response to fears of social and cultural transformation after 1989.19 The radical right
League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR) had previously benefited
from an earlier version of the same opportunity structure, before PiS appropriated its
discourse and electorate after their ill-fated coalition of 2005–2007.20 At different
points in time, the backlash has focused on accession to the European Union, migration
from non-European countries, “gender ideology,” “LGBT ideology,” and various
other issues raised by a loose “discourse coalition” of right-wing activists,
organizations, and sections of the Church.21 Since returning to power in 2015, PiS
has used state instruments to promote these issues and associated organizations.
Bill / Counter-Elite Populism and Civil Society in Poland  121
In short, PiS has politically exploited a rightward drift in an already conservative
Polish society, and then sought to amplify this drift by supporting the “discourse
coalition” that produced it.22 The PiS government’s engagement with civil society is
a prime place to see this “iterative” process in action, as it reveals the circular feedback
relationship of public culture with political actors and their discourse. By analysing
PiS’s specific methods of pressure and promotion in the sphere of civil society,
this article shows the interaction of cultural and political dimensions of its ideology
and policy agenda.
Poland’s Civil Society Context and PiS’s Policy Response
The general state of civil society in Poland is an object of disagreement among
scholars. According to one interpretation, traditional forms of civil society engagement
have been low after 1989 in comparison with other parts of Europe. As
Kerstin Jacobsson and Elżbieta Korolczuk summarize this view, civil society in
Poland is “weak, passive, and nonparticipatory in nature, still in need of ‘catching
up’ with Western Europe.”23 Among the Polish scholars who have promoted this
assessment is sociologist Piotr Gliński, now Minister of Culture in the PiS government
and one of the key executors of its policy on civil society.24 PiS’s 2014 policy
program is similarly critical, describing the sector as “weak” and “marginal” in its
role in public life.25
Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik have challenged this prevalent view, insisting that
civil society has played an important role both in Poland’s transition and in the consolidation
of democracy.26 Together with Michal Wenzel, they point to a steady
growth in numbers of NGOs and a “spectacular” rise in volunteerism captured more
clearly in domestic survey data than in standard international studies.27 In a similar
vein, Jacobsson and Korolczuk have argued that certain types of informal activism
have been ignored by scholars, and that methodological flaws have distorted the
evidence.28 Nevertheless, most agree that the weight of quantitative data on formalized
or institutional forms of activism still puts Poland at the lower end of European
tables, especially with respect to volunteering.29 Ekiert, Kubik, and Wenzel point out
that various other European countries show similar levels of engagement, but concede
that Poles are “not among the most civically active Europeans.”30
In this general context, PiS’s 2014 program argues that Polish civil society needs
to be “strengthened.”31 The specific diagnosis is somewhat contradictory. On the one
hand, the party claims that Polish civil society organizations are dangerously dependent
on public funds. On the other, it says that the Polish state and its elites have not
been sufficiently engaged in the development of civil society—a failure Minister
Gliński describes as the “betrayal of the elite.”32 In response, PiS proposes that “the
state must take systematic responsibility for the condition of the sector” through the
investment of public funds.33 In 2017, the parliament put this principle into practice
122  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
by passing legislation to create the National Freedom Institute—Center for Civil
Society Development.34 The stated purpose of the new institution is to improve coordination
across government departments and to expand access to funds among organizations
based in non-urban areas.35 Minister Gliński explains that the aims are
equalization, democratization, and pluralization.36
Implicit in the task of “pluralization” is the assumption that civil society organizations
with left or liberal ideological orientations have previously monopolized
funding opportunities, especially from abroad. According to Gliński, this
“ideologization” has partly derived from the “leftist” priorities of foreign foundations
and the European Union.37 Other scholars also acknowledge certain
“imported” dimensions of civil society organization in Poland, raising the question
of insufficient “local embeddedness” across Central and Eastern Europe.38
Yet Ekiert, Kubik, and Wenzel reject the assessment of a lack of pluralism in
Poland’s civil society.39 Indeed, even Gliński himself refers to its “enormous and
multidimensional internal diversity.”40 Nevertheless, a sense of structural unfairness
resulting from the availability of foreign funding to liberal NGOs has been
deeply felt not only within PiS but also in wider right-wing circles in Poland.41
From this point of view, the role of the Polish state should be to balance these
foreign influences, and to swing the pendulum away from the supposed domination
of left-wing or liberal civil society organizations.
In practice, this means promotion of organizations with right-wing profiles and
amplification of the “thickened” cultural narratives that support PiS’s political narratives.
As one commentator in government-friendly media explains, public funds are
to be shifted away from “gender ideology, sex education and minority rights” towards
“national and Christian values.”42 This article will focus later on the specific role of
a major grant program of the National Freedom Institute in this process. However,
this new stream of funding has merely complemented existing sources of stateguided
support, including ministerial funds, state-owned companies, and European
funds controlled by the government. Perhaps the best known example of such support
concerns the various enterprises associated with Father Tadeusz Rydzyk and his
ultra-conservative Catholic media network.
Rydzyk’s media have disseminated a “national-Catholic” ideology that PiS has
promoted and exploited since it took over from LPR in the mid-2000s as the main
political beneficiary of the priest’s patronage.43 The party receives mostly positive
coverage in his media. In return, PiS has generously rewarded him since coming to
power. By the middle of 2019, Rydzyk’s multiple foundations, companies, and journalism
school in Toruń had accumulated PLN 214 million of state support from a
wide variety of sources, including a long list of government ministries and other state
institutions.44 Senior PiS representatives—including Kaczyński and prime minister
Mateusz Morawiecki—have also frequently attended conferences at the journalism
school, and made appearances at birthday celebrations of Radio Maryja, the original
centerpiece of Rydzyk’s media network.
Bill / Counter-Elite Populism and Civil Society in Poland  123
At the same time, the anti-gender, anti-LGBT, and “national-Catholic” narratives
disseminated by Rydzyk’s media have been promoted by PiS and the public
media under its control. Kaczyński himself has repeatedly referred to the need to
defend “authentic” Polish values against “the threat brought by the shape of western
culture,” specifically emphasizing that Rydzyk taught him to appreciate this
threat.45 PiS has used these narratives for explicitly political purposes in multiple
election campaigns, as a resource intended to mobilize a core conservative electorate.
For instance, during the 2019 parliamentary campaign, Kaczyński claimed
that opposition parties supported the dangerous “gender” and LGBT “ideologies,”
and that only PiS could protect “the nation” from their ideological plan to
“destroy” its culture and “the family.”46 OSCE international observers subsequently
noted that “nationalist and homophobic rhetoric gave rise to a sense of
threat” during the campaign.47
Rydzyk’s circles are far from the only proprietors of these “thickened” narratives,
which hold broad currency in large parts of Poland’s still somewhat heterogeneous
Catholic Church. For instance, a prominent bishop, Marek Jędraszewski, has been
especially vociferous on the “gender” and “LGBT” issues, describing gay rights
campaigns as a “rainbow plague.”48 In this sense, the “thickening” of public culture
is a much wider phenomenon related to fears in mainstream Church circles and
among other conservatives about secularization, European integration, and liberalization
of Polish society.49 Nevertheless, Rydzyk’s direct political influence and
media reach give him special significance. According to Kaczyński, PiS’s victory in
2015 would not have been possible without him.50
The other plank of PiS’s dual strategy of modified elite replacement in civil society
is pressure on organizations viewed as politically or ideologically hostile. Perhaps
the most extreme example—once again following Hungarian precedents—has been
a series of police raids conducted on the offices of women’s NGOs in 2017 after the
“Black Protest” against proposals to tighten abortion laws.51 However, “unfriendly”
organizations have more often been targeted via removal of existing state support
and government-sponsored smear campaigns. Women’s rights and migrant aid organizations
have been systematically cut off from previous ministerial sources of
funding.52 PiS-controlled public media have also followed Orbán’s example by promoting
conspiracy theories about organizations funded by Hungarian American
businessman George Soros’s Open Society Foundations.53 According to these theories,
Soros-influenced liberal elites plan to destabilize the Polish state or even to
destroy “the nation” by triggering a migrant invasion of “multicultural chaos.”54
This approach fits the definition of what Grzebalska and Pető have described as
“securitization” of NGOs—a discourse that shifts certain issues and groups
beyond the realm of ordinary politics into a category of “existential threat” to the
community.55 The same approach is also evident in government and public media
representations of NGOs campaigning for LGBT rights in Poland. A few days before
the parliamentary elections of October 2019, public television screened a
124  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
documentary film entitled “Invasion” (Inwazja), which depicted LGBT rights activists
as a foreign-backed threat to Polish children, religion, values, and the very biological
continuation of the nation.56
Yet perhaps the most incongruous case of pressure on an independent NGO has
been the government-sponsored campaign against the Great Orchestra of Christmas
Charity, an organization best known for fundraising for children’s health care. Indeed,
it is precisely the apparent innocuousness of the Orchestra that best exposes the farreaching
ambition and application of PiS’s strategy of elite replacement in the sphere
of civil society. As a supposed product of the liberal establishment elites of the postcommunist
“Third Polish Republic,” the Great Orchestra has become the target of a
series of attacks with both cultural and political dimensions. These attacks began in
the 2000s in Father Rydzyk’s media circles as part of a broader struggle for moral
supremacy. More recently, they have been promoted by the PiS-led government as a
consequence and continuation of its “thickened” political narrative.
Pressure on the “Establishment Elite”: The Campaign against
the Great Orchestra
The Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity is one of Poland’s largest post-1989
civil society initiatives, an independent charitable operation that has mobilized millions
of Polish citizens and raised over PLN 1 billion since its inception in 1993.57
The money raised by the charity supports public health care. Above all, the Great
Orchestra is known for the purchase of medical equipment for hospitals and clinics,
especially for children’s wards. The Orchestra was founded by Jerzy Owsiak, an
eccentric host of television programs for young people focused on Western youth
culture and rock music. His musical interests also led him to establish the Woodstock
Station music festival (now called the Pol’and’Rock Festival), originally as a special
additional event for the Great Orchestra’s volunteers.
The Great Orchestra initiative takes the form of an annual fundraising drive
culminating in outdoor concerts in cities around the country and a televised studio
show in late January. The drives mobilize large numbers of Polish citizens, especially
young people, who volunteer to collect money in the charity’s branded tins.
According to the charity, more than 120,000 volunteers participated in the final
drive in 2019, collecting more than 175 million PLN.58 The conspicuous red heartshaped
stickers given to donors, and widely worn, create a climate of visible celebration
of the social act of giving. This aspect of ostentatious pride in charitable
giving was especially novel in the early 1990s, as private charity had been discouraged
under the communist regime.59 The Great Orchestra’s fundraising drives also
attracted support from state institutions, including logistical assistance from emergency
services and coverage in public media. These relationships have come into
question under the PiS-led government.
Bill / Counter-Elite Populism and Civil Society in Poland  125
Almost immediately after the party’s victory in 2015, one ultra-conservative PiS
MP suggested that any state functionaries participating in the Orchestra’s campaign
should be forced to resign.60 In 2017, a state-owned bank ended its sponsorship
agreement with the Orchestra.61 In the same year, state television ceased to broadcast
the January finale of the fundraising drive, which moved to the private TVN network.62
Since this transition, public television channels and other media have given
little information on the Orchestra’s fundraising activities. In 2017, the main evening
news bulletin digitally removed a Great Orchestra sticker from the jacket of an opposition
politician being interviewed.63 Hostility was even directed at the Orchestra’s
young volunteers, with editor-in-chief of the flagship public television news program
describing them as a “ridiculous sect.”64
In 2019, the campaign against the Orchestra escalated significantly on public television.
On 10 January, less than a week before the fundraising finale, a leading current
affairs program aired a satirical sketch featuring a crudely caricatured puppet of
Owsiak collecting money and giving it to an opposition politician, then Mayor of
Warsaw Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz of the liberal Civic Platform (Platforma
Obywatelska, PO). The sketch also included an anti-Semitic subtext, as some of the
banknotes being distributed in the animation were marked with a star of David. The
whole segment was later taken off the air, and the news director apologized for the
“dissemination of anti-Semitic stereotypes.”65 Poland’s ombudsman criticized both
the anti-Semitic references and the unsubstantiated accusations of embezzlement
against Owsiak—part of a broader pattern of insinuations.66
Only a few days later, on 13 January, opposition politician and mayor of Gdańsk
Paweł Adamowicz was stabbed on the stage at a Great Orchestra finale concert in his
home city. The perpetrator seized the microphone and shouted that he had been
unjustly imprisoned and “tortured” by Adamowicz’s former party—opposition PO.
The Mayor died shortly afterwards. The day after the tragedy, public television news
depicted Owsiak and opposition politicians themselves as indirectly responsible for
the murder through their supposed creation of a growing climate of hate speech.67
PiS MP Krystyna Pawłowicz—who had previously launched multiple tirades against
Owsiak—attacked him on social media, accusing him of spreading hate and slandering
the Church.68 Since then, the negative campaign against the Orchestra has continued
sporadically, involving prominent PiS politicians, PiS-friendly media, and
public institutions.69 But what were the specific causes of this sustained government
hostility towards a charitable organization?
The attacks on Owsiak and the Great Orchestra have been motivated and legitimated
by “thickened” versions of PiS’s right-wing discourse and its antecedents,
combining both cultural and political dimensions. First, the charity is viewed as a
front for a progressive cultural agenda at odds with traditional values, and especially
with the doctrine of the Catholic Church. This critique dates back to the early 2000s,
when it was first propagated by Father Rydzyk’s media in response to the loose,
youth-culture style of Owsiak’s presentation and the celebratory atmosphere of the
126  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
Woodstock Station concerts. According to these critics, Owsiak and his collaborators
disseminate a morally relativist ideology of individual freedom and hedonism without
responsibility or restraint.70
Rydzyk’s media and other Catholic conservatives have also attacked the music
festival, the charity, and especially its leader for their alleged support of the so-called
“civilization of death”—a pejorative term denoting advocacy of rights to contraception,
abortion, or voluntary euthanasia. The evidence for these claims includes various
public statements from Owsiak on these subjects and his presence together with
other members of the Great Orchestra foundation at the 2016 “Black Protest” against
proposals to tighten Poland’s already strict abortion laws.71 On this basis, some representatives
of PiS and wider conservative circles have even advised Poles against
giving to the Orchestra, proposing the transferal of donations to Caritas, a large charity
linked to the Church.72
In this case, a kind of symbolic moral supremacy is at stake, with the Orchestra
represented as an illegitimate rival to the Church both in the values it represents and
in its specific charitable activities. Caritas has distanced itself from the government’s
attacks, insisting that it is not in competition with the Orchestra.73 Nevertheless, by
criticizing the Orchestra, PiS members and their allies have publicly placed themselves
on the side of the Church in a contest of values, reinforcing shared ideological
positions against the supposed threat of permissive freedoms and “gender” ideology.
For the same reason, Kaczyński has argued during election campaigns that the
Church is the sole source of moral values in Polish culture, and that only “nihilism”
lies outside it.74 Such declarations—together with the campaign against the Orchestra
and other ideological enemies—enact a political calculation, with PiS counting on
the open or implicit support of Rydzyk’s media, hardline bishops, and other conservative
members of the Church.75
These moral and cultural arguments have also been intertwined with a narrative
about the Orchestra’s specific political function in post-1989 Poland. Critics claim
that the charity and its founder have entered into a mutually beneficial relationship
with the post-communist political establishment of the “Third Polish Republic.”
According to this narrative—also established long before PiS came to power—liberal
and left-wing political actors have used the Orchestra both as a distraction from
their unscrupulous exercising of political power and as a tool to force a progressive
cultural agenda. In return, Owsiak and the Orchestra have been promoted and supported
by state institutions and media.76 From this point of view, the charity and its
founder are propaganda creations of the “Third Republic”—garish, liberal, and
opposed both to traditional conservative values and to right-wing political parties.77
This skeptical interpretation of the Orchestra’s achievements includes a key
thread running back to the 1980s. Just as PiS and its ideological allies have sometimes
presented the post-1989 “Third Republic” as a continuation of the Polish
People’s Republic (PRL), they have often traced Owsiak’s methods and success
back to the communist period.78 According to the critics, from his early days as a
Bill / Counter-Elite Populism and Civil Society in Poland  127
promoter of rock music, Owsiak was a cultural tool of an intentional strategy of the
communist security services to distract young people from protest against the
regime. In his role as a television presenter and disseminator of western youth culture,
he supposedly channeled the potential for youthful rebellion in harmless directions.
In this way, he provided a “safety valve” for the authorities in a period of
social unrest after the “Solidarity” revolution and Martial Law.79
This alleged collusion with the communist authorities—for which there is no
clear evidence—supposedly set the agenda for Owsiak’s activities after 1989, including
the establishment of the Great Orchestra. In extreme versions of the narrative,
this continuity literally implies that Owsiak is still working for his communist security
service “minders.”80 In this light, the Orchestra’s activities are an ideological
front for the continued influence of the shadowy post-communist układ—the network
of former security operatives and communist party members supposedly controlling
Poland’s post-1989 business and politics. Owsiak and his Orchestra form
part of the cultural arm, whose purpose is now to erode traditional Polish values
associated with the Catholic Church and to “inoculate” the youth against any tendency
to question or rebel against the post-communist order.81
In a televised public discussion with a Catholic bishop shortly before the 2019
elections to the European Parliament, Kaczyński himself explained the mechanism
of the “safety valve” and Owsiak’s alleged role:
[This is] the continuation of pacification methods of social engineering that the communists
used in the time of Martial Law. The dissemination of all these messages
associated with sex. That’s Owsiak, who is an element of the late social engineering of
Martial Law, when preparations were being made for the transition.82
Here Kaczyński references theories that Poland’s transition was managed or
even orchestrated by communist elites seeking to defend their interests in the face
of inevitable change.83 In this way, he connects the cultural questions that Owsiak
primarily represents with PiS’s broader political narrative of an “unfinished” transition
to be completed through the “good change.” As a propagator of a liberal cultural
agenda, Owsiak appears as an agent of the political and economic interests of
the post-communist establishment. He is part of the “pseudo-elite” to be overthrown
and replaced by a legitimate “counter-elite.” Since this goal cannot be achieved
directly, the ruling party attacks him through a combination of withdrawal of state
support and negative propaganda. At the same time, this propaganda itself serves to
further “thicken” PiS’s transition narrative with the cultural “glue” of a pre-existing
right-wing reaction to advocacy of women’s rights, LGBT rights, and progressive
values. By attacking the Orchestra, PiS uses this “cultural backlash” to reinforce its
political narrative, while also shoring up the support of key allies like Rydzyk and
other Catholic conservatives.
PiS evinces a fundamental “hermeneutics of suspicion” towards civil society.
From a strongly elite-centric perspective, the party expresses distrust of the notion
128  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
that civil society organizations could embody or combine the diverse motivations
and activities of multiple social actors. Instead, right-wing critics of the Great
Orchestra and other NGOs have sought to expose the role of “establishment elites”
in the promotion of supposedly illegitimate political, economic, and cultural models
in the service of foreign interests or the post-communist układ. At the same time, the
ruling coalition has set about consolidating its own civil society “counter-elite.”
Promotion of the “Counter-elite”: The National Freedom
Institute
PiS’s network of affiliated civil society organizations existed long before the
party came to power. Indeed, some of these groups contributed significantly to its
2015 electoral success by mobilizing a core base of supporters through organized
promotion of the party’s political narratives.84 Ewa Dąbrowska characterizes these
groups as an “alternative civil society” or “discourse coalition”—a wide and diverse
front of ideologically conservative organizations.85 The “thickening” of public culture
and resulting discursive opportunities for PiS described by Kotwas and Kubik
have reflected the influence of these organizations, many of them connected to the
party. Nevertheless, PiS’s politicization of civil society since 2015 has not generally
followed the Hungarian model of creating subordinate bodies merely “masquerading”
as independent organizations.86 Instead, the party has used state instruments to
strengthen a pre-existing, partly autonomous, right-wing coalition. The latest tool for
this strategy is the National Freedom Institute–Center for Civil Society Development.
In 2016, when the government first announced plans to create this institution,
domestic and international observers noted a lack of transparency and consultation as
well as the potential for politicization or control of civil society.87 Many expressed
concerns that the new Institute would be biased towards certain ideological options,
pointing out that the preamble to the law establishing it specifically mentioned “the
Christian ideals of citizens” to the exclusion of other value systems.88 One of the five
NGO members of the Council of the Institute represents the Ordo Iuris Institute, an
ultra-conservative Catholic association of lawyers best known for its proposal of the
abortion ban that provoked the “Black Protest” in which Jerzy Owsiak and members
of the Great Orchestra foundation participated.89 The first round of substantial funding
grants from the National Freedom Institute in August 2019 appeared to bear out
the observers’ concerns.90
In this grant program, close to PLN 86 million was distributed among 154 organizations.91
Although apolitical local organizations constitute the majority on the list,
there is also a disproportionate presence of beneficiaries that are ideologically, politically,
or personally linked to the ruling party and its allies.92 By my estimate—on the
basis of the findings of Polish journalists and my own additional research—at least
20 organizations with direct links to ruling coalition politicians and activists received
Bill / Counter-Elite Populism and Civil Society in Poland  129
funding.93 A further 14 successful applicants are linked with PiS allies, right-wing
ideology, or with politicians from the right-wing populist Kukiz15’ parliamentary
grouping. Twenty-four successful applicants are affiliated with the Church or with
Catholic values.94 I found no evidence of analogous support for organizations
strongly linked to other opposition parties or to non-conservative values. Admittedly,
such organizations may simply not have applied for funding, as I found no clear
evidence of applications rejected for ideological reasons.
Among the party-affiliated individuals with formal roles in funded organizations
are three deputy ministers, the head of the Prime Minister’s Chancellery, multiple
members of parliament and local councilors, campaign team members, a former
advisor of the Minister of Culture, and PiS-appointed members of state institutions.95
Many of the associated organizations received the highest possible grant of PLN
700,000; some of them were already being supported financially by state-owned
companies. Significant grants also went to two pro-PiS media foundations, a pro-PiS
organization dedicated to defending Poland’s “good name,” a nationalist organization
that made headlines for its opposition to an LGBT rights march in Białystok, and
a right-wing NGO “confederation” linked to two members of the Council of the
National Freedom Institute, including Tymoteusz Zych, the representative of the
ultra-conservative Ordo Iuris Institute.96 Zych is also the president of another organization
that received the maximum grant.97
Few of these organizations linked with the ruling coalition are explicitly political
in their operations. Some of them are locally focused or charitable in their main aims.
However, the majority still show a clear ideological orientation, with missions or
activities devoted to the promotion of Christian and conservative values, traditional
forms of patriotism, national versions of history, and right-wing political narratives.98
In effect, the National Freedom Institute has given PiS a new instrument of public
funds for top–down support of its civil society “discourse coalition.” In many cases,
there is a multiplying effect, with favored organizations also receiving other grants
from the Institute as well as access to funds from government ministries, state-owned
companies, and government-administered programs of the European Union. The
example of one prominent beneficiary demonstrates how PiS both draws on and
expands the discursive opportunities offered by friendly organizations.
The Polish League against Defamation (Reduta Dobrego Imienia—Polska Liga
Przeciw Zniesławieniom)—a right-wing group dedicated to fighting perceived misrepresentations
of Polish history abroad—belongs to PiS’s “discourse coalition.” The
organization has contributed significantly to the construction and promotion of rightwing
narratives of historical grievance and the so-called “pedagogy of shame.” The
latter term refers to alleged attempts by hostile foreign forces to make Poles ashamed
of their history, especially in regard to Polish–Jewish relations during the Second
World War.99 PiS has used this issue in its political narrative of the “good change,”
positing its own brand of national self-assertiveness against the acquiescence of its
liberal opponents in the “anti-Polish” propaganda of foreign actors.100 In response to
130  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
supposed attempts to shift responsibility for German crimes onto Poland, PiS has
promised to defend “our truth about the past.”101 In 2018, the government introduced
a controversial “memory law,” which threatened prison terms to anyone convicted of
accusing the “Polish nation” of complicity with Nazi German crimes “against the
facts.” The law was later amended, reportedly under US pressure.102
The League has received two separate tranches of funding from the National
Freedom Institute as well as additional funding from the Foreign Ministry.103 Its
founder, Maciej Świrski, was appointed to the board of a new state institution, the
Polish National Foundation (Polska Fundacja Narodowa), tasked with improving
Poland’s image abroad. He reportedly played a central role in the preparation of the
ill-fated “memory law.”104 He was also involved in scandal when the Foundation’s
funds were used—against its statute—for a domestic billboard campaign promoting
the ruling party’s much-criticized judicial reforms.105
In these interactions with a civil society organization and its leader, PiS has sought
to achieve several mutually reinforcing aims. First, the party has utilized the discourse
and policy agenda of the League and other groups in its own political communication
and legislative program—admittedly, with mixed success. It has then
rewarded the organization and its leader with funding, positions, and policy influence.
Finally, the organization and its leader have used these benefits and influence
for the direct promotion of PiS’s policies and positions. Once again, the party’s strategy
is to strengthen its own cultural and political narratives by advancing the ideology
and interests of friendly civil society elites.
PiS’s funding of organizations from its discourse coalition also brings practical
benefits to its organizational structures. These advantages are especially apparent in
the case of a whole ecosystem of interconnected right-wing youth organizations
sponsored by the National Freedom Institute and a range of other state sources. At
least eight youth organizations with links to the ruling party received funding in the
first round of Institute grants. Analysis of the activities and membership of these
organizations reveals their partial function as breeding grounds for political and
administrative cadres for the ruling coalition, connecting ideologically aligned young
people with PiS and its political allies.
For instance, the right-wing Foundation of Youth Initiatives (Fundacja Inicjatyw
Młodzieżowych) received the maximum grant of nearly PLN 700,000 from the
Institute.106 Its goals are to promote “Christian values” and “patriotic attitudes.”107
The organization’s founders include multiple figures now associated with PiS.108 Its
other sponsors include two ministries and three state-owned companies. The
Foundation has also won a European Union grant of over PLN 1 million, dispensed
by the Prime Minister’s Chancellery.109 One of its activities is the organization of an
“Academy of Leaders” for young people. Speakers at the Academy’s events have
consisted almost exclusively of high-ranking members of the PiS camp and its rightwing
ideological allies.110 Separate sponsors and partners of the Academy include
four state-owned companies, the Ordo Iuris Institute, and no less than six other
Bill / Counter-Elite Populism and Civil Society in Poland  131
organizations that also received grants from the National Freedom Institute.111 The
Foundation of Youth Initiatives has supplied PiS with a local councilor, a member of
its presidential and parliamentary election staff, a departmental director in the president’s
office, and multiple figures in state-owned companies.112
Another right-wing youth organization, Service to the Independent Republic
(Służba Niepodległej), also received the maximum grant. In 2018, the group had
already obtained separate funding—together with another four right-wing organizations
later awarded major grants by the Institute—to organize a forum attended by
two deputy prime ministers.113 In 2014, before PiS came to power, the same forum
had been sponsored by the Lech Kaczyński Institute, an NGO controlled by close
associates of Jarosław Kaczyński.114 In effect, the funding of the event has been
shifted from a party-affiliated source to the state treasury. In 2018, Service to the
Independent Republic also received grants totaling almost PLN 500,000 to organize
another College of Leaders and a cycle of seminars.115 Current and former members
of the Foundation’s governing bodies include at least three individuals who have
gone on to run as PiS candidates in local elections, two who have joined the PiS
Youth Forum, and several others who have had internships in various government
ministries. One has even served as an intern at the National Freedom Institute.116
Apart from direct financial benefits, Service to the Independent Republic has also
enjoyed other forms of personal and institutional patronage from the highest levels
of the ruling party. In 2019, when Minister Gliński set up a new government-backed
Council for Dialogue with the Young Generation (Rada Dialogu z Młodym
Pokoleniem), the deputy head of Service to the Independent Republic became its
inaugural co-chair.117 He had previously been the chair of the Council of Children
and Youth of the Republic of Poland (Rada Dzieci i Młodzieży Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej), a body attached to the Ministry of National Education. Both these youth
councils appear to be political instruments for the fostering of new generations of
PiS’s “counter-elite.” In particular, the Council for Dialogue with the Young
Generation is dominated by representatives of right-wing youth organizations as well
as multiple members of PiS’s Youth Forum.118
Various other right-wing youth organizations supported by the National Freedom
Institute and other state funds exhibit similar political connections with the ruling
coalition.119 By mobilizing and coordinating diverse streams of state funding, PiS has
fostered an ecosystem of interconnected civil society organizations congenial to its
ideology. On multiple levels and with reinforcing feedback effects, the ruling party
has backed organizations whose young leaders it has had opportunities to influence,
groom, and to feed directly into its own political structures. Such activities inevitably
involve initiative and agency on both sides, with diverse actors motivated in different
ways and some following trajectories outside PiS’s sphere of influence. However,
when numerous members of the sponsored organizations have joined PiS or been
appointed to positions in state institutions and companies, these groups may be said
functionally to exist as forges for the party’s “new social hierarchy.” By supporting
132  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
its broad right-wing “discourse coalition,” PiS reinforces its own cultural and political
narratives, while also strengthening its organizational structures.
Conclusion: Civil Society Resistance
This article has argued that PiS and its allies have attempted to enact a strategy
of elite replacement in civil society in accordance with a broader rhetoric of “counter-elite”
populism. The “old-new elite” of the “Third Polish Republic” must be
replaced by a “counter-elite” that will represent the true political, economic, and
cultural interests of “the nation”. In civil society, this process has been more partial
and moderate than the large-scale replacement of cadres seen in the civil service, the
public media, state-owned companies, and the courts. This less radical approach has
been necessitated by the lack of direct instruments with which to remove unfavorable
elites from independent civil society organizations. In the absence of this direct
power, the ruling party and its allies have enacted a two-pronged strategy of pressure
and promotion.
First, they have withdrawn state support from supposedly hostile elites and run
smear campaigns against them. Using the compliant tool of a politicized public
media, they have attacked civil society leaders like the Great Orchestra’s Jerzy
Owsiak, representing them as an “establishment elite” in league with shadowy postcommunist,
liberal, or foreign political and cultural interests. Second, they have used
various public funds—including the resources of the newly formed National Freedom
Institute—to support the production of their own civil society “counter-elite,” whose
boundaries with the party political elite are porous. In both cases, these strategies
further legitimize the right-wing cultural narratives of the “discourse coalition” that
helped bring PiS to power in 2015. At the same time, the strategy has delivered very
practical benefits in the form of financial support for initiatives linked with party
members and mechanisms to feed young talent into PiS’s party system.
PiS’s strategies would appear to threaten the health and independence of civil
society in Poland. However, the overall efficacy of its pressure on “unfriendly” organizations
remains doubtful. Indeed, the negative campaign against the Great
Orchestra has done nothing to dent its success. On the contrary, the Orchestra has set
new fundraising records in every year since PiS came to power, with the 2019 drive
raising three times more than the 2015 drive. The final figure of almost PLN 176
million in 2019 is more than the entire annual budget of the National Freedom
Institute. Some commentators have even speculated that Poles may have donated
more generously in direct response to PiS’s negative campaign.120 In any case, if the
intention of PiS’s campaign was to challenge the Orchestra’s moral and financial
hegemony as a leading civil society organization in Poland, then this operation can
only be characterized as a failure. On the other hand, the charity’s continued success
provides PiS with a discursive enemy for its cultural and political narratives.
Bill / Counter-Elite Populism and Civil Society in Poland  133
More broadly, Jacobsson and Korolczuk point to evidence suggesting that independent
civic engagement in Poland—both political and otherwise—is far from
being in retreat, with various informal, grassroots initiatives attracting mass
support.121 They argue that protest events like the large demonstrations against the
proposed abortion ban represent a major form of civil society engagement often
ignored by researchers. Some other NGOs that have fallen victim to defunding or
smear campaigns have also seen significant increases in private donations.122
Korolczuk asks whether the current circumstances might even represent a “new
opening,” forcing the development of a stronger, more independent, and more locally
rooted civil society.123 This perspective suggests that grassroots mobilization may
have the power to resist the top–down imposition of a politicized “new social
hierarchy.”
The level of pressure exerted on civil society in Poland has not yet equaled the
strong legal measures taken in Hungary—for instance, through a 2017 law limiting
foreign funding.124 However, the resistance exemplified by the Great Orchestra and
others might also point to the distinctively resilient nature of Polish civil society.
While PiS has colonized a significant proportion of the state sector in accordance with
its modified “counter-elite” populist logic, the party has not yet enjoyed the same success
in delivering elite replacement in civil society. Instead, it has largely consolidated
existing polarization of the third sector into broad camps aligned with and opposed to
the government (though the majority of NGOs remain non-political).125 Poland’s ruling
coalition has succeeded in promoting its own civil society elite, but its perceived
opponents have so far withstood various forms of negative pressure. The question is:
for how much longer? As PiS moves through its second term, the party and its allies
will continue their attempts to build “Budapest in Warsaw.”126
ORCID iD
Stanley Bill https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4898-6641
Notes
   1. B. Stanley, “Confrontation by Default and Confrontation by Design: Strategic and Institutional
Responses to Poland’s Populist Coalition Government,” Democratization 23, no. 2 (2016): 267.
  2. PiS’s attempted imitation of Orbán’s successful model in Hungary has been explicit since its
election defeat in 2011, when Kaczyński promised that “the day will come when there will be Budapest
in Warsaw.” See “Przyjdzie dzień, że w Warszawie będzie Budapeszt,” TVN24 (9 October 2011), https://
tvn24.pl/polska/przyjdzie-dzien-ze-w-warszawie-bedzie-budapeszt-ra186922-3535336. On “colonization”
or “occupation” of the state, see J. W. Müller, What Is Populism? (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 44; W. Grzebalska and A. Pető, “The Gendered Modus Operandi of the
Illiberal Transformation in Hungary and Poland,” Women’s Studies International Forum 68 (2018): 168.
   3. J. Kaczyński, Porozumienie przeciw monowładzy: Z dziejów PC (Poznań: Zysk i S-ka, 2016), 113.
134  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
  4. Zdrowie, Praca, Rodzina: Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014, 26.
  5. Ibid.
   6. J. Kaczyński, Polska naszych marzeń (Lublin: Akapit, 2011), 41.
   7. Ibid., 49.
  8. The notion of “counter-elite populism” is similar to what Zsolt Enyedi characterizes—on the
example of Hungary—as “a borderline subtype of populism, best labelled paternalistic populism.” See Z.
Enyedi, “Paternalist Populism and Illiberal Elitism in Central Europe,” Journal of Political Ideologies 21,
no. 1 (2016): 10. As Ben Stanley observes, PiS’s elitist rhetoric does not sit comfortably with the “populist
emphasis on popular sovereignty.” See Stanley, “Confrontation by Default,” 267
   9. According to a report for Puls Biznesu, the former PO-PSL government made at least four hundred
political appointments in various institutions over its first four years in government, while PiS made
more than one thousand such appointments in the first year alone. See D. Tokarz, “Teraz k. . . my. Na
całego!,” Puls Biznesu (15 January 2017), https://www.pb.pl/teraz-k-my-na-calego-852258 (accessed 5
March 2020). Also see Grażyna Kopińska, Stanowiska publiczne jako łup polityczny: Polityka personalna
w okresie od 16 listopada 2015 do 31 października 2017 roku (Warszawa: Fundacja Batorego, 2018),
http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Odpowiedzialne%20Panstwo/
Stanowiska_publiczne_jako_lup_polityczny.pdf.
 10. For instance, legislative changes were made to allow for purges in the civil service, research
institutes, the Institute of National Remembrance, the National Media Council, among many other institutions.
See Kopińska, Stanowiska publiczne jako łup polityczny.
  11. “Poland: Freedom in the World Report 2020,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/coun-
try/poland/freedom-world/2020.
  12. W. Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 4–6.
 13. J. Kornai, “Hungary’s U-Turn,” Society and Economy 37, no. 3 (2015): 284; Grzebalska and
Pető, “The Gendered Modus Operandi of the Illiberal Transformation in Hungary and Poland,” 169.
  14. M. Kotwas and J. Kubik, “Symbolic Thickening of Public Culture and the Rise of Right-Wing
Populism in Poland,” East European Politics and Societies & Cultures 33, no. 2 (2019): 435–71.
  15. Ibid., 460.
  16. Grzebalska and Pető, “The Gendered Modus Operandi,” 165.
  17. M. Bożewicz, “Komunikat z badań nr 90/2019: ‘Stosunek Polaków do związków homoseksualnych,’”
Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (July 2019), https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM
.POL/2019/K_090_19.PDF; K. Pacewicz, “Rośnie niechęć Polaków do WSZYSTKICH narodów. „Efekt
polityki PiS oblężonej twierdzy”—prof. Bilewicz,” OKO.press (14 March 2018), https://oko.press/ros-
nie-niechec-polakow-wszystkich-narodow-efekt-polityki-pis-oblezonej-twierdzy-prof-bilewicz/?fb_
comment_id=1519195158178632_1519252388172909.
  18. Kotwas and Kubik, “Symbolic Thickening,” 460.
  19. See P. Norris and R. F. Inglehart, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
  20. S. L. de Lange and S. Guerra, “The League of Polish Families between East and West, Past and
Present,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 42 (2009): 527–49; B. Stanley, “From Periphery to
Power: The Trajectory of Polish Populism, 1989-2012,” in Populism in Central and Eastern Europe—
Challenge for the Future? Documentation of an Expert Workshop, ed. S. Bachrynowski (Warszawa:
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2012), 17.
 21. E. Dąbrowska, “New Conservatism in Poland: The Discourse Coalition around Law and
Justice,” in New Conservatives in Russia and East Central Europe, ed. K. Bluhm and M. Varga
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge 2018), 95.
 22. The scale of this “rightward drift” should not be exaggerated. As Radosław Markowski
points out, PiS’s victory was as much determined by a high number of wasted votes as by any
“switches” in voter preferences. See R. Markowski, “The Polish Parliamentary Election of 2015: A
Free and Fair Election That Results in Unfair Political Consequences,” West European Politics 39,
no. 6 (2016): 1311.
Bill / Counter-Elite Populism and Civil Society in Poland  135
  23. K. Jacobsson and E. Korolczuk, “Introduction,” Civil Society Revisited: Lessons from Poland,
ed. K. Jacobsson and E. Korolczuk (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 14.
 24. See P. Gliński, “Twenty Years of Civil Society in Poland?,” Polish Sociological Review 175
(2011): 271–300; D. Gawin and P. Gliński, eds., Civil Society in the Making (Warsaw: IFiS Publishers,
2006).
 25. Zdrowie, Praca, Rodzina: Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014, 145.
 26. See G. Ekiert and J. Kubik, Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic
Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); G. Ekiert and J.
Kubik, “Civil Society in Postcommunist Europe: Poland in a Comparative Perspective,” in Civil Society
Revisited: Lessons from Poland, ed. K. Jacobsson and E. Korolczuk (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017),
39–62.
  27. G. Ekiert, J. Kubik, and M. Wenzel, “Civil Society and Three Dimensions of Inequality in Post-
1989 Poland,” Comparative Politics 49, no. 3, Special Issue: Civil Society and Democracy in an Era of
Inequality (April 2017): 337–39.
  28. Jacobsson and Korolczuk, Introduction, 17–21.
 29. See Flash Eurobarometer 408: European Youth: Report (Brussels: European Commission,
Directorate-General for Education and Culture, 2015); Volunteering and Intergenerational Solidarity:
Eurobarometer Report (Brussels: TNS Opinion & Social, 2011); J. Czapiński and T. Panek, eds., Social
Diagnosis: Objective and Subjective Quality of Life in Poland (Warsaw: The Council for Social
Monitoring, 2013), 333–35.
  30. Ekiert et al., “Civil Society,” 339.
 31. Zdrowie, Praca, Rodzina: Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014, 14.
  32. Gliński, “Twenty Years of Civil Society in Poland?,” 284.
  33. Ibid.
 34. “Ustawa z dnia 15 września 2017 r. o Narodowym Instytucie Wolności—Centrum Rozwoju
Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego,” Narodowy Instytut Wolności, https://niw.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/
2018/07/niw-crso.pdf.
  35. B. Smith, Polish Civil Society: Adapting to New Pressures: A Report of the CSIS Human Rights
Initiative (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies), 7.
 36. “Wywiad. Wicepremier Gliński: Mądre państwo powinno wzmacniać słabszego. Z funduszy
publicznych zaczną korzystać małe, lokalne organizacje,” wPolityce.pl (30 March 2017), https://wpoli-
tyce.pl/polityka/333701-nasz-wywiad-wicepremier-glinski-madre-panstwo-powinno-wzmacniac-slab-
szego-z-funduszy-publicznych-zaczna-korzystac-male-lokalne-organizacje?strona=1.
 37. Gliński, “Twenty Years of Civil Society in Poland?,” 284. Also see A. Gąsior-Niemiec and P.
Gliński, “Europeanization of Civil Society in Poland,” Revija za socijalnu politiku 14, no. 1 (2007): 29–47.
  38. A. Giza-Poleszczuk, “(Mis)understanding Social Activism in Poland,” in Civil Society Revisited:
Lessons from Poland, ed. K. Jacobsson and E. Korolczuk (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 65. Also
see P. Załęski, Neoliberalizm i społeczeństwo obywatelskie (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu
Mikołaja Kopernika, 2012).
  39. Ekiert et al., “Civil Society,” 335.
  40. Gliński, “Twenty Years of Civil Society in Poland?,” 278.
  41. P. Trudnowski, “Zagraniczne pieniądze kręcą polską polityką? Soros, aborcja i polskie NGO,”
Klub Jagielloński (9 October 2017), https://klubjagiellonski.pl/2017/10/09/zagraniczne-pieniadze-kreca-
polska-polityka-soros-aborcja-i-polskie-ngo/.
  42. M. Nykiel, “RPO walczy z Narodowym Instytutem Wolności. Bodnar sięga po OBWE, które
krytykuje wspieranie polskości i chrześcijańskich wartości,” wPolityce.pl (13 September 2017), https://
wpolityce.pl/polityka/357535-tylko-u-nas-rpo-walczy-z-narodowym-instytutem-wolnosci-bodnar-siega-
po-obwe-ktore-krytykuje-wspieranie-polskosci-i-chrzescijanskich-wartosci.
  43. I. Krzemiński, “Radio Maryja and Fr. Rydzyk as a Creator of the National-Catholic Ideology,”
in Religion, Politics and Values in Poland, ed. S. P. Ramet and I. Borowik (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017), 85–112; Stanley, “From Periphery to Power,” 16.
136  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
  44. B. Mikołajewska, “214.158.441 złotych z publicznych pieniędzy na ‘dzieła’ o. Rydzyka,” OKO.
press (23 July 2019), https://oko.press/214-238-441-zl-na-dziela-o-rydzyka/.
  45. Kaczyński, Porozumienie przeciw monowładzy, 366–67. Elżbieta Korolczuk and Agnieszka
Graff have described the “anti-colonial frame” of this resistance to supposedly foreign ideologies
from “the West.” See E. Korolczuk and A. Graff, “Gender as ‘Ebola from Brussels’: The Anticolonial
Frame and the Rise of Illiberal Populism,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 43, no. 4
(2018): 797–821
  46. “Prezes PiS o opozycji: Oni chcą zniszczyć naszą kulturę, chcą zniszczyć rodzinę,” TVP Info (6
October 2019), https://www.tvp.info/44718815/prezes-pis-o-opozycji-oni-chca-zniszczycnasza-kulture-
chca-zniszczyc-rodzine.
  47. “Polish Parliamentary Elections Were Prepared Well, but Marred by Intolerant Rhetoric and Bias
in Public Media, International Observers Say,” osce.org (14 October 2019), https://www.osce.org/odihr/
elections/435941.
 48. See “Arcybiskup Jędraszewski o ‘tęczowej zarazie,’” TVN 24 (2 August 2019), https://www.
tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/arcybiskup-marek-jedraszewski-teczowa-zaraza-zamiast-czer-
wonej,957818.html.
 49. See S. Guerra, “Without Losing My Religion: The Dilemmas of EU Integration in Poland,”
Kultūra ir visuomenė: socialinių tyrimų žurnalas 2 (2017): 51–68.
  50. “Jarosław Kaczyński: Nie może być Polski bez kościoła,” Radio Maryja (5 December 2015),
https://www.radiomaryja.pl/informacje/jaroslaw-kaczynski-nie-moze-byc-polski-bez-kosciola/.
  51. Grzebalska and Pető, “The Gendered Modus Operandi,” 166.
 52. H. Margolis, “‘The Breath of the Government on My Back’: Attacks on Women’s Rights in
Poland,” Human Rights Watch (6 February 2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/02/06/breath-government-my-back/attacks-womens-rights-poland;
P. Marczewski, “Freedom to Exclude: Conservative CSOs
in Law and Justice Poland,” Carnegie Europe (4 October 2018), https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/10/04/
freedom-to-exclude-conservative-csos-in-law-and-justice-poland-pub-77377; Human Rights First,
“Poland’s New Front: A Government’s War against Civil Society” (2017), https://www.humanrightsfirst.
org/sites/default/files/Poland-Report-August-2017.pdf.
  53. D. Bychawska-Siniarska, P. Godzisz, and Z. Wars, Information on the Recent Challenges Faced
by Human Rights Defenders and Civil Society in Poland (Warsaw: Helsinki Foundation for Human
Rights, 2016), 6–8.
 54. “Projekt decentralizacji Polski. Kto za tym stoi?,” TVP Info (3 June 2019), https://www.tvp.
info/42917109/projekt-decentralizacji-polski-kto-za-tym-stoi; K. Woliński, “George Soros walczy o
świat bez granic i narodów,” Tygodnik TVP (8 February 2019), https://tygodnik.tvp.pl/41206866/george-
soros-walczy-o-swiat-bez-granic-i-narodow.
  55. Grzebalska and Pető, “The Gendered Modus Operandi,” 166–67.
 56. “Film ‘Inwazja’: Metody pracy działaczy LGBT w ukrytej kamerze,” TVP Info (10 October
2019), https://www.tvp.info/44785356/film-inwazja-metody-pracy-dzialaczy-lgbt-w-ukrytej-kamerze.
Also see E. Korolczuk, “‘The War on Gender’ from a Transnational Perspective—Lessons for Feminist
Strategizing,” in Antigender Movements on the Rise? Strategising for Gender Equality in Central and
Eastern Europe, ed. Heinrich Böll Foundation (Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2015).
  57. “Sprawdź, co robimy przez cały rok!,” Wielka Orkiestra Świątecznej Pomocy, https://en.wosp.
org.pl/fundacja
  58. “Letnia zadyma w środku zimy,” Wielka Orkiestra Świątecznej Pomocy, https://www.wosp.org.
pl/final.
 59. H. Chmielewska-Szlajfer, Reshaping Poland’s Community after Communism: Ordinary
Celebrations (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 83.
  60. “Orkiestra bez straży i policji? Poseł PiS ostrzega przed udziałem w ‘hecy WOŚP,’” TVN24 (21
December 2015), https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/posel-pis-stanislaw-pieta-ostrzega-mundu-
rowych-przed-udzialem-w-wosp,604675.html.
Bill / Counter-Elite Populism and Civil Society in Poland  137
 61. “Pekao zakończył współpracę z WOŚP,” Business Insider (2 November 2017), https://busi-
nessinsider.com.pl/firmy/strategie/pekao-zakonczyl-wspolprace-z-wosp/7shpr02.
  62. M. Deja, “WOŚP kończy współpracę z TVP. Przyszłoroczny finał zobaczymy w TVN,” Polska
The Times (17 October 2016), https://polskatimes.pl/wosp-konczy-wspolprace-z-tvp-przyszlorocznyfinal-zobaczymy-w-tvn/ar/10751120;
“25. finał WOŚP bez transmisji w TVP?,” Newsweek Polska (16
September 2016), https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/tvp-nie-pokaze-finalu-wosp-25-final-wosp-bez-tel-
ewizji-polskiej/5x4grn9.
  63. Ł. Woźnicki, “TVP wymazała serduszko WOŚP z materiału ‘Wiadomości’. ‘Żenujące, niskie,
małostkowe,’” Gazeta Wyborcza (16 January 2017), http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,21251547,tvp-wymazala-
serduszko-wosp-z-materialu-wiadomosci-zenujace.html.
  64. M. Paczuska, Twitter, https://twitter.com/MarzenaPaczuska/status/820906096957255680?s=20.
 65. A. Kublik, “Owsiak jako marionetka z gwiazdą Dawida w tle, czyli TVP o Wielkiej
Orkiestrze Świątecznej Pomocy,” Gazeta Wyborcza (11 January 2019), http://wyborcza.pl/7,753
98,24353815,owsiak-jako-marionetka-z-gwiazda-dawida-w-tle-czyli-tvp-o-wielkiej.html.
  66. “Rzecznik prosi KRRiT o zbadanie sprawy ‘plastusi’ TVP Info,” Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich
(16 January 2019), https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/RPO-do-krrit-o-zbadanie-sprawy-plastusi-tvp-info.
 67. “Materiał ‘Wiadomości’ TVP: ‘Rekord barbarzyństwa,’” Rzeczpospolita, https://www.rp.pl/
Media/190119615-Material-Wiadomosci-TVP-Rekord-barbarzynstwa.html.
 68. “‘Owsiak wzbudza negatywne emocje - musi odejść’: Pawłowicz po ataku na Adamowicza,”
Polsat News (13 January 2019), https://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2019-01-13/owsiak-wzbudza-
negatywne-emocje-musi-odejsc-pawlowicz-po-ataku-na-adamowicza/.
  69. See “Jurek Owsiak żąda przeprosin od Beaty Mazurek. Za ‘namiot,’” Rzeczpospolita (31
January 2019), https://www.rp.pl/WOSP/190139823-Jurek-Owsiak-zada-przeprosin-od-BeatyMazurek-Za-namiot.html;
Agata Szczęśniak, “Sukces dzięki czytelnikowi OKO.press! PiS się
poddał: Morawiecki: będą pociągi na festiwal Owsiaka,” OKO.press (18 June 2019), https://oko.
press/pis-sie-poddal-morawiecki-osobiscie-zdecydowal-beda-pociagi-na-festiwal-owsiaka/.
 70. P. Jarosińska and H. Karp, “Brakuje przeciwwagi dla ‘zaciągu’ Owsiaka,” Radio Maryja (13
January 2010), https://www.radiomaryja.pl/informacje/brakuje-przeciwwagi-dla-zaciagu-owsiaka/;
Chmielewska-Szlajfer, Reshaping Poland’s Community after Communism, 93.
  71. J. Blikowska, “Jurek Owsiak odpowiada na ‘czarny protest,’” Rzeczpospolita (1 October 2016),
https://www.rp.pl/Spoleczenstwo/310019983-Jurek-Owsiak-odpowiada-na-czarny-protest.html.
  72. P. Guzik, “Patryk Jaki skrytykował WOŚP,” Gazeta Wyborcza (16 January 2018), http://opole.
wyborcza.pl/opole/7,35086,22905903,patryk-jaki-skrytykowal-wosp-rodzice-zmarlej-anielki-prosze.
html; T. Terlikowski, “Pamiętaj! Wspierasz WOŚP i Owsiaka wspierasz aborcję i eutanazję!,” Telewizja
Republika (12 January 2017), https://telewizjarepublika.pl/pamietaj-wspierasz-wosp-i-owsiaka-wspierasz-aborcje-i-eutanazje,43157.html.
Also see Chmielewska-Szlajfer, Reshaping Poland’s Community
after Communism, 92.
  73. “Caritas przekazał na aukcję WOŚP lampę oliwną. ‘Nie konkurujemy,’” Wirtualna Polska (11
January 2017), https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/caritas-przekazal-na-aukcje-wosp-lampe-oliwna-nie-konkuru-
jemy-6079060684759681a.
 74. “Jarosław Kaczyński: Naszym celem jest budowa polskiej wersji państwa dobrobytu.”
Rzeczpospolita (7 September 2019), https://www.rp.pl/Prawo-i-Sprawiedliwosc/190909407-Jaroslaw-
Kaczynski-Naszym-celem-jest-budowa-polskiej-wersji-panstwa-dobrobytu.html.
  75. S. Guerra, “The Polish Catholic Church Has Become Intertwined with Euroscepticism and the
Promotion of Conservative ‘National Values,’” Democratic Audit UK (28 April 2016), https://www.
democraticaudit.com/2016/04/28/the-polish-catholic-church-has-become-intertwined-with-euroscepti-
cism-and-the-promotion-of-conservative-national-values/.
  76. Ł. Warzecha, “Po co dawać Owsiakowi?,” Rzeczpospolita (6 January 2014), https://www.rp.pl/
artykul/1076944-Po-co-dawac-Owsiakowi-.html.
 77. See “Dla kogo gra orkiestra Owsiaka,” wPolsce.pl, https://wides.pl/film/5161732/debatawpolsce-pl-dla-kogo-gra-orkiestra-owsiaka-cz-1;
Ł. Warzecha, “WOŚP—dlaczego nie wielbię Owsiaka:
138  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
‘Jest częścią medialno-politycznego układu i będzie promowany tak długo, jak długo ten układ będzie
trwał,’” wpolityce.pl (7 January 2012), https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/124972-wosp-dlaczego-nie-wielbie-
owsiaka-jest-czescia-medialno-politycznego-ukladu-i-bedzie-promowany-tak-dlugo-jak-dlugo-ten-
uklad-bedzie-trwal.
 78. D. Kania, J. Targalski, and M. Marosz, Resortowe dzieci: Media (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo
Fronda, 2013), 307–16.
  79. P. Lisiewicz, “Ten, który zniszczył bunt. O Jerzym Owsiaku—bezpieczniku system,” niezależna.
pl (23 October 2013), https://niezalezna.pl/47507-ten-ktory-zniszczyl-bunt-o-jerzym-owsiaku-bezpiec-
zniku-systemu.
  80. “Dla kogo gra orkiestra Owsiaka.”
  81. Lisiewicz, “Ten, który zniszczył bunt. O Jerzym Owsiaku—bezpieczniku system.”
 82. “Konferencja z udziałem Jarosława Kaczyńskiego,” TVP Info (24 April 2019), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=rS0yT6wgB9o.
 83. Zdrowie, Praca, Rodzina: Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014, 15–17; Teresa Torańska, My
(Warszawa: Oficyjna Wydawnicza MOST, 1994), 91.
  84. M. Ślarzyński, “Rola klubów ‘Gazety Polskiej’w sukcesie politycznym Prawa i Sprawiedliwości
w 2015 roku. Aktorzy lokalni czy aktor ogólnokrajowej sfery publicznej III RP?,” Przegląd Socjologiczny
67, no. 2 (2018): 139–58.
 85. Dąbrowska, “New Conservatism in Poland: The Discourse Coalition around Law and
Justice,” 95.
  86. A. Pap, Democratic Decline in Hungary: Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy (New York:
Routledge, 2018), 37; Grzebalska and Pető, “The Gendered Modus Operandi,” 169.
  87. Visit by the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe to Warsaw. Participation of NGOs
in the decision-making process in the Republic of Poland. Report (June 2016), 14; Helsinki Foundation
for Human Rights, The Situation of Civil Society Organizations in Poland (Warsaw: Helsinki Foundation
for Human Rights, 2017), 3; “Zmieniony projekt ustawy o Narodowym Centrum Rozwoju Społeczeństwa
Obywatelskiego ‘Instytut Wolności,’” Obserwatorium Demokracji (23 June 2017), http://obserwatorium-
demokracji.pl/ustawa/zmieniony-projekt-ustawy-o-narodowym-centrum-rozwoju-spoleczenstwa-obywatelskiego-2/;
Ignacy Dudkiewicz, “Narodowy Instytut Wolności. Czy jest się czego bać?,” ngo.pl (25
September 2017), https://publicystyka.ngo.pl/narodowy-instytut-wolnosci-czy-jest-sie-czego-bac.
 88. “Ustawa z dnia 15 września 2017 r. o Narodowym Instytucie Wolności—Centrum Rozwoju
Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego,” 1.
  89. Grzebalska and Pető, “The Gendered Modus Operandi,” 169.
  90. N. Novakova, “The Conservative-Liberal Clash Reshaping Poland’s Civil Society,” The German
Marshall Fund of the United States (10 March 2020), https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2020/03/10/conserva-
tive-liberal-clash-reshaping-polands-civil-society.
 91. “Wyniki oceny wniosków pełnych w Priorytecie 1a PROO,” Narodowy Instytut Wolności—
Centrum Rozwoju Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego, https://www.niw.gov.pl/wyniki-oceny-wnioskow-pel-
nych-w-priorytecie-1a-proo/.
  92. A. Dąbrowska, “Miliony dla fundacji i stowarzyszeń związanych z PiS,” Polityka (19 August
2019), https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1919166,1,miliony-dla-fundacji-i-stowarzyszen-
zwiazanych-z-pis.read.
  93. Of the twenty organizations linked directly with PiS’s ruling coalition, eight had members who
were current MPs, party activists or functionaries; five had members who were local politicians; five had
members who were party candidates; and two had members who were former MPs or functionaries.
  94. D. Sitnicka, “Za pół miliona złotych „będziem Polakami”. Absurdy z listy grantów Narodowego
Instytutu Wolności,” OKO.press (15 August 2019), https://oko.press/za-pol-miliona-zlotych-bedziem-
polakami-absurdy-z-listy-grantow-narodowego-instytutu-wolnosci/.
  95. See note 93 and Dąbrowska, “Miliony dla fundacji i stowarzyszeń związanych z PiS.”
  96. See “Ludzie,” Konfederacja Inicjatyw Pozarządowych Rzeczypospolitej, https://konfederacjaipr.
pl/ludzie/.
Bill / Counter-Elite Populism and Civil Society in Poland  139
  97. “Zarząd,” Ośrodek Analiz Prawnych, Gospodarczych i Społecznych im. Hipolita Cegielskiego,
https://osrodekanaliz.pl/zarzad/.
  98. Of thirty-four organizations, in total, either personally linked to the ruling coalition or part of its
“discourse coalition,” sixteen had missions or activities promoting different combinations of Christian
and conservative values, patriotism or national visions of history; twelve had missions or activities that
were local, apolitical or undefined (nine of these had direct personal links with the ruling coalition); three
were political or engaged in promotion of media friendly to the ruling coalition; two were engaged in
legal and economic analysis.
 99. P. Żuk, “Nation, National Remembrance, and Education—Polish Schools as Factories of
Nationalism and Prejudice,” Nationalities Papers 46, no. 6 (2018): 1051–53.
100. K. Kłosińska and M. Rusinek, Dobra zmiana (Kraków: Znak, 2019), 175–80.
101. “Morawiecki i Kaczyński nagrodzeni podczas gali 25-lecia ‘Gazety Polskiej,’” Polsat News (6
February 2018), https://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2018-02-06/morawiecki-ikaczynski-nagrodzeni-
podczas-gali-25lecia-gazety-polskiej/.
102. C. Davies, “Poland makes partial U-turn on Holocaust law after Israel row,” The Guardian (27
June 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/27/poland-partial-u-turn-controversial-holo-
caust-law.
103. J. Kunert, “‘Internetowa husaria’ za 231 tys. zł. Sprawdzamy efekty projektu z pieniędzy MSZ,”
Konkret24 (30 April 2019), https://konkret24.tvn24.pl/polska,108/internetowa-husaria-za-231-tys-zl-
sprawdzamy-efekty-projektu-z-pieniedzy-msz,920047.html.
104. P. Trudnowski, “Jednoosobowe konsultacje. Dlaczego przy ustawie o IPN zawiódł ‘system wczesnego
ostrzegania’?,” Klub Jagielloński (6 February 2018), https://klubjagiellonski.pl/2018/02/06/jed-
noosobowe-konsultacje-dlaczego-przy-ustawie-o-ipn-zawiodl-system-wczesnego-ostrzegania/.
105. M. Wojtczuk, “Polska Fundacja Narodowa złamała swój statut, promując partię, a nie Polskę,”
Gazeta Wyborcza (8 July 2019), https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,24973524,polska-fun-
dacja-narodowa-zlamala-swoj-statut-promujac-partie.html.
106. “Program Rozwoju Organizacji Obywatelskich na lata 2018-2030 PROO Priorytet 1a. Wsparcie
działań misyjnych i rozwoju instytucjonalnego, Lista wniosków zakwalifikowanych do realizacji,”
Narodowy Instytut Wolności—Centrum Rozwoju Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego, https://niw.gov.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/PROO-1a-Lista-wniosk%c3%b3w-zatwierdzonych-do-realizacji.pdf.
107. https://fundacjainicjatywmlodziezowych.pl/#wladze.
108. Dąbrowska, “Miliony dla fundacji i stowarzyszeń związanych z PiS.”
109. “Pracownia Liderów NGO’s,” Fundacja Inicjatyw Młodzieżowych, https://fundacjainicjatywm-
lodziezowych.pl/pracownia-liderow-ngos/.
110. “Prelegenci Akademii Liderów Rzeczypospolitej,” Akademia Liderów Rzeczypospolitej, https://
akademialiderowrp.pl/prelegenci/.
111. Akademia Liderów Rzeczypospolitej, https://akademialiderowrp.pl/.
112. Dąbrowska, “Miliony dla fundacji i stowarzyszeń związanych z PiS.”
113. “Wicepremier Piotr Gliński gościem honorowym Forum ‘Wspólnie dla Przyszłości,’”
Ministerstwo Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego (15 September 2018), http://www.mkidn.gov.pl/pages/
posts/wicepremier-piotr-glinski-gosciem-honorowym-forum–wspolnie-dla-przyszlosci–8705.php.
114. “Wicepremier Piotr Gliński gościem honorowym Forum ‘Wspólnie dla Przyszłości.’”
115. “Lista rankingowa—Priorytet 3—FIO 2018,” fio.gov.pl, https://fio.niw.gov.pl/edycja9/wyniki/
ListarankingowaPriorytet3.pdf; “Wykaz wniosków rozpatrzonych pozytywnie (beneficjentów) w programie
‘Kultura—Interwencje 2018,’” nck.pl, https://www.nck.pl/dotacje-i-stypendia/dotacje/programy-
dotacyjne-nck/kultura-interwencje/aktualnosci/kultura-interwencje-2018-wyniki-pierwszego-naboru.
116. “Władze,” Fundacja Służba Niepodległej, http://sluzbaniepodleglej.pl/wladze.
117. “Drugie posiedzenie Rady Dialogu z Młodym Pokoleniem,” premier.gov.pl, https://www.pre-
mier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/aktualnosci/drugie-posiedzenie-rady-dialogu-z-mlodym-pokoleniem.html.
118. “Rada Dialogu z Młodym Pokoleniem,” Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej, https://bip.kprm.gov.pl/
kpr/komit/7158,Rada-Dialogu-z-Mlodym-Pokoleniem.html.
140  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
119. Among others, the European Center for Non-Governmental Projects (Europejskie Centrum
Projektów Pozarządowych) has supplied a member of PiS’s youth forum (also on the Council for
Dialogue with the Young Generation), a PiS local councillor, and a PiS candidate for local elections, while
Collegium Nobilium Opoliense, an organization based in Opole, is closely linked with PiS coalition
partners Agreement (Porozumienie).
120. S. Ogórek, “Rekord WOŚP dzięki PiS: Polacy wrzucili do puszek pieniądze z 500+?,” money.
pl (8 March 2017), https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/wosp-rekord-500-plus-rzad-
pis,102,0,2276198.html.
121. Jacobsson and Korolczuk, “Introduction,” 21.
122. Novakova, “The Conservative-Liberal Clash Reshaping Poland’s Civil Society.”
123. E. Korolczuk, “Społeczeństwo obywatelskie w Polsce—kryzys czy nowe otwarcie?” (Warszawa:
Instytut Studiów Zaawansowanych Krytyki Politycznej, 2017), 8.
124. “Hungary approves strict regulations on foreign-funded NGOs,” BBC News (13 June 2017),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40258922.
125. Ekiert et al., “Civil Society,” 333.
126. “Przyjdzie dzień, że w Warszawie będzie Budapeszt.”
Stanley Bill, PhD, is Senior Lecturer in Polish Studies and Director of the Polish Studies Programme at
the University of Cambridge. He works on contemporary Polish politics and twentieth-century Polish
literature and culture. He has particular interests in populist discourse, postcolonial interpretations of
Polish cultural and political history, the poetics of the body, religion and secularization, and Polish–
Ukrainian relations. He has written on monism and pluralism in Polish politics (with Ben Stanley),
postcolonial theory in the Polish context, legacies of Polish Romanticism, and the works of Czesław
Miłosz and Bruno Schulz. He is the Chair of the Cambridge Committee for Russian and East European
Studies (CamCREES). He recently spent a term as Early Career Research Fellow at the Centre for
Research in the Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities (CRASSH) at the University of Cambridge, where
he worked on the structure and origins of contemporary populist discourse in Poland in terms of postcolonial
theory. He is also founder and editor-at-large of the news and opinion website and social media hub
Notes from Poland.