6 capitalism and freedom against which classical liberalism fought. In the very act of turning the clock back to seventeenth-century mercantilism, he is fond of castigating true liberals as reactionary! The change in the meaning attached to the term liberalism is more striking in economic matters than in political. The twentieth-century liberal, like the nineteenth-century liberal, favors parliamentary institutions, representative government, civil rights, and so on. Yet even in political matters, there is a notable difference. Jealous of liberty, and hence fearful of centralized power, whether in governmental or private hands, the nineteenth-century liberal favored political decentralization. Committed to action and confident of the beneficence of power so long as it is in the hands of a government ostensibly controlled by the electorate, the twentieth-century liberal favors centralized government. He will resolve any doubt about where power should be located in favor of the state instead of the city, of the federal government instead of the state, and of a world organization instead of a national government. Because of the corruption of the term liberalism, the views that formerly went under that name are now often labeled conservatism. But this is not a satisfactory alternative. The nineteenth-century liberal was a radical, both in the etymological sense of going to the root of the matter, and in the political sense of favoring major changes in social institutions. So too must be his modern heir. We do not wish to conserve the state interven-tions that have interfered so greatly with our freedom, though, of course, we do wish to conserve those that have promoted it, Moreover, in practice, the term conservatism has come to cover so wide a range of views, and views so incompatible with one another, that we shall no doubt see the growth of hyphenated designations, such as libertarian-conservative and aristocratic-conservative. Partly because of my reluctance to surrender the term to proponents of measures that would destroy liberty, partly because I cannot find a better alternative, I shall resolve these difficulties by using the word liberalism in its original sense — as the doctrines pertaining to a free man. Chapter I + The Relation between Economic Freedom and Political Freedom It is widely believed that politics and economics are separate and largely unconnected; that individual freedom is a political problem and material welfare an economic problem; and that any kind of political arrangements can be combined with any kind of economic arrangements. The chief contemporary manifestation of this idea is the advocacy of "democratic socialism" by many who condemn out of hand the restrictions on individual freedom imposed by "totalitarian socialism" in Russia, and who are persuaded that it is possible for a country to adopt the essential features of Russian economic arrangements and yet to ensure individual freedom through political arrangements. The 8 capitalism and freedom Economic Freedom and Political Freedom ( thesis of this chapter is that such a view is a delusion, that there is an intimate connection between economicsjmdjDolitics, that only_cextain combinations of political and economic arrangements are possible, and that in particular, a society which is -!> socialist cannot also be democratic, in the sense of guaranteeing individual freedom. Economic arrangements play a dual role in the promotion of ' a free society. On the one hand, freedom in economic arrange-l. ments_is_itself a component of freedom broadly understood, so .economic freedom is an end in itself. In the second place, economic freedom is also an^ indispensable means toward the The first of these roles of economic freedom needs special emphasis because intellectuals in particular have a strong bias against regarding this aspect of freedom as important. They tend to express contempt for what they regard as material aspects of life, and to regard their own pursuit of allegedly higher values as on a different plane of significance and as deserving of special attention. For most citizens of the country, however, if not for the intellectual, the direct importance of economic freedom is at least comparable in significance to the indirect importance of economic freedom as a means to political freedom. The citizen of Great Britain, who after World War II was not permitted to spend his vacation in the United States because of exchange control, was being deprived of an essential freedom no less than the citizen of the United States, who was denied the opportunity to spend his vacation in Russia because of his political views. The one was ostensibly an economic limitation on freedom and the other a political limitation, yet there is no essential difference between the two. The citizen of the United States who is compelled_.by_law to doxa£_something like_io per cent.of his income to the purchase of a particular kind of retirement contract, admimstereaby the government, being deprived of a corresponding part of his personal freedom. How strongly this deprivation may be felt and its closeness to the deprivation of religious freedom, which all would regard as "civil" or "political" rather than "economic", were dramatized by an episode involving a group of farmers of the Amish sect. On grounds of principle, this group regarded compulsory federal old age programs as an infringement of their personal individual freedom and refused to pay taxes or accept benefits. As a result, some of their livestock were sold by auction in order to satisfy claims for social security levies. True, the number of citizens who regard compulsory old age insurance as a deprivation of freedom may be few, but the believer in freedom has never counted noses. A citizen of the United States who under the laws of various states is riot free to^llow_tbj^ocaujatio^ own choosing unless he_can get a license for it, is likewise_berng deprived of an essential part of his freedom. So is the man who would like to exchange some of his goods with, say, a Swiss for a watch but is prevented from doing so by a quota. So also is the Californian who was thrown into jail for selling Alka Seltzer at a price below that set by the manufacturer under so-called "fair trade" laws. So also is the farmer who cannot grow the amount of wheat he wants. And so on. Clearly, economic freedom, injnd_ofjtself, is an extjernglyJERortant part of totaTfreedom. Viewed as a means to the end of political freedom, economic--arrange_ments^e_inipjortant because of their effect onjhe concentration oil dispersion,of power. The kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic powenFrorr^oTitical power and in this way enaBTes" the one to offset the other. Historical evidence speaks with a single voice on the relation between political freedom and a free market. I know of no example in time or place of a society that has been marked by a large measure of political freedom, and that has not also used something comparable to a free market to organize the bulk of economic activity. Because we live in a largely free society, we tend to forget how limited is the span of time and the part of the globe for which there has ever been anything like political freedom: the typical state of mankind is tyranny, servitude, and misery. The nineteenth century and early twentieth century in the Western world stand out as striking exceptions to the general trend of historical development. Political freedom in this instance clearly came along with the free market and the development of capitalist 10 capitalism and freedom Economic Freedom and Political Freedom ii institutions. So also did political freedom in the golden age of Greece and in the early days of the Roman era. — History suggests only that capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom. Clearly it is not a sufficient condition. Fascist Italy and Fascist Spain, Germany at various times in the last seventy years, Japan before World Wars I and II, tzarist Russia in the decades before World War I — are all societies that cannot conceivably be described as politically free. Yet, in each, private enterprise was the dominant form of economic organization. It is therefore clearly possible to have economic arrangements that are fundamentally capitalist and political arrangements that are not free. Even in those societies, the citizeruy_had^ji_good_deal more freedom than citizens of_ajnodern totalitarian state like Russia or Nazf Germany, in which. econom^totahtarianism_is_com-bined with political totalitarianism. Even in Russia under the Tzars, it was possible for some citizens, under some circumstances, to change their jobs without getting permission from political authority because capitalism and the existence of private property provided some check to the centralized power of the state. The relation^between political and economic freedom is complex and by nojneans unilateral. In the earrylimeteenthcentury, Bentham and the Philosophical Radicals were inclined to regard political freedom as a means to economic freedom. They believed that the masses were being hampered by the restrictions that were being imposed upon them, and thatif political reform gay.e_thej3uJjc_c£jhe^ReflpIe the vote, they_would do what was good for them, which wajjorote for laissez faire. In retrospect, one cannot say that they were wrong.There was a large measure of political reform that was accompanied by economic reform in the direction of a great deal of laissez faire. An enormous increase in the well-being of the masses followed this change in economic arrangements. The triumph of Benthamite liberalism in nineteenth-century England was followed by a reaction toward increasing intervention by government in economic affairs. This tendency to collectivism was greatly accelerated, both in England and elsewhere, by the two World Wars. Welfare rather than freedom be- came thedormnantjio^e_^ Recognizing the implicit threat to individualism, the intellectual descendants of the Philosophical Radicals — Dicey, Mises, Hayek, and Simons, to mention only a few — feared that a continued movement toward centralized control of economic activity would prove The Road to Serfdom, as Hayek entitled his penetrating analysis of the process. Their emphasis was on economic freedom as a means toward political freedom. Events since the end of World War II display still a different relation between economic and political freedom. Collectivisi economic planning has indeed interfered with individual freedom. At least in some countries, however, the result has not been the suppression of freedom, but the reversal of economic policy. England again provides the most striking example. The turning point was perhaps the "control of engagements" order which, despite great misgivings, the Labour party found it necessary to impose in order to carry out its economic policy. Fully enforced and carried through, the law would have involved centralized allocation of individuals to occupations. This conflicted so sharply with personal liberty that it was enforced in a negligible number of cases, and then repealed after the law had been in effect for only a short period. Its repeal ushered in a decided shift in economic policy, marked by reduced Reliance jm cen-tralized_"plans" and "programs!1, jyy the jdism^ntEng of many controls, and by increased emphasis on the private market. A 4?^nM!jSS^^^?]i^^c^rI^^i5 most other democratic cojintries. The proximate explanation of these shifts in policy is the lim-ited^uc^gss-oLccntral planning or its outright failure to achieve stated objectives. However, this failure is itself to be attributed, at least in some measure, to the political implications of central planning and to an unwillingness to follow out its logic when doing so requires trampling rough-shod on treasured private rights. It may well be that the shift is only a temporary interruption in the collectivist trend of this century. Even so, it illustrates the close relation between political freedom and economic arrangements. Historical evidence by itself can never be convincing. Perhaps it was sheer coincidence that the expansion of freedom occurred 12 capitalism and freedom at the same time as the development of capitalist and market institutions. Why should there be a connection ? What are the logical links between economic and political freedom? In discussing these questions we shall consider first the market as a direct .compongntof freedom, jind then-the indirectrelation between markelarrangemeji^_a^ A by-product will be an outline of the ideal economic arrangements for a free society. As liberals, we take freedom of the individual, or perhaps the family, as our ultimate goal_in judging social arrangements. , Freedom as a value in this sense hasjo^o^yndijhejnjerrelations " among people; it has no meaning whatsoever to a Robinson Crusoe on an isolated island (without his Man Friday). Robinson Crusoe on his island is subject to "constraint," he has limited "power," and he has only a limited number of alternatives, but there is no problem of freedom in the sense that is relevant to our discussion. Similarly, ina society, freedom has nothing to say about what an individ^I doeT^iuTIiis freedom; it is not an all-embracing ethic. Indeed, a major aim of the liberal is to leave the ethjcalj)r^lem for thejndividual to wrestle with. The "really" important ethical problems arelEose^ that face an individual in a free society—what he should do with his freedom. There are thus two sets of values that a liberal will emphasize — rthe values that are relevant to relations among people, which is ( the context in which he assigns first priority to freedom; and I the values that are relevant to the in&vidjiajjn. the exercise of j his freedom, which is the realm of individual ethics and k philosophy. The liberal conceives of men as imperfect beings. He regards the probleni9£sodal^^ajuzation to be as much a negative prob-lenxpfjJTej^ting "bad" people from doing harm as of enabling "good" people faJcTo good; and, of course, "bad" and "good" people may be the same people, depending on who is judging them. The basic problem of social organization is how to co-ordinate the economic_jicriyities of large numbcjxof people. .Even in relatively backwardsocieties, extensive division of labor and specialization of function is required to make effective use of available resources. In advanced societies, the scale on which co- Economic Freedom and Political Freedom 13 ordination is needed, to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by modern science and technology, is enormously greater. Literally millions of people are involved in providing one another with their daily bread, let alone with their yearly automobiles. The challenge to the believer in liberty is to reconcile this widespread interdependence with individual freedom. Fundamentally, there are only two wavs ofco-ordinating the' economic activities of millions. One is central direction involving the use of coercion — the technique of the army and of the modern totalitarian state. The other is voluntary co-gDeration of in-aividjials^tJ^techntcu^ place. The possibility of co-ordination through voluntary co-operation rests on the elementary—yet frequendy denied — proposi-, tion thatboth parties to ane^onornic transaction benefit from! v it, prnfJneA_^th^^(in^ct.iQ^'.ts ~Si4aterall\ voltmtMV and\ informed. Exchange can therefore bring about co-ordination without co-eicion. A working model of a society organized through voluntary exchange is a free private enterprise exchange economy — what we have been calling competitive capitalism. In its simplest form, such a society consists of a number of independent households—a collection of Robinson Crusoes, as it were. Each household uses the resources it controlsjto produce goodjjandservices that it exchanges_for^oocls'^d^rvices pro-ducejTjyotEerhouseholds7onjerrns mutually acceptable to the two parties~tolne bargain. It is thereby enabled to satisfy its wants indirectly by producing goods and services for others, rather than directly by producing goods for its own immediate use. The incentive for adopting this indirect route is, of course, the increased product made possible by division of labor and specialization of function. Since the househoH_always_has the aftermtiveof^oduangdu-ecdy for itself, it need not enter into any exchange unless it benefitslrom it. Hence, no exchange will take place unless both parties do benefit from it. Co-operation is thereby achieved without coercion. Specialization of function and division of labor would not go far if the ultimate productive unit were the household. In a modern society, we have gone much farther. We have intro-duced enterprises which are intermediaries between individuals i A 14 capitalism and freedom in thf jr^^rjadags as suppliers of service and as purchasers of goods. And similarly, specialization of function and division of labor could not go very far if we had to continue to rely on the barter of product for product. In consequence, money has been [introduced as^a means_of facilitating exchange, and of ena"bling nn~e acts of purchase ancfof sale to be separated into two parts. Despite the important role of enterprises and of money in our actual economy, and despite the numerous and complex problems they raise, the central characteristic of the market technique of achieving co-ordination is fully displayed in the simple exchange economy that contains neither enterprises nor money. As in that simple model, so in the complex enterprise and money-exchange economy, co-operation is_stricdy individual.and vol-funtaiy_j>rovided: (a) tjiat^nterprises are private, so that the ' nfcipiarp contracting partiesare individuals and {b\ that individuals are effectively free to enter or not to enter into any par-^^•/ *i ticular exchange, so that every transaction is strictly voluntary. It is far easier to state these provisos in general terms than to spell them out in detail, or to specify precisely the institutional arrangements most conducive to their maintenance. Indeed, much of technical economic literature is concerned with precisely these questions. The basic requisite is thejnaintenance of .law and ordertoprevent physical coercion of one individual by i ajTothcr and to enforce aytrac^ voluntarily entered into, thus I givingsubstancg to "private". Aside from this, perhaps the most difficult problems arise from monopoly — which inhibits effec-"[ tive freedom by_denying individualsalmrnatiges to the particular exchange — and from "neighborhood effects"—effects on j third parties for whichjt isnot feasible to charge or recompense V. them. These problems will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. So long as effective freedom of exchange is maintained, the central feature of the market organization of economic activity yis that it prevents one_p£porijFromJnterferb in I resr>ectj2fjrioiLQfJus_actWities. The consumer is protected from . coercion by the seller because of the presence ofother sellers with whom he can deal. The seller is protected from coercion by the consumer because of other consumers to whom he can sell. The employee is protected from coercion by the employer because of Economic Freedom and Political Freedom J5 other employers for whom he can work, and so on. And the markeT~does~thls impersonally and without centralized authority. Indeed, a major source of objection to a free economy is precisely that it does this task so well. It gixes_people what theyfl want instead of what a particular group thinks_ theyought to want. Underlying most arguments against the free market is a lack of belief in freedom itself. The existence of a free market does not of course eliminate the need for government. On the contrary, government is essen-tial both as a forum forjietermining the "rulesjjfrhegame" and a.s an umpire_tointerpret andenforce the rules decidecTon. What the market does is to reduce greatlxthe rang£oFTssues that must be^ecid^djin^ug^ and thereby to minimize the extent to which government need participate directly in the game. The characteristic feature of action through political channels is that it tends to require or enforce substantial_con-formity. The great advantage of the market, on the other hand, is that it permits wide diversity. IFls, in political terms, a system of proportional representation. Each man can vote, as it were, for the color of tie he wants and get it; he does not have to see what color the majority wants and then, if he is in the minority, submit It is this feature of the market that we refer to when we say that the market provides economic freedom. But this characteristic also has implications that go far beyond the narrowly economic. Political freedom means the absence of coercion of a man by his fellow men. The fundamental threat to freedom is power to coerce, be it in the hands of ^monarch, a dictator, an oligarchy, or^£_momentary majority. The preservation of free-dom requires mFeTLmuiation of such concentration of power to I the fullesrpossible extent and the dispersal and distribution ofi whatever power cannot be eliminated — a system of checks and(l balances. Uy removing the organization of economic activity from the control of political authority, the market eliminates this source of coercive power. It enables economic,strength to be a check to political power rather than a reinforcement. Economic power can be widely dispersed. There is no law of conservation~wnTch forces The growth of new centers of eco- i6 capitalism and freedom 1 nomic strengthjo be at the expense of existingjxnters. jPohtical power^onthe o&erJiancL is more difficult todecentralize. There can be numerous small independent governments. But it is far more difficult to maintain numerous equipotent small centers of political power in a single large government than it is to have numerous centers of economic strength in a single large economy. There can be many millionaires in one large economy. But can there be more than one really outstanding leader, one person on whom the energies and enthusiasms of his countrymen are centered ? If the central government gains power, it is likely to be at the expense of local governments. There seems to be something like a_ fixed total of polidcalpower to be distributed. Consequently, if economic power is joined to political power, concentration seems almost inevitable. On the other f hand, jf^economi£_ppwerjs kept in separate hands from political I power, it can serve as a check and a counter to political power. ' The force of this abstractargument can perhaps best be demonstrated by example. Let us consider first, a hypothetical example that may help to bring out the principles involved, and then some actual examples from recent experience that illustrate the way in which the market works to preserve political freedom. One feature of a free society is surely the freedom of individuals to advocate and propagandize openly for a radical change in the structure of the society—so long as the advocacy is restricted to persuasion and does not include force or other forms of coercion. It is a mark of the political freedom of a capitalist society that men can openly advocate and work for socialism. Equally, political freedom in a socialist society would require that men be free to advocate the introduction of capitalism. How could the freedom to advocate capitalism be preserved and protected in a socialist society ? In order for men to advocate anything, they must in the first place be able to earn a living. This already raises a problem in a socialist society, since all jobs are under the direct control of political authorities. It would take an act of self-denial whose difficulty is underlined by experience in the United States after World War II with the problem of "security" among Federal Economic Freedom and Political Freedom 17 employees, for a socialist government to permit its employees to advocate policies directly contrary to official doctrine. But let us suppose this act of self-denial to be achieved. For advocacy of capitalism to mean anything, the proponents must be able to finance their cause —to hold public meetings, publish pamphlets, buy radio time, issue newspapers and magazines, and so on. How could they raise the funds ? There might and probably would be men in the socialist society with large incomes, perhaps even large capital sums in the form of government bonds and the like, but these would of necessity be high public officials. It is possible to conceive of a minor socialist official retaining his job although openly advocating capitalism. It strains credulity to imagine the socialist top brass financing such "subversive" activities. The only recourse for funds would be to raise small amounts from a large number of minor officials. But this is no real answer. To tap these sources, many people would already have to be persuaded, and our whole problem is how to initiate and finance a campaign to do so. Radical movements in capitalist societies have never been financed this way. They have typically been supported by a few wealthy individuals who have become persuaded—by a Frederick Vanderbilt Field, or an Anita McCor-tnick Blaine, or a Corliss Lamont, to mention a few names recently prominent, or by a Friedrich Engels, to go farther back. This is a_r_ole of inequality of wealth in preserving political freedom that is seldorrn^ed^the ngkoflhe patron. In a capitalist society, it is only necessary to convince a few wealthy people to get funds to launch any idea, however strange, and there are many such persons, many^ndejiejidem foci of support. And, indeed, it is not even necessary to persuade people or financial institutions with available funds of the soundness of the ideas to be propagated. It is only necessary to persuade them that the propagation can_bejfinanaaTly successful ;~that the newspaper or magazine or book or other venture will be profitable. The competitive publisher, for example, cannot afford to publish only writing with which he personally agrees; his touchstone must be the likelihood that the market will be large enough to yield a satisfactory return on his investment. capitalism and freedom Economic Freedom and Political Freedom 19 In this way, the market breaks the vicious circle and makes it possible ultimately to finance such ventures by small amounts from many people without first persuading them. There are no such possibilities in the socialist society; there is only the all-powerful state. Let us stretch our imagination and suppose that a socialist government is aware of this problem and is composed of people anxious to preserve freedom. Could it provide the funds ? Perhaps, but it is difficult to see how. It could establish a bureau for subsidizing subversive propaganda. But how could it choose ; whom to support ? If it gave to all who asked, it would shortly find itself out of funds, for socialism cannot repeal the ele-; I mentary economic law that a sufficiently high price will call forth a large supply. Make the advocacy of radical causes sufficiently remunerative, and the supply of advocates will be unlimited. Moreover, freedom to advocate unpopular causes does not require that such advocacy be without cost. On the contrary, no society could be stable if advocacy of radical change were costless, much less subsidized. It is entirely appropriate that men make sacrifices to advocate causes in which they deeply believe, r Indeed, it is irnr^rtanttjxrjiejgjve^eedom only for people who are willing to practiceself-denial. foTomerwlselr^d^ni'degen-erates into liceme^rtaTrresponsibility. What is essential is that the cost of advocating unpopular causes be tolerable and not prohibitive. But we are not yet through. In a free market society, it is enough to have the funds. The suppliers of paper are as willing to sell it to the Daily Worker as to the Wall Street Journal. In a socialist society, it would not be enough to have the funds. The hypothetical supporter of capitalism would have to persuade a government factory making paper to sell to him, the government printing press to print his pamphlets, a government post-office to distribute them among the people, a government agency ., (ii>u^ll^ to rent him a hall in which to talk, and so on. Perhaps there is some way in which one could overcome these afa,-} difficulties and preserve freedom in a socialist society. One cannot say it is utterly impossible. What is clear, however, is that there are very real difficulties in establishing institutions that] will effectively preserve the possibility of dissent. So far as I know, none of the people who have been in favor of socialism and also in favor of freedom have really faced up to this issue; or made even a respectable start at developing the institutional "arrangements that would permit freedom under socialism. By contrast, it is clear how a free market capitalist society fosters freedom. - A striking practical example of these abstract principles is the experience of Winston Churchill. From 1933 to the outbreak of World War II, Churchill was not permitted to talk over the ; British radio, which was, of course, a government monopoly ad- •ministered by the British Broadcasting Corporation. Here was a leading citizen of his country, a Member of Parliament, a former cabinet minister, a man who was desperately trying by !'-every device possible to persuade his countrymen to take steps to ward off the menace of Hitler's Germany. He was not permitted to talk over the radio to the British people because the BBC was a hgovernment monopoly and his position was too "controversial". - Another striking example, reported in the January 26, 1959 issue of Time, has to do with the "Blacklist Fadeout". Says the Time story, 1 The Oscar-awarding ritual is Hollywood's biggest pitch for dig-Inity, but two years ago dignity suffered. When one Robert Rich l^was announced as top writer for the The Brave One, he never i stepped forward. Robert Rich was a pseudonym, masking one of jabout 150 writers . . . blacklisted by the industry since 1947 as [suspected Communists or fellow travelers. The case was particularly [embarrassing because the Motion Picture Academy had barred any ICommunist or Fifth Amendment pleader from Oscar competition. Last week both the Communist rule and the mystery of Rich's [identity were suddenly rescripted. V Rich turned out to be Dalton {Johnny Got His Gun) Trumbo, rone of the original "Hollywood Ten" writers who refused to testify pt the 1947 hearings on Communism in the movie industry. Said producer Frank King, who had stoutly insisted that Robert Rich j|yas "a young guy in Spain with a beard": "We have an obligation to our stockholders to buy the best script we can. Trumbo Ibrought us The Brave One and we bought it". . . . L In effect it was the formal end of the Hollywood black list. For [barred writers, the informal end came long ago. At least 15% of cur- 20 capitalism and freedom rent Hollywood films are reportedly written by blacklist members. Said Producer King, "There are more ghosts in Hollywood than in Forest Lawn. Every company in town has used the work of blacklisted people. We're just the first to confirm what everybody knows." One may believe, as I do, that communism would destroy all of our freedoms, one may be opposed to it as firmly and as strongly as possible, and yet, at the same time, also believe that in a free society it is intolerable for a man to be prevented from making voluntary arrangements with others that are mutually attractive because he believes in or is trying to promote communism. His freedom includes his freedom to promote communism. Fre^oirr^aTIor~oT~course, 1riclude£3ie_fj££dom of "others_not_to deal with him under those circumstances. The , Hr%vg(^hlacklisTwas^n'unfre\^ that destroys freedom be-/ cause it was a coUusive arrarigement rJi^usedcoerciye means to preventjyoluntarY exchanges. It didn't work precisely because the market made it costly for people to preserve the blacklist. The commercial emphasis, the fact that people who are running enterprises have an incentive to make as much_money as they can, protected the freedom of the individuals who were blacklisted by providing them with an alternative form of employment, and by giving people an incentive to employ them. If Hollywood and the movie industry had been government enterprises or if in England it had been a question of employment by the British Broadcasting Corporation it is difficult to believe that the "Hollywood Ten" or their equivalent would have found employment. Equally, it is difficult to believe that under those circumstances, strong proponents of individualism and private enterprise—or indeed strong proponents of any view other than the status quo — would be able to get employment. Another example of the role of the market in preserving political freedom, was revealed in our experience with McCarthyism. Entirely aside from the substantive issues involved, and the merits of the charges made, what protection did individuals, and in particular government employees, have against irresponsible accusations and probings into matters that it went against their conscience to reveal? Their appeal to the Fifth Amendment Economic Freedom and Political Freedom 21 would have^£en_a_hollow mockery without jux_alt£r_native to goveniment employment. Their fundamental protection was the existence of a private--1, markeLeconomy in which they could earna living. Hereagain. the protection wasjeLabsoIute. Many~potential private employers were, rightly or wrongly, averse to hiring those pilloried. It may well be that there was far less justification for the costs imposed on many of the people involved than for the costs generally imposed on people who advocate unpopular causes. But the important point is that the costs were limited and not prohibitive, as they would have been if government employment had been the only possibility. It is of interest to note that a disproportionately large fraction of the people involved apparently went into the most competitive sectors of the economy —small business, trade, farming— where the market approaches most closely the ideal free market. No one who buys bread knows whether the wheat from which it is made was grown by a Communist or a Republican, by a constitutionalist or a Fascist, or, for that matter, by a Negro or a white. This illustrates how an irrirjerspnalmarket separates eco-ji, ftv-^J ,A nomic_aj3jymejijro^^ prqtemjrienif mm ] ^^ng^cr^^^^^^istjn^cix economic activities forrea-s°ns tliatare irrelevant to their productivity—whether these reasons are associated with their views or their color. As this example suggests, the groups in our society that have the jxiost atstake in the preservation and strengthening of competitive capitalism are those rnih^tygroups which can most easily become the object of the distxustanarenmlty of the majority—the Negroes, the Jews, the foreign-born, to mention only the most obvious. Yet, paradoxically enough, the enemies of the free market —the Socialists and Communists^haye been recruited in disproportion atejneasure from these groups. Instead of recognizing that the existence of the market has protected them from the attitudes of their fellow countrymen, they mistakenly attribute the residual discrimination to the market.--—* • -A,h Chapter II + ' The Role of Covernment in a Free Society • common objection to totalitarian societies is that they regard the end as justifying the means. Taken literally, this objection is clearly illogical. If the end does not justify the means, what does? But this easy answer does not dispose of the objection; it simply shows that the objection is not well put. To deny that the end justifies the means is indirectly to assert that the end in question is not the ultimate end, that the_ultimate end is itself the usjjj£lh£_prorjerjneans. DesirabIe~oTnot7any end that can be attained only by the use of bad means must give way to the more basic end of the use of acceptable means. To the liberal, the appropriate means are free discussion and voluntaryjco-operaMri, whlcTTn^plies that^nyjSmoE coercion is inappropriate. TheldealTs unanimity among responsible indi- Government in a Free Society 23 viduals achieved on the basis of free and full discussion. This is another way of expressing the goal of freedom emphasized in the preceding chapter. From this standpoint, the role of the market, as already noted, is that it permits unmimity^^xout^oiJorirritv; that it is~a system of effectiyely. .proportionaj_r^esentation. On the other hand, the characteristic feature of action through explicitiy political chamielsis that it tends torejuireprto enfoicg. substantial conformity. The typical issue must be decided "yes" or "no"; at most, provision can be made for a fairly limited number of alternatives. Even the use of proportional representation in its explicitly political form does not alter this conclusion. The number of separate groups that can in fact be re^resentecHsJnarrdwly| limited, enormously so by"comparison withjEej>njportional rep-' resentation of the More Important, that the final outcome generally mustbe a law applicable to all groups, rather than separate legislative enactments for «fch "party" represented, means that prop^fional representation in its political version, far from permitting unanimity without conformity, tends toward ineffectiveness and fragmentation. It thereby operates to destroy any consensus on which unanimity with conformity can rest. There are clearly some matters with respect to which effective proportional representation is impossible. I cannot get the amount of national defense I want and you, a different amount. With respect to such indivisible matters we can discuss, and argue, and vote. But having decided, we must conform. It is precisely the existence of such indivisible matters — protection of the.mdiyiduaj^ndjl^n^tion^pm coercion are clearly_the most basic — that prevents exclusive reliance on individual action through the market. IFwe are to use some of our resources for such indivisible items, we must employ political channels to reconcile differences. The use of political channels, while inevitable, tends to strain thejocial cohesion essenjiaLfar a stable_society. The strain is least if agreement for joint action need be reached only on a limited range of issues on which people in any event have common views. Every extension of the range of issues for which explicit agreement is sought strains further the delicate threads that hold capitalism and freedom 24 society together. If it goes so far as to touch an issue on which men feel deeply yet differently, it may well disrupt the society. [Fundamental differences in basic values can seldom if ever be resolved at the ballot box; ultimatťpjhjiy carTonly bejlecided^ mougVnot re5olved,~By~čônSict. ThTTeligious andcivil wars ofrlistory are a bloody testament to this judgment. , The widespread use of the market reduces the strain on the / social fabric by rendering conformity mmecessar^_w_uh respect \ to anv activities it encompasses. The wi3«3£e^anÉe^í-3ctiv^ies covered by the markl^ the fewer_^rc_th£jsMjes on_which ex-pliatlyjoMc^i^ecisjons are required and hence on which it is necessary to achieve agreement. In turn, the fewer the issues on which agreement is necessary, the greater is the likelihood of getting agreement while maintaining a free society. Unanimity is, of course, an ideal. In practice, we can afford (neither the time_ngr^he_e^ to achieve 1 complete unanimity on_every issue. We must perforce accept something less. WearejhusíedUoj£^ in one form or another as'an expedient. That majority rule is an expedient rather than itself a basic principle is clearly shown by the fact that ourjwillingness Jo resort to majority rule, and the size of the majority we require, mexnsdyííH^niori^the seriousness of thejssue involved. If the matter is of little moment and the minority has no strong feelings about being overruled, a bare plurality will suffice. On the other hand, if the minority feels strongly about the issue involved, even a bare majority will not do. Few of us would be willing to have issues of free speech, for example, decided by a bare majority. Our legal structure is full of such distinctions among kinds of issues that require different kinds of majorities. At the extreme are those issues embodied in the Constitution. These are the principles that are so important that we are willing to make minimal concessions to expediency. Something like essential consensus was achieved initially in accepting them, and we require something like essential consensus for a change in them. The self-denying ordinance to refrain from majority rule on certain kinds of issues that is embodied in our Constitution and in similar written or unwritten constitutions elsewhere, and the specific provisions in these constitutions or their equivalents pro- 25 [ Government in a Free Society hibiting coercion of individuals, are themselves to be regarded [as reached by free discussion and as reflecting essential unanimity about means. > I turn now to consider more specifically, though still in very libroad terms, what the areas are that cannot be handled through'i Ae marJar^t^alTfor can_be handled only at so gn-aTacost that] the useif_poJitical ch^nnds^^B^preferable. " GOVERNMENT AS RULE-MAKER AND UMPIRE It is important to distinguish the day-to-day activities of people from the general customary and legal framework within which these take place. The day-to-day activities are like the actions of the participants in a game when they are playing it; the framework, like the rules of the game diey play. And just as a good game requires acceptance by the players both of the rules and of the umpire to interpret and enforce them, so a good society re-:quir.esjiatjts_rrierribjxs agree on the geneiaLcondidons that will govern_ relations among them, on some means of _arbitrating differentinterpretations of these conditions^and on some device for enforcing compliance with the generally accepted rules. As |n games, so also in society, most of the general conditions are the inintended outcome of custom, accepted unthinkingly. ,At most, we consider explicidy only minor modifications in them, though lie cumulative effect of a series of minor modifications may be f drastic alteration in the character of the game or of the society. In both games and society also, no set of rules can prevail unless most participants most of the time conform to them without External sanctions; unless that is, there is a broad underlying fecial consensus. But we cannot rely on custom or on this concensus alone to interpret and to enforce the rules; we need an rtimpire. These then are the basic roles of government in a free ; society: to movjdejyneans^ rules, to ( roediat£dif|erence£^Mi^us on the meaning of the rules, and" ! I enforcecomghancew^ few ' who would otherwise not play the game. The need for government in these respects arises because ab-jjolute freedom is impossible. However attractive anarchy may teas a philosophy, it is not feasible in a world of imperfect men. f>U of j of' 26 capitalism and freedom Men's freedoms can conflict, and when they do, one man's free-dom must be limited to preserve another's — as a Supreme Court Justice once put it, "My freedom to move my fist must be limited by the proximity of your chin." The major problem in deciding the appropriate activities of government is how to resolve such conflicts among the freedoms of different individuals. In some cases, the answer is easy. There is little difficulty in attaining near unanimity to the proposition that one man's freedom to murder his neighbor must be sacrificed to preserve the freedom of the other man to live. In other cases, the answer is difficult. In the economic area, a major problem arises in respect of the conflict between freedom to combine and freedom to compete. What meaning is to be attributed to "free" as modifying "enterprise" ? In the United States, "free" has been understood to mean that anyone is free to set up ah enterprise, which means that existing_£rjj£rjjrises are not frei_toJceep out competitors except by selling a better product atthe same price orme¥ame~groduct at a lower price. In the con-tmeritaXtr2fflpn, on the other hand, the meaning has generally been that enterprises are fjgr tn An what they want, including the fixing of prices, division of markets, and the adoption of other techniques to keep out potential competitors. Perhaps the most difficult specific problem in this area arises with respect to combinations among laborers, where the problem of freedom to combine and freedom to compete is particularly acute. A still more basic economic area in which the answer is both difficult and important is the definition_of_property rights. The notion of property, as it has developed over centuries and as it is embodied in our legal codes, has become so much a part of us that we tend to take it for granted, and fail to recognize the extent to which just what constitutes property and what rights the ownership of property confers are complex social creations rather than self-evident propositions. Does my havurgtitle toJand, for example, and my freedom to_u^emy^ropixiy_asI wish, permit mcjtp_dejay to someone else the rightjojlyjwermy land in his airplane? Or does~hiF"right to i!se~m71urpIariTtaTft~preced-ence ? Or does this depend on how high he flies ? Or how much noise he makes ? Does voluntary exchange require that he pay Government in a Free Society 27 me for the privilege of flying over my land ? Or that I must pay him to refrain from flying over it ? The mere mention of royalties, copyrights, patents; shares of stock in corporations; riparian rights, and the like, may perhaps emphasize the role of generally accepted social rules in the very definition of property. It may suggest also that, in many cases, the existence of a well specified and generally accepted definition of property is far more important than just what the definition is. Another economic area that raises particularly difficult problems is the monetary system. Goyernment responsibility for the ^jm-monetary system has long been recogTuzedTlt is explicitly provided for in the constitutional provision which gives Congress the power "to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin." There is probably no other area of economic activity with respect to which government action has been so uniformly accepted. This habitual_and by now almost unthinking acceritanc^of_^ thorough un- derstandings of _the grounds for such responsibnIty~ali the more necessary, since it enhances thTTianger that the scope of government will spread from activities that are, to those that are not, appropriate in a free society, from providing a monetary framework to determining the allocation of resources among individuals. We shall discuss this problem in detail in chapter iii. In summary, the organization of economic activity through voluntary exchange presumes that we have provided, through government, for the maintenance _of_law and order to prevent coercion of onejndividual by another, the enforcement of con-tractJvHuiUariTYentered infcythe definition of the meaning of property rights, rhV^terpretation^ahd_entorcement of such rights^md^he^r^ySoiL^ra"mohetarY framework:* action through government on grounds of technical monopoly and neighborhood effects The role of government just considered is to do something that the marke^annot^do for itself, namely, to determine^arbitrate, and eruCTce~the rulesTof the gameTWelnay also want to do through~government some things that might conceivably be done through the market but that technical or similar conditions 1