AND
By DANIEL DEUDNEY
strikingfeatwe of thegrowing discussion
of environmental issues in the United
Statesis the use of language traditionalAly
associated with violence and war t.0
understand environmental problems and to
motivate action. Lester Brown, Jessica Tuchman
Mathews, Michael Rennei; and others have
proposed “redefining national security” to
encompass resource and environmental threats.
Richard Ullman and others have proposed
including natural disastersin the security definition.
Hal Harvey has put forth the concept of
“natural security,’’ and Sen. Albeit Gore, Tennessee
Democrat, recently proposed a “strateDcwiel
1%7idney is HeloLett
Teclmobogy, Society c1.tthe Ceibterfor Ewrgy
ci)id Skiclies, Pri.)zcetoii Ujiiversity,
Primetou, A loliyer vwsio?L
of this iti. Millennium:Jomnal of
International Studies (Vb2ter1990).
gic environment initiative.” Backed by some of
the country’s wealthiest foundations, numerous
conferences and researchers are addressing
issues of “environmental security.” With Congress’s
recent adoption of Senate Armed Services
Chairman Sam Nunn’s $200 million proposal
to use nlilitay facilities for environmental
monitoring and research, these ideas have
begun to shape spending ancl organizational
priorities.
Conceptual ferment in languageoften reflects
important changes in political and socialnorms.
New phrases arecoinedanclold teims areappropiiated
fornew puyoses. Great changeslikethe
emergence of capitalism,thegrowth of democrac
~ 7 ~and the end of slaveiy were accompaniedby
shifting and expanding political language. Such
experimentation in the language used to understand
and act upon environmental problems is a
natural and encouragingdevelopment.
But not all neologisms and linkages are equally
plausible or useful. Traditionally,the concept
of national security,asopposed to national interest
or well-being, has centered upon organized
violence. Obviously, security from violence is a
primal human need sinceloss of life prevents the
enjoyment of all other goocls. And various
resource factors, such as access to fuels and
ores, have contributed to state capacities to
wage war and achieve security from violence.
But before melding these “threats,”it is worth
comparingthe national pursuit of security from
violence to environmental problems and their
solutions.
War and the preparation for war pose threats
to the environment and consumeresources that
could be used to ameliorate environmental
degradation. Defoliation in Vietnam, toxic and
radioactive waste from nuclear weapons production,
the oil spillin the Persian Gulf,and the
possibility of “nuclear winter” are direct environmental
problemscaused by violenceand war.
Because of these environmental impacts, the
war system imposescostsbeyond the intentional
destruction and loss of life.’However, most
environmental degradation is not caused by
and preparation for war,and there is no guarantee
that the world would spend money saved
from military expenditures on environmental
restoration. Nor is it clear that the world cannot
afford environmental restoration without cutting
military espenditures.
Identifying environmental degradation as a
threat to national security can be useful if the
two phenomena-security from violence and
from environmental threats-are similar. Un-
a
1991 23
fortunately, they have little in common. Four
major dissimilarities deserve mention:
Environmental degradation and violence
pose very different types of threats. Both may
kill people and may reduce human well-being,
but not all threats to life and property are
threatsto secwity. Disease, aging, accidents
routinely destroy life and property. but we do
not think of them as threats to security. And
when an earthquake or huriicane causesestensive
damage, it is customary to speak of natural
disasters,but not to speak about such events as
threatening national security. If everythingthat
causes a decline in human well-being is labeled
a securitythreat, the term loses any analytical
usefulness.
The scope and source of threats to environmental
well-being and national security from
violence are very different. Nothing about the
problem of environmentaldegradation is particularly
national in character. Few environmental
threats afflict just one nation, and many altogether
ignore national borders. But it would be
misleading even to call most environmental
problems international,because perpetrators
and victims are within the same country. There
is nothing distinctively national about the causes,harms.
or solutions.
Threats to environmental well-being and
national security involve greatly differing
degrees of intention. Threats of violence are
highly intentional: organizations are mobilized,
weapons procured, and wars waged with relatively
definite aims in mind. In contrast, environmental
degradation is largely unintentional,
the side effectof many otheractivities. With the
limited exception of environmentalmodification
for military purposes, no one really sets out to
harm the environment.
Organizations that provide protection from
violence differ greatly from those engaged in
environmental protection.Citizenstypically delegate
the goal of achieving national security to
organizationsfar removed from the experience
of civil society.Military organizations are secretive,
extremely hierarchical, and centralized;
they tsypicallydeploy expensive,highly specializecl,ancl
advanced technologies. The specialized
professional group staffing them is trained to
kill ancl destroy.
Responding to environmental problems requires
opposite approaches and organizations.
Everyone is involved, because certain aspects
of vii-tually all mundane activities-house construction,
farmingtechniques, waste treatment,
factory design, land-use planning-must be
reformed. And the professional ethos of environmental
restoration is stewardship: respectful
cultivation and protection of plants. animals,
and the land. Because national security from
violence and environmental habitability have
little in common, the new fashion of linking
t.hemmay create a conceptual muddle rather
than a paradigm shift.
of
Another motive for speaking of environmental
degradation as a threat to natural security is
rhetorical: to make people respond to environmental
threats with a sense of urgency. But
before harnessing the old horse of national security
to pull the heavy new environmental wagon,
one must examine its temperament.The sentiments
associated with national security are
powerful because they relate to war. Historian
Michael Howard has observed: “Self-consciousness
asa Nation implies.by definition,a sense of
differentiation from other communities,and the
most memorable incidents in the group memoiy
usually are of conflict with, and triumph over,
other communities. It is in fact veiy difficult to
create national self-consciousness zuitliozht a
war.’’2If the emotional appeals of national security
can somehow be connected to environmen-
24 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
tal issues, then it is also possible that other, less
benign associations may be transferred.
Yet the national security mentality engenders
an enviable sense of urgency, and a corresponding
willingness to accept great personal sacrifice.
Unfortunately, these emotions may be
difficultto sustain. Crises call for resolution,and
the patience of a mobilized populace is rarely
long. A cycle of arousal and somnolence is unlikely
to establish permanent patterns of environmentally
sound behavior, and “crash” solutions
we often bad ones. For esample,the energy
crisis of the 1970sspawned such white elephants
as the proposed synfuels program, the
“energy mobilization board.” and a Byzantine
system of price controls.
Finally,the “nation”is not a concept waiting to
be dehed,but isinstead profoundly to war
and “usagainstthem”thdcing. The stronger the
nationalism, the stronger the distinctionbetween
friend and foe.
In conti-at, in the environmental sphere“we”not
“they”-are the “enemy.” Existinggroups
of opponents in world politics not match the
causal lines of environmental degradation. In
fact, intense nationalismconflictswith the globalism
that has been one of the most impoi-tant
insights of environmentalism. Thinking of the
environment as a national security problem
risks undercutting the sense of world community
and common fate that may be necessary to
solve the problem.
If pollution is seen asa threat to national security,
there is also a danger that the citizens of
one country will resent the pollution from other
countries more than the pollution created by
their fellow citizens. US. citizens, for esample,
could become much more concerned about
deforestation in Brazil than about reversing
centuriesof North Ameiican deforestation. This
could increase international tensions, make
international agreements more difficult to
achieve,and divert attention from solvinginternal
problems. Taken to an absurd extreme-as
national security threats sometimes are-seeingenvironmental
degraclation in a neighbor-
is threat
of
ing country as a national security threat could
trigger various types of intervention and
imperialism.
Instead of hlkingnational security to the environment,
environmentalists should emphasize
that global ecologicalproblemscall intoquestion
the nation-state and its privilegecl status in
world politics.Ecologicaldecay is not a threat to
national security,but it challengesthe utility of
thinking in national terms.
Integally woven into ecological awareness is
a powerful set of values and symbols. ranging
from human health and property values to beauty
and concern for future generations, which
draw upon basic human aspirations and are
powerful motivators of human action. This
"green" sensibility can make strong claim to
being the master metaphor for an emerging
post-industiial civilization. Instead of attempting
to gain leverage by appropriating "national
security" thinking. environmentalists should
continuedevelopingand dissenunatingtllisrich,
emergent world view.
Many analysts have begun calling ecological
degradation a national secuiityproblem because
they think environmental stress will cause or
exacerbate wars. If states become much more
concerned with repources and ecological decay,
particularly if they think such decay isa threat
to their security, they may well fight resource
and pollution wars. For example, Arthur Westing
has observed: "Global deficiencies and
degradation of natural resources. both renewable
and non-renewable, coupled with the
uneven distribution of these raw mateiials, can
lead to unlikely-and thus unstable-alliances,
to national rivalries, and,of course, to war."3
Few ideas seem more intuitively sound. and
many ideas about resource war are derived
from the cataclysmic world warsof the firsthalf
of the twentieth century. Influenced by geopolitical
theories that emphasized the importance
of land resources for Great Power status,Hitler
in significant measure fashioned Nazi war aims
to achieveresource autonomy.' Lachngindigenous
fuel and ninerals, and faced with a tighteningembargo
by the Western colonialpowers in
Asia, the Japanese invaded SoutheastAsia for
oil,tin, rubber.' Although the United States
had a richer resource base than the Axis
ers,fears of shortages and industrial strangulation
played a central role in U.S. strategic
thinking. During the Cold War. the presence of
natural resources in the Third World helped
stimulate East-West conflict in this vast area.'
But scenarios of resource war may be diminishing
in plausibility.The robust character of the
world trade system means that resource dependency
is no longer a major threat to a nation's
military security and politicalautonomy. During
the 1930sthe world trading system had collapsed.
driving states to pursue autarkiceconomies.
In contrast, contemporary states routinely
meet their resource needs without controlling
the teiiitory containingthe resources.?
Moreover, it is becoming more difficult for
states to esploit foreign resources through teriitoiial
conquest. It is very costlyfor any invader,
even one equipped with advanced technology.
to subdue a resisting population-as
France discovered in Indochina and Algeria,the
United Statesin Vietnam, aid the Soviet Union
in Afghanistan. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait fitsthe
older pattern but was based upon a tiuly esceptional
imbalance between power (Iraq had the
fourth-largest military force in the world) and
wealth (Kuwait had the third-largest oil reservesand
a tiny military).
In addition, the world is entering what H.E.
Goeller and Alvin M. Weinberg have called the
"age of substitutability," in which industrial
technology makes it possible to fashion viitually
everything needed from substances such as
iron,aluminum, silicon,and hydrocarbons which
are ubiquitous and plentiful. Evidence for this
trend is that prices for virtually every raw
material have been stagnant or falling for the
last several decades despite the continued
growth in world output, and despite espectations
many voiced during the 1970s that resource
scarcity would drive up commodity
piices to the benefit of Third World raw mateiial
suppliers.
Environmentalanalysts have outlined a number
of ways resource scarcity and environmental
stress may lead to violent conflict:
The most frequently mentioned
scenario is that disputes over water supplies
will become acute asrainfall and runoff patterns
are altered by atmospheric warming. Many
livers crossinteinational bounclaies, and water
is already becoming scarce in several arid
regions. But it seems less likely that conflicts
over water will lead to interstate war than that
the development of jointly owned water
resources \vi111reinforce peace. Esploitation of
water resources typically requires espensive-and
vulnerable-civil engineering systems
such as dams and pipelines. Large clams,
likenuclear power plants, are potential weapons
in the hands of an enemy?This creates a mutual
hostage situation which greatly reduces the
incentives for states to employ violence to
resolve conflicts. Furthermore, there is evidence
that the development of water resoirees
by antagonisticneighbors creates a network of
common interests.
In a second scenario,declining
26 of Atomic
living standards first cause internal turmoil.
then war. If groups at all levels of affluence protect
their standard of livingby pushing depiivation
on other groups. class war and revolutionary
upheavals could result. Faced with
these pressures, liberal democracy and free
market systemscould increasinglybe replaced
by authoritarian systemscapable of maintaining
minimum order.9If authoritarian regimes are
more war-prone because they lack democratic
control, and if revolutionary regimes are warprone
because of their ideological feivor and isolation,
then the world is likely to become more
violent. The record of previous depressionssupports
the proposition that widespread economic
stagnation and unmet economic espectations
contribute to international conflict.
Although initially compelling, this scenario
has major flaws.One is that it is arguably based
on unsound economic theory. Wealth is formed
not somuch by the availability of cheap natural
resources as by capital formation through savings
and more efficient production. Many
resource-poor countries,like Japan, are very
wealthy, while many countries with more estensive
resources are poor. Environmental constraints
require an end to economic growth
based on growing use of raw materials, but not
necessarily an end to growth in the production
of goods and services.
In addition, economicdecline does not necessaiily
produce conflict.How societiesrespond to
economic decline may largely depend upon the
rate at which such declines occur.And as people
get poorer, they may become less willing to
spend scarce resources for niilitary forces. As
Bernard Brodie observed about the modein era,
“The predisposingfactorsto military aggression
are full bellies, not empty ones.”’”The esperience
of economic depressions overthe last two
centuries may be irrelevant, because such depressions
were characterized by under-utilized
production capacity and fallingresource prices.
In the 1 9 3 0 ~ ~increased military spendingstimulated
economies, but if economic growth is
retarded by environmental constraints,military
spending will exacerbatethe problem.
A third scenariois that environmental
degradation might causewar by altering
the relative power of states; that is, newly
stronger states may be tempted to prey upon
the newly weaker ones, or weakened statesmay
attack and lock in their positions before their
power ebbs firther. But such alterations might
not lead to war as readily asthe lessonsof history
suggest, because economic power and niilitary
power are not as tightly couplecl as in the
past. The economicpower positions of Germany
and Japan have changed greatly since World
War 11,but these changeshave not been accompanied
by war or threat of war. In the contemporary
world, whole industries rise, fall, and
relocate, causing substantial i-luctuationsin the
economic well-being of regions and peoples.
without producing wars. There is no reason to
believe that changes in relative wealth and
power caused by the uneven impact of environmental
degradation would inevitably lead to
Even if environmentaldegradation were to
destroy the basic socialand economicfabric of a
country or region, the impact on international
order may not be very great. Among the first
casualties in such country would be the capacity
to wage war. The poor and wretched of the
earth may be able to deny an outside aggressor
an easy conquest, but they are themselves a
minimal threat to other states. Contemporary
offensive military operations require complex
organizationalskills,specializedindustrial products.
and surpluswealth.
In today’s world everythingis connected,but
not eveiything is tightly coupled. Severeregional
disasters may produce scarcely ripple in the
rest of the world. For example, Idi Amin drew
Uganda back into savage darkness,the Khmer
Rougemurdered an estimated two million Cambodians.
and the Saharahas advanced across the
Sahel without much perturbing the economies
War.
War is a poor
way to resolve
many of
the conflicts
that might
arise from
environmental
degradation.
and political systems of the rest of the world.
A fourth possible route from
environmental degradation to interstate conflict
and violence is pollution across interstate borders.
It is easy to imagine a situation in which
one country dumps an intolerable amount of pollution
on a neighbor, and coercive efforts to stop
the offense eventually lead to armed conflict.
But in real life such cases are rare. More typically,
activities produce harm both internallyand
outside a countiy’s border. This createscomplex
sets of winners and losers,as well as potential
internal and interstate coalitions.
Another t-ype of conflict could emerge in the
effort to preserve the globalcommons.Solutions
to global phenomena like atmospheric” i n g
and ozone depletion require collective action,
but one significant polluter might resist joining
an agreement, and the others might attempt to
force the “free rider”to cooperate. It is difficult
tojudge thisscenaiobecause we lack historical
examples. It seems doubtful. however- that
stateswould find militxy instrumentsuseful for
coercion and compliance. Any state sufficiently
industrialized to be a major contiibutor to these
problems is a poor target for military coercion.
The wrong paradigm
The case for asserting that environmental
degradation will cause institutional violence is
weak,largely because of factors having little to
do with environmental matters. Of course,
today there are some 169independent states
and environmental problems are diverse; therefore
any generalizationwill surely have important
exceptions. Although many analogies for
such conflictcan be drawn from historical esperience,
they fail to take intoaccount the ways in
which the current international system differs
from earlier ones. Because military aggression
is prohibitively costly, even large shifts in the
relat,ivepower of states are less likely to cause
war. War is a poor way to resolve many of the
conflicts that might arise from environmental
degradabion.The vitality of the international
1.Arthur H. Westing,etl.,Ewiro?anentnl Hciicrrdsof
War(Lonclon:Sage,1990).
2. Michael Howard, “War and the Nation-State,”
Dciedul.?ts(Fall 1979).
3. Arthur H. Westing, “Global Resourcesand International
Conflict:An Oveiview,” in Arthur H. Westing, ecl.,
Global Resowces aiid Coiqlict:
roi~?nentalFactors in.Strateyic Polic!/ a d -4ct.io~(New
York: Osford University Press. lfJS6).p. 1.
4. See,for example. Brooks Emeny, The Strciteyy of
Ra.wMaterials (New York: Macmillan, 1934);Norman
Rich, lVa~.41”.~ State.m d
(NewYork: W.W. Norton, 1973).
5. James Crowley, Jn.pa?r’sQTLest jiw
Secwity cr.?rd Foreiyli Polic!y, 1.930-1998
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press. 19%).
6.Alfred E. Eckes, UqiitedStutes mid the Globu1
Sb.iigy/efor (Austin. Texas: University of
Texas Press, 1979).
trading systemand complexinterdependency in
general alsomilitate against violence.The result
is a world system with considerable resilience
and %ttle room” to weather significant environmental
disruption without significant violent
conflict.
The degradation of the natural environment
upon which human well-beingdependsis a challenge
of far-reachingsignificance for societies
everywhere. But this emergingproblem has little
to do with national security from violence.
Not only do the causes and solutions to these
two problems have little in common, but the
nationalist.and militarist mindsets closelyassociated
with national security thinking directly
conflict with the core of the environmentalist
world view. Harnessing t.heirsentiments for a
“war on pollution” is unnecessary, dangerous,
and probably self-defeating. The prospects for
resource and pollution wars are not great but,
ironically,could be increased if the national security
mindset becomes as pervasive as some
environmentalistshope.
The fashionable recourse to national security
paradigms to conceptualize the environmental
problem represents a profound and disturbing
failure of imagination and politicalawareness. If
the nation-state enjoys a more prominent status
in world politicsthan its competence and accomplishments
warrant.,then it.makes little sense to
emphasizethe links between it.and the emerging
problem of global habitability.” Nationalist
sentiment and the war system have a longestablished
character that are 1ikely.todefy any
rhetorically conjured redirection toward benign
ends. The movement to preserve the habitability
of the planet for future generations must
directly challenge the tribal power of nationalism
and the chronic militarization of public discourse.
Ecologicaldegradationis not a threatto
national security:rather, environmentalism isa
threat to national security attitudes and institutions.
When environmentalists dress their programs
in the blood-soaked garments of the war
system,they betray their core values and create
confusion about the real tasks at hand.
7. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Nations Raw
Ma.tevinls. Ideoloyy uxd.Foreigx Policy (Cambridge,
Mass.: Ballinger, 1989).
S.Wilson Clark and Jake Page, E,wryy.VzLlnerubility,
W ~ T(New York: W.W. Norton, 19Slj;Amory B.
Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins, Brittle Power: E,neryg
Strategyjor Natioiinl Secio’itg (Andover,Mass.:
House, 1952).
9. See, for example, William Ophuls, Ecologg awl
Politics of Scurcit!/ (San Francisco: Freeman, 1976),
152;Susan M.Leeson, “Philosophical Implicationsof the
Ecological Crisis:The Authoiitwian Challengeto Liberalism,”
Polity. vol. 11:no. 3(Spring 1979).
10. Bernard Brodie. “The Impact. of Technological
Change on t.he International System,” in Sullivan and
Sattler,eds.. Chanye the FzLtzwe ofthe
System (N.Y.: Columbia University Press. 1972).
11.See George Modelski. Pri,iiciplescf World Politics
(New York: Free Press, 1972).
28 The Bulletin of the .4toniic Scientists