Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ccam20
Cambridge Review of International Affairs
ISSN: 0955-7571 (Print) 1474-449X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccam20
Environmental security and climate change:
analysing the discourse
Maria Julia Trombetta
To cite this article: Maria Julia Trombetta (2008) Environmental security and climate change:
analysing the discourse, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21:4, 585-602, DOI:
10.1080/09557570802452920
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570802452920
Published online: 26 Jan 2009.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 49933
View related articles
Citing articles: 42 View citing articles
Environmental security and climate change: analysing the
discourse
Maria Julia Trombetta1
Delft University of Technology
Abstract This article analyses the emerging discourse on ‘climate security’ and
investigates whether and how attempts to consider environmental problems as security
issues are transforming security practices. Attempts to broaden the security agenda have
been deemed as spreading the confrontational logic of security—which, within
international relations, is traditionally associated with the exceptional decision that
brings into existence the logic of war—into sectors from which it had been excluded. This
problematic development has been described as ‘securitization’. This article argues that
this perspective does not consider whether and how by securitizing nontraditional sectors,
alternative security logics are evoked and practices associated with securitization are
challenged and transformed. The securitization of the environment, it is argued, is
transforming existing security practices and provisions. This process is part of broader
re-articulation of the spaces in which a logic of security based on emergency and
contingency is legitimated and those in which a logic of prevention and management
prevails. It implies new roles for security actors and different means to provide security.
Introduction: setting the divide
Appeals to ‘climate security’ represent a recent and fairly successful attempt to
introduce environmental concerns into the security agenda. Despite this
momentum, the link between environmental change and security remains a
contested topic: not only are environmental problems often silenced by more
urgent threats but the very opportunity of considering the environment as a
security issue is also challenged.
Since environmental problems began to gain relevance in political discourse in
the 1970s, there have been a number of suggestions to consider their security
implications (Falk 1971; Brown 1977). However, it was only in the 1980s—with the
emergence of global environmental problems such as the depletion of
stratospheric ozone or global warming—that the debate on environmental
security gained momentum. The publication of Our common future by the World
Commission on Environment and Development (1987) marked the entry of the
phrase ‘environmental security’ into international debates; the merits of the
concept were considered on analytical and normative grounds (Soroos 1994).
1
I would like to thank the four anonymous reviewers for their comments and
suggestions.
Cambridge Review of International Affairs,
Volume 21, Number 4, December 2008
ISSN 0955-7571 print/ISSN 1474-449X online/08/040585–18 q 2008 Centre of International Studies
DOI: 10.1080/09557570802452920
Environmental security initially appeared to be a good idea, as it was ‘meant to
alarm traditional security analysts about the issues that “really” matter’ (de Wilde
2001, 2) and to increase the relevance of environmental problems in the political
agenda. Buzan emphasized that ‘[e]nvironmental security concerns the
maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support
system on which all other human enterprises depend’ (1991, 19–20). Others
welcomed the concept since it ‘plays down the values traditionally associated
with the nation-state—identity, territoriality, sovereignty—and implies a different
set of values associated with environmental change—ecology, globality, and
governance’ (Dyer 2001, 68). Yet others argued that ‘environmental security . . . is
all about solidarity’ (Thompson 1999, 137). On analytical grounds, it seemed a way
to provide a better account of new typologies of vulnerability as well as the
potential for conﬂict and violence with which these vulnerabilities could be
associated.
Opponents were quick to warn that the term ‘security’ evokes a set of
confrontational practices associated with the state and the military which should
be kept apart from the environmental debate (Deudney 1990). Concerns included
the possibilities of creating new competencies for the military—militarizing
the environment rather than greening security (Ka¨ko¨nen 1994)—or the rise of
nationalistic attitudes in order to protect the national environment (Deudney
1999, 466–468). Deudney argued that not only are practices and institutions
associated with national security inadequate to deal with environmental
problems, but security can also introduce a zero-sum rationality to the
environmental debate that can create winners and losers, and undermine the
cooperative efforts required by environmental problems. Similar objections
came from a southern perspective: environmental security was perceived as a
discourse about the security of northern countries, their access to resources
and the protection of their patterns of consumption (Shiva 1994; Dalby 1999;
Barnett 2001). Although the debate waxed and waned, the concept slowly
gained popularity. In April 2007 the security implications of climate change
were discussed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council but the state
representatives remained divided over the opportunity of considering climate
change and, more generally, environmental degradation as a security issue
(United Nations Security Council 2007).
The divide between those who oppose the use of the term environmental
security by arguing that the logic of security is ﬁxed and inﬂexible and those who
support it by suggesting that the logic of security should be changed2
distracts
attention away from the question of whether practices associated with providing
security have been transformed by environmental security discourses. In the
literature there is a debate about whether and how security language transforms
the method of dealing with an issue—the debate focuses ‘on the implications of
using security language for the deﬁnition and governance of migration and the
environment’ (Huysmans 2006, 16)—but there is little on the reverse process or
on the implications of using environmental language for the deﬁnition and
2
This is the argument of critical security studies. A similar point has been made by
Dalby and Barnett who suggested redeﬁning security and environmental security as
human security. See Dalby (1998, 2002) and Barnett (2001).
586 Maria Julia Trombetta
governance of security.3
This article is an attempt to develop the latter type of
analysis by exploring the meaning and function of environmental and climate
security. The purpose is to consider how the use of a word in different contexts
challenges and transforms the practices and meanings associated with it. It aims to
explore ‘what the practices of deﬁnition and usage do to a concept, and what the
concept in turn does to the world into which it is inscribed’ (Bartelson 2000, 182). To
undertake this analysis it is necessary to explore how different discourses about
environmental and climate security have developed and ‘conditioned the
possibility of thought and action’ (181).
The article is presented in three parts. The ﬁrst explores why the environment
has been excluded from security considerations. By adopting a perspective that is
attentive to the social construction of security issues and its implications, the
article assesses the potential of a discursive approach in transforming existing
security practices. The analysis draws on the theory of securitization elaborated
by the Copenhagen School (inter alia Buzan and Waever 1998) and integrates it
with elements borrowed from Beck’s work (inter alia 1992, 1999, 2006) on risk
society to provide a framework that accounts for transformation. It argues that the
securitization of environmental issues can reorient security logics and practices.
The second and third parts apply this framework to explore the development of
environmental security and climate security discourses respectively.
Securitization and the logic of security
The two main arguments against considering the environment as a security issue
come from Realists, and from those who warn against the problematic
implications the word security brings with it.
Realism—traditionally the mainstream approach in security (or rather strategic
studies)—adopts a narrow deﬁnition of security that has the state as referent and
takes security to be achieved through the menace or use of force. Realists tend to
consider environmental problems as belonging to the realm of ‘low’ politics rather
than an issue of ‘high’ politics, such as security. In this way, as Lacy (2005) has
outlined, realists tend to create a hierarchy of threats, distinguishing between threats
that can be legitimately included in the security agenda and those that cannot.4
Constructivists and poststructuralists have challenged the narrow realist
perspective, suggesting instead that threats are socially constructed. The most
innovative and thoughtful attempt to conceptualize the social construction of
security issues is the theory of securitization as elaborated by the Copenhagen
School, a body of research mainly associated with the work of Barry Buzan and
Ole Waever. The work of the Copenhagen School is relevant to the ongoing
3
An exception is Dalby (1998). However, Dalby focused on alternative visions of security
based on ecological principles rather than exploring the implications of a speciﬁc usage in a
particular context.
4
During the Cold War this approach was initially challenged by peace studies and the
subsequent emergence of new issues in the economic and environmental ﬁeld.
Nevertheless the intellectual space for a different understanding of security was only
opened up by the end of the Cold War. Security, the claim goes, has to be broadened not
only to include new threats such as environmental ones, but also to consider other referents
below and above the state (Rothschild 1995; Krause and Williams 1996).
Climate security 587
analysis because it considers the implications of broadening the security agenda
and deals speciﬁcally with environmental problems. Moreover it has been
inﬂuential in the political and academic debate with its warning about the risk of
framing environmental problems in security terms.
The theory of securitization argues that there are no objective threats, waiting
to be discovered. Instead, various issues can be transformed into security issues
if a political community constructs them as such through a successful speech act
that transforms the way of dealing with them. Security in this perspective is not a
value or a condition but a form of social practice. That is to say, if an issue
succeeds in being labelled as a security issue, the method of handling it will be
transformed.
The consideration of the discursive formation of security issues provides a
new perspective to analyse the environmental security discourse. First, it allows
an investigation of the political process behind the selections of threats, exploring
why some of them are considered more relevant and urgent than others. Second, it
suggests that the awareness of environmental issues can have a relevant role in
deﬁning and transforming political communities and their identities, since the
process creates new ideas about who deserves to be protected and by whom.
Finally, as Behnke (2000, 91) points out, securitization can open the space for a
‘genuinely political’ constitutive and formative struggle through which political
structures (including the practices associated with security) are contested and
re-established.
However, for the Copenhagen School, securitization has problematic
consequences. The label security brings with it a set of practices and a way of
dealing with a problem that characterizes an issue as a security issue. The word
security entails a speciﬁc logic or rationality, independent of the context or the
intentions of the speakers. Security is about survival, urgency and emergency. It
allows for exceptional measures, the breaking of otherwise binding rules and
governance by decrees rather than by democratic decisions. Moreover security
implies a ‘decisionist’ attitude which emphasizes the importance of reactive,
emergency measures. This set of practices is not necessarily codiﬁed nor can it be
identiﬁed by speciﬁc rules. Instead it is more a form of rationality, a way of
framing and dealing with an issue, or ‘a generic structure of meaning which
organizes dispositions, social relations, and politics according to a rationality of
security’ (Huysmans 2006, 24–25). This mindset, once activated, is not open to
negotiation. Although it is possible to decide whether or not to securitize an
issue—and securitization, as a social process, is determined by a political
community rather than by individuals—once an issue is securitized the logic of
security necessarily follows.
This logic is borrowed from the Schmittian understanding of the political.5
For
Carl Schmitt (1996 [1932], 37) the political is about the friend-enemy distinction
and successfully evoking security brings about that distinction. The logic of
security is the logic of war; this suggests an extreme form of antagonism and a
zero-sum understanding of security. With the codiﬁcation and institutionalization
of a national security discourse this rationality has been narrowed down to a
speciﬁc context. Attempts to broaden the security agenda result in the spreading
5
See Williams (2003) and Huysmans (1999).
588 Maria Julia Trombetta
of this rationality to other contexts from which it had been excluded (Buzan and
Waever 1998).
The Copenhagen School warns about the risk of securitization and
distinguishes between securitization—‘meaning the issue is presented as an
existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside
the normal bounds of political procedure’—and politicization—‘meaning the
issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource
allocations’ (Buzan et al 1998, 23–24). The School warns that ‘when considering
securitizing moves such as “environmental security” . . . one has to weigh the
always problematic side effects of applying a mind-set of security against the
possible advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization’ (29) and Waever’s
normative suggestion is: ‘less security, more politics!’ (Waever 1995, 56).
In the case of the environment this suggestion is problematic. It can lead to the
depoliticization and marginalization of urgent and serious issues, while leaving
the practices associated with security unchallenged. Many appeals to
environmental security have been made not only with the intent of prioritizing
issues but also with that of transforming the logic of security and the practices
associated with it.
And yet, when applied to environmental issues, the process of securitization
does not seem to be analytically accurate. The Copenhagen School, in its
empirically driven analysis of various sectors in Security: a new framework for
analysis, has identiﬁed several peculiarities in the environmental sector (Buzan
et al 1998, 71–94). Amongst these peculiarities the most noticeable is that few
appeals to environmental security have mobilized exceptional measures or
inscribed enemies in any context. The Copenhagen School has suggested that
when the environment is involved, ‘“emergency measures” are still designed and
developed in the realm of ordinary policy debates’ (83). This suggests that issues
can be politicized through an appeal to security, a problematic development for
the Copenhagen School, which argues that ‘transcending a security problem by
politicising it cannot happen through thematization in security terms, only away
from such terms’ (Waever 1995, 56). Even if the School tends to dismiss these as
failed securitizations, this seems to show that the transformation of an issue into a
security issue can follow different modalities and different logics, which eschew
the confrontational logic of the national security model suggested by the School.
Through the appeal to security, other logics, which characterize different contexts,
can be brought into existence and new actors can gain relevance in security policies.
Securitization, as de Wilde has argued, ‘triggers two debates: one about the
underlying risk assessment, one about the strategic answer to it’ (2008, 596).
Successful appeals to security require developing security policies, identifying
appropriate strategies and means to deal with the problem. These developments
are largely sector dependent and reﬂect different values, priorities and practices.
As Williams has noted, ‘[s]peech-act theory entails the possibility of argument, of
dialogue, and thereby holds out the potential for the transformation of security
perceptions both within and between states’ (2003, 523).
The emergence of new threats such as environmental problems has suggested
that reactive measures and an antagonist understanding of security are not the
best ways to deal with these issues. Instead preventive measures appear to be
more effective and new means are required. In this context, the growing
awareness of the complexity and uncertainty of contemporary threats has
Climate security 589
suggested to some scholars and policy makers the use of the concept of risk to
conceptualize contemporary security dynamics. Themes like risk management
and preventive approaches have become more relevant in security discussions.
In this context, Beck’s analysis of risk society has been used as ‘a means to
conceptualise and understand the transformation of Western security policies’
(Rasmussen 2001, 285). Beck’s analysis of risk society, which has been largely
inspired by his analysis of environmental problems and ecological catastrophes,
suggests that what he deﬁnes as ‘risk society’ is characterized by a greater number
of risks (such as those produced by more complex and dangerous technologies)
with new characteristics. Contemporary risks are unbounded and potentially
catastrophic. They may affect parts of the globe distant from the place where they
originated. For example, nuclear, chemical and genetic technologies have the
potential to bring destruction on such a large scale that no remedial action or
insurance can be appropriate to compensate for them.
The security dream of ﬁrst modernity was based on the scientiﬁc utopia of making
the unsafe consequences and dangers of decisions ever more controllable; accidents
could occur, as long as and because they were considered as compensable. (Beck
2006, 334)
In a risk society instead ‘the logic of compensation breaks down and is replaced by
the principle of precaution through prevention’ (334).
According to Beck, a risk society undermines the credibility of institutions and
practices dedicated to security provision. First, Beck suggests that it is impossible
to disentangle oneself from a web of risk. Contemporary risks affect everybody
and it is impossible to create barriers and distance oneself from them—the enemy.
For the Copenhagen School security is about the inscription of enemies and the
logic of war. On the other hand, Beck points out that ‘[t]he concept of “enemy” is
the strongest possible antithesis to the concept of security’ since ‘enemy
stereotypes empower’ as they create ‘the relationships and the behavioural logic
of attack and defence, pro and contra, which ﬁrst kill the question and then the
people’ (1997, 82). Second, Beck challenges the very possibility of having a
security logic based on evoking and governing through emergencies. Beck is
suggesting that contemporary threats are beyond insurability and ‘[m]aybe the
time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, and
not merely towards their control. Today, there are plans for all kinds of
emergencies (ecological, medical, military), but there is no politics to prevent
them’ (Agamben 2002, 24).
The ﬁrst consideration targets the antagonistic understanding of security
described by the Copenhagen School, whereas the second challenges the neoliberal
discourse of risk. This discourse relies on more sophisticated techniques to try to
insure even catastrophic risk by shifting it to the capital market. In the case of the
environment this discourse is problematic because it can also paradoxically
contribute ‘to continually generate the condition of emergent catastrophe, in order
to proﬁt from it’ (Cooper 2004, 8).
Risk society challenges the logic of violence, antagonism and war suggested by
securitization. This suggests a set of security practices—based on risk management
and on prevention—which are rather different from those suggested by the
Copenhagen School. Are appeals to security stuck in ﬁxed problematic practices
that the latter suggests? This article claims that through the securitization of
590 Maria Julia Trombetta
nontraditional sectors like the environment, different logics of security can be
brought into being. Securitization—broadly understood as the social construction
of an issue as a security issue—can be considered as a reﬂexive process that is not
only ‘rule-directed’ but also ‘rule altering’ (Beck 1997, 134). Securitization is not
about applying a ﬁxed meaning of security as exceptionality that inscribes
enemies in a context. Rather, it is ‘an always (situated and iterative) process of
generating meaning’ (Stritzel 2007, 366). By securitizing nontraditional issues, the
incongruence of a speciﬁc logic of security appears while different practices are
applied. In this framework, the construction of both threats and rules by which
security is carried out are open to a process of social construction and
transformation. The following sections explore this process, analysing the
development of environmental security and climate security discourses.
Evolving perspectives on environmental and climate security
The emergence of global environmental problems, such as global warming and
ozone depletion, resulted in one of the ﬁrst attempts to securitize the environment
on a global scale. The Brandt Report (1980) suggested that ‘few threats to peace
and survival of the human community are greater than those posed by the
prospects of cumulative and irreversible degradation of the biosphere on which
human life depends’ (quoted in Brauch 2003, 81). These new threats suggested the
need to redeﬁne the nature of security in an interdependent world facing new
challenges.
In the post-Cold War era, the environmental security discourse opened the
window for debating a common approach to security affairs. For instance, at
the United Nations General Assembly in December 1988, Gorbachev stressed:
‘The relationship between man and the environment has become menacing . . .
[t]he threat from the sky is no longer missiles but global warming’ (quoted in
Norman Myers 1993, 11). He also promoted the creation of an Ecological Security
Council.6
As a result of these appeals to security, several initiatives were launched
during the early post-Cold War era. Alarming concerns for the hole in the ozone
layer transformed the problem into a threat to human health and promoted fairly
successful agreements to deal with the issue at an international level. Concerns for
climate change not only led to the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC)7
to assess scientiﬁc, technical and socio-economic
aspects of human impact on climate change but also to the signing of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change in Rio in 1992 (United Nations 1992).
However, negotiations on climate change proved to be more problematic than
those on the ozone because acting on climate change would require the
transformation of much of the existing economic structure and way of life. Hence
climate change was marginalized in the environmental security discourse.
6
The then USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, at the 43rd
UNGA, proposed
‘a discussion on how to turn the United Nations Environment Programme into an
Environmental Council capable of taking effective decisions to ensure ecological security’
(quoted in Nico Schrijver 1989, 118).
7
The IPCC was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and by
the United Nations Environment Programme.
Climate security 591
Despite the initial momentum and the broad scope of environmental security
discourses, the debate was captured by discussions about environmentally induced
conﬂicts. This helped both to frame environmental threats in more familiar terms to
national security experts and to consider the environment as a legitimate threat. The
academic discussion was largely shaped by the work of Thomas Homer-Dixon and
a series of well-funded research projects, which aimed to study the relationships
between environmental degradation and violent conﬂicts (Homer-Dixon 1991,
1994). Although Homer-Dixon was cautious in suggesting a straightforward
connection between environmental degradation and conﬂict, his argument was
popularized by Kaplan’s article ‘The coming anarchy’ (1994), which drew a grim
picture of a future of human misery, migrations and violent conﬂict, suggesting that
the environment would be the ‘national-security issue of the early twenty-ﬁrst
century’ (58).
The debate about environmentally induced conﬂicts has since evolved.
Research suggests that conﬂicts are likely to be subnational and low intensity.
These results have been corroborated by the projects undertaken by Spillman and
Ba¨chler (Ba¨chler et al 1996; Ba¨chler 1999). These projects identiﬁed the
circumstances conﬂicts are likely to occur in and emphasized the conﬂictual
dimension of the development process, suggesting that when people face the
rapid changes and challenges imposed by the process of development conﬂicts
can follow. Violence is unlikely to occur along the fault-lines between developed
and developing countries but it tends to be localized. More pertinently, conﬂicts
were seen as part of the dynamic that draws groups together rather than a
disturbance of an otherwise stable society. This suggests that it is not possible to
simply condemn conﬂicts as such (and intervene to restore order), but more
emphasis has to be placed on the analysis of when and why different groups
decide to resort to violence, and on how to prevent these developments. These
results have largely been used by the study ‘Environment and Security in an
International Context’, launched in 1995 by the NATO Committee on the
Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) and carried out by research teams in
Germany and in the US (Lietzmann and Vest 1999). The project identiﬁed a
number of ‘syndromes’—sets of complex, pathological relationships between
environmental and other social, demographical and political factors—that might
help monitoring problematic situations and providing early warning systems for
potential conﬂicts.
Research on environmental conﬂicts has produced an intense academic debate
concerning the empirical validity of the claims, their analytical relevance,
methodology and normative implications. The argument that environmental
scarcity induces conﬂicts has been challenged by empirical research showing how
environmental degradation often provides an opportunity for cooperation (Hauge
and Ellingsen 2001) and, more recently, demonstrating that it is resource
abundance rather than scarcity that determines conﬂicts (Berdal and Malone
2000). Nevertheless this debate is more relevant for the political practices it has
determined. During the Clinton administration Homer-Dixon’s research was
used to promote a more proactive foreign policy (Harris 2001, 121–122). The EU
commission, largely inﬂuenced by the NATO project, has promoted actions
to include environmental considerations into its cooperation for development
programmes. The EU has also used environmental concerns to develop and
legitimize security capabilities and competencies at the European level.
592 Maria Julia Trombetta
These capabilities include the creation of a European satellite system for the
‘global monitoring for environment and security’ (Council of the European
Union 2000).
Even if the debate on environmental conﬂict has been criticized on normative
grounds—and some scholars have argued that the debate has represented people
in the Third World as ‘barbaric Southern Others’ (Dalby 1999; Barnett 2001, 67),
erased the responsibility of developed countries and tried to frame environmental
problems in terms of national security—this debate and the policies it has
procured have achieved two things. Firstly, this debate has legitimized new actors
and instruments to develop forms of security governance, which downplay the
role of the state and of traditional reactive responses. Secondly, it has promoted
the development of human security and of a new paradigm of preventive and
intervention measures which are often legitimized by the use of the concept.
Dufﬁeld and Waddell argued that: ‘[h]ow conﬂict has been understood in the
post-Cold War period is central to understanding the concept of “security” within
human security’ (2006, 43).8
Human security shifted the focus of security from the
state to the individual and ‘the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought
security in their daily life’ (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]
1994, 22). The ﬁrst major formulation of the concept appeared in the UNDP 1994
annual report, which identiﬁed environmental security, together with economic,
food, health, personal, community and political security as a relevant component
of human security and stressed the ‘all-encompassing’ and ‘integrative’ qualities
of the concept (24). The debate on environmental conﬂict has played a relevant
role in promoting and legitimating forms of intervention, and the development of
the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’ (Dufﬁeld and Waddell 2006, 8–10).
The environmental security debate has shown two tendencies. On one hand,
the inﬂuence of the national security discourse has emphasized the focus on
conﬂicts, transforming the threat to the environment and to the people that
depend on it into a threat to global order and stability. Other aspects, such as the
impact on health and problems related to over-consumption have been largely
ignored in the environmental security discourse. At the same time this discourse
has challenged a set of security practices, which focused on military threats and
reactive measures and outlined how military responses and preparation are
inadequate to deal with environmental issues. And yet it has contributed to
shifting the attention to different kinds of vulnerabilities, suggesting that the
instruments to provide stability require effort to promote both mitigation and
adaptation to environmental impact and change, and that the best results are
associated with early intervention and preventive measures.
This is echoed by Dufﬁeld and Waddel (2006), who have pointed out the
existence of two discourses. The ﬁrst emphasizes the importance of circulation—it
suggests that disasters or conﬂict in one region have the ability, through
population displacement to affect other regions and countries. The second focuses
on local consolidation, increasing the resilience of the local population (10). It
emphasizes the promotion of diversity and choice and supports the existence of
8
Even Barnett, who is relatively critical of the environmental conﬂict thesis, argues that
the ‘subversive message of Homer-Dixon’s work’ is that ‘environmental problems only
have a meaning for security if security is understood in human terms’ (2001, 64–65).
Climate security 593
relationships and institutions able to govern populations. This discourse reﬂects
environmental values and considerations such as diversity and resilience, which
are threatened by unsustainable development. This suggests ‘a more holistic and
ecological view of the security problem, one which sees external threats as a piece
of a larger security ecology’ (de Lint and Virta 2004, 472). This is not to deny the
relationships of power that are deployed in a process of securitization. Instead it
suggests that other forms of power—like the discursive and symbolic ones
incorporated in the environmental discourse—have played a role in determining a
less confrontational approach to security.
These two aspects—one informed by reactive, defensive measures, the other
inspired by precautionary ones—have largely been balanced in the environmental
security discourse in western countries, even if the balance depended on the
different capabilities of the actors involved in the construction of the security
discourse. The EU, for instance, has traditionally emphasized a preventive
approach over a reactive one. As a result various securitizations of environmental
issues have brought about security practices largely inspired by the practices
developed within the environmental sector to ensure safety, adaptation and
resilience. In this context the ‘emergency measures’ determined by the appeal to
environmental security have been ‘designed and developed in the realm of
ordinary policy debates’ (Buzan et al 1998, 83). Is this development going to be
implemented in the recent securitization of climate change, even if it is occurring in
the context of the war on terror, which has renewed a confrontational approach to
security? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider how the climate
security discourse has been framed.
The challenge of climate security
The debate about environmental security has been marginalized in the shadow of
the war on terror. The latter has made other threats appear more urgent and
serious than the environmental ones. However, over the last few years, concerns
over climate changes have gained momentum. Several factors have contributed to
this new development: on one hand, there has been a growing consensus on the
dimensions of the anthropogenic impact on climate; on the other hand, since the
withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto protocol, there have been several
‘securitizing moves’ aimed at promoting action to counter climate change and its
consequences, on both sides of the Atlantic.
In 2004 David King, then UK government’s chief scientiﬁc adviser, claimed
that climate change was a far more serious threat than international terrorism
(BBC News Online 2004). This was not only a European move. The same year an
internal report of the US Department of Defense on the impact of ‘an abrupt
climate change’ was leaked to the press. Drawing a comparison with paleoclimatic
events, the report forecasted a rapid climate change: after a decade of slow
warming, characterized by severe storms, typhoons and ﬂoods—bringing
destruction in coastal cities and low-lying islands—the alteration of the Gulf
Stream would plunge Northern Europe into a Siberian-like climate and transform
key areas in Africa, Asia and Australia into deserts by 2020 (Schwartz and Randall
2003). This report seemed to anticipate the destruction caused by hurricanes Rita
and Katrina, which struck the US in autumn 2005. Events that had traditionally
594 Maria Julia Trombetta
been considered as natural disasters were increasingly associated with the
growing instability of climate. Moreover they outlined how even the US was not
able to protect its own citizens and provide effective disaster relief. Movies like
The day after tomorrow and An inconvenient truth further reinforced the
representation of climate change as a threat and a security issue.
These developments followed a typical securitization move by delineating
climate change as an urgent, existential threat which demands immediate action.
When Margaret Beckett was the UK Foreign Secretary, she promoted an active
campaign to prioritize climate change in the international agenda. She was one of
the ﬁrst to employ the term ‘climate security’ (Beckett 2006). Thus Beckett
transformed the debate over climate change into a more dramatic one on climate
security, contributing to its securitization, thereby prompting several questions
about this securitization and its impact on security practices. Who or what is the
object of security in the climate security discourse? Who is supposed to provide
security and by what means? What are the implications of the process of
securitization of the climate? These questions need to be addressed to analyse the
meaning and function of climate security.
Climate security suggests a concern for the security of the climate which is
understood as the maintenance of stable climatic conditions as a prerequisite of all
human enterprises, rather than the security of the climate itself. Climate security is
evoked to secure people and societies that depend on it. As in the case of
environmental security, climate security is about ‘the maintenance of achieved
levels of civilization’ (Buzan et al 1998, 76). In this sense, as de Wilde (2008)
highlights, climate security captures a paradox because it is the contemporary
way of life that is causing environmental problems. Yet to maintain the existing
way of life, it is necessary to change many present global structures. The dilemma
then becomes one of whether the existing structures should be changed
voluntarily or whether it is preferable to wait until ‘structural change will be
enforced violently and randomly by environmental crises’ (595). The problem is
even more pressing because action on climate change requires long-term
measures: power plants that are built today would last for decades and innovation
in the transport system takes time.
This touches the core of the problem and identiﬁes two contrasting approaches
to security provisions. The ﬁrst—the reliance on emergency measures—suggests
that it is impossible to be prepared for all potential threats and it is preferable to
deal with emergencies as they occur; the second—the development of preventive
ones—warns of potential catastrophic impacts. In this sense securitization is about
moving from one position to the other. This transformation is evident in the debate
on the kind of threats that are posed by climate change and in its recent
transformation.
There are two aspects to this transformation. First, much of the debate has been
framed in terms of adaptation to climate change, on the assumption that it will be
a slow process. This is implicit in the UNFCCC which states that the objective of
the Convention is to achieve the
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such
a level should be achieved within a time frame sufﬁcient to allow ecosystems to
adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened
Climate security 595
and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. (United
Nations 1992, article 2)
This discourse assumes the relative stability of climate systems—ongoing
changes will occur in a predictable way—and relies on human ingenuity and
adaptation capability. This approach has been challenged by the possibility of
catastrophic events. That is, when a complex system reaches a tipping point, it can
have nonlinear responses, which result in runaway changes that are very difﬁcult
to bring under control again. Examples of such catastrophic events would be the
disruption of the Gulf Stream, the weakening of the monsoon systems and the
instability of continental ice sheets. The recent securitization move is based on this
dramatic reframing of the threat.
The second aspect is the shift of importance between two different and
overlapping securitizations. The ﬁrst one identiﬁes climate change as a threat. The
second considers environmental policies as a threat. The latter was evident in
the US position at the 1992 Earth Summit, when George Bush stated that ‘the
American lifestyle is not up for negotiation’ (quoted in Lerner 1998, 12). The US
subsequently withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, which was considered as a
threat to the US economy. This kind of securitization is also evident in the concern
expressed by some developing countries, which argued against the imposition of
policies aimed at forcing them to reduce their emissions since these policies can
threaten their development process. The Stern review on the economics of climate
change prepared by the economist Nicholas Stern for the British government and
published in October 2006 is an intervention in this debate and has contributed to
the securitization of climate change instead of that of environmental policy. The
Stern review focused on the economic consequences of climate change, an aspect
that has often been marginalized in the environmental security discourse, and
outlined the economic cost of postponing action. In this way the idea that
environmental measures can be a threat to economic competitiveness and growth
is turned around with a cost-beneﬁt analysis which warned that inaction on
climate change could cost the world economy between 5 and 20 per cent of global
GDP each year, whereas the cost of reducing greenhouse gas emission to avoid the
worst impact of climate change could be limited to around 1 per cent of global
GDP annually (Nicholas Stern 2006, vi). The Stern review typiﬁes the difference
between the European approach—that tends to see environmental policy as an
opportunity—and the US one—that sees it as a potential threat.
As demonstrated hitherto, the identiﬁcation of threats reveals not only the
identities, interests and values that are supposed to be protected, but also the
practices and logics associated with security. Hence, it is relevant to explore which
speciﬁc aspects are identiﬁed in the climate security discourse, in order to assess
its potential and limits in a process of transformation. The list of threats provided
by Margaret Beckett is illustrative. She focused on food security, water issues,
security of energy supply, immigration, conﬂicts and failing states, arguing that ‘a
failing climate means more failing states’ (Beckett 2006). In this way, she outlined
the complexity of climate change and the variety of people and vulnerabilities
involved, and called for a wider and deeper security discourse, which is more
attentive to human needs. This approach resonates with the human security
discourse and its associated practices. However, what has emerged as the
‘threat’—since it is represented as the root cause—in the recent development of
596 Maria Julia Trombetta
the climate security discourse is the emission of greenhouse gases, mainly carbon
dioxide. This is evident in the British statement about 2006 strategic priorities, one
of which includes ‘achieving climate security by promoting a faster transition to a
sustainable, low-carbon economy’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce 2007, 70).
A focus on emissions has the merit of involving industrialized countries and
avoiding the removal of their responsibility suggested by the discourse on
environmental conﬂicts, which focused on the global south, its inadequacy and
responsibility. Moreover, it links the discourse on climate security with that on
energy security, suggesting that the two issues are interconnected.
This focus however has two problematic implications. First it tends to reduce
the problem of sustainability to one of emissions, creating the illusion that it is
enough to simply focus on cutting emissions or switching toward nongreenhouse
gas energy, such as nuclear or bio-fuel to solve the environmental crisis. This
approach downplays the complexity of environmental problems and the impact
of the overuse of limited resources. Instead, climate change is only one aspect
of a larger human-made environmental change. As humankind pushes the
boundaries of the carrying capacity of the planet, the impact of climate change is
going to increase especially on those who live in marginal, vulnerable areas.
Reducing emissions will not solve all the other environmental problems or
increase the resilience of vulnerable population. Returning to the previous
example of hurricane Katrina: even though it has been associated with global
warming, its devastating impact was also a result of other local problems, such as
the draining of the wetlands or the extraction of groundwater; problems of levee
design and maintenance standards; the failure of emergency services which had
been focused on other security priorities. There is a trade-off between the focus on
reducing emissions and that on improving resilience and adaptability. In this
sense, the focus on emissions tends to limit the holistic perspective suggested by
environmental security.
The second implication is related to the link between climate security and
energy security. This link contains an inherent tension since energy security is
traditionally associated with national security and its logic, whereas climate
security is supposed to promote a cooperative approach to global issues.
Agreements on energy supply are generally the result of bilateral agreements
between states. The energy sector contributes a substantial portion of states’
income and policy—states gain revenues from concessions, transit fees and taxes
or are directly involved with national companies. Hence the current situation of
tight energy markets characterized by rising demand, high prices and concerns for
terrorist attacks against critical infrastructures is particularly challenging for
states, which are divided between promoting privatization and being more
involved in energy policy. Besides, there are limited multilateral institutions that
deal with energy security, resulting in the higher risks of fostering a zero-sum
mentality and an antagonistic attitude which can be problematic in dealing with
climate issues.
How can these developments be read through the lens of the framework
previously elaborated? Can this be considered as a securitization which is
transforming security practices? The renewal of the debate on climate change and
security appears as an attempt to transform it into an existential threat, requiring
urgent measures. It has mobilized political action, emergency measures and
even attempts to institutionalize the debate at an international level. So far the
Climate security 597
securitization of climate has succeeded in persuading even the reluctant Bush
administration to undertake discussion on emissions reduction. It has also
contributed to the formulation of the Bali Roadmap to set a strategy for the postKyoto
period. The UN Security Council, at the initiative of the UK, discussed the
potential impact of climate change on peace and security for the ﬁrst time ever
(UK Mission to the UN 2007). The most impressive results have been within the
EU, since it has contributed to the EU developing a common energy policy—an
issue that has previously been delayed for decades. Traditionally energy issues
have been considered a prerogative of member states and security of supply has
been considered a national security issue. The EU Commission is promoting a
nonantagonistic approach that relies on liberalization and cooperation to promote
a common energy policy and to secure energy supply and climate stability. The
impact of this strategy is evident in the reaction to the Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006.
When Russia cut the gas supply to Ukraine, due to their dispute over gas prices,
the amount of gas transiting through Ukraine and destined for European
countries fell dramatically (Jon Stern 2006). Despite the rapid solution of the crisis
it was considered a wakeup call which prompted a signiﬁcant debate on energy
security. Within NATO the point was discussed in terms of new roles for the
alliance, including the possibility of military involvement to patrol the supply
routes, suggesting an antagonistic approach (Shea 2006), but within the EU the
crisis provided an opportunity to expedite the development of a common energy
policy. The common energy policy set ambitious targets, mobilizing consensus
through the double lever of climate security and energy security. In January 2007
the Commission presented the ‘Energy and Climate package’ (Commission of the
European Communities 2007). It included a Strategic Energy Review which
focused on both internal and external aspects of EU energy policy. In March 2007,
EU leaders approved the plan, agreeing on a binding target of 20 per cent
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by the EU by 2020, compared to 1990
levels. Central to the agreement was the recognition that energy and environment
should go hand in hand. The plan committed member states to raising the
European share of renewable energy to 20 per cent, increasing energy efﬁciency,
completing the internal market for electricity and gas, and the development of a
common external energy policy. Although the focus is on the EU interest and
security, the means to achieve them are market mechanisms, promotion of liberal
order and multilateralism.
Thus far appeals to climate security have mobilized actions even if the
emergency measures have not exceeded the ordinary policy debate. Hence these
appeals can be considered as proper securitization rather than failed securitizing
moves.9
The securitization of climate change has avoided the identiﬁcation of
enemies and has involved actors other than states, both in the securitizing moves
and in the security provisions.
The other relevant aspect of climate security discourse is the securitization of
threats that are uncertain, widespread and whose impact is difﬁcult to quantify.
The appeal to security is intended to develop precautionary measures, as
9
The Copenhagen School distinguishes between a securitizing move—a discourse that
presents something as an existential threat to a referent object—and securitization—if the
audience accepts the discourse (Buzan et al 1998, 25).
598 Maria Julia Trombetta
Margaret Beckett stated: ‘I am in no doubt that today being a credible foreign
minister means being serious about climate security because the question for
foreign policy is not just about dealing with each crisis as it hits us’ (2006). She
continued that it is necessary to put ‘in place the condition for our future security
and prosperity in a crowded and interdependent world’. This is an application of
the ‘precaution through prevention’ approach to security and reﬂects Beck’s
argument on risk society (Beck 2006, 334).
The possibility of transforming into a threat something that has not yet
materialized and allowing it to bring about the practices suggested by the
Copenhagen School in the case of securitization presents a grim perspective. The
possible adoption of a precautionary approach to security issues has been
criticized on the grounds that it can justify preventive military actions, extensive
surveillance measures, the inversion of the burden of proof or actions decided on
the worst case scenario (Aradau and van Munster 2007). In the case of the
environment, it is possible that the securitization of climate change would result in
confrontational politics, with states adopting politics to protect their territory
against sea-level rising and immigration; with the Security Council adopting
resolutions to impose emission targets, and even military action against polluting
factories; and surveillance systems to monitor individual emissions. This
possibility, however, depends on taking for granted a security logic based on
enemies and extraordinary measures.
What is at stake in the climate security discourse is the possibility of
introducing mechanisms to prevent emergencies within a system that tends to
rely, on the one hand, on governing through emergencies and, on the other hand,
on insurance and compensation. The securitization of climate is an attempt to
evoke the symbolic power of an environmental discourse based on interdependence
and prevention to establish a framework for security and energy
governance at the global level. It is about renegotiating the spaces in which risk
management and market mechanisms prevail, and those in which intervention
and regulations are legitimated. Securitization remains a very political moment.
Its implications largely depend on what is securitized and what means are
employed to provide security.
Conclusion
The recognition and constitution of a problem as a threat implies the identiﬁcation
of the political community that deserves protection, the legitimization of the
means to provide security and eventually their institutionalization. Some of these
aspects are more settled and consolidated than others, as are the different logics of
security, such as the antagonistic, emergency-based one evoked by the
Copenhagen School. These developed because, within a particular context, they
were the most effective response against a speciﬁc representation of threats. This,
however, does not mean that they are not open to negotiation when challenged by
a new environment and threats.
Climate change poses threats that are largely uncertain, diffuse, difﬁcult to
quantify and yet potentially catastrophic. This reﬂects the logic of a risk society
portrayed by Beck. This article has explored how the practices associated with
security are challenged by the attempts to transform environmental crises and
Climate security 599
climate change into a security issue, and has shown how appeals to security have
emphasized the relevance of preventive, nonconfrontational measures and the
importance of other actors than states in providing security. A potentially
nonessentialist approach like securitization, which focuses on the social process
that speciﬁes threats, can be relevant in studying how various environmental
issues gain priority and mobilize social action. However, the Copenhagen School
identiﬁes the ‘securityness’ of security with a speciﬁc logic determined by the
realist tradition. In this way the School has imposed a problematic ﬁxity that tends
to essentialize an historical- and sector-speciﬁc understanding of security and the
practices legitimized by it. Even if this logic is still relevant, the analysis of
environmental security discourses and the securitization of climate change have
shown that transforming an issue like climate change into a security issue is not
about applying a ﬁxed meaning of security and the practices associated with it.
Rather, it is a reﬂexive and contextualized process that generates meanings and
practices.
References
Agamben, Giorgio (2002) ‘Security and terror’, transl Carolin Emcke, Theory and Event, 5:4, 24
Aradau, Claudia and Rens van Munster (2007) ‘Governing terrorism through risk: taking
precautions, (un)knowing the future’, European Journal of International Relations, 13:1,
89–115
Ba¨chler, Gunther (1999) Violence through environmental discrimination (Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Kluwer)
Ba¨chler, Gunther, Volker Bo¨ge, Stefan Klo¨tzli, Stephan Libiszewski and Kurt R Spillmann
(1996) Kriegsursache Umweltzersto¨rung [Environmental degradation as a cause of war]
(Zurich: Ru¨egger Verlag)
Barnett, Jon (2001) The meaning of environmental security: ecological politics and policy in the new
security era (New York: Zed Books)
Bartelson, Jens (2000) ‘Three concepts of globalization’, International Sociology, 15:2, 180–196
BBC News Online (2004) ‘Global warming “biggest threat”’ 9, January, ,http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3381425.stm. , accessed 5 May 2008
Beck, Ulrich (1992) Risk society: towards a new modernity (Newbury Park: Sage Publications)
Beck, Ulrich (1997) The reinvention of politics: rethinking modernity in the global social order
(Cambridge: Polity Press)
Beck, Ulrich (1999) World risk society (Cambridge: Polity Press)
Beck, Ulrich (2006) ‘Living in the world risk society’, Economy and Society, 35:3, 329–345
Beckett, Margaret (2006) Untitled speech on foreign policy and climate security given at the
British Embassy, Berlin, 24 October, ,http://www.britischebotschaft.de/en/news/
items/061024.htm. , accessed 5 March 2008
Behnke, Andreas (2000) ‘The message or the messenger? Reﬂections on the role of security
experts and the securitization of political issues’, Cooperation and Conﬂict, 35:1, 89–105
Berdal, Mats and David Malone (eds) (2000) Greed and grievance: economic agendas in civil
wars (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner)
Brauch, Hans (2003) ‘Security and environment linkages on the Mediterranean space’ in
Hans Brauch (ed) Security and environment in the Mediterranean: conceptualizing security
and environmental conﬂicts (Berlin: Springer), 35–143
Brown, Lester (1977) Worldwatch Paper 14: Redeﬁning national security, (Washington DC:
Worldwatch Institute)
Buzan, Barry (1991) People, states, and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the
post-Cold War era (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf)
Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever (1998) ‘Liberalism and security: the contradiction of the
liberal leviathan’, Working Paper 23, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI),
Copenhagen
600 Maria Julia Trombetta
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) Security: a new framework for analysis
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner)
Commission of the European Communities (2007) ‘An energy policy for Europe’,
COM(2007)1 ﬁnal, Brussels, 10 January
Cooper, Melinda (2004) ‘On the brink: from mutual deterrence to uncontrollable war’,
Contretemps: An Online Journal of Philosophy, 4, 2–18
Council of the European Union (2000) ‘Council resolution on a European space strategy’,
C371/02, Brussels, 16 November
Dalby, Simon (1998) ‘Ecological metaphors of security: world politics in the biosphere’,
Alternatives, 23:3, 291–320
Dalby, Simon (1999) ‘Threats from the South? Geopolitics, equity, and environmental
security’ in Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew (eds) Contested grounds: security and
conﬂict in the new environmental politics (Albany: SUNY Press), 187–219
Dalby, Simon (2002) Environmental security (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press)
De Lint, Willem and Sirpa Virta (2004) ‘Security in ambiguity’, Theoretical Criminology, 8:4,
465–489
De Wilde, Jaap (2001) ‘Environmental security’, Unpublished manuscript
De Wilde, Jaap (2008) ‘Environmental security deconstructed’ in Hans G Brauch (ed)
Globalization and environmental challenges: reconceptualizing security in the 21st
century
(Berlin: Springer), 595–602
Deudney, Daniel (1990) ‘The case against linking environmental degradation and nationalsecurity’,
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 19:3, 461–476
Deudney, Daniel (1999) ‘Environmental security: a critique’ in Daniel Deudney and Richard
Matthew (eds) Contested grounds: security and conﬂict in the new environmental politics
(Albany: SUNY Press), 187–219
Dufﬁeld, Mark and Nicholas Waddell (2006) ‘Securing humans in a dangerous world’,
International Politics, 43:1, 1–23
Dyer, Hugh (2001) ‘Theoretical aspects of environmental security’ in Eileen PetzoldBradley,
Alexander Carius and Arpa´d Vincze (eds) Responding to environmental conﬂicts:
implications for theory and practice (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer), 67–81
Falk, Richard A (1971) This endangered planet: prospects and proposals for human survival (New
York: Random House)
Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce (2007) Department report: 1 April 2006–31 March 2007
(London: Her Majesty Stationery Ofﬁce)
Harris, Paul (2001) International equity and global environmental politics: power and principles in
US foreign policy (Aldershot, United Kingdom: Ashgate)
Hauge, Wenche and Tanja Ellingsen (2001) ‘Causal pathways to conﬂict’ in Paul Diehl and
Nils Gleditsch (eds) Environmental conﬂict (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press), 36–57
Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1991) ‘On the threshold: environmental changes as causes of
conﬂict’, International Security, 16:2, 76–116
Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1994) ‘Environmental scarcities and violent conﬂict’, International
Security, 19:1, 5–40
Huysmans, Jef (1999) ‘Know your Schmitt: a godfather of truth and the spectre of Nazism’,
Review of International Studies, 25:2, 323–328
Huysmans, Jef (2006) The politics of insecurity: fear, migration and asylum in the EU (London:
Routledge)
Ka¨ko¨nen, Jyrki (ed) (1994) Green security or militarized environment (Aldershot, United
Kingdom: Dartmouth)
Kaplan, Robert (1994) ‘The coming anarchy’, Atlantic Monthly, 273:2, 44–76
Krause, Keith and Michael Williams (1996) ‘Broadening the agenda of security studies:
politics and methods’, International Studies Quarterly, 40:2, 229–254
Lacy, Mark (2005) Security and climate change: international relations and the limits of realism
(London: Routledge)
Lerner, Steve (1998) Eco-pioneers: Practical visionaries solving today’s environmental problems
(Cambridge: MIT Press)
Lietzmann, Kurt and Gary Vest (1999) ‘Environment and security in an international context’,
Report 232 (Brussels: NATO Committee on Challenges of Modern Society)
Climate security 601
Myers, Norman (1993) Ultimate security: the environmental basis of political stability (New
York: Norton)
Rasmussen, Mikkel (2001) ‘Reﬂexive security: NATO and international risk society’,
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 30:2, 285–309
Rothschild, Emma (1995) ‘What is security?’, Daedalus, 124:3, 53–98
Schmitt, Carl (1996 [1932]) The concept of the political, transl G Schwab (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press)
Schrijver, Nico (1989) ‘International organization for environmental security’, Bulletin of
Peace Proposals, 20:2, 115–122
Schwartz, Peter and Doug Randall (2003) ‘An abrupt climate change scenario and its
implications for United States national security’, Global Business Network, Emeryville,
,http://www.edf.org/documents/3566_AbruptClimateChange.pdf. , accessed
5 March 2008
Shea, Jamie (2006) ‘Energy security: NATO’s potential role’, NATO Review, 2006:3,
,http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue3/english/special1.html. , accessed
5 March 2008
Shiva, Vandana (1994) ‘Conﬂicts of global ecology: environmental activism in a period of
global reach’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 19:2, 195–207
Soroos, Marvin (1994) ‘Global change, environmental security, and the prisoner’s dilemma’,
Journal of Peace Research, 31:3, 317–332
Stern, Jon (2006) ‘The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006’, Energy Comment
(Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies)
Stern, Nicholas (2006) The Stern review on the economics of climate change (London: HM
Treasury)
Stritzel, Holger (2007) ‘Towards a theory of securitization: Copenhagen and beyond’,
European Journal of International Relations, 13:3, 357–383
Thompson, Michael (1999) ‘Security and solidarity: an anti-reductionist analysis of
environmental policy’ in Frank Fischer and Maarten A Hajer (eds) Living with nature:
environmental politics as cultural discourse (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 135–150
UK Mission to the UN (2007) ‘Energy, security and climate’, UK Concept Paper, 23 April,
,http://www.britishembassy.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename ¼ OpenMarket/
Xcelerate/ShowPage&c ¼ Page&cid ¼ 1183543073739. , accessed 5 March 2008
United Nations (1992) ‘Framework convention on climate change’, FCCC/INFORMAL/84
GE.05-62220 (E) 200705, 9 May
United Nations Development Programme (1994) Human development report 1994 (New York:
Oxford University Press)
United Nations Security Council (2007) ‘Security Council holds ﬁrst-ever debate on impact
of climate change’, SC/9000, 17 April
Waever, Ole (1995) ‘Securitization and desecuritization’ in Ronnie Lipschutz (ed) On
security (New York: Columbia University Press), 46–86
Williams, Michael (2003) ‘Words, images, enemies: securitization and international politics’,
International Studies Quarterly, 47:4, 511–531
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our common future (Oxford:
Oxford University Press)
602 Maria Julia Trombetta