CONFLICTS AND VNSA Lucie Konečná GLCb2026 Africas Contemporary Security Challenges 28/2/2024 Contemporary Conflict Trends ■1. A decrease in the number of interstate wars and an increase in the number of intrastate wars: –1981-2005 –Bakassi conflict –1989-1991 - Mauritania–Senegal Border War –1996-1997 First Congo War, 1998-2003 Second Congo War, 2000 - Six-Day War –1998-2018 - Eritrean–Ethiopian War –2008 - Djiboutian–Eritrean border conflict ■2. Internationalization of national/intrastate conflicts Contemporary Conflict Trends ■3. Engagement of foreign units that are motivated by the economic interests of their countries ■4. An increase in identity conflicts ■5. An increase in conflicts involving VNSA ■6. An increase in civilian casualties ■7. Increasing numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons ■8. Development of humanitarian activities and aid ■9. Privatization of conflicts ■10. Brutalization of conflicts ■11. Extending the duration of conflicts VNSA - General Info ■Primary, secondary, and tertiary conflict actors ■Intrastate, Interstate, and Non-state/Sub-state conflicts ■Violent Non-State Actors: ■ a) use violence to achieve their goals ■ b) are not integrated within formalized state structures ■Violence that involves violent non-state actors is often described as unconventional ■Violent non-state actors involved in a low-intensity conflict may prefer the status quo over negotiation and mediation because their power is much lower Typology of War Participants ■1. Members of the armed forces according to international law: –Combatants – members of regular or irregular armed forces –Non-combatants - not intended for combat duties (medics, clerics). –2. Civilians ■Real fighters in modern wars: a)Conventional soldiers/army b)Insurgents, guerrillas, partisans, and rebels c)Terrorists d)Mercenaries, PSC/PMC e)Foreign volunteers f)Warlords g)Child soldiers h)Paramilitary units and death squads i)Militias j) – Factors Affecting the Rise of VNSA ■Decline of bipolarity/end of Cold War and the emergence of a globalized world ■ Socioeconomic factors ■Repressive politics ■Poverty and income inequality ■Weakness of security institutions ■State collapse ■Individual explanations (rural vs. urban, age, education, socio-economic status, unemployment, socio-psychological level) VNSA Typology according to Williams ■Rebels/Insurgency ■Militia ■Paramilitary units ■Terrorist groups ■Warlords ■Criminal organizations and gangs ■Motivations and purpose ■Strength and scope ■Funding and access to resources ■Organizational structure ■Role of violence ■Relationship between VNSA and state ■Functions of VNSAs for members and supporters VNSA Typology according to Ezrow ■Insurgencies ■Warlords and Marauders ■Paramilitary units ■Terrorist Organizations ■Private security companies ■Organized crime and gangs ■Motivation ■Strategy and tactics ■Funding and access to resources ■Organizational structure ■Scope and power ■Victims ■Legitimacy and popularity VNSA Typology according to Schneckener Insurgency ■The primary raison d'être of these groups is to achieve some political goal ■Territorial control ■Strategy - irregular attacks and war of attrition ■Hierarchical structure, in recent years there has been decentralization ■A threat to the legitimacy of the state ■Four basic types: liberationist, separatist, reformist/revolutionary, and religious/traditional. Insurgency Terrorist Organizations ■A deliberate form of politically motivated violence ■Lack of territorial character ■Low threat to state legitimacy (very little public support) ■Strategy - psychological impact, shock a wide audience, attacks mainly on civilians ■Structure - currently mainly network ■Arquilla a Ronfeldt (2001) - Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy ■Zelinsky a Shubik (2008) – hierarchy, franchise, venture capital, a brand Warlordism ■Primarily economically motivated violence ■Strong territorial character ■Hierarchical structure - headed by a charismatic leader ■A threat especially to weak states ■Strategy - marauding terror, unpredictable and random violence Organized Crime and Gangs ■Economic motivation ■Often transnational ■Hierarchical and network structure ■Strategy - use of violence to achieve economic goals, attempt to avoid media attention, violence especially in times of uncertainty ■The effort to subvert the structures of the state - they do not want to completely destroy the state ■„Organized criminal groups are structured groups of three or more persons that exist for a certain period of time and whose aim is to regularly commit more serious crimes in order to obtain material benefit.“ Private Military Companies ■Economic motivation ■Territoriality is related to the type of task/contract ■Hierarchical structure ■Strategy - they do not have long-term strategies, it always depends on the contract ■Can threaten the state's monopoly on the use of violence, ineffective as a long-term solution ■Executive Outcomes, Blackwaters/Academi, Wagner Group ■United Nations Mercenary Convention 2001 (The convention extends on the Geneva Conventions Protocol I which in Article 47(1) states that a mercenary cannot be a lawful combatant or prisoner of war) ■Mercenaries: foreigner, independence – not a member of the army, economic motivation, obscure recruitment, short-term/ad hoc tasks, engaged in combat ■Military Providing Firms, Military Consulting Firms, Military Supporting Firms Wagner Group A map of Africa with marked countries where Russia's Wagner Group has been operating Wagner Group in Africa faces unknown future | The Australian Increase of Military Coups in Africa? ■Coup - an illegal and overt attempt by the military - or other civilian officials - to unseat sitting leaders. ■Cultural pluralism, soldiers’ greed and grievances, poor governance, corruption, autocracy, limited economic growth, low-income levels, increase in insecurity, and fragile democracy. ■Neocolonialism Increase of Military Coups in Africa? Map showing African countries with most coups Increase of Military Coups in Africa? Year State 2019 •2019 Gabonese coup d'état attempt •2019 Sudanese coup d'état •2019 Amhara Region coup d'état attempt (Ethiopia) 2020 •2020 Malian coup d'état •2020 Sudanese coup d'état attempt •2020–21 Central African Republic coup d'état attempt 2021 •2021 Nigerien coup d'état attempt •2021 Malian coup d'état •2021 Guinean coup d'état •2021 Chad’s covert coup •September 2021 Sudanese coup d'état attempt •October–November 2021 Sudanese coup d'état 2022 •January 2022 Burkina Faso coup d'état •2022 Guinea-Bissau coup d'état attempt •May Malian coup d'état attempt •September 2022 Burkina Faso coup d'état •December 2022 – Gambian coup d'état attempt 2023 •July – Nigerien coup d'état •August – Gabonese coup d'état •September Burkina Faso coup d’état attempt •November Sierra Leone coup attempt •November Guinea-Bissau coup d'état attempt The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) – Conflicts to watch 2024 ■v Recent war in Ethiopia Eritrean soldiers leaving parts of Ethiopia's Tigray – witnesses ... The Original Sin of Ethiopian Federalism - 50 Shades of Federalism Recent war in Ethiopia ■Primary actors: Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) (Tigray Defense Forces). ■Secondary actors: Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF), Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). ■August 2020 – postponement of parliamentary elections,TPLF own elections. ■November 3, 2020 - the beginning of the conflict. ■June 2021 - conquest of Mekele, expansion into Ahmara and Afar. ■August 2021 - involvement of OLA in the conflict. ■November 2, 2021 - state of emergency, detention camps. ■December 2021 withdrawal from Ahmara and Afar, stalemate. ■War crimes on both sides of the conflict. ■March 24, 2022 - Humanitarian ceasefire, end August 24, 2022. ■3 November 2022 – Treaty on Cessation of Hostilities (Pretoria Agreement). Thank you for your attention