The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, 1993-2000
Author(s): Oren Barak
Source: Journal of Peace Research , Nov., 2005, Vol. 42, No. 6 (Nov., 2005), pp. 719-736
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
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RESERCH
© 2005 Journal of Peace Research,
vol 42, no. 6, 2005, pp. 719-736
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi) http://jpr.sagepub.com
DOI 10.1177/0022343305057889
The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace
Process, 1993-2000*
OREN BARAK
Department of Political Science e& Department of International Relations,
Hebrew University of erusalem
The article presents a critique of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process of 1993-2000 (the Oslo Process)
by placing it in historical and theoretical perspective. It begins by showing how the Oslo Process was
inspired by the legacy of peacemaking in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which stipulated peacemaking between
states, and contends that this factor had far-reaching implications for the way the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
was analyzed and treated. It then employs insights from the expanding literature on conflict and
peace between groups, and especially from three major theoretical approaches that are referred to here
as conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict regulation, to assess the Oslo Process and explain
its failure. This is done by examining (1) the causes and nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; (2) the
methods used to establish peace; (3) the impact of peacemaking efforts on the conflict; and (4) the role
of outside players. The article contends that the peacemaking strategy adopted in this period was not
informed by the vast literature on intergroup conflicts or by the experience of other, similar cases. It concludes
by arguing that reconsidering conventional modes of peacemaking and learning from the experience
of others are the most promising paths to peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
Introduction
In mid-2003, in the wake of several failed
attempts to end the renewed cycle of violence
between Israelis and Palestinians, which had
claimed about 3,000 lives since September
2000, a US-sponsored 'Roadmap' for a
peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict was announced. Yet, despite its initiators'
efforts to distance themselves from
the peace process that had been launched on
13 September 1993, this initiative was, in
* An earlier draft of this article was presented at the research
seminar of the World Peace Foundation Program on
Intrastate Conflict at the John E Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University. I thank Yaacov BarSiman-Tov,
Piki Ish-Shalom, Erin Jenne, Arie Kacowicz,
Herbert Kelman, Brynjar Lia, Shaul Mishal, Roger Owen,
Laila Parsons, Robert Rotberg, Gabi Sheffer, Gary Sussman,
Mario Sznajder, and the editor and referees of JPR for their
useful coments. E-mail: msornb@mscc.huji.ac.il.
effect, a continuation of that process: defined
as 'performance-based', it stipulated a
gradual peace process whereby the implementation
of each step would be a condition
for launching the next; being 'goal-driven', it
prescribed a two-state solution to the conflict
(US Department of State, 2003).
Like previous attempts to resuscitate the
peace process, however, the Roadmap proved
extremely difficult to implement. Still, the
historical continuity manifested by it is significant,
and one could argue that so long as
the parties and interested outsiders do not
change their attitude towards peacemaking
in this conflict, future initiatives are l
be based on similar premises.
This marked continuity requires a r
sideration of not only the peace process that
took place in the period 1993-2000 (the
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720 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
Oslo Process), but also the legacy of peacemaking
in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which
shaped that process and subsequent initiatives
by creating expectations regarding the
nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
peacemaking and its impact, and the role of
outsiders.
But there are other reasons why a reexamination
of the Oslo Process is warranted.
Recent contributions to the study of
conflict and peace between groups place us
in a better position to understand the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its dynamics
and assess the ways it has been construed and
handled. Unlike conflicts between states,
intergroup conflicts involve non-uniform
actors that are neither sovereign nor territorially
defined (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998).
This has two major implications: first, group
leaders have neither a monopoly over the use
of force nor sufficient guarantees that their
constituencies would go along; second,
unlike states, which are protected by the
international norm that forbids their demise,
groups face the threat of 'ethnic cleansing'
and, in extreme cases, genocide. Intergroup
conflicts are, hence, highly antagonistic,
indiscriminate, and prone to anarchy: they
evoke maximalist notions of their participants'
security and identity; the difference
between combatants and civilians is constantly,
and often deliberately, blurred; and
they offer ample room for negative outbidding
by intragroup entrepreneurs.
Given their number and perilous consequences,
intergroup conflicts have elicited
growing concern. Since the early 1970s,
social scientists have criticized 'nationbuilding'
projects in the Third World, which
often induced intergroup violence (Connor,
1994; Lijphart, 1977). Social psychologists,
for their part, explored the causes of intergroup
conflicts and developed tools for
treating them (Burton, 1987; Kelman, 1991;
Lederach, 1997). From the early 1990s,
students of International Relations (IR) have
volume 42 / number 6/ november 2005
also become attuned to these conflicts and
their dynamics (Posen, 1993; Kaufmann,
1998; Fearon & Laitin, 2003).
But the rapid expansion of the field of
conflict and peace studies raises new
problems. First, the terms 'conflict' and
'peace' have become blurred, hence the pitfall
of ambiguity (Burton & Dukes, 1990).
Second, the study of these phenomena is
considerably diverse. Some have misgivings
about this pluralism (Rouhana, 1995; Kriesberg,
1996) while others praise it (Touval,
1992, 1995). A third problem, which is discussed
below, occurs when concepts and
tools used to address interstate conflicts are
employed in the realm of intergroup conflicts,
creating a certain bias that impinges on
the way these conflicts are understood and
treated.
This article presents a critique of the O
Process by examining its theoretical un
pinnings. I argue that the tools applied to
Israeli-Palestinian conflict have drawn o
the legacy of peacemaking in the Arab-Is
conflict, which was one of peacemaking
between states, despite the fact
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, essen
intergroup conflict. This bias, exh
the parties themselves and by inte
siders, chiefly the USA, was anchored in
hegemonic notions of conflict and peace that
stipulated that both were the prerogative of
sovereign states. It was also advantageous to
the parties' leaders, regardless of whether
they already possessed a state or were in
pursuit of one.
The applicability of interstate theories
peacemaking to the realm of intergroup
flicts, which raised doubts during the C
War, has been openly challenged in its a
math, especially as peaceful settlements were
reached between contending groups in
Africa, Lebanon, and Northern Ireland.
as far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflic
1 For a discussion of the Lebanese case, see Barak
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Oren Barak ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS
concerned, theories of interstate peace
remain hegemonic.
In the article, I employ relevant insights
from the vast literature on conflict and peace
to analyze the Oslo Process. More specifically,
I look into the causes and nature of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the methods used
for attaining peace; the impact of peacemaking
efforts on the conflict; and the role of
outsiders.
There are two caveats that should be
stated before proceeding further. First, my
aim is not to provide a comprehensive
account of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
but to ask how it was analyzed and treated.
This allows for a broad view of the Oslo
Process, particularly when an exhaustive
account of it is beyond our reach. Second, I
do not refer to all approaches to conflict and
peace (for a useful typology, see Ross, 2000),
but focus on those that address political
aspects.
The Legacy of Arab-Israeli
Peacemaking
Any attempt to explain the failure of the
Oslo Process must consider the legacy of
Arab-Israeli peacemaking. This is because
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has generally
been construed as one facet of the 'overall'
conflict, and this helped shape expectations
regarding the Oslo Process and subsequent
initiatives.
In November 1947, the UN decided to
divide Palestine into its two contending
communities - the Jews and the Palestinian
Arabs. The former were mostly immigrants
who had fled persecution and settled in what
they regarded as their historical homeland;
the latter were the country's indigenous residents.
But the result was the escalation of
conflict between the two groups, which had
been simmering since Jewish immigrants
first arrived in Palestine in the late 19th
century. In May 1948, after the State of Israel
was proclaimed, the neighboring Arab states
intervened, and the intergroup conflict
became an interstate war. This war ended in
1949 with the signing of Armistice Agreements
between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon,
Jordan, and Syria after UN-mediated negotiations.
The Palestinians, the majority of
whom were expelled from, or fled, the
country, were not party to these accords.
Thus, a precedent was set according to
contended issues between Arabs and Isr
are settled on a state-to-state basis. Bu
accords did not lead to peace treaties, w
would be attained, at least in part, only
three additional rounds of violence.
In 1979, a first peace treaty was sign
between Israel and Egypt under the ausp
of the USA, which endorsed the intersta
perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict an
facets (Quandt, 1977). This event was
important milestone in the overall conflict,
and its impact on subsequent peacemaking
efforts cannot be overstated (Hirschfeld,
2000: 45). About a year and a half earlier,
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat traveled to
Jerusalem, doing 'the daring, the imaginative,
the dramatic, the unprecedented, and
indeed, the inspired' (Stein, 1982:
538-539). This move, which complemented
Egypt's surprise attack on the Israeli army in
the Sinai Desert in 1973, sought to shatter
the 'psychological barrier' to peacemaking
between the two states. Yet, by traveling to
Israel and ultimately regaining every inch o
Egypt's soil, Sadat not only reinforced the
interstate perception of the Arab-Israel
conflict, but also created expectations regarding
future peacemaking efforts: while Arab
leaders would have to accept Israel, the latter
would have to return all the territories it
occupied in 1967 (Stein, 1999). Yet, there
was a notable exception to this rule: Israel
only agreed to autonomy for the Palestinians
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
A second theme that has influenced
Arab-Israeli relations is the Algerian 'model'.
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722 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
After failing to quash the Algerian revolt,
President Charles de Gaulle dramatically
reversed France's policy toward its defiant
colony, culminating in total French withdrawal
and Algerian independence. For
young Palestinian activists, the Algerian
struggle for independence was a model to be
emulated. At the same time, the belief that
only a retired army officer could overcome
the internal divisions in Israel and make
peace with the Arabs became entrenched.
Israeli-Arab peacemaking since 1979 can,
thus, be analyzed according to two general
themes: while many Israelis have been
yearning for an Arab leader - a 'Sadat' - who
would bring down the wall of enmity surrounding
them, many Arabs (and some
Israelis) have waited for an Israeli leader,
preferably with a significant military background
- a 'de Gaulle' - who would
withdraw from all the Territories. In the late
1980s and early 1990s, the Israeli-Palestinian
track seemed to live up to these expectations:
after the outbreak of the first intifada
and Jordan's disengagement from the West
Bank, the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) proclaimed the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state and its representatives
attended the Madrid Conference
as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
In 1992, after the efforts to subdue
the Territories came to naught, a retired
Israeli general, Yitzhak Rabin, became prime
minister. In the Oslo Accord of 1993, in
which Israel and the PLO formally recognized
one another, the two themes, or
models, converged: while Israel expected
Arafat and his men to quell the Territories
and normalize relations with it, PLO leaders
called upon Rabin to abide by the peace of
the brave and its stipulations. At the same
time, the historic breakthrough gave both
the PLO and Israel's Labor Party an edge
over their intragroup rivals.
Students of conflict and peace have long
appreciated Sadat's and de Gaulle's ability to
volume 42 / number 6/ november 2005
transform a protracted conflict and allow for
its successful termination (Kelman, 1985;
Kellerman & Rubin, 1988; Lustick, 1993).
Nevertheless, a closer examination suggests
that the Egyptian-Israeli peace process and
Algeria's struggle for independence afford
only limited insights into the Israeli-Palestinian
case. The conflict between Egypt and
Israel was, from the outset, an interstate
conflict. This fact was blurred because of
President Nasser's quest for regional
hegemony in the 1950s and 1960s, which
prompted him to speak in the name of panArabism,
and Israel's tendency to accept his
rhetoric at face value. But the Arab defeat in
1967 returned the conflict to its original
mode, with help from the USA, which, too,
viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict through a
statist prism.2 Turning to the French experience
in Algeria, one could argue that
although French ties to Algeria had been very
firm, this conflict was part of the process of
decolonization in the Third World. In that
period, France already had robust institutions
and a celebrated political tradition.
Like other states that waged post-colonial
wars, it witnessed periods of instability. But
its leaders could draw on traditions and
norms to legitimize their policy (Schmitt,
2004: 68-71).
Unlike the Israeli-Egyptian conflict, the
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has
never been an interstate conflict; unlike the
French-Algerian struggle, it has not only
revolved around the fate of a disputed territory,
but also evokes issues linked to the
identity, security, and economy of both
groups. What makes the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict an intergroup conflict? As argued
earlier, this conflict can be traced to the
arrival of Zionist Jews in Palestine and their
deteriorating relations with its people. In
1948, a Jewish state was established in part
of the land and its borders began to stabilize.
2 Kissinger's peacemaking strategy in the 1970s is a case in
point. See Stein (1985).
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Oren Barak ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS
But Israel's occupation of the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip in 1967, and the various steps
taken by its successive governments, caused
the boundaries between Israelis and Palestinians
to become increasingly blurred. In
time, Jewish radicals managed to acquire
veto power over the actions of the Israeli state
vis-a-vis the Territories by appealing to a
higher instance - the Jewish People - whose
interests purportedly override raison d'etat.3
The Palestinians, too, have been highly fragmentized,
and their leaders never enjoyed a
monopoly over the use of legitimate force. As
a result, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has
evoked maximalist notions of the two
groups' security and identity; violence has
never spared civilians; and dissenters in both
groups have been particularly effective
spoilers. As I show below, these basic features
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have not
changed significantly in the period
1993-2000. Nonetheless, the legacy of
Arab-Israeli peacemaking, and the interstate
bias that undergirds it, still shape the ways in
which this conflict is addressed.
One place where the interstate bias
towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is
manifested is the expanding literature on the
collapse of the Oslo Process (Pundak, 2001;
Sayigh, 2001; Beilin, 2001; Malley & Agha,
2001; Slater, 2001; Pressman, 2003).4 Most
analyses focus on the roles of the parties'
leaders, as if they were heads of state and not
leaders of groups. Pundak (2001: 73), an
Israeli scholar who participated in the negotiations
leading to the Oslo Accord,
contends:
One could argue that peace between Israelis
and Palestinians is simply impossible. Or one
could conclude that peace is possible but the
3 The following anecdote is illustrative. Daniella Weiss, a
leader of the settlers in the West Bank, was asked if she
approved of a referendum on the Territories. Weiss replied
that it must include seventy generations ofJews. When told
that this was technically impossible, she responded that a
referendum was, hence, impossible.
4 Exceptions are Shikaki (2002) and Kriesberg (2002).
two sides do not yet recognize it as the only
viable option, and are therefore not ready to
make the necessary painful concessions. But
the evidence points to a third explanation.
There was, in fact, an opportunity for pea
but it was squandered through miscalculatio
and mismanagement of the entire process.
He then recounts the failure of Israeli prim
ministers Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud
Barak and their Palestinian counterparts to
advance the peace process, culminating in
the Camp David summit in 2000 and the
outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada.
While acknowledging that other factors - the
two sides' 'insensitivity' to each other's suffering,
the incitement and propaganda by the
Palestinians, and their 'immature ... political
system' - also contribute to the violence,
Pundak (2001: 45) emphasizes the failure
the parties' leaders to seize the opportun
for peace (see also Beilin, 2001: 20).
Sayigh, a Palestinian scholar who was
involved in the peace process, presents a
mirror image of Pundak's argument. According
to Sayigh (2001: 47), it was Arafat who
lacked a clear strategy and his 'political management
has been marked by a high degree
of improvisation and short-termism'. He
asserts that 'whatever the material contribution
of successive Israeli governments to
the collapse of the Oslo framework', Arafat
is 'guilty of historic misjudgement, with
consequences for the Palestinians of potentially
historic proportions' (2001: 48). BenAmi,
an Israeli minister who attended the
summit in 2000, concurs: 'Arafat is not a
leader. He is a myth. A leader makes
decisions, which sometimes devastate his
constituency, and he sometimes must pay the
price with his own career. De Gaulle was a
leader. Arafat is not a leader who faces the
waves, but rather he is riding them'.5
5 Ma'ariv, 6 April 2001, quoted in MEMRI, 'Special
Dispatch 207', 20 April 2001 (http://www.memri.org/
sd/SP20701.html). See also Stein (2003).
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724 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
These and other views reflect the prevailing
interstate bias toward the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. This is manifested in the use
of concepts and criteria taken from the realm
of interstate conflict to analyze it. Pundak
and Sayigh underscore the failure of the
leadership on both sides to effect a breakthrough.
But they do not consider the constraints
on these leaders, namely, the fragile
consensus within their groups and their concomitantly
limited room for maneuver
(Shikaki, 2002). The missed opportunity
paradigm is also misleading because it fails to
acknowledge that peacemaking in intergroup
conflicts is an ongoing enterprise (Saunders,
1995; Kriesberg, 2001). Malley & Agha
(2001) suggest that the Camp David summit
between Barak, Arafat, and Clinton in 2000
- a recreation of the 1978 summit between
Sadat, Carter, and Begin - was untimely and
poorly handled. But they never question the
applicability of such a strategy to a conflict
that is waged between groups.
Approaches to Conflict and Peace
This part presents the tools used to analyze
the Oslo Process. In my discussion, I differentiate
between three major approaches to
conflict and peace - conflict management,
conflict resolution, and conflict regulation and
refer to their adherents as Managers,
Resolvers, and Regulators, respectively (for a
summary of these approaches, see Table I).6
Although there are, occasionally, points of
overlap between these schools (these are discussed
below), each exhibits sufficient
epistemological and practical coherence to
merit a separate treatment.
6 Frensley (1998) differentiates between 'interest-based'
and 'identity-based' approaches to conflict and peace but
does not situate them in broader historical and philosophical
perspective and leaves little room for 'entrepreneurs'
who shape their group's perception of the conflict.
volume 42 / number 6/ november 2005
Conflict Management
Proponents of this approach can be classified
into two branches. One includes theorists
and practitioners who specialize in settling
private and public disputes; the other comprises
IR students and diplomats. Yet, despite
the differences between these two subgroups,
which are elaborated below, most Managers
share the following premises: first, conflicts
occur because parties pursue incompatible
goals; second, conflicts are terminable,
provided that the parties' interests ar
filled; finally, negotiations are the best
of terminating conflicts. The work of
Managers from the first branch is rooted in
US liberalism and is inspired by theories of
rational choice (RC). Members of the second
branch, for their part, are indebted to the
realist tradition of IR, or realpolitik. RCinspired
Managers argue that the interests of
all contending parties, whether individuals
or groups, can be realized through 'principled
negotiations', which culminate in an
agreement that proves to be beneficial to all.
Since humans are rational and conflicts are
exhausting to all, there is an incentive for the
parties to arrive at a mutually satisfying
understanding that allows each of them to
attain at least some of its goals. The fact
all parties have a stake in the agreement
which preferably rests on objective points of
reference, ensures that it will be hono
Moreover, the ability of former bellige
to reach common ground helps build tr
between them, thus improving their re
and allowing for more agreements to be
attained. Conflict-ridden relations between
the parties are thus transformed into a
pattern of negotiated settlements, which culminate
in peace that is mutually satisfying
and, hence, enduring. The blueprint for
what these Managers seek is a 'good negotiated
settlement' characterized by 'fairness,
efficiency, wisdom and stability' (Susskind &
Cruikshank, 1987: 21; Fisher & Ury, 1991).
IR-oriented Managers also view negotiations
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Oren Barak ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS
Table I. Approaches to Conflict and Peace
Conflict management Conflict resolution Conflict regulation
Theoretical emphasis Interests Needs Identities
Parties Individuals, groups, Human groups Communities
states
Causes of conflict Opposing goals and Incompatible goals or Deep and overlapping
interests values, attempts for societal cleavages
mutual control,
antagonism
Participants in Formal representatives Influential individuals Elites
peacemaking
Peacemaking method Formal negotiations Informal interactive Elite accommodation
workshops
Product A good negotiated Reconciliation Political settlement
settlement
Implementation Persuasion and Influence on Vertical enforcement
enforcement policymakers
Effect on conflict Problem solved, process Final termination of Temporary
of learning and trust conflict
initiated
Role of outsiders Helpful (active or Crucial Helpful but not necessary
passive)
as the best means to end conflicts, but
emphasize the role of power and the way it
helps sustain agreements. They are also interested
in other policy-relevant aspects of
peacemaking, including preventive diplomacy
and 'mediation, peacekeeping, peacemaking,
confidence- and trust-building
measures . . . [and] unofficial so-called
"Track Two" diplomacy' (George, 2000: 15).
But these are considered secondary to negotiated
agreements between the parties
(Zartman, 2000).
Conflict Resolution
Scholars and practitioners with a background
in the behavioral sciences and retired
diplomats share the second approach to
conflict and peace. Its proponents regard it
as an alternative - or a complementary path
- to both RC and realpolitik. Drawing on
the theory of human needs, Resolvers focus
on sociopsychological aspects of relations
between communities, which are at the core
of most intergroup conflicts. They
that groups have subjective collect
including 'identity, security, recognition,
participation, dignity and justice' (Kelman,
1990: 284). Unfulfilled or clashing needs,
material and psychological, thus constitute
the underlying causes of intergroup conflicts,
and these can be resolved only when these
needs are acknowledged and addressed
(Burton, 1987, 1990; Azar et al., 1990;
Kelman, 1997a). Resolvers prescribe
informal sessions between influential
members of the groups, which take place in
a neutral setting. In these sessions, the participants
work together to formulate solutions
to their conflicts. The sessions are
characterized by 'a non-adversarial framework
for conflict resolution, an analytic
approach, a problem-solving orientation,
direct participation by the partie
in jointly shaping a solution, and
by a third party trained in the
conflict resolution' (Kelman, 1993: ix).
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726 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
Through them, the participants learn that
there is 'someone to talk to' on the other side
and 'something to talk about'; become
acquainted with the perspectives of the other
side; and acknowledge that it has the
capacity to change and that there are ways to
promote such change (Kelman, 1991: 152).
Resolvers contend that their methods
provide 'durable, long-term and self-supporting
solutions to disputes by removing
the underlying causes and establishing new,
and satisfactory, relationships between previously
antagonistic parties' (Mitchell, 1990:
150-151). Theories of postwar reconciliation
and peacebuilding also fall under this
rubric (Minow, 1998; Hayner, 2001).
Conflict Regulation
Conflict regulation theories emerged following
the disastrous consequences of several
'nation-building' projects in the Third
World. The realization that forced assimilation
may trigger intergroup conflict
prompted some scholars to reconsider the
'one nation, one state' maxim, especially in
deeply divided societies that are fragmented
along often-overlapping national, ethnic, linguistic,
and/or socio-economic cleavages.
Whether adhering to primordialist or constructivist
approaches to the formation and
endurance of communities, Regulators view
them as irreducible social categories that defy
all efforts to assimilate them. The best way
to ameliorate intergroup conflicts, while preserving
stability and democracy, is to
acknowledge the embedded pluralism of the
state (hence theories of multiculturalism)
and design mechanisms that ensure that all
societal sectors participate in decisionmaking
processes that affect their lives (hence
theories of power-sharing). Regulators
maintain that political systems in pluralist
societies should not follow the majoritarian
model of democracy, characterized by competition
between a government and an opposition.
Instead, they argue that politics must
volume 42 / number 6/ november 2005
institutionalize society's embedded pluralism.
Some prescribe power-sharing, that is,
political arrangements reached between the
leaders of all sectors, which regulate conflicts
while preserving the state's democratic character
(Lijphart, 1977; Horowitz, 1985;
Smooha & Hanf, 1992; McGarry &
O'Leary, 1993). Examples of states governed
by such formulas are Switzerland, Belgium,
Canada, and Lebanon. The Good Friday
Agreement of 1998 in Northern Ireland is
also an example of a power-sharing settlement.
Others contend, however, that
relationships between the sectors of deeply
divided societies are often characterized by
'control', namely, by 'the emergence and
maintenance of a relationship in which the
superior power of one segment is mobilized
to enforce stability by constraining the political
actions and opportunities of another
segment or segments' (Lustick, 19
Other conflict regulation mechanisms
include federations, confederations,
autonomy, 'affirmative action', and a 'representative
bureaucracy' (Esman, 1999).
Why Did the Oslo Process Collapse?
This section employs insights from the
above approaches to analyze the Oslo
Process. I discuss the causes and nature of
the conflict; the methods used for establishing
peace; the impact of peacemaking; and
the role of outsiders.
The Conflict and Its Causes
Managers argue that conflicts occur when
parties try to achieve contradictory goals.
Resolvers explain that human groups h
basic needs and that conflicts ensue whe
these are not addressed. Regulators maint
that the collective identities of communitie
overlap with other disparities, engender
deep societal cleavages that induce confli
Whereas Resolvers and Managers view conflicts
as essentially soluble, Regulators believe
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Oren Barak ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS
that they are interminable so long as the
societal cleavages remain intact. Yet, these
views are not incompatible. On a basic level,
intergroup conflicts arise out of unfulfilled
ontological needs of groups, especially
identity and security. But intergroup conflicts
are also political phenomena, and as
such presuppose two interactive processes:
first, a 'decisionmaking' process within the
group, during which its needs are debated;
second, a process of 'negotiations' between
groups over the implications that various
ways to address these needs have for them.7
The first process involves competition
between intragroup entrepreneurs, who
mobilize their kin by reformulating the
group's needs as its interests and suggesting
ways to address them, that is, by defining its
political goals; the second involves all groups
immediately affected by any group's definition
of its needs (Kelman, 1997b: 338).
Whether groups ultimately define their
interests and goals in a way that is conducive
to conflict or peace depends not only on the
outcome of these intergroup and intragroup
interactions, which are 'intimately and
necessarily integrated' (Lake & Rothchild,
1998: 9), but also on exogenous opportunities
and constraints (Barak, 2002:
636-637). The terms 'decisionmaking
process' and 'negotiations' are used with
caution, since groups are not states. The
former, while resembling decisionmaking
within states, is more fluid, given the lack of
a legitimate authority within the group
(Rothstein, 1999: 12). On the intergroup
level, too, 'negotiations' resemble interstate
trade-offs, but they are informal and produce
'joint understandings and formulations'
rather than formal agreements (Kelman,
1997b: 335). Even when one of the parties
to an intergroup conflict is equipped with a
state, the two interlinked processes do not
become state-like. First, the group that has a
7 This process is reminiscent of the two-level game discussed
by Putnam (1988).
state can be expected to mobilize its resources
against its stateless opponent. Second, given
that the interests of the group, and not of the
state, are at stake, dissenters do not feel
obliged to accept decisions by the state's
leaders.
The relationship between needs, interests,
and goals is useful for explicating several key
aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Both Jews and Palestinians are human
groups whose needs for identity and security
went unfulfilled. Two entrepreneurs, the
Zionist movement and the Palestinian
national movement, dominated each group's
'public marketplace of ideas' (Snyder &
Ballentine, 1996). Zionism transformed the
Jews' needs for identity and security into a
political interest in the establishment of a
Jewish homeland and defined the settling of
Palestine as its goal. The Palestinian national
movement also transformed its group's needs
for identity and security into a political
platform for establishing its own 'place under
the sun'. Initially calling for, and attempting
to trigger, an all-out Arab-Israeli war for the
liberation of Palestine, this movement abandoned
this strategy after 1967 and sought to
realize this goal on its own. The goals of these
two movements were, however, contradictory:
Israel failed to settle the entire territory
west of the Jordan River and subdue its
inhabitants, whose collective identity it
ignored, and the Palestinian factions could
not defeat the 'Zionist Entity'. The search for
ways to accommodate the groups' interests so
as to allow their respective needs to be
addressed culminated in the Oslo Accord of
1993.
But the agreement, while indeed moving
towards an acknowledgment of the
embedded pluralism of Palestine/I
poned the discussion of the mos
issues in the two groups' relationship to the
'final-status' negotiations. These issues were
Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees, the
Jewish settlements in the Territories, and the
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728 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
Palestinian state and its borders. Thus, all the
issues that could suggest that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict was, in effect, an
intergroup conflict became 'taboos' that
could not be addressed. The first issue,
Jerusalem, could have implied that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict was an identitybased
conflict, in addition to its being a territorial
dispute. The second issue, refugees,
was liable to evoke the conflicting narratives
of the 1948 War and the needs of the Palestinians
in the diaspora. Finally, the issues of
settlements and a Palestinian state could have
revealed the magnitude of the former and
how it effectively obstructed the latter, that
is, that the 'facts on the ground' created by
Israel in the Territories have caused both
groups to become intertwined.
According to Kriesberg (2000: 71), the
Oslo Accord 'was designed to set in motion
a multi-step peace process in which higher
levels of agreement would be reached as
parties established mutual trust at earlier
levels'.8 However, since both groups were
internally divided, the result was the
opposite. The agreement was repeatedly
challenged by intragroup entrepreneurs who
criticized their leadership's definition of the
group's needs and presented their own
interpretation of them, as well as alternative
means to address them. In Israel, the rightwing
opposition challenged the legitimacy of
the Rabin government, arguing that its
majority rested on non-Jewish MPs, and
called to preserve Jewish rule over the entire
land. In 1994, an Israeli settler massacred 29
Palestinian worshippers in Hebron in order
to derail the peace process, and, in 1995, an
Israeli extremist assassinated Prime Minister
Rabin and accomplished just that. The
Palestinian opposition, which included not
8 Hirschfeld (2000: 110, 117, 167) argues that this principle
was favorable to Israel since it did not terminate its
system of control in the Territories but, rather, enabled its
gradual replacement by a bilateral Israeli-Palestinian
system.
volume 42 / number 6/ november 2
only Islamic and leftist factions but also
members of Arafat's Fatah, also rejected the
Oslo Accord and sought to obstruct it by
launching attacks on both sides of the Green
Line.
The groups' leaderships responded to
these challenges in different ways. Israeli
leaders dismissed the opposition's criticism,
underplayed the actual price paid for peace,
and magnified its prospective benefits (e.g.
by propagating the idea of the New Middle
East). Palestinian leaders presented the agreements
as the culmination of their group's
long and heroic struggle for independe
and as a first step towards the recovery o
most sacred symbols. But these claims only
caused disillusionment within rank-and-file
members of each group, particularly as the
implementation of the agreement failed
realize their interests and, ultimately, add
their needs. The Palestinian National
Authority (PNA), while indeed representing
a first autonomous Palestinian foothold in
the Territories and having certain attributes
of a state, was nevertheless not a state,
although it was encouraged to perform as a
state. It was, as one observer has put it, 'an
archipelago of disconnected enclaves separated
by [Israeli] checkpoints . . . bent on
reminding Palestinians who's in charge'
(Shipler, 2002). Israel, for its part, established
formal relations with additional Arab
states but failed to guarantee its citizens'
security. Thus, while a commitment to the
idea of peace, however ambiguous, remained
a prerequisite for those vying for power in
both groups, the Oslo Accord itself became
a synonym for poor statesmanship.9 The
widening gap between the vision of peace
and prosperity and the grim reality of
violence and suffering, that is, between
9 Israeli campaign slogans demonstrate this point.
Netanyahu's slogans in 1996 were 'Peace with Security',
'Peres Will Divide Jerusalem', and 'Netanyahu is Good for
the Jews'. Sharon's slogan in 2001 was 'Ariel Sharon - A
Leader to Peace'.
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Oren Barak ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS
interstate perceptions of the conflict and its
intergroup manifestations, allowed the
opposition to undermine public support for
a compromise. That the most sensitive issues
in the two groups' relationship had become
taboos for the two leaderships - but not for
their rivals - made this task all the more easy.
The Peace Process
Managers prescribe negotiations between the
parties to the conflict. IR-oriented Managers
advocate bargaining, where 'each party
attempts to give up items of little value in
return for other items of assumedly equal or
greater value'. RC-inspired Managers prefer
'interest-based' negotiations, where the
'parties look beneath their positions at the
underlying interests of all involved parties,
brainstorm options to meet their mutual
interests, and then decide upon options that
are mutually advantageous' (Shapiro, 2000:
409-410). As noted earlier, the latter argue
that the peace process should produce a
'good negotiated settlement', while the
former advocate settlements sustained by the
balance of power between the parties and
third-party commitments. Either way,
reaching an agreement marks the end of the
peace process. Resolvers prescribe informal
sessions where influential members of the
parties work together to shape solutions for
their conflicts (Mitchell, 1993). Regulators
posit that the best way to reduce conflicts is
for the elites to reach a settlement. Elite
accommodation takes place in summits,
where agreements are worked out on such
mechanisms as a grand coalition, proportionality
in representation and the allocation
of positions and public funds, mutual veto
for each sector on cardinal issues, and
autonomy (Lijphart, 1977). After a settlement
is reached, the elites impose it on their
constituencies. Some Resolvers object to
negotiations between the parties and disapprove
of power-sharing (Burton, 1986:
49); but others view their work as inspiring,
and indeed facilitating, negotiations.
Kelman (1995), who has organized workshops
between Israelis and Palestinians since
the early 1970s, argues that these generated
creative ideas for solving the conflict and
cadres that were involved in the negotiations.
Drawing on their experience from Tajikistan,
Slim & Saunders (1996: 44-45) propose a
two-track peacemaking strategy that
combines unofficial dialogue and
civil society institutions. Whereas t
is a conflict resolution strategy, th
reminiscent of the Regulators' ideas.
Managers also consider ways to incorporate
methods from other approaches (Shapiro,
2000: 414; George, 2000: 15).
In the Israeli-Palestinian case, conflict
resolution methods were employed at least
two decades prior to the formal negotiations,
since the two groups did not recognize one
another and mutual interactions were illegitimate.
In these sessions, members of both
groups learned that their needs could be
addressed. This realization, which percolated
to the two leaderships, helped bring about
the Oslo Accord, demonstrating how a tracktwo
effort could lay the groundwork for
formal negotiations (Agha et al., 2003).
However, once the threshold of mutual
recognition was passed, the conflict was
approached primarily using the tool-kit of
the IR-oriented Managers. Since many
believed that the Oslo Process would culminate
in the establishment of two states, and
given the legacy of Arab-Israeli peacemaking,
the resort to these methods seemed
natural. But their near-exclusive use failed to
consider the nature of the conflict and the
sheer imbalance between the parties. It w
as if everyone assumed that a Palestinian s
had already existed, when there was only
little evidence to support such a premise.
Instead of adopting a problem-solving
approach, conflict-regulation strategies, or
even interests-based negotiations, the p
wrapped themselves in the straitjacket of
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730 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
formal negotiations, which assumed a
progressively competitive nature (Kriesberg,
2001: 389). Accords were ceremoniously
signed but their implementation was delayed
time and again. Deadlines were set and then
postponed under the pretext of 'no holy
dates'. Because the agreements were not
signed between states, each could be reopened
and renegotiated ad infinitum. The adversarial
relationship between the parties, which the
earlier meetings were eager to avoid, was thus
revived. In this atmosphere, the opponents
of the peace process in Israel could even use
the Oslo Accord itself to undermine the
peace process by treating it merely as a legal
text, not as a political compromise with the
Palestinians (Lustick, 1997: 62).
It is noteworthy that certain conflict resolution
efforts, in the form of a joint working
group on Israeli-Palestinian relations, did
tackle final-status issues after 1993, as did
other informal meetings (Rouhana & BarTal,
1998; Beilin, 2001; Agha et al., 2003).
But everyone accepted the primacy of the
formal negotiations. In any case, the declining
trust between Israelis and Palestinians
meant that these efforts could not influence
policymaking or transform public views. In
2000, Israeli MP Yossi Katz, who participated
in the informal sessions, was condemned
for suggesting that Israel accept part
of the responsibility for the Palestinians'
plight in 1948 and absorb 100,000 refugees.
Conflict regulation methods were never considered.
After all, they suggested that a
solution to the conflict might not correspond
to the legacy of Arab-Israeli peacemaking, a
premise that neither side was prepared to
accept.
The Impact of the Peace Process
IR-oriented Managers argue that the peace
process ends when an agreement is signed
and implemented. However, RC-inspired
Managers maintain that negotiated settlements
have positive long-term effects on the
volume 42 / number 6/1 november 2005
parties' relationship, since they prove that
they are capable of reaching an understanding
that allows each to attain at least som
its goals. A process of learning and trus
building is thus initiated, and a pattern
cooperation replaces one that has been ch
acterized by conflict. Resolvers different
between conflicts that are 'settled', either
coercion or compromise, and conflicts that
are 'resolved'. Only in the latter case ca
conflict 'be regarded as having been concluded
... in such a way as to prevent a
resurrection of the underlying issues in contention
and a recurrence of the conflict
behavior between the adversaries' (
1990: 150). Agreements in intergro
flicts thus mark the beginning of a
in their relations and are neither t
their relationship nor an end in th
This view entails long-term facilitation
between the parties. Regulators posit that
elite accommodation allays frictions and
allows for peaceful coexistence. Yet, arrangements
reached in this manner require maintenance
and can be replaced only when the
societal cleavages are significantly reduced.
While concurring that a peace process is a
broad and ongoing enterprise, Resolvers and
Regulators differ with respect to its outcome,
since they hold different positions on the
solubility of conflicts. RC-inspired Managers
are, in this regard, closer to the Resolvers
than to Managers of the IR type, since they
view an agreement as a springboard for
further understandings.
In the Israeli-Palestinian case, there
emerged a discrepancy between the transformation
of some members of groups' elites
and the lack of change as far as other members
were concerned. The process that led to the
Oslo Accord, like the informal workshops
that preceded it, transformed the attitudes of
certain elite members on both sides but failed
to persuade others. Equally unsuccessful was
the attempt to win the support of the general
public, which continued to perceive the other
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Oren Barak ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS
side as its enemy and view the conflict as a
zero-sum game. Wolfsfeld (2001: 31) argues
that only 51-55% of Israel's legislature and
32-44% of its public supported the Oslo
Process, compared to 75% and 56-73%,
respectively, in Northern Ireland.
Whatever limited projects were launched
to transform public attitudes fell short of
overcoming the efforts of the opponents of
the Oslo Process to 'unmask the other side's
true face' and highlight its 'breaches' of the
agreement in the name of 'reciprocity'. These
efforts, which resonated in each group's marketplace
of ideas, reaffirmed its members'
belief-system, thus preventing the progress of
their transformation. Reconciliation, in
other words, was not achieved (Kriesberg,
2002: 560). Change was difficult, not least
because the leaders of both sides often presented
the Oslo Process as a means of getting
rid of the burdensome presence of the other,
making only little effort to extrapolate the
relationship between Israelis and Palestinians
in the wake of a political settlement.10 While
Palestinian leaders called for a 'peace of the
brave' - that is, total Israeli withdrawal without
specifying what would happen later,
their Israeli counterparts demanded concrete
steps towards 'normalization', such as
omission of anti-Israeli phrases from Palestinian
textbooks, without making any commitment
on the issues of Palestinian
statehood.
In any case, the trajectory of Israeli-Palestinian
relations in this period in fact moved
away from a statist outcome to the conflict.
By 1993, the Palestinians were already
dependent on Israel, which controlled all
their land and water resources, and basic
services such as water, electricity, and telephones
were provided by Israeli firms. The
Green Line separating Israel from the Territories
had become even more blurred owing
10 One of Prime Minister Barak's slogans was 'We [will be]
here, they [will be] there'. Jewish proponents of expulsion
of Palestinians later adopted this slogan.
to the incessant construction of Israeli s
ments and military bases and the pavin
roads. As mentioned earlier, the Oslo Ac
addressed this problem by differentiat
between issues that were to be reso
during the 'interim period' and 'final-st
issues that were postponed. But this dif
entiation, which matched the interstate
model of peacemaking, ultimately accentuated
the intergroup nature of the conf
since both sides used the interim perio
affect the long-term issues. Figures
early 2001 indicated a 52.49% growth in
housing in Israeli settlements in the Territories
since September 1993, and 72%
growth in the number of settlers - from
115,700 to 203,000 (Americans for Peace
Now, 2001). But on the Palestinian side, too,
there were those who defied the Green Line
by launching attacks within Israel proper. At
any rate, Palestinian economic dependence
on Israel was reinforced after 1993 (Farsakh,
2001; Selby, 2003). Thus, while the parties
were ostensibly moving towards a 'two-state
solution' to the conflict, the two groups were,
in fact, becoming inseparable.
It is against this backdrop that Prime
Minister Barak's attempt to 'end the conflict',
which reached its pinnacle at the Camp
David summit in July 2000, must be considered.
Notwithstanding the lack of trust
between Palestinians and Israelis (in January,
about 75% of the Palestinians in the territories
doubted whether the Israeli prime
minister would agree to a settlement that
would meet their aspirations; Sahliyeh &
Deng, 2003: 706), Barak sought to untangle
their complex relationship in one stroke. The
idea of holding one summit where all issues
would be settled attested to an overly rigid
approach to peacemaking, as did the attempt
to present the other side with 'take it or leave
it' offers. Barak failed to grasp the nature of
the conflict, did not differentiate between
settling and resolving it, and overlooked its
negative dynamics, thus pushing it toward
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732 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
confrontation. Instead of attempting to solve
the conflict prudently, all issues were to be
decided swiftly and permanently. The results
were calamitous.
The Role of Outsiders
Managers argue that a third party can assist
in peacemaking. Because the parties are
immersed in the conflict, they lack perspective,
and their leaders cannot identify the
interests of the other side or their own true
interests. When the parties cannot communicate,
mediators and envoys can go
between them, enabling them to exchange
views and perceptions. When formal negotiations
are launched, outside actors can assist
the parties in reaching an agreement by
offering incentives or guarantees, or pressure
them to do so. Objective criteria, such as
United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
resolutions, can serve as points of reference
for such endeavors. To Resolvers, third-party
intervention is crucial. If the parties do not
recognize one another, they can meet
together only with outside help, and the
informal sessions allow them to find solutions
to their problems with the Resolvers'
facilitation. Regulators do not consider
outside involvement a prerequisite for
successful peacemaking, since it is the parties
themselves that must find ways of accommodation,
neither do they put high value on
objective criteria (Regulators may even prefer
subjective criteria, i.e. whatever is agreed
upon by the parties). Yet, they do suggest
that outsiders can help reach a compromise
and that a peaceful environment is conducive
to elite accommodation. The three
approaches seem to concur that if the parties
do not recognize one another, then a third
party can help by providing them with an
appropriate setting and a suitable mechanism
for exchanging views. But when mutual
recognition is no longer an obstacle and the
parties are able to meet in an unfettered
manner, the role of a third party becomes
volume 42 / number 6/ november 2005
controversial. Outside actors can assist the
parties by providing them with information
and insights. But they can become an
obstacle to peace if they use coercion, allow
the parties to manipulate them, or compromise
their impartiality. As the parties att
to sort out their differences, a third party
be a hindrance by allowing its own inter
to affect the peace process or imposing its
perspective on it.
Informal workshops between Israelis and
Palestinians helped launch the Oslo Process,
as did the Norwegian back channel that led
to the Oslo Accord. UNSC resolutions also
served as an objective point of reference,
although each party highlighted re
that buttressed its positions while i
others. However, the role of outside actors
since Israel and the PLO formally recognized
one another has been problematic. Instead of
informing the two sides about their situation
and suggesting how their difficulties could be
overcome, third-party actors, and especially
the USA, have become embroiled in the
peace process, allowing the parties to use,
and often abuse, their involvement. An
illuminating example is, again, the Camp
David summit in 2000. During its course,
Arafat and Barak held no substantive
meetings, and bargaining occurred primarily
between each leader and the mediator. This
strategy was ill-suited to an intergroup
conflict, especially when there was little trust
left between the parties. President Clinton's
decision to ignore his earlier commitment
and blame the Palestinian side for the
summit's failure only undermined the role of
the USA as an honest broker (Malley &
Agha, 2001; Hanieh, 2001). Like the parties,
third-party actors perceived the conflict and
the attempts to solve it in interstate terms
although they were well aware of the imbalanced
relationship between the parties and
the steps taken during the interim period
This may have been the case because the
parties themselves were locked in this
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Oren Barak ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS
perception, and the mediator simply 'went
along'. But the traditional preference of US
policymakers for a statist outcome to the
conflict was also influential. Already, in the
early 1970s, noted Managers had urged the
Palestinians to acquire state-like attributes
(Fisher, 1972).
The role of the regional system in the
Middle East was ambivalent. Unlike the case
of Northern Ireland, where Britain and
Ireland acted in concert to promote intergroup
accommodation (Cullen, 2001), some
of the region's states had reservations regarding
the Oslo Process, mainly because of their
apprehensions of Israeli hegemony. While
some, like Egypt, supported the peace
process and engaged in mediation between
the parties, others, like Syria and Iran,
rejected it and backed its opponents.
Conclusion
In February 2004, the International Court of
Justice at The Hague began discussing the
massive 644-km barrier built by Israel in and
around the Territories. Claiming that the
barrier was designed to prevent terrorist
attacks against its citizens, Israeli leaders boycotted
the hearings and instead encouraged
public rallies and demonstrations outside the
court. The symbolism of these actions was
telling: despite the fact that the state planned
and built the 'Separation Fence', it was the
group that was entrusted with defending it.
One could argue that this was merely a
tactical choice on the part of Israel's leaders:
having surmised that the court would rule
against them anyway, they decided to shift
their efforts to the realm of public opinion.
Yet, an alternative explanation is that since
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, essentially,
an intergroup conflict, the group, and not
the state, was to make its case before the
world.
This article has thrown light on the failure
of the Oslo Process by showing how an intergroup
conflict between Israelis and
ans was construed and treated as an i
conflict and how this way of fram
conflict ultimately impinged on th
to ameliorate it. This perception, fo
had drawn on the legacy of Arab-Israeli
peacemaking and on hegemonic notions of
conflict and peace. This convergence of
history and theory had produced an interstate
bias towards the conflict, which ultimately
hindered its successful treatment.
In view of the legacy of Arab-Israeli
peacemaking and hegemonic perceptions of
conflict and peace, formal negotiations were
perceived as the only way to solve the
conflict. Realizing the potential
framing the conflict in this way,
of both parties embraced it: for t
negotiations were means to gain
and international legitimacy; for Israeli
leaders, an attempt to settle the conflict
reflected positively on their country's
standing internationally, and, at the same
time, pulled the rug out from under their
political opponents.
But the Oslo Process failed to delive
Palestinians came nowhere near an independent
state, and various factions within this
group challenged Arafat's position. Israel's
hope that Arafat and his lieutenants would
impose law and order in the Territories,
without the normative constraints imposed
on its own security forces, were also left
unfulfilled, and the Labor Party was defeated
in three out of four elections (1996, 2001,
2003). Their inability to gain tangible results
through negotiations eventually prompted
the Palestinians, the weaker party, to resort
to violence, perhaps to induce the Algerian
model, and 'the violence of the other side justified
each side's escalation of violence to
defeat the other' (Kriesberg, 2002: 56
What can be done to ameliorate the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict after peacemaking
has failed and violence has escalated with
renewed fervor? Since radical solutions, such
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734 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
as assimilation or expulsion, are unthinkable,
both groups will have to sort out their mutual
problems. But, as the failure of the Oslo
Process suggests, they must do so freely,
without being constrained by past legacies
and peacemaking strategies that are incongruent
with the complex and manifold nature
of their relationship. Reconsidering 'conventional'
modes of peacemaking and learning
from the experience of others seem to be the
most promising paths that they can pursue.
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OREN BARAK, b. 1970, PhD in Islamic and
Middle Eastern Studies (Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, 2000); Assistant Professor, Departments
of Political Science and International
Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
(2002-). Research interests: state, society, and
the military in non-Western regions; ethnic
and national relations. Publications in History
and Memory, International Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies, and the Middle East Journal
(forthcoming).
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