Atlantic Council
When the Friend of My Friends Is Not My Friend: The United States, US Allies, and
Russia In the Middle East
Author(s): MARK N. KATZ
Atlantic Council (2019)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep20702
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During the Cold War, the Soviet Union posed a challenge to the United
States throughout the entire world, including in the Middle East.
Soviet activity in the Middle East, though, was also a challenge for many
US allies in the region, and beyond. Soviet influence in the Middle East
expanded during the 1950s and 1960s, in particular, as many in the Arab
world became angry about US support for Israel, and as several pro-Western
Arab governments were overthrown and replaced by anti-Western
ones that actively sought Soviet support. Due to several factors, however,
many of the gains made by the Soviets in the Middle East ended up being
lost. These included: the defection of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s successor in
Egypt, Anwar Sadat, from the Soviet to the US camp; Washington’s successful
1970s-era diplomacy in bringing about an Israeli-Egyptian peace
agreement; genuine fear of the Soviet threat on the part of Saudi Arabia
and other Arab monarchies; the 1979 Iranian Revolution, in which the
downfall of a pro-Western regime did not lead to the rise of a pro-Soviet
one, but to the rise of one that was both anti-American and anti-Soviet;
and, finally, the collapse of both communism and the Soviet Union itself
from 1989 to 1991.1
After the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the USSR, Moscow
played a much less active role in the Middle East. It did not seem to pose
a significant challenge there for either the United States or its allies during
the last decade of the twentieth century and the first decade of the
twenty-first. In the 1990s, certain Russian officials—most notably, Yevgeny
Primakov, the Soviet Middle East specialist who served successively
1	 On Soviet foreign policy toward the Middle East during the Cold War, see Robert
O. Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of
Afghanistan (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Yevgeny Primakov,
Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the
Present, Paul Gould, trans. (New York: Basic Books, 2009).
When the Friend
of My Friends
Is Not My Friend
The United States, US Allies, and Russia
In the Middle East
ISSUE BRIEF
The Scowcroft Center
for Strategy and Security
brings together top
policymakers, government
and military officials, business
leaders, and experts from
Europe and North America
to share insights, strengthen
cooperation, and develop
common approaches to
key transatlantic security
challenges.
MAY 2019 MARK N. KATZ
INTRODUCTION
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2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
ISSUE BRIEF When the friend of my friends is not my friend
as Boris Yeltsin’s intelligence chief, foreign minister, and
then prime minister—made clear that Moscow sought
to regain the influence that it had lost in the Middle
East.2
It would not be until the 2010s, though, that Russia
became dramatically more active and influential in
the Middle East, especially as a result of Moscow’s intervention
alongside Iran, Hezbollah, and other Shia militias
in support of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria.
The image of Russia becoming more active and influential
in the Middle East has been magnified by the partial
US disengagement from the region that has occurred
during both the Barack Obama and Donald Trump administrations,
through the withdrawal of US forces from
Iraq—albeit, this was followed by their partial reintroduction
for the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS)—the drawdown of US forces from
Afghanistan, and the limited US willingness to become
militarily involved in Syria. Indeed, part of the reason
why Washington has been deemphasizing the Middle
East and the war on terrorism is that great powers
elsewhere—namely China and Russia—have become a
greater concern. But, as the United States has become
more concerned about the security implications of Russian
activity in general, it stands to reason that it should
also be concerned about Russian activity in the Middle
East. In addition, Washington remains concerned
about many of the same interests in the region that it
has had since the Cold War era: access to the region’s
energy resources; the freedom of navigation in the region
needed for the export of energy, and as a key link
between Europe and Asia; and the security of Israel
(which remains an important priority for US domestic
politics) and other allies in the region.
What makes the US response to Russian activity in
the Middle East especially challenging now, though, is
that—unlike during the Cold War—US allies in the region
all have good relations with Russia, despite the
concerns that many of them also have about Russian
activity in Syria and/or Russia’s close relations with Iran.
In addition, some US allies outside the region are more
worried about what Russia is doing closer to them than
in the Middle East, while others do not see Moscow as
much of a threat to them anywhere.
2	 Talal Nizameddin, Russia and the Middle East: Towards a New Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 99–103.
3	 Mark N. Katz, “Saudi-Russian Relations in the Putin Era,” Middle East Journal (2001), 612–617.
For Washington to deal effectively with whatever challenges
Russia poses for the United States in the Middle
East, it is necessary for US foreign policymakers to understand
how other governments—both inside and outside
the region—view Russia’s role in the region, as well
as those governments’ strategies for dealing with Russia.
Special attention must be paid to how US foreign and
military policies—especially the announced withdrawals
from Syria and Afghanistan—affect the response of US
allies to Russian activity in the Middle East, and their willingness
to cooperate with the United States regarding it.
First, though, something needs to be said about Vladimir
Putin’s aims in the Middle East.
Putin’s Policies Toward the Middle East
While Russia appears to be gaining strength, and its field
of activity is increasingly broad, it must be remembered
that when Putin first became president at the turn of
the century, Russia was struggling to suppress Muslim
opposition in Chechnya and elsewhere—and Russian
officials and commentators repeatedly claimed this opposition
was supported by Saudi Arabia.3
Concerned
that Chechnya not become a cause to rally the Muslim
world against Moscow the way Afghanistan had in the
1980s, Putin set about seeking improved relations with
all Middle Eastern governments and “national” opposition
movements such as Fatah, Hamas, and Hezbollah.
It may have seemed counterintuitive in the West that
Russia tried to build good relations with opposing sides
simultaneously in the Middle East. However, these Middle
Eastern actors (including Saudi Arabia after 2003, when
it became the target of al-Qaeda bombings), like Russia,
regarded supra-national Sunni jihadis such as al-Qaeda
as their enemy. Putin portrayed Chechen and other Muslim
rebels inside Russia as Sunni jihadis just like those
operating in the Middle East, arguing they should be regarded
as the common enemy of Russia, the West, and
all governments in the Middle East.
Since he first came to power, Putin has also sought to expand
Russia’s economic relations with the region. While
Putin first attempted to get Moscow’s Soviet-era allies
to repay their large debts from the Cold War days, he
soon realized that this was a fruitless effort. Instead, he
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3ATLANTIC COUNCIL
ISSUE BRIEF When the friend of my friends is not my friend
focused on expanding trade and investment relations
between the Middle East and the key Russian economic
sectors on whose revenue he relies: oil, gas, arms, and
atomic energy. It quickly became clear that Putin was
at least as anxious to pursue economic ties with pro-US
governments as with anti-US ones; indeed, the former
often provided more lucrative opportunities than the latter.
Between 2000 and 2018, Russian arms exports to
Iran and Syria amounted to $2.06 billion and $2.12 billion,
respectively. By contrast, during the same period,
Russian arms exports to Egypt (a US ally), were worth
$3.6 billion, and those to the post-Saddam-Hussein Iraqi
government were worth $2.15 billion.4
Turkey is set to
buy the S-400 air-defense missile system, worth about
$2.5 billion, from Russia, and Saudi Arabia signed a 2017
memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the purchase
of $2.5 billion worth of Russian arms. The United Arab
Emirates (UAE), which has already bought $796 million
worth of Russian arms, is negotiating with Moscow to
4	 Data generated from “Importer/Exporter TIV [total trend indicator value] Tables,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
accessed March 21, 2019, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php.
5	 Dmitri Trenin, What Is Russia Up to in the Middle East? (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2018), 125–129.
buy Su-35 Russian fighter jets, while its rival Qatar is
negotiating to buy Su-35 fighters and the S-400. But,
the biggest Middle Eastern buyer of Russian arms (and
third-largest worldwide, after India and China) is Algeria,
which bought a whopping $11.421 billion worth of Russian
weapons between 2000 and 2018.
Russian-Middle Eastern cooperation in the energy sphere
has also grown in importance recently. After years of
resisting Saudi calls for Moscow to cooperate with the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) to limit oil exports in order to support oil prices,
Russia began doing so in 2016 through the OPEC+
format. In 2016, Qatar bought a 19.5-percent share in
Rosneft—Russia’s state-controlled oil giant.5
Other Gulf
Arab states have allowed Russian firms to become involved
in their petroleum spheres, and/or have invested
in Russia’s. Saudi ARAMCO is reportedly in negotiations
with Russia’s largest privately owned natural-gas firm,
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov meets with his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif in Moscow, Russia May 8, 2019.
Source: REUTERS/Evgenia Novozhenina
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4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
ISSUE BRIEF When the friend of my friends is not my friend
Novatek, for a stake in its new Arctic liquefied natural
gas (LNG) project.6
In addition, Middle Eastern customers
have bought more than $61 billion worth of Russian
nuclear reactors—with more deals expected.7
Russia also
sells large quantities of wheat to Egypt, and is actively
seeking to expand wheat exports to other markets, including
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria—at the expense
of US and European suppliers.8
Despite the region’s turmoil,
millions of Russian tourists visit the Middle East
every year, with Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Tunisia, and the
UAE especially popular as destinations.9
Since 2014, economic relations with the Middle East have
become even more important to Moscow, as a means of
enabling Russia to avoid the consequences of Western
economic sanctions related to Crimea, eastern Ukraine,
and Europe. In addition, Russia’s economic relations with
the Middle East could help Moscow mitigate its increasing
economic dependence on China, which has resulted
from Western sanctions.
Further, Putin is famous for being neuralgic about democratic
“color revolutions” overthrowing regimes friendly
to Russia and replacing them—either with ones friendly
to the United States, or with internal chaos that threatens
other countries. He was especially exercised about
the 2011 intervention in Libya by the United States and
some of its European and Arab allies, which led to the
downfall of the Muammar al-Qaddafi regime, the death
of Qaddafi himself, and the rise of jihadi forces in Libya
and elsewhere. Putin was determined not to let a similar
fate befall the Assad regime in Syria. While Russia’s
acting to preserve the Assad regime complicated relations
with those governments in the region that wanted
it to fall (most notably, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar),
it also had the welcome (to Putin) effect of enhancing
Russia’s reputation for stoutly defending its allies while
the United States did not (as many regarded the Obama
administration’s “abandonment” of Egypt’s Hosni
Mubarak during the 2011 Arab Spring uprising). This also
helps burnish the image Putin wishes to transmit, that
Russia is a defender of the status quo in the Middle East,
while the United States has been a disrupter. Further, the
Russian intervention in Syria enhances Putin’s ability to
6	 Malte Humbert, “Saudi Arabia Looks to Enter Arctic LNG with Large Investment,” High North News, March 19, 2019,
https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/saudi-arabia-looks-enter-arctic-lng-large-investment.
7	 Trenin, What Is Russia Up to in the Middle East? 129–130.
8	 “From Russia with Wheat: Exports by Global Grain Superpower Soar 80%,” RT, September 7, 2018, https://www.rt.com/business/437886-
russian-wheat-exports-increase/.
9	 Trenin, What Is Russia Up to in the Middle East? 131–32.
claim that Russia is not just a regional power confined to
the former Soviet Union, but a truly global great power.
In addition, Putin sees Russia’s good relations with all
parties in the Middle East (except the jihadis) as an opportunity
for Russian diplomacy to take charge of resolving
conflicts among them. Moscow long ago came
to see the USSR’s breaking off diplomatic relations with
Israel in 1967 as having allowed the United States to work
with all sides in Arab-Israeli conflict-resolution efforts
while the USSR could not. Moscow now sees the US and
Russian positions as reversed. Putin argues that Russia’s
ability to talk to all sides, while the United States cannot
or will not talk with certain parties (such as Iran, the
Assad regime, and Hezbollah), puts Russia in a better
position to resolve conflicts. Russian diplomacy has not
yet succeeded in resolving any of the Middle East’s many
conflicts, but has succeeded in engaging many US allies
in conflict-resolution efforts that often compete with
Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and
Turkey’s Tayyip Erdogan meet in Sochi, Russia November 22,
2017. Source: Sputnik/Mikhail Metzel/Kremlin via REUTERS
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5ATLANTIC COUNCIL
ISSUE BRIEF When the friend of my friends is not my friend
Washington’s.10
During his two stints as president, Putin
has paid visits to several US allies in the region, including
once each to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Morocco,
twice each to Israel and Jordan, three times to Egypt,
and a remarkable twelve times to Turkey. In addition, the
leaders of several US allies in the Middle East—including
Saudi King Salman and influential Crown Princes Abdallah
bin Abdulaziz and Mohamed bin Salman; reigning
Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed of the UAE; Qatar’s
Emir Tamim bin Hamad; Egyptian Presidents Mubarak,
Mohamed Morsi, and Abdel Fattah al-Sisi; and, most notably,
both Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan (first
as prime minister, then as president) and Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—have visited Russia numerous
times to meet with Putin.
US Interests Regarding Russia and the Middle East
At a time when US and Russian interests are increasingly
at odds over many issues, it stands to reason that the rise
of Russian influence in the Middle East should concern
Washington. Yet, the United States and Russia actually
appear to have certain common interests in the region.
Both are opposed to Sunni jihadis such as al-Qaeda and
ISIS. And, unlike during the Cold War—when Moscow
was eager to see pro-Western regimes overthrown and
replaced with pro-Soviet ones—Putin emphasizes how
Russia supports all existing governments, including proUS
ones.
Still, there are important reasons why Washington should
be concerned about Russian policy toward the Middle
East. While Russia claims to be combatting jihadism
there, observers have noted that in Syria, Russian forces
targeted the moderate opposition to the Assad regime,
and not ISIS. (For their part, the Russians claim there is
no moderate opposition to Assad, but only a jihadist one
that the United States and some of its Middle Eastern
allies have supported).11
Further, Putin has sought to take
advantage of instances when the United States and its
Middle Eastern allies are at odds, in order to advance
Russian influence. When the Obama administration announced
that it would cut back on arms sales to Egypt
10	 Ekaterina Stepanova, “Russia and Conflicts in the Middle East: Regionalism and Implications for the West,” International Spectator: Italian
Journal of International Affairs (2018), 4, 35–57.
11	 Florence Gaub, “Russia’s Non-War on Daesh” in Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru, eds., Russia’s Return to the Middle East: Building
Sandcastles? European Union Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper 146, July 2018, 57–64.
12	 Philipp Casula and Mark N. Katz, “The Middle East” in Andrei P. Tsygankov, ed., Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy (London:
Routledge, 2018), 301–309.
after its elected president was ousted by the military
leadership in 2013, Putin quickly declared his willingness
to sell Russian weapons to Cairo. Russia’s success at improving
relations with Turkey in the wake of Ankara’s
strained ties with both the United States and Europe—
despite serious differences between Russia in Turkey in
2015–16—is especially disturbing. Finally, Washington is
concerned about Russian support for Iran, whose activities
in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere are considered highly
threatening by some of the United States’ closest Middle
Eastern allies, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates. However, the US response to Russian
collaboration with Iran has been complicated by the
fact that these and other US allies in the Middle East are
actively cultivating good relations with Moscow, even
though it is supporting Tehran.12
Indeed, for the United States to formulate effective policies
to whatever challenges Russia poses, Washington
must understand how its allies and others—both inside
and outside the region—view Russian policies there, as
well as how they have chosen to engage with Moscow.
A US policy intended to limit, or even reduce, Russian
influence in the Middle East is unlikely to be successful
if it does not take account of why US allies have chosen
to engage with Russia despite concerns about Moscow’s
actions. The factors motivating the policies of the United
States’ allies will be explored next.
US Middle Eastern Allies and Russia
Middle Eastern actors have long turned to external powers
for support against their local and regional opponents.
European colonial powers gained and held their
positions in the Middle East not just through brute force,
but by partnering with local rulers seeking protection
against their neighbors and rivals. During the Cold War,
Middle Eastern governments allied with either the United
States or the USSR less on the basis of shared ideologies
(indeed, most US allies in the region were antidemocratic,
while Moscow’s Arab Nationalist ones were also
anticommunist) than on the superpowers’ willingness to
support them against their regional adversaries. Despite
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6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
ISSUE BRIEF When the friend of my friends is not my friend
their near-universal fear and loathing of Saddam Hussein,
most of the United States’ Middle East allies opposed
the George W. Bush administration’s intervention
to overthrow his regime—and to democratize not just
Iraq, but the greater Middle East—fearing this would disrupt
the region and undermine their rule. The desire to
disengage from the Middle East expressed by Presidents
Obama and Trump has resulted in some regional allies
looking for other external patrons.
However, there are not many others available, at least at
present. Neither Europe’s most powerful countries (the
United Kingdom, France, and Germany) nor the European
Union as a whole are willing to defend Middle Eastern
governments without Washington playing the leading
role in doing so. Europe simply does not have the military
capacity for such a mission without US leadership
and support. China and India are rising powers that are
playing an increasing role in the Middle East, but neither
is yet willing to take on the role of security provider for
any Middle Eastern state against another. Also, neither
has the ability to replace the United States as protector
of the sea routes they rely on for their energy imports
from the region. This leaves only Russia; its successful intervention
in Syria and clear interest in increasing its role
in the region make it a viable potential external patron.
Why would US allies turn to Russia when it is aiding regional
adversaries such as Iran and Hezbollah? There
appear to be three basic motives. The first is that, at a
time when US presidents have expressed the desire to
pull back from the Middle East but have not made clear
whether the United States will actually do so, reaching
out to Russia may be intended to persuade Washington
that it needs to “do more” for its Middle Eastern allies,
lest it lose them to Moscow.
Yet, whether the United States stays or goes, a second
reason for US allies in the Middle East to cooperate with
Russia is related to the opportunistic nature of Putin’s
foreign policy. While they do not like how Moscow is aiding
Iran and the Assad regime, they know that Putin is
eager to sell Russian weapons and other goods, to any
and all who can afford to buy them—which several of the
13	 For recent Iranian analyses of Russia’s ties to both Saudi Arabia and Israel, see Mahmoud Shoori, “Between Iran and Saudi Arabia; Russia’s
Tough Path for Neutrality,” Institute for Iran-Eurasia Studies, November 8, 2018, http://www.iras.ir/en/doc/article/3765/between-iran-andsaudi-arabia-russia-s-tough-path-for-neutrality;
Hamidreza Azizi, “Israel Role in Iran-Russia Partnership in Syria,” Institute for Iran-Eurasia
Studies, February 11, 2019, http://www.iras.ir/www.iras.iren/doc/note/3813/israel-role-in-iran-russia-partnership-syria.
14	 Carole Nakhle, “Russia’s Energy Diplomacy in the Middle East” in Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru, eds., Russia’s Return to the Middle
East: Building Sandcastles? European Union Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper 146, July 2018, 32.
United States’ Middle East allies are well able to do. The
more their cooperation with Moscow grows, the more
that powerful Russian groups connected to Putin acquire
an interest in “balancing” between that country and its
adversary, instead of just supporting the latter. Middle
Eastern governments, though, can grow frustrated that
their interactions with Russia do not result in much (if
any) reduction in Russian support for their adversaries
in the region. Moscow, though, always seems to hold out
the prospect that the more US Middle East allies cooperate
with Russia economically and militarily, the more
fully Russia will take their interests into account.
A third reason for US allies in the region to cooperate
with Moscow is that—even if they are unhappy that their
cooperation does not reduce or end Moscow’s cooperation
with their adversaries, and they have no illusions
that this will change—their doing so is still useful for undercutting
their adversaries’ relationship with Russia. For
example, just as Israel and Saudi Arabia are unhappy that
Moscow cooperates with Iran, Tehran is often unhappy
that Russia cooperates with Israel and Saudi Arabia.13
For
Israel and Saudi Arabia, this has the advantage of casting
doubt about whether Russia will support or oppose
Iranian actions against them, and so (they hope) serves
to restrain Iran.
US Middle East allies also cooperate with Russia for reasons
unrelated to concerns about their regional adversaries.
One is that both Russia and the United States’
Gulf Arab allies depend on petroleum exports for much
of their revenue, and so prefer higher oil prices. Thus,
they both see increased US shale-oil production, which
tends to limit oil prices, as a serious competitive threat.
While Russia defied Saudi Arabia’s calls to do so for
many years, since December 2016 it has cooperated with
Riyadh to limit oil exports and support oil prices through
the OPEC+ format.14
Another reason they are drawn to cooperating with Moscow
is that none of the United States’ Middle East allies
(including Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians) has appreciated
Washington’s expressions of support for democratization
and human rights in the region. While the Trump
*
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7ATLANTIC COUNCIL
ISSUE BRIEF When the friend of my friends is not my friend
administration has pulled back from this, some US allies
in the region are unhappy about congressional and press
criticism of their policies. The Saudi government, for example,
is indignant over congressional and press scrutiny
of its role in the killing of Saudi dissident journalist Jamal
Khashoggi and of its military campaign in Yemen, which
has contributed to a humanitarian catastrophe there. By
contrast, US Middle East allies very much appreciate that
Russia does not make such demands (while Moscow ostensibly
supports Palestinian aspirations, it has not done
anything to impede Israel’s policies thwarting them).
Finally, these allies now exhibit a degree of comfort in
dealing with Russia that they did not have in dealing with
the USSR. While the Putin regime is perceived as increasingly
hostile and aggressive in the United States and elsewhere
in the West, the United States’ Middle East allies
appear to see Russia more as a corrupt, and, thus, pliable
authoritarian regime with which they can do business.15
15	 Mark N. Katz, “What Do They See in Him? How the Middle East Views Putin and Russia,” Russian Analytical Digest 219, May 3, 2018, http://
www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD219.pdf.
Other US Allies and Russia
US allies outside the Middle East can be divided into two
groups: those that feel seriously threatened by Russia,
and those that do not. Ironically, neither group is focused
on Russian behavior in the Middle East. Those US allies
outside the Middle East that fear Russia are focused on
Moscow’s threat to them and their immediate neighborhood,
in Europe or elsewhere, rather than on the Middle
East. Those that do not fear a Russian threat to themselves
or their immediate neighborhood also do not fear
Russia’s actions in the Middle East. Therefore, both sets
of allies are unlikely to strongly participate in any US effort
to counter Russian influence in the Middle East—especially
if it is not supported by the United States’ Middle
Eastern allies.
In addition, there is one issue on which allies outside the
Middle East are more aligned with Russia than with the
Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) shakes hands with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during a meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow,
Russia, October 20, 2015. Picture taken October 20, 2015. Source: REUTERS/Alexei Druzhinin/RIA Novosti/Kremlin
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8 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
ISSUE BRIEF When the friend of my friends is not my friend
United States: the Iranian nuclear accord. While Israel,
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE opposed the Obama administration’s
pursuit of the Iranian nuclear accord and applauded
the Trump administration’s withdrawal from it,
most other US allies—especially the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany, which were signatories to the
agreement—supported the agreement, as did Russia.
The differences between the Trump administration and
its non-Middle Eastern allies over the Iranian nuclear
accord do not serve to promote cooperation between
them regarding the Russian challenge, either in the Middle
East or anywhere else.16
The Trump administration has criticized certain US allies,
especially Germany, for buying so much oil and gas
from Russia. But, even if these countries wanted to reduce
their petroleum imports from Russia, they would
need to replace them with supplies from other sources.
Although it would take a massive effort to develop,
Iranian gas could reduce European dependence on
(and, hence, increase Europe’s leverage over the terms
for buying) Russian gas.17
The Trump administration,
though, has been threatening sanctions against countries
that do not reduce or end their imports of petroleum
from Iran. In addition to irritating allies outside the
Middle East, this Trump administration policy does not
advance its own goal of getting allies to reduce their
energy dependence on Russia.
Another issue that bothers the United States’ European
allies, in particular, is that while Washington insists
that they comply with US-backed sanctions against
Iran, neither the Obama nor the Trump administration
pushed as hard on US Middle East allies to comply
with US-backed sanctions against Russia over its annexation
of Crimea and subsequent issues. Indeed, Israel,
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have reportedly urged
the Trump administration to lift Ukraine-related sanctions
against Russia.18
This shows the United States’
European allies that US allies in the Middle East do not
prioritize their concerns about Russian policy toward
Ukraine or Europe.
16	 Yasmeen Serhan, “Is the U.S. Bringing Europe and Russia Closer Together?” Atlantic, May 25, 2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/is-the-us-bringing-europe-and-russia-closer-together/561008/.
17	 Lukáš Tichý and Nikita Odintsov, “Can Iran Reduce EU Dependence on Russian Gas?” Middle East Policy, Spring 2016,
https://www.mepc.org/journal/can-iran-reduce-eu-dependence-russian-gas.
18	 Adam Entous, “Israeli, Saudi, and Emirati Officials Privately Pushed for Trump to Strike a ‘Grand Bargain’ with Putin,” New Yorker, July 9,
2018, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/israeli-saudi-and-emirati-officials-privately-pushed-for-trump-to-strike-a-grand-bargain-
with-putin.
What Is to Be Done?
There are four possible policy approaches that the United
States could adopt to address what it sees as the
problem of expanding Russian influence in the Middle
East. Each of them acknowledges that there is a sharp
difference between how the United States’ allies in the
Middle East and those elsewhere regard Iran and how to
deal with the Russian-Iranian relationship.
Middle-East-Allied-Centric Approach: Because its allies
in the Middle East tend to see Iran as more of a threat
and Russia as more of a partner, Washington should not
call upon them to reduce their cooperation with Russia.
Rather, it should join them in increasing efforts to pressure
Iran into changing its behavior. Israel, Saudi Arabia,
and the UAE want the United States to do this. Despite
Iran’s friendly relations with Russia, increasing US pressure
may have the effect of forcing Russia to choose between
more actively defending Iran (which will alienate
the United States’ Middle Eastern allies) or not doing so,
and seeing Tehran become weaker (which will infuriate
Tehran, but please US allies). Either way, US influence
with its own Middle Eastern allies may be enhanced. Allies
elsewhere may not approve of Washington’s focus
on Iran, but either Washington will succeed in persuading
them to also adopt this approach, or they will neither
do so nor strongly oppose it.
Other-Allied-Centric Approach: Should the current or
future US administration view Russia as a far greater
threat than Iran to the United States and most of its allies
(especially its traditional ones in Europe), Washington
should make the case that containing Russia is a higher
priority than containing Iran. It should also make clear
that Middle East allies more concerned about Iran cannot
expect much help from the United States, unless and
until they cease what Washington considers problematic
cooperation with Moscow. US Middle Eastern allies will
not like this, but, sooner or later, they may come to realize
that this is the price they will have to pay if they want
US and other Western support against Iran.
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9ATLANTIC COUNCIL
ISSUE BRIEF When the friend of my friends is not my friend
Strategic-Patience Approach: If US allies in the Middle
East do not see Russian policy as threatening enough to
seek help from Washington, and US allies elsewhere are
not concerned about Russian activity in this particular
region, there may be little that the United States can—or
should—do. If the allies do not regard Russia as a threat
in the Middle East, then perhaps it is not one. Or, perhaps
it is, but the United States’ Middle East allies can manage
Moscow well enough on their own. If so, then Washington
should not allow dealing with Russia to become
a point of friction with its Middle Eastern allies. If and
when they come to see that Russia is more of a problem
than they can address on their own, then Washington
can step in to help. There is, of course, the danger that
if the United States steps back from the Middle East to
such an extent, Russia will be able to become the principal
external great power in the region. But, as noted
earlier, Middle Eastern actors have long sought support
from external powers against their regional rivals. Unless
Russia can actually resolve the conflicts between them,
its practice of endlessly supporting opposing sides simultaneously
is likely to result in some Middle Eastern
actors (especially those that the United States has long
supported against their regional adversaries) retaining,
or even increasing, their dependence on Washington.
Coalition-Building Approach: Because some US allies
differ as to whether Iran or Russia is more of a threat,
Washington should try to convince them all that Russian-Iranian
cooperation is harmful, and that US allies
need to cooperate against both. In particular, Washington
needs to make clear to its Middle Eastern allies that,
if they want other US allies to support the sanctions regime
that they want to see enforced against Iran, they
need to observe Western sanctions against Russia. So
long as Russia and Iran continue to collaborate, the United
States and all its allies need to work together against
both.
None of the four foreign policy approaches outlined
here is ideal, and each has risks. Prioritizing Iran in conjunction
with US Middle East allies risks alienating other
allies more concerned about Russia, as well as not
dealing effectively with growing Russian influence in the
Middle East. Prioritizing Russia risks US Middle Eastern
allies simply not going along with this approach and
continuing, or even increasing, their cooperation with it
in the hope (however unrealistic) that Moscow will ultimately
side with them over Iran. The strategic-patience
approach, in which the United States trusts that its Middle
Eastern allies will either deal with Russia effectively
on their own or turn to Washington for support if they
realize that they cannot run the risk of allowing Russian
influence to grow even stronger in the region. The coalition-building
approach, in which Washington convinces
its allies that Russian-Iranian cooperation is a threat to
all of them and they should work together, is the best
policy option. The fact that this fairly obvious solution
has not already been adopted, though, indicates that it
will be difficult to implement, for the simple reason that
different US allies have contrasting threat perceptions
about Russia and Iran. But, a foreign policy approach coordinated
with US allies both inside and outside the Middle
East would seem to have a better chance of success
than one supported only by some allies but not others.
FURTHER RESEARCH
•	There is a gap in understanding of the full scope of
both Russian activities in the Middle East and how
different US allies view and interact with Russia.
While much information is available from press accounts,
obtaining a more complete picture requires
dedicated discussions with policymakers, academics,
and journalists on the ground, to obtain a fuller
and more nuanced image of Russia’s diplomatic,
military, and economic relations with the different
countries of the Middle East, as well as how each of
them views Russia.
•	Research on the views of different Middle Eastern
governments toward Russia could help indicate how
their expectations of Moscow compare to one another’s,
as well as whether they have similar or different
concerns about Russian policies. This will require
intense discussions with policymakers and key
advisers in the region’s different countries.
•	Especially at a time when the US government is not
focused on how to deal with the challenge of Russian
activity in the Middle East, a structured Track II
dialogue with US allies inside and outside the region
may facilitate the development and articulation of a
consistent, long-term approach to this issue. This will
likely be more effective if it is undertaken in cooperation
with US allies, instead of at odds with them.
Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics
at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy
and Government, and a nonresident senior fellow at the
Atlantic Council.
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10 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
ISSUE BRIEF When the friend of my friends is not my friend
Atlantic Council Board of Directors
CHAIRMAN
*John F.W. Rogers
EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
EMERITUS
*James L. Jones
CHAIRMAN EMERITUS
Brent Scowcroft
PRESIDENT AND CEO
*Frederick Kempe
EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRS
*Adrienne Arsht
*Stephen J. Hadley
VICE CHAIRS
*Robert J. Abernethy
*Richard W. Edelman
*C. Boyden Gray
*Alexander V. Mirtchev
*Virginia A. Mulberger
*W. DeVier Pierson
*John J. Studzinski
TREASURER
*George Lund
SECRETARY
*Walter B. Slocombe
DIRECTORS
Stéphane Abrial
Odeh Aburdene
Todd Achilles
*Peter Ackerman
Timothy D. Adams
Bertrand-Marc Allen
*Michael Andersson
David D. Aufhauser
Colleen Bell
Matthew C. Bernstein
*Rafic A. Bizri
Dennis C. Blair
Thomas L. Blair
Philip M. Breedlove
Reuben E. Brigety II
Myron Brilliant
*Esther Brimmer
R. Nicholas Burns
*Richard R. Burt
Michael Calvey
James E. Cartwright
John E. Chapoton
Ahmed Charai
Melanie Chen
Michael Chertoff
*George Chopivsky
Wesley K. Clark
*Helima Croft
Ralph D. Crosby, Jr.
Nelson W. Cunningham
Ivo H. Daalder
*Ankit N. Desai
*Paula J. Dobriansky
Thomas J. Egan, Jr.
*Stuart E. Eizenstat
Thomas R. Eldridge
*Alan H. Fleischmann
Jendayi E. Frazer
Ronald M. Freeman
Courtney Geduldig
Robert S. Gelbard
Gianni Di Giovanni
Thomas H. Glocer
Murathan Günal
John B. Goodman
*Sherri W. Goodman
*Amir A. Handjani
Katie Harbath
John D. Harris, II
Frank Haun
Michael V. Hayden
Brian C. McK. Henderson
Annette Heuser
Amos Hochstein
*Karl V. Hopkins
Robert D. Hormats
*Mary L. Howell
Ian Ihnatowycz
Wolfgang F. Ischinger
Deborah Lee James
Reuben Jeffery, III
Joia M. Johnson
Stephen R. Kappes
*Maria Pica Karp
Andre Kelleners
Sean Kevelighan
Henry A. Kissinger
*C. Jeffrey Knittel
Franklin D. Kramer
Laura Lane
Richard L. Lawson
Jan M. Lodal
Douglas Lute
Jane Holl Lute
William J. Lynn
Wendy W. Makins
Mian M. Mansha
Chris Marlin
Gerardo Mato
Timothy McBride
John M. McHugh
H.R. McMaster
Eric D.K. Melby
Franklin C. Miller
*Judith A. Miller
Susan Molinari
Michael J. Morell
Richard Morningstar
Mary Claire Murphy
Edward J. Newberry
Thomas R. Nides
Franco Nuschese
Joseph S. Nye
Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg
Ahmet M. Oren
Sally A. Painter
*Ana I. Palacio
Carlos Pascual
Alan Pellegrini
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Thomas J. Ridge
Michael J. Rogers
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Harry Sachinis
Rajiv Shah
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Frances M. Townsend
Clyde C. Tuggle
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Charles F. Wald
Michael F. Walsh
Ronald Weiser
Geir Westgaard
Maciej Witucki
Neal S. Wolin
Jenny Wood
Guang Yang
Mary C. Yates
Dov S. Zakheim
HONORARY DIRECTORS
James A. Baker, III
Ashton B. Carter
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George P. Shultz
Horst Teltschik
John W. Warner
William H. Webster
*Executive Committee
Members
List as of May 8, 2019
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11ATLANTIC COUNCIL
ISSUE BRIEF When the friend of my friends is not my friend
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12 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
ISSUE BRIEF When the friend of my friends is not my friend
The Atlantic Council is a nonpartisan organization that
­promotes constructive US leadership and engagement
in ­international ­affairs based on the central role of the
Atlantic community in ­meeting today’s global ­challenges.
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