The Struggle over Arab Hegemony after the Suez Crisis
Author(s): Elie Podeh
Source: Middle Eastern Studies , Jan., 1993, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp. 91-110
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283542
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Middle Eastern Studies
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Struggle over Arab Hegemony after the
Suez Crisis
ELIE PODEH
Since the Suez affair Nasser, the Egyptian presiden
thing of a myth in the eyes of the public and scholar
the facts concerning his political victories have, at tim
the magnitude of his image.' The material recently
archives reveals that although he eventually establ
pre-eminent leader of the Arab world, this was a
fierce battle in regional Arab politics. The long-sta
ween Egypt and Iraq over Arab hegemony did not
Suez Crisis, as some scholars have claimed; rather the o
in Iraq temporarily succeeded in overcoming the int
asserting its dominance in Arab politics. The founda
coalition' (including Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan)
directed against Nasser's rising prestige. However,
Egypt and Syria in February 1958 - the United Ar
heralded a complete triumph for his brand of Ar
ensuring his superiority in the Arab world. The pu
then, is to analyze the struggle for Arab hegemony an
on the fluctuations in regional Arab politics from the
establishment of the UAR.
The future of the Baghdad Pact was the main focus of the struggle
between Egypt and Iraq before the Suez Crisis. On 24 February 1955,
Iraq and Turkey signed a military pact, which served as the basis for the
formation of the Baghdad Pact, including also Britain, Pakistan and
Iran.2 Originally, the pact was part of a Western build-up (in conjunction
with NATO and SEATO), designed to protect the Middle East from the
Soviet menace. However, Nasser, who saw Iraq's leading role in the pact
as a challenge to Egypt's hegemony, relentlessly attempted to dissuade
the Arab states from adhering to it. In the struggle which ensued between
Iraq and Egypt, the latter succeeded in winning over Syria and Saudi
Arabia; Syria vacillated for a short period before yielding to Egyptian
pressure; Saudi Arabia enthusiastically supported Egypt, owing to the
age-old rivalry between the Hashemites and the Saudis. Although Egypt
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1. January 1993, pp. 91-110
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
succeeded in crystallizing a camp which opposed Iraq's
Baghdad Pact, she failed to establish a rival Arab pact, wh
isolate Iraq. Thus Nasser had to content himself with signing i
military agreements with Syria and Saudi Arabia during O
Meanwhile, Britain and Iraq tried to persuade Jordan
Baghdad Pact. Such a venture - so it was hoped - would tip
favour of Iraq, and stimulate other Arab states to foll
struggle reached its climax in December 1955, when Brit
pressed King Husayn not to succumb to the Egyptian and S
but to stick to his former decision to join the pact. The riots
across Jordan, hotted up by the Egyptian media and S
convinced Husayn that by adhering to the pact he would seal h
His refusal proved to be a fateful turning point for the Baghd
even though the struggle in the Arab world over the pact did
was clear that no Arab state would dare join it. The Jordanian
to the isolation of Iraq, leaving her to face the tripartite coali
Jordan and Lebanon were straddling the fence. Yet, while t
Syrian bond was slowly tightening, the Egyptian-Saudi axis wa
disintegrating owing to the different nature of the two re
Western encouragement, Iraq attempted to erode Nasser's
detaching Saudi Arabia from Egypt; however, the nationali
Suez Canal Company temporarily suspended this process, an
a new era in inter-Arab relations.
Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, on 26 July 1956,
perceived as a victory of Arab nationalism over Western imperialism, was
received with great enthusiasm throughout the Arab world. Syria was
quick to call for a meeting of the Arab League political committee in
order to obtain a declaration of unequivocal support for Egypt's action.3
Iraq was the only Arab state to oppose vehemently the Syrian initiative;
ironically, the news of the nationalization reached King Faysal and Nuri
al-Said, as they were dining with the British Prime Minister, Anthony
Eden. Nuri's spontaneous reaction, recorded by Hugh Thomas, the
Sunday Times' correspondent, was 'hit him, hit him hard and hit him
now'.4 Indeed, Nuri perceived the nationalization as an excellent pretext
for the British to eliminate the Egyptian leader,5 but he was forced to
yield to public opinion in the Arab world. Accordingly, the Iraqi cabinet
issued a public statement declaring, inter alia, that the nationalization was
Egypt's 'indisputable right', and expressed its hope for a reasonable
settlement of the dispute.6
While Syria was exerting its efforts to convene the Arab League, Nuri
was furiously working to undermine Syria's draft proposal.7 His diplomatic
skill was indeed manifested by his success in convincing Lebanon,
92
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
ARAB HEGEMONY AFTER THE SUEZ CRISIS
Saudi Arabia, Libya and Sudan to accept a more moderate resol
Considering the circumstances, the Political Committee's resolu
12 August was an impressive victory for Iraq: first, the Syrian p
which was supported, if not initiated, by Nasser, was succe
blocked; second, the resolution did not explicitly support the nation
tion, but expressed general support for Egypt's policy; and, finally,
if the severance of diplomatic relations with the West, and the imp
of an embargo, were discussed in the proceedings, these proposa
excluded from the final resolution.9 This compromise satisfied
Egypt, enabling her to claim 'wide Arab support', as well as Iraq
was not compelled to pay more than lip service to Egypt.°1
On 16 August Eden opened the London Conference, convened
Western powers, in order to find a diplomatic solution to the nation
tion crisis. The Arab world noted it with five minutes of silence in
and a general strike. The protest was meant to express their contem
what Nasser called an 'imperialist conspiracy against freedom'.
unprecedented demonstration of solidarity was a genuine expre
the widespread support Nasser enjoyed among the masses. A
expression of support was the creation of the 'Arab Syrian Committ
Aiding Egypt', formed by representatives from various political par
Syria to coordinate aid for Egypt.12 The committee invited del
from different Arab organizations and political parties, who su
the Egyptian nationalization, to attend a conference in Damasc
assembly, which met on 18 September in the Syrian Parliament buil
chose the Lebanese Hamid Franjieh as its president, and decided
branches in the Arab states, with a central liaison committee in
With the exception of declarations supporting Egypt, the conferenc
not achieve much else.13
In contrast to the vast support of the Arab masses, most of the leaders
saw the nationalization as a dire threat to the stability of their regimes;
yet, while they could hardly express any criticism publicly, they
denounced Nasser's move behind the scenes. The most vehement opposition,
as was to be expected, came from Nuri and the Royal Palace. Great
anxiety concerning the Egyptian president's rising prestige was also
expressed by King Saud, President Chamoun and to a lesser extent by
King Husayn; even Quwatly, Egypt's staunchest ally, seemed to be
occasionally dissatisfied with Nasser's independent decisions. This contradiction
was a permanent feature of Arab politics: Arab rulers were
forced to respond to public opinion by an overt expression of solidarity
with Egypt, even though it undermined their own interests; these leaders
were apprehensive lest the waves of enthusiasm would stimulate radical
Arab nationalism, which would lead to their downfall. Thus, 'the power-
93
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
ful wave of Arab support for Egypt', as it is often portray
was not joined by all Arab rulers.
The reluctance of Nuri and the Palace to accept any co
Egypt was unequivocally expressed to British officials;
frequently repeated was that Nasser should not 'get a
rather, be able to 'save his face'. There was no room for
this was the last possible ditch: 'Either Nasser was succe
influence and Nuri were lost for ever,' concluded the Br
Nasser was got rid of and we and Nuri succeeded.'"s The iss
not just the fate of the Baghdad Pact, or the leadership of
but the very survival of the Iraqi ruling elite and British i
emphatically claimed that the operation against Nasser
short and successful'. He argued that Nasser was profi
passage of time as the possibility of a military respons
decreasing. He added that if the Egyptian president we
proposals offered by the London Conference then Brita
to force (with or without the United States), and comp
surrender or to wage war. Nuri and the Minister o
convinced that if force were applied against Egypt, they w
maintain internal order by imposing martial law.16
Nuri's interventions were not confined solely to
attempted to diminish Nasser's stature in the Arab wor
Saudi Arabia from Egypt, and by drawing Jordan closer to
of detaching Saudi Arabia from Egypt was propose
Department as early as March 1956. The underlying assu
Egypt's ties with the Soviet Union, coupled with the distur
of Arab nationalism, would create a solid basis for coop
Iraq and Saudi Arabia.17 The nationalization gave greater
Iraqi-Saudi rapprochement, which had begun in spring
Saud was compelled to support publicly Nasser's move,
by the decision which, in contrast to their military agr
been coordinated with him. As Saud was dependent on
was anxious lest the nationalization force him to suppo
the West.'8 Nuri, quick to take advantage of the wideni
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, dispatched the Amir Zayd, Ir
in London, to Riyad. 19 Sending Zayd, the fourth and only
King Husayn, who was evicted by the Saudis from
intended to open a new era between the two dynasties.2
rapprochement was further consolidated after the meet
two kings in Dammam in September 1956. During the
Saud promised the young King Faysal of Iraq not to
hostilities against the West, nor to rely on 'dictators and p
94
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
ARAB HEGEMONY AFTER THE SUEZ CRISIS
rather to base his future policy on 'cooperation with the sist
Iraq'.21 As soon as Faysal concluded the visit, the Syrian
presidents unexpectedly arrived in Riyadh.2 The timing of t
carefully planned; it was undoubtedly intended to diminis
dous impact of the meeting between the two kings; indeed, a
Ambassador in Jedda, Parkes, lamented: 'I am afraid that the
from King Faisal's visit, if not entirely lost, was heavil
Nevertheless, the meeting between Faysal and Saud was
victory for Iraq, and later served as the basis for the Royalis
Arab politics.
Simultaneously, Iraq attempted to patch up the differe
fellow Hashemite state - Jordan. The latter's refusal to joi
Pact (December 1955), and its insistence on maintain
position in the Arab world, had soured relations between
while a major obstacle for improving the relations was th
military and financial aid Iraq was willing to allocate to J
nationalization, however, made Iraq more forthcoming in her
to aid Jordan; thus, when Husayn, alarmed by Israel's lat
into his territory, invited on 14 September 1956 an Iraqi
request met with approval.25 Although the reply was co
expression of Arab solidarity against the common enemy
plain to Israel through Wright, the British ambassador in
his primary goal was to detach Husayn from Nasser.26 The Is
Ministry estimated, therefore, that the dispatch of Ira
'initially to prevent Egyptian domination of Jordan, and, at
to draw her into the Baghdad Pact'.27 Nasser, however, was n
in his conversation with Hare, the American ambassador,
that he did not believe that the entrance of the Iraqi forces
defending Jordan from Israel, but part of a combined B
conspiracy to detach Jordan from Egypt.28 Despite the f
response, the negotiations with Jordan were stalled over t
the expeditionary force's command. Consequently, Abd a
Amman on 14 October; his arrival, no doubt, was a genuine e
Iraq's concern over the Jordanian question. Eventually, Jorda
her request, as it was agreed that the Iraqi forces would
Jordanian frontier, and move in only if Jordan were atta
her formal request.2
As soon as the Israeli forces invaded Sinai, Syria, Saud
Jordan offered Egypt military support. While expressin
tion, Nasser, who had already ordered his troops to retre
declined the offer, fearing that it might serve as a pretext fo
powers to invade Syria, and to inflict further humiliation. T
95
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
president preferred Quwatly to proceed with his planned vi
(1-3 November) in order to ensure Soviet assistance, if
required.30 However, when the transmitters of Sawt AlEgyptian
propaganda station, were destroyed by the Br
Force, Radio Damascus replaced the Egyptian Radio.31 M
response to a formal invitation, Syrian, Saudi, and Iraqi
Jordan in order to protect her from a possible Israeli attack
Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia severed their diplomatic
Britain and France.
The main focus of criticism in the Arab world during and after the war
was Iraq. From the beginning of the war, anti-Western demonstration
were held in Syria and Jordan, calling on Iraq to withdraw from th
Baghdad Pact and demanding Nuri's resignation. The new Jordanian
Parliament (under the nationalist Nabulsi's cabinet) even sent a telegram
in this spirit to the Iraqi Parliament.32 However, the most significan
action was the Syrian blowing up of three pumping stations along the
Iraqi pipeline from Kirkuk to Tripoli. This action, which stopped the o
flow for six months, severely damaged Iraq's economy.33 Yet, under
British pressure, the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) allocated a credi
of 25 million pounds, which enabled Iraq to overcome the budget defic
caused by loss of oil revenues.34 Although the sabotage was coordinate
with Mahmud Riad, the Egyptian ambassador in Damascus, it seemed
that the Egyptian president opposed it.35 According to Heikal, his closest
advisor, 'in those days [of the war] everybody in the Arab world wa
acting on his own initiative; any attempt to coordinate strategy or tactics
would have been impossible'. Moreover, such an action might trigger
British or Iraqi intervention in Syria.36 However, there was no doubt that
the sabotage was aimed solely at Iraq and Britain, since the Tapline (
Saudi-American interest) remained intact.37 Riad feared that Britain and
Iraq would pump oil through the Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline, which had no
been used since the establishment of Israel. Consequently, he convinced
Haj Amin Al-Husseini, the Palestinian leader, to send a Fidayyin unit t
discover whether it was indeed being used.38
After the war started, the Lebanese president made efforts to convene
a conference of all Arab leaders. Chamoun's motives were unclear; he
either wanted to become a moderating power in the Arab world, or h
strove to strengthen his position at home.39 Eventually, the conferenc
was convened in the aftermath of the war (13 November), with the
participation of all the Arab kings and presidents, except Nasser wh
delegated the Egyptian ambassador in Beirut to represent him. The mai
topic on the agenda was the question of Arab diplomatic relations wit
Britain and France. Quwatly claimed that all the Arab states should
96
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
ARAB HEGEMONY AFTER THE SUEZ CRISIS
follow Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia in severing th
relations with Britain and France; King Faysal was adama
severing relations with Britain, although he had done
Lebanon, Libya and Sudan supported the Iraqi position b
moderate stance; Egypt did not share Syria's extremist attit
apprehensive of further alienating the Western powers
which was finally adopted by the conference was relativ
declared general support of Egypt's policy, denounced
collusion, and hinted that each Arab state could make any p
deemed necessary.'4 At the conclusion of the conferen
feeling was that its results 'could have been worse', and
Syria's extremism, the Lebanese president had succeeded
the storm.4'
As a consequence of the Suez War, Britain's allies in th
found themselves in an extremely difficult position: n
Western power attacked a sister Arab state, but the attack
in collusion with their arch-enemy - Israel. Of all the Ar
situation was the most difficult; its special ties with Britain
joint membership in the Baghdad Pact made Iraq, and h
target of Arab attacks. The grave situation in Iraq led Weste
believe that a coup was inevitable, and that her withdr
Baghdad Pact was imminent. Nuri and the palace were
disturbed by the British attack as by the unexpected involv
in the operation. In order to cope with a deterioration o
situation, the cabinet decided on 31 October to impose
Nevertheless, Nuri remained skeptical as to his abili
internal order; he told Wright that it was impossible t
stability for more than 'five or six days' and emphasized th
period Britain must achieve a ceasefire and demand Israel's r
ambassador was shocked by the repercussions of the war
have built up here over many years and with such pains
'has been shaken nearly beyond repair'.44
Troubles at home notwithstanding, Nuri did not negl
world; he now hastened, for instance, to respond to Hus
send troops ('up to a division') to Jordan.45 Previously,
command was one of the problems which had hinder
entrance to Jordan; now, however, both parties were t
disagree on this point. Nuri was weary of possible Arab
he had refrained from assisting a sister state, while Husayn
by the possibility of an Israeli attack. Therefore, it was has
the Iraqi forces would enter under joint command, head
deputy chief-of-staff, Ali Al-Hiyari.46 Nuri assured Britain
97
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
units would not fight Israel, unless the latter attacked Jordan, and that
they would be stationed in Mafraq, far from the Israeli border.47
Arab criticism against Iraq was focused on her membership in the
Baghdad Pact alongside Britain. Yet Nuri refused to surrender to
demands voiced both in Iraq and the Arab world which required withdrawal
from the pact; he also tried to use the pact as a lever to enhance
Iraq's position in the Arab world. On 3 November Nuri left for Teheran
in order to participate in a conference of the Muslim members of the pact.
Nuri's visit, in spite of the tense situation in his country, clearly indicates
the importance he attached to the results of the conference.4 At Tehran,
Nuri hoped to play an active role in ending the war, and to advance a
solution for the Palestine problem - the everlasting panacea for shifting
Arab attention. Nuri arrived with a four-point proposal, approved by his
cabinet aiming: to ensure Egypt's sovereignty and territorial integrity; to
ensure Israel's retreat to the ceasefire lines; to repatriate all prisoners of
war; and to reach a comprehensive solution of the Palestine problem.49
Nuri's purpose was twofold: first, to prove that the Baghdad Pact had
played a crucial role in ending the war; second, to shift public attention
from the Suez Crisis to the Palestine issue in which Iraq could play a
major role. Much to Nuri's disappointment, the conference opened only
on 8 November, by which time a ceasefire had already been declared.
Nevertheless, in the final communique it was stated that the appeal of the
Muslim members to Britain had influenced her decision to accept a
ceasefire.50
Following the conference, Iraq decided to sever its diplomatic relations
with France, and to restrict the Baghdad Pact's meetings to its Muslim
members (that is, exclude Britain from the activities of the pact).5' These
decisions indicate that the Tehran conference achieved little in satisfying
the Iraqi domestic and regional problems. The first move was primarily
symbolic, as Iraq's ties with France were negligible; while the second
move, made without prior consultation with the members of the pact, was
rather surprising and revealed the sinister political implications of the
Suez crisis on Iraq.52 Britain and Turkey were reconciled to the Iraqi
decision out of understanding for her predicament, while assuming that
the suspension would be temporary (as Iraq privately admitted); Pakistan
and Iran strongly protested against Iraq's unilateral decision, but were
unable to change it.53 By suspending Britain from the pact (even temporarily)
Iraq achieved two goals: first, she averted public criticism;
second, she presented the pact as a genuine regional defense organization
made up of Muslim states, aimed against Israel (not only against the
Soviets) and open to Muslim Arab members.
There was another drastic twist, however, in Iraqi foreign policy; on 13
98 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
ARAB HEGEMONY AFTER THE SUEZ CRISIS
November, Iraq adopted a new radical position concernin
question, calling for the liquidation of the state of Israel and
the Palestinian refugees.54 It marked a radical shift from a f
stance, which accepted the Partition Plan (Nov. 1947) as a
solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, to an Arab extremi
eliminating Israel. The timing of this change was highly sign
exploited the fact that the Palestine problem had not bee
the Beirut conference, to demonstrate that she was the genu
tative of the Palestinians, who had been neglected by the
Once again, the Palestine problem was used as a lever in
politics in order to achieve internal and regional gains.
On 17 November, shortly after the Suez War ended
members of the Baghdad Pact reconvened at Baghdad, t
future of the pact. They concluded that Britain should remai
of the pact despite her involvement in the war; furthermore
to invite the United States to join the pact, an offer whic
rejected by the State Department.5 As before, Nuri hoped
conference to promote Iraqi interests; yet the conference wa
mistake, as student demonstrations, fueled by the Egypti
spread across the country.57 In addition, on 23 Nov
announced the uncovering of an Iraqi plot to topple the S
ment.5 The conspiracy, which was ineptly planned and doom
start,59 had a disastrous effect on Iraq: the very fact that sh
with Western allies against an Arab state, and especially the
coup (planned innocently for 29 October, the day the Su
began), justified unprecedented attacks by Syria and
claimed that Iraq had colluded with the Western pow
against Syria.60
While Iraq was gradually becoming isolated in the Ara
Egyptian president astonishingly discerned that the Bag
despite so many blunders - had not as yet withered away; rat
tactic - the pact as a seemingly Islamic organization - pose
to Egypt, as it could theoretically induce other Arab state
the pact. This fear was clearly shown in Nasser's letter, dated
ber, to King Saud, who was considered by many as a pote
for joining the pact. Although the pact was apparently
Egyptian president wrote, 'Britain and her allies are thinking
convert it into an Islamic pact which will attract all Islamic c
already members of the pact.' In this context, he expressed h
this policy was intended to isolate Egypt from Saudi Ara
Jordan.61 Actually, this fear was quite justified the member
sent the Pakistani president to Riyadh and his prime ministe
99
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
order to advance cooperation with these countries, mainly agai
munism, but also to hear their position (especially the Saudi
concerning the adherence to the 'Islamic Pact'.62 Saud, claimed
promised Nasser that he would not even contemplate such a v
Iraq's isolation in the Arab world led Nuri, for the first time sin
talks in September 1954, to send feelers to Nasser. Tawfiq AlIraq's
former prime minister and Nuri's confidant, was instructed
a discreet message to Nasser, proposing a private meeting. Nuri
this move to the British ambassador by saying that 'after all,
between nations seldom lasted indefinitely'. He added that it
desirable to neglect the possibility of convincing the Egyptian
to cooperate against communism and towards the solution of t
tine problem.64 Although Nuri's initiative, no doubt, stemmed
growing isolation in the Arab world, he approached Nasser a
when various Arab sources reported that the mounting resentmen
the Egyptian army, and Egypt's financial problems could enda
latter's rule.65 In light of these difficulties, Nuri thought that the
president would become more flexible.
The Foreign Office, and Eden in particular, were alarmed b
possible reconciliation between the two; in a telegram bearin
personal imprint, it was emphasized that there was no reason t
that Nasser's ambition 'to become the dictator of the Arab world' has
changed, and that in order to achieve this goal, he seeks to destroy the
Iraqi regime which he regards as the biggest stumbling block in his path.
The British emphasized that Nuri should not rely on Nasser but rather
should await his downfall, which would enable Iraq to emerge 'as the
leader of the Arabs, a position in which we should like to see her'.6 This
last sentence, written in late December 1956, showed more than anything
else Eden's lack of insight regarding Iraq's position in the Arab world.
However, the British need not have worried; Nuri had not changed his
position towards the Egyptian president, but was exploring a new device
in order to circumvent his own problems in the Arab world. Yet, the issue
never came to a head as Nasser ignored Suwaidi's message.67
Although Nuri effectively subdued the domestic strife, his abortive
manoeuvres in the Arab world contributed to Iraq's isolation and made
him the most despised Arab leader. The change of policy regarding the
Palestine question and the endeavour to turn the Baghdad Pact into a
Muslim pacts were intended to arrest the decline in Iraq's influence in the
Arab world. However, these actions did not improve her position; Iraq
was in dire need of external intervention, and it came with the Eisenhower
Doctrine.
At the end of 1956 Iraq was almost completely isolated in the Arab
100
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
ARAB HEGEMONY AFTER THE SUEZ CRISIS
world; yet, as early as February 1957 the most prominent Arab
paper, Al-Hayat predicted the formation of a new axis: 'the Saud
Jordani-Sudani axis'.68 By March 1957 it seemed that Nuri had r
much of his confidence, as he assured Wright that Nasser was now l
ground in the Arab world',69 and he agreed to resume the Baghdad P
meetings on all levels. At the same time, Hare, in Cairo, assessed tha
of the targets of the Egyptian president was 'to counter growing Eg
isolation'.70 How, then, did the new coalition emerge so swiftly, and
were the dynamics which brought about Egypt's and Syria's isola
the Arab world in early 1957?
At the beginning of 1957 Egypt found itself increasingly isolated;
the political ramifications of the Suez Crisis, this development
unexpected and was related to the greater involvement of the
States in the Middle East. The Americans became increasingly in
in the region owing to their fear that the Soviets would se
opportunity to fill the power vacuum caused by the British with
As a result, in January 1957 the Eisenhower doctrine was procla
which was in essence intended to deter communist aggression
Middle East, and which made provision for a special econom
military grant in the sum of two hundred million dollars. At the he
the proposal was the declaration that 'overt armed aggression fr
nation controlled by international communism would be met b
armed forces of the United States'.71
The Eisenhower Doctrine divided the Arab world into two camps: one
included Egypt and Syria, who rejected Western support, being more
inclined towards neutralism; while the other consisted of the rulers who
feared communist penetration and were convinced that their future was
tied up with the West, both ideologically and economically. The formation
of the Royalist axis, however, was neither easy nor swift; the first
actual sign was in early February 1957, when the Iraqi crown prince met
King Saud in Washington. The meetings between Abd Al-Ilah and Saud
(6-7 February), more than anything else, symbolized the conclusion of a
long and bitter conflict between the two royal dynasties.72 The discussions
considerably improved Iraqi-Saudi relations and led Saud to adopt a
more conciliatory approach towards the Baghdad Pact. Saud's
favourable attitude towards the Eisenhower Doctrine as well as his
willingness to extend the Dhahran Airbase lease for five years lef
impression that the deliberations in Washington had succeeded in
tancing further Saud from Nasser.7The
Saudi drift away from Egypt was also manifested by her gro
interest in Jordanian affairs; this was clearly shown by the dispatch o
Saudi contingent to Jordan during the Suez War. Even more
101
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
ficantly, Saud signed the 'Arab Solidarity Pact' in January 1957,
he committed himself to pay Jordan (at this stage still cooperat
Egypt and Syria) an annual subsidy of LE 12.5m for a period of
to replace the British subsidy.74 The rift became evident during
conference in February 1957 which was divided upon the questio
Eisenhower Doctrine; while Nasser and Quwatly opposed it,
Husayn enthusiastically endorsed it.75 However, Jordan was not
to become party to a Royalist coalition; though Husayn had
shown his symphathy for Saud's position, his freedom of
somewhat circumscribed by the nationalist cabinet, headed b
al-Nabulsi. The friction between the King and his cabinet cam
in April 1957 when Husayn, with American and Saudi supp
ceeded in ousting Nabulsi.76 This episode ushered in a new
Jordan; her short-lived flirtation with Egypt and Syria ended a
was free to take his place in what a British official term
Monarchistic Trade Union'.77
Saud's arrival for his first official visit in Baghdad since the beginning of
the rapprochement (May 1957) was a further step towards the consolidation
of the Royalist coalition. The Arab press attached great significance
to this meeting in terms of inter-Arab relations. The belief that great
changes were about to occur led an Iraqi official categorically to deny
rumours about the alleged intention of Iraq to withdraw from the
Baghdad Pact and to form a 'new Arab Alliance' with Saudi Arabia,
Jordan and, eventually Lebanon.78 During his visit, Saud left no room for
doubt concerning his position towards Nasser, especially after having
discovered an Egyptian plot to assassinate him a few days earlier.79 'I gave
him [Nasser] forty million dollars and other help besides,' complained
Saud, 'and in return he tried to assassinate me.'8 The latter asked Nuri to
convey unofficially to the British that he wished them to refrain from
lending financial or economic support to the Egyptian president; as Saud
stated, Nasser must remain 'as poor as possible'. He hoped that the latter
would then be compelled to turn to him for assistance, a scenario which
would allow Saud to use his financial leverage to mitigate Nasser's proSoviet
leanings.8'
During his deliberations, Saud also expressed his willingness to establish
a 'new alignment' in the Arab world; he proposed to convene an
Islamic conference in which Nasser - if he agreed to come at all - would be
in a minority. Saud proposed that, 'among the objects would be agreement
upon [the] collective right of self-defence under Article 51 of the
UN Charter, and recognition that the Baghdad Pact was in accordance
with this principle and was of advantage to the Muslim world'. Saud
further clarified that although he had no intention of committing his
102
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
ARAB HEGEMONY AFTER THE SUEZ CRISIS
country to this pact, he now understood its raison d'etre
Moreover, he hoped to achieve some cooperation in th
between the Islamic countries against communism.82 Ho
made it clear that, owing to his fear of Nasser's propaganda
new policy would have to be developed 'cautiously and s
The crystallization of the new alignment, which inclu
monarchies and Lebanon (and to a lesser degree Mor
Sudan and Libya), indicated Egypt's and Syria's isolation
world.84 This process reached its climax in June 1957, with
Amman, and Husayn's to Baghdad.85 In his assessment of
ments, Charles Johnston, the British ambassador in Amm
that Saud's visit was 'a further step towards the new alignm
world by which Jordan is linked with Saudi Arabia, and less
Iraq and the Lebanon, in opposition to Egypt and Syria'. '
caravan",' he added, 'is a much more homogeneous collect
than the group which came together with such enthusiasm
and February [in the Cairo conferences] and disintergra
tacularly in April and May.'86
The new atmosphere in the Arab world was clearly man
replacement of Nuri who had been prime minister durin
three years; in June 1957, at the climax of this process,
secure enough in its position, as Wright wryly lamented, 'to
normal Iraqi system of allowing the fruits of office to b
time to time by different groups of politicians.'87 Altho
country and throughout the Arab world Nuri was unpopular
eyes he was still considered a prominent leader: 'Nuri is
either physically or politically,' Wright remarked in early J
added that if Egypt would 'regain some of the impetus that
in the hearts of Arab Nationalists, not only Iraq but the We
a whole may well need him.'88 His evaluation proved to b
Thus Egypt's first bid for the dominance of the Arab world
the Suez War had been thwarted.
It should be emphasized, however, that the Royalist coalition was
never a homogeneous body; Saudi Arabia's attachment to this alignmen
was tenuous, sometimes even dubious; as long as Saudi interests were n
jeopardized, Saud saw himself as part of the alliance. At the same time he
refrained from taking any steps that would expose his vulnerable monarchy
to Egypt's subversive activities. Therefore, Saud preferred not
take a stand in inter-Arab conflicts but rather served as the eternal
mediator enjoying the trust and support of all the parties involved. In this
context, one must view Saud's visits to Damascus and Beirut in September
1957, born as they were out of the desire to allay tensions in Syria,
103
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
which had deteriorated nearly to the point of open hostilities.89
his growing bitterness against the Egyptian and Syrian regimes,' W
concluded, 'King Saud appears still to wish to maintain his
somewhat au dessus de la melee and to keep his lines out to all t
countries.90
By mid-1957 Nasser's position had completely changed; internally, the
repercussions of the Suez crisis were still strongly felt, at least economically;
while externally, the Eisenhower Doctrine brought about Egypt's
isolation in the Arab world. An illustrative example was the absence of
Arab-country contingents in the annual military parade held in Cairo on
23 July 1957.91 Just the year before, even Iraq had to send a token
representation in order to arrest Arab criticism.92 In addition to Nasser's
isolation among the Arab leaders (except Quwatly), there was some
measurable decline in his popularity among the masses. In fact, Dekmejian
has clearly shown that Nasser's 'centrality' in the media at that
time was the lowest since mid-1954, while he also observed a slight
decline in the manifestations of Arab nationalism.93 It seemed, therefore,
that the influence of the Egyptian leader had been 'contained' - a phrase
taken from the cold war terminology - at least in the Arab world. 'Nasser
has confined his recent efforts in the Arab field to trying to mend his
fences with Saudi Arabia', wrote a British official, 'and to trying to keep
Syria aligned with him without accepting commitments there.' However,
the African Department correctly judged that Nasser's ultimate aim of
achieving hegemony in Egypt's three circles (Arab, African and Muslim)
remained unchanged, and that 'he is simply waiting for suitable opportunities
to pursue his old objectives.'94 The assessment proved to be
accurate, for within six months the Egyptian president partially accomplished
his aims, at least in the Arab circle.
A new threat loomed over Egypt during the summer of 1957, as her
only ally - Syria - fell victim to the struggle between East and West over
control in the Middle East. On 12 August the Syrians expelled three
American diplomats after an American plot to overthrow the regime in
Damascus was uncovered. The United States, with the cooperation of
Turkey and Iraq, tried by different means to bring down the pro-Soviet
regime, fearing that Syria might become a 'victim of international Communism'
- a phrase in accordance with the conditions set out for activating
the Eisenhower Doctrine.95 Just as Syria was the hinge around which
the struggle between the superpowers turned, so was she also the focus of
the struggle over Arab hegemony. Nasser understood perfectly that any
Western victory there would likely end Egypt's claim for Arab hegemony
and that only by controlling Syria could he aspire to regional leadership.96
Consequently, on 13 October Egyptian troops landed in Latakiyya,
104
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
ARAB HEGEMONY AFTER THE SUEZ CRISIS
thereby formally activating the Defence Pact signed in 1955.97 A
by that time much of the crisis had dissipated, the Egyptian
firmly re-established that he was the sole arbiter of the Syrian
the Arab world, and he clearly showed that Syria was still withi
sphere of influence.
The establishment of the United Arab Republic in Februa
which came to many as a surprise, transformed the Arab politic
From 1955, and especially through 1957, Egypt and Syria had
various unification schemes, yet it was not expected that S
completely surrender her sovereignty to Egypt. Moreover,
was not in accordance with the traditional Egyptian pol
preferred to maintain the independence of the Arab states
influence.9 The conventional explanation was that the Syrian off
the Ba'th Party forced the union on Nasser as a result of t
situation in Syria. This explanation, propagated by the Egyp
dent and his advisors, has been accepted by some scholars.9
less, it seems that the importance of the Syrian pressur
overestimated, while Egypt's motivation for the merger, wh
less significant, has been played down. Analysing the reaso
creation of the UAR is beyond the scope of this article; however
to comprehend the change in the Arab political pendulum in
Egypt, it is necessary to explain Nasser's motivation for the
The military intervention in Syria did not extricate Egypt
isolation in the Arab world; moreover, the Egyptian presiden
the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact as potential th
position. No wonder, therefore, that the annual confere
Baghdad Pact in Ankara (January 1958), attended by Dulles,
Egypt's fears concerning the revitalization of the pact or its
with NATO.'1° This anxiety was clearly manifested in the E
media: the editor of the weekly Al-Mussawar, for example, wrot
reasons for the merger were the Suez War, the NATO conf
Paris, 'and after that, the most salient factor is the Bag
[conference] in Ankara'.10' Ahmad Said, in his propaganda
claimed that 'every meeting of the Baghdad Pact is followed
against the Arabs, and the union between Syria and Egypt i
which protects Arabism against any aggression'02. Nasser's
isolation in the Arab world, and his fear of an American and
Pact conspiracy against him, perhaps by using NATO or by impl
the Eisenhower Doctrine, compelled him - among other things with
Syria. The UAR, therefore, was not only a 'shield' for
Arabism and Syria, but also for protecting Egypt.
In addition to the above-mentioned considerations, the crea
105
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
UAR, like the military intervention, was intended to maint
influence over Syria and display Nasser's leading role within
world. As Syria, on the verge of collapse as a political comm
falling prey to super power rivalries, Egypt grasped the opp
counteract her isolation in the Arab world by 'rescuing' Syr
more, the Egyptian president saw the union as a means of o
stronger foothold in the Fertile Crescent against the Hashem
and Jordan.103 It is true that the union was not in accordance wit
traditional policy of maintaining the independence of Arab
ever, it was consistent with his policy 'to hold tenaciously to th
to counter-attack whenever in danger of being out-manoe
isolated within the Arab world.'04
The establishment of the UAR undoubtedly displayed Nasser's great
tactical skill; first, he finally succeeded in breaking Egypt's isolation, and
in coming out victorious in the struggle for Arab hegemony; second, he
reasserted himself as the eponym of Arab Nationalism in the eyes of the
masses. 'In early 1958,' wrote Dekmejian, 'all indications were that Abd
al-Nasir was at the zenith of his popularity among Arab masses.'105 The
last efforts of Arab conservative elites to struggle against the tide of Arab
nationalism were doomed: the establishment of the 'Arab Union'
between Iraq and Jordan on 14 February was no more than a
imitation of the UAR; Saudi Arabia was quick to abandon the sink
Royalist ship; the military coup in Iraq (July 1958), which eliminated t
Hashemite dynasty, and the civil war in Lebanon (May 1958), wer
sparked by the Nasserist wave which flooded the Arab world. Thus
marked the climax of Nasser's quest for power in the Middle East. A ne
era in Arab politics had begun, but the struggle between Egypt and
for Arab hegemony - although with different protagonists - remai
central feature of inter-Arab relations for years to come.
NOTES
1. Rashid Khalidi, for example, in a recent study, wrote that after the Suez
Nasser firmly established himself as 'the pre-eminent Arab leader until t
life, and Arab nationalism as the leading Arab ideology for at least th
'Consequences of the Suez Crisis in the Arab World', in R. Louis and R
The Suez 1956, the Crisis and Its Consequences (Oxford 1989), p.377
Shemesh, 'Egypt: From Military Defeat to Political Victory', in S. I. T
Shemesh (eds.), The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and Reappra
1989), p.160.
2. Most of the details concerning this period are taken from my doctoral thesis. 'The
Quest for Arab Hegemony: The Struggle Over the Baghdad Pact. 1954-58', (Dec.
1990), Tel Aviv University [Hebrew].
106
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
ARAB HEGEMONY AFTER THE SUEZ CRISIS 107
3. Al-Hayat, 1 Aug. 1954, p.2: see also Mudhakkirat Khale
Khaled Al-Azm], Vol.2. Ch.12.
4. H. Thomas. The Suez Affair (London, 1986), p.38.
5. On Nuri's views in this respect, see Wright's minute [Wright was British ambassador in
Baghdad], 30 July 1956, VQ1051/43, F0371/121662. Henceforth, unless otherwise
mentioned, all the documents are taken from F0371. See also; Wright to FO, Tel.
914, 20 Aug. 1956, JE10393/2, 118857; Tel. 951,29 Aug 1956, ES1021/53, 120756. This
was also the view of the Crown Prince, see Amery to Lloyd, 1 Aug. 1956, VQ1051/44,
121662.
6. Al-Hayat, 7 Aug. 1956.
7. Gardner (Damascus) to FO, Tel. 452, 11 Aug 1956, JE14211/632, 119100; for a slight
different version, see Al-Hayat 10 Aug. 1956.
8. Wright to FO, Tel. 876; 11 Aug. 1956, JE14211/632, 119099.
9. Al-Hayat, 14 Aug. 1956, Trevelyan (Cairo) to FO, Tel. 1526, 12 Aug. 1956, JE14211/
660, 119100; Tel. 1551, 13 Aug 1956, JE4211/691, 119101.
10. More details on the Arab League meeting, see Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 1545, 13 Aug.
1956, JE14211/687, 119101.
11. Al-Hayat, 17 Aug. 1956.
12. Ibid., 15 Aug. 1956; 25 Aug. 1956.
13. For the names of the delegates, see al-Hayat, 19 Sept. 1956.
14. Khalid. p.377, is just one recent example.
15. Wright to Ross. 29 Aug. 1956, JE10393/5, 118857; Wright to FO, Tel. 955, 31 Aug.
1956, JE10393/3, 118857.
16. Wright to FO, Tel. 914, 20 Aug. 1956, JE10393/2, 118857; Tel. 951, 29 Aug. 1956,
ES1021/53, 120756.
17. W. Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of NuriAs-Said, 1954-1958
(Baltimore, 1964), p.151; see also Shuckburgh's Minute, 6 March 1956, VQ10325/3,
121655.
18. Parkes (Riyadh) to FO, Tel. 241,8 Aug. 1956, JE14211/474, 119094; Parkes to Lloyd,
Despatch No.57. 11 Aug. 1956, ES10316/10, 120759; see also M. H. Heikal, Cutting
the Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes (London: 1986), pp.133, 155-7 (henceforth
Heikal).
19. Parkes to FO, Tel. 249. 18 Aug. 1956, ES1021/49, 120756; Parkes to Lloyd, Despatch
No.65, 3 Oct. 1956, ES1021/102, 120758.
20. Wright to FO, Tel. 29 Aug. 1956, ES1021/53,120756; Tel. 970, Sept. 1956, ES1021/57,
120756. On Zayd's visit to Riyadh, see Wright to FO, Tel. 951. 29 Aug. 1956,
ES1021/53, 120756; Tel.954, 30 Aug. 1956, ES1021/55, 120756; Walmsley's Minute,
10 Sept. 1956, ES1021/75, 120757.
21. Accounts concerning the Saud-Faysal meeting, see Wright to FO, Tel. 1049, 15 Sept
1956, ES1021/72, 120757; Tel.1085, 23 Sept. 1956, ES1021/81, 120757; Parkes to FO,
Tel.303, 23 Sept. 1956, ES1021/84, 120757; Parkes to Lloyd, Despatch No.65, 3 Oct.
1956, ES1021/102, 120758.
22. Most of the material concerning the tripartite meeting is taken from Heikal, pp. 158-9.
23. Parkes to FO, Tel. 318, 2 Oct. 1956, ES1021/94. 120757.
24. Duke (Amman) to FO, Tel.1138, 18 Aug. 1956, VJ10393/54, 121486, Wright to FO,
Tel.945, 28 Aug. 1956, VJ10393/55, 121486.
25. FO to Baghad, Tel. 1948, 28 Sept. 1956, VJ10393/69, 121486.
26. Wright to FO, Tel. 1097, 27 Sept. 1956, VJ10393/68, 121486.
27. 'Israel and the entrance of Iraqi army to Jordan' [Hebrew], 18 Oct. 1956. The Israeli
Archives, File 2453/10.
28. Trevelyan to FO, Tel.2480, 17 Oct. 1956, JE1053/87, 118865.
29. On the results of Abd Al-Ilah's visit, see Wright to FO, Tel. 1187, 17 Oct 1956,
VJ10393/146, 121489; Duke to FO, Tel. 1490, 18 Oct. 1956, VJ10393/161, 121489;
Duke to FO, Tel. 1490, 18 Oct. 1956, VJ10393/161, 121489; Wright to FO, Tel. 1187,
17 Oct. 1956, VJ10393/146, 121489.
30. M. Riad, Mudhakkirat Mahmud Riad. al-Amn al-Qaumi bayna al-injaz wal-fashal
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
[The Memoirs of Mahmud Riad: National Security between Succ
(Cairo, 1986), p.155 (henceforth Riad).
31. BBC, No.92, 8 Nov. 1956, II.
32. Riad, p.155; BBC, No.93, 9 Nov. 1956, I.
33. Al-Hayat, 4 Nov. 1956, 7 Nov. 1956.
34. Wright to Lloyd, Despatch No.181, 11 July 1957, VQ1051/34, 128
35. Riad, pp.155-7: Heikal, pp.189-91.
36. Ibid, p.191.
37. Riad, p.157.
38. Ibid.
39. Middelton (Beirut) to FO, Tel. 1074, 8 Nov. 1956, VL1022/8, 121608.
40. Middelton to Lloyd, Despatch No.188, 27 Nov. 1956, VL1022/13, 121608; Wright
FO, Tel. 1416, 17 Nov. 1956, VL1022/11, 121608.
41. Middelton to Lloyd, Despatch No.188, 27 Nov. 1956, VL1022/13, 121608.
42. BBC, No.87, 2 Nov. 1956, II.
43. Wright to FO, Tel. 1263, 2 Nov. 1956, VQ1015/94, 121646; Tel. 1250, 2 Nov. 1956,
VR1091/484, 121785.
44. Wright to FO, Tel. 1287, 4 Nov. 1956, VR1091/523, 121786.
45. Wright to FO, Tel. 1238, 1 Nov. 1956, VJ10393/176, 121489.
46. Wright to FO, Tel. 1268, 3 Nov. 1956, VR1091/557, 121787.
47. Wright to FO, Tel. 1280, 3 Nov. 1956, VJ10393/182, 121489.
48. Wright to FO, Tel. 1307, 6 Nov. 1956, VR1091/650, 121790.
49. Stevens (Tehran) to FO, Tel. 871, 4 Nov. 1956, VR1091/590, 121788; Stevens to
Lloyd, Despatch No.125, 15 Nov. 1956, V1073/405, 121266.
50. See the text of the final communique, Stevens to FO, Tel. 920, 8 Nov. 1956,
VR1091/766, 121793.
51. Al-Hayat, 10 Nov. 1956; Wright to FO, Tel. 49 Saving, 10 Nov. 1956, VQ1094/3,
121682; Tel. 1476, 26 Nov. 1956, VQ1015/108, 121647.
52. Wright to FO, Tel. 1348, 9 Nov. 1956, V1073/387, 121265.
53. On Iran's reaction, see Stevens to FO, Tel. 932, 10 Nov. 1956. V1073/387, 121265;
concerning Pakistan's reaction, see High Commissioner (Karachi) to Commonwealth
Relations Office, Tel. 1878, 13 Nov. 1956, 121265; and, Turkey's reaction, see
Bowker (Ankara) to FO, Tel. 954, V1073/399, 121266.
54. Al-Hayat, 14 Nov. 1956; BBC, No.98, 15 Nov. 1956, pp.7-8.
55. Al-Hayat, 16 Nov. 1956;
56. See the text of the final communique. Ibid; 24 Nov. 1956.
57. BBC, No.105, 23 Nov. 1956, p.8; No.106, 24 Nov. 1956, I
58. P. Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1958 (New
Edition, London: 1986), pp.270-82 (henceforth Seale).
59. For more details concerning the Iraqi plot, see the memoirs of W. C. Eveland, Ropes
of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East (New York, 1980), pp. 181-233; and, FO
to Baghdad, Tel. 2255, 11 Sept. 1957, VY1015/186, 128227. See also two articles,
recently published: D. Little, 'Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and
Syria, 1945-1958,' Middle East Journal, Vol. 44, No.l (Winter 1990), pp.51-75; A.
Gorst and W. S. Lucas, 'The Other Collusion: Operation Straggle and AngloAmerican
Intervention in Syria, 1955-56,' Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 4,
No.3 (July 1989), pp.576-95.
60. Ibid., pp.224-7.
61. Heikal, p.209.
62. Wright to FO, Tel. 1444, 21 Nov. 1956, V1022/2, 121223; Tel. 1449, 21 Nov. 1956,
V1022/3, 121223.
63. Heikal, pp.210-11.
64. Wright to FO, Tel. 1655, 24 Dec. 1956, JE1015/107, 118835.
65. See for example, Middelton to FO, Tel. 1513, 24 Dec. 1956, JE1015/106, 118838;
Wright to FO, Tel. 9, 2 Jan. 1957, JE1015/2, 125411; Tel. 74, 17 Jan. 1957, JE1023/3,
125426; Tel. 20, 4 Jan. 1957, JE1015/6, 125411; Bailey to Watson, 19 Jan. 1957,
JE1015/41, 125412.
108
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
ARAB HEGEMONY AFTER THE SUEZ CRISIS 109
66. Eden's Minute, 26 Dec. 56, JE1015/115, 118836; see also
Tel. 3182, 27 Dec. 1956, 118836. On this version Eden w
67. Wright to FO, Tel. 9, 2 Jan. 1957, JE1015/2, 125411; Tel. 7
125426.
68. Al-Hayat, 16 Feb. 1957.
69. Wright to FO, Tel. 299, 7 March 1957, VB1072/46, 1288
70. FO to Washington, Tel. 1030, 4 March 1957, V1022/13,
71. On the Eisenhower Doctrine, see Seale, pp.285-9.
72. Wright to FO, Tel. 62, 15 Jan. 1957, V010325/1, 12804
Hadow, 26 Jan. 1957, VQ10325/2, 128047.
73. On the visits of Saud and Abd al-Ilah, and the meeting
(Washington) to Lloyd, Despatch No.42, 15 Feb. 1957, ES1
Rose, 13 Feb. 1957, VQ10325/7, 128052; Beaumont to Ll
May 1957, VQ10325/7, 128047.
74. For the text of the Arab Solidarity Pact, see Khalil, pp
75. Most of the details concerning the 'second Cairo Confer
Hayat, 11 March 1957; Having no other available source,
sadors had to base their accounts on Al-Hayat's version. See
to FO, Tel. 8 Saving, 1 March 1957, V1022/11, 127724; For
communique, see BBC, No.185, March 1957, pp.l-2; Kh
76. For an account of the Jordanian crisis, see the memoirs of
Amman, C. Johnston, The Brink of Jordan (London: 197
77. Beaumont (Baghdad) to Lloyd, Despatch No.116, 10 May
78. Al-Hayat, 8 May 1957.
79. On the attempt on Saud's life, see the summary of the L
1957, ES1015/4A, 127150; Wright to FO, Tel. 39 Saving
127150.
80. Wright to Lloyd, Despatch No.140, 30 May 1957, VQ10325/13, 128047.
81. Wright to FO, Tel. 632, 15 May 1957, JE1152/13, 125471. The Foreign Office duly
promised that he had no intention of helping Nasser, FO to Baghdad, Tel. 1326, 21
May 1957, JE1152/13, 125471.
82. Wright to FO, Tel. 633, 15 May 1957, VQ10325/8, 128047.
83. Wright to Lloyd, Despatch No.140, 30 May 1957, VQ10325/13, 128047;
See also, Wright to FO, Tel. 633, 15 May 1957, VQ10325/8, 128047.
84. Al-Hayat, 16 June 1957.
85. On Saud's visit to Jordan, see Johnston to FO, Tel. 1046, 14 June 1957, VJ10325/11,
127892; Johnston to Lloyd, Despatch No.37, VJ10325/14, 127892; on Husayn's visit to
Iraq, see al-Hayat, 23 June 1957.
86. Johnston to Lloyd, Despatch No.37, 14 June 1957, VJ10325/14, 127892.
87. Wright to Lloyd, Despatch No.42, 11 March 1958, VQ1015/28, 134198.
88. Wright to Lloyd, Despatch No.176, 9 June 1957, VQ1015/34, 128041; on Nuri's
stature in Western eyes, see the article in Time magazine, quoted in Al-Hayat, 16 June
1957; and J. Alsop's article, 'The Pasha', New York Herald Tribune, 27 May 1957.
89. Most of the details concerning the Syrian crisis in Summer 1957 are not publicly
available yet; a good account is found in Seale, pp.289-306. See also Little, pp.69-74.
90. Wright to Lloyd, Despatch No.301, 28 Dec. 1957, VQ10325/1, 134039; Crawford
(Baghdad) to FO, Tel. 143, 31 Jan. 1958, VY10316/17, 134386.
91. K. Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis (London: 1960), p.252.
92. Wright to FO, Tel. 665, 14 June 1956, VQ10316/61A, 121651.
93. H. Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics (London: 1972),
p.112 (Figure 6), pp.94-5 (Figures 4-5).
94. 'A General Survey of Nasser's Foreign Policy', 30 Aug. 1957, JE1023/24, 125427.
95. Wheelock, p.254.
96. Seale, p.313.
97. Ibid., p.305; Riad, p.188.
98. Seale, pp.312-4; Riad, p.199.
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
110 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
99. Seale, pp.307-21; Riad, pp. 193-2
in Syria] (Cairo, 1962), pp. 15-40.; E
Arab Relations (London, 1962), pp
Israeli Conflict, 1948-1967 (New Y
100. For examples of such allegatio
Dec. 1957, p.3; No.426, 13 Dec. 19
1957, pp.2-3; No.439, 2 Jan. 1958
101. Al-Mussawar, No.1738, 31 Jan.
102. BBC, No.458, 24 Jan. 1958, p
103. P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and Hi
104. M. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: G
1981), p.32.
105. Dekmejian, p.58; see also, Vatikiotis. pp.234-6.
This content downloaded from
78.128.147.204 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 15:21:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms