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NACLA Report on the Americas
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From Trump to Biden in Latin America
The Biden administration holds significant political tools for navigating
relations with Latin America. How will it leverage this power?
Tom Long
To cite this article: Tom Long (2021) From Trump to Biden in Latin America, NACLA Report on the
Americas, 53:2, 121-126, DOI: 10.1080/10714839.2021.1923197
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2021.1923197
Published online: 19 May 2021.
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121Summer 2021  |  NACLA  — Report on the Americas
© 2021 North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)  —  121-126, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2021.1923197
AROUND THE REGION
TOM LONG
From Trump to Biden in
Latin America
The Biden administration holds significant political tools for navigating
relations with Latin America. How will it leverage this power?
S
tanding in the ornate Hall of the Americas
in 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry proclaimed
the death of the Monroe Doctrine.
Four years later, Kerry’s successor Rex Tillerson
exhumed the old doctrine: “I think it’s as relevant
today as it was the day it was written,” he said before
starting a tour of Latin America. Initially dismissed
by some as a curious gaff, in its arguments against
Chinese influence in Latin America, the Trump
administration continued a revival of Monroe’s
1823 denunciation of extra-hemispheric powers.
However, the invocations of Monroe masked a
strategic vacuum. Aside from browbeating Latin
American leaders about migration, the Trump
administration lacked a consistent approach to the
region. The dominant ethos was one of short-term
transactionalism, as with Mexico and Central America,
and personalized praise with minimal policy
follow through, as with Brazil. Regarding perceived
adversaries like Cuba and Venezuela, policy was
warped by pressures from several members of Congress
and narrow electoral interests.
The new administration of President Joseph Biden
is more rhetorically attuned to Latin American concerns,
both because of the makeup of his team and
Biden’s own longstanding connections to regional
leaders. As a young senator, Biden cut his teeth in
the battles over human rights and the 1978 Panama
Canal treaties, which gradually returned the canal
and adjacent lands to Panama’s control. Later, he
emerged as a strong advocate for Plan Colombia,
and the government of Colombian President Andrés
Pastrana saw him as an ally. As vice president, Biden
spearheaded the Obama administration’s economic
dialogue with Mexico and its security and migration
approach to Central America. Now, his team includes
committed multilateralists and liberal internationalists
in prominent positions, as well as seasoned Latin
American policy hands and Latinx officials.
For all those reasons, there is little doubt that
Biden’s discourse will re-bury the Monroe Doctrine.
Will his policy do so as well?
Monroe 3.0?
Whether Monroe is buried or not, elements of
this thinking are deeply embedded in U.S.
policies. Often, such fretting has its roots in comparison
with a misplaced, Monroeist nostalgia for levels
of unchallenged U.S. control that never existed, as
well as a shallow understanding of the nature of U.S.
power in the hemisphere.
While it is common to read sweeping proclamations
of unbroken U.S. “domination” or “hegemony”
over Latin America stretching back to 1823, the
history of the Monroe Doctrine is less clear-cut.
Initially, the United States lacked the clout to back
up the proclamation with force. Instead, the policy
co-existed with—and depended upon—extensive
British influence throughout the Americas. While
the transition from U.S. to British predominance
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122 NACLA  — Report on the Americas  |  VOL. 53, NO. 2
in Central America was under way by the middle
of the 19th century, U.S. influence elsewhere in
the hemisphere continued to vary geographically
and over time. U.S. leadership claims faced challenges
from Latin American and extra-hemispheric
actors. The meaning of the doctrine also changed
from presumptuous to interventionist as the United
States intervened in, and then occupied, Cuba in
the 1898 war against Spain. Perceived challenges to
U.S. influence consistently make U.S. policymakers
nervous.
Such fears also often misunderstand the nature
of U.S. power. In 1987, political economist Susan
Strange presciently argued that recurring, exaggerated
rumors of the death of U.S. hegemony
overlooked how U.S. power remains deeply embedded
in global structures of security provision (or
credible threat), production of goods and services,
finance and credit, and influence over knowledge.
In Latin America, the United States has only lost
serious ground in the production of goods. Chinese
lending has declined since 2015 and nearly disappeared
since the onset of the pandemic; U.S. control
of the financial infrastructure remains. While the
Trump administration bungled the public health
response to Covid-19, the U.S. Treasury demonstrated
its ability to throw lifelines to U.S. partners,
as political scientist Carla Norrlöf shows. The United
States retains its lead in military power and knowledge
infrastructure in Latin America. The structural
power built over a century retains deep roots.
Trump’s transactionalism created some short-term
“wins” while eroding the long-term basis of structural
power. But the Biden administration retains
tremendous tools and leverage in Latin America. It
may marshal these into competition with China or
into supporting a more positive transition in its foreign
policy towards the region.
The Region Biden Encounters
At the international level, Latin America has
changed dramatically in recent years. Two
In his second meeting with a foreign leader, President Joe Biden met virtually with Mexican President Andrés Manuel
López Obrador on March 1, 2021. (WHITE HOUSE)
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Summer 2021  |  NACLA  — Report on the Americas 123
elements stand out. First, starting in the mid-2000s,
a chasm opened between the economic orientations
of most of South America and those of Mexico, Central
America, and much of the Caribbean. The cause,
essentially, was Chinese commodity demand. Chinese
imports flooded most of Latin America equally,
but Chinese purchases of Latin American exports—
and relatedly, China’s provision of finance—were
highly unequal. The end of the “China boom” after
2013 represented a dramatic reduction of commodity
demand, but China remained the leading
provider of imports to most of Latin America.
Second, regional leadership has fragmented since
Biden’s time as vice president, sinking regional
institutions. Most prominently, the Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR)—once the great hope
for new, multidimensional regional cooperation
without the United States—collapsed in 2018 amid
divisions over ideology and Venezuela policy. It has
not been replaced with any meaningful mechanism
for regional coordination. Among major contenders
for regional leadership, Brazil’s Bolsonaro is hostile
to perceived “globalism,” while Mexico’s López
Obrador spares little time for foreign policy. With
few exceptions, the region struggles to enunciate a
shared agenda.
These factors will create challenges for Biden.
The need for regional cooperation in Latin American
and inter-American relations remains pressing.
Above all, there is a need for regional economic
strategies that avoid the mistakes of both the Washington
Consensus and the China boom and bust.
Chinese exports—often effectively subsidized—
challenge Latin American production. This creates
some shared regional priorities, but South America’s
continued reliance on Chinese commodity purchases
and hopes for renewed lending complicate
coordinated regional responses. Given the United
States’ lasting structural power, there is a need for
the United States to engage in this cooperation, too.
Biden’s legacy and foreign policy team suggest
a return to liberal internationalism, including
an emphasis on multilateralism. That penchant
for multilateralism offers the potential for more
positive approaches to inter-American relations.
Multilateralism has often been a favored tool for
Latin American leaders who sought to curtail U.S.
unilateral impulses, and they have variously sought
multilateral versions of the Monroe Doctrine in
international law or seized opportunities to soft balance
or institutionally bind the United States.
However, deeper multilateral cooperation entails
risks of U.S. overreach, and Biden’s priorities suggest
that cooperation would encompass issues
where numerous Latin American governments are
not eager to mess with the status quo. The burning
of the Amazon in Brazil, human rights in Mexico,
corruption in Honduras and Guatemala, and authoritarianism
in Nicaragua and El Salvador stand
out. Though Trump’s insults and approach were
unsightly, many leaders found a modus vivendi,
striking bargains and enjoying the lack of U.S. scrutiny
on human rights, corruption, and climate policy.
Policy Priorities
How will the Biden administration respond
to these contradictions? It is often suggested
that Latin America is unlikely to draw much attention.
Surely, Biden’s agenda will be occupied by
the pandemic and recovery. Foreign policy will be
dominated by never-ending wars, Iran, China, and
rebuilding trans-Atlantic ties.
However, U.S. “gravity,” structural power, and deep
interdependence mean that many largely domestic
policies will have tremendous impacts for the region.
These include the pandemic and recovery, U.S. fiscal
and Treasury policy, domestic environmental policy,
and approaches to drugs, crime, and prisons. For
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, the
traditional “intermestic” issues will weigh heavily.
Border policies, migration and asylum, U.S. firearms
laws, and trade and government procurement have
immediate impacts on the United States’ neighbors.
More traditional foreign policy issues will also come
to bear on the region.
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124 NACLA  — Report on the Americas  |  VOL. 53, NO. 2
The pandemic and economic recovery will take
top billing. U.S. decisions on economic stimulus
and monetary policy will shape patterns of growth
or recession for countries tightly linked to the
United States. The prioritization of demand-side
spending in a $1.9 trillion stimulus package is good
news for Mexican production. The mercantilism
of Biden’s “Buy American” provisions, however,
is a worrying holdover from the Trump era and
before. Treasury decisions will shape credit markets
for the whole region. Biden’s appointments of
figures like Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen suggest
a moderate, Keynesian approach amenable to continued
expansion with slightly more tolerance for
inflation risk. Even small changes to U.S. monetary
policy will have profound effects after a period of
pandemic-induced spending and revenue losses.
In health policy, the Trump administration
largely abandoned the region and let Latin American
governments turn to vaccines from Russia,
China, and international organizations. Biden has
ramped up vaccine production, particularly of the
easier-to-distribute, single-shot Johnson & Johnson
vaccine. These purchases may allow the United States
to belatedly enter the ambit of vaccine diplomacy
after having lost ground to China and Russia. Certainly,
the administration’s rhetoric and appointees
realize that vaccination in Latin America is crucial
Vice president Joe Biden speaks to President Juan Orlando Hernández of Honduras during a meeting with leaders of
northern Central America. Also featured are former presidents Salvador Sánchez Cerén (right) of El Salvador and Jimmy
Morales of Guatemala. (WIKIMEDIA / PRESIDENCIA EL SALVADOR)
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Summer 2021  |  NACLA  — Report on the Americas 125
for the United States, too. In practice, though, nationalism
has dominated early efforts and fed justifiable
impressions that a miserly United States is hoarding
vaccines and ignoring its neighbors. U.S. vaccination
programs and the restoration of “normal” economic
activity will affect the region in other ways. Notably,
the interruption of tourism upended the economy
in parts of Mexico and in many Caribbean islands.
Elements of Biden’s coalition will renew the push
for police, prisons, and sentencing reform. The
administration will exercise more discretion in the
tolerance of state-level experiments with legalization
and decriminalization—as a corollary, it will have to
be more accepting of Mexican marijuana legalization.
These changes create space for discussing less
militarized forms of policing at home and abroad, but
on their own will not shift the dynamics of the war
on drugs. Though even congressionally mandated
reports accept the failure of an interdiction-first,
militarized approach, the drug war retains deep
bureaucratic (and often public) support both in the
United States and many Latin American countries.
On “intermestic” issues, from Biden’s first days in
office, he made migration a focus. Notably, Biden’s
immediate policies and legislative plans go beyond
rolling back the Trump administration’s nativism.
They also break with Obama’s strategy of trading
border enforcement budgets for migration reforms.
That approach failed against Republican obstructionism
while causing tremendous damage to migrant
communities. Enforcement will not disappear. Biden
is unlikely to “abolish ICE” given the entrenched
resistance. The short-lived appointment of Ambassador
Roberta Jacobson as border coordinator was
more geared to resolve intra-agency disputes than
to act as an advocate for open borders. Biden’s team
continues to struggle with tremendous logistical
challenges on the ground and to find policies that
balance a more humane approach, especially to
minors, and an entrenched enforcement paradigm.
Nonetheless, Biden’s approach holds the promise
of real improvements in conditions for migrants,
transnational families, and Central American economies
through possibilities for greater circulatory
migration.
However, Biden’s migration strategy has another
element that may be less welcome in Central America
and Mexico. Democratic insiders like Daniel
Restrepo, a former Obama administration advisor
on the Americas, are increasingly arguing that corruption
is a driver of Central American migration.
Restrepo advocates renewed anti-corruption measures
and the denial of visas and financial access to
corrupt officials, as well as firmer links between U.S.
aid and governance reforms in Central America.
Such policies will face resistance of the sort engendered
by international anti-corruption agencies like
the Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption
and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH) and
the International Commission Against Impunity
in Guatemala (CICIG), both now defunct. Similar
reforms could subject Mexican security forces to
greater scrutiny. This should include state forces, like
the Tamaulipas state police unit involved in a massacre
of Guatemalans in early 2021, and the National
Guard. Though nominally new, the National Guard
is overwhelmingly made up of old Mexican military
units. Such scrutiny will not sit well with political
The China boom and bust were a reminder of how deeply
South America’s social progress depended on extractive
economies. The economic depths of the pandemic
incentivize those activities even at lower commodity prices,
risking a further entrenchment of carbon-intensive growth.
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dynasties like the family of President Juan Orlando
Hernández in Honduras or with the Mexican military
brass. Indeed, that is the point.
Climate change will take a higher place on the
agenda than for any previous administration. The
high-profile appointment of John Kerry as climate
envoy, and ambitious U.S. emissions targets, suggests
the United States will emphasize international climate
negotiations beyond the Paris Accord. While
most climate attention will take place at the global
level of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), South America’s
role is too big to leave to the global forum. Renewed
fires in the Amazon will receive sustained U.S.
attention, in a sharp contrast to the Trump administration’s
shrug. This will increase pressure on Brazil,
in particular, but also on Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.
The China boom and bust were a reminder of how
deeply South America’s social progress depended on
extractive economies. The economic depths of the
pandemic incentivize those activities even at lower
commodity prices, risking a further entrenchment of
carbon-intensive growth. The conjuncture calls for
new models. The Biden administration will likely
try to cajole greater cooperation, perhaps with economic
incentives.
On more traditional foreign policy issues, namely
Cuba, Venezuela, and the role of China in the hemisphere,
there are divisions within the administration
and across the hemisphere. Some in the administration
will see Cuba and Venezuela through the lens of
Biden’s weak performance in South Florida, where
elections cost the Democrats in the House as well
as in the presidential tally. There will be some holdover
sympathy from Obama’s Cuba policy. However,
unlike during Obama’s second term, Cuba lacks
the broad coalition of supportive friends in Latin
America. On both Cuba and Venezuela policy, the
moderate, coordinating role of Colombia’s Juan
Manuel Santos has been replaced by opposition from
Iván Duque, backed by Brazil. On Venezuela, Biden
inherits a policy with no runway and no evident exit
ramp. His early moves play up humanitarianism,
including the provision of Temporary Protected
Status for Venezuelans in the United States and an
openness to reconsider some broad-based sanctions.
However, this does not offer an end to the political
stalemate.
On China, elements of the trade war will diminish,
but underlying dynamics remain. Given China’s
aggressive moves against Hong Kong and growing
fears about Taiwan, such tensions may grow.
It is less likely that China will be a litmus test for
inter-American relations, but on this issue, Monroeist
impulses will remain. Stoked by intelligence
and commercial concerns, the State Department will
continue pressure over Chinese technology and the
construction of 5G networks. The question for Latin
American leaders, then, is whether they will try to
multilateralize these U.S. pressures or deflect them
in the name of greater autonomy.
On several issues, Biden can look to Latin America
for foreign policy wins with domestic political benefits.
Cooperation with Central America and Mexico,
in particular, would pay dividends on migration
and trade. A change in tone has already served as
a welcome break from Trump’s dog-whistle attacks
on Mexicans and Central Americans as criminals.
It should extend to a clear repudiation of Trump’s
border wall—an early rallying point for anti-Trump
activism—and to associated nativist polices. Biden
should go further, listening seriously to regional
preferences for multilateralism and international
law, and demonstrating an openness to rethink
failed policy paradigms. Only then will the rhetoric
of engaging as “equals” be matched by reality.  nn
Tom Long is associate professor in the Department of Politics
and International Studies at the University of Warwick
and affiliated professor at the Centro de Investigación y
Docencia Económicas, Mexico. He is author of Latin America
Confronts the United States: Asymmetry and Influence
(Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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