Voters’ Perception of Pork Barrel Politics _ PMCb1113 Money and Politics Voters’ perception of pork-barrel - THEORY •Classical notion - politicians need to make favourable decisions in order to please their constituents and secure re-election (Downs 1957, Schumpeter 1943) • •Social psychology “Procedural fairness theory” (Allen & Birch, 2014; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002, 2008) •People care about how decisions are made • •Basic principle – process should be fair (to maintain the trust and support from voters) • •Personal motives can harm political trust – people less inclined to trust and vote • •In politics: politicians/decision-makers should be impartial (without personal interests in the outcome) • •Challenge: To please potential voters (favourable policies) and remain fair and impartial • Voters’ perception of pork-barrel – THEORY vs. PRACTICE Politicians seek reelection Downs, 1957 Mayhew, 1974 Popkin, 1991 Schumpeter, 1943 Intentional distribution of public resources Costa-I-Font et al., 2003 Denemark, 2000, 2014 Milligan & Smart, 2005 Influence of (local) electoral behavior Kitschelt, 2000 Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007 Stokes, 2005 Stokes et al., 2013 Voters’ perception of pork-barrel – THEORY vs. PRACTICE Voters Vote for decision-maker (?) Trust Support Intentional/Unfair/Partial distribution of resources Motivation for research •„Pork-barrel“ – unfair/impartial allocation of public finances – tool for securing votes/reelection • •UNFAIR = BAD •UNFAIR + BENEFIT = ?? • How voters perceive this inherently unfair effort to ensure their votes in case they can benefit from it? • (Are openly expressed „pork-barrel“ efforts efficient for politicians?) Best way to study voters (and perception?) EXPERIMENT Experiment (in political science) Why/when do we need experiment? How? •Randomization •Standardization •Placebo effect (medicine) • BIAS (independent variables) (dependent variables) Experiment (in political science) Randomization •Assignment of subjects into experimental conditions (groups) – difference in experimental manipulation •Random assignment → even distribution of unseen factors → reduction of biases •No systematic differences in subjects (and between groups) • • • source: khanacademy.org Experiment (in political science) Standardization • •To ensure the same procedures and measures apply for all subjects (respondents) • •All experimental sessions administered in the same way • •Laboratory experiments (controlled environment) • •Only values of independent variable can be (and have to be) manipulated • • Pork-barrel in lab US Congresspersons Braidwood (2015) Desirable pork: do voters reward for earmark acquisition? money for the district (pork-barrel projects/earmarks) appreciation from constituents •More grateful constituents v. general public opposes pork-barrel spending • •Braidwood: explain this discrepancy • •Experimental data Braidwood (2015) Desirable pork: do voters reward for earmark acquisition? •Scholars: pork-barrel politics make elections more safe (higher voters‘ evaluation) • •Theory: voters must be able to successfully connect actions of elected officials to specific benefit – requires knowledge of the voters (Popkin 1991) • •Evidence: citizens are uninformed about spending (and politics) • • •Braidwood first to directly measure connection between pork-barrel politics and opinions •Assumption: despite the “pork” is disliked in aggregate, can particular benefits increase politician‘s support? • •Personal economic well being (new roads, schools, ... ) – key factor in the candidate assessments • • Braidwood (2015) Desirable pork: do voters reward for earmark acquisition? Hypotheses: •Information about money secured for the local benefit will increase favorable evaluations of responsible member of Congress • •Information about personally relevant local benefit will increase evaluations of responsible member of Congress People like local projects, especially those devoted to the issues that are personally important to them Braidwood (2015) Desirable pork: do voters reward for earmark acquisition? Experiment •Survey-based lab experiment •Subjects: Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Florida residents to ensure direct connection between MC and voters) •5 groups (5 experimental conditions): Bill Nelson - general Marco Rubio - general Bill Nelson - education Marco Rubio - military Control group – no text Braidwood (2015) Desirable pork: do voters reward for earmark acquisition? Braidwood (2015) Desirable pork: do voters reward for earmark acquisition? Results • students education as important issue in army national defense as important issue Braidwood (2015) Desirable pork: do voters reward for earmark acquisition? Results •Exposure to the general treatment did not affect assessment of congressmen • •Higher saliency of the issue increases positive evaluation of congressmen • • CONCLUSION •Earmarks/pork-barrel politics may help politicians • CONDITION! •Issue/project must be individually relevant to the recipient/voter • Boggild (2016) How Politicians’ Reelection Efforts Can Reduce Public Trust, Electoral Support, and Policy Approval •Experiment in Denmark •Based on Procedural fairness theory (attention of voters to both outcomes and fairness of procedure) • •Assumption: people respond negatively to the reelection effort of politicians EVEN when such efforts are targeted at themselves (and provide them with favorable outcomes) • Impartiality/fairness = central determinant of vote choice (?) Boggild (2016) How Politicians’ Reelection Efforts Can Reduce Public Trust, Electoral Support, and Policy Approval Hypotheses: •Citizens will be less inclined to trust a political decision-maker who adopts a political decision motivated by winning reelection. • •Citizens will be less inclined to vote for a political decision-maker who adopts a political decision motivated by winning reelection. • •Citizens will be less inclined to support a political decision adopted by a political decision-maker motivated by winning reelection. Boggild (2016) How Politicians’ Reelection Efforts Can Reduce Public Trust, Electoral Support, and Policy Approval Study 1 •Survey-based experiment •Between subject design •2 x 2 factorial design (2 independent variables) • •Decision maker impartiality •Outcome favorability • •Paper and pencil •Subjects: Danish medical students (N = 154) •4 groups/experimental conditions Boggild (2016) How Politicians’ Reelection Efforts Can Reduce Public Trust, Electoral Support, and Policy Approval •Treatment: Made-up newspaper article in Politiken describing fictitious policy initiative at the EU level (article described how were participating countries chosen to the new educational grant scheme) • Impartial decision-maker Partial decision-maker Favourable Decision maker: Danish Distribution: random (money goes to Denmark) Decision maker: Danish Distribution: partial (money goes to Denmark) Unfavourable Decision maker: Belgian Distribution: random (money goes to Belgium) Decision maker: Belgian Distribution: partial (money goes to Belgium) Boggild (2016) How Politicians’ Reelection Efforts Can Reduce Public Trust, Electoral Support, and Policy Approval •Follow-up questionnaire • •Measurement of dependent variables: •Trust in decision-maker •Inclination to vote for decision-maker •Support for decision (money distribution) • •Questions with 0-10 scale Boggild (2016) How Politicians’ Reelection Efforts Can Reduce Public Trust, Electoral Support, and Policy Approval Results: money goes to participant’s home country (Denmark) money goes to another country (Belgium) partial (intentional/unfair) distribution impartial (fair/random) distribution Boggild (2016) How Politicians’ Reelection Efforts Can Reduce Public Trust, Electoral Support, and Policy Approval Results: • •Reelection efforts of politicians can depress public trust, inclination to vote and support of the political decision • •Effect persists even when people can benefit from such efforts • • •(Procedural) fairness matters What we know so far? •Existing findings limited and contradictory • •Experimental studies: • •USA – subjects who benefited from redistribution (aimed to please the voters) appreciated such decision (Braidwood 2015) • •Denmark – subjects responded to reelection efforts of politicians (impartial redistribution of public finances) with lower level of trust and reduced willingness to vote even when they can benefit from redistribution (Bøggild 2016) • •Appears that voters can perceive pork-barrel strategies both in positive and negative way • Contextually conditioned effect? • •Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) – „perceived levels of corruption“ – defined as „the misuse of public power for private benefit“ • •Denmark vs. CE countries Contextually conditioned effect? • •Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) – „perceived levels of corruption“ – defined as „the misuse of public power for private benefit“ • •Denmark vs. CE countries Contextually conditioned effect? • •Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) – „perceived levels of corruption“ – defined as „the misuse of public power for private benefit“ • •Denmark vs. CE countries Tóth, Nemčok, Spáč (2021) I Don't Like It Unless It's for Me: Perceptions of Pork-Barrel Politics in Central and Eastern Europe •Project „Distributive Politics in Central Europe“ – study of pork-barrel politics in CE (patterns of distribution, strategies, factors influencing distributive politics etc.) • •Experimental part – better understanding of psychological mechanisms behind distribution of subsidies • •Series of survey experiments (manipulation based on Boggild‘s (2016) study) - replication • • •Pilot study: summer 2018 – non representative sample of 87 subjects (survey distributed via social networks) – goal: test the design and manipulation • •1st study: 2018 – Slovakia – representative sample of 700 subjects • •2nd study: 2019 – Czech republic - representative sample of 1025 subjects – goal: replicate findings from 1st study • Tóth, Nemčok, Spáč (2021) I Don't Like It Unless It's for Me: Perceptions of Pork-Barrel Politics in Central and Eastern Europe • Benefit Fairness Trust in decision-maker Willingness to vote for decision-maker Support for the policy Tóth, Nemčok, Spáč (2021) I Don't Like It Unless It's for Me: Perceptions of Pork-Barrel Politics in Central and Eastern Europe Experimental design: •Experimental manipulation: newspaper article describing the way how money from made-up trial European health care grant scheme were distributed among several EU members •4 scenarios/versions: differences: •Benefit from distribution - origin of the politician (decision-maker responsible for the distribution of the money) •Slovak/Hungarian •Czech/German • •Fairness of such distribution •random draw •intentional (secure votes in upcoming elections) • •Participants randomly assigned to each condition Tóth, Nemčok, Spáč (2021) I Don't Like It Unless It's for Me: Perceptions of Pork-Barrel Politics in Central and Eastern Europe Slovakia Czech Republic Fair distribution Unfair distribution Fair distribution Unfair distribution Benefit Decision-maker: Slovak N = 186 Decision-maker: Slovak N = 174 Decision-maker: Czech N = 269 Decision-maker: Czech N = 256 No benefit Decision-maker: Hungarian N = 171 Decision-maker: Hungarian N = 169 Decision-maker: German N = 241 Decision-maker: German N = 259 Total 700 participants 1,025 participants Tóth, Nemčok, Spáč (2021) I Don't Like It Unless It's for Me: Perceptions of Pork-Barrel Politics in Central and Eastern Europe Results Trust in decision-maker Benefit + Fair Benefit + Unfair Tóth, Nemčok, Spáč (2021) I Don't Like It Unless It's for Me: Perceptions of Pork-Barrel Politics in Central and Eastern Europe Results Trust in decision-maker No benefit + Fair Benefit + Unfair Tóth, Nemčok, Spáč (2021) I Don't Like It Unless It's for Me: Perceptions of Pork-Barrel Politics in Central and Eastern Europe Results Willingness to vote Tóth, Nemčok, Spáč (2021) I Don't Like It Unless It's for Me: Perceptions of Pork-Barrel Politics in Central and Eastern Europe Results Support for the policy Tóth, Nemčok, Spáč (2021) I Don't Like It Unless It's for Me: Perceptions of Pork-Barrel Politics in Central and Eastern Europe Conclusion: •Subjects showed higher trust (and willingness to vote) to politician, who selected countries for funding on the fair basis (random selection) • •At the same time, they appreciated more if their country benefits from the funding program • •In contrast to Danish study (Boggild 2016), results indicate that people in Slovakia and Czech Republic are willing to forgive „corruption“ (unfairness) providing they benefit from it • •Reasons – context, characteristics of the sample (students v. population sample) • •Main result: Benefits beat fairness