What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not
Philippe C. Schmitter, Terry Lynn Karl
Journal of Democracy, Volume 2, Number 3, Summer 1991, pp. 75-88 (Article)
Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI:
For additional information about this article
https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1991.0033
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/225590
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[88.102.163.40]ProjectMUSE(2024-02-1411:54GMT)Hannah-Arendt-InstitutTotalitarismusforschung
WHAT DEMOCRACY IS
... AND IS NOT
Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl
Philippe C. Schmitter is professor of political science and director of the
Center for European Studies at Stanford University. Terry Lynn Karl is
associate professor of political science and director of the Center for
Latin American Studies at the same institution. The original, longer
version of this essay was written at the request of the United States
Agency for International Development, which is not responsible for its
content.
For some time, the word democracy has been circulating as a debased
currency in the political marketplace. Politicians with a wide range of
convictions and practices strove to appropriate the label and attach it to
their actions. Scholars, conversely, hesitated to use it--without adding
qualifying adjectives--because of the ambiguity that surrounds it. The
distinguished American political theorist Robert Dahl even tried to
introduce a new term, "polyarchy," in its stead in the (vain) hope of
gaining a greater measure of conceptual precision. But for better or
worse, we are "stuck" with democracy as the catchword of contemporary
political discourse. It is the word that resonates in people's minds and
springs from their lips as they struggle for freedom and a better way of
life; it is the word whose meaning we must discern if it is to be of any
use in guiding political analysis and practice.
The wave of transitions away from autocratic rule that began with
Portugal's "Revolution of the Carnations" in 1974 and seems to have
crested with the collapse of communist regimes across Eastern Europe
in 1989 has produced a welcome convergence towards a common
definition of democracy. ~ Everywhere there has been a silent
abandonment of dubious adjectives like "popular," "guided," "bourgeois,"
and "formal" to modify "democracy." At the same time, a remarkable
consensus has emerged concerning the minimal conditions that polities
must meet in order to merit the prestigious appellation of "democratic."
Moreover, a number of international organizations now monitor how well
Journal of Democracy Vol.2,No.3 Summer1991
76 Journal of Democracy
these standards are met; indeed, some countries even consider them when
formulating foreign policy.2
What Democracy Is
Let us begin by broadly defining democracy and the generic concepts
that distinguish it as a unique system for organizing relations between
rulers and the ruled. We will then briefly review procedures, the rules
and arrangements that are needed if democracy is to endure. Finally, we
will discuss two operative principles that make democracy work. They
are not expressly included among the generic concepts or formal
procedures, but the prospect for democracy is grim if their underlying
conditioning effects are not present.
One of the major themes of this essay is that democracy does not
consist of a single unique set of institutions. There are many types of
democracy, and their diverse practices produce a similarly varied set of
effects. The specific form democracy takes is contingent upon a
country's socioeconomic conditions as well as its entrenched state
structures and policy practices.
Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers
are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens,
acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected
representatives.3
A regime or system of governance is an ensemble of patterns that
determines the methods of access to the principal public offices; the
characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access;
the strategies that actors may use to gain access; and the rules that are
followed in the making of publicly binding decisions. To work properly,
the ensemble must be institutionalized that is to say, the various
patterns must be habitually known, practiced, and accepted by most, if
not all, actors. Increasingly, the preferred mechanism of
institutionalization is a written body of laws undergirded by a written
constitution, though many enduring political norms can have an informal,
prudential, or traditional basis.4
For the sake of economy and comparison, these forms, characteristics,
and rules are usually bundled together and given a generic label.
Democratic is one; others are autocratic, authoritarian, despotic,
dictatorial, tyrannical, totalitarian, absolutist, traditional, monarchic,
oligarchic, plutocratic, aristocratic, and sultanistic) Each of these regime
forms may in turn be broken down into subtypes.
Like all regimes, democracies depend upon the presence of rulers,
persons who occupy specialized authority roles and can give legitimate
commands to others. What distinguishes democratic rulers from
nondemocratic ones are the norms that condition how the former come
to power and the practices that hold them accountable for their actions.
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Schmitter & Karl 77
The public: realm encompasses the making of collective norms and
choices that are binding on the society and backed by state coercion. Its
content can vary a great deal across democracies, depending upon
preexisting distinctions between the public and the private, state and
society, legitimate coercion and voluntary exchange, and collective needs
and individual preferences. The liberal conception of democracy
advocates circumscribing the public realm as narrowly as possible, while
the socialist or social-democratic approach would extend that realm
through regulation, subsidization, and, in some cases, collective
ownership of property. Neither is intrinsically more democratic than the
other--just differently democratic. This implies that measures aimed at
"developing the private sector" are no more democratic than those aimed
at "developing the public sector." Both, if carried to extremes, could
undermine the practice of democracy, the former by destroying the basis
for satisfying collective needs and exercising legitimate authority; the
latter by destroying the basis for satisfying individual preferences and
controlling illegitimate government actions. Differences of opinion over
the optimal mix of the two provide much of the substantive content of
political conflict within established democracies.
Citizens are the most distinctive element in democracies. All regimes
have rulers and a public realm, but only to the extent that they are
democratic do they have citizens. Historically, severe restrictions on
citizenship were imposed in most emerging or partial democracies
according to criteria of age, gender, class, race, literacy, property
ownership, tax-paying status, and so on. Only a small part of the total
population was eligible to vote or run for office. Only restricted social
categories were allowed to form, join, or support political associations.
After protracted struggle--in some cases involving violent domestic
upheaval or international war--most of these restrictions were lifted.
Today, the criteria for inclusion are fairly standard. All native-born adults
are eligible, although somewhat higher age limits may still be imposed
upon candidates for certain offices. Unlike the early American and
European democracies of the nineteenth century, none of the recent
democracies in southern Europe, Latin America, Asia, or Eastern Europe
has even attempted to impose formal restrictions on the franchise or
eligibility to office. When it comes to informal restrictions on the
effective exercise of citizenship rights, however, the story can be quite
different. This explains the central importance (discussed below) of
procedures.
Competition has not always been considered an essential defining
condition of democracy. "Classic" democracies presumed decision making
based on direct participation leading to consensus. The assembled
citizenry was expected to agree on a common course of action after
listening to the alternatives and weighing their respective merits and
demerits. A tradition of hostility to "faction," and "particular interests"
78 Journal of Democracy
persists in democratic thought, but at least since The Federalist Papers
it has become widely accepted that competition among factions is a
necessary evil in democracies that operate on a more-than-local scale.
Since, as James Madison argued, "the latent causes of faction are sown
"However central
to democracy,
elections occur
intermittently and
only allow citizens
to choose between
the highly
aggregated
alternatives
offered by political
parties..."
into the nature of man," and the possible
remedies for "the mischief of faction" are
worse than the disease, the best course is to
recognize them and to attempt to control
their effects.6 Yet while democrats may
agree on the inevitability of factions, they
tend to disagree about the best forms and
rules for governing factional competition.
Indeed, differences over the preferred
modes and boundaries of competition
contribute most to distinguishing one
subtype of democracy from another.
The most popular definition of
democracy equates it with regular elections,
fairly conducted and honestly counted.
Some even consider the mere fact of elections---even ones from which
specific parties or candidates are excluded, or in which substantial
portions of the population cannot freely participate--as a sufficient
condition for the existence of democracy. This fallacy has been called
"electoralism" or "the faith that merely holding elections will channel
political action into peaceful contests among elites and accord public
legitimacy to the winners" no matter how they are conducted or what
else constrains those who win them.7 However central to democracy,
elections occur intermittently and only allow citizens to choose between
the highly aggregated alternatives offered by political parties, which can,
especially in the early stages of a democratic transition, proliferate in a
bewildering variety. During the intervals between elections, citizens can
seek to influence public policy through a wide variety of other
intermediaries: interest associations, social movements, locality groupings,
clientelistic arrangements, and so forth. Modern democracy, in other
words, offers a variety of competitive processes and channels for the
expression of interests and values---associational as well as partisan,
functional as well as territorial, collective as well as individual. All are
integral to its practice.
Another commonly accepted image of democracy identifies it with
majority rule. Any governing body that makes decisions by combining
the votes of more than half of those eligible and present is said to be
democratic, whether that majority emerges within an electorate, a
parliament, a committee, a city council, or a party caucus. For
exceptional purposes (e.g., amending the constitution or expelling a
member), "qualified majorities" of more than 50 percent may be
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Schmitter & Karl 79
required, but few would deny that democracy must involve some means
of aggregating the equal preferences of individuals.
A problem arises, however, when numbers meet intensities. What
happens when a properly assembled majority (especially a stable, selfperpetuating
one) regularly makes decisions that harm some minority
(especially a threatened cultural or ethnic group)? In these circumstances,
successful democracies tend to qualify the central principle of majority
rule in order to protect minority rights. Such qualifications can take the
form of constitutional provisions that place certain matters beyond the
reach of majorities (bills of rights); requirements for concurrent majorities
in several different constituencies (confederalism); guarantees securing the
autonomy of local or regional governments against the demands of the
central authority (federalism); grand coalition governments that
incorporate all parties (consociationalism); or the negotiation of social
pacts between major social groups like business and labor
(neocorporatism). The most common and effective way of protecting
minorities, however, lies in the everyday operation of interest associations
and social movements. These reflect (some would say, amplify) the
different intensities of preference that exist in the population and bring
them to bear on democratically elected decision makers. Another way
of putting this intrinsic tension between numbers and intensities would
be to say that "in modern democracies, votes may be counted, but
influences alone are weighted."
Cooperation has always been a central feature of democracy. Actors
must voluntarily make collective decisions binding on the polity as a
whole. They must cooperate in order to compete. They must be capable
of acting collectively through parties, associations, and movements in
order to select candidates, articulate preferences, petition authorities, and
influence policies.
But democracy's freedoms should also encourage citizens to deliberate
among themselves, to discover their common needs, and to resolve their
differences without relying on some supreme central authority. Classical
democracy emphasized these qualities, and they are by no means extinct,
despite repeated efforts by contemporary theorists to stress the analogy
with behavior in the economic marketplace and to reduce all of
democracy's operations to competitive interest maximization. Alexis de
Tocqueville best described the importance of independent groups for
democracy in his Democracy in America, a work which remains a major
source of inspiration for all those who persist in viewing democracy as
something more than a struggle for election and re-election among
competing candidates.8
In contemporary political discourse, this phenomenon of cooperation
and deliberation via autonomous group activity goes under the rubric of
"civil society." The diverse units of social identity and interest, by
remaining independent of the state (and perhaps even of parties), not
80 Journal of Democracy
only can restrain the arbitrary actions of rulers, but can also contribute
to forming better citizens who are more aware of the preferences of
others, more self-confident in their actions, and more civic-minded in
their willingness to sacrifice for the common good. At its best, civil
society provides an intermediate layer of governance between the
individual and the state that is capable of resolving conflicts and
controlling the behavior of members without public coercion. Rather
than overloading decision makers with increased demands and making
the system ungovernable,9 a viable civil society can mitigate conflicts
and improve the quality of citizenship---without relying exclusively on
the privatism of the marketplace.
Representatives--whether directly or indirectly elected-----domost of the
real work in modem democracies. Most are professional politicians who
orient their careers around the desire to fill key offices. It is doubtful
that any democracy could survive without such people. The central
question, therefore, is not whether or not there will be a political elite
or even a professional political class, but how these representatives are
chosen and then held accountable for their actions.
As noted above, there are many channels of representation in modem
democracy. The electoral one, based on territorial constituencies, is the
most visible and public. It culminates in a parliament or a presidency
that is periodically accountable to the citizenry as a whole. Yet the sheer
growth of government (in large part as a byproduct of popular demand)
has increased the number, variety, and power of agencies charged with
making public decisions and not subject to elections. Around these
agencies there has developed a vast apparatus of specialized
representation based largely on functional interests, not territorial
constituencies. These interest associations, and not political parties, have
become the primary expression of civil society in most stable
democracies, supplemented by the more sporadic interventions of social
movements.
The new and fragile democracies that have sprung up since 1974
must live in "compressed time." They will not resemble the European
democracies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and they
cannot expect to acquire the multiple channels of representation in
gradual historical progression as did most of their predecessors. A
bewildering array of parties, interests, and movements will all
simultaneously seek political influence in' them, creating challenges to the
polity that did not exist in earlier processes of democratization.
Procedures that Make Democracy Possible
The defining components of democracy are necessarily abstract, and
may give rise to a considerable variety of institutions and subtypes of
democracy. For democracy to thrive, however, specific procedural norms
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Schmitter & Karl 81
must be followed and civic rights must be respected. Any polity that
fails to impose such restrictions upon itself, that fails to follow the "rule
of law" with regard to its own procedures, should not be considered
democratic. These procedures alone do not define democracy, but their
presence is indispensable to its persistence. In essence, they are necessary
but not sufficient conditions for its existence.
Robert Dahl has offered the most generally accepted listing of what
he terms the "procedural minimal" conditions that must be present for
modem political democracy (or as he puts it, "polyarchy") to exist:
1) Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally
vested in elected officials.
2) Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted
elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
3) Practically all adults have the fight to vote in the election of
officials.
4) Practically all adults have the fight to run for elective offices in
the government....
5) Citizens have a fight to express themselves without the danger of
severe punishment on political matters broadly defined....
6) Citizens have a fight to seek out alternative sources of information.
Moreover, altemative sources of information exist and are protected by
law.
7) . . . Citizens also have the fight to form relatively independent
associations or organizations, including independent political parties and
interest groups.~~
These seven conditions seem to capture the essence of procedural
democracy for many theorists, but we propose to add two others. The
first might be thought of as a further refinement of item (1), while the
second might be called an implicit prior condition to all seven of the
above.
8) Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their
constitutional powers without being subjected to overriding (albeit
informal) opposition from unelected officials. Democracy is in jeopardy
if military officers, entrenched civil servants, or state managers retain the
capacity to act independently of elected civilians or even veto decisions
made by the people's representatives. Without this additional caveat, the
militarized polities of contemporary Central America, where civilian
control over the military does not exist, might be classified by many
scholars as democracies, just as they have been (with the exception of
Sandinista Nicaragua) by U.S. policy makers. The caveat thus guards
against what we earlier called "electoralism"--the tendency to focus on
the holding of elections while ignoring other political realities.
9) The polity must be self-governing; it must be able to act
independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political
system. Dahl and other contemporary democratic theorists probably took
82 Journal of Democracy
this condition for granted since they referred to formally sovereign
nation-states. However, with the development of blocs, alliances, spheres
of influence, and a variety of "neocolonial" arrangements, the question
of autonomy has been a salient one. Is a system really democratic if its
elected officials are unable to make binding decisions without the
approval of actors outside their territorial domain? This is significant
even if the outsiders are themselves democratically constituted and if the
insiders are relatively free to alter or even end the encompassing
arrangement (as in Puerto Rico), but it becomes especially critical if
neither condition obtains (as in the Baltic states).
Principles that Make Democracy Feasible
Lists of component processes and procedural norms help us to specify
what democracy is, but they do not tell us much about how it actually
functions. The simplest answer is "by the consent of the people"; the
more complex one is "by the contingent consent of politicians acting
under conditions of bounded uncertainty."
In a democracy, representatives must at least informally agree that
those who win greater electoral support or influence over policy will not
use their temporary superiority to bar the losers from taking office or
exerting influence in the future, and that in exchange for this opportunity
to keep competing for power and place, momentary losers will respect
the winners' right to make binding decisions. Citizens are expected to
obey the decisions ensuing from such a process of competition, provided
its outcome remains contingent upon their collective preferences as
expressed through fair and regular elections or open and repeated
negotiations.
The challenge is not so much to find a set of goals that command
widespread consensus as to find a set of rules that embody contingent
consent. The precise shape of this "democratic bargain," to use Dahl's
expression," can vary a good deal from society to society. It depends on
social cleavages and such subjective factors as mutual trust, the standard
of fairness, and the willingness to compromise. It may even be
compatible with a great deal of dissensus on substantive policy issues.
All democracies involve a degree of uncertainty about who will be
elected and what. policies they will pursue. Even-in those polities where
one party persists in winning elections or one policy is consistently
implemented, the possibility of change through independent collective
action still exists, as in Italy, Japan, and the Scandinavian social
democracies. If it does not, the system is not democratic, as in Mexico,
Senegal, or Indonesia.
But the uncertainty embedded in the core of all democracies is
bounded. Not just any actor can get into the competition and raise any
issue he or she pleases--there are previously established rules that must
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Schmitter & Karl 83
be respected. Not just any policy can be adopted there are conditions
that must be met, Democracy institutionalizes "normal," limited political
uncertainty. These boundaries vary from country to country.
Constitutional guarantees of property, privacy, expression, and other
rights are a part of this, but the most effective boundaries are generated
by competition among interest groups and cooperation within civil
society. Whatever the rhetoric (and some polities appear to offer their
citizens more dramatic alternatives than others), once the rules of
contingent consent have been agreed upon, the actual variation is likely
to stay within a predictable and generally accepted range.
This emphasis on operative guidelines contrasts with a highly
persistent, but misleading theme in recent literature on
democracymnamely, the emphasis upon "civic culture." The principles
we have suggested here rest on rules of prudence, not on deeply
ingrained habits of tolerance, moderation, mutual respect, fair play,
readiness to compromise, or trust in public authorities. Waiting for such
habits to sink deep and lasting roots implies a very slow process of
regime consolidation---one that takes generations--and it would probably
condemn most contemporary experiences ex hypothesi to failure. Our
assertion is that contingent consent and bounded uncertainty can emerge
from the interaction between antagonistic and mutually suspicious actors
and that the far more benevolent and ingrained norms of a civic culture
are better thought of as a product and not a producer of democracy.
How Democracies Differ
Several concepts have been deliberately excluded from our generic
definition of democracy, despite the fact that they have been frequently
associated with it in both everyday practice and scholarly work. They
are, nevertheless, especially important when it comes to distinguishing
subtypes of democracy. Since no single set of actual institutions,
practices, or values embodies democracy, polities moving away from
authoritarian rule can mix different components to produce different
democracies. It is important to recognize that these do not define points
along a single continuum of improving performance, but a matrix of
potential combinations that are differently democratic.
1) Consensus: All citizens may not agree on the substantive goals of
political action or on the role of the state (although if they did, it would
certainly make governing democracies much easier).
2) Participation: All citizens may not take an active and equal part
in politics, although it must be legally possible for them to do so.
3) Access: Rulers may not weigh equally the preferences of all who
come before them, although citizenship implies that individuals and
groups should have an equal opportunity to express their preferences if
they choose to do so.
84 Journal of Democracy
4) Responsiveness: Rulers may not always follow the course of action
preferred by the citizenry. But when they deviate from such a policy, say
on grounds of "reason of state" or "overriding national interest," they
must ultimately be held accountable for their actions through regular and
fair processes.
5) Majority rule: Positions may not be allocated or rules may not be
decided solely on the basis of assembling the most votes, although
deviations from this principle usually must be explicitly defended and
previously approved.
6) Parliamentary sovereignty: The legislature may not be the only
body that can make rules or even the one with final authority in
deciding which laws are binding, although where executive, judicial, or
other public bodies make that ultimate choice, they too must be
accountable for their actions.
7) Party government: Rulers may not be nominated, promoted, and
disciplined in their activities by well-organized and programmatically
coherent political parties, although where they are not, it may prove
more difficult to form an effective government.
8) Pluralism: The political process may not be based on a multiplicity
of overlapping, voluntaristic, and autonomous private groups. However,
where there are monopolies of representation, hierarchies of association,
and obligatory memberships, it is likely that the interests involved will
be more closely linked to the state and the separation between the public
and private spheres of action will be much less distinct.
9) Federalism: The territorial division of authority may not involve
multiple levels and local autonomies, least of all ones enshrined in a
constitutional document, although some dispersal of power across
territorial and/or functional units is characteristic of all democracies.
10) Presidentialism: The chief executive officer may not be a single
person and he or she may not be directly elected by the citizenry as a
whole, although some concentration of authority is present in all
democracies, even if it is exercised collectively and only held indirectly
accountable to the electorate.
l l) Checks and Balances: It is not necessary that the different
branches of government be systematically pitted against one another,
although governments by assembly, by executive concentration, by
judicial command, or even by dictatorial fiat (as in time of war) must be
ultimately accountable to the citizenry as a whole.
While each of the above has been named as an essential component
of democracy, they should instead be seen either as indicators of this or
that type of democracy, or else as useful standards for evaluating the
perform~mce of particular regimes. To include them as part of the generic
definition of democracy itself would be to mistake the American polity
for the universal model of democratic governance. Indeed, the
parliamentary, consociational, unitary, corporatist, and concentrated
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Schmitter & Karl 85
arrangements of continental Europe may have some unique virtues for
guiding polities through the uncertain transition from autocratic to
democratic rule.~2
What Democracy Is Not
We have attempted to convey the general meaning of modern
democracy without identifying it with some particular set of rules and
institutions or restricting it to some specific culture or level of
development. We have also argued that it cannot be reduced to the
regular holding of elections or equated with a particular notion of the
role of the state, but we have not said much more about what democracy
is not or about what democracy may not be capable of producing.
There is an understandable temptation to load too many expectations
on this concept and to imagine that by attaining democracy, a society
will have resolved all of its political, social, economic, administrative,
and cultural problems. Unfortunately, "all good things do not necessarily
go together."
First, democracies are not necessarily more efficient economically than
other forms of government. Their rates of aggregate growth, savings, and
investment may be no better than those of nondemocracies. This is
especially likely during the transition, when propertied groups and
administrative elites may respond to real or imagined threats to the
"rights" they enjoyed under authoritarian rule by initiating capital flight,
disinvestment, or sabotage. In time, depending upon the type of
democracy, benevolent long-term effects upon income distribution,
aggregate demand, education, productivity, and creativity may eventually
combine to improve economic and social performance, but it is certainly
too much to expect that these
immediately--much less that they will
democratization.
Second, democracies are not
administratively. Their capacity to make
improvements will occur
be defining characteristics of
necessarily more efficient
decisions may even be slower
than that of the regimes they replace, if only because more actors must
be consulted. The costs of getting things done may be higher, if only
because "payoffs" have to be made to a wider and more resourceful set
of clients (although one should never underestimate the degree of
corruption to be found within autocracies). Popular satisfaction with the
new democratic government's performance may not even seem greater,
if only because necessary compromises often please no one completely,
and because the losers are free to complain.
Third, democracies are not likely to appear more orderly, consensual,
stable, or governable than the autocracies they replace. This is partly a
byproduct of democratic freedom of expression, but it is also a reflection
of the likelihood of continuing disagreement over new rules and
86 Journal of Democracy
institutions. These products of imposition or compromise are often
initially quite ambiguous in nature and uncertain in effect until actors
have learned how to use them. What is more, they come in the aftermath
of serious struggles motivated by high ideals. Groups and individuals
"'...democracies
will have
more open
societies and
polities than the
autocracies
they replace, but
not necessarily
more open
economies."
with recently acquired autonomy will test
certain rules, protest against the actions of
certain institutions, and insist on
renegotiating their part of the bargain. Thus
the presence of antisystem parties should
be neither surprising nor seen as a failure
of democratic consolidation. What counts is
whether such parties are willing, however
reluctantly, to play by the general rules of
bounded uncertainty and contingent consent.
Governability is a challenge for all
regimes, not just democratic ones. Given
the political exhaustion and loss of
legitimacy that have befallen autocracies
from sultanistic Paraguay to totalitarian Albania, it may seem that only
democracies can now be expected to govern effectively and legitimately.
Experience has shown, however, that democracies too can lose the ability
to govern. Mass publics can become disenchanted with their performance.
Even more threatening is the temptation for leaders to fiddle with
procedures and ultimately undermine the principles of contingent consent
and bounded uncertainty. Perhaps the most critical moment comes once
the politicians begin to settle into the more predictable roles and relations
of a consolidated democracy. Many will find their expectations frustrated;
some will discover that the new rules of competition put them at a
disadvantage; a few may even feel that their vital interests are threatened
by popular majorities.
Finally, democracies will have more open societies and polities than
the autocracies they replace, but not necessarily more open economies.
Many of today's most successful and well-established democracies have
historically resorted to protectionism and closed borders, and have relied
extensively upon public institutions to promote economic development.
While the long-term compatibility between democracy and capitalism
does not seem to be in doubt, despite their continuous tension, it is not
clear whether the promotion of such liberal economic goals as the right
of individuals to own property and retain profits, the cleating function
of markets, the private settlement of disputes, the freedom to produce
without government regulation, or the privatization of state-owned
enterprises necessarily furthers the consolidation of democracy. After all,
democracies do need to levy taxes and regulate certain transactions,
especially where private monopolies and oligopolies exist. Citizens or
their representatives may decide that it is desirable to protect the rights
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Schmitter & Karl 87
of collectivities from encroachment by individuals, especially propertied
ones, and they may choose to set aside certain forms of property for
public or cooperative ownership. In short, notions of economic liberty
that are currently put forward in neoliberal economic models are not
synonymous with political freedom--and may even impede it.
Democratization will not necessarily bring in its wake economic
growth, social peace, administrative efficiency, political harmony, free
markets, or "the end of ideology." Least of all will it bring about "the
end of history." No doubt some of these qualities could make the
consolidation of democracy easier, but they are neither prerequisites for
it nor immediate products of it. Instead, what we should be hoping for
is the emergence of political institutions that can peacefully compete to
form governments and influence public policy, that can channel social
and economic conflicts through regular procedures, and that have
sufficient linkages to civil society to represent their constituencies and
commit them to collective courses of action. Some types of democracies,
especially in developing countries, have been unable to fulfill this
promise, perhaps due to the circumstances of their transition from
authoritarian rule. 13 The democratic wager is that such a regime, once
established, will not only persist by reproducing itself within its initial
confining conditions, but will eventually expand beyond them. 14 Unlike
authoritarian regimes, democracies have the capacity to modify their rules
and institutions consensually in response to changing circumstances. They
may not immediately produce all the goods mentioned above, but they
stand a better chance of eventually doing so than do autocracies.
NOTES
1. For a comparative analysis of the recent regime changes in southern Europe and
Latin America, see Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead,
eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986). For another compilation that adopts a more structural approach see Larry
Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing
Countries, vols. 2, 3, and 4 (Boulder, Colo.:Lynne Rienner, 1989).
2. Numerous attempts have been made to codify and quantify the existence of
democracy across political systems. The best known is probably Freedom House's
Freedom in the WorM: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, published since 1973 by
Greenwood Press and since 1988 by University Press of America. Also see Charles
Humana, Worm Human Rights Guide (New York: Facts on File, 1986).
3. The definition most commonly used by American social scientists is that of Joseph
Schumpeter: "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which
individualsacquire the power to decide by meansof a competitive strugglefor the people's
vote." Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1943),
269. We accept certain aspects of the classical procedural approach to modem democracy,
but differ primarily in our emphasis on the accountability of rulers to citizens and the
relevance of mechanisms of competition other than elections.
4. Not only do some countries practice a stable form of democracy without a formal
constitution (e.g., Great Britain and Israel), but even more countries have constitutions and
88 Journal of Democracy
legal codes that offer no guarantee of reliable practice. On paper, Stalin's 1936
constitution for the USSR was a virtual model of democratic rights and entitlements.
5. For the most valiant attempt to make some sense out of this thicket of distinctions,
see Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes" in Handbook of Political Science,
eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addision Wesley, 1975),
175-411.
6. "Publius" (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison), The Federalist
Papers (New York: Anchor Books, 1961). The quote is from Number 10.
7. See Terry Karl, "Imposing Consent? Electoralism versus Democratization in E1
Salvador," in Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-1985, eds. Paul Drake
and Eduardo Silva (San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, Center for
US/Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1986), 9-36.
8. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 2 vols. (New York: Vintage Books,
1945).
9. This fear of overloaded government and the imminent collapse of democracy is well
reflected in the work of Samuel P. Huntington during the 1970s. See especially Michel
Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy (New York:
New York University Press, 1975). For Huntington's (revised) thoughts about the prospects
for democracy, see his "Will More Countries Become Democratic?," Political Science"
Quarterly 99 (Summer 1984): 193-218.
10. Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1982), 11.
11. Robert Dahl, After the Revolution: Authority in a Good Society (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1970).
12. See Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," Journal of Democracy 1 (Winter
1990): 51-69, and the ensuing discussion by Donald Horowitz, Seymour Martin Lipset, and
Juan Linz in Journal of Democracy 1 (Fall 1990): 73-91.
13. Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative
Politics 23 (October 1990): 1-23.
14. Otto Kirchheimer, "Conf'ming Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs,"
American Political Science Review 59 (1965): 964-974.