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Review of European Studies Vol,1, No. 2www.ccsenet.org/j ournaihtml December 2009
The UltraS: An Emerging Social Movement?
Dr. Alberto Testa (Corresponding author)
School of Sport and Education, Brunel University
London UB8 3PH, UK
Tel: 44-0-18-952-67382 E-mail: a.testa@brunel.ac.uk
Abstract
In recent years, there has been a rise in the conflict between the Italian police forces and football fans. This situation is a
result of the resurgence of the UltraS (the S capital is a neologism ofthis study to suggest neo-fascist oriented fans' and
to differentiate them from the wider hardcore football supporters -ultra'). However, despite their popularity among the
Italian curve (football terraces), the UltraS have been the subject of fairly little ethnographic research. This paper is the
result of ethnographic research conducted continuously between 2003-2006 and updated from 2007 to the first part of
2009. The research sought to evaluate the UltraS phenomenon via an examination of the internal and external dynamics
of two nationally well-known groups located in the Italian capital of Rome (the Italian centre of the political power).
The groups are the Boys Roma and the Irriducibiliof Lazio who enact their performances on their respective curve
(football terraces) of the city's Olympic stadium. The present paper argues that the ideological alliance between the
UltraS of Lazio and Roma (followed as example by other UltraS groups throughout Italy) , the death of Lazio fan
Gabriele Sandri in 2007 (and concomitant violent UltraS' reaction against the police) together with the existence of the
UltraS Italia (a national organisation which unites the main Italian Ultras groups) are all elements that signify the
beginning of a common meaningful opposition to the perceived repressive Italian State. Most importantly these
elements appears indicating the UltraS as an emerging social movement.
Keywords: UltraS, Fascism, Football, Social movement, Mobilization
1. Introduction
Since the beginning of our constitution,we have had clearideas aboutpolitics in the stadium. We believe it cannot be
avoided, because every man, hence, every UltraS,has his own ideals and beliefs, and it seems right that especially in
this placeofaggregationhe can manifest them (Juventude Crociata -Crusade Youth), (Note 1)
Neo-fascist manifestations are not new phenomena in the Italian curve. However the UltraS, as they exist today, are
different to those who preceded them. The above statement ofthe Juventude Crociata,an UltraS group of Padova, well
represents the progressive sense of ideologisation of the Italian curve. This study argues that there are adequate
ideological, behavioural and cultural elements manifest in the UltraS to conceive them- similar to the arguments of
Gentry (2004) regarding gatherings of extreme right skinheads- as manifestations of an emerging social movement.
Taylor (in Klandermans and Mayer 2006) argues that social movements never originate from a vacuum but they arise
from precedent experiences. The UltraS would support this claim and indeed find their roots in both the Italian youth
neo-fascist and the hardcore football supporters movements (Note 2). However, before delving into the UltraS as Social
Movement hypothesis, it is fruitful to outline their historical emergence. What follows illustrates the UltraS origin from
the wider Italian hardcore supporters (ultri) (Note 3) and allows us to see how the UltraSconstitute at least in part a
particular response by one section of Italian youth towards the social, cultural and political restrictions that they
encounter within the broader social system.
2. Ultrh to the UltraS
The UltraS grew out of ultri gatherings. The term ultri was used to indicate generically (regardless of political
orientation) all hardcore Italian football fans (invariably males between the ages of 16 and 40) that manifest behaviours
that at times exceed that considered the 'norm' in linguistics, bodily comportment and ultimately violent practices. The
word finds its etymology in French political discourse. During the Restoration period (1815 1830) the word
ultra-royaliste indicated partisan loyalty to the Absolute Monarchy. The ultra-royalistechampioned the interests of
property-owners, the nobility and clericalists. They were the supporters of authority and royal tradition in contraposition
to the philosophies ofhuman rights and individual freedoms proseletysed by followers of the Enlightenment.
During the 1950s Italian football was characterised by a - generally - relaxed and informal football fan culture. Fan club
offices were places to buy match tickets and gather with the like-minded to collectively listen to the state radio match
commentary when the team played outside the town. The football match was a parochial town event; it was a social
gathering and whilst episodes of violence were present they never acquired tragic tones. Aggressive acts were often
remarkably comical; umbrellas were occasionally thrown at referees by furious fans. There were, on occasion, scuffles
between opposing fans usually around long-standing district and regional rivalries and, sometimes fights were
evidenced amongst groups supporting the same team over both on-the-pitch incidents (Cf. Roversi, 1992). In this era,
violence in the stadium was not correlated to notions of a 'social problem'. Acts of supporter intemperance and
aggression were explained as individual predispositions or as a result of the match events causing mass distemper (Le
Bon 1895; Zimbardo 1969).
The chronology of the appearance of such ultri (hardcore football fans) groupings is hotly debated. While Roversi
(1992) argued that the first violent clashes between Italian rival fans occurred during the 1970s, the English sociologists
from the Leicester University Centre for Football Research criticise this native-born assertion, claiming that such
episodes have occurred since the origin of modern Italian football and cite an event in 1959 during a Napoli versus
Bologna match when 65 people were injured following a pitch invasion. This dissertation favours the interpretation of
Roversi whilst accepting that the debate arises out of a misunderstanding of that considered fan intemperance to that
which defines the presence and practices of those considered ultr. The late 1960s are the crucial fulcrum between these
two paradigms.
The first half of the 1970s witnessed large sectors of Italian youth, from diverse social classes, practicing a form of
socio-political insubordination. When combined with an exaggerated hostility against any form of authority and the
elaboration of stylistic (subcultural) peculiarities a general juvenile tumultuousness was manifest. In this temporal frame
emerged the hardcore ultrd football supporter gatherings in and around the football stadium. According to Italian
sociologist De Biasi (1993), this extreme form of support was novel to Italy and intentionally innovative, rebellious and
carnivalesque. The appeal of such gatherings to Italian youth at the end of the 70s was a sign that Italian politics (and
trade unions) had lost any monopoly they may once have had of mobilising both youthful and general public opinion
and indeed their behaviours (Triani, 1994). In a 1975 poll conducted by the Italian magazine Panorama,Italian youth
were found to be generally in favour of leftist ideology (86,8%) with just 7% favouring the right and a mere 6%
claiming to be moderates (cited in Marchi, 1994). The majority of the football curve also proclaimed a tendency
towards left-wing ideology.
A geo-political logic was evident between place and belief Ideological divisions of Italian society, reflected in cities
and regions, were usually mirrored in the political sympathies manifest at the local football stadia. The Veneto region,
customarily hostile to communist ideology, saw the majority of their football supporters sympathetic to either the
conservative Christian Democrats or to neo-fascist parties. In this era one could find Left-wing hardcore football fans
groups included the AC Milan Brigate Rossonere (Red-Blacks Brigades), and the Brigate gialloblue (Yellow-Blue
Brigades) of Modena. On the opposite side, it was possible to find the Verona's Brigate Gialloblu (Yellow-Blue
Brigades), and the Boys SAN of Inter-Milan (constituted by members of the Frontedella Gioventu -the Youth Front
Organisation of the Italian neo-fascist party Movimento Sociale Italiano). These groups together with the Boys Roma
can be considered the first manifestation ofwhat this study indentifies as the UltraS movement.
Apart few exceptions mentioned earlier, the hardcore football fandom of the 1970s was not meaningfully political.
Grispigni (1993) argues that the 'death' of politics and the associated disillusionment were characteristics of Italian
youth of the time:' which returningfrom the disappointment of the movement ofprotest of 1968 and 1977 transferred
the generationalconflictfrom the politicalto the sports arena ' (quoted in Triani 1994, p. 75). The youthful pursuit of
collective identification, excitement and conflict were to be satisfied henceforth in the football context via identification
with colours, symbols and territories of football-related belonging. This pursuit could be very consequential.
2.1 The Rise of the UltraS
On the 28th of October 1979 a petard fired from the curva sud by Roma supporters during the Rome derby killed a
Lazio supporter named Vincenzo Paparelli (Cf. Mariottini, 2004). The same day, football-related violence occurred in
the cities of Ascoli, Milan and Brescia causing many injuries and widespread criminal damage. This was an important
date for Italian football; football spectators' violence from now became a key issue in media discourse, state institutions
and public opinion. The latter called for repressive measures from the State to eradicate the teppisti' (ruffians). Many
house searches of suspects were subsequently made by the police targeting the most notorious individuals. Headquarters
ofhardcore football fans groups were raided and banners, drums and choreographic materials seized (Borghini, 1987).
The escalation of the hardcore football fans' violence, between the seventies and early eighties, indicates
transformations in the movement during the second phase of its development. It was in the eighties that the Italian
hardcore football fans movement reached its apex for participants and episodes of violence. The development of a
55
Review ofEuropeanStudies December, 2009
complex of friendships and rivalries regulated at first glance by the logic of the 'Bedouin Syndrome' ensured ostensibly
that the friends of an ally became friends, and the enemies of an ally were enemies. (Bruno, cited in Marchi, 1994). This
simplistic formula was, however, open to challenge arising out of historical antecedents and personal and political
negotiations. The organising took on new dimensions. The exacerbation of security measures - such as CCTV
surveillance and hand-held metal detectors at stadium entrances - manifested most notably a 'militarisation' of the
stadium. Stadia took on the appearance of a fortress with police surrounding the vicinities and parading internally in
large numbers clad in riot gear. This forced a polarisation of groups in the hardcore football fans gatherings that had
hitherto co-existed. While the policing impositions reduced episodes of violence in the stadium a 'dislocation effect'
saw a concomitant rise in violence outside the stadium in town centres, railway stations and tube stations (Roversi,
1992).
The 1980s ended with serious incidents of fans violence (Marinelli & Pili, 2000). In 1988 during an Ascoli versus
Inter-Milan match, Nazareno Filippini was killed by a group of Inter Milan hardcore fans having been repeatedly struck
by kicks and punches. On the June 4th 1989 during a Milan versus Roma game, a Roma supporter Antonio De Falchi
died of a heart attack following an assault carried out by rivals from Milan. Amongst the traditional factions, younger
formations appeared who celebrated their boundary breaking. By the mid-1980s new gatherings had joined the curve.
These were the cani sciolti('mug wumps') a neologism which equates to 'Hot Heads', i.e., those difficult to control - a
term applied to youngsters by the organised ultri groups (Vincenti, 2000).These youngsters did not recognise
themselves in any pre-existing fan groups - nor did they seek such a correlation - and did not collaborate with
pre-existing supporter formations. They did not originate out of schisms within the established groups; they were
autonomous from all pre-existing fan constitutions. The majority of this new demographic, invariably aged between
14-16 years, was lacking in political consciousness and had little historical knowledge of the ultri movement. These
gatherings were significant in being more interested in self presentation than preserving links that stressed historical
solidarity and wider group cohesion (Roversi, 1992). Having no pre-existing social framework from which to learn or
act; theirs was a clean slate but one that was on occasion more vicious in its form of opposition, and less responsive to
those who shared their football loyalties.
The new curve formations represented an Italian society that during the 1980s celebrated individualism, self-indulgence
and ostentation. As a consequence the era saw a refusal in much of its young generation to engage or participate in
matters that were political or required a sense of dedication. The nomenclature of the curva groups reflected this ethos.
Names with political connotations were substituted by those linked to psychological conditions and drug and alcohol
consumption. Example of these gatherings were the Sconvolts (Deranged) and Kolletivo Alcoolico (Alcoholic Group)
Wild Kaos and Arancia Meccanica (Clockwork Orange- from the controversial 1971 Stanley Kubrick film with its
dystopian vision of violence nihilism)( Note 4). The dislike and opposition to such metamorphosis was showed in the
constitution of groups in the more notorious curve such as Roma, Milan, Bergamo, Naples and Genova which took on
them the title Vecchia Guardia (Old Guards). The UltraS groups continued the cult of masculine 'hardness',
quasi-military organisation, and attachment to territory but added values now more meaningful based in the doctrines of
fascism. Neo-fascist philosophy gained the same revolutionary significance as the communist ideology once had with
its myths, particularly those around Che Guevara. From the early 1990s UltraS groups throughout Italy started to
display more and more on their banners common emblems or mottos related to neo-fascism (Marchi, 1994).The Boys
Roma, and others like them in Cagliari, Palermo, Sora, and Turris used the two-edged axe symbol of Ordine Nuovo
(New Order) as an identifier.
That such displays were evident in and around football should not surprise a reader. The 1990s were a decade of
profound political and economic crisis for Italy. An entire political system was falling apart under the acts of
Tangentopoli (Bribesbille) (Note 5); public opinion was tiring of corrupt politicians. The electorate punished the
distrusted political parties which were decimated in the corruption inquiries of the Italian magistrates. Sentiments of
political renewal were represented by extreme parties such as the Movimento SocialeItaliano(Italian Social Movement)
that subsequently became Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance) in 1995, or by new political parties such as the Lega
Nord(founded in 1996) and Silvio Berlusconi's ForzaItaliafounded in 1994 (Pagani, 2003). Both parties have recently
(in 2009) merged in the newly constituted Partito delle Libert6 (Freedom Party) chaired by Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi. The era also saw the increased popularity of national revolutionary movements on the extreme right
spectrum such as Forza Nuova (New Force) and Fronte Nazionale Sociale (National Social Front), and the
reaffirmation of extreme left ideological parties such as Rifondazione Communista.
At the moment of writing (2009), the extent and diffusion throughout Italy of gatherings that share the same Irriducibili
and Boys' ideology and logic is remarkable (see Tablel). In 2009, the National Observatory on Sport Events of the
Italian Minister of the Interior (Note 6) confirmed the existence of 58 UltraS groupings and circa 15000 members
throughout Italy. The UltraS are, thus, a relatively large nation-wide grouping that interacts across regions. Whilst they
are not a threat to parliamentary democracy, their very existence is a stain on the Italian body politic. The political
concern that they carry with them is two-fold; they are prepared for violence and they are unpredictable having
unknown potential.
Vol. 1,No. 2 Review ofEuropeanStudies
3. The UltraS Collective Identity
Over the past 20 years it has been possible to witness in the curve not only a rise in ideologisation but a concomitant
increase in UltraS' politicisation. Simi et al. (2004) stress the main elements of the process of politicization which can
be applied to the UltraS namely the belief in the possibility to resist /change things for a common cause. For the UltraS
the common cause is predominantly their very survival, having common opponents (these are the police, media and
football institutions); resorting to tactics such as 'supporters' strike' (where they refuse to support the football teams
during the match to voice their discontent). Further shared elements are willingness to violence, public protest
campaigns and a recognisable organisation, which in the last two years is starting to emerge into the newly found UltraS
Italia (see later). The politicisation process among the UltraS marks the development of their collective identity; an
important attribute of any social movement. Collective identity is a sense of 'we' based on cohesion and solidarity
around which individuals act (Cf. Simi et al. 2004; Klandesmans 1997). Traditional rivalries among the UltraS groups,
as this study indicated, can be forgotten to resist a perceived persecution of the State against their common way oflife.
The capital of Italy, Rome, can be considered a good example about the capability of the UltraSin their struggle against
the Italian State. The UltraS of Roma and Lazio have gradually preferred the resistance against the State, its repressive
laws and the police, to 'ordinary' clash against rival fans. Whilst aware of differences, 'Marco' of the Boys underlines
the cameratismo (comradeship) between the two gatherings of the Boys and Irriducibili while indicating at the same
time the common ideological based logic:
The leaderof our group had a personalfriendship, based also on the same ideologicaloutlook of life, with one of the
Irriducibilileader When he died in 2005 all the Direttivo [management board] of the Irriducibiliattended hisfuneral
and raisedtheir hands doing the roman salute in sign of respect. We are more explicit and openly politicalthan the
Irriducibili.We produced a banner stating 'No American peace on my land!!' We are anti-Nato [they do not want
American Bases in Italy]. We are againstItaliansoldiersin Iraq;we do not want to wasteItalianbloodfor anAmerican
war
Similar dynamics are emerging among other UltraSthroughoutItaly. Few in Italy would ever imagine the possibility of
the hardcore tifosi (fans) of Juventus and Roma sitting together in the stadium and watching a football match. This is
actually happening with the UltraSItalia who gather to watch and support the national team as the symbol of the
concept of Patria.In 2009, I asked 'Todde'of the Boys, who had recently been involved with the group, about the
UltraS Italia.Namely, I questioned if there were aspects in this group to consider the UltraS Italiaas an expression of
the ability of the UltraS to organise themselves at a national level. The answer was positive; he told me that currently
the number of the members was approximately 600 and that the camerati of Lazio, Roma and Inter had recently joined
the project. Other members were drawn from Juventus, Ascoli, Verona, Udine, Trieste, Napoli, Genova and elsewhere.
In 'Todde's analysis the same logic valid to explain the Irriducibiliand the Boys, was valid for the UltraSItalia.Even if
many of the members were neo-fascist sympathisers they considered themselves autonomous from any political party.
The national mobilization of the UltraS, which is pertinent to their being considered a social movement, is manifest by
their 'direct' actions. Direct action takes several forms. At its most 'primitive' it is exercised by banners containing
messages of accusation and defiance displayed in the stadium. At a high level it is evidenced by social campaigns aimed
to what the UltraS perceive as 'just'. Direct action is also demonstrated at an organizational level via their radio
programs that proselytise and propagate their ideas against the 'system'. Whilst these typologies have become a
constant 'background noise', when the issue is considered meriting, the UltraS can mobilise and attack the State.
Although I cannot affirm yet that the UltraS structures and connections are formally delineated among the groups, the
sense of an emerging movement is present and is certainly based on a common foe and a common strategy of
opposition. In 2007, the death of the Lazio UltraS Gabriele Sandri (Gasport, 2007) - killed by a police officer who
intervened to control a fight between Juventus and Lazio fans at a petrol station near Arezzo- provoked an
unprecedented violent reaction expressed by UltraS groups throughout Italy. UltraS from Atalanta, Taranto, Fiorentina,
AC Milan, Inter Milan, Parma, Torino, and Juventus attacked police and police properties in protest both against the
killing but also in rage against the militarisation ofthe football stadia and the cumulative repressive measures the Italian
state had undertaken against them. A common theme of the chants was 'PoliziaAssassini' (Police - Murderers); graffiti
on Milan and Rome walls threatened revenge upon police. In Rome the reaction of the Roma and Lazio UltraS in the
streets of the Capital - assisted by the clumsy decision of the authorities to cancel the AS Roma-Cagliari match a few
hours before its beginning -was extremely violent. Some 20 police officers were injured in the disturbances. At the time
ofthe disorder four UltraSwere arrested and charged with offences pertaining to terrorism. In March 2008 a further 16
Lazio UltraS were arrested in police raids in connection with the events (Note 7). The same year during the match
Triestina-Rimini in CurvaFurlanwas displayed a banner to honour Sandri and the UltraS ofLazio (Note 8).
The disorders, which followed Sandri's death, were in the words of the former Italian Minister of Interior, Giuliano
Amato, a manifestation of 'a blindrage, led by madly criminalminds subversive againstthe police, its vehicles and its
symbols' (Radioradicale, 2007). Amato informed the Parliament of planned disorder, subversive articulations, and
Review ofEuropeanStudies December, 2009
diversionary tactics employed by those seeking 'to attractthe police and CarabinieriaroundCONI (ItalianOlympic
Committee), to leave unattendedthe police barracks with the intention of making their attack easier'(Radioradicale,
2007). In this case the behaviour of the Italian police force was exemplary. The police could have reacted and shot; in
one instance the UltraS attacked the Maurizio Giglio barrack which was full of weapons, ammunition and vehicles; the
law allowed them to shoot in that circumstance to protect the public but with great skills and professionalism they
avoided the tragedy (Bonini, 2009).The images of the riots, globally broadcasted, were not good for the reputation of
Italy.
4. Deprivation: as reason of the UltraS mobilization?
The identification of the UltraS as an emerging social movement does not end our attempt to complete a macro analysis
of the phenomenon. The task of the researcher remains one of trying to understand the emergence of a social movement.
One answer may lie in the Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT), a construct which, according to Walker and Smith
(2001), is a compelling topic for research and is employed in various ways to make sense of the rise of a variety of
collective identities and social movements.
RDT argues that: whenever groupsfind a benchmark that implies they could or should be better off than they are, a
condition of relative deprivation exists and a psychological strain (cognitive dissonance) triggersparticipation in
collective behavior (Buechler quoted in Snow et.al., 2004, p. 49). Deprivation- or the sense of deprivation - is a
condition that has resonance in both the individual and the socio-cultural setting. According to the RDT, when groups
develop legitimate expectations (in the case of the UltraS the main expectations are to be present and voice their beliefs
in the stadium while keeping control of the curve) and- at the same time- a conviction that these expectations will never
be satisfied (in the case of the UltraS their expectations are strongly opposed by the Italian State via tough repression
policies and legislation), they may develop a cognitive dissonance that focuses on feelings of prejudice and
discrimination (Morrison, 1971). This condition, in a power-oriented movement such as that of the UltraS, can lead to
forms of resistance which may comprised of violence but also staging demonstrations and lobbying the Italian
parliament.
The RDT highlights the elements that may lead to the emergence of such movements, as well as providing reasons for
their consolidation. Research consequently should be aimed at investigating the objective conditions that lead to
discontent and, ultimately, action (Kornhauser 1959; Davies 1971).
The UltraS have always considered their cause legitimate; furthermore they consider the curve their territories upon and
within which they have the right to voice their opinions and ideology. The recent and sudden escalation of tougher laws
and State repression have promoted a perception among them of blocked expectation and a concomitant sense of
outrage around notions of injustice and inequity. Such sense of grievance increasingly leads the UltraS to see
themselves as societal 'outcasts' and foster conflict with the State and the media; the latter, according to the groups,
have sided with the State-oppressor. Consequently the group rhetoric of stigma and discrimination have increased. At
the same time, such feeling is not necessarily negative in the immediate sense of the gatherings and in the wider sense
of the movement. Klandermans and Mayer (2006), focusing on youth neo-fascist gatherings, highlight different ways of
coping with discrimination all of which are applicable to different degree to the UltraS. Among the most relevant is
'social creativity', whereby the groups respond by defining themselves as superior to others (Tajfel and Turner, 1986).
The UltraS' feeling of superiority towards other hardcore supporters is evidenced considering themselves as 'pure' not
polluted like the 'others' by the commercialized logic of modern calcio, where mercenaries (players) are idolized. In
comparison to the 'ordinary' youth; they stress their 'elitism' and 'superior' values. They feel their ethical stance
justifies and makes bearable the perceived social stigma; it is 'morally' worth it. However, the key strategy to cope with
discrimination/stigma lies in what Klandermans and Mayer (2006) define as social support and feelings of belonging.
The ideological and cultural traits based on ideology that make the UltraS feel strong are also able to create a similar
feeling of belonging and strength throughout the movement. As Todde argues: although there was an attempt to
organise ourselves at national level before Sandri's death [he refers to the first emergence of a national group called
Vikings Italia] after Sandri'sdeath and the injustice carriedout againstone of us, there are more interactionsamong
all the groups, one of the result is the UltraS Italia. On the occasion of Sandri's death for the first time, many UltraS
throughout Italy displayed banners in their stadium and wrote about the death on their websites in honour ofboth Sandri
and in solidarity with the UltraS of SS Lazio.
There may be, however, another facet of the UltraS' grievance that deserves evaluation: this relates to the UltraS nature
of an 'extreme' youth movement. The pervasive sense of dissatisfaction by the Italian youth is mostly related to the
legitimate expectations by youth of an efficient political class that works in their interest.Traditionally the Italian
politics has been unsympathetic and blind to youth. The UltraS do not trust Italian politics and of course oppose it. Such
anti-politics discourses were a common and persisting pattern in many interactions I had with the UltraS and are
diffused in the whole movement. As youth, the UltraS do not miss any chance to declare their dislike for Italian politics
and their incompetent youth policies; this hostility is well represented in the following 'Marco' statement: 'I do not like
Vol. 1,No. 2 Review ofEuropeanStudies
politics and do notfollow it! I am an extra-parliamentary;I follow the ThirdPosition- the 'revolutionary'position.
The Italiansystem is putrid; if the tree is sick to the root it cannotgive goodfruits. The problems arenot thefruits that
need to be changed but the tree that needs to be eradicatedor at least cured. Sometimes I agree with Bertinotti [the
leader of the extreme left party Rifondazione Communista, and former president of the Chamber of Deputies]. The
extreme left and rightconverge on some issues...'
The term 'putrid' used by Marco can be considered a fair representation of the mood of the youth of the curve, an
important part of the Italian youth. In 2009, the international organization TransparencyInternationalpolled Italians to
determine what they believed to be the most corrupt organization in the country. Astonishingly, 44% of the participants
indicated the Italian political parties (La Repubblica -online- 03 June, 2009).The Italian journalist Bosetti in his article
'why is the politicalpower in the hands of the old?' (2008) argued that the current Italian political class is based on
gerontocrazia (democracy by elders); young politicians are still underrepresented and not in key places to exercise
power. Moreover, according to Abravanel (2008), Italy is far from achieving the requisite of any just society -namely
having a system based on meritocracy. In Italy a career , especially in State controlled domains, is accomplished
because ofpersonal recommendations and seniority that, according to Abravanel , greatly de-motivates the youth.
In addition, Italian sociologist Carboni (2008) in his most recent study about Italian political class affirms that in the
Italian parliament individuals of poor political skills but loyal to the party function merely to reinforce the leadership
which has chosen them. Too Many MPs still are old professional politicians. According to Della Loggia (2008), Italy is
also a country existing on political immobility, a society fragmented and lacking a strong political institutional
framework. A country which has a significant public debt and which instead of introducing much needed reforms
related to education, health and justice - to name but a few- is instead blocked by litigious local and national leaders
who promote de facto a system based on political parties and not on people. Furthermore, Italy is the country wherein
governments regardless of political line are unable to erase organised crime in the regions of the South; not by chance
these regions experience higher unemployment rates among youth (Note 9). Roberto Saviano (2007), a young and
courageous Italian journalist, argues, that since his birth in 1979 the Camorra (Naples's network of organised crime
clans) had taken the lives of 3,600 men and women, many more that the Sicilian Mafia has on its conscience over the
same period.
Della Loggia (2008) believes that this status quo is due to a society which is prisoner of its past focusing on the same
political discourses, contrapositions, and the same old 'low politics'. As Clark (1996) acknowledges, such milieu can be
defined as a systematic way of doing politics where concessions and favouritism become institutionalised and where
conceding favours to obtain votes develops into a consistent and non-written rule.
The majority of Italians politicians have never worked; politics is their only means of income making them inclined to a
systematic and methodological administration of power to survive and obtain monies. This situation creates conflict,
protest and resistance especially amongst youth who are the most penalised. The protest of the Italian people for politics,
political parties and their protagonists has already provoked reaction and resistance by sections of the electorate in their
search for an idealistic alternative. The well-known Italian journalist Eugenio Scalfari (2007) writes:
...grows the numbers of Italian citizens who totally refuse this political class.... This attitude can be defined as
anti-politicsorpolitical because it is not the result of indifference but of active and aggressiveparticipation[against
political parties and politicians] but this does not change the reality. There is a growing refusal of 'these'political
parties, of 'these'politicians..... It is a total refusalon all levels: taxes,public order legality,inequalities,andfreedom.
Thumbs down on everything. They [the political class] need to go (Scalfari, 2007).
The statement of Scalfari was supported by the recent emergence of a popular movement organized by the renowned
Genoan comedian Beppe Grillo who, during his stage and broadcasting career, has always been a vociferous critic
against the malpractice of Italian politics and its politicians.
We are against 'right'and'left'; we do not have hope anymore. This shouldhave been the government who would have
changed everything. We need young people and new ideas not policies originatingfrom 'pensioners'of 70 years
[referring ironically to the existing politicians] they are all old!! The aim [of this manifestation and movement] is to
'kick them outfrom thepalace'andmost ofall to express ourdislike and wearinessofapolitics which is more andmore
millionsofmiles awayfrom the citizens andtheirneeds (Grillo, 2007).
The protest took shape gradually via the comedian's Internet blog and, during his Italian tour, it found its first public
manifestation with a protest meeting held in Bologna's Piazza Maggiore in September 2007. The main objective of the
movement was to 'clean' Italian politics from its so-called rationalisation, wipe out its professionalisation and expose its
lack of ideals. The Bologna meeting called 'V-Day' (i.e. Vaffanculo Day, or Fuck Off Day) aimed to collect signatures
for a petition for a new law to prescribe the ineligibility for the future with criminal records (25 MPs in Parliament in
2007 held such a status). The movement also sought to make it invalid for any Italian citizens to be elected as an MP if
holding a criminal conviction or in the legal system awaiting a verdict. The purpose was also to get rid of 'the
Review ofEuropeanStudies December, 2009
professional politician'. To this end the protesters proposed that no Italian citizens could be elected as an MP more than
twice and anyone elected had to come from a grass-root selection procedure and not be parachuted in by some party
system. Some 50,000 signatures were collected as the Piazza was linked via the Internet with 179 cities (30 of them
foreign). In March 2009, Grillo launched an electoral list closed to his movement throughout Italy for the forthcoming
administrative elections. Commenting the event Grillo said: Thepartiesare dead.We are the only virus that crossesour
disappeared'little'Italy:perhapswe lose today, but ourideas arethe ones that will win in thefuture (Grillo, 2009).
The inability of the Italian State to respond to the concrete needs ofpeople, especially its youth, who see their existence
increasingly uncertain in this political framework, can be said to contribute to the creation of an ideological vacuum.
The search for security and certainty can then promote the diffusion of any extreme ideologies founded on 'action'. The
attraction of a political formula like fascism professed by the UltraS is, thus, not hard to see. The esteemed sociologist
(and novelist) Umberto Eco (1995) lists various characteristics ofwhat he terms 'Ur Fascism'; the most relevant for this
study is irrationalism. 'Ur Fascism' is based on the cult of action for the sake of action; there is no struggle for life,
but rather a 'fight for life'. According to this formula, Pacifism is collusion with the enemy; action is good in itself, and
must be implemented without reflection.
This will to act by UltraS movement is the opposite of the immobilism dominant in Italian politics. The groups will
fight for their ideas no matter the outcome and no matter the medium used. As Eco recognised in his reflection on
fascism, in any mythology the 'hero' is an exceptional being closely linked to the cult of death. Heroism is the norm.
The Fascist hero aspires to death as the ultimate reward for a heroic existence. As 'Antonio' of the Boys argues: 'who
dies or is a victim ofthis state in ourgroups is notforgotten and will be always remembered'.The heroes celebrated by
Italian UltraS are people that fight for their ideals and if necessary pay for it with their lives. Their heroes are the
deceased - their 'fallen' are such as Paolo di Nella (Note 10); others are the 'victims' of the DASPO (Stadium banning
order) or those imprisoned for being UltraS. As Eco (1995) notes for those devoid of alternative social identities,
Ur-Fascism,presents a privilege - to be born with a sense of nation going back to the Roman Empire, of being Italian,
the inheritor of the values, cults and histories. Significantly the Boys and Irriducibilisport the colours of the Italian flag
in their merchandising.
The UltraS have parallels elsewhere. For many, modern society lacks meaningful relationships, beliefs, strong values
and a sense of place (Klapp 1969, p. 318). In modern cities there is absence of strong identifications of strong point of
reference. In this context many correlate themselves with the most unlikely of individuals and movements. The 'Boxer',
one of leader ofthe Irriducibili group, recognizes this and has his logic for the response it provokes:
When we speak about issues such as the PalestineIntifada and Saddam Hussein's Iraq they do not like it; they do not
like politicaltopics at the stadium because they could create a consensus; this scarespoliticianswho cannot control
votes. This is the reasonfor this strongpolice repression...
In distant places, in obscure texts and in myths of origin are found the UltraS narratives and practices to aspire to, even
if the causation has no relevance to the Roman or Italian context. The sympathy to the Irish Republican, which is
present among the groups, cause arises out of their perceiving in Ireland a nation forever resisting an imposed discourse
via myth, legend and songs - and ultimately violence. The Irish nationalist populations celebrate the warrior; the
nationalist murals are admired, stressing, as they do, a sense of identity through symbols, non-conformist heroes,
national (and submerged) identities. The Palestinian cause offers the same admiration-logic. Such support is not
required, it is what such people symbolise that matters.
The wish ofthe UltraS to be heard and counted is evidenced by 'Giovanni ofthe Irriducibili':
I can tellyou even more;for a while a well-known andpopularextreme left-leaningnewspaper [I1 Manifesto] dedicated
articles aboutus andpraisedusfor our social battlesagainstdrugs andpedophilia;ironicallythey saidwe werefascist
that did not know how to be communist. How ignorant!Many do not know the social doctrine offascism has many
things in common with the revolutionaryleft. Unfortunatelyin Italyfascism has been always depicted as reactionary
whilst in origin it was nothing like that; unfortunately these things are taught in history books that our children study
where many things are representedfollowing dominant ideology ... for us communism has been reactionarywhile real
fascism was revolutionary'.
5. Concluding remarks
The ideology ofthe Italian neo-fascists, as expressed by the UltraS, has potential in the Roman (and in the Italian) curve;
it has revolutionary power and has found in the stadium an outlet. As 'Giovanni' elaborates:
Until the emergenceof ourgroup, everyone thought that the typical UltraS was an imbecile who goes to the stadium to
watch the match, perhapsdrunk andseeking violence. We want to send a message to thepublic; the Irriducibilishowed
the public that UltraS can think beyondfootball. We did thisfirstly with ourfanzine and then with our radiobroadcast.
Via these tools we can express our opinions anddefend ourselvesfrom media attacks; this was the main reasonwhy we
startedradiobroadcasting. The fanzinepushed the Irriducibilithought at the games, our radioshow keeps it alive all
Vol. 1,No. 2 Review ofEuropeanStudies
week. We wanted to underline that the Irriducibiliare Lazio UltraS but they are also citizens wishing to have their
opinions heard. We have been pioneers;we tried to make other UltraS realize that we are a potent lobby and we can
make a difference at the elections.
Giovanni's statement underlines the status of Agori of the football stadium. The Agor is an ancient Greek term
meaning public meeting place (Camp, 1992). It is a location in Ancient Greece primarily for public assembly. The
Agori is the location where the oikos (private dimension) and ecclesia (public dimension) meet. It is the location where
private problems are dealt with in a meaningful way. This locale is used to articulate, not just to draw narcissistic
pleasures or to search for some relief through public display, but to collectively seek the tools that are powerful enough
to lift individuals from their privately suffered misery. It is the space where ideas may be born, take shape and be
considered the 'public good'. It pursues the 'just society' or at least provides comfort in a sense of 'shared values'.
(Bauman, 1999). The Italian football stadium is one of the few remaining Italian modern social Agori. It is a site where
not only football, but also ideological opinions - often the antithesis of notions of political correctness - and direct
actions are freely expressed in the pursuit of a wider consensus and resistance. 'Todde' affirms :
The football stadium allows us to bring our battles -via the media- to 40 million Italians. Before in the stadium you
would rarelyfind socio-politicalissues raisedby UltraS.It is the only place that we can speakfreely about our ideas
without being chargedwith subversive association.In otherplaces we would be repressed. We arepeople that do not
want to be made stupidby consumeristrepression, we want to discuss and to confront. The stadium ends are ours and
here we can express who we areand impose our rules. We go to the stadium and articulateour ideas because the State
does not allow the individual tofreely speak out becauseof rampantpoliticalcorrectness. We fight this lack offreedom
mainly with negative campaigns but when the State allows us to express our values; we also send constructive and
positive messages.
In their Agori -stadium, the UltraS have a liminal arena for the public performance of stigmatised behavior. In ritual
and display, they have words and symbols and, similar to Rappaport's (1979) debate on religious protagonists and
performance, the believer 'gives substance to the symbol, as the symbol gives him form' (p. 200). The Agor -stadium
becomes for the UltraS another means of identification; it can be considered at the same time a place for the outlaw and
socially excluded and a locale where the UltraScan resist repression. Football support coupled with a strong ideology
induces notions of the 'Fundamental', but as Vrcan and Lalic (1999) have argued in the context of post-1991 Croatian
football and football-related political ideology, the escalation ofconflict makes it possible to die because of symbolism.
5.1 An EthnographicNote
This ethnographic study adopted a Triangulation strategy, using more than one method to collect information (Denzin
1989, 2000, 2003; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p.230). I used Participant observation (Gold, 1958),
semi-structured interviews focusing on influential members (7 individuals) and casual conversations with 21 individuals
Furthermore, I employed documents such as the groups' fanzines, newspapers articles and information retrieved from
Internet. To attain an outcome both trustworthy and authentic. (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).The Names used in this paper
are fictional.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Gianpaolo, Yuri, Katia, Paolo, Fabrizio T., Fabrizio P. and most importantly Paolo Zappavigna for
their help during the research. I am indebted to Dr. Gary Armstrong, my PhD supervisor for some six years, for his
dedication and help during the toughest moments ofthis research project. Finally I would like to thank Professor Nicola
Porro (University of Cassino, Italy) for his suggestions during the research project.
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Notes
Note 1. Citation retrieved June 11, 2001, from http://www.tifonet.it/free/juventudepd.
Note 2. The notion of a social movement used in this study is that of a 'collectivity acting with some degree of
organizationand continuity outside institutionalchannelsfor promoting or resistingchange in the group, society, or
world order of which it is a part' (Simi et.al, 2004, p.3). More specifically the study refers to 'power-oriented'
movements, which contrarily to participation-oriented movements, act in concert to achieve group influence to make or
block changes (Morrison, 1971).
Note 3. A reader is directed to the seminal work on the topic written in 1992 by Italian Sociologist Antonio Roversi
titled Calcio,to e violenza [Football, tifo and Violence] for a more detailed and dedicated analysis.
Note 4. For an in depth account on the history of the Italian hardcore football supportrs movement cf. C. Balestri, & G.
Vigano. Gli Ultra': Origini, storia e sviluppi recenti di un mondo ribelle. Quadernidi Sociologia,34.
Note 5. The Tangentopoli scandal erupted in full in the late 1980s; it did not only reveal the illicit financing of political
parties and bribery of politicians but promoted a loss of faith amongst the Italian electorate in the integrity of their
country's political life and indeed in wider Italian society.
Note 6. In 2009, questions were asked to the National Observatory on Sport Events of the Italian Ministry of the
Interior; the questions aimed to evaluate the efficiency of the police strategy in tackling violence at the football stadium
(ofwhich the UltraS are an integral part).
Note 7. Retrieved January 11, 2008, from http://www.ecn.org/antifa/article/183 1/Arrestati20estremistididestra
Note 8. Retrieved April 09, 2009, from http:// www.curvafurlan.forumfree.net
Note 9. Recently Eurostat (the statistics department ofthe European Community) in his study about the European youth
unemployment situation has documented that six Italian south regions have reached the alarming threshold of 30% with
Sicily at the 37 % (Cf.
http://blog.panorama.it/economia/2009/02/16/disoccupazione-giovanile-6-regioni-del-sud-tra-le-prime-in-ue).
Note 10. Paolo di Nella is considered by Italian neo-fascism as one of their martyrs against the communists. He was
honoured in 2005 by the former center-left Mayor of Rome, Walter Veltroni with a street dedication in a historical
Roman Park. In February 1983, Di Nella was acting as a member of the Frontedella Giovent5 (Youth Front-the youth
organization of the neo-fascist political Movimento Sociale Italiano)placing posters at Piazza Vescovio aiming to raise
environmentalist issues concerning the preservation of the historical park of Villa Chigi. He was attacked by a group of
the extreme left; he died after seven days in coma (Cf.
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2009/02/10/alemanno-cambia-la-targa-del-martire.html).
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