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Middle Eastern Studies
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What is the matter with citizenship? A Turkish
debate
Ahmet Içduygu , Yilmaz Çolak & Nalan Soyarik
To cite this article: Ahmet Içduygu , Yilmaz Çolak & Nalan Soyarik (1999) What is the
matter with citizenship? A Turkish debate, Middle Eastern Studies, 35:4, 187-208, DOI:
10.1080/00263209908701291
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00263209908701291
Published online: 06 Dec 2006.
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Citing articles: 25 View citing articles
What is the Matter with Citizenship?
A Turkish Debate
AHMET İÇDUYGU, YILMAZ ÇOLAK
and NALAN SOYARIK
Fundamental to the establishment of the Turkish Republic was the
development of a new concept of citizenship in the national polity that
would go hand in hand with the nation-building process. Mustafa Kemal,
the founder of the Republic, perceived citizenship as the very core of the
legitimacy of the Republic' Accordingly, he himself actively participated in
designing a compulsory course of civic education that was to be taught in
the schools of Turkey. In those early days of the Republic, civic education
in the country began with the course entitled Malumat-i Vataniyye
(Information about the Motherland) which was included in school curricula
in 1924. In 1927, it was replaced by Yurt Bilgisi (again the same meaning,
Information about the Motherland),and finally from 1985 on, it was offered
with the title of Vatanda§hk Bilgileri (Information about Citizenship).2
In
other words, from the very start in Turkey, citizenship was officially taken
to be one of the key elements of successful nation-building.
Despite the fact that from the very beginning, citizenship had a deep
underlying significance for the construction of the new Turkish society and
state, social science literature seldom explicitly discussed the concept of
citizenship in Turkey beyond its ideological implications regarding
nationalist heritage. In addition to these implications, Turks often thought of
their citizenship as serving goals and practices of a universal kind reflected
in Western political and philosophical tradition: defining the rights,
obligations and identity of individuals in the country, citizenship concerns
the relations that individual members of the state have among each other
and with the governing body. Now, however, this comfortable scenario is
challenged on two fronts. At the present time, Turkey finds itself reacting to
the naturalization policies and practices of migrant-receiving states, in
which thousands of its emigrant citizens are in search of access to
citizenship and citizenship rights in those states, and consequently 'dual
citizenship' has become an issue of increasing concern. On the other hand,
it has to deal with the question of how the free expression of ethnic
188 SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC
(Kurdish), religious (Islamic) and sectarian (Alevi) revivalism is possible
under the unitary principles of the Turkish state and citizenship, and
accordingly 'constitutional citizenship' is repeatedly pronounced. In these
circumstances Turkish citizens have been forced to ask whether they have a
distinct 'citizenship' identity of their own which is challenged by the forces
of migration, ethnicity, and religion challenge. The new citizenship debate
in Turkey is essentially centred on these three forces.
The purpose of this article is to consider the extent to which issues of
'constitutional citizenship' and 'dual citizenship' are integral parts of the
current citizenship debate in Turkey. Of course, one can claim that these two
issues are so utterly dissimilar in nature that it is obviously ambitious to
attempt to discuss them both in the same brief article. But we stress the need
for an evaluation of these issues together as they come into play on the
citizenship debate in Turkey today. To this end the essay explains some of
the difficulties inherent in both the content of these two terms and their
implications for the concept of citizenship itself. Next, an outline of
approaches to citizenship from the beginning of the Republic to the present
day is offered to provide perspective on the current debate concerning the
level of citizenship practices that Turkish citizens enjoy. An indication of
the extent of the citizenship debate in Turkey is drawn from the most recent
public and scholarly discussions in the country. This latter issue is then
explored in the light of recent developments in relevant social issues, such
as international migration and ethnic and religious revivalism, and a
discussion of the politics of mobility and ethnicity is opened up. A
conclusion points the way to future directions in these areas.
The concept of citizenship has received renewed interest in the last ten
years, since globalization has become a popular issue. This recent interest is
as multifaceted as it is immense. Various political events and trends
throughout the world are seen as being responsible for the increasing global
importance of the concept of citizenship: for instance, the resurgence of
nationalist movements in Eastern Europe; the stresses created by an
increasingly multicultural and multiracial population in Western Europe; the
refugee problem which has created a new crisis of stateless persons in the
contemporary political system, and so forth.3
What all these developments
imply is that the conventional concept of the nation-state has been
profoundly challenged by global events and trends, and consequently,
citizenship as an issue has become prominent.
Studies which link citizenship to the rise and stability of nation-states
perceive the former as an outcome of modernity, and consider it as a
transition from status to contract.4
Thus, in its simplest formulation,
WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH CITIZENSHIP? 189
citizenship corresponds to the contract-like status of membership in a
nation-state. But this membership has different aspects. For instance,
Hammar delineates four interrelated meanings of citizenship; namely legal,
political, social and cultural, and psychological.5
The legal dimension is
formal membership in a state, based on specific rules and connotes a
number of rights and duties. The political dimension specifies the position
of the individual in the polity as citizen, and thus forms the basis of the state.
In the cultural and social sense it signifies the membership of a nation. And
finally, psychologically it provides an expression of individual
identification. From Hammar's perspective, it is obvious that more than a
legal status, citizenship is seen as an identity expressing an individual's
membership in a definitive politico-cultural community.
Similarly, Brubaker's analysis, referring to an ideal-typical model,
provides an analytical study of the membership status of citizenship.
Brubaker, who also defines citizenship as membership of the nation-state,
draws his argument from the contention that each nation-state attempts to
have a certain population as its own which can be identified as something
more than individuals in order that a cohesive and homogeneous nation can
be constructed. By regarding the nation-state both as an idea and an ideal,
Brubaker delineates six membership norms for the ideal-typical model.
According to this model, this membership should be egalitarian, sacred,
nation-based, democratic, unique, and consequential.6
The distinguishing
feature of Brubaker's approach arises from the fact that he conducts a
comparative analysis which attempts to elaborate the link between different
conceptions of nationhood and citizenship by focusing on nation-state
formations in France and Germany. More specifically, Brubaker bases the
expansive conception of citizenship in the French context which he depicts
as stemming from the principle ofjus soli, on the contention that nationhood
in the French vocabulary was state-centred and assimilationist.
Distinguishing the German case as Vb/fc-centred and differentialist, he finds
the identifying features of German citizenship to be based onjus sanguinis.
In this respect, Brubaker notes that by drawing upon a specific ethnocultural
dimension, Germany failed to integrate the egalitarian, democratic,
nationalist and statist aspects of citizenship which had been realized in
France. Such a remark leads him to conclude that the evolution of
citizenship in Germany displayed a diversified path among formal state
membership, participatory citizenship and ethno-cultural nation
membership.7
What is clear meanwhile is that both the French and German
models of citizenship were deeply affected by the concept of 'nation', even
though its meaning was different from one to another.
The relationship between the concept of citizenship, defined as the
legally acknowledged membership of a state, and the concept of
190 SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC
nationhood, defined as the socially acknowledged belonging to a nation, is
the core context in which the various membership status of individuals and
citizenship rights are questioned. Having defined state as a legal and
political organization, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from
its citizens, and nation as a community of people, whose members are
bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national
consciousness, it is possible to argue that 'while state is a legal and political
concept, nation is a cultural one'.8
With such a distinction made, it is also
possible to argue that the notion of a homogeneous nation-state, which is
based on the ideal of 'one nation in one state', is more a fiction than a
reality. Working contrary to the theoretical construction of an ideal nationstate,
emergence of the competing forms of national, regional, ethnic, or
religious identities makes an important contribution to the increasing
heterogeneity of populations in the nation-states. The implied assumption is
that there are fundamental challenges to governance where the society
appears increasingly fragmented into a multitude of groups, each having its
own distinct identity and issuing social and political demands based on their
identity.9
Considering the question of pluralism, the core issue of citizenship
today is the cultural fragmentation in modern nation-states. Members of
these states have different and competing cultural identities which often
undermine the shared identity signified by their citizenship. As elaborated
by Marshall,10
citizenship can be taken as a shared identity that would
integrate previously ignored groups within the society and provide a source
of unity. When Marshall gave an historical account of the development of
citizenship in Britain through the evolution of civil, political and social
elements, he indeed saw the citizenship as a tool not only to integrate the
people to the common culture, but also to construct this 'common
possession and heritage'. It has become clear, however, that many citizens
with their distinct identities today have serious difficulties in becoming a
part of the common culture in their nation-states, despite possessing the
common rights of citizenship." In other words, the conventional notion of
citizenship fails to deal with the 'problems that are associated with equality
in the context of difference'.12
Behind this failure, it is believed that there is
the notion of universality which results in both an abstract notion of citizenindividual
identity and a general notion of common citizenship identity.
Both of these identities, citizen-individual identity and common citizenship
identity, imply that all individuals are given the same formal and legal rights
regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, religion or class. From this
conventional perspective, citizenship is an issue of viewing people as
individuals with equal rights under the law. Consequently, in our
contemporary world, it is seen that neither of these notions of citizenship
WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH CITIZENSHIP? 191
can take account of identity differences and accommodate the special unmet
needs of distinct identity groups. The conventional notion of citizenship is
unable to respond to the requirements of the principle of pluralism. Keyman
puts the case with the following statement: '...the unitary conceptions of
modern self (as a political class identity or a citizen identity or a national
identity) can no longer play their unifying function; nor are they capable of
dissolving difference into sameness'.13
What is required then is a new form of citizenship, a membership status
in a modern democratic state which neither necessitates a homogeneous
socio-political community nor subordinates various identity groups, but
rather recognizes the diversity of identities, even values them, and
incorporates them into the larger community, or common culture. It is
within this context that an increasing number of scholars emphasize the
need of modelling some new types of citizenship in our modern
democracies. The models currently being debated include, among others,
the concepts of multicultural citizenship,14
differentiated citizenship,15
constitutional citizenship,16
and dual,17
or multiple, citizenship. Considering
their relevance to our discussion of the Turkish case, two of these specific
types of citizenship, multiple citizenship (generally known as dual
citizenship) and constitutional citizenship, are elaborated here in some
detail.
What is generally known as dual citizenship, or rarely as multiple
citizenship, signifies that one person holds the membership, i.e. citizenship
status, of more than one state, as a consequence of international migration.
Given the importance of citizenship as a key to participation in a sociopolitical
community, and as a symbol of commitment to the future of this
community, international migration is a challenge to both the theory and the
practice of governance in migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries.
Indeed, the status of millions of migrants around the world is often socially
and politically anomalous. International migration leads to the emergence of
large groups of foreign citizens who, for all intents and purposes, are
permanent residents but cannot fully benefit from their citizenship rights.
Although one can acknowledge the difficulties in coping with the diversity
of established policies, practice and outlook with regard to immigration and
admission to citizenship in various nation-states, the liberalization of
naturalization and dual (multiple) citizenship rights seem to be practical
solutions.18
The notion of dual, multiple, citizenship suggests that
citizenship is formal legal membership of a state, implying loyalty to the
state rather than the nation, and it is important for both symbolic and
practical reasons with the emphasis on the latter. Of course, the content of
dual citizenship within the boundaries of the 'theory of citizenship' is at the
centre of a significant debate. Although the full details of this debate are not
192 SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC
in the scope of our study, some aspects of the debate on dual, multiple
citizenship will be elaborated in more detail by referring to the Turkish case.
Although the concept of constitutional identity, or constitutional
citizenship, remains largely undefined, we might take it 'to refer to that
aspect of our collective and individual self-conception which we owe to our
shared constitutional heritage'.19
Constitutional citizenship, which often
comes to the fore in relation to the possibility of a European identity
transcending the identity of nation-states in the European Union,20
implies a
supra-national identity guaranteed by the constitution to function as a
common identity denominator for the diversity and integrity of the different
forms of life coexisting in a multicultural environment. The original idea of
constitutional identity, constitutional citizenship, or constitutional
patriotism suggests that democratic citizenship in our modern states does
not need to be rooted in the national identity of a people. However, it does
require that citizens, without divorcing themselves from their diversity of
different cultural forms of life, should be socialized into a common political
culture. If 'a constitution can be thought of as an historical project that each
generation of citizens continues to pursue',21
then the concept of
constitutional citizenship can be seen as a driving force for the dynamic
project of creating a new common identity. This collective identity provides
a socio-political setting for the manner in which a common politico-cultural
self-understanding would emerge by differentiation from the cultural
orientations of different national, ethnic, and religious identities. On the
other hand, if the constitution expresses formal consensus among various
identities,22
the concept of constitutional citizenship would contribute to the
question of how to deal with a diversity of identities so that identity and
otherness would complement rather than exclude one another. Accordingly,
on the basis of constitutional citizenship every person would 'receive equal
protection and equal respect in their integrity as irreplaceable individuals, as
members of ethnic or cultural groups, and as citizens, that is, as members of
the political community'.23
It is believed that by recognizing and including
the diversity and otherness in one common identity, constitutional identity
would contribute to the integrative function of citizenship. It is also believed
that the demand for both representational rights and multicultural rights
coming from various identities is a demand for inclusion, not for
exclusion.24
In order to understand and grasp the parameters and nature of the official
concept of citizenship in Turkey (in the development of which the state
played the determinant role), this section will attempt to portray the process
by which it was constructed. The development of Republican citizenship is
WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH CITIZENSHIP? 193
divided into three basic time periods: first, the Single Party period
(1923-50); second, the period from 1950 to 1980; and third, the 1980
military intervention and its aftermath.
The laws and regulations aiming at institutionalizing the status of
citizenship in the Turkish Republic had close links with Ottoman
modernization. Attempts at modernization in the Ottoman Empire gained
impetus by the proclamation of Giilhane Hatt-i Hiimayunu, which initiated
a reformation period called Tanzimat. Tanzimat was based on the
secularization of religious laws and implementation of new administrative,
educational and financial policies for reorganizing the state structure in
conformity with European models. For the first time in Ottoman history a
legislative act was put into practice, dependent on the principle of securing
the life, honour and property of all subjects regardless of their religion. It
also brought about limitations on the Sultan's power to the advantage of the
bureaucracy.25
By the Tanzimat reform movement and the 1876 constitution,
generally speaking, the subjects living in the Empire were taken as
individuals making a society, not simply as the being parts of different
religious-ethnic communities.26
The first legal regulation on the issues of
Ottoman citizenship was dated 23 January 1869 Tabiiyet-i Osmaniyeye dair
Nizamname.27
The Regulation was based on descent, only those born to
Ottoman parents were regarded as Ottoman citizens; however, territorial
understanding was exercized in a limited manner for those born in the
territory of the Empire after they reached maturity.
The first attempt to search for a Turkish identity for the citizens of the
Empire in light of the modern nationalist ideals appeared with the
government of the Committee of Union and Progress, from 1908 to 1918.
The Young Turks introduced a new understanding that 'the nation was the
source of all authority',28
and so they made the first attempt to transform the
Empire into a model of a homogeneous state based on the premise of one
state, one nation. Citizenship in the Turkish Republic was described in
Article 88 of Teskilat-i Esasiye Kanunu, 1924, meaning that without regard
for their religious or ethnic origins, people living in Turkey were to be
considered Turks regarding citizenship. Legal regulation, dated 23 May
1928, and numbered 1312, the Turk Vatandashgi Kanunu (Turkish
Citizenship Law), was also descent based, but territorial understanding is
exercised as complementary. The law in use today, dated 11 February 1964
and numbered 403, is also based on descent, and territorial understanding is
exercised as complementary in order to avoid statelessness among the
foreigners in the country.29
The process of 'citizenization'30
and the conceptualization of citizenship
in the early Republican period, or the Single Party period, is the most
significant in providing background information for understanding the
194 SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC
current debates on citizenship in Turkey. During that era, the creation of a
new Turk or Turkish citizen who had to be, first of all, 'civilized' and
'patriotic'31
was the most significant civilizing mission of the Kemalist
reformist elite. The Kemalist attempt at transforming subjects into citizens
came into being with the rising concern of the political authority for
describing who were Turks and who were not, or who the Turks were going
to be.32
In that ruling, the modernizing elite tried to establish a strong link
between citizenship and nationality or national identity. This was regarded
in most cases as inevitable in the exercise of citizenship, and, according to
their cultural objectives, in defining the profiles of civilized and patriotic
citizens of the Republic. It is in this respect that they appeared to take into
consideration the idea that creating a shared sense of national culture and
identity was a fundamental precondition for forming and strengthening
citizenship. That was the main task of the Kemalist nation-building project
that required, in its defining of the national and cultural identity of citizens,
the total elimination of Ottoman and Islamic heritage, which was considered
responsible for the backwardness of the state and society. By striving to
eliminate the hegemony of traditional institutions and values over the state
structure and society, the Republican elite aimed at building a 'completely
secular state'33
and a secular socio-cultural structure. That is why the
Turkish reform movement stimulated by the nationalist ideology of the
Kemalist modernizing state was a sort of cultural revolution or, in the words
of Mardin, a 'revolution of values'.34
Thanks to its preexistence as a strong,
centralized state35
that helped to facilitate the process of cultural and
linguistic integration, the Republican state projected a particular form of a
vision of socio-cultural life, a good life which each Turkish citizen should
adopt. This new life would represent a common good and national interest,36
but not a particular and individualistic one that was dangerous for national
unity.
In forging a new identity, the Turkish state used its powers and agencies
to accomplish its social and cultural engineering. It strove to eliminate all
previously designated symbols, attitudes and manners, replacing them with
its own new myths and symbols. Atatiirk defined the 'new' Turk thus: 'We
must be civilized men from every point of view; our ideas, our reasoning
will be civilized from head to toe.'37
For him, the nation to which new Turks
belonged was composed of citizens tied together by a common language,
culture and collective consciousness and ideals, being a political and social
entity.38
This definition contains no reference to religion - Islam - or
tradition. In short, the Kemalists sought to establish a common cultural
content, in large measure newly formulated and of course secular, to be
used in forging the new Turkish citizens' identity, and for manifesting their
position as members of both the state and the organic whole (the nation).
WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH CITIZENSHIP? 195
The conceptualization of citizenship, as it was argued, came hand in hand
with constructing a unique, unchangeable and historic Turkish identity that
would be made possible only by newly fabricating and imposing a new
monolithic culture, while ignoring ethnic and sub-cultural identities. That
led to the designation of traditional/Islamic and local cultural symbols to the
periphery of the public sphere, and even to the dictation and regulation of
everyday life of the new Turks. The Republican civilizing elite, therefore,
tried its best to 'penetrate into the life style, manners, behavior and daily
customs of the people, and to change the self-conception of Turks' .'9
Each
Turkish citizen, equipped with well-defined modes of behaviour, had to be
faithful to the his/her own state which, as a representative of collective
personality of the nation and citizens, preached the advantages and
goodness of being a Turk, a Turkish citizen. In other words, the Republican
concept of citizenship was perceived not only as equipping its citizens with
the rights and responsibilities of the public sphere, but as forming a totally
new man by preaching even the rearrangement of private life, or the very
life-style of the people.
While people with different ethnic and cultural origins were to be called
Turks, the notion of citizenship was not defined simply in ethnic terms. That
is, Turkish nationality was not regarded as the product of biology or blood
ties. The new and artificially constructed or 'manufactured' Turkish culture
was, therefore, open to non-Turkish Muslim groups, who were accepted as
members of the nation and state so long as they were willing to integrate or
assimilate culturally and linguistically into Turkish culture. This is the logic
of cultural assimilation, not ethnic or racist. The migration of Muslim
groups (Bosnians, Albanians, Macedonians) from both the Balkans and the
Caucasus was accepted, and those groups were easily naturalized; however,
the migrations of the Gagavuz Turks, a small Turkish group with a Christian
origin, were hardly accepted.40
In a similar way, non-Muslim groups
(Greeks, Armenians and Jews) were called Turk only in respect of
citizenship but not of nationality; in terms of defining nationality they were
seen as outsiders whether or not of Turkish origin, for they were not
Muslim.41
This shows that in determining the nature of Turkish nationality,
in an implicit manner, religion appeared as a significant element together
with ethnicity.
Herein lies the paradox of the official definition of Turkish identity and
citizenship. While seeming to reject their Ottoman and Islamic heritage, the
new regime (Republic) still continued to respect the common historical
heritage with those non-Turkish groups mentioned above. Those groups
were placed within the Muslim millet in the Ottoman Empire, and, it might
be argued, there is a reflection of that millet system in the Turkish Republic
in its recognition of the groups that previously were parts of the Muslim
196 SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC
millet as Turks. In a similar way, the non-Muslim groups remaining in
Turkey were regarded as Turkish citizens as a continuation of their
community status in the Ottoman Empire. But there were debates on the
status of the non-Muslim communities and the problem of their citizenship
during the 1920s. The debate was around equality and the assimilation of
the non-Muslim population.42
On the other hand, it was exclusionary in the
sense that the outsiders with non-Muslim origins were hardly accepted as
citizens.
Consequently, until the 1950s, the concept of (national) citizenship that
was closely bound up with the Kemalist secular notion of Turkishness was
culturally, as well as politically, formulated on the basis of homogeneous,
generalized and unique secular national culture. It was in this process that
the construction of political and social citizenship was realized from above
or, in the words of Bryan Turner, 'citizenship rights from above'.43
With the transition to a multi-party system the actual defining of the
notion and content of the 'official' definition of Turkish identity became a
chief objective of the political debate. As a result of such debate certain
policies of the state were influenced, and to some extent began to be slowly
transformed. The Democrats who put a strong emphasis on Islam and
traditional, local values44
propagated a peculiar understanding of Turkish
nationalism that was more or less coupled with Islam, but that was refuted,
at least in terms of their discourses, by the Kemalists in determining the
boundaries and nature of the 'enlightened', 'civilized' and 'patriotic'
citizen. In spite of these attempts and their later implications, until 1980,
religion - Islam - did not exist as one of the officially determined,
constitutive elements which were the defining features of Turkish citizens.
However, with the social, political and economic changes, religion began to
gain importance sociologically speaking, and consequently its impact on
politics has been increasing since 1950. Following the 1960 military
intervention, the 1961 constitution attempted to provide a venue wherein
some civil/societal elements might express themselves. Although, in this
sense, it seemed to extend the scope of citizenship, the participation of
citizens was actually gained primarily by subscribing to the obligations of
the state such as military service, voting and the paying of taxes.45
It was
seen as significant only in its relation to the ballot box.
The third period in the process of citizenization in Turkey started with
the 1980 military intervention and continued in its aftermath. The 1982
constitution might be regarded as a brilliant perversion of the original
Kemalist discourse in the sense that it placed more emphasis on 'Turkish
historical and moral values';46
and so Islam was recognized by the state elite
with regard to its importance in, at least, maintaining Turkish identity and
unity, and as a crucial antidote to communism and other factional and
WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH CITIZENSHIP? 197
divisive movements. In addition, it was used to address the failure of the
Kemalist progressive ideals to 'propagate social ethics' and to provide
common cultural feelings and values that were 'equivalent for the widely
used Islamic idiom'.47
This was, one may argue, one result of the process of
the domestication of the Kemalist modernizing state.48
In the last two
decades, the assessment of citizenship has been based on not much more
than limited political participation (such as voting) and some other duties to
the state, from which citizens' rights have been excluded. In spite of these
features of the status of citizenship in Turkey, one may not ignore the fact
that, in parallel with the development of some civil societal elements
facilitated by the changes in the socio-economic structure, we are
witnessing a continuously rising debate on citizenship.
The notion of citizenship in Turkey was conceptualized in large measure
in terms of a monolithic, unique culture and identity that was the most
fundamental product of the process of nation-building; in other words, in a
sense, it implies the sense of belonging directly to a (national) community
based on loyalty to the state. From the beginning, the formation of
citizenship has been realized by emphasizing the significance of
manufactured symbols. Notably, during the single party period especially,
there were attempts by the regime to prescribe precisely how citizens should
speak, dress, behave in public and (even) in private life, and so on. This is
why citizenship in Turkey is a cultural status more than a social or political
one. This sort of conceptualized citizenship has been challenged by two
main trends: first, increasing international migration since 1960, and
second, the new increasingly vocal and powerful religious, ethnic and
sectarian movements, especially since the 1980s, namely the Kurdish,
Islamic and Alevi movements. These movements have played a crucial role
in expanding the claims to rights and entitlements to new areas, and in the
light of that expansion and diversity of claims, they have posed questions of
membership at the cultural, political and social level. The discussion of
'constitutional citizenship' and the implementation of 'dual citizenship' are
the result of the controversy over the official citizenship concept that is
closely bound with the 'idealized' Kemalist discourse.
As already stressed, there have been two separate social issues that
contributed to the debate on the citizenship concept in Turkey since the
early 1980s. The first one is associated with international migration and the
citizenship position of Turkish emigrants living abroad. The other is related
to the citizenship rights of some competing politico-cultural groups such as
Kurds, Islamists, and Alevis. While the former has been dealt with in terms
of the concept of 'dual citizenship', the latter has brought into focus the
198 SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC
notion of 'constitutional citizenship'. It is obvious that these two concepts
are very different from each other. Nevertheless, common ground exists in
that both groups challenge and attempt to redefine the existing concept of
citizenship, in order to create more responsive policies that will address
their needs more specifically.
The first major challenge to the established notion of citizenship in
Turkey was a consequence of international migration. Since the early 1960s,
millions of Turkish citizens in search of work and a better life, and
sometimes of political freedom, have left their homes and been admitted as
legal residents of Western countries.49
Many Turkish immigrants have lived
in these states for several decades, paid taxes and been affected by political
decisions, but they never gained full political rights, since they do not, or
cannot, become citizens of the country in which they now live. In fact,
before 1981, it was extremely rare to see Turkish emigrants anywhere in the
world who had gained citizenship in their host country. Even if it had been
the case, it was not possible for Turkish emigrants to assume citizenship
status of another country without surrendering their original Turkish
citizenship. In short, before 1981 Turkish citizens could not hold multiple
(dual) citizenship. In April 1981 Turkish regulations were changed,
allowing dual citizenship for the first time.50
The effect of this has now
become apparent in the numbers of Turkish emigrants gaining citizenship
status in the countries where they now reside. For instance, official statistics
indicate that there were 126,000 Turkish citizens granted German
citizenship in 1996, and by 1998 another 125,000 Turks were expected to
became naturalized, bringing the total number of naturalized Turkish
citizens in Germany to a quarter million.51
It is obvious that, as often happens in most migrant-sending states,
Turkey today prefers the blood principle of citizenship. Based on national
practical interests, the country wishes to keep close contacts with its citizens
abroad, and therefore tends to encourage emigrants to retain their
citizenship and transfer it to their children. Of course, concerning the
naturalization policies and practices in the migrant-receiving countries, no
one can expect that the Turkish state would have any sympathy towards the
process in which several hundred thousands of its citizens abroad will be
definitely lost. Acknowledging the reality of the permanent presence of its
emigrants abroad, and considering the ongoing process of access to
citizenship rights in the receiving states, the Turkish state today tends to
stress the importance of legal regulations which permit the emigrants to
qualify for naturalization without giving up their original citizenship.52
Accordingly, from the viewpoint of the state in Turkey, dual citizenship is
increasingly seen as an important and practical tool for the integration
process of its emigrants in the receiving societies.53
WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH CITIZENSHIP? 199
It seems that dual citizenship provides an opportunity for the Turkish
state to overcome several negative consequences of the permanent
settlement of its citizens abroad, while at the same time offering some
practical solutions to the naturalization difficulties experienced by the
migrant-receiving states and emigrants themselves. Since the renunciation
of native citizenship is often considered as an enormous psychological and
practical barrier to naturalization, it is widely shown that acceptance of dual
nationality by the receiving and sending states will increase the inclination
of immigrants to naturalize.54
Although a basic consensus is achieved
regarding the main advantage of dual citizenship, which is to facilitate an
easy and quick solution to the anomalous status of immigrants in the
migratory process, the inconveniences of dual citizenship have received
much more attention than have the positive aspects. For instance, it is
argued that dual citizenship will create some complicated situations which
cannot be squared with egalitarian democratic norms, such as dual military
obligations, dual loyalties, and dual political rights. However, as is pointed
out by many proponents of dual citizenship, it is apparent that these
inconveniences can be limited by means of bilateral and international
agreements. The content of dual citizenship in itself reveals that the process
of acquiring the citizenship of another country without giving up the
original citizenship involves consequences for governments of both the
sending and receiving states as well as for the international migrants. For
instance, emphasizing the idea that 'everyone should be a citizen of one
country and no one should be a citizen of more than one',55
many Turkish
emigrants living abroad have worried about the application and
consequences of dual citizenship. From this perspective, and closely related
to the debates concerning citizenship in Turkey, are the emigrants'
perceptions and attitudes concerning their own position in the processes of
access to citizenship and citizenship rights. What it means to Turkish
emigrants to take out citizenship in a host country, why some of them
change their membership status while others do not change: these are the
questions that require some solid answers.
Some research findings56
give us an opportunity to comment on the
question of what kinds of meanings, costs and benefits are involved in
Turkish emigrants' naturalization decisions. These findings show that when
the emigrants were asked why they had become citizens of the receiving
states or intended to do so, mostly pragmatic considerations were given as
important factors affecting their decisions. For instance, apart from only a
few who mentioned the advantages of travelling with the passport of the
receiving state, many said that becoming a citizen in receiving states gave
them a chance to live both in Turkey and in host countries without having
visa and residence permit problems. Having citizenship rights and the right
200 SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC
to seek permanent positions in public and government services, many
emigrants believed that job opportunities would be more abundant not only
for themselves but, also most important, for their children. For some, the
reasons for becoming a citizen covered some normative and moral
motivations together with pragmatic considerations. For instance, they felt
that it was a proper step which should be taken after their decision to
become permanent residents in the host countries, or they indicated that
they would be able to use various rights of citizenship, such as voting, in the
country where they live. Meanwhile, emigrants often pointed out that the
legal change in Turkey in 1981, allowing dual citizenship for the first time,
was a stimulus for their decision.
While those who had become citizens of the receiving states or were
intending to do so often emphasized that pragmatic considerations played
an important role in their decisions, a large proportion of those who
indicated that they did not have any intention of becoming citizens in these
receiving states, also gave pragmatic reasons to explain their attitudes.
Some believed that they would not get any benefit from naturalization in the
host countries; others felt that they might lose some of their rights in Turkey,
such as owning property there." In this context, some complained that dual
citizenship regulations in Turkey were unclear and mentioned the rumour
about confiscation of properties in the homeland by the Turkish government
if they took another citizenship. Some of the emigrants said that they were
not willing to become citizens, because they intended to go back home to
Turkey for good. For others, the main reason for refusing the rights of
citizenship was based on a basic psychological and moral consideration:
they said that becoming citizens in these countries was inappropriate
because they considered themselves Turkish rather than German, Australian
or Swedish.
While Turkey was losing its comfortable certainties regarding the
citizenship institution, owing mainly to its participation in the world-wide
emigration system, another force made its way to the agenda of the
citizenship debate: the persistence of ethnic and religious identities and their
struggle for recognition as distinct groups; to be more specific, it was the
identity crisis of the Kurds, Islamist and Alevis. It is within this context that
the issue of constitutional citizenship began to occupy a place in the various
spheres of the Turkish public, government and state. The main idea behind
the concept of constitutional citizenship is the fabrication and promotion of
a new socio-political identity for everyone in the country, and that identity's
relation to citizenship. For instance, after becoming president in 1994,
Siileyman Demirel announced the idea of constitutional citizenship several
times,58
that is the creation of a new 'super identity' for all the members of
society, which appears increasingly fragmented into various identity groups
WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH CITIZENSHIP? 201
who are issuing political demands based on their identities. Similarly, Prime
Minister Tansu (filler in December 1994 contributed to the debate with the
statement of 'what a happiness to the one who says I am a citizen of
Turkey', which was actually a converted version of the famous statement of
Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, 'what a happiness to the one who says I am a
Turk'.59
It is interesting that the issue of constitutional citizenship has been
a kind of item on the official agenda which suddenly appears and then again
suddenly disappears. Meanwhile, however, the public60
and academicians61
show considerable interest in the issue.
The premises of the debate within the context of constitutional
citizenship impart criticism toward the legacy of the construction of
citizenship in early modern Turkey.62
As elaborated in some detail above, in
the early period of the Turkish Republic the core argument was to create a
new nation, and consequently a new form of membership to this nation,
which was meant to be modern, civilized, non-religious and egalitarian with
regard to the hitherto hierarchical social structure that were divided across
lines of religious, ethnic and national memberships. The ideas of
Westernization, nationalism and secularism were considered crucial
ideological and practical tools for accomplishing the sense of unity and
cultural consensus that is regarded as essential in forming a new citizenship
concept in the multicultural population inherited from the Ottoman past.
However, it was paradoxical to construct a citizenship concept by
accommodating the idea of nationalism based on Turkishness, and at the
same time securing the loyalty of non-Turkish populations in the country.
Even if we were reminded that the notion of Turkishness was often used
with the statement of 'anyone who is bound to the Turkish state by
citizenship is Turk', it was extremely difficult to deal with a national type
of citizenship in a multiethnic, multinational and multireligious
environment. It was also paradoxical to treat religion as glue for a cohesive
nation and a bridge between society and state on the one hand and to
promote secularism in the country on the other. One of the main
consequences of these paradoxical elements since the establishment of the
Republic is that the country has been Turkified, and some sectors of the
society Islamicized. As another consequence, the recent decades have
witnessed identity revivals of the Kurds, Islamists, and Alevis.
Although the most frequently declared aims of the Kurdish movement
range from cultural and political rights to federalism and separate statehood,
the basic problem seems to be Turkey's failure to recognize Kurds as a
distinct ethnic group.63
For the Islamists, the main problem has been the
exclusion of the Islamic ethos from public discourse and the inclusion of an
alien secular nationalism into the larger society.64
The Alevi community
demands accommodation of their religious identity within mainstream
202 SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC
institutions such as the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and they wish to
establish their own religious institutions. The common point of these
demands is a search for a socio-political setting free from alienation and
anonymity where these distinct identities can enjoy their social, cultural and
political rights. What is implied is that the anomalous picture of the
membership status of these distinct identities in Turkey contradicts the very
abstract assumption, which is basic to democracy, that people who have
their legal residence on the territory of the state are also its members and
therefore shall meet all obligations and enjoy full civil, political and social
rights in this state. In short, the current positions of Kurds, Islamists, and
Alevis create a context in which a new citizenship based on constitutional
rights rather than on nationality emerges as a political imperative from the
basic principles of democratic citizenship.
Almost every state (country) in the world has its own citizens with
various identities. For the most part these are defined in ethnic terms, or in
terms of clear identifiable or socially defined attributes. Indeed, the notion
of constitutional citizenship comes into the picture at this point. The
dynamics and characteristics of the recent constitutional citizenship debate
in Turkey are complex and varied. Although for each different actor
involved in this debate, its meaning, scope and practice have unique aspects
of their own, there is a framework common to the whole debate. To
summarize, one can show four basic points which shape this framework.
The first is that the struggle of the ethnic and religious identities for
recognition as distinct groups has had a very significant impact on the
notion of nation-state in Turkey. Second, there is a need to recognize the
reality and implications of that identity-based diversity. Third, there is a
greater awareness about the need for a series of policy initiatives, which will
help the state better to manage the consequences of identity-based diversity
in the interests of the state, citizens, and society as a whole. Fourth, there is
recognition of the importance of the citizenship institution in solving the
identity-based conflicts.
The identity-based conflicts in Turkey have been haunting the political
rationality of the Turkish state. It is within this context that the state and
public in the country seem to be attracted by the notion of constitutional
citizenship as representing something more than a formal legal status of
membership. Proponents of constitutional citizenship want to show that this
type of citizenship has continuing relevance in securing the loyalty of
distinct identity groups in the country who are open to the growing
'divisive' sentiments in society. Opponents of constitutional citizenship, on
the other hand, seeing it as a danger to the nation, argue that recognition of
ethnic and religious identities will not bring a sense of unity to the nation,
and claim that contrary to what is expected, they will always have certain
WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH CITIZENSHIP? 203
serious difficulties in meeting the basic measure of becoming a member of
the nation, which is to be bound by a sense of solidarity, a common culture
and a national consciousness.
If it is true that 'the development of the concept of membership in a
national polity went hand in hand with the nation-states in the West',65
then
the situation in Turkey today, as has been the case in many other countries,
would tell us that there has been a major transformation in recent decades:
as pointed out by Silverman,66
'the link between the nation and the state has
become visibly dislocated and the gap is likely to grow even more... the
dislocation of these elements today, the breakdown in blood and soil
definitions of community and the reformulation of the notion of citizenship
are all factors in the contemporary crisis of the nation-state'. Although one
can acknowledge the difficulties in coping with the diversity of already
established policies and the practice and outlook with regard to citizenship
issues in various nation-states, the concept of constitutional citizenship
seems to be a practical solution. If constitutional citizenship is defined as a
formal legal status of the membership of a state, and if this definition
implies loyalty to state rather than nation, it will be possible, if not easy, to
see that in a country like Turkey where identity-based conflicts endanger
the sense of unity, citizenship rights based on constitutional arrangements
are important for both symbolic and practical reasons; however, its practical
significance is much more important than its symbolic significance.
The Kemalist Revolution began carefully to construct the modern concept
of citizenship in Turkey 75 years ago, and there were not many occasions in
which the new concept of citizenship was challenged. However, there have
been two issues since the early 1980s that have made it a major topic of
debate: emigration of Turkish citizens, and as one of its consequences, dual
citizenship; and revival of various ethnic and religious identities and their
association with the concept of constitutional citizenship. The common
denominator of these issues is that they are directly related to the concept of
citizenship which is an essential basis in defining the rights, obligations, and
identities of individuals in modern societies. It is in these issues, we believe,
that we faced the great problems and challenges which confronted Turkey
in the 1980s and 1990s. These problems have occurred as previously
excluded peripheral identities began to question the fabricated and imposed
monolithic citizenship identity which was the product of the early
Republican project of social engineering. Briefly, the formal conventional
framework of citizenship today can neither accommodate the past 75 years
of socio-political change nor articulate the new model of pluralism.
The principal conclusion drawn from this study is that although the pace
204 SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC
in the recognition process for some new citizenship arrangements in Turkey
was quite slow, the Turkish state has eventually become receptive to the
case of its emigrants by facilitating them with dual citizenship; but while the
state has been dealing with the identity-based conflicts in the country it has
had considerable adaptation difficulties and has been confused by the notion
of constitutional citizenship. This is of course, something we expect. Some
critics have suggested that dual citizenship will create dual loyalties and
rights that will encourage emigrants to use their new citizenship rights and
benefits, and to ignore their implicit responsibilities to their sending state.
However, it is thought that, overall, the acceptance of dual citizenship does
not seriously harm these states. On the other hand, however, the notion of
constitutional citizenship, which recognizes the multicultural diversity of
society, is often seen as a divisive socio-political project for the identity and
integrity of the Turkish state. This worry is understandable when the real
picture of sociopolitical climate in Turkey is taken into consideration: for
instance, Kurdish ethnic nationalism often threatens the unity of the country
and creates a potential for violence and war; and religious revivalism makes
the situation potentially even more explosive.
However, it seems reasonable to conclude that if citizenship is
considered important mostly as a matter offunctionalism rather than that of
normativism, the task of formulating a new concept of citizenship is not an
impossible one. As argued in this study, when access to citizenship rights in
an immigration context is considered mainly as a matter of pragmatic choice
rather than normative and moral commitment, the notion of dual citizenship
becomes a desirable and rational choice for the involved actors. Similarly,
if functionalism directs the actors of the politics of citizenship, we believe
constitutional citizenship or any other similar formulation would offer
promising solutions to the dilemma of pluralism.
We think that Turkey will be more stable and more prosperous only on
the condition that it produces new ideas and formulates satisfying answers
to the question of 'knowing how to deal with diversity'. Indeed, dual
citizenship might be considered as a way of coping with diversity, so that
emigrants' identities, demands and practical needs may be satisfied, at least
in part, within the framework of a flexible citizenship arrangement.
Similarly, within the concept of constitutional citizenship, a new and more
complex formula starts imposing itself, the basis of which would combine
unity and diversity in a pragmatic way, even if doing so is not easy. In short,
what is needed is rethinking of the politics of citizenship.
WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH CITIZENSHIP? 205
NOTES
1. A.Afet Inan, Medeni Bilgiler veM. Kemal Atatiirk 'iinEl Yazilari[Civic Information and the
Manuscripts of Atatiirk] (Ankara, 1988, 2nd.edition).
2. Fiisun Ustel, 'Cumhuriyet'ten Bu Yana Yurttas Profili' [Profile of the Citizen since the
Republic], Yeni Yuzyd, 24 April1995.
3. SeeWill Kymlicka andWayne Norman, 'Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Workon
Citizenship Theory1
, Ethics 104 (Jan. 1994), pp.352-81; Bryan Turner, 'Contemporary
Problems in the Theory of Citizenship, in B. Turner (ed.), Citizenship and Social Theory
(London, 1993), p. 1.
4. Turner, 'Contemporary Problems in theTheory of Citizenship',p.5.
5. Tomas Hammar, 'State, Nation and Dual Citizenship', in William Rogers Brubaker (ed.),
Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe andNorth America (Lanham, New
York, London: The German Marshall Fund of the US, University Press of America Inc.,
1989),pp.81-96.
6. Brubaker, 'Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A
Comparative Historical Analysis', International Sociology, Vol.5, No.4 (1990), pp.380-1.
According to this model, membership should be egalitarian, that is,there should be a status
of full membership andnoother. Secondly, it should be sacred,that is,citizens should make
sacrifices or sacred acts for the state. Thirdly, membership should be nation-based, that is,
the political community should overlap with thecultural community of shared language and
character, which is acquired either by birth or through assimilation. Fourthly, membership
should be democratic, that is, members should participate in the ruling process. Fifthly,
membership should be unique; people should belong to only onestate. Finally, membership
should be socially consequential, that is, it should be expressed in a community of well-
being.
7. William Rogers Brubaker, 'Introduction' in Brubaker (ed.), Immigration and thePoliticsof
Citizenship in Europe andNorth America, pp.1-27; Citizenship andNationhood in France
and Germany (Cambridge, MA,1992).
8. Shu-Yun Ma, 'Nationalism: State Building or State Destroying?', The Political Science
Journal, Vol.29, No.3 (1992), p.294.
9. David Miller, 'Book Review of Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship,
Community by Chantal Mouffe', American Political Science Review, Vol.87, No.4(1993),
p.1003.
10. T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship andSocial Development (Garden City, NY, 1965).
11. SeeKymlicka andNorman, 'Return of theCitizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship
Theory'.
12. Anne Phillips, Democracy andDifference (Oxford, 1993), p.2.
13. Fuat Keyman, 'On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism: TheCrisis of
Hegemony andtheRise of (Islamic) Identity in Turkey', New Perspectives onTurkey,Vol.13
(Fall 1995), p.94.
14. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford,
1995).
15. SeeKymlicka andNorman, 'Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship
Theory', pp.352-81.
16. Jiirgen Habermas, 'Citizenship andNational Identity' (1990), in J. Habermas (ed.)Between
Facts andNorms (Cambridge, MA,1996).
17. Tomas Hammar, 'Citizenship: Membership of a Nation and of a State', International
Migration, Vol.24, No.4 (1986), pp.735-46; Democracy and the Nation-State (Aldershot,
1990), pp.191-219; Mark J. Miller, 'Dual Citizenship: A European Norm?', International
Migration Review, Vol.23, No.4(1989), pp.945-50.
18. Ibid.
19. Robin West, 'Toward a First Amendment Jurisprudence of Respect: A Comment on George
Fletcher's Constitutional Identity', in Michel Rosenfeld (ed.), Constitutionalism, Identity,
Difference andLegitimacy (Durham, NC, 1994).
20. Fora general discussion on thenational andsupra-national identity question in theEuropean
206 SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC
Union, see John Rex, 'National Identity in the Democratic Multi-Cultural State',
Sociological Research Online, Vol.1, No.2 (1996); for a specific discussion on the
constitutional citizenship in the European Union context, see Habermas, 'Citizenship and
National Identity'.
21. Jiirgen Habermas, 'Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State', in
Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton,
1994), p. 107.
22. Habermas, 'Citizenship and National Identity', p.496.
23. Ibid.
24. Kymlicka and Norman, 'Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship
Theory', p.373.
25. Halil Inalcik, 'The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey', in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart
A. Rustow (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, 1964), p.56; Ali
Kazancigil, 'The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalizm', in A. Kazancigil and E. Ozbudun
(eds.), Atatiirk: Founder of a Modern State (London, 1981), p.38; and Serif Mardin,
'Religion and Secularism in Turkey', in ibid., p.196.
26. For further details on the 1876 Constitution, see Seref Goziibuyiik and Suna Kill, Turk
Anayasa Melinleri [Turkish Constitutional Texts] (Ankara, 1957), pp.21-55.
27. For the extended analysis of the historical development of legal status of citizens in Turkey,
see Ergin Nomer, Vatandashk Hukuku [Citizenship Law] (Istanbul, 1993, 9th ed.).
28. Metin Heper, 'The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative
Perspective', British Journal of Middle East Studies, 13 (1991).
29. Ergin Nomer, VatandashkHukuku [Citizenship Law].
30. Robert Nisbet, The Making of Modern Society (Great Britain, 1986), p.131.
31. Ftisun Ustel, 'Cumhuriyet'ten Bu Yana Yurttas Profili' [Profile of the Citizen since the
Republic].
32. Identity', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.32, No.2 (1996), p.177.
33. Metin Heper, 'The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative
Perspective', p.47.
34. §erif Mardin, 'Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Transformation', International Journal
of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.2 (1971), p.209.
35. For further details and discussion on the strong state tradition in Turkey, see Metin Heper,
State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington, 1985).
36. For a discussion and the views of Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (Minister of Justice in the Inonii
government in the late 1920s) on the relationship between common good and life-style, see
Mustafa Baydar, Atatiirk ve Devrimlerimiz [Atatiirk and Our Reforms] (Istanbul, 1973),
pp.208-10.
37. Cited in Yilmaz Altug, 'Atatiirk and the Building of a Modern State', Turkish Review
Quarterly Digest, Vol.5, No.12 (1991), p.34.
38. For Atatiirk's views and explanations on nation, culture and citizenship, see Afet tnan,
Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk'iin El Yazilan [Civil Information and the
Manuscripts of Atatiirk].
39. Niliifer Gole, 'Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey', in
Richard Norton (ed.) Civil Society in the Middle East (Leiden, 1995),p.21.
40. Selc.uk Aksin Somel, 'Osmanh'dan Cumhuriyet'e Turk KimligT [Turkish Identity from the
Ottoman to the Republic], in Nuri Bilgin (ed.), Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik [Republic,
Democracy and Identity] (Istanbul, 1997),p.81.
41. 'One may', writes B. Lewis, 'speak of Christian Arabs, but a Christian Turk is an absurdity
and a contradiction in terms. Even after thirty years of the secular Republic, a non-Muslim
in Turkey may be called a Turkish citizen, but never a Turk.' Bernard Lewis, 'Turkey:
Westernisation', in G. E. von Grunebaum (ed.), Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization
(Chicago, 1955), p.326.
42. There were, for example, volunteers for integration in the Jewish community; some of them
regarded Jews as Turks from the Judaic religion while Tekinalp, a converted Jew, delineated
the testament for Turkification. For the discussion of the status of Jews in Turkey see Avner
Levi, Turkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Yahudiler[Jews in the Republic of Turkey] (Istanbul, 1993).
WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH CITIZENSHIP? 207
43. In this connection, Turner argues, the citizen is seen as 'a mere subject rather than an active
bearer of effective claims against society via the state'. B.S. Turner, 'Outline of a Theory of
Citizenship', in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), Dimensionsof Radical Democracy(London, 1992),p.46.
44. Serif Mardin, 'Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?', Daedalus, 102
(1973), p.169.
45. Fiisun Ustel, 'Yurttashk Bilgisi Kitaplan ve Yurttas Profili' [Schoolbooks on Citizenship and
Profile of the Citizen], Yeni Yuzyil, 25 April 1995.
46. Metin Heper, State Tradition in Turkey, p. 146.
47. Serif Mardin, 'Islam in Mass Society: Harmony versus Polarization', in Metin Heper and
Ahmet Evin (eds.), The Politics in the Third Turkish Republic (Boulder, CO, 1994),
48. Chris Hann describes the process Turkey entered into with the transition to a multi-party
system as the domestication of the modernizing state, that is, the state began taking into
consideration the pressure and demands from below, and partially rearranging its policies in
accordance with these demands: Chris Hann, 'Subverting Strong States: The Dialectics of
Social Engineering in Hungary and Turkey', Daedalus, Vol.126, No.2 (1995).
49. For a voluminous annotated bibliography of the studies on Turkish migration to Western
European countries see N. Abadan-Unat and N. Kemiksiz, Tiirk Dis Gocii: 1960-1984
[Turkish External Migration: 1960-1984] (Ankara, 1986). For a recent study of the Turkish
emigration to Europe, see also Ahmet icduygu. 'Migration from Turkey to Western Europe:
Recent Trends and Prospects', paper presented to the Mediterranean Conference on
Population, Migration and Development, Palma de Mallorca, 15-17 Oct. 1996.
50. Some articles of the Turkish Citizenship Law, originally dated 22 Feb. 1964 and numbered
403, were changed on 13 Feb. 1981, with the Law No.2383.
51. See Volkan Bozkaya, 'Life Situation, Identity and Integration of Turks in the Federal
Republic of Germany', paper presented at the 3rd National Population Conference,
Hacettepe University, 2-5 Dec, Ankara; in relation to the effect of the 1981 regulations,
which caused an increasing trend in the number of Turkish immigrants taking out citizenship
of the receiving states after 1981, see Ahmet icduygu, 'Citizenship at the Crossroads:
Immigration and the Nation-State', in Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs (eds.),
Globalisation, Theory and Practice (London, 1996), pp.154-60, and also see Ahmet
icduygu, 'Becoming a New Citizen in an Immigration Country: Turks in Australia and
Sweden', International Migration, Vol.34, No.l (1996), pp.257-74.
52. As an example of the increasing Turkish official interest to the dual citizenship issue, see K.
Akin, 'Yurttashk Nasil Korunur' [How to Protect the Citizenship], Yeni Birlik, Vol.11, No. 11,
1988 (an interview with the Deputy Director of the Office of Population and Citizenship,
Ministry of Interior).
53. For instance, the dual citizenship debate was intensified when in May 1993 five Turkish
women and children were killed in an arson attack in Solingen, Germany. After the incident,
Turkish officials often argued that Turkey wanted easier naturalization and dual citizenship
for the Turkish nationals in Europe, which is seen as a tool to discourage violence towards
Turks abroad.
54. See Brubaker, 'Introduction', pp.115—16, and Miller, 'Dual Citizenship: A European
Norm?', p.948.
55. See, for instance, for a related debate, Report on Political Participation (Strasbourg, 1991).
56. See Ahmet icduygu, 'Citizenship at the Crossroads: Immigration and the Nation-State', and
Ahmet icduygu, 'Becoming a New Citizen in an Immigration country: Turks in Australia and
Sweden'.
57. New regulations had to be done in June 1995 about the protection of the rights and
possessions of Turkish citizens in the case of their citizenship position change. See, Tiirk
Vatandashgi Kanununda Degisiklik Yapilmasina Iliskin Kanun [Law on the Change in the
Turkish Citizenship Law], Law No.4112, Date: 7.6.1995, Official Gazette.
58. See for instance, Ertugrul Ozkok, 'Demirel Anayasal Vatandashga Doniiyor' [Demirel,
Turning to the Constitutional Citizenship], Hiirriyet, 3 Dec. 1996.
59. See, G. Zeynep Cetinkaya, 'Ne Mutlu'ya Kimlik Araniyor' [Identity wanted to what a
happiness], Pazar Postast, 1 Jan. 1995.
208 SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC
60. See, for instance, Ertugrul Ozkok, 'Demirel Anayasal Vatandashga Doniiyor'. See G.
Zeynep Cetinkaya, 'Ne Mutlu'ya Kimlik Araniyor'.
61. See Ahmet Icduygu, 'Cokkiilturluluk' [Multiculturalism], Tiirkiye Gunlugu (March-April
1995); Fiisun Ustel, 'Anayasal Vatandashk, Hangi Anayasaya Vatandashk?' [Constitutional
Citizenship, Citizenship to What Constitution?], Radikal, 17 Dec. 1996; Nur Vergin,
'Anayasal Vatandaslik Ne Demektir?' [What Does Constitutional Citizenship Mean?],
Milliyet, 26 Dec. 1996.
62. Although there is no direct reference to the concept of constitutional citizenship, the
following two articles provide a historical background in which the debate was intensified:
the first one is Ergun Ozbudun, 'Milli Miicadele ve Cumhuriyet'in Resmi Belgelerinde
Yurttashk ve Kimlik Sorunu' [National Struggle and the Problem of Citizenship and Identity
in the Official Documents of the Republic], in Nuri Bilgin (ed.), Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve
Kimlik (Istanbul, 1997), pp.63-70; and the second one is Sel?uk Aksin Somel, 'Osmanh'dan
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63. See, Nimet Beriker-Atiyas, 'The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties and Prospects',
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64. See, Hakan Yavuz, 'Turkey's Imagined Enemies: Kurds and Islamists', The WorldToday
(April 1996),pp.99-101.
65. Ayse Kadioglu, 'Citizenship, Immigration and Racism in a Unified Germany with Special
reference to the Turkish Guestworkers', Journal of Economics and Administrative Studies,
Vol.6, Nos.1-2 (1992), p.200,
66. M. Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation (London, 1992), p.35.