

8 Citizenship Education without Citizenship?

The Migrant in EU Education Policy on European Citizenship—Toward the Margin through ‘Strangification’

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INTRODUCTION

An important task of education in many Western democracies, including the supra-national European Union, is to provide for the formation of active participatory citizens. This task is particularly urgent in the present social and educational situation of plurality and globalisation. The emphasis on promoting participatory citizenry through education in these democracies can be viewed in light of general political concerns about the future of democracy. These concerns are partly underpinned by political science and sociological research suggesting a decline, particularly among adolescents, in political participation, knowledge and interest at local, national and global levels in various parts of the world (Inglehart 1997; Putnam 2000; Schulz, Ainley and van de Gaer 2010c; Yates and Youniss 1998). Although the claims raised by this research are inconsistent, a contemporary political targeting of these issues in the field of education, coupled with the ongoing revival of the field of political socialisation (cf. Amnå et al. 2009), indicates a political unease about the current state of democracy and participatory citizenship.

This unease is based on a normative, liberal educational ideal that emphasises individual autonomy and freedom as core values (Barry 2001; Feinberg and McDonough 2005; Gutmann 1999; Irisdotter Aldenmyr, Jepson Wigg and Olson 2012; Kymlicka and Norman 2000). This ideal implies that, as far as possible, individuals should be in charge of their own lives. It entails “the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives” (Raz 1986:369). The ideal thus promotes two notions: First, the idea that people have a *capacity* for both autonomy and for living in a plural and diversified society, that is, they are able to turn the rights and provisions conferred on them into actions that serve their best interests and ways of living; and, second, that they both can and have the possibility and right to *consider* whether or not they want to be part of an educational formation for European participatory citizenship (for critical comments on the heavy

reliance on liberal ideals in education when it comes to young people's citizen competence, see Olson 2012c).

The current EU education policy on citizenship is by no means exceptional in stressing the need for a liberal-style educational approach to participatory citizenship (cf. Kerr and Nelson 2006; Schulz et al. 2008; Weerd et al. 2005). In fact, increased attention has been directed toward such education during the last two decades within the European Union (Hvinden and Johansson 2007; Isin and Wood 1999; Johansson 2007; Nóvoa and Lawn 2002). More precisely, this attention is a matter of revitalising citizenship education programmes that are alleged to be too oriented toward the nation-state within the established democracies of Europe. At the EU educational policy level this revitalisation is considered to be essential for the legitimacy of democratic governance in Europe, which crucially depends on the extent to which the complexly interwoven liberal democratic structures and practices are supported and 'owned' by citizens in command of their own lives (see McCowan and Unterhalter, Chapter 7, and Zimenkova, Chapter 2, this volume).

By conducting a policy analysis of the EU's supra-national educational policy on European citizenship, I aim to stress three things in this chapter. First, certain individuals and groups—who can be characterised by the concept of the Migrant—tend to become marginalised by this policy. Second, these marginalising rhetorical policy forces can be depicted as a 'pushing' of the Migrant toward the margin of what counts as a proper European citizenship. Finally, this pushing process tends to be self-reinforcing in the sense that it does not lend itself easily to making it possible for the Migrant to be considered as an adequately educated European participatory citizen. The chapter is structured as follows: First, the current EU education policy on citizenship is presented. Second, central features of its implications are juxtaposed to the figure of the Migrant, who is introduced as a hypothetical character in this text. Third, a brief account of a postcolonial perspective is given, followed by an analysis of the ways in which the Migrant becomes marginalised within and through the EU's education policy. Finally, some ideas are suggested regarding an educational approach for European participatory citizenship, which could pave the way to counteracting these marginalising forces.

EDUCATING FOR PARTICIPATORY CITIZENSHIP IN EU POLICY

As the European Union does not have an educational entity under its own command, the current emphasis in its policy on the role of education in the formation of participatory European citizens is directed towards its member states. Similar to the days when various European individual state curricula placed emphasis on patriotism, this joint EU education policy is also presented in positive terms: qualifying and socialising young people

by providing them with certain social skills and creating both individual and collective identities among them (Bîrzea 2003; Hvinden and Johansson 2007; Johansson 2007; Ross 2008; see also Sack, Chapter 1, this volume). Two lines of thought are especially stressed in the EU policy on citizenship—knowledge and shared social and cultural belonging:

A Europe of knowledge is now widely recognised as an irreplaceable factor for social and human growth and as an indispensable component to consolidate and enrich the European citizenship, capable of giving its citizens the necessary competences to face the challenges of the new millennium, together with an awareness of shared values and belonging to a common social and cultural space. (European Commission 1999:1)

The political efforts of the EU assume a multiplicity of histories that are held together by a great emphasis on “knowledge” and on an imagined, common “social and cultural space”. The vision of a collective European participatory citizenship seems to focus on reconfiguring the relationship between citizenship, belonging and identity, so as to allow current demands on contemporary European society at the jurisdicative, social and cultural levels (Zimenkova, Chapter 2, this volume). This reframing is to take place within the member states of the EU and their educational systems. It is emphasised that the educational systems of the member states should not merely be limited to the reproduction of their own cultures by promoting nation-state-oriented values. “They should also educate for citizenship: and here, Europe is not a dimension which has replaced others, but one which enhances them” (European Commission 1993:6). In this reframing, the EU is seen as the uniting agent (cf. Haar 1997), as put forth in the Lisbon Treaty:

The peoples of Europe are building a single Union out of many diverse nations, communities, cultures and language groups: it is a Union built around the equal interchange of ideas and traditions and founded upon the mutual acceptance of peoples with different histories but a common future. (Lisbon Treaty 2008:3)

Taken together, these policy demands accentuate the need for a modified, expanded and participatory citizenship-fostering agenda among the member states of the EU. This agenda may serve as a plausible basis for something other than the patriotism that is commonly expected. This educational agenda for European citizenship appears to require somewhat disconcerting features. On the one hand, it calls for a type of fostering that includes the objective of promoting an individually oriented pluralism and difference in liberal registers. On the other hand, it emphasises the importance of belonging to a certain social and culturally coloured terrain—Europe—in order to attain these individually oriented, participatory

citizen-fostering goals. In this twofold imagery, the EU's educational goal of promoting European citizenship appears to be contradictory: It calls for a citizenship of a 'plural nowhere', but it also calls for a defined base and place for this nowhere.

What is problematic here is that the framing of European citizenship as a post-national, 'non-' or even 'never-bound' territorial life form within education policy is simultaneously presented as being distinctively European (Olson 2012a). Furthermore, this ambiguity involves an unsettling promise of a nation-transcending, participatory European citizenship in Europe through national citizenship education.¹ The tension, or paradox, involved here comes to a head in that a European participatory citizenship is presumed to be plural and multicultural just because it is situated in Europe. This ambiguity in EU education policy is well mapped out in critical studies, mainly in Foucauldian analyses (Dean 1999; Fejes 2006; Mitchell 2006; Popkewitz, Olson and Petersson 2006). In relation to my focus on the figure of the Migrant, I will adopt a postcolonial perspective (Hansen 1998; King 2005; Masuzawa 2005; Said 1978; Sibley 1995; Spivak 1988) that offers vital insights into the relationship between the Migrant and EU policy on citizen-fostering for participatory citizenship. Based on this theoretical approach, I aim to investigate how this puzzling ambiguity in EU education policy on citizenship is called into question by relating it to the figure of the Migrant, which serves as a hypothetical backdrop on which the image of this policy can take form in this chapter.

THE MIGRANT AND EDUCATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 'KNOWABILITIES'

Through the lens of the Migrant as a fictional figure, we may ask what positions are being offered to children, young people and adults who are subjected to education that is formally or even informally related to the EU's education policy on citizenship in Europe.² What comes to the fore, I suggest, is the fact that this policy does not merely stand out as being incompatible in its principles. It also seems to fail to allow the Migrant to come into question and to matter as an adequately educated participatory European citizen. I begin by providing a specific description of the figure of the Migrant. This is followed by a discussion of two central 'knowabilities' that stand out in the EU's education policy. These knowabilities denote certain capacities, skills and knowledge considered necessary for an adequate European participatory citizenship. Finally, I will provide an account of the relationship between the Migrant and these knowabilities.

The fictional figure of the Migrant can be depicted as a unifying image of individuals and groups that can be perceived to embody certain characteristics common to the depiction of a migrant. Far from providing any full-fledged or all-inclusive depiction of what persons and groups of persons

could or should be included in this unifying image—as this is indeed a delicate task with political implications that vary from one nation-state in Europe to the other—some characteristic features of these persons can be provided.³ The Migrant can be either a non-resident or resident of Europe, inside or outside the EU. Furthermore, s/he can be more settled or less settled, i.e. more mobile, depending on the mode of existence actualised in ethnic, religious, cultural and social registers. Thus, in invoking the Migrant, I am referring to people who are excluded from a citizenship status or parts of it, due to any form of alien-ness, resulting from external perception, self-perception or both.

To provide some concrete examples, the persons embedded in the fictional figure of the Migrant could be guest or migrant workers; ethno-cultural minority groups or other marginalised groupings, like the Romani or the Sami; exiled or illegal refugees from both inside and outside the EU; residents from any intra-European or non-European country; or residents from one EU country that move to another EU country. These people may or may not have formal, juridical citizenship status inside or outside of Europe and can be more or less itinerant. In sum, the persons who fall under the notion of the Migrant are those who, for one reason or another, are conceived of as being in special need of a European participatory citizenship education (PCE)—regardless of whether this is an alleged requirement from an EU supra-national political perspective or from the level of any of the EU's member states that claim this supra-national perspective (for a French case, see Olson 2012b; for Russian and Estonian case, see Zimenkova, Chapter 2, this volume), or if this need is assumed to be voiced by the people in question.

When it comes to the paradoxical notion of citizenship and the educational implications that are inscribed into EU policy on citizenship, the central features presented in the preceding can be pictured as two different knowabilities for European participatory citizenship. The concept of knowability denotes a particular capacity, set of skills or knowledge considered to be necessary to attain for an adequate European participatory citizenship. It can be seen as a way through which EU education policy envisions what it means to be a pan-European participatory citizen, but also—and perhaps most importantly—how this objective is to be attained and accomplished within and through educational settings of each EU member state. The first envisioned knowability could be seen as the educational acquisition of socially and culturally specific codes related to the nation-state. This acquisition involves a concretisation of traditions, moral values, manners and customs that are distinctively tied to the particular national context in question. This nation-state-based knowability can be seen as corresponding to the emphasis in policy on the role of education in providing children, youth and adults with different social and cultural identities and “histories” of Europe in order to partake in a “common future” of Europe (Lisbon Treaty 2008:3).

The second knowability that can be derived from the EU's education policy on citizenship could be described as an educational acquisition of a set of individual-oriented principles and rights-regimes (see Sack, Chapter 1, and Hedtke, Chapter 3, this volume). To illustrate, children, youths and adults are assumed to acquire knowledge about freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of sexual orientation and so on, and the judicial prohibition against harassing or persecuting anyone because of her or his opinion, religion, disability and ethno-cultural affiliation, among others. The acquisition of such knowledge involves the embodiment of liberal principles of individual autonomy and freedom and can be seen as corresponding to the nation-transcending, territorially independent feature of the EU's education policy. This knowability stresses the need to face difference and plurality *beyond* the knowledge, skills and attitudes of children, young people and adults that they have appropriated through nation-state-oriented education. That is, they should go beyond the socially and culturally specific codes related to the nation-state they have acquired in the first knowability.

What is at stake here is to expand the student's general aptitude for embracing the universal liberal values of respect, plurality and tolerance through education, in order for them to be prepared for a European citizenship. If the former knowability can be traced back to the policy's emphasis on the need for the individuals to inculcate nation-centred values, traditions and customs—which are inscribed as nation-based examples of the different social and cultural “histories” of Europe—the latter knowability can be understood as being part of the universalistic, nation-transcending tendency within EU policy in order to ensure each individual's educational preparedness to be(come) territorially independent with regard to the enactment of a participatory citizenship in Europe and elsewhere.

If we try to flesh out what this policy envisions to be desirable outcomes of the citizenship education offered to children, young people and adults in any of the EU's member states, the educationally desired individual is one who is territorially confident with certain values, skills and traditions considered to be relevant for a proper participatory citizenship in nation-state-oriented registers. S/he is also familiar with liberal universal values of tolerance, plurality and difference with regard to different historical, social and cultural contexts within and outside of Europe. Thus, s/he is assumed to be sufficiently prepared for the territorially independent part of a European participatory citizenship.

What is at stake, I argue, is not only that these two knowabilities are incompatible in principle, but also that the Migrant individual can hardly embrace and embody them in a presumably appropriate way, and thus barely comes into question as being an adequately educated participatory European citizen. When it comes to the EU's policy framing of the educational task to provide children, youths and adults with the two derived knowabilities for European participatory citizenship, the Migrant is implicitly thought of as not having the opportunities, disposition and motivation

to be subjected to education in order to cultivate these knowabilities. This policy vision of the Migrant—be it children or young or adult persons who come from a non-European country, or persons who live in a EU country or a non-EU European country, or people who move around between different EU countries and non-EU European countries—implies stipulating certain predispositions, skills, knowledge, familiarities and qualities considered necessary for them to acquire. What the EU's policy framing of citizenship education tends to imply is that the Migrant person has the opportunity, disposition and motivation to take on these two knowabilities through education, which might not always be the case. This situation regarding the relationship between the EU's policy and the Migrant might have hazardous implications.

Following this line of thought, the EU's policy emphasis on the two-step educational task of providing for a participatory European citizenship has an unsettling limitation for—at least some, if not all or only—persons who can be seen as integral to the Migrant. The alleged participatory citizenship that is to be attained through education is limited to the following: *firstly*, those who have access to the educational arena in any of the EU member states; *secondly*, those who do not embrace a mobile lifestyle that involves an itinerant mode of existence across nation-states in Europe; and, *thirdly*, those who have a predisposition to inculcate liberally entangled knowledge, skills and qualities necessary to achieve a proper participatory European citizenship.

Turning to the first condition that has to be fulfilled for the Migrant children, youths and adults to come into educational consideration as a potential participatory European citizen—that s/he is offered *access* to education in any of the EU's member states—some of them are provided meagre opportunities to come into such consideration. The knowabilities required, the “knowledge” and “belonging” necessary for a “common future” in Europe, are offered to people who are partly acknowledged as being legal or formal residents in the EU's member states and are therefore able to gain access to these educational systems (cf. McCowan and Unterhalter, this volume). Migrants who lack this level of recognition with regard to their legal and formal status do not have access to such educational systems. This holds for people living in any EU country for any of the following reasons: work-related reasons, like the Turkish people working in Germany who are not or have not been, historically, full German citizens; political reasons, like refugees or exiled children, youths and adult people who are waiting for state-sanctioned decisions about their formal and legal status in some European nation-state; or for other reasons, like undocumented people who live their lives anonymously in EU countries without access to education, ‘white’ legal jobs or protection from national and international social rights and regulations. These persons do not receive consideration as full-fledged subjects for citizenship education toward a European participatory citizenship.

If we consider the second condition that has to be fulfilled for the Migrant to come into consideration as a potential European participatory

citizen—that s/he is settled and ‘non-itinerant’ as a member of a *specific* territorial (nation-oriented) setting in Europe—we face the fact that there are many people who do not embrace a stationary lifestyle but are instead part of an itinerant mode of living across different nation-states within the EU. An example are the Romani and Sami people, who—voluntarily or not—seem to embody mobile modes of existence for cultural, material or social reasons. This type of Migrant can scarcely come into consideration for attaining a proper education for participatory European citizenship within and through the educational arrangement offered by the EU’s member states as this arrangement seems to require a settled, non-itinerant lifestyle. Regardless of whether this ‘first step’ of the EU’s policy—which includes the educational task of providing for the assimilation of allegedly European values—covers nation-oriented values and traditions or ‘lighter’ liberal universal attitudes and principles (Gregg 2003), the Migrant has to possess certain formal, legal acknowledgments and ways of living in order to come into consideration for an educational acquisition of the knowabilities ‘necessary’ for attaining a proper European participatory citizenship.

Even if the Migrant has gained access and legal acknowledgment and conforms to a lifestyle that follows the compulsory regulations of the educational system of any EU country, there is another, third, condition that has to be fulfilled for him/her to come into consideration for a European citizenship education: an inclination to embrace liberal values and a liberal democratic worldview. This condition, which can be characterised as the ‘second’ step in the EU’s policy on citizenship, is actualised through the second knowability and corresponds to the non-territorial aspect of the EU’s education policy on citizenship. What is required here is that the Migrant child, youth or adult has the willingness and belief that acquiring a set of individual-oriented liberal principles and their related rights-principles is a good thing to undertake at both a personal and social level.

Hence, in order to be regarded as a person with the necessary preparedness to achieve and enact a proper participatory European citizenship, s/he must be in agreement with liberal values. Regardless of whether such values focus on the achievement of substantial cultural (particularly European) qualities or on the enculturation into a non-territorial, yet at the same time deeply ‘European’, participatory attitude, it is assumed that the Migrant *can* and *should* acculturate and act upon them. This seems to be an exclusionary condition, in that it makes it hard for those who come from social and cultural contexts other than the EU, or other liberal Western European countries, to nurture such inclinations. To give an example, migrants who come from China, Cuba, India, Saudi Arabia or any other country in the world that does not have political traditions in full concert with Western liberal cosmopolitan values, and thus are educated into political worldviews other than the liberal one, might be less inclined to embrace liberal values as part of a global participatory European citizenship education.

In sum, as the nation-state is (still) the primary social and cultural entity that is envisaged as an educational setting for *gemeinschaft* in the EU's education policy on participatory European citizenship (Zimenkova 2011a), it contributes toward putting some persons and groups included in the figure of the Migrant in a special and difficult situation: They must first acquire the social and cultural capital within the curriculum of some European nation-state within the EU, which mirrors that particular nation-state's social and cultural identity. After having been acculturated into this local educational setting, the 'second' step to take toward a European, nation-transcending citizenship is opened up for her or him, which involves an appropriation of liberal values in order for her or him to transcend the acquired social capital of the nation-state. This two-step model, which stands out as exemplary in the EU's education policy on citizenship, is also mirrored in the EU member states' citizenship education curricula (on Swedish education policy, see Olson 2008). This implies, I suggest, that there are certain forces involved in this policy that serve to marginalise certain persons and groups of people making up the figure of the Migrant. On the basis of the scrutinised notions and examples of persons that might become targets for such marginalising policy forces, we may ask how these forces work, i.e. in what way the Migrant comes to be subjected to these marginalising forces.

A POSTCOLONIAL PERSPECTIVE: THE MIGRANT, THE MARGIN AND 'STRANGIFICATION' THROUGH CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

By making a postcolonial perspective my theoretical point of departure, I will approach the question of what possible features of marginalisation are put into play in the policy apparatus with regard to the marginalisation of the Migrant. First, some theoretical concepts are introduced, followed by a discussion of what forces stand out as being actualised with respect to the EU's education policy on participatory citizenship.

The Centre and the Margin of What Counts as a Proper Education for European Citizenship

From a postcolonial perspective, the relationship between the Migrant and EU education policy on citizenship appears to be more than just one filled with tension. This relationship also fuels centrifugal forces whereby the Migrant, as exemplified earlier, stands out as being marginalised from an alleged centre of what counts as properly educated European citizenship. This marginalisation can be seen as being part of Europe's colonial heritage. What is at stake here is the rhetorical level of the EU's policy, which not only covers socio-cultural dimensions but also juridical/legal, political and

social ones. This rhetorical policy-related marginalisation can be viewed as an integral part of Europe's constitutional, colonial heritage in religious, scientific, gendered, national and Western-oriented contexts (King 2005; Masuzawa 2005; Said 1978; Sibley 1995; Spivak 1988). From a postcolonial perspective, the concepts of centre and margin within European participatory citizenship are central to understanding what this colonial heritage implies in terms of the rhetorical marginalisation of the Migrant.

What could constitute the centre and the margin of what counts as European participatory citizenship in EU education policy according to this theoretical perspective? One concise depiction of the centre is that it consists of a space, which some voices on European citizenship and its educational implications occupy by repressing "other" voices, voices of the subaltern, i.e. others who are not heard or given the opportunity to voice their opinions on the subject at hand as they are repeatedly pushed out into the margin (Spivak 1988). Historically, these others have been women, minority groups or ethno-cultural groups, often with religious affiliations other than those of the people who colonise the centre. Yet there is more to the concept of the subaltern than merely being another word for the other. According to Spivak (in de Kock 1992), the subaltern denotes a specific space of difference:

The Subaltern is not just a classy word for oppressed, for Other, for somebody who's not getting a piece of the pie . . . In postcolonial terms, everything that has limited or no access to the cultural imperialism is subaltern—a space of difference. Now who would say that's just the oppressed? The working class is oppressed. It's not subaltern . . . Many people want to claim subalternity. They are the least interesting and the most dangerous. I mean, just by being a discriminated-against minority on the university campus, they don't need the word 'subaltern' . . . They should see what the mechanics of the discrimination are. They're within the hegemonic discourse wanting a piece of the pie and not being allowed, so let them speak, use the hegemonic discourse. They should not call themselves subaltern. (1992:45)

What comes to the fore here is that the concept of subaltern is intimately related to power. The voices from the occupied centre have historically provided a colonised place, and the subaltern can be depicted as offering a perspective of those who are colonised, at least from the viewpoint of the colonisers of the centre. Bhaba (1996:210) stresses the importance of highlighting the historical and social power relations involved in the repression of subaltern groups, as this might remind us that they do not have to be repressed, because it has not always been so: "oppressed, minority groups whose presence was crucial to the self-definition of the majority group, subaltern social groups, were also in a position to subvert the authority of those who had hegemonic power". Looking at Europe as a representational

space, Said (1978) furthers Bhaba's argument by claiming that the very European idea of familiarity, difference and strangeness with respect to what counts as proper and untainted European values, traditions and habits is founded on a historically settled image of an other (the Orient).

According to Said (1978), the voice given to the other by the colonised centre of Europe has been perpetuated by the media and political discourse in Europe, creating an 'us-and-them' binary by which Europeans define themselves by identifying the differences of this imagined and delineated other. Said further claims that this has laid the foundation for colonialism by presenting the other, the Orient, as backward and irrational and therefore in need of help to become modern in the European sense. Hence, the political discourse of the other is necessary for maintaining Europe as the representational centre of what it 'really means' to be modern, respectful, democratic and so on. This abstracted and generalised other is thus continuously stigmatised as an object who has not yet been properly modernised, educated or cultivated according to a 'truly European' order, or something in need of 'matching' in order to achieve the standards of the European discourse and its educational implications (cf. Phoenix 2009).

In this context, Europe both signifies and serves as a signifier for what it means to be truly cultivated in the 'European way', in Europe and elsewhere. Europe constitutes the colonial centre that serves the principal aim of excluding voices that are considered not to be 'its own', as this would tear down the centre and the voices that populate it altogether. The populated centre takes on the task of perpetually addressing, "interpellating" (Althusser 1976) or calling for the other in a way that positions her/him as the subaltern. Put differently, the other becomes an object for subjectification, as s/he is called into being by this policy language in a special way. This subjectification is the process by which s/he comes to experience her/himself as a subject having particular subjectivities. Even though the aim here is not to deepen the scope of these intra-active processes of subjectification, this perspective offers important insights into the function of the Migrant in Europe's history, especially in relation to the way in which s/he comes to be marginalised in the EU's education policy language as representing apparently 'too much' difference and plurality with regard to European citizenship.

EU Policy 'Pushing' the Migrant toward the Margin through Acts of 'Strangification'

Leaving aside the important historical, empirical and political implications of this colonial heritage, I aim to shed light on the apparatus of policy language that is 'at work' in the EU's education policy on citizenship. This apparatus is understood to marginalise the figure of the Migrant and his/her opportunities and dispositions to become regarded as a properly educated European citizen. Alternatively put, this marginalising policy language involves pushing the Migrant toward the margin of what counts as

properly educated pan-European citizenry, by implicitly stressing that s/he is not approved or qualified for its educational actualisation.

The very pushing force in this language apparatus can be seen in symbolic registers; through the policy wording, the Migrant is framed as someone who is positioned—or positions her/himself—in the margin of what constitutes an adequately educated European citizen. Moreover, the very process through which this symbolic pushing of the Migrant toward the margin takes place through policy can be further specified as a matter of ongoing rhetorical acts that ‘strangify’ the skills, dispositions, preferences, lifestyles and citizen enactments that are actualised by concrete others that are encompassed by the figure of the Migrant. More precisely, it is a strangification of these peoples in the policy text by leaving their enactments ‘outside’ of what is inscribed as necessary for achieving European citizenship. This language-based strangification of what-is-not-truly-European tends to contribute to a framing of the Migrant as someone who consequently takes on the form of a European subaltern. This silenced Other(ness) is defined—explicitly or implicitly—by an indicated and alleged pan-European political policy centre which determines what counts as proper skills, dispositions and ways of living in order to be appropriately educated into an assumedly adequate European participatory citizenship through some of the EU member states’ citizenship curricula.

According to this postcolonial scrutiny, the language used in the EU’s education policy tends to prioritise certain knowledge, skills and ways of living in relation to the educational objectives of the member states in order to ensure a properly educated European participatory citizenry at the expense of marginalising those who do not embody this knowledge, skills and ways of living. If we consider the example of the Migrant, the people in question are, for example, those who lack documentation for formal citizenship or social rights in any EU nation-state, those who enact a more or less itinerant mode of living or those who, for different reasons, do not have the disposition or inclination to embrace Western-oriented liberal values. The processes of strangification of any mode of being and living other than those inscribed in the policy language of EU education policy contributes to marginalisation of those comprised by the figure of the Migrant. This is so, I suggest, as the policy’s language indirectly touches on their presumed inability of being part of a citizenship education in any of the nation-states in the EU context. Put differently, according to the policy language, this citizenship education is marked by certain kinds of complexly interwoven liberal values, like social and cultural plurality and difference that—when emphasised—contribute to marginalising persons within or beyond the EU context. They tend to be perceived as failing to embody or even understand or acquire these pluralities and differences within and throughout the educational systems of the EU nation-states. Thus, according to the EU’s policy vision, there seems to be, to put it roughly, ‘right’ ways of being and becoming an adequately educated participatory European citizen and ways that are less ‘right’ or valid.

If we recall the aforementioned examples of persons that are encompassed by the figure of the Migrant—i.e. the Turkish guest workers in Germany, exiled, undocumented persons or itinerant persons who move from one (EU) European context to another—such persons become portrayed as being ill-equipped to be part of an education for European participatory citizenship. Regarding the two knowabilities involved for adequate participation, they appear to be out of practical reach for (some of) the Migrant(s). This is so as these knowabilities do not seem to be in concert with their life situation. In this sense, the EU's education policy on participatory citizenship is not only paradoxical. It is also harsh. It is paradoxical in that it involves quasi-communitarian modes of togetherness and collectively determined identity-making processes for European citizenship, which are not in tandem with the all-inclusive liberal principles of difference and plurality. It is harsh in that it presupposes that the Migrant *can* and *wants* to acculturate, perform and engage in such participatory citizenship, even when this is not the case.

The implied shortcoming of the Migrant to live up to these liberal, but at the same time illiberal, policy criteria for participative European citizenship is testament to a power-related tension in the EU's policy apparatus of European citizenship: a tension that tends to position the Migrant as subaltern. Consequently, s/he becomes an object for subjectification by *negation*. S/he fails to come into consideration as a subject for the acquisition of a 'right' participatory citizenship through education. In other words, the Migrant's own social and cultural repertoire of difference, which pertains to her/his mode of living and the conditions through which this living is enabled, turns out to be 'too strange' in the EU's education policy language on citizenship (cf. Chapter 7, this volume, pp. 137–47; cf. Chapter 2, this volume, pp. 45–46).

As a result of this policy of pushing and strangification, the figure of the Migrant is potentially, if not practically, cut off from being considered—by policymakers and political actors on national and supra-national levels in the EU—as capable of enacting a proper European citizenship. The concrete people comprised by the figure of the Migrant become, following Spivak (1988, 1993), positioned as subaltern by EU policy. This takes place because s/he, the subaltern Migrant, is considered to lack the necessary resources to design an active, participatory citizen life in accordance with European 'standards'. From this perspective, EU education policy on citizenship pushes the Migrant out from the centre of what counts as a proper European participatory citizenship by 'strangifying' her/his life conditions. In doing so, this policy not only contributes to a marginalisation of the Migrant in relation to this supra-national envisioning of citizenship. It also contributes to a recalling of the colonial heritage of Europe by reproducing Europe and European values and knowledge as exemplary (Olson 2012b). Ironically enough, it is this strangification that EU education policy for citizenship explicitly aims *not* to reproduce with its alleged call for a socially and culturally plural, individual-oriented, nation-transcending European participatory citizenship within liberal registers.

EXCURSUS—WHERE COULD EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION GO? TOWARD DIS-ORDERED INTERROGATION?

What we can learn from the preceding is that the colonial heritage of Europe may be just as actualised in the current liberal, supra-political framing of participatory citizenship as it was in the days of patriotism with its related establishing of nation-state curricula inside and outside of Europe. This heritage may even be more difficult to see because geographical borders are no longer concrete, and the signalling of what codes, symbols and values are needed to purportedly become an appropriately educated citizen in society are inscribed in the overall explicit ambition to include each and every one. From this point of view, the EU's supra-political policy regarding participatory citizenship risks having hazardous implications for certain people. This is so as it contains a political strategy of enclosure that is pulled forth as an all-inclusive one but nonetheless reduces chances for citizenship with its juridical, social and cultural consequences.

Where, then, could nation-bound citizenship education in Europe go? From a postcolonial purview, it seems to be practically impossible for education in Europe to respond to this concern. Historically, education—particularly higher education—has been considered to serve as a medium in which critical, often ideological spaces for thinking and action are encouraged. At a social and educational level, it has also been assumed, and to some extent desired, that education advocate such spaces. Nevertheless, such an approach to education in Europe is by no means unproblematic. From postcolonial purviews, the very existence of this education is intimately intertwined with the reproduction of well-established paternalistic acts of 'pushing-through-strangification' within the EU. This perspective does not offer much in the way of educational counter-responses to these acts. It rather points to the notion that education has served, and continues to serve, to foreclose spaces for such responses. The question thus becomes how to disrupt the oppressing logics of the centre precisely through the schooling processes created for the making of these logics?

Far from offering any concrete solution to this question, some feasible suggestions might be provided as to what direction citizenship education in Europe could take. Considerable work on this question has been made within the EU's policy discourse (cf. Council of Europe 2007; Council of European Commission 2003), where goals and action plans in many different directions are promoted and produced within the concept of "Diversity Education" (Council of European Commission 2003). A general feature in this work is that diversity is stressed explicitly in relation to the postcolonial consciousness of bloodshed in Europe's history:

At long last, Europe is on its way to becoming one big family, without bloodshed, a real transformation . . . a continent of humane values . . . of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for others'

languages, cultures and traditions. (Laeken Declaration in Council of European Commission 2003:1)

Nonetheless, even though the people of Europe are meant to “become one big family”, and despite this being characterised in terms of “real transformation”, as in the preceding quote, these policy efforts tend to be based on a similar imagery of a homogenised, unifying, all-inclusive liberal citizenship education for European citizenship as the one problematised in this chapter. What a postcolonial perspective on the figure of the Migrant offers in relation to EU policy on European participatory citizenship is doubt about *any* one political policy depiction of the educational formation of citizens that takes its point of departure in preformulated, all-inclusive agendas in its formulation and design (cf. Sack, this volume). The power processes ‘at work’ within such policies challenge us as educationalists to hint at radically different approaches to such agendas with respect to the task of providing for a European participatory citizenship through the EU’s member states’ educational systems (cf. Hedtke, this volume).

Without offering any answers or practical keys—which in itself would be to speak *for* the subaltern Migrant—we can ask ourselves what an education from the margin might be like, if it is possible to think of this in positive terms. In raising this issue, some vital questions could be drawn out at the educational policy and practical level: What spaces for agency can be sought out or maintained in education—either generally or in a concrete educational situation—because this institution has historically played a central role in fuelling the old, colonial heritage of Europe? What might the articulation of an education toward a *dis-ordered* depiction of European participatory citizenship sound like, if it were voiced? Whereas the current liberal, albeit quasi-communitarian conception of EU citizenship education focuses on how individuals can be included in pre-established social and cultural orders, a dis-ordered citizenship education of peoples—formal citizens with full rights or not—might no longer be determined entirely in terms of predefined knowledge, skills and attitudes. It could also be based on a desire to find out *the ways* in which each new effort made in the EU’s policy on citizenship and its educational outputs contribute to the perpetual pushing of certain persons and groups away from the historically settled centre toward the margin in the envisioned citizenship based on “equal interchange of ideas and traditions and founded upon the mutual acceptance of peoples with different histories but a common future” (Lisbon Treaty 2008:3).

One tangible proposal about how such an approach could be actualised in citizenship education might be to investigate what claims specific texts, subject matters and curricula make to their readers: In what ways do these claims come to represent educational failures in establishing a non-marginalising citizenship formation of children, youths and adults in school? Even though there seems to be limited space for a total escape from the

remnants of imperialism, a persistent critical questioning by teachers and students about the very processes of strangification and pushing persons and groups toward the margin of a ‘proper’ European citizenship might provide a way of countering these imperialistic practices. Such questioning requires both EU and nation-bound educational policies and practices to embrace the notion that the political ideas of inclusion, as well as the political implementation of these ideas, tend to oppress vast numbers of people precisely by *negating* that they are oppressive (Todd 2010). It also calls for resistance to assertions that these policy ideas successfully express what-is-best-for-all-people-in-Europe. With reference to Europe’s colonial heritage, it is exactly such powerful expressions that have led to marginalisation of certain peoples (Zimenkova 2011b). This is not to say that we should head for an education that lacks reference to constructive notions of citizenship. What is important here is the attempt to turn the perpetual corrective questioning of educational policies and practices into insights at local, nation-state and supra-national levels regarding the hazardous power-related political apparatus involved in the very notion of European participatory citizenship within education.

NOTES

1. I use both the concept of education and that of citizenship education without making any specific or vital distinction between them. The reason for doing so is that, for different reasons, not all (EU) European member states’ educational curricula involve the concept or subject matter of citizenship education (Sweden is a case in point here, see Olson 2008), even though what is at stake at a more general level is precisely that—to offer an education that aims at providing for some kind of formation for citizenship.
2. The aim of the text includes all presumptive individuals subjected to any educational level and design where the goal is to educate for citizenship. Hence, the presumed not-yetness stressed in the text refers to any individual who, regardless of age, is object-subject of (citizenship) education for doing something later. Therefore, I do not refer to any age-related or developmental aspect of these individuals but rather to an educational or political postponing of their enactment of citizenship that is imposed by the EU’s education policy on citizenship regardless of their age or condition.
3. Important to note is that my aim is not to say anything about what, how or why any individual or group of people comprised by the figure of the Migrant in this text testify to the representational forces they are subject to. The temporary, representational burdens that are imposed on them through my exemplifications are to be seen as part of the analytical points I wish to make rather than as a consequence of any political, social or cultural pre-judgment or voicing by themselves. This is crucial to stress as this relates to the important issue of who speaks for whom, which is inevitably entwined with historical and power-related particularities (Spivak 1988).