East European Politics and
Societies and Cultures
Volume 32 Number 4
November 2018  818­–844
© 2018 Sage Publications
https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325417745128
journals.sagepub.com/home/eep
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com
The Conduct of Gazprom in
Central and Eastern Europe:
A Tool of the Kremlin, or Just an
Adaptable Player?
Martin Jirušek
Petra Kuchyňková
Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
This article presents the results of evidence-based research into the behaviour of
Gazprom and the relevant behaviour of the Russian government in selected countries
of Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Moldova,
and Belarus). The authors’ aim was to determine the scope of involvement by the
Russian government in problems that have arisen in supplying these states, and the
degree to which these issues have been linked with Gazprom’s conduct and Russia’s
foreign policy toward the countries. Another interest was to seek out the key factors
that may determine this behaviour in particular environments. To address these goals,
the authors monitored specific indicators defined by the strategic approach to energy
security (indicators that uncover governmental support, the linking of foreign policy to
gas supplies, and misuse of a dominant market position). The core of the research
underlying the paper was organized as a set of individual idiographic, theory-guided
case studies. Data were gathered from official documents, statistics, articles, analytical
studies, and from semi-structured interviews with experts. The exploration revealed
that Gazprom has behaved in such a way as to indicate that it is being used as a tool of
foreign policy, but the primary factor controlling its behaviour remains the environment
in which the company is operating. Two points were crucial: implementation of
the IEM rules and—above all—the diversification of sources.
Keywords: natural gas; Gazprom; energy security; central and eastern Europe;
energy policy
Introduction
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the natural gas crises (the 2006 and
especially the 2009 crisis), ignited by the dispute between Russia’s Gazprom and
Ukraine, were a bitter reminder that some parts of Europe still depend on a single
supply source.1 These crises and the worsening relations between Russia and the
West also reawakened the fear that the supply of gas could become politicized,
745128EEPXXX10.1177/0888325417745128East European Politics and SocietiesJirušek and Kuchyňková/ Conduct of Gazprom
research-article2018
Jirušek and Kuchyňková/ Conduct of Gazprom  819
particularly for those states whose gas is supplied by Gazprom. Mutual accusations
of supply disruption have come from both Russia and some of its Eastern European
customers, and this has only added fuel to the fire. Another element in recent years
has been the worsening relations between Russia and the West, which has been
further aggravated by a series of conflicts in the European neighbourhood. As a
result, the security of supply, and energy security in general, has become a major
concern for these dependent states and for the European Union, which has
attempted to tackle the issue in various ways, including emphasizing the development
of the Internal Energy Market (IEM) and observation of its rules.
This has prompted the authors to take a closer look at Russia’s conduct in selected
countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe to find out whether accusations
that gas supplies have been politicized indeed correspond to reality. The aim
was to conduct evidence-based research into the behaviour of Gazprom and the relevant
behaviour of the Russian government in various environments, in order to
determine how these varying environments impact this behaviour. In this way, the
authors hoped to determine the depth of Russian government involvement in supplying
the individual states in question, and to discover how supplies are linked to
Russian foreign policy generally in terms of the mutual relations between Russia and
these states. To meet this goal, the research question was formulated as follows:
“Does Gazprom behave like a tool of Russian foreign policy in the countries under
examination? If so, what factors determine this behaviour in varying environments?”
To address this goal and the research question, the authors monitored specific indicators
chosen to uncover the sort of strategically motivated behaviour that Gazprom is
accused of engaging in—serving as a political tool2 (which is in line with the strategic
approach to energy policy). Specifically, the focus was on indicators that unveil
government support, linking foreign policy to gas supplies, and that show misuse of
the dominant market position.
Manifestations of such behaviour were sought in four separate cases within the
region in question. The countries examined are the Czech Republic, Bulgaria,
Belarus, and Moldova. The Czech Republic was chosen because it is firmly anchored
in the EU, implements the rules of the EU’s IEM, and its government conducts a
stable, pro-Western foreign policy discourse. Bulgaria is an EU member and is
approaching a fully liberalized energy market, but the country’s foreign policy is
fairly ambiguous as regards Russia. It has changed over time in terms of energy
policy, as well as in other ways. These fluctuations in foreign policy discourse have
made it a kind of Petri dish for Gazprom to test strategies. Moldova was selected
because of its aspirations to become an EU member and is therefore poised to implement
the IEM rules (by virtue of its membership in the Energy Community and
recent signature of the Association Agreement) in the foreseeable future.3 At the
same time, Moldova has strong ties to Russia because of the structure of its economy,
even if its relationship with Gazprom’s home country is complicated because of territorial
issues involving the Transnistria region, among other things. Our final choice
820  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
was Belarus, a country which is strongly tied to Russia both in terms of energy and
with regard to its overall economic orientation, as well as because of its membership
in the Eurasian Economic Union. These factors signal that Belarus lies outside the
bounds of the IEM rules. Although Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime has not had an
entirely uncomplicated relationship with Putin’s Russia, Belarus has the strongest
economic and political ties with Russia of any of the four countries under consideration.
These countries, then, provided the sought-after variability to test what sort of
behaviour Gazprom and the Russian state demonstrate in various environments and
allowed for comparisons to be made and the assumptions incorporated into the
research process to be verified.
The importance of the influence of the EU’s Internal Energy Market was highlighted
by the so-called Third Liberalization Package, which was introduced into the
natural gas sector in 2009 by the European Commission4 to improve market flexibility
and liquidity and, in effect, ensure fair competition. The main principles of the
package were the ownership unbundling principle, the third-party access principle,
and the prohibition of destination clauses. The first principle prohibits any entity
from being producer and/or supplier and infrastructure owner at the same time. The
second principle enables equal entry to the market for any entity that wishes to enter.
The third principle essentially enables the free flow of natural gas, prohibiting the
erection of any obstacles to resale. Targeting, as the package does, market incumbents
in general, it was not directed specifically at Gazprom, but the Russian national
champion felt particularly threatened by it nevertheless. This was because of the
company’s traditional use of certain tools to further its dominant position, including
long-term contracts, destination clauses and a prohibition on reselling gas and control
over transit infrastructure5—tools that were essentially challenged by the Third
Liberalization Package.
The bulk of what has been published about Russia’s role in supplying European
countries and the potential politicization of this topic came out after 2000, especially
in connection with the two gas-related disputes between Russia and Ukraine in 2006
and 2009. While the first disruption of Gazprom’s deliveries to Ukraine in 2006,
which affected also some of the EU member states (esp. Central European countries),
served as an impulse for some EU members in their diversification efforts,6 the crisis
in 2009 represented the most serious and really damaging gas-related dispute between
Russia and Ukraine. Obviously, though, the crisis did draw the attention of the public
and that of scholars to the issue of energy security. One of the best known contributions
was the timely book by Anita Orbán titled Power, Energy and the New Russian
Imperialism.7 The book is, however, limited in geographical scope, examining only
the Central European countries of Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary.
Academic articles, which are usually more flexible and address contemporary trends
more closely, have been written on various related topics. Some address the broader
issue of energy security and resource nationalism, including work by Ian Bremmer and
Robert Johnston;8 others have focused directly on Russian energy policy vis-à-vis
Jirušek and Kuchyňková/ Conduct of Gazprom  821
European customers.9 All address the issue of Russia potentially misusing gas supplies
as a policy tool. In any case, the majority of the issue-focused publications mentioned
above perceive Russia to be the main culprit for energy security–related concerns in
Europe, and most share the perception that excessive dependence on Russian supplies is
dangerous, especially given Russia’s current foreign policy aspirations. The literature
review thus confirms the need for a thorough examination of the issue.
The article is structured as follows: First, the research methodology is introduced.
This section includes both the theoretical foundations of the strategic behaviour and
the actual indicators used in individual case studies. The case studies then follow and
contain an overview of the natural gas sectors in the countries vis-à-vis their relations
with Russia, as well as a review of indicators. Overview of the indicators then permits
the outcomes contained in the concluding chapter to be derived.
Research Design and Theoretical Basis
The core research that underpins this paper was organized as a set of individual
case studies as described, for instance, in Gerring.10 For purposes of the study, the
authors used the idiographic, theory-guided case study as described by Levy,11
Stake12 and Odell.13
As for sources, the authors relied upon open sources, data gathered from official
documents, and statistics on the energy sectors of the individual countries put out by
widely recognized institutions such as the Energy Community, the European
Commission, the International Energy Agency, and others. Supporting information,
and information on important events described under individual cases, was gathered
from newspaper articles, specialized websites hosted by analytical and investigative
institutions, and semistructured interviews with experts,14 focused on the region or
individual countries and conducted during the course of field research in these countries
(see below). Respondents mostly insisted upon anonymity; therefore, the
authors have encoded their names. To gather additional sources and to triangulate
information, the authors also made use of the online analytical tool IntelTrak,15
which collects information and references on the activity of Russian and Chinese
enterprises worldwide.
The research spanned the period stretching from the fall of the Soviet bloc and the
emancipation of the countries in the region to the present day. The more extensive
roots of the development of the natural gas sector, which stretch back before the fall
of communism, were also treated where essential.
Theoretical Underpinnings of the Research
For purposes of this research, the strategic approach to energy security was
relied upon. Based on the realist tradition of thinking in international relations,
822  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
its central focus is on state power. Our main interest lay in defining the principles
that highlight the role of the state and its representatives in steering energy companies
in particular directions and using energy commodities and infrastructure
as foreign policy tools. These key principles of the strategic approach then served
as the indicators. The choice of the strategic approach to energy policy and security
as a basis for the research was made primarily to address the fact that Russia
has been the target of accusations that it misuses natural gas supplies and energyrelated
deals to exert not only economic, but also political, pressure on its customers—a
behaviour that corresponds to one of the basic assumptions of this
approach.
The cornerstone of the strategic approach is the perception that energy commodities,
like other potential sources of power, should be subordinated to the needs of the
state, and may be used as foreign policy tools that help the state to achieve its goals16
and to exert its power abroad.17 This assumption is based on the realist focus on the
state and its power as the key principle in the international system.18 As Gilpin suggests,
although companies usually subordinate themselves to an economic logic,
their states of origin cannot be separated from the underlying rationale for their
behaviour.19 The basis for the use of energy commodities as foreign policy tools can
be also found in Burchill and Jackson and Sorensen,20 who suggest that a stronger
state—that is, one with greater capacities when it comes to sources of power, such as
natural resources, a greater population base, a stronger economy, a larger army,
etc.—cannot “resist” the temptation to use this power against weaker actors (states).
Energy commodities thus appear to be the number one choice for an actor who has
the commodities or their supply routes under its control. A further factor of importance
relates to the role played by state representatives, who drive the state’s policies
and its statecraft. A link may be seen to this role in the areas of energy diplomacy and
negotiations.21
The aforementioned principles were summarized and refined into the so-called
strategic approach to energy policy and security, which subscribes to the basic
assumptions of the realist paradigm in international relations—mainly classical realism,
offensive realism within the neorealist stream, and neoclassical realism.22
Implementing this approach leads to the energy sector being considered a strategically
sensitive area requiring the monitoring and to a certain extent the active engagement
of the state to secure the commodities essential for national survival. The
practical consequence of such thinking is the legitimization of direct state action and
the distinctive role played by the energy sector in the economy.23
We focused on the two key points of the strategic approach that are most frequently
raised in connection with accusations that Gazprom serves as a political tool
for Moscow. These are the special status of energy commodities, including their vital
importance for the state economy,24 and the use of energy commodities and supplies
as tools. On the basis of these principles, the following indicators were developed
and sought in the individual cases.
Jirušek and Kuchyňková/ Conduct of Gazprom  823
- Active support by Russian state representatives for Gazprom in the countries under
examination
-  Rewarding behaviour compatible with Russian foreign policy aims; coupling
energy-related issues and energy prices with a state’s foreign policy orientation
-  Infrastructure (e.g., pipelines) and differential pricing as tools to pressure the client
state
-  Disruption of alternative supply routes/sources of supply by various means
The first two criteria are derived directly from the theoretical underpinnings of the
strategic approach, which highlights the role of state representatives and the interconnection
between energy supplies and the foreign policy discourse and behaviour
of the company’s home government. The remaining two criteria are also based on
these theoretical underpinnings, but are at the same time respective manifestations of
the behaviour Russia is most often accused of displaying (misusing energy supplies
to exert pressure) and of Gazprom’s agenda (of maintaining its market dominance).
Country Case Study: Czech Republic
The Czech Republic has been a member of the EU since 2004 and has fully
implemented the legislation related to the Third Liberalization Package. The country
has maintained a generally pro-European foreign policy discourse for the past
twenty-seven years.25 After 1989, diversifying the import portfolio and freeing itself
from unilateral dependence became a key goal for the natural gas sector and the
Czech energy sector in general. In the gas sector, that goal was achieved on May 1,
1997, when the country managed to diversify its gas import portfolio by getting
Norwegian gas from the North Sea via pipelines running through Germany.26
Currently, however, all gas coming into the country is of Russian origin, as the
Norwegian gas has been replaced by Russian supplies entering Germany as part of
so-called “gas swap” deals.27 The existence of an alternative supply route is crucial,
however, and this was apparent during both the 2006 as well as the 2009 gas supply
crisis. Moreover, when the 2009 gas crisis hit, the Czech Republic was not only able
to keep itself in gas, it also played a major role in bringing supplies to neighboring
countries.28
As indicated above, 99 percent of the country’s gas is imported on the basis of
import contracts, primarily operated by Innogy (formerly known as RWE
Transgasa.s.). The remaining 1 percent is supplied using domestic sources.29 The
only other company importing gas is VEMEX s.r.o. Innogy operates a long-term
contract with OAO Gazprom30 valid until 2035.31 VEMEX s.r.o. entered the Czech
market in 2006 as an alternative supplier of Russian gas. It is majority owned by
Gazprom32 Germania, a subsidiary of OAO Gazprom. The company’s current contract
is valid until 2017 and stipulates annual supplies of 0.5 bcm.33
824  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
The events of 2009 also demonstrated the importance of gas storage capability.
The Czech Republic is relatively safe in this regard, since its total gas storage capacity
is more than one-third of annual consumption.34
Overview of the Indicators
Active support by Russian state representatives for Gazprom in the countries under
examination. Gazprom and Russian state officials opposed Czech diversification,
which has been championed by the Czech government since the early 1990s. Some
Czech specialists, as well as members of the general public, were alarmed by the
oppositional rhetoric coming from Russian officials, and by allegations that Gazprom
was scheming to circumvent the country as it routed gas to the West, or to
aggravate the position of Czech exporters in Russia.35 But none of these threats came
to pass, and the Czech Republic has therefore been able to diversify its gas supply
portfolio.
In general, relations with Russia in the gas sector have been unproblematic, and
gas-related issues have come up for discussion only occasionally, such as during the
2006 and 2009 gas crises, and in 2014 during the crisis in Ukraine.36
Rewarding behaviour compatible with Russian foreign policy aims; coupling energyrelated
issues and energy prices with a state’s foreign policy orientation.  Since the
Czech Republic has been able to diversify its portfolio, there is little room for “nonstandard
relations.” In the two decades since the fall of communism within CEE, the
Czech government has maintained a fairly strong pro-Western foreign policy discourse,
and this has discouraged any attempt to forge a closer political or security
relationship with Russia, particularly during the 1990s.As noted above, the country’s
drive to diversify away from 100 percent dependence on Russia in the 1990s was
negatively perceived by the Russians, but no open threats were issued, and no supply
cuts took place. The change in the Czech supply portfolio did, though, contribute to
the chilly relations between the countries at the tail end of the 1990s. Another thorn
in Russia’s side came with the Czech Republic’s accession to NATO, which flouted
Russia’s wish to preserve the status quo in Central Europe, followed by Czech support
for the Kosovo operation. Partial change came at the end of the 1990s and after
2000, when relations between the two countries were enhanced mainly in the areas
of economics and trade. But this pragmatic discourse, cutting across political and
ideological boundary lines, has always been challenged by a more cautious discourse
that worries about the undemocratic nature of Putin’s Russia and about the potential
for it to become a security threat.37
It is likely not far from the truth that the traditionally less-than-ideal relations
between the two countries have contributed to the relatively high price paid by
Czechs for Russian gas supplies. Although clear evidence of a link between foreign
Jirušek and Kuchyňková/ Conduct of Gazprom  825
policy discourse regarding Russia and the price individual countries pay for Russian
gas is generally missing, conditionality in gas pricing does occur (see the case study
on Bulgaria). Based on available sources, the Czech Republic tends to pay around
100 euros more than the European average.38 However, the evidence supporting this
figure is not clear-cut. It would thus be something of an oversimplification to claim
a correlation between the gas price and relations between the two countries. The
absence of a clear correlation between gas issues and behavior compatible with
Russian foreign policy aims might also be illustrated by the fact that despite the
Topolanek government’s support for the US missile defence project in Central
Europe and for the Nabucco project, construction started in 2010 on the Gazelle
Pipeline to facilitate the movement of Russian gas supplies from the Nord Stream
Pipeline in the north–south direction.39 This may also serve to illustrate the mix of
pragmatism and a cautious approach to Russia on the Czech side after 2000.
Infrastructure (e.g., pipelines) and differential pricing as tools to pressure the client
state. Gazprom, technically speaking, has not been able to misuse its position by completely
cutting off the Czech Republic. This is because of the infrastructural advantages
the country enjoys: North Sea gas is available, allowing for diversification of sources,
and there is an alternative line in for Russian gas connected to the OPAL Nord Stream,
allowing for diversification of routes. In fact, as noted, in 2009, the Czech Republic
was not only secure in its own position, it had enough gas from its alternative supply
route to secure supplies for Slovakia as well, which had no such alternative and was
completely cut off until the Czechs used reverse flow to send gas in.
Nevertheless, in April 2015, the European Commission started an investigation
into Gazprom for abuse of its dominant market position in several countries, the
Czech Republic among them. (The others are Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia.) Two years later, the dispute seemed to come close
to reconciliation as the Russian company ultimately agreed with removing restrictions
on gas re-selling in the disputed countries.40
Disruption of alternative supply routes/sources of supply by various means. Russian
state officials expressed verbal opposition to Czech efforts at diversification that
culminated in the establishment of an alternative supply route bringing gas in from
the North Sea. But thanks to Russia’s relatively weak international position at the
time—prior to 2000—along with the clear Western orientation of the Czech government
and Russia’s dependence on revenues from hydrocarbon sales, the opposition
was strictly verbal.
Country Case Study: Bulgaria
Bulgaria is among the most import-dependent in the EU in terms of energy supplies
while simultaneously being one of the most energy-intensive economies.41 The
826  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
current gas contract serving 90 percent of the country’s gas needs was signed in
November 2012, and stipulates that Bulgaria is to be supplied with 2.9 bcm/year
until 2022.42 Gazprom remains the country’s sole foreign supplier. As part of
Gazprom’s efforts to better its reputation after the 2009 crisis, Bulgaria was granted
a ten-year 20 percent discount.43 Despite a significant recent rise in domestic production
from less than 100 mcm/year in 2010 to nearly 0.5 bcm in 2011 and early
optimism about new finds, predictions are that even with full exploitation, domestic
resources will not cover more than one-third of total domestic consumption.44 In
addition, older gas plays are gradually being depleted, with new finds only partly
offsetting the decline. Bulgaria is thought to have potentially large shale gas plays.
These resources, though, remain untapped. The government issued a moratorium on
shale gas extraction or even shale exploration in 2012, and has confirmed its stance
on the issue in recent months.45 Although the share of gas in Bulgaria’s energy
supply—around 13 percent—and its overall annual consumption of around 3 bcm
are not very high,46 the issue is still a pressing one for the Bulgarian economy given
the high level of dependence of the industrial sectors on gas. In addition, although
the gas utilization in the residential sector is not particularly high, the sector is supply-sensitive
from the very definition. Combined with the country’s relatively high
energy poverty, any supply shortages or price hikes may have a severe impact on the
people, making the gas supply issue even more imminent.47
Bulgaria’s unilateral dependence was spotlighted by the 2009 gas crisis, when the
industrial sector and power generation were particularly hard hit as priority was
given to the residential sector.48 In combination with the ongoing financial crisis, the
gas shortage impacted the Bulgarian economy very negatively and deepened the
economic contraction.49 But despite this bitter experience, little has changed in the
interim. Bulgaria remains dependent on Russian supplies coming into the country via
Ukraine. Its inability to diversify its gas portfolio is very likely reflected in the price
it pays for gas deliveries, since its negotiating position is weak.
Gazprom’s customers on the Bulgarian market include Bulgargaz,50 the national
company, and Overgas,51 a company in which Gazprom and its subsidiary
Gazpromexport have an approximately 50 percent ownership share.52 Overgas holds
around a 70 percent majority share in distribution, supplying households via local
distributors in which it has a stake.53 This makes Overgas the main supplier of
Bulgarian households. It is generally quite active in the country’s gas sector and,
until 2010, served as the intermediary between Gazprom and Bulgargaz along with
WintersHall.54 Up to that point, Overgas had bought discounted gas from Gazprom
and resold it to Bulgargaz, which sold gas to local distributors often owned by
Overgas. In 2010, Overgas began buying gas directly from Gazprom and distributing
without resale to Bulgargaz.
Bulgaria would have been able to strengthen its position as a transit country as
part of the so-called Southern Gas Corridor embodied in the Nabucco Pipeline
Project, intended to carry up to 31 bcm/year,55 ultimately bringing in gas from nonRussian
sources not only to Southeastern Europe but further on to the West, as well,
Jirušek and Kuchyňková/ Conduct of Gazprom  827
terminating at Baumgarten, Austria. After a lengthy struggle, however, the project as
originally envisioned was abandoned in 2014. Bulgaria had been a part of the project
from the outset, since it was among the countries whose territory the pipeline would
have traversed (see map below). Bulgaria’s initial reluctance to take part prompted
Gazprom to consider replacing it with Romania, but this was mostly perceived as a
way to pressure the country, and in the end, it signed a bilateral deal. Bilateral deals
signed between Gazprom and other transit countries were subsequently cited by the
European Commission as breaches of EU law, in particular of the third-party access
principle.56 Given that the economic viability of the project was in question from the
beginning, some understandably see the South Stream Project as having simply been
a tool to exert pressure on Nabucco.57
Overview of the Indicators
Active support by Russian state representatives for Gazprom in the countries under
examination.  Bulgarian energy sector insiders indicate that representatives of Gazprom
and the Kremlin act interchangeably in dealing with Bulgaria, since the deals
involved are usually strongly supported by Russian officials.58 This is in line with the
powerful influence Russian companies have on the Bulgarian economy and is also
clear from a high-level meeting on energy-related issues in 2008 at which nuclear,
gas, and petroleum projects were discussed,59 and from a meeting that took place in
2010 at which the main topic of discussion was the Stream Project.60
The South Stream Project is, in fact, one of the most appropriate examples. It was
supported by Russian representatives of the highest level from the outset, as were
negotiations between Gazprom and Bulgaria on the project’s planned route. When
disputes later broke out over the Bulgarian government’s stance on the project, high
state representatives of Russia got involved. When in 2009 the government of Boyko
Borissov expressed reluctance to continue construction without EU approval,
Russian Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev both took part in negotiations
aimed at pressuring Bulgaria.61
The latest manifestation of involvement by Russia’s highest-level representatives
was Putin’s angry reaction to Bulgarian opposition to South Stream in late 2014,
when he expressed his disappointment to Turkish president Erdogan by saying he
was “fed up with the Bulgarians,” and accused Bulgaria of burying the South Stream
project.62
Rewarding behaviour compatible with Russian foreign policy aims; coupling energyrelated
issues and energy prices with a state’s foreign policy orientation.  Projects in
the country that are related to Russia typically begin when leftist governments are in
power (the Socialist Party, BSP)63 and end (often with a dispute) when a right-wing
government takes over. Examples include the aforementioned South Stream Pipeline,
as well as the cancelled Belene nuclear power plant.
828  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
With the South Stream Project, it should be noted that the most recent drop in gas
prices64 for Bulgaria came right after a bilateral deal on the pipeline had been
signed.65
During the course of negotiations on the South Stream, allegations of corruption
emerged that should have led Bulgarian officials to support the South Stream
Project.66 Later, in 2014, a series of behind-the-scenes negotiations led a pro-Russian
coalition to propose a bill67 that would have ultimately exempted the South Stream
Project from internal market rules by renaming the pipeline the “gas–sea interconnector.”
Internal documents were leaked that alleged the bill had been tailored to
Gazprom’s needs.68
A link between Bulgaria’s foreign policy stance and gas prices was evident in the
final deal on the South Stream Project, inked in the summer of 2012. Gazprom promised
an 11 percent gas discount if the agreement was signed and the project timetable
accelerated by the Bulgarians.69 The “take-or-pay” condition was also apparently
softened, but Gazprom refused to link that agreement to the South Stream deal.70
In April 2015, the European Commission started the abovementioned investigation
(see the chapter on the Czech Republic) into Gazprom’s alleged abuse of its market
position. In Bulgaria’s case, the accusation was focused on alleged conditionality
involving gas supplies and the country’s participation in the South Stream Project.71
Infrastructure (e.g., pipelines) and differential pricing as tools to pressure the client
state.  Current conditions were not misused as leverage to exert pressure; instead, the
pressure Gazprom exerted on Bulgaria on more than one occasion centered around
the planned South Stream Project.
Disruption of alternative supply routes/sources of supply by various means. When
Greece considered selling DEPA, its national Public Gas Corporation, in 2013 and
Gazprom expressed interest in buying it, concerns arose that Gazprom would ultimately
become a dominant player in South-eastern Europe. The company would also
as a result have acquired control over the Greece–Bulgaria interconnector. But Gazprom
withdrew its bid, and the sale did not take place.72
The quick rise of the anti-fracking movement prompted accusations it was organized
and perhaps even funded by Gazprom, for whom the emergence of an alternative
source of gas supply in Bulgaria would be undesirable.73 Clear evidence proving
a link between the anti-fracking movement and Russia’s stake in gas, though, has not
been forthcoming.
Country Case Study: Moldova
A feature that is characteristic of most post-communist countries in the region,
that of strong dependence on Russian energy sources, is very much in evidence in
Jirušek and Kuchyňková/ Conduct of Gazprom  829
Moldova. In the gas sector, this dependency means that practically all the gas consumed
in the country comes from Russia. Moldova’s natural gas consumption currently
rests just above 1 bcm per year, with an additional amount of nearly 2 bcm
consumed in the separatist region of Transnistria. Natural gas makes up about 60
percent of the country’s primary energy consumption, the majority of which is used
for power generation and for heating.74 Given its importance for these supply-sensitive
sectors, natural gas is of strategic importance for Moldova.
By itself, Moldova produces no significant quantity of natural gas. It also lacks
storage capacity and thus has no way to safeguard against disruptions in the gas supply.
Connections with neighbouring countries that could potentially provide gas from
other sources are used almost entirely to transit gas further on to Europe.75 The
exception is the Iasi–Ungeni gas interconnector, built between August 2013 and
August 2014 to connect Moldova and Romania and put into service in 2015. It delivers
gas at a price competitive with that charged by Gazprom, but to have any real
impact on the country’s gas import portfolio, the interconnector must be extended
further to reach the main centres of consumption.76
Gazprom’s presence in Moldova dates back to the first half of the 1990s.
MoldovaGaz began to accumulate debt at a time when Gazprom was charging unusually
high fine amounts for late payments. Since the company (in fact, the Moldovan
government) was unable to repay the debt, Gazprom was given shares in the company
as compensation. Although Moldova is a member of the Energy Community,77
consultations conducted in the country reveal that, because of Gazprom’s strong
anchorage in the country, Moldova favours unbundling only on paper; unofficially,
strong lobbying opposition is slowing the entire process.78
Over the last decade, Gazprom’s prices have risen from what had formerly
been a fraction of the typical European price (US$60/tcm) to proper European
levels of US$368/tcm.79 This steep rise seems to have been accelerated by the
worsening mutual relations between Moldova and Russia,80 which began with the
rejection by then-Moldovan president Voronin in 2003 of the so-called Kozak
Memorandum, intended to implement a Moscow-tailored solution to de-escalate
tensions in the dispute between Moldova and Transnistria, which included a
Russian proposal to resolve the issue of Transnistria’s status.81 Relations between
the countries suffered a further setback during the “Twitter Revolution” of 2009,
when protesters stormed government buildings to protest revisionism on the
domestic political scene.82
Currently, the Moldovan natural gas sector is dominated by MoldovaGaz, which
is formally in charge of natural gas management throughout the country, including
transmission, distribution, and marketing. Two subsidiaries have been established
and placed in charge of the transmission system: Moldovatransgas on the right bank
of the Dniester, and Tirspoltransgas in Transnistria. MoldovaGaz’s shareholder structure
is as follows: Gazprom has a 50 percent stake,83 the Government of the Republic
of Moldova holds 36.6 percent, and Tiraspoltransgas, from the autonomous region of
830  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
Transnistria, holds a 13.44 percent stake.84 This setup basically gives Gazprom control
over the entire Moldovan gas sector.
Overview of the Indicators
Active support by Russian state representatives for Gazprom in the countries under
examination.  The country’s largest power plant, Kuchurgan, lies in the Transnistria
region. This gas-fired power plant is owned by the Russian company Inter RAO UES,
which acquired it in 2004,85 and it lies directly on the main pipeline bringing gas into
Moldova. The problem is that Transnistria, a separatist region for which Russia serves
as a kind of international patron, does not pay for the gas it receives; rather, under the
original supply contract, extended each year since its planned expiry date in 2011, the
government in Chisinau is made liable to Gazprom for the debt. That debt has reached
about US$3–4 billion; the debt of Moldova itself stands at around US$400 million.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin has explicitly coupled Moldova’s
gas debt to settling the dispute over the status of Transnistria.86 He has also personally
discouraged Moldova from increasing transit fees, warning it might have serious consequences.87
During his September 2013 visit to Moldova, Rogozin said, “Take care
not to freeze in the winter and get lost in the vortex of European integration you are
caught in,”88 likely addressing Moldova’s accession to the Energy Community and
signature of the Association Agreement (including the Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Area Agreement) with the EU, which was being prepared in 2013. The statement
could easily be taken as a tacit threat.
Rewarding behaviour compatible with Russian foreign policy aims; coupling energyrelated
issues and energy prices with a state’s foreign policy orientation. Moldova’s
inclination toward the European Union have been tied to Gazprom’s reluctance to
sign a new long-term gas contract. A steep hike in gas prices has been correlated with
the worsening of mutual relations between the two countries triggered by the failure
to sign the Kozak Memorandum in 2003.89 The situation changed to some extent at
the end of 2016, when the gas contract was prolonged for a further three years, until
the end of 2019.90 The decision was made shortly after the January 2017 election of
new president Igor Dodon,91 who represents pro-Russian Socialist Party, and signalled
that the mainland Moldova may recognize the Transnistrian debt.92
Infrastructure (e.g., pipelines) and differential pricing as tools to pressure the client
state.  The misuse of infrastructure is evident in more than one regard. The gas used
in Transnistria’s Kuchurgan power plant is charged on the government in Chicinau
instead of the power plant’s operator, and the same is true with regard to the debt
owed. The fact that Moldova is essentially dependent upon a single pipeline coming
in from Russia has been leveraged in the current dispute over a new long-term gas
supply contract (see above).
Jirušek and Kuchyňková/ Conduct of Gazprom  831
Disruption of alternative supply routes/sources of supply by various means. The
rather sluggish activity of MoldovaGaz—a company controlled by Gazprom—has
prevented gas flow through the newly built Iasi–Ungheni interconnector, effectively
hamstringing the only existing diversification project.93
The issue of gas supply diversification through the Iasi-Ungeni interconnector is
part of the bigger picture in Gazprom’s efforts to preserve its dominant position in
Moldova’s energy market. Via its majority stake in MoldovaGaz, Gazprom essentially
controls the entire Moldovan gas sector, and the implementation of the Third
Liberalization Package, which requires the decoupling of transmission, production,
and sales, was postponed to 2020 partly as the result of direct pressure exerted by
Russian officials,94 and as a result of Gazprom’s reluctance to sign a new long-term
gas supply agreement. The newly established TSO Vestmoldtransgaz, in charge of
operating the interconnector, will therefore probably encounter some obstacles in its
effort to get non-Russian gas to the marketplace.95 One such obstacle might be in the
form of pressure exerted on consumers who would like to change gas suppliers. It is
likely that MoldovaGaz might use debts that many consumers, including industrial
consumers, have tallied so far to prevent them from switching.96
Country Case Study: Belarus
Strong political, security, and economic ties between Belarus and Russia date
back to the Soviet era, when significant production capacity was concentrated in the
area of the then-Byelorussian SSR,97 and there was a heavy dependency on raw
material supplies. After minor attempts at cooperation with Western integration
structures (the EU and NATO) in the early 1990s, Alexander Lukashenko was
elected in 1994 as a critic of the dissolution of the USSR and a supporter of a proRussia
orientation.98 During the latter half of the 1990s, Lukashenko supported the
establishment of an economic union between the two countries while insisting on the
formal political equality of each. This laid the groundwork for the sinusoidal nature
of Russian–Belorussian relations, which have alternated between periods of deteriorating
relations, more or less aligned with repeated disputes in the energy sphere,99
and periods of pragmatic rapprochement, accompanied often by new projects
involving economic cooperation as well as cooperation on energy-related projects.
The sustainability of the Belarusian regime and its ability to provide citizens with
social guarantees has been largely dependent on the country’s nonstandard relations
with Russia. Belarus has always paid extraordinarily low prices for both oil and
gas100 and the Belarusian economy benefited from the petrochemical trade, with production
in Belarusian refineries using Russian oil imported under favourable (dutyfree)
conditions. The situation changed after the new Russian president, Vladimir
Putin, began to realize his vision of a single economic space101 and revised Russia’s
energy policy regarding Belarus. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the
832  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
greatest controversy has arisen in connection with disputes centered on Russian
crude oil imports and on the export of other oil products from Belarusian refineries.
These disputes even figured into efforts to establish a customs union in 2010.102
There have also been a number of gas crises (in 2002–2004, 2006–2007, and
2010–2011). Even the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)103 in
2015 has not completely eliminated conflicts in the energy sphere, as was demonstrated
when clashes occurred in 2016 and in early 2017. Currently, Russia–Belarus
relations are being significantly influenced by the security situation in Eastern
Europe,104 and Belarus’s recent foreign policy moves toward once again seeking rapprochement
with the EU.
The role played by natural gas in the Belarusian energy mix is indeed important. Its
share of TPES was more than 61 percent in 2014 according to the IEA statistics,105
while the single monopoly supplier, Gazprom, plays a key role in its import. From an
energy security perspective, Belarus’s energy mix is poorly balanced. The amount of
imported oil and gas in TPES is more than 90 percent. In addition, gas is important to
electricity production in the country—the proportion of gas in electricity production
sector was 98 percent in 2014. Gas is also the key fuel for Belarusian heating plants:
the proportion of gas in the production of heat was more than 88 percent in 2014.106
The country’s gas consumption amounts to around 18 billion m3 of natural gas per
year, all of it imported from Russia.107 Gazprom has been the key supplier of gas to
Belarus over the entire period since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and it has
been the sole gas supplier to Belarus since 2005. Compared to other Russian investors
in Belarus, Gazprom is also the biggest property owner,108 which confirms the
significant influence it wields in the Belarusian energy market and in its economy in
general.
Overview of the Indicators
Active support by Russian state representatives for Gazprom in the countries under
examination.  The gas crises that have been noted were frequently accompanied by
bilateral negotiations between Lukashenko and Putin directly concerning issues to
do with gas supplies, gas prices, or control over the Belarusian gas network. As an
example, in connection with the first serious gas dispute in 2003, Gazprom announced
that starting January 2004, it would halt discount gas supplies to Belarus, doubling
the price. During the same month, the Russian–Belarusian summit took place.
Lukashenko and Putin agreed to implement market pricing for gas supplies and to
establish a joint venture to operate the gas network. On this basis, Belarus announced
its consent to the sale of a minority stake in Beltransgaz to Gazprom, with the stipulation
that, in exchange, Russia would base its price quote on the price of cheaper gas
from 2002.109 This was the beginning of the crisis, which went so far as to cause a
temporary interruption of gas supplies to Belarus,110 including a brief closure of the
Jamal transit pipeline.111
Jirušek and Kuchyňková/ Conduct of Gazprom  833
Bilateral negotiations between Lukashenko and Putin, which took place in spring
2017, played an important role also in recent energy conflict between Russia and
Belarus. The issues of the future of Russian gas and oil supplies to Belarus have been
linked with problems of foreign policy and security cooperation of both countries in
the context of difficult geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe (see below).112
Rewarding behaviour compatible with Russian foreign policy aims; coupling energyrelated
issues and energy prices with a state’s foreign policy orientation. Belarus’s
long-term isolation from the West (including from the EU), and the leading role
played by Russia as its strategic and security ally, have figured heavily into the country’s
energy relations. The situation changed somewhat after 2000, but even during
the Putin era, numerous instances may be found in which the Belarusian regime has
been rewarded for its loyalty, and energy-related steps have been coupled to political
issues (and this despite the fact that Lukashenko has not always been the easiest
partner for Putin’s Russia). As an example, in autumn of 2005 Gazprom announced
once again that market prices would be introduced for gas imports, but in December
of that same year, it said the price for Belarus would remain at 2005 levels because
of the country’s ongoing negotiations with Russia about forming a confederation.
Also important were the approaching presidential elections in Belarus. Gazprom’s
decision making about introducing market prices for its gas was thus influenced by
the political situation in Belarus, as well as by support for Lukashenko and the future
confederation.113 But significant examples may also be found in which the reverse
was true—when during energy disputes with Russia, Lukashenko’s Belarus made
friendly overtures towards the West, including the EU.114 Thus, the coupling of
energy issues to foreign policy positions was also found on the Belarusian side.
Belarus’s membership in the Customs Union was also initially connected to
rewards in the form of lower gas prices.115 But Belarus also has a significant interest
in customs duties for the export of energy materials. While in the Customs Union
customs duties were the subject of bilateral negotiations, once the EAEU and the
single economic area had been established, they became subject to regulation by the
common EAEU organs.116 Disputes in 2016–2017117 show that problems persist in
the system, but it must be said that to a great extent, both sides prefer bilateral settlements,
and has had difficulty breaking away from the nonstandard nature of relations
in the energy sphere (as, e.g., the above mentioned summit in Sankt Petersburg in
April 2017 clearly shows). While it is true that this makes things prone to politicization,
it also offers more room to maneuver, not only for the Russian side, but also for
President Lukashenko.
Infrastructure (e.g., pipelines) and differential pricing as tools to pressure the client
state.  The transport of gas over Belarusian territory to the West has played an outsize
role in Russian–Belarusian relations. Until Nord Stream was put into operation in
2012, almost one-quarter of Russia’s gas exports to Europe crossed over Belarusian
834  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
territory.118 Gazprom’s efforts to gain control of state-owned company Beltransgaz
(operator of the Belarusian gas pipeline network and the Belarusian stretch of Gazprom’s
Yamal transit pipeline) also figured in heavily. These efforts targeted the
transport security of Russian gas bound for Europe, and sought to minimize Belarus’s
potential to engage in political and/or economic extortion. They accompanied
the gas disputes from the very beginning, first occurring at the end of 2002, when
Gazprom sought higher prices for the gas it supplied beyond the original 2002 contract,
under which Belarus was able to import gas at prices that were effectively
comparable to those on the Russian domestic market. But the contract also contained
a clause that created a joint venture involving the purchase of a 50 percent stake in
Beltransgaz. The situation was thus influenced (and facilitated) by the nonstandard
nature of the countries’ relations when it came to gas prices, as noted above.
The gas price dispute arose once again in 2003, this time also related to transit gas
supplied via Belarussian transit routes (Yamal) from Russia to Europe. The issues
touched on both gas and oil, and this is characteristic for Russia–Belarus energy
spats. While Gazprom used tools like higher price demands (stating that it was no
longer willing to “subsidize” the Belarusian economy with discount prices) and gas
supply interruptions, Belarus deployed “weapons” of its own, including boosting
transit fees for Russian gas passing over Belarusian territory. Gas prices were also
coupled to unrelated political issues, not only by the Russians.119 This first phase of
the gas disputes between the two countries came to a close in 2007 with the signature
of a contract that called for a gradual increase in gas prices for Belarus, increased
transit fees for the transport of Russian gas, and the relatively advantageous purchase
of a 50 percent stake in Beltransgaz by Gazprom.120 Another series of disputes in
2010–2011 was heavily influenced by the impacts of economic crisis, growing inflation
and deepening deficit of the state budget. Belarusian rouble devalued in 2011
and government repeatedly asked Russia and the Eurasian Economic Community for
a stabilization loan.121 At the same time, in 2011 Gazprom succeeded in gaining 100
percent control of the Beltransgaz company.
Disruption of alternative supply routes/sources of supply by various means. Throughout
the period under examination here, Gazprom has been the key supplier. Despite
the disputes that have occurred, Belarus has never developed plans to diversify its
sources of gas (unlike the action it has taken in the oil sector).
Conclusion
The aim of this article has been to assess whether Gazprom’s conduct in selected
countries of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe bears out accusations that
Russia, as Gazprom’s chief shareholder, uses natural gas supplies as a tool of foreign
policy. To meet this goal, the research question was formulated as follows: “Does
Jirušek and Kuchyňková/ Conduct of Gazprom  835
Gazprom behave like a tool of Russian foreign policy in the countries under examination?
If so, what factors determine this behaviour in varying environments?” For
this purpose, four main indicators addressing the most typical manifestations of
politicized conduct in the natural gas sector were formulated. These indicators were
then used to assess the individual cases of Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
and Moldova. These states were selected to provide a diverse sample in terms of
foreign policy discourse and ties to Russia and the European Union (as the main
driver behind recent energy policy changes on the continent).
What the authors found is that any answer to the research question is very casespecific.
The outcomes also reveal the factors that determine such behaviour. First,
membership in the European Union and, above all, implementation of the Internal
Energy Market rules within the natural gas sector are crucial. These rules are in direct
opposition to the marketing model Gazprom had traditionally used to supply the
region and placed the company in a substantially different position from the one it
had formerly enjoyed. Originally, Gazprom was able to use its position as a major
gas supplier to dictate market conditions de facto. With the introduction of such rules
as ownership unbundling, third-party access, and the ban on destination clauses
imposed by the European Commission as market overseer, however, Gazprom is no
longer the master of its own market but is instead subject to its forces.
For the IEM rules to fulfil their main goal of marketizing the natural gas sectors
in the former communist countries, though, one essential precondition must be met.
This is source diversification. In essence, any state with access to other, non-Russian,
sources of gas that also adopts the EU IEM rules is going to be safe from having its
supplies politicized in a way that could harm its energy security status. The Czech
Republic is a clear example of a country that meets both these conditions. The importance
of source diversification as a necessary condition for the depoliticization of
supplies was confirmed in the case of Bulgaria. Although an EU member and one
that formally subscribes to the IEM rules, it is still basically dependent on Russia for
almost 100 percent of its natural gas, and this puts it in a weak bargaining position.
This was visible in the case of the South Stream Pipeline, where Russian state officials
got heavily involved (something that did not happen with the Czech Republic),
and gas sales became conditioned on foreign policy objectives being met. Given
Bulgaria’s dependent status and the impact of potential supply cuts, it is safe to say
that dependence on Russian imports plays a major role.
It also appears that the issue of EU membership (or even signature of the association
agreement, as in the case of Moldova) and implementation of the IEM
rules are very sensitive issues for Gazprom (and its owner, the Russian government).
This finding was clearly demonstrated in the case of Moldova. The country’s
aim of approaching the European Union and implementing the IEM rules
has gotten a chilly reaction from Moscow on more than one occasion. The issue
of natural gas supplies (one that has been aggravated by the status of the separatist
Transnistria region, supported by Russia) and the conditions written into the
836  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
supply contract are openly related to Moldova’s pro-European foreign policy
discourse. In the case of Belarus, the situation is a bit more complicated. Although
the country shows little interest in joining the EU, and although it is not a member
of the Energy Community, occasional signs of a tilt toward the EU may be
spotted. They have often occurred in conjunction with mutual disputes with
Russia in the energy sphere and elsewhere, when Lukashenko has played the EU
card as part of his short-term geopolitical game. In any event, Belarus’s failure to
adopt the IEM rules and its complete dependency on Russian gas deliveries and
Russian control over the gas transport network, in addition to its special relations
with Russia in many different spheres, has caused substantial politicization of
supplies on both sides of the negotiating table.
The answer, then, to the main research question is as follows: Gazprom does
indeed appear to behave in a way that would indicate the company is being used as a
foreign policy tool by the Russian government. But ultimately, the main constraint
on the company’s behaviour is the environment in which it operates. Here, two factors
are crucial: implementation of the IEM rules and, most importantly, source
diversification. Where both factors are met, politicization of natural gas supplies is
practically non-existent or very weak. To complicate things even further, the market
in Europe has been changing, and with it, Gazprom’s position as dominant supplier
has eroded. It is challenging to identify in which cases the company is acting as a
coercive tool of its home government, and in which its motivation is simply to retain
market share. In any event, though, the two criteria noted above still serve as the best
precaution that can be taken no matter Gazprom’s motivation.
Acknowledgments
This text has been prepared as part of the grant project of the Grant Agency of the Masaryk University
“Russia in the categories friend-enemy. Czech reflection” (MUNI/M/0921/2015).
Notes
  1. J. Osička and P. Ocelík, “Natural gas infrastructure and supply patterns in Eastern Europe: Trends
and Policies,” Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy 2 (2017): 358, doi:
10.1080/15567249.2015.1136971 (accessed 16 May 2017).
 2. Similarly, some other Russian state-owned energy companies are also being accused of serving as
political tools, most notably Rosatom in the nuclear energy sector. The sensitivity in this case is determined by
the role a nuclear power plant usually plays in a state’s power generation. See T. Vlček, M. Jirušek, and J.
Henderson, “Risk Assessment in Construction Process in Nuclear Sector within the Central and Eastern
Europe,” International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy 2 (2015): 482–93; N. Minin and T. Vlček,
“Determinants and Considerations of Rosatom’s External Strategy,” Energy Strategy Reviews 17 (2017): 37–44.
  3. In 2014, Moldova signed the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU, including the Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement (DCFTA). While the AA/DCFTA does not formally equate
Jirušek and Kuchyňková/ Conduct of Gazprom  837
to preparation for EU membership, it does imply the possibility of closer association with the EU and the
harmonization of related legislation.
 4. Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 14 August 2009, http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32009L0073 (accessed 14 November 2016).
 5. M. Jirušek, T. Vlček, H. Koďousková, R. Robinson, A. Leshchenko, L. Lehotský, and V.
Zapletalová, Energy Security in Central and Eastern Europe and the Operations of Russian State-Owned
Energy Enterprises (Brno: Masaryk University, 2015), 384–388, http://energy.fss.muni.cz/bresearch/
publications (accessed 23 October 2017).
 6. H. Koďousková, P. Kuchyňková, A. Leshchenko, and M. Jirušek, Energetická bezpečnost asijských
zemí a Ruské federace (Brno: Masaryk University, 2014), 266.
  7. A. Orbán, Power, Energy, and the New Russian Imperialism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008).
  8. I. Bremmer and R. Johnston, “The Rise and Fall of Resource Nationalism,” Survival 3 (2009):
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 9. See, e.g., S. Woehrel, “Russian Energy Policy toward Neighboring Countries,” Federation of
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Relations with Russia: Conflicting Approaches to Securing Natural Gas Supplies,” Geopolitics 16 (2011):
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the Implications for the EU,” Energy Policy 38 (2010): 1229.
10. J. Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (New York: Cambridge University
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11. J. S. Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict Management and
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12. R. E. Stake, Multiple Case Study Analysis (New York: Guilford, 2006).
13. J. S. Odell, “Case Study Methods in International Political Economy,” in Models, Numbers &
Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations, ed. D. F. Sprinz and Y. Wohlinsky-Nahmias (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 56–80.
14. As described in, e.g., S. Brinkmann, Qualitative Interviewing: Unerstanding Qualitative Research
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); S. Halperin and O. Heath, Political Research: Methods and
Practical Skills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); N. King and C. Horrocks, Interviews in
Qualitative Research (London: Sage, 2010).
15. IntelTrak.RWR Advisory Group, n.d., www.inteltrak.rwradvisory.com (accessed 8 May 2017).
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NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 17–19, 21–24.
17. S. Burchill, Theories of International Relations (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 43–44;
Gilpin, Global Political Economy, 15–24, 43–44; R. Jackson and G. Sorensen, Introduction to
International Relations: Theories and Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 86–88.
18. Burchill, Theories of International Relations, 30–34.
19. Gilpin, Global Political Economy, 17–19, 21–24.
20. Burchill, Theories of International Relations, 29–34, 38–39; Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction
to International Relations, 60–67.
21. Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations, 67–74.
22. See, e.g., M. T. Klare, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing
Dependency on Imported Petroleum (New Zork: Holt Paperbacks, 2005); M. T. Klare, “There Will Be
Blood: Political Violence, Regional Warfare and the Risk of Great-Power Conflict over Contested Energy
Sources,” in Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook, ed. G. Luft and A.
Korin (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2009), 44–61; G. Luft and A. Korin, “Realism
838  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
and Idealism in the Energy Security Debate,” in Luft and Korin Energy Security Challenges, 335–48; D.
Moran, “The Battlefield and the Marketplace: Two Cautionary Tales,” in Energy Security and Global
Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management, ed. D. Moran and J. A. Russel (New York:
Routledge, 2009), 19–33.
23. F. Ciuta, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?” Security Dialogue XLI2
(2010): 123–44; F. Leverett, “Resource Mercantilism and the Militarization of Resource Management,” in
Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management, ed. D. Moran and J. A.
Russel (New York: Routledge, 2009), 211–42; Klare, Blood and Oil; Klare, “There Will Be Blood”; M. T.
Klare, “Petroleum Anxiety and the Militarization of Energy Security,” in Moran and Russel, Energy
Security and Global Politics, 39–61.
24. Here, we must not neglect the importance of energy exports for the Russian economy in general.
25. Národní zpráva Energetického regulačníh oúřadu o elektroenergetice a plynárenství v České
republice za rok 2015, 2016, http://www.eru.cz/documents/10540/462958/NZ_ERU_2015.pdf/4ab55a4e-
01d5-4805-938b-0433b6a052f6 (accessed 12 May 2017).
26. P. Strejček, “Plynová diplomacie Ruské federace,” Středoevropské politické studie 1 (2011), http://
www.cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=430 (accessed 16 May 2017).
27. International Energy Agency, “Czech Republic—Energy Supply Security 2014,” https://www.
iea.org/media/freepublications/security/EnergySupplySecurity2014_TheCzechRepublic.pdf (accessed 16
May 2017); BusinessInfo, “Teritoriální informace - země: Norsko,” 2015, http://www.businessinfo.cz/cs/
zahranicni-obchod-eu/teritorialni-informace-zeme/norsko.html (accessed 16 May 2017).
28. L. Tichý, “Dvě kola rusko-ukrajinské plynové krize,” Euroskop, March 16 2009, https://www.
euroskop.cz/46/11211/clanek/dve-kola-rusko-ukrajinske-plynove-krize-2009/ (accessed 12 May 2017).
29. Ministerstvo průmyslu a obchodu České republiky, 2014, “Plán preventivních opatření nezbytných
k odstranění nebo ke zmírnění zjištěných rizik pro zajištění dodávek zemního plynu v České republice,”
https://www.mpo.cz/assets/dokumenty/47643/59433/619439/priloha002.pdf (accessed 16 August
2015); L. Musil, “Co možná nevíte o zemním plynu,” TZB Info, March 30, 2004, http://www.tzb-info.
cz/1908-co-mozna-nevite-o-zemnim-plynu (accessed 12 May 2017).
30. The contract with Gazprom accounts for 70 percent of Innogy’s long-term contracts. The original
supply contract started running in 1998 and the transit contract in 1999. They were prolonged in 2006 and
stipulated 9 bcm/year in supplies and 30.5 bcm/year for transit. See in Ministerstvo průmyslu a obchodu
České republiky, 2014; T. Vlček and F. Černoch, The Energy Sector and Energy Policy of the Czech
Republic (Brno: Masaryk University, 2013), 110.
31. T. Vlček and F. Černoch, Energetický sektor České republiky (Brno: Masarykova univerzita,
2012), 197; Vlček and Černoch, The Energy Sector and Energy Policy, 111.
32. The exact share is 50.14 percent. See in VEMEX s.r.o., 2013, “Konsolidovaná výroční zpráva,”
http://www.vemex.cz/downloads/annual-report-2013.pdf (accessed 16 May 2017). Thirty-three percent
of shares are owned by Centrex Europe Energy AG—an international group of companies operating in
the gas sector. It is likely that this group is connected to Gazprom. See in R. Kupchinsky, “The Shadowy
Side of Gazprom’s Expanding Central European Gas Hub,” The Jamestown Foundation, 2008, http://
www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=34120#.VdCRp_ntmkp (accessed
16 May 2017).
33. Gazprom Export, n.d., http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/czech/ (accessed 16 May 2017).
34. See Vlček and Černoch, Energetický sektor České republiky, 205; Zásobníky plynu v České
republice, 16 October 2015, http://oenergetice.cz/plyn/zasobniky-plynu-v-cr/ (accessed 17 May 2017).
35. Those politicians who expressed unequivocal opposition to diversification were predominantly
members of the former communist party, which is well known for its sympathetic stance on Russia.
36. On the other hand, the media and the Czech Security Information Service (BIS) have uncovered
information in recent years that points to increased activity by the Russian secret services, particularly
within the economic realm, including the energy sector. This information relates mostly to plans in that
era to build new blocks at the Temelín nuclear power plant. See, e.g., ČTK, “Je to provokace, uvedl
Jirušek and Kuchyňková/ Conduct of Gazprom  839
Lavrov k údajnému vyhoštění diplomatů z Česka,” Hospodářské noviny, www.ihned.cz, 17 August
2009, http://domaci.ihned.cz/c1-38082590-je-to-provokace-uvedl-lavrov-k-udajnemu-vyhosteni-diplomatu-z-ceska
(accessed 15 May 2017); Bezpečnostní informační služba, zpravodajská služba České
republiky, n.d., “Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2011,” https://www.bis.cz/
vyrocni-zpravac2ed.html?ArticleID=26 (accessed 15 May 2017); ČTK, “Vicepremiér Žukov: Rusko
čeká vítězství v tendru o Temelín,” vz24.cz. Denní zpravodajství o veřejných zakázkách, 19 October
2010, http://www.vz24.cz/clanky/vicepremier-zukov-rusko-ceka-vitezstvi-v-tendru-o-temelin/
(accessed 15 May 2017); T. Dráb and T. Vlček, “Způsoby financování výstavby jaderných elektráren a
jejich hrozby,” Středoevropské politické studie 4 (2016): 291–318.
37. P. Kuchynkova, P. Kratochvil, and B. Shmelev, “Czech-Russian Relations 1989-2012,” in Russia
and East Central Europe after the Cold War: A Fundamentally Transformed Relationship, ed. A. Zagorski
(Prague: Human Rights Publishers, 2015), 95–134.
38. Radio Free Europe. Radio Liberty, n.d., “Gazprom’s Grip: Russia’s Leverage over Europe,”
https://www.rferl.org/a/gazprom-russia-gas-leverage-europe/25441983.html (accessed 15 May 2017); E.
Калюков, “«Газпром» допустил снижение цены для европейских потребителей,” РБК, 11 September
2014, http://www.rbc.ru/economics/11/09/2014/570422099a794760d3d4165e (accessed 15 May 2017).
39. Kuchynkova et al., “Czech-Russian Relations 1989-2012,” 120.
40. A. Denková, G. Gotev, K. Kokoszczynski, and P. Szalai, “Poland to Lead Battle against
Commission-Gazprom Entente,” 5 April 2017, http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/poland-tolead-battle-against-commission-gazprom-entente/
(accessed 17 May 2017).
41. R. Stefanov, T. Galev, M. Tsanov, M. Vladimirov, and N. Gantcheva, Energy Sector Governance
and Energy (In)security in Bulgaria (Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2014), 36.
42. Gazprom Export, 2012, “New Long-term Contract Signed for Russian Gas Supplies to Bulgaria,”
http://www.gazprom.com/about/subsidiaries/news/2012/november/article148751/ (accessed 15 May 2017).
43. J. Marson and J. Parkinson, “In Reversal, Neighbors Squeeze Russia’s Gazprom over Natural-Gas
Prices,” The Wall Street Journal, 1 May 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873242408
04578414912310902382 (accessed 23 August 2015).
44. Enerdata, “Country Energy Report—Bulgaria,” Enerdata, June 2015, https://estore.enerdata.net/
energy-market/bulgaria-energy-report-enerdata-table-of-content.pdf (accessed 16 August 2015); Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, The Trade Council, “Bulgarian Oil and Gas Sector,” Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Denmark, November 2013, http://bulgarien.um.dk/da/~/media/Bulgarien/Documents/
Sector%20reports%202013/Bulgarian%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Sector.pdf (accessed 15 May 2017);
TransAtlantic Petroleum, n.d., “History,” http://www.transatlanticpetroleum.com/about/history.aspx
(accessed 15 May 2017); Natural Gas Europe, “Bulgaria Boosts Domestic Gas Production; Elevates
Regional Role,” Natural Gas Europe, 19 December 2012, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/bulgaria-liftgas-production-and-elevates-regional-role
(accessed 23 August 2015); Bulgartransgaz, “2014–2023 TenYear
Network Development Plan of Bulgartransgaz EAD,” Bulgartransgaz, 27 March 2014, http://www
.bulgartransgaz.bg/files/useruploads/files/news/tyndp_10-04-2014_en-full.pdf (accessed 15 May 2017).
45. Reuters, “UPDATE 1—Bulgaria Bans Shale Oil and Gas Drilling,” Reuters, 18 January 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/18/bulgaria-shalegas-ban-idUSL6E8CI2ML20120118 (accessed
15 May 2017); Novinite, “Bulgarian PM Reaffirms Moratorium on Shale Gas Extraction,” novinite.com,
Sofia News Agency, 30 January 2015, http://www.novinite.com/articles/166260/Bulgarian+PM+Reaffir
ms+Moratorium+on+Shale+Gas+Extraction#sthash.yP0pFnfM.dpuf (accessed 15 May 2017); Shale Gas
Europe, 2014, “Bulgaria,” http://shalegas-europe.eu/shale-gas-explained/shale-gas-and-europe/bulgaria/
(accessed 15 May 2017).
46. Gazprom Export Delivery Statistics 2016, n.d., http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/
(accessed 17 May 2017).
47. International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), 2011, “Renewable Energy Country Profile:
Bulgaria,” http://www.irena.org/REmaps/countryprofiles/Europe/Bulgaria.pdf#zoom=75 (accessed 14
April 2015); Energy Delta Institute, “Bulgaria,” Energy Delta Institute, April 14, 2015, http://www.energydelta.org/mainmenu/energy-knowledge/country-gas-profiles/bulgaria#t57389
(accessed 23 August
840  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
2015); European Commission—Energy, n.d., “Bulgaria,” http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/
bg_energy_market_2011_en.pdf (accessed 14 April 2015); Stefanov et al., Energy Sector Governance, 33.
48. A. Kovacevic, “The Impact of the Russia–Ukraine Gas Crisis in South Eastern Europe,” Oxford
InstituteforEnergyStudies,March2009,http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/
NG29-TheImpactoftheRussiaUkrainianCrisisinSouthEasternEurope-AleksandarKovacevic-2009.pdf
(accessed 15 May 2017).
49. Ibid.
50. Bulgartransgaz, a company that was split off of Bulgargaz to comply with the EU’s Third
Liberalization Package, is in charge of gas transmission.
51. Bulgargaz buys gas for the wholesale market but is not active in distribution. Overgas dominates
distribution and currently buys gas to meet its own needs.
52. Overgas, n.d., “Shareholders,” https://www.overgas.bg/web/english/shareholders (accessed 23
August 2015).
53. Enerdata, “Country Energy Report—Bulgaria,” 2015.
54. Technically, Wintershall had a 50 percent share in a joint venture with Gazprom in WIEE
(Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus Zug AG), which had charge of gas supplies. See in T. Dąborowski,
“Bulgaria: Cheaper Gas from Russia in Exchange for the Approval of South Stream,” Ośrodek Studiów
Wschodnich, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-11-21/bulgaria-cheaper-gas-russiaexchange-approval-south-stream
(accessed 16 May 2017).
55. M. Hafner, “The Southern Gas Corridor and the EU Gas Security Supply: What’s Next?,”
Natural Gas Europe, 28 March 2015, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/southern-gas-corridor-and-eugas-security-of-supply-22688
(accessed 23 August 2015)
56. EurActiv, “South Stream Bilateral Deals Breach EU Law, Commission Says,” EurActiv, 4
December 2013, http://www.euractiv.com/energy/commission-south-stream-agreemen-news-532120
(accessed 16 May 2017).
57. H. Koďousková and M. Jirušek, “Cancellation of South Stream Makes Economic Sense,”
EurActiv, 12 December 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/cancellation-south-stream-project-makes-economic-sense-310788
(accessed 16 May 2017).
58. Interviewee 1, Sofia: Bulgaria, 5 March 2015; Interviewee 2, Bucharest: Romania, 9 March 2015;
Interviewee 3, Sofia: Bulgaria, 28 October 2014; Interviewee 4, Sofia: Bulgaria, 28 October 2014.
59. A. Smolchenko, “Stress Put on Friendship as Putin Visits Bulgaria,” The Moscow Times, 18
January 2008, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2008/1/article/stress-put-on-friendship-asputin-visits-bulgaria/303437.html
(accessed 23 August 2015); Novinite, “Russia, Bulgaria Finally Ink
Gas Discount Deal,” novinite.com, Sofia News Agency, 28 August 2012, http://www.novinite.com/articles/142668/Russia,+Bulgaria+Finally+Ink+Gas+Discount+Deal
(accessed 16 May 2017).
60.Archive of the Official Site of the 2008–2012 Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin,
“Prime Ministers Vladimir Putin and Boyko Borissov Speak to the Media following Bilateral Talks,” 13
November 2010, http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/pressconferences/12909/ (accessed 16 May 2017).
61. EurActiv, “Bulgaria ousted from Russia’s South Stream Pipe,” EurActiv, 31 August 2011, http://
www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/bulgaria-ousted-from-russia-s-south-stream-pipe/
(accessed 16 May 2017).
62. Novinite, “Putin Tells Erdogan He Is ‘Fed Up with Bulgarians,’” novinite.com, Sofia News
Agency, 4 December 2014, http://www.novinite.com/articles/165199/Putin+Tells+Erdogan+He+Is+%27
Fed+Up+with+Bulgarians%27 (accessed 16 May 2017).
63. The Socialist Party has traditionally closer ties to Russia based on the ideology and personal history
of numerous members of the party.
64. More specifically, in formula under which the price is calculated.
65. Interviewee 1, 2015.
66. J. Yardley and J. Becker, “How Putin Forged a Pipeline Deal That Derailed,” The New York Times,
30 December 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/world/europe/how-putin-forged-a-pipelinedeal-that-derailed-.html?_r=1
(accessed 16 May 2017).
Jirušek and Kuchyňková/ Conduct of Gazprom  841
67. The decisive player in the parliament at that time was the far-right party Ataka, which had close
ties to Russia. See EurActiv, “Nationalists Vow to Topple Bulgarian Cabinet over Russia,” EurActiv, 2
April 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/nationalists-vow-topple-bulgarian-cabinetover-russia-301301
(accessed 16 May 2017).
68. Ibid.; EurActiv, “Bulgaria, Commission, Lost in Translation over South Stream,” EurActiv, 25
April 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/bulgaria-commission-lost-translation-over-southstream-301751
(accessed 16 May 2017); G. Traufetter, “In the Kremlin’s Grip: Fears Grow over Bulgaria’s
Russian Dependence,” Spiegel Online International, 12 May 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/
europe/fears-grow-in-europe-that-russia-will-influence-bulgaria-a-968955.html (accessed 16 May 2017).
69. Novinite, “Russia, Bulgaria Finally Ink Gas Discount Deal.”
70. Stefanov et al., Energy Sector Governance; A. Топалов, “Скидка за «Южный поток»,” Фонд
национальной энергетической безопасности, 15 November 2012, http://www.energystate.ru/
news/4002.html (accessed 16 May 2017); ZN.ua., “ “Газпром” подписал с Болгарией новый контракт
в обмен на уступки по ‘Южному потоку,’” ZN.ua, 15 November 2012, https://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/
gazprom_podpisal_s_bolgariey_novyy_kontrakt_v_obmen_na_ustupki_po_yuzhnomu_potoku.html
(accessed 16 May 2017).
71. Denková et al., “Poland to Lead Battle.”
72. Natural Gas Europe, “The New Greek Government: Implications for Azerbaijan’s DESFA
Purchase,” Natural Gas Europe, 4 March 2015, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/syriza-implicationsfor-azerbaijans-desfa-purchase-22491
(accessed 23 August 2015).
73. Yardley and Becker, “How Putin Forged a Pipeline Deal”; K. Hope, “Bulgarians See Russian
Hand in Anti-shale Protests,” Financial Times, 30 November 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
e011d3f6-6507-11e4-ab2d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3jehP5MsQ (accessed 23 August 2015).
74. Energy Community Secretariat, “Annual Implementation Report,” Energy Community, 1
September 2015, https://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/DOCS/3872267/2
3B450386A075E64E053C92FA8C0F69F.PDF (accessed 16 May 2017).
75. Moldova is entitled to use some gas stored in Ukrainian storages; however, it is not likely that
Ukraine will make this gas available to Moldova if disruptions of Russian gas occur. See K. Całus,
“Russian Sanctions against Moldova. Minor Effects, Major Potential,” Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 6
November 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-11-06/russian-sanctionsagainst-moldova-minor-effects-major-potential#_ftn18
(accessed 16 May 2017).
76. The price is estimated to be US$260/1000 bcm. See Natural Gas Europe, “Romania Charges
Forward with Its Gas Strategy,” Natural Gas Europe, 2 April 2015, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/
romania-natural-gas-strategy-22916 (accessed 27 August 2015).
77. The Energy Community is an intergovernmental organization established in 2005 to bring together
the countries of the European Union and the Balkan and Black Sea regions to help them implement the
EU’s Internal Energy Market rules.
78. Interviewee 5, Chisinau, Moldova, 12 March 2015; Interviewee 6, Chisinau, Moldova, 12 March
2015; Interviewee 7, Chisinau, Moldova, 13 March 2015; Interviewee 8, Chisinau, Moldova, 13 March
2015; Interviewee 9, Chisinau, Moldova, 13 March 2015.
79. K. Całus, “The Iasi–Ungheni Pipeline: A Means of Achieving Energy Independence from Russia?
Moldova’s Attempts at Gas Supply Diversification,” Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, October 11, 2013,
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-10-11/iasi-ungheni-pipeline-a-meansachieving-energy-independence
(accessed 16 May 2017); Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, “Gazprom’s
Grip: Russia’s Leverage Over Europe,” 3 April 2015, http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/gazpromrussia-gas-leverage-europe/25441983.html
(accessed 16 May 2017).
80. Interviewee 6, Chisinau, Moldova, 12 March 2015; Interviewee 7, Chisinau, Moldova, 13 March 2015.
81. The documents suggested that the country be federalized, and talked about the need for the
Russian military to remain present for twenty years. E. Korosteleva, The European Union and Its Eastern
Neighbours. Towards a More Ambitious Partnership? (London: Routledge, 2012), 114; Całus, “The
Iasi–Ungheni Pipeline”; Interviewee 6, Chisinau, Moldova, 12 March 2015; Interviewee 7, Chisinau,
Moldova, 13 March 2015.
842  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
82. The protests came in reaction to the results of the parliamentary elections, which gave the communists
an absolute majority in the Moldovan parliament, enabled changes to the Constitution, and saw
the election of a new president. See, e.g., E. Barry, “Protests in Moldova Explode, With Help of Twitter,”
The New York Times, 7 April 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/world/europe/08moldova.html
(accessed 16 May 2017).
83. In fact, Gazprom holds a 50 percent + 1 share according to Moldova-based energy experts and
Employees of the Ministry of Economy (Interviewee 6, Chisinau, Moldova, 12 March 2015; Interviewee
7, Chisinau, Moldova, 13 March 2015).
84. “Implementation Report: Moldova,” Energy Community Secretariat (2016), 104.
85. Całus, “Russian Sanctions against Moldova.”
86. RBC.ru., “Д.Рогозин: Если Кишинев не признает Тирасполь, тогда долг за газ, потребленный
Приднестровьем, - это долг Молдавии,” RBC.ru., 18 April 2012, http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20120418060404.shtml
(accessed 16 May 2017).
87. Interviewee 6, Chisinau, Moldova, 12 March 2015; Interviewee 7, Chisinau, Moldova, 13 March
2015; Interviewee 8, Chisinau, Moldova, 13 March 2015; Interviewee 9, Chisinau, Moldova, 13 March
2015); S. Molnar, “Russia Hints at Stopping Gas Deliveries to Moldova,” Natural Gas Europe, 6
September 2013, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/russia-dimitri-rogozin-moldova-gas-delivery
(accessed 27 August 2015).
88. Molnar, “Russia Hints at Stopping Gas Deliveries.“
89. Interviewee 5, Chisinau, Moldova, 12 March 2015; Interviewee 6, Chisinau, Moldova, 12 March
2015.
90. C. Vlas, “Moldovagaz and Gazprom Agree on Prolonging the Contract until 31 December 2019,”
moldova.org, 30 December 2016, http://www.moldova.org/en/moldovagaz-gazprom-agree-prolongingcontract-31-december-2019/
(accessed 16 May 2017).
91. In his campaign, Dodon often criticized the AA/DCFTA. His Socialist Party supported its cancellation
and the reorientation of Moldova to the Eurasian Economic Union. See e.g. P. Ivan, “What to
expect from the new president of Moldova,” European Policy Centre, 14 November, http://www.epc.eu/
pub_details.php?cat_id=4&pub_id=7169 (accessed 16 May 2017).
92. Infotag, “President Igor Dodon Recognizes Transnistrian Gas Debts as Moldova’s Aggregate Debt,”
Infotag, 18 January 2017, http://www.infotag.md/economics-en/238272/ (accessed22 October, 2017).
93. L. Barbarosie, R. Coalson, and R. Jozwiak, “Empty Pipeline Shows Difficulty of Breaking
Moldova’s Gazprom Addiction,” Natural Gas Europe, 29 September 2014, http://www.naturalgaseurope.
com/empty-pipeline-shows-difficulty-of-breaking-moldova-gazprom (accessed 27 August 2015).
94. EurActiv, “Russia to Moldova: Choose Cheap Gas or EU Integration,” 13 September 2012, http://
www.euractiv.com/europes-east/russia-moldova-chose-cheap-gas-e-news-514769 (accessed 16 May 2017).
95. This assumption actually proved to be correct right from the start when the Iasi–Ungheni pipeline
was inaugurated in August 2014. The rather sluggish activity of MoldovaGaz—a company controlled by
Gazprom—was preventing the gas flow at that time. (Barbarosie et al., “Empty Pipeline Shows
Difficulty”).
96. A. Mihalache, “The Fairytale That Wasn’t: The Iasi–Ungheni Gas Interconnector,” Natural Gas
World, 18 November 2014, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/iasi-ungheni-gas-interconnector (accessed
17 May 2017).
97. F. Garbe, F. Hett, and R. Lindner, “Brothers to Neighbours: Russia-Belarus Relations in Transit,”
in Russian Energy Security and Foreign Policy, ed. A. Dellecker and T. Gomart, 188–202 (London:
Routledge, 2011), 188.
98. See, e.g., P. K. Baev, Russian Energy Policy and Military Power. Putin’s Quest for Greatness
(London: Routledge, 2008).
99. A. Кречетников, “Щука Путина и сом Лукашенко: что стоит за пиаром лидеров,” BBC,
Pycckaя cлyжбa, 1August 2013, http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2013/08/130801_putin_lukashenko_
spike_catfish.shtml (accessed 15 May 2017); T. Мельничук, “Лукашенко в послании к нации
выступил за единую Украину,” BBC, Pycckaя cлyжбa, 22 April 2014, http://www.bbc.com/russian/
international/2014/04/140422_belarus_lukashenko_ukraine_view.shtml (accessed 15 May 2017).
Jirušek and Kuchyňková/ Conduct of Gazprom  843
100. Before 2002, Belarus imported gas for prices that were almost comparable with the prices on the
Russian domestic market.
101. B. Nygren, The Rebuilding of Greater Russia. Putin’s Foreign Policy towards the CIS Countries
(London: Routledge, 2010), 71.
102. Since January 2010, the common customs tariff has been applied among Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan. The common customs code came into force in July 2010, but Belarus briefly withheld its
signature because of disputes over energy. See e.g. I. Tochitskaya, “The Customs Union between Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Russia: An Overview of Economic Implications for Belarus,” CASE Network Studies &
Analyses 405 (2010), http://www.case-research.eu/upload/publikacja_plik/32701553_CNSA_405.pdf
(accessed 15 May 2017). The signature of the series of agreements that established the customs union
between the two countries laid the foundation for resolving what were at that time the biggest issues in
the oil dispute. See A. E. Kramer, “Russia-Belarus Oil Dispute Threatens Europe’s Supply,” The New York
Times, 3 January 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/world/europe/04belarus.html (accessed 17
May 2017).
103. With Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan.
104. The annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine.
105. IEA Energy Statistics, 2016, “Share of Total Primary Energy Supply in 2014. Belarus,” http://
www.iea.org/stats/WebGraphs/BELARUS4.pdf (accessed 15 May 2017).
106. IEA Energy Statistics, 2016, “Total Primary Energy Supply. Belarus,” http://www.iea.org/stats/
WebGraphs/BELARUS5.pdf (accessed 15 May 2017); International Energy Agency, 2017, “Statistics:
Belarus: Electricity and Heat for 2014,” http://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?year=2014&
country=BELARUS&product=ElectricityandHeat (accessed 15 May 2017).
107. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2016. Natural gas, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/
bp/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2016/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2016-naturalgas.pdf
(accessed 15 May 2017).
108. Министерство экономического развития Российской Федерации, n.d., “Российско-белорус
ское инвестиционное сотрудничество 2012 г,” http://www.ved.gov.ru/exportcountries/by/by_ru_relations/by_rus_projects/
(accessed 15 May 2017).
109. Garbe et al., “Brothers to Neighbours,” 195.
110. Baev, Russian Energy Policy and Military Power, 147.
111. T. Romanova, “Energy Dialogue from Strategic Partnership to the Regional Level of the
Northern Dimension,” in The EU-Russian Energy Dialogue. Europe’s Future Energy Security, ed. P.
Aalto (Surrey: Ashgate, 2008), 89; E. Wyciszkiewicz, “Polish Perspective on the EU’s Energy Policy and
the Security of External Supply,” International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs 1 (2009): 18–19.
112. See, e.g., S. Bohdan, “Belarus Has Obtained Gas and Oil Concessions from Russia: But What
Did Russia Get in Exchange?” Belarus Digest, 11 April 2017, http://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-hasobtained-gas-and-oil-concessions-russia-what-did-russia-get-exchange-29754
(accessed 15 May 2017).
113. Nygren, The Rebuilding of Greater Russia, 77–78.
114. Here may be noted Lukashenko’s attempts to open Belarus’s door a little wider to relations with
the EU in 2008–2010. These ceased after the EU issued a sharp rebuke and instituted restrictions on the
country after the violent suppression of opposition demonstrations in Minsk tied to the 2010 presidential
elections.
115. Since 2013, the price Belarus pays for Russian gas has been calculated based on the gas price in
the Yamalo-Nenets region of Russia, where the raw materials for the Belarusian market are extracted, plus
transport expenses to the border between Belarus and Russia and expenses for refuelling Russian gas
tankers. This change was related to the rules of the Customs Union coming into force. See in M. Jirušek,
T. Vlček, H. Koďousková, R. Robinson, A. Leshchenko, L. Lehotský, and V. Zapletalová, Energy
Security in Central and Eastern Europe and the Operations of Russian State-Owned Energy Enterprises
(Brno: Masaryk University, 2015), 406, http://energy.fss.muni.cz/bresearch/publications (accessed 23
October 2017).
844  East European Politics and Societies and Cultures
116. Bectи: Бизнес, “В Казахстане создали Евразийский экономический союз,” Bectи, 2015,
http://business.vesti-ukr.com/54142-v-kazahstane-sozdali-evrazijskij-jekonomicheskij-sojuz
(accessed 16 May 2017); ЕврАзЭС. Евразийскоe экономическоe сообществo, n.d., http://evrazes.
com/customunion/eepr (accessed 15 May 2017).
117. In the latter half of 2016, Belarus was at the receiving end of another reduction in Gazprom
deliveries that was tied, according to reports, to the Belarusian debt reaching a level of about US$300
million. The recent disputes were connected, e.g., with longstanding issues surrounding prices and tariffs
on gas imported from Russia. It is in Belarus’s interest to keep gas and oil deliveries from Russia tarifffree
and to keep gas prices close to those on the Russian domestic market, which is the basic incentive
for Belarus to support the EAEU. Recent disputes have been also accompanied by trade wars in areas that
are not directly connected to energy, and gestures on both sides that have threatened to call into question
even Belarus’s membership in the EAEU. (See, e.g., A. Shraibman, “How Long Can Belarus`s Balancing
Act Last?,” Carnegie Moscow Center, 15 November 2016, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=66140
(accessed 15 May 2017); A. Shraibman, “The Far-Reaching Consequences of Belarus`s Conflict with
Russia,” Carnegie Moscow Center, 8 February 2017, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=67939 (accessed
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118. Garbe et al., “Brothers to Neighbours,” 192.
119. Ibid., 195.
120. S. Closson, “Russia’s Key Customer: Europe,” in Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations.
Implications for Conflict and Cooperation, ed. J. Perovic, R. W. Orttung, and A. Wenger (London:
Routledge, 2009), 93; K. Yafimava and J. Stern, The 2007 Russia-Belarus Gas Agreement (Oxford:
Institute for Energy Studies, 2007).
121. A. Alachnovič and S. Naŭrodski, “Belarusian Economy: Structural Crisis,” CASE Belarus, July
2011, http://case-belarus.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Belarusian-Crisis-CASE-Belarus-July-2011.
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Martin Jirušek, PhD, is assistant professor at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University focusing
on energy security in post-communist Europe and tranastlantic dimension of energy security. Email:
jirusek.martin@mail.muni.cz
Petra Kuchyňková, PhD, is assistant professor at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University
focusing on EU affairs and Eastern Europe. Email: kuchynko@fss.muni.cz