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Annual Review of Political Science
Populism, Democracy, and
Party System Change
in Europe
Milada Anna Vachudova
Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,
North Carolina 27599, USA; email: vachudov@email.unc.edu
Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 2021. 24:471–98
First published as a Review in Advance on
March 1, 2021
The Annual Review of Political Science is online at
polisci.annualreviews.org
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-
102711
Copyright © 2021 by Annual Reviews. This work is
licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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Keywords
populism, party systems, ethnopopulism, democratic backsliding,
polarization, European politics
Abstract
How has populism transformed party systems in Europe? I survey the varieties
of populism, the sources of their support and the different ways that
they appeal to voters. I use data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey to explore
whether populist parties are intensifying competition on the cultural
dimension, accelerating the decline of mainstream parties, and increasing
polarization. I argue that while left and center populist parties have upended
existing structures of competition, it is longstanding conservative parties, remodeled
using ethnopopulism,that have been the most consequential for the
substance of political competition and the trajectory of domestic politics. I
consider the behavior of incumbents and argue that varieties of populism
should shape our expectations of what happens when populists rule: While
left populist parties in power over the last decade have tended to become
more ordinary, sometimes even shedding antiestablishment and anti-EU positions,
ethnopopulist parties in power have used harsh “us-versus-them” appeals,
misinformation, and democratic backsliding in their pursuit of more
power.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last four decades, scholars have chronicled how competition among political parties in
Europe’s democracies has moved away from traditional left–right debates about how to govern
the economy. Competition has expanded to identity and cultural values and now directly engages
questions about who belongs to the polity and “the people.” Parties today are often identifiable
less by their positions on redistribution and the regulation of the economy than by their positions
on cultural issues. This change has played out most vividly in contestation over immigration and
European integration and in the rise in support for far right parties and positions. More recently,
party competition in Europe has been shaken up by different varieties of populist parties,especially
those on the economic left, reigniting debates on inequality and redistribution, and those on the
cultural right, broadening and amplifying exclusionary appeals.
In this article, I consider the consequences of this shake up. How has populism changed party
systems in Europe? How much of the variation is a consequence of different varieties of populism?
Populist parties on the right stand out as drivers of competition on identity and cultural values:
I argue that ethnopopulist parties, more flexible political entrepreneurs than traditional far right
parties, have helped define and intensify competition on the new cultural dimension (Vachudova
2020). While new populist parties on the left and in the center have upended the structure of
competition in party systems across Europe, it is longstanding conservative and far right parties,
remodeled using ethnopopulism, that have fundamentally altered the substance of competition.
Yet, what accounts for variation in whether and how populist parties have changed the structure
and substance of political competition? In what follows, I draw on recent scholarship to lay out
the changing topography of political competition in Europe and the varieties of populism that
have animated this competition in recent years. I sketch the causes: the factors whose confluence
has led to a rise in support among voters for populist parties. These factors include cultural and
economic changes in daily life, failures of representation on the part of mainstream parties, the
flexible and innovative playbooks of populist leaders, and the twin shocks of the financial and
refugee crises. And I survey the consequences: I set out the expectations in the literature that rising
support for populist parties has intensified competition on the cultural dimension, accelerated the
decline of mainstream parties, increased polarization in party systems, and impacted the quality
of democracy. I use data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to identify populist parties
and to illustrate change on the cultural and economic dimensions of political competition in eight
European party systems over the last decade.
I also consider the behavior of populist incumbents: How should different varieties of populism
shape our expectations of what happens when populists rule? Around the globe, party systems
have been buffeted by attacks on the democratic institutions that safeguard a level political
playing field. In Europe, the last decade suggests a striking difference: While time in government
has transformed new left populist parties into more ordinary democratic parties, it does not appear
to have had a similar tempering effect on established parties that have been revamped using
ethnopopulism. Divisions in society may help populists of different varieties win votes, but for
ethnopopulist incumbents, deepening polarization and dismantling democratic institutions have
been part of a playbook to amplify power and prevent turnover. This playbook is legitimized by
the core ethnopopulist message that the party defends the interests of the “real” people from
opposition parties who represent the interests of culturally harmful outsiders. This message can
create intense partisanship that is permissive of democratic backsliding and rent-seeking. For all
of their differences, Brexit and authoritarian rule in Hungary stand as the greatest consequences
of populist rule so far in Europe in this century.
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THE CHANGING TOPOGRAPHY OF PARTY COMPETITION
IN EUROPE
One way to conceptualize competition in a party system is to map the positions of parties on two
fundamental dimensions: the economic left–right dimension of governing the economy, and the
social-cultural dimension of identity and values. This second dimension puts universalistic and socially
liberal values in competition with traditional and communitarian ones. In the longstanding
CHES1
project, we call this dimension GAL–TAN. GAL stands for green, alternative, and libertarian;
TAN stands for traditional, authoritarian, and nationalist. We know that, overall, party
competition has shifted from the economic left–right dimension to the GAL–TAN cultural dimension
(Polk et al. 2017).2
We also know that, for all parties, the salience of immigration and
European integration has increased over time (De Vries 2018). Data plots in the section titled
Identifying Populist Parties and Party System Change show how extensively parties differentiated
themselves on the GAL–TAN cultural dimension in both 2010 and 2019. With regard to the
substance of competition, these data plots also show that there is great variation among just the
eight party systems depicted here. In Hungary, for example, parties compete exclusively on the
GAL–TAN cultural dimension and are all but indistinguishable on the left–right economic dimension.
In Spain, parties differentiate themselves as much on the left–right economic dimension
as on GAL–TAN.
Scholars have long puzzled over how party systems change over time. The literature takes as its
starting point the stable party landscapes of postwar West European democracies, where parties
competed across cleavages grounded in longstanding structural conflicts that scholars mostly organized
along a left–right dimension (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). In response to rising immigration,
trade, and integration, Hooghe & Marks (2018) have conceptualized a new “transnational cleavage”:
On one side are the more affluent, educated, and cosmopolitan citizens who benefit from
transnational trade, mobility, and governance; on the other side, their fellow citizens who instead
see these developments as a cultural and economic threat. Parties, mostly on the far right, push
back against people, institutions, and rules coming from outside the nation-state. While some
cleavages are receding, the new transnational cleavage representing contestation along the GAL–
TAN dimension is intensifying (Hooghe & Marks 2018, Marks et al. 2020, Rovny 2015, see also
Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012).
Yet the positions of established parties tend to change only slowly, if at all. Instead, De Vries
& Hobolt (2020) argue that in Western Europe, it is the rise of challenger parties along the
new cleavage that has gradually transformed party systems and shifted the axis of competition
(see also De Vries & Hobolt 2012, Hooghe & Marks 2018, Hutter & Kriesi 2019, Rovny 2012).
The stability of postwar party systems has been disrupted by the rise of challenger parties with
GAL positions. Urban, educated, and professional voters have tended to leave mainstream parties
and embrace the postmaterialist values of strongly GAL parties. Stability has also been disrupted
by the rise of far right parties with TAN positions. Rural, less educated, and working-class voters
have tended to leave mainstream social democratic and Christian democratic parties for the
1The figures in this article use CHES data for the positions of national political parties. The data set is built
using expert surveys: A team of researchers asks experts—usually academics specializing in political parties—
to evaluate the positions of parties on different ideological dimensions and policy issues. All CHES data are
publicly available at https://www.chesdata.eu.
2Scholars have used a variety of terms to describe the cultural dimension of competition that we call
GAL–TAN, including the postmaterialist (Inglehart 1990), libertarian–authoritarian (Kitschelt 1994), and
integration–demarcation dimension (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012).
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anti-immigration positions and authoritarian values of strongly TAN parties (Hooghe & Marks
2018, Oesch 2008; for an insightful overview, see Ford & Jennings 2020). Some far right parties
have also used antiestablishment appeals rooted in opposition to the clientelism of established
parties to attract middle-class professional voters (Katz & Mair 1995, Kitschelt 2002). In Eastern
Europe, among the postcommunist members of the European Union, party systems have been
more fluid, with the frequent birth and death of parties claiming to have “clean hands” (DeeganKrause
& Haughton 2018, Hanley & Sikk 2014, Haughton & Deegan-Krause 2020, Pop-Eleches
2010). Also in Eastern Europe, the structure of competition crystallized in a distinct way after
1989 as left-TAN parties reflecting communist-era positions competed with right-GAL parties
supporting market liberalism and European cultural values (Vachudova & Hooghe 2009). Three
decades later, it is still uncommon for a postcommunist party to combine economic right and TAN
positions—or indeed for a West European party to combine economic right and GAL positions.
Over the last two decades, party systems across Europe have been shaken up by populism—a
broader and more electorally successful challenge that subsumes the far right but goes well beyond
it. Populist parties are not necessarily new; some are a populist reincarnation of a long-established
party. Many do not fit neatly into existing party families owing to an eclectic mix of positions.
The scholarship on populism in Europe today is in many ways a continuation of the literature
on the far right that investigates what motivates voters to support antiestablishment appeals, how
antiestablishment parties have calibrated these appeals, and how mainstream parties have reacted
to them, for example by toughening their positions on immigration (Art 2011; Bustikova 2019; de
Lange 2007; Kitschelt 1995; Meguid 2008; Mudde 2007, 2019; Pirro 2015). However, to understand
the structure and substance of political competition in contemporary Europe, it is important
to differentiate among different kinds of populist parties—how they conceptualize “the people”
and how they govern.
VARIETIES OF POPULISM: INEQUALITY ON THE LEFT,
IMMIGRATION ON THE RIGHT
Populism itself is a common, loosely defined political tool for appealing to voters. Politicians
promise to defend the people against establishment elites by arguing that these elites are protecting
and expanding their own privileges at the expense of ordinary citizens (Mudde 2007). They
argue that dominant parties are corrupt and unaccountable—and that the people deserve to be
represented directly, without intermediaries. They also tend to adopt a Manichean “good versus
evil” approach to politics (Taggart 2000). What distinguishes different kinds of populist parties
is how they define the people, and this in turn determines whether they challenge mainstream
parties mainly from the left, on the left–right economic dimension, or from the right, on the
GAL–TAN cultural dimension. What also distinguishes populist party types is how they define
the elite, although a common position for populists on the economic left and the cultural far right
is skepticism of elites and institutions associated with the international financial institutions and
European integration. Hix et al. (2019) show that as populists have gained more seats in the European
Parliament, the division between those supporting and opposing the deepening of European
integration has become as important as the traditional economic left–right dimension. The intensity
of Euroskepticism, however, varies greatly among populist parties—and with the spectacular
exception of the revamped British Conservative Party, those in power calibrate their anti-EU positions
to accommodate receiving structural funds and other benefits of EU membership.
Populism has tended to come from the economic left in Southern Europe and Latin America,
taking on a class dimension as politicians pledge to improve the lives of the powerless and the
poor (Roberts 2019). Populist appeals have centered on promises to promote the rights and
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wellbeing of the people in the face of the misery and unfairness caused by austerity (Hobolt &
Tilley 2016) and, more broadly, by neoliberal economic policies and rising inequality. The people
are not defined as part of a particular class, but instead “defined by their nonelite economic
status and their generalized political disempowerment” (Roberts 2019, p. 646). Populist parties
competing from the left such as Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain take on more universalistic
GAL values and include ethnic minorities, refugees, and migrants in an inclusionary view of
society (Font et al. 2021, Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013). For left-wing populists, financial elites that
are connected to globalized trade and integrated capital markets are the enemy—and, in Europe,
this has often included the European Union.
Populism has tended to come from the cultural right in Western and East Central Europe,
as politicians cast the people as part of an ethnicity, culture, nation, religion, race, or even civilization
that is under threat. They take TAN positions and adopt an exclusionary view of who
belongs to the people, the group that deserves better representation (Canovan 1999, Mudde &
Kaltwasser 2013). These parties are called right-wing populist parties (Mudde 2007), exclusionary
populist parties (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013), nativist parties (Art 2020), paternalist populist parties
(Enyedi 2020), ethnonationalist populist parties (Bonikowski 2017) and ethnopopulist parties
( Jenne 2018).I call them ethnopopulist parties because ethnopopulism helps us conceptualize how
strategic party leaders define the people based on categories of identity that are broader than nationalism,
how they adjust the intensity of their exclusionary appeals with greater agility than the
far right, and how they choose a flexible cast of friends and enemies to achieve their political goals
( Jenne 2018, Vachudova 2020). Appeals by ethnopopulist parties such as Fidesz in Hungary and
the League in Italy are centered on defending traditional values (Taggart 2000) against the threat
of immigration (Hobolt & Tilley 2016) and against a civilizational threat from Islam (Brubaker
2017), with growing overtures to pan-European Christianity and white supremacy. It is important
to underscore that the immigrant threat is often racialized: Most ethnopopulist parties single
out dark-skinned migrants and refugees, especially Muslims, as a threat but do not necessarily
politicize other migrants (Vachudova 2020). In the discourse of ethnopopulist parties, domestic
and transnational elites that are seen as promoting immigration, integration, multiculturalism,
LGBTQ rights, and progressive social values are the enemy, especially elites associated with the
European Union (Pirro & van Kessel 2017).
What about populism in the center? Parties may stand against the political establishment but
take moderate or undetectable positions on the economic left–right dimension and also on the cultural
GAL–TAN dimension. Such parties are rare and their credentials as populists are contested.
One example is La République En Marche! (LREM) in France, which rejects traditional party labels
and promises to work directly for the people. Scholars have identified a kind of “technocratic
populism” that offers to replace clientelism and patronage with higher-caliber policy making by
experts or businessmen (Bustikova & Guasti 2019)—in other words, to replace one set of establishment
elites with another. Populist discourse can, paradoxically, be detected as a strategy for
state capture by parties with no special policy agenda except rent-seeking for the benefit of the
office holders (Zankina 2016). Owing to this flexibility, scholars have termed populism a “thincentered”
ideology or a discursive frame that parties combine with other ideologies and positions
(Bonikowski 2017, Mudde 2007, Stanley 2008).
WHY THE “HOUR OF POPULISM”?
Populism as a political tool has been around for centuries, so what is it about the last decade that
has made populism a winning strategy for political parties and catapulted it to the forefront of
scholarship (Noury & Roland 2020) in political science? Here I sketch three interconnected ways
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that scholars explain the rise of populism and how it has shaped party competition in Europe:
the changing attitudes of voters, failures of representation by mainstream parties, and strategies
of political entrepreneurs. I also look at how the financial and refugee crises have amplified the
populist wave.
Bottom-Up and Top-Down Reasons for Rising Support for Populist
Parties Among Voters
The first explanation focuses on how the attitudes of voters have gradually shifted to reflect feelings
of injustice and resentment owing to economic and cultural changes in their daily lives (see
Noury & Roland 2020). Voters became unmoored from the strong partisanship that anchored previous
generations to parties that were intertwined with their profession, class, church, and local
community (Marks et al. 2020). They felt angry about patronage politics among dominant moderate
parties and increasingly perceived mainstream parties as corrupt (Engler 2020). They became
resentful of the rise in immigration and the impact of globalization on the quality of low-skilled
jobs, both of which are linked to lower wages and higher unemployment. They felt left behind
by rising inequality and neoliberal reforms (Appel & Orenstein 2018, Huber & Stephens 2014)
and by disparities in economic power (Epstein 2020). Economic anxiety and resentment were interlinked
with a cultural and racial backlash on the part of voters alienated by immigration, the
spread of cosmopolitan values, and the empowerment of women and minorities (Gidron & Hall
2017, Norris & Inglehart 2019; on Eastern Europe, Haughton & Deegan-Krause 2020; PopEleches
& Tucker 2017). Voters also became resentful of the expanding powers of the European
Union, which was seen as elitist and out of touch and was blamed for immigration, unemployment,
and income inequality (Whitefield & Rohrschneider 2015). European integration and globalization
became linked with immigration, trade, and the reallocation of authority to the European
Union—“political choices that affect the life chances of identifiable groups” (Marks et al. 2020,
p. 25; see also De Vries 2018). Scholars have connected the rise of different kinds of populism
with different varieties of capitalism, including distinct labor market and welfare state institutions
(Roberts 2019; on varieties of capitalism, see Hall & Soskice 2001).
The second explanation builds on the first, arguing that a failure of representation has pushed
voters away from the center: Mainstream political parties, especially social democrats, have not
represented the interests of unmoored and disaffected voters effectively (Berman 2019, Lynch
2019). This has led to a steep decline in participation, the hollowing out of parties and democracies,
and the shift to competition on identity and values (Greskovits 2015, Hooghe & Marks
2018, Mair 2013). Voters have felt unrepresented by the convergence of policy positions among
mainstream parties (Grzymala-Busse 2019a, Spoon & Klüver 2019), and by the support of social
democratic parties for immigration, neoliberal economic policies, and European integration—a
stance that caters to the preferences of educated groups. Bakker et al. (2020) find that the incongruence
between the positions of parties and the preferences of their voters on these critical issues
helps explain support for antielite parties at the ballot box. Working-class and other voters have
therefore drifted away from mainstream parties in search of parties that represent their attitudes
and are responsive to their concerns (Berman 2019, Snegovaya 2021, Stanley 2019). For Western
Europe, Rooduijn (2018) cautions, however, against the widely imagined concept of a “populist
voter” with a consistent set of attributes across all populist parties; his study shows instead that
voters supporting different populist parties vary a great deal in their positions on issues such as
globalization and European integration.
The third explanation accepts that popular attitudes have changed but attributes those changes
also to agency: the strategies of political entrepreneurs about what positions to take and how to
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challenge other parties. Charismatic leadership is embedded in the logic of populism. While leaders
may call for greater citizen participation in referenda or on the internet, they present themselves
as the embodiment of the grievances and resentments of the people (Urbinati 2019; see also
Pappas 2019). The causal arrows are therefore reversed. They are top down, from party leaders to
voters: It is cueing and manipulation by well-positioned elites that have pushed voters to change
their attitudes and reject mainstream parties as corrupt (Engler 2020,Haughton & Deegan-Krause
2020) and culturally harmful (Vachudova 2020). Over time, voters react to the rhetoric of party
leaders by forming and changing their preferences (Stroschein 2019). This has been especially
evident in cases where incumbent ethnopopulists have captured the state administration, taken
over independent media outlets, cultivated “uncivil” society (Ekiert 2020, Greskovits 2020), and
exploited online social media to create an exaggerated sense of threat by broadcasting an unrelenting
narrative of xenophobia and resentment (Moffitt 2016, Surowiec & Štˇetka 2019). Politicians
who use ethnopopulist strategies are often playing outside the bounds of the liberal democratic
playing field, spreading fake news and demonizing their domestic opponents in extreme ways
(Noury & Roland 2020, Štˇetka et al. 2020, Vachudova 2019, Wodak 2019). The standout example
in Europe is the spread of misinformation portraying Muslims and Islam as a threat to cultural
and civilizational survival (Brubaker 2017). In the United States, it is the lies about rigged
elections that led to an insurrection at the Capitol and alternate realities threatening democratic
institutions. Politicians who use ethnopopulist strategies boost their success by elevating otherwise
illegitimate actors to positions of epistemic authority in government and in the public sphere
(Bonikowski 2017).
The Financial and Refugee Crises
The populist wave in Europe was strongly amplified by the twin shocks of the financial crisis in
2008 and the refugee crisis in 2015,which intensified party competition on the transnational cleavage
in Europe.Hooghe & Marks (2018) argue that durable party system change comes when external
shocks create purchase for new parties to challenge the established ones. Europe’s twin shocks
solidified competition on the GAL–TAN dimension along the new transnational cleavage and
created durable support for the parties that contest it—both new parties and established ones that
adapted their appeals. For populist parties, these crises were a catalyst for showcasing unwanted
interference by elites and institutions associated with European integration and international financial
markets (Bohle & Greskovits 2019, Johnson & Barnes 2015, Pirro & Van Kessel 2017).
The financial and refugee crises illustrate vividly how populist support is shaped by domestic
factors that mediate the impact of external shocks. In Southern Europe, as a consequence of the
financial crisis, transnational elites imposed fiscal orthodoxy and austerity that caused intense economic
misery and deep resentment, creating a political opening for antiestablishment, left-wing
populist parties (della Porta et al. 2017; see also Casal Bértoa & Rama 2020, Kriesi & Pappas 2015).
Syriza in Greece, the Five Star Movement in Italy and Podemos in Spain have subsequently intensified
competition on the economic dimension, gained substantial vote share, and become parties
of government. In Eastern Europe, as the refugee crisis unfolded, it raised the prospect that unwanted
immigrants and cosmopolitan values would be imposed by transnational elites; this was
accompanied by a growing fear of cultural destruction even though there are virtually no Muslim
refugees or migrants in the region. Whereas economic misery brought on by the financial crisis
was grounded in the lived experiences of voters in Southern Europe, the fear of Muslim immigrants
in Eastern Europe was largely a product of strategically curated misinformation (Brubaker
2017, Jenne 2018, Štˇetka et al. 2020, Vachudova 2020). Elections since 2014 have been fought on
the cultural dimension, and ethnopopulist parties have won a plurality or a majority of the vote
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on intensely anti-Muslim platforms in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. In Southern
Europe, where voters have coexisted with large numbers of actual refugees and migrants, support
for far right and ethnopopulist parties has been substantially lower.
WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF POPULISM?
How do populist parties change political competition—and do different varieties of populist parties
shape party systems differently? In addition to intensifying competition on the economic and
cultural dimensions, political changes that are widely associated with populism in the literature
are the decline of mainstream parties, rising polarization, and attacks on liberal democratic institutions
(for a careful study of European cases, see Wolinetz & Zaslove 2018).
All populist parties promise to turn the tide against establishment parties whose hold on power
has led to policies that privilege the elite. This suggests that we should observe a decline in the
electoral strength of long-established, mainstream parties in favor of populist challenger parties.
We do observe this in many European party systems but not in all (de Vries & Hobolt 2020).
And while many populist parties can be termed challenger parties, we see below that among the
most powerful and consequential populist parties are longstanding conservative mainstream parties
such as the British Conservative Party in the United Kingdom and Fidesz in Hungary that
have been remodeled using ethnopopulism (Vachudova 2020).
All populist parties also adopt a Manichean “good versus evil” approach to politics, though with
very different degrees of intensity. This suggests that we should observe greater polarization of
party systems, defined as centrist parties losing ground to parties at the extremes—or indeed centrist
parties choosing to move toward the extremes. Over the last decade, the polarization shaping
political competition in Europe and also in the United States has been primarily on the cultural
dimension. Scholars identify rising polarization and decreasing trust among parties and citizens as
both a cause and a consequence of ethnopopulist rule (Haggard & Kaufman 2021, Hetherington
& Rudolph 2018, McCoy et al. 2018, Vachudova 2020). Bustikova (2019) shows that political
power in the hands of socially liberal GAL parties can mobilize voters in support of far right TAN
parties—and recent European social movements and election results suggest that the inverse is
true as well. Partisanship itself appears to be both decreasing and increasing: Partisan attachments
to old mainstream parties of the center left and center right have indeed decreased, yet populist
parties, especially dominant ruling ethnopopulist parties, benefit from intense partisanship on the
part of their core voters (Svolik 2019) that is associated with polarization in the party system.
Dominant ruling ethnopopulist parties are, in turn, strongly associated with democratic backsliding
and rent-seeking that they legitimize with the Manichean view of political competition, as I
explore below.
IDENTIFYING POPULIST PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE
The 2019 round of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) helps identify the varieties of populist
parties and how they shape the substance and structure of political competition. It asks experts to
score all parties on the salience of antiestablishment rhetoric that can serve as a proxy for populism
at the party level (as in Norris & Inglehart 2019; for other measures, see Meijers & Zaslove
2021). Figures 1–4 show the salience of antiestablishment rhetoric for each party, helping illustrate
that most populist parties clearly differentiate themselves from other parties on this measure.
These four figures also show the salience of immigration for each party, helping us distinguish
ethnopopulist parties from leftist and centrist populist parties. For an exclusionary ethnopopulist
party, such as the League in Italy, antiestablishment rhetoric and rhetoric related to immigration
are both strongly salient. In contrast, for inclusionary left-wing populist parties, such as Podemos
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Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Hungary
MSZPMSZP
Fidesz−KDNPFidesz−KDNP
JOBBIKJOBBIK
LMPLMP
DKDK
SLDSLD
POPO
PiSPiS
PSLPSL
NowoNowo
KonfederacjaKonfederacja
LewicaLewica
WiosnaWiosna
Salience of
antiestablishment
rhetoric
Salienceof
immigrationrhetoric
Poland
Salience of
antiestablishment
rhetoric
Salienceof
immigrationrhetoric
Hungarian and Polish parliamentary party positions in 2019
Vote share
10
20
30
40
EU position
Favors
Opposes
Figure 1
Parliamentary party positions in 2019 in Hungary and Poland. For each party, the salience of antiestablishment rhetoric is plotted
against the salience of immigration rhetoric. Data are from the 2019 round of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al.
2020). Abbreviations in Hungary: DK, Democratic Coalition; Fidesz-KDNP, Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union Christian Democratic
People’s Party; JOBBIK, Jobbik-Movement for a Better Hungary; LMP, Politics Can Be Different; MSZP, Hungarian Socialist Party.
Abbreviations/translations in Poland: Konfederacja, Confederation Liberty and Independence; Lewica, Left Together; Nowo, Modern;
PiS, Law and Justice Party; PO, Civic Platform; PSL, Polish People’s Party; SLD, Democratic Left Alliance; Wiosna, Spring.
Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Austria
Salience of
antiestablishment
rhetoric
Salienceof
immigrationrhetoric
Italy
Salience of
antiestablishment
rhetoric
Salienceof
immigrationrhetoric
Austrian and Italian parliamentary party positions in 2019
Vote share
10
20
30
EU position
Favors
Opposes
SPÖSPÖ
ÖVPÖVP
FPÖFPÖ
GruneGrune
LIF/NEOSLIF/NEOS
LNLN
RIRI
FIFI
SVPSVP
PDPDSISI
FDI/CNFDI/CN
M5SM5S
Figure 2
Parliamentary party positions in 2019 in Austria and Italy. For each party, the salience of antiestablishment rhetoric is plotted against
the salience of immigration rhetoric. Data are from the 2019 round of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al. 2020).
Abbreviations in Austria: FPÖ, Freedom Party; Grune, Greens; LIF/NEOS, New Austria and Liberal Forum; ÖVP, People’s Party;
SPÖ, Social Democratic Party. Abbreviations in Italy: FDI/CN, Brothers of Italy; FI, Forza Italia; LN, League (formerly Northern
League); M5S, Five Star Movement; PD, Democratic Party; RI, Italian Radicals; SI, Italian Left; SVP, South Tyrolean People’s Party.
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Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Greece
Salience of
antiestablishment
rhetoric
Salienceof
immigrationrhetoric Spain
Salience of
antiestablishment
rhetoric
Salienceof
immigrationrhetoric
Greek and Spanish parliamentary party positions in 2019
Vote share
10
20
30
EU position
Favors
Opposes
PASOKPASOK
NDND
SYRIZASYRIZA
KKEKKE
KIDISOKIDISO
ELEL
MR25MR25
PSOEPSOE
PPPP
IUIU
PNVPNVERCERC BNGBNG
CCCC
EHBEHB
PodemosPodemos
CsCs
VoxVox
PaisPais
Figure 3
Parliamentary party positions in 2019 in Greece and Spain. For each party, the salience of antiestablishment rhetoric is plotted against
the salience of immigration rhetoric. Data are from the 2019 round of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al. 2020).
Abbreviations in Greece: EL, Greek Solution; KIDISO, Movement of Democratic Socialists; KKE, Communist Party of Greece;
MR25, European Realistic Disobedience Front; ND, New Democracy; PASOK, Panhellenic Socialist Movement; SYRIZA, Coalition
of the Radical Left. Abbreviations in Spain: BNG, Galician Nationalist Bloc; CC, Canarian Coalition; Cs, Citizens; EHB, Basque
Country Unite; ERC, Republican Left of Catalonia; IU, United Left; Pais, More Country; PNV, Basque Nationalist Party; Podemos,
We Can; PP, People’s Party; PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party; Vox, Voice.
and Syriza, only antiestablishment appeals are extremely important for how the party presents itself
to the voters. The 2019 CHES data also show that, for most ethnopopulist parties (the British
Conservatives are the exception), the high salience of rhetoric related to immigration is strongly
correlated with the high salience of anti-Muslim rhetoric (Blackington & Vachudova 2020).
I turn now to a sketch of how populist parties that have taken part in government, albeit briefly
in some cases, have reshaped their respective party systems over the last decade. The eight party
systems shown in the remaining figures help illustrate the variation at hand, spanning different
varieties of populist parties that have held varying amounts of political power. They suggest that
while incumbent ethnopopulist parties have been the most consequential for the substance of
political competition, it is left and center populist parties that have upended existing structures of
competition, playing a part in the most party system turbulence and change. They also suggest
that time in government has made left and center populist parties into more ordinary democratic
parties but it has not had a similar moderating effect on ethnopopulist parties.
Hungary and the United Kingdom: Dominant Conservative Parties
Transformed Into Ethnopopulist Parties
In Hungary and the United Kingdom, what had been dominant, mainstream conservative parties
have been transformed into ethnopopulist parties by ambitious political leaders in a similar way
as the Republican Party in the United States. Figures 5 and 6 depict how the party systems
are polarized on the cultural dimension between the dominant ethnopopulist incumbent and a
fragmented, socially progressive opposition. Fidesz and the British Conservative Party both took
up remarkably successful antiestablishment appeals that resonated with working-class voters,
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Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Extremely
important
Not important
at all
Extremely
important
Not important
at all
France
Salience of
antiestablishment
rhetoric
Salienceof
immigrationrhetoric
United Kingdom
Salience of
antiestablishment
rhetoric
Salienceof
immigrationrhetoric
French parliamentary and British party positions in 2019
Vote share
10
20
30
40
50
EU position
Favors
Opposes
Neutral
PCFPCF
PSPS
VERTSVERTS
FN/RNFN/RN
MODEMMODEM
FIFI
DLFDLF
LREMLREM
CONSCONS
LABLAB
LIBDEMLIBDEM
GREENGREEN
SNPSNP
PLAIDPLAID
UKIPUKIP
BREXITBREXIT
Figure 4
Parliamentary positions France and party positions in the United Kingdom in 2019. For each party, the salience of antiestablishment
rhetoric is plotted against the salience of immigration rhetoric. For the United Kingdom, anti-EU parties not in parliament are
included. Data are from the 2019 round of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al. 2020). Abbreviations in France: DLF,
France Arise; FI, France Unbowed; LREM, La République en Marche!; PCF, Communist Party; PS, Socialist Party; RN, National
Rally (formerly FN, National Front); MODEM, Democratic Movement (formerly UDF); VERTS, Greens. Abbreviations in the
United Kingdom: CONS, British Conservative Party; BREXIT, Brexit Party; GREEN, Green Party; LAB, Labour Party; LIBDEM,
Liberal Democratic Party; PLAID, Party of Wales; SNP, Scottish National Party; UKIP, United Kingdom Independence Party.
claiming to fight transnational elites intent on diminishing the country through immigration
and European integration. In power since 2010, they both achieved incredible change: Hungary
became an authoritarian regime, and the United Kingdom left the European Union. Fidesz
and the Conservative Party both displaced far right parties: Fidesz by appropriating far right
positions and the Conservatives by “getting Brexit done.” But while the Conservative Party
has used an “us-versus-them” narrative mainly to attack European elites and not marginalized
groups, Fidesz has been far more extreme in its appeals (Enyedi 2016); Figure 5 shows that it has
become intensely TAN since 2010. As part of their transformation, both parties purged moderate
members and quieted internal party debate. In the United Kingdom, deep divisions inside the
Conservative Party in a plurality electoral system created the opportunity for an ethnopopulist
takeover similar to the takeover of the Republican Party in the United States (Hobolt 2016). In
neither case does the incumbent’s large parliamentary majority reflect voter preferences: In the
United Kingdom, the first-past-the-post system twinned with opposition fragmentation caused by
the pro-Brexit position of the Labour Party leadership amplified the results for the Conservative
Party; in Hungary, the fixing of the playing field in conditions of democratic backsliding boosted
the results for Fidesz.
Poland and Austria: Far Right Parties That Also Become Ethnopopulist Parties
In Poland and Austria, longstanding far right parties that embrace ethnopopulist appeals have
benefited from a rise in support over the last decade, boosted especially by the 2015 refugee
crisis. Figures 7 and 8 show that the structure of party competition has been fairly stable in both
countries since 2010 but with growing polarization on the cultural dimension.
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2010
TAN–GALposition
Left–Right economic position
Hungarian parliamentary party positions
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
2019
Vote share
10
20
30
40
EU position
Favors
Opposes
MSZPMSZP
Fidesz−KDNPFidesz−KDNP
JOBBIKJOBBIK
LMPLMP
DKDK
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
MSZPMSZP
FIDESZFIDESZ
KDNPKDNP
JOBBIKJOBBIK
LMPLMP
Figure 5
Parliamentary party positions in 2010 and 2019 in Hungary. For each party, the TAN–GAL cultural position
is plotted against the left–right economic position. Data are from the 2010 and 2019 rounds of the Chapel
Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). Abbreviations: DK, Democratic Coalition; Fidesz-KDNP,
Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union Christian Democratic People’s Party; JOBBIK, Jobbik-Movement for a
Better Hungary; LMP, Politics Can Be Different; MSZP, Hungarian Socialist Party; TAN–GAL, traditional,
authoritarian, nationalist–green, alternative, libertarian.
In Poland, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) won the elections in both 2015 and 2019. Similar to
Fidesz in Hungary, PiS’s time in government has made it more exclusionary—more nativist, racist,
sexist, and homophobic—in its ethnopopulist conception of the true and deserving Polish people
(Fomina & Kucharczyk 2016). Like Fidesz, PiS has deepened polarization in society (Tworzecki
2019) and vilified opposition parties, civic groups, minorities, journalists, and many others as “enemies
of the people.” It has delivered policies on the cultural right in support of traditional values
but also on the economic left in the form of nativist welfare policies that are consistent with the
preferences of its voters (Stanley 2019). While PiS is sometimes classified as a conservative party,
Figure 7 shows that it takes positions that are as intensely TAN as the Austrian Freedom Party
and the League in Italy. In contrast to the Hungarian party system, the Polish party system includes
several opposition parties with heterogeneous positions on both the economic left–right
and the cultural GAL–TAN dimensions. These opposition parties have cooperated against the
ruling ethnopopulist party more effectively than opposition parties in Hungary or the United
Kingdom—and they have challenged more robustly the power of PiS, despite the severe erosion
of liberal democratic institutions by PiS governments (Blackington & Vachudova 2020).
In Austria, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) stands out as a long-established far right party
that was swept into government, briefly, during the recent populist wave. Figure 8 shows that
the party system in Austria is polarized on the cultural GAL–TAN dimension in a durable way.
The dominant conservative party in Austria, the People’s Party (ÖVP), has long been torn between
moderation and pro-EU positions, on the one hand, and traditional values and strong antiimmigration
positions, on the other. In terms of party strategy, the ÖVP has been pulled between
governing across the center with pro-European and GAL parties, on the one hand, and competing
for votes and governing with the more intensely TAN and Euroskeptic FPÖ, on the other. The
FPÖ gained prominence as an antistatist party protesting the “grand coalition government and
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EU position
Favors
Opposes
Neutral
Vote share
10
20
30
40
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
2010
TAN–GALposition
Left–Right economic position
British party positions
2019
EU position
CONSCONS
LABLAB
LIBDEMLIBDEM
SNPSNP
PLAIDPLAID
GREENGREEN
UKIPUKIP
BNPBNP
CONSCONS
LABLAB
LIBDEMLIBDEM
GREENGREEN
SNPSNP
PLAIDPLAID
UKIPUKIP
BREXITBREXIT
Figure 6
Parliamentary party positions in 2010 and 2019 in the United Kingdom. For each party, the TAN–GAL cultural position is plotted
against the left–right economic position. Anti-EU parties not in parliament are included. Data are from the 2010 and 2019 rounds of
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). Abbreviations: BNP, British National Party; BREXIT, Brexit Party; CONS,
British Conservative Party; GREEN, Green Party; LAB, Labour Party; LIBDEM, Liberal Democratic Party; PLAID, Party of Wales;
SNP, Scottish National Party; UKIP, United Kingdom Independence Party; TAN–GAL, traditional, authoritarian, nationalist–green,
alternative, libertarian.
its clientelist practices” and later added strong xenophobic and anti-immigrant appeals (Kitschelt
2002, p. 185). In 2018, the ÖVP formed a coalition with the FPÖ, as it had done previously in
2000. But unlike in 2000, the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition was not condemned by Austria’s EU partners—
a sign of Europe’s changing political landscape (Mudde 2019, p. 138). In power, the FPÖ put a
strong stamp on policy making with aggressive anti-immigrant and anti-Islam policies that fit well
with the ÖVP’s own agenda. But the coalition was short-lived, as two of the peculiarities of today’s
far right—criminal dealings for personal and party gain and strong affinity to Russia—came on
full display in the so-called Ibiza affair, along with the more longstanding problems of professional
incompetence (Art 2011).
Italy: A New Left Populist Party and an Ethnopopulist Party
In contrast to Austria, the differences between Italy’s party system in 2010 and in 2019 are striking.
Figure 9 shows the birth of a powerful, left populist party, the Five Star Movement, and a jump in
contestation and polarization on the cultural dimension. The Five Star Movement is a new antiestablishment
political force calling for internet-based democratic participation by the people. It
is difficult to categorize: scholars argue that it falls somewhere between an inclusionary and an exclusionary
conception of the people (Font et al. 2021). Since 2015, the longstanding far right and
strongly TAN party called the League (formerly Northern League) has gained prominence and
electoral strength under a charismatic new leader, Matteo Salvini. While differing on inclusion
and on immigration, the League and the Five Star Movement both take strong antiestablishment
positions that include opposition to the European Union (Ivaldi et al. 2017, Verbeek et al. 2018).
Following the 2018 elections, the victorious Five Star Movement formed a government with the
League, whose electoral share had jumped to 17%. But like the ethnopopulist FPÖ in Austria,
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0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
2010
TAN–GALposition
Left–Right economic position
Polish parliamentary party positions
2019
Vote share
10
20
30
40
EU position
Favors
OpposesSLDSLD
POPO
PiSPiS
PSLPSL
SDPLSDPL
SLDSLD
POPO
PiSPiS
PSLPSL
NowoNowo
KonfederacjaKonfederacja
LewicaLewica
WiosnaWiosna
Figure 7
Parliamentary party positions in 2010 and 2019 in Poland. For each party, the TAN–GAL cultural position
is plotted against the left–right economic position. Data are from the 2010 and 2019 rounds of the Chapel
Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). Abbreviations: Konfederacja, Confederation Liberty and
Independence; Lewica, Left Together; Nowo, Modern; PiS, Law and Justice Party; PO, Civic Platform; PSL,
Polish People’s Party; SDPL, Social Democracy of Poland; SLD, Democratic Left Alliance; Wiosna, Spring;
TAN–GAL, traditional, authoritarian, nationalist–green, alternative, libertarian.
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
2010
TAN–GALposition
Left–Right economic position
Austrian parliamentary party positions
2019
Vote share
10
20
30
EU position
Favors
Opposes
SPÖSPÖ
ÖVPÖVP
FPÖFPÖ
GruneGrune
LIF/NEOSLIF/NEOS
SPÖSPÖ
ÖVPÖVP
FPÖFPÖ
GruneGrune
BZÖBZÖ
Figure 8
Parliamentary party positions in 2010 and 2019 in Austria. For each party, the TAN–GAL cultural position
is plotted against the left–right economic position. Data are from the 2010 and 2019 rounds of the Chapel
Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). Abbreviations: BZÖ, Alliance for the Future of Austria; FPÖ,
Freedom Party; Grune, Greens; LIF/NEOS, New Austria and Liberal Forum; ÖVP, People’s Party; SPÖ,
Social Democratic Party; TAN–GAL, traditional, authoritarian, nationalist–green, alternative, libertarian.
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0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
2010
TAN–GALposition
Left–Right economic position
Italian parliamentary party positions
2019
Vote share
10
20
30
EU position
Favors
Opposes
LNLNUDCUDC
PDLPDL
SVPSVP
IDVIDV
PDPD
MpAMpA
LNLN
RIRI
FIFI
SVPSVP
PDPD
SISI
FDI/CNFDI/CN
M5SM5S
Figure 9
Parliamentary party positions in 2010 and 2019 in Italy. For each party, the TAN–GAL position is plotted
against the left–right economic position. Data are from the 2010 and 2019 rounds of the Chapel Hill Expert
Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). Abbreviations: FDI/CN, Brothers of Italy; FI, Forza Italia; IDV, Italy of
Values; LN, League (formerly Northern League); M5S, Five Star Movement; MpA, Movement for
Autonomies; PD, Democratic Party; PDL (People of Freedom, temporary name for Forza Italia); RI, Italian
Radicals; SI, Italian Left; SVP, South Tyrolean People’s Party; UDC, Union of the Center; TAN–GAL,
traditional, authoritarian, nationalist–green, alternative, libertarian.
the League overplayed its hand. A year later, the Five Star Movement formed a government instead
with the left-GAL Democratic Party and adopted more mainstream positions (Moschella &
Rhodes 2020). For its part, the League left a stamp on policy making with vicious policies against
dark-skinned migrants, and the party continues to broadcast racist and anti-immigration appeals
that resonate with a stable group of supporters that it shares with the small but rising, ideologically
similar, Brothers of Italy (FdI/CN) party. Ethnopopulist and antiestablishment parties are likely
to benefit from ongoing fragmentation and instability in Italy’s governing coalitions.
France: A New Centrist Populist Party Challenged from Many Sides
In France, as in Italy, the changes between 2010 and 2019 are impressive. Figure 10 shows the
fading of mainstream parties and the emergence of La République en Marche! (LREM), the
cosmopolitan, pro-European, technocratic party of President Emmanuel Macron. LREM is a
genuinely new political entity that was heralded as a lightly populist counterstrike to the far right
in France and across Europe. LREM faces populist challengers that take far left positions on
the economic dimension and those that take intensely TAN positions on the cultural dimension
(Figure 10). The vote share of the longtime far right party National Rally (formerly the National
Front) jumped to 8% in the 2017 elections, and its leader, Marine Le Pen, won 34% of the
vote in the second round of the presidential elections that year. While LREM won the 2017
legislative elections in a landslide, it has struggled to sustain popular support. Among many
reasons, Macron’s establishment background in combination with his strong cosmopolitan,
pro-EU positions may put him at a disadvantage; successful populists with similar backgrounds
such as Boris Johnson and Viktor Orbán have created antiestablishment credentials by pushing
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0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
2010
TAN–GALposition
Left–Right economic position
French parliamentary party positions
2019
Vote share
10
20
30
40
50
EU position
Favors
Opposes
PCFPCF
PSPS
PRGPRG
VERTSVERTS
UMPUMP
MPFMPF
MODEMMODEMNCNC PCFPCF
PSPS
VERTSVERTS
FN/RNFN/RN
MODEMMODEM
FIFI
DLFDLF
LREMLREM
Figure 10
Parliamentary party positions in 2010 and 2019 in France. For each party, the TAN–GAL cultural position is
plotted against the left–right economic position. Data are from the 2010 and 2019 rounds of the Chapel Hill
Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). Abbreviations: DLF, France Arise; FI, France Unbowed; LREM,
La République en Marche!; MODEM, Democratic Movement; MPF, Movement for France; NC, New
Center; PCF, Communist Party; PRG, Left Radical Party; PS, Socialist Party; RN, National Rally (formerly
FN, National Front); VERTS, Greens; UMP, Union for a Popular Movement; TAN–GAL, traditional,
authoritarian, nationalist–green, alternative, libertarian.
the Manichean us-versus-them narrative to the European and civilizational stage. Margulies
(2020) argues that LREM may be eclipsed by other socially liberal, cosmopolitan parties at the
next elections; the old socialist and green parties may even stage a comeback. Whether LREM
survives or not, competition on the cultural dimension as well as the economic dimension look
set to continue in the French party system (Gougou & Persico 2017).
Spain and Greece: New Left Populist Parties Tempered by Governing
In Spain and Greece, the financial crisis created a political opening for left populist parties to challenge
mainstream parties on the economic dimension. Figures 11 and 12 illustrate how parties
taking left positions on the economic dimension and inclusive GAL positions on the cultural dimension
have strengthened in both party systems between 2010 and 2019. Among the left-GAL
parties, Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece foreground antiestablishment rhetoric along populist
lines. While both rose to prominence as far left populist parties that were imagined by some
as a leftist revolution of representation in European politics, and by others as a threat to public
order and democracy, they have become fairly ordinary parties, in and out of government, with
strongly inclusive views (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014); unlike the Five Star Movement, they
explicitly emphasize the inclusion of outgroups such as refugees, migrants, and minorities (Font
et al. 2021).
In Spain, Podemos has always supported European integration. After the 2019 elections,
it joined a coalition government with the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party. Far right, antiimmigrant,
and anti-EU parties were virtually absent from the Spanish parliament until Vox broke
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0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
2010
TAN–GALposition
Left–Right economic position
Spanish parliamentary party positions
2019
Vote share
10
20
30
40
EU position
Favors
Opposes
PSOEPSOE
PPPP
IUIU
CiUCiU
PNVPNV
ERCERC
BNGBNG
CCCC
UPDUPD
PSOEPSOE
PPPP
IUIU
PNVPNV
ERC
BNGBNG
CCCC
EHBEHB
PodemosPodemos
CsCs
VoxVox
PaisPais
Figure 11
Parliamentary party positions in 2010 and 2019 in Spain. For each party, the TAN–GAL cultural position is
plotted against the left–right economic position. Data are from the 2010 and 2019 rounds of the Chapel Hill
Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). Abbreviations: BNG, Galician Nationalist Bloc; CC, Canarian
Coalition; CiU, Convergence and Unity; Cs, Citizens; EHB, Basque Country Unite; ERC, Republican Left
of Catalonia; IU, United Left; Pais, More Country; PNV, Basque Nationalist Party; Podemos, We Can; PP,
People’s Party; PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party; UPD, Union, Progress and Democracy; Vox, Voice;
TAN–GAL, traditional, authoritarian, nationalist–green, alternative, libertarian.
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
2010
TAN–GALposition
Left–Right economic position
Greek parliamentary party positions
2019
Vote share
10
20
30
40
EU position
Favors
Opposes
PASOKPASOK
NDND
SYRIZASYRIZA
KKEKKE
LAOSLAOS
PASOKPASOK
NDND
SYRIZASYRIZA
KKEKKE
KIDISOKIDISO
ELEL
MR25MR25
Figure 12
Parliamentary party positions in 2010 and 2019 in Greece. For each party, the TAN–GAL cultural position
is plotted against the left–right economic position. Data are from the 2010 and 2019 rounds of the Chapel
Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). Abbreviations: EL, Greek Solution; KIDISO, Movement of
Democratic Socialists; KKE, Communist Party of Greece; MR25, European Realistic Disobedience Front;
LAOS, Popular Orthodox Rally; ND, New Democracy; PASOK, Panhellenic Socialist Movement; SYRIZA,
Coalition of the Radical Left; TAN–GAL, traditional, authoritarian, nationalist–green, alternative,
libertarian.
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through in the 2019 elections with 15% of the vote, trading on opposition to the Catalan secessionist
movement.
In Greece, Syriza won power in the elections in 2015 and governed with a small coalition partner
until 2019. Syriza’s time in office was defined by its transformation from an antiestablishment
party to a pro-European governing party forced to implement difficult austerity measures orthogonal
to its left populist platform as part of the third EU bailout of Greece (Katsanidou & Otjes
2015). While Syriza lost to the conservative New Democracy party, the 2019 elections confirmed
Syriza as a durable player in the Greek party system and also demonstrated a seamless transfer
of power from left populist rule (Kyriazi 2019). Unlike Italy, Greece has no strong ethnopopulist
party, even though it continues to face the challenge of caring for large numbers of migrants
arriving by sea; the combined vote share of far right parties has hovered around only 7% over
the last decade. While in office, Syriza did transform regional politics by negotiating the Prespa
Agreement with neighboring North Macedonia, which appeared to cost it votes in the 2019 elections
(Kyriazi 2019). Previous Greek governments had used a dispute over the name for domestic
political gain for more than two decades at great harm to the prospects for democracy and EU
membership for North Macedonia.
POPULISM AND THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY: VERTICAL
REPRESENTATION, YES; HORIZONTAL CHECKS, NO
We have surveyed evidence that the rise of populist parties has shaped political competition in
a variety of ways. What about the relationship between populism and the quality of democracy?
Scholars have hypothesized that populist parties can both improve and degrade democracy and
that the impact depends on the position and the ideology of the parties. On the one hand, populist
parties may boost participation and representation by invoking the direct, vertical representation
of the people. They may rally citizens to mobilize for causes that they care about, such as fighting
corruption, and inspire more individuals to participate in the political arena. They may also provide
an important voice for ordinary people in times of economic and political crisis (Stavrakakis
& Katsambekis 2014). The data suggest that populist parties do boost participation and improve
vertical representation, especially if they contest elections but remain in the opposition and if they
belong to the political left wing ( Juon & Bochsler 2020). Left-wing populist parties with an inclusive
conception of the people may also have a positive impact on minority rights (Huber &
Schimpf 2017).
On the other hand, populist parties may have a negative impact on horizontal checks and balances
and on the fairness of political competition. While parties that use populist appeals are not
all led by aspiring authoritarians (Bonikowski 2017), on the global level the data suggest a propensity
for undermining democratic institutions. Scholars argue that government by populists across
the ideological spectrum is associated with weakening institutional safeguards such as the rule of
law and state transparency ( Juon & Bochsler 2020; see also Haggard & Kaufman 2021, Huber
& Schimpf 2017). Populist parties across the board question the competence and the integrity of
mainstream parties and conceptualize the elite as a separate “caste” whose interests are at odds
with those of the people (Ivaldi et al. 2017). By presenting themselves as the only legitimate and
trustworthy representatives of the people, populist parties signal a tension with one of the anchors
of liberal democracy—competition among political parties on a level political playing field. At the
European level, however, the data suggest a striking difference: While time in government has
transformed left populist parties Syriza, Podemos, and the Five Star Movement into more ordinary
democratic parties, it does not appear to have had a similar tempering effect on ethnopopulist
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parties. Indeed, it is specifically ethnopopulist parties in power that have undermined democratic
institutions over the last decade in Europe.
ETHNOPOPULISM AND DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING IN EUROPE
The greatest impact of populism on party systems in Europe may not be the rise of new parties,
new issues, and new divisions; it may be changes to the playing field where political competition
takes place (Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018). Focusing on the choices of political leaders in power,
one of the fastest-growing literatures in comparative politics today is on democratic backsliding
(Waldner & Lust 2018) at the hands of incumbents who erode liberal democratic institutions in
order to amplify their power. Democratic backsliding is defined by Bermeo (2016, p. 5; emphasis
original) as “the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain
an existing democracy” and by Waldner & Lust (2018, p. 95) as a “deterioration of qualities
associated with democratic governance.” Around the globe, “authoritarian populism” (Norris &
Inglehart 2019) has been associated with democratic backsliding and constitutional engineering
(Stoyan 2020) by incumbents that position themselves on the economic left (Venezuela, Ecuador)
and, more often, on the cultural right (Turkey, India, Brazil, Israel, the United States) (see also
Pappas 2019). Art (2020) argues, however, that populism is not the defining feature of parties
engaging in authoritarian practices, and that studies attributing backsliding to the rise of global
populism are therefore misleading.
In Europe, democratic backsliding over the past decade has been the work of incumbent parties
in postcommunist Europe that take antiestablishment and TAN positions and use strong
ethnopopulist appeals (Vachudova 2020). As a consequence of Fidesz rule since 2010, Hungary
is now an authoritarian regime. In Poland, PiS has been in power since 2015 and has dramatically
eroded liberal democracy. In the Czech Republic, coalition governments led by the ANO party,
which presents itself as an anticorruption, technocratic, liberal party, have captured state administration
and policy making for oligarchic and criminal interests (Bustikova & Guasti 2019, Hanley
& Vachudova 2018, Havlík 2019). Scholars point to variations on ethnopopulism and democratic
erosion in other postcommunist EU states as well (among many, Barton Hronešová 2021, Džanki´c
& Keil 2017, Lorenz & Anders 2021, Zankina 2016). This raises many new puzzles that I group
into four broad areas of inquiry: How do incumbents justify backsliding? What methods do they
use to amass power? What do they deliver for their voters? And how do we measure whether and
how much backsliding has taken place? In this section, I briefly look at each in turn.
Justification
Ethnopopulist parties argue for a majoritarian conception of democracy that reflects the will of
the people. The logic of majoritarian democracy, also embraced by the radical right, helps justify
democratic backsliding in two critical ways. First, it privileges the will of the deserving people over
the rights of minorities (Canovan 1999)—and therefore tends to be accompanied by the vilification
of groups that challenge traditional values, including women and members of the LGBTQ
community.3
Second, it portrays the ethnopopulist incumbents as the sole protectors of the
interests of the real people against the predatory elite. Partisanship elicited by ethnopopulist and
3Some opposition parties who use ethnopopulist appeals in Western Europe,however,vow to defend the rights
of women and members of the LGBTQ community in the face of purported threats from Muslim immigrants
(see Lancaster 2020).
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authoritarian parties can be so intense that the rule of rival parties is understood as devastating—a
threat that justifies democratic backsliding even for citizens who otherwise support democratic
institutions (Svolik 2019). The use of Manichean language helps legitimize policy decisions
(Bartha et al. 2020) as well as maneuvers to keep allegedly dangerous opposition elites out of
power at all costs (Grzymala-Busse 2019b, Müller 2017). Ethnopopulists in Poland and Hungary
have amplified this point in quite an extraordinary way, claiming that in 1989, opposition forces
betrayed the nation by colluding with the communists. Therefore, it is not enough to keep the
opposition out of office; incumbents must be given extraordinary power in order to undo this
historic mistake and finally rid the country of communism (Kubik & Bernhard 2014). This is
accepted by the base even though, ironically, the Fidesz and PiS governments use many of the
same methods to control the polity—and to fuse the party with the state—that the communist
regimes used before 1989 (Ekiert 2020, Enyedi 2020, Sadurski 2019, Scheppele 2013). Indeed, as
they use the control of information to construct alternate realities for their followers, ethnopopulists
more broadly appear to share remarkable resilience in the face of hypocrisy (Vachudova
2020).
Methods
Incumbents intent on amplifying and extending their power through democratic backsliding have
used a broad array of similar methods. Vachudova (2020) shows that in Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech Republic, parties that won power using a playbook of ethnopopulist appeals have drawn
on a companion playbook for eroding democratic institutions. Incumbents use the logic of majoritarian
democracy to justify moves to control the policy-making process; to exclude experts
and civil society actors (Bartha et al. 2020); to eliminate independent media; and to control the
cultural, academic, artistic, and economic life of the country. They use state-funded media, domestic
groups, and institutions—ministries, museums, historical institutes, universities, and cultural
institutions—to spread illiberal narratives throughout society (Enyedi 2020,Greskovits 2020,
Grzymala-Busse 2019b, Sadurski 2019). They set about dismantling liberal democracy because, at
its heart, ethnopopulism is a strategy to end political turnover and expand opportunities for rentseeking.
As Waldner & Lust (2018, p. 110) argue, incumbents are “no longer satisfied playing
strictly by the rules, losing gracefully, and competing again in the next round.”
Incumbents also abolish constraints on rent-seeking and capture parts of the economy to amplify
their political power (Magyar 2016, Ádám 2019), even though, ironically, they win elections
by using strong anticorruption appeals. What merits more study is how ethnopopulist parties purposefully
conflate neoliberal economic policies with liberal democracy. They argue against liberalism
as such while signaling that moving away from neoliberal economic policies also necessitates
dismantling liberal democracy. Meanwhile, they continue many neoliberal policies (Bohle &
Greskovits 2019) and enrich themselves by adjusting taxes, eliminating environmental safeguards,
rejecting climate science, and cutting or changing regulations to benefit their own businesses.
An additional source of power has been the learning and mutual aid that have taken place
among ethnopopulist regimes on the European and world stages. For years, the positions of political
parties in the EU East were “tempered” by the leverage of the EU (Vachudova 2005, 2008),
but now the tables have turned: Ethnopopulist incumbents protect one another from sanctions
for violating EU rules and values and trade favors with authoritarian regimes intent on scuttling
EU policy making (Kelemen 2020, Meunier & Vachudova 2018). Whereas far right parties focused
historically on hatreds of adjoining nations, today’s ethnopopulists have identified a flexible
cast of common enemies centered on Islam, international institutions, the LGBTQ community
and cosmopolitan elites—and a common set of friends, such as the Trump administration and the
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Putin regime, that have supported ethnopopulist and far right parties across Europe (Enyedi 2020,
Orenstein 2019).
Benefits
What have incumbents been able to deliver to their voters? Fidesz and PiS have combined
ethnopopulist appeals on the cultural right with positions in favor of redistribution and welfare
chauvinism on the economic left. Like the FPÖ and the League, in power they have delivered
on intense rhetoric and policies opposing immigration by people of color and also, more variably,
supporting what they call traditional values. They have also joined far right parties across Europe
in embracing nativist welfare policies that cater to working-class voters angered by inequality
and opposed to immigration (Gingrich & Häusermann 2015, Magni 2020, Rovny & Polk 2020).
In power, Fidesz and PiS have offered targeted, demography-oriented social policies to support
traditional families and strengthen those whom they identify as the people. The PiS and Fidesz
governments can afford to buy votes with generous child payments (Grzebalska & Kováts 2018),
but only in Poland have they reduced poverty and inequality, while in Hungary such payments are
“welfare for the wealthy” (Szikra 2018).
Measurement
A challenge for scholars is how to measure whether and how intensively democratic backsliding
is taking place. The quest for more power is perhaps universal among incumbents, so where do
normal political behaviors end and backsliding maneuvers begin? Waldner & Lust (2018) explore
existing indicators of regime type and explain why they are ill suited for measuring regime change.
Scheppele (2013) shows, for example, how Fidesz managed for years to implement many reforms
that appeared acceptable in isolation—and hardly moved various indices—but together added up
to the elimination of liberal democracy. Haggard & Kaufman (2021) compare and graph backsliding
using different indices and highlight the strengths of the Varieties of Democracy data set
(Coppedge et al. 2020). Some scholars argue for a dichotomous measure of backsliding based on
the presence or absence of formal institutional changes in order to prevent conceptual stretching
(Bakke & Sitter 2020). Others argue for a continuous measure of democratic backsliding that
takes into account a broader set of changes to the polity (Haggard & Kaufman 2021, Vachudova
2020). These changes may include the erasures of informal norms—for example, the end of transparency
and representation for opposition parties in state or state-funded bodies (Dimitrova 2018,
Grzymala-Busse 2019b). They may also include more clandestine measures such as the cooptation
of the civil service, the judiciary, the police, the media, and regulatory bodies for the benefit of
oligarchic and criminal interests (Hanley & Vachudova 2018). They may even stem from speech—
from the statements of elected or appointed officials that brand opposition politicians as enemies
or that demonize groups of citizens based on their gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and religion
in ways that are likely to undermine the fundamental liberal democratic principle of equal
protection under the law (Vachudova 2020).
CONCLUSION
Party systems in many European states have changed substantially over the last decade as populist
parties on the economic left, in the center, and on the cultural right have animated political
competition on the economic and the cultural dimensions. Mainstream parties have declined,
polarization has increased, and competition on the cultural dimension has intensified or even
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become dominant. New left and center populist parties have upended existing structures of
competition in some of the eight cases I have surveyed. However it is not political outsiders
but longstanding conservative and far right parties, remodeled using ethnopopulism, that have
been the most fateful for the substance of political competition and the trajectory of domestic
politics.
The positions that populist parties on the cultural right and the economic left have taken over
the last decade in Europe are profoundly different in many respects—especially in whether they
adopt an inclusionary conception of the people or an exclusionary one that trades on scapegoating
marginalized groups. What is even more striking is how differently they have governed, indicating
that varieties of populism should shape our expectations of what happens when populists rule.
In power, left populist parties have drifted to the ordinary, sometimes even shedding antisystem
and anti-EU positions. In contrast, ethnopopulist parties have dismantled democratic institutions
in order to concentrate power and prevent turnover. Hungary is now an authoritarian regime,
keen to help likeminded incumbents follow a similar path. Orbán challenges the legitimacy of
the European Union by seeking to decouple it from liberal democracy and to disrupt internal
and foreign policy decisions in exchange for favors from other authoritarian regimes (Meunier &
Vachudova 2018). It remains to be seen whether 2021 will bring a change of international fortune
as ethnopopulist incumbents lose the support of Washington and face a greater determination by
EU leaders to sanction democratic backsliding.
Across Europe, ethnopopulist parties with similar electoral campaigns have seen a rise in popularity,
indicating that the substance of political contestation in the east and the west is converging
in some ways. However, while Brexit must be acknowledged as a form of backsliding in its own
right (McEwan 2020), backsliding has otherwise taken place almost entirely in the east. Postcommunism
has been theorized as a “background vulnerability” (Waldner & Lust 2018) associated
with democratic backsliding. Can we attribute this to different attitudes among postcommunist
citizens or to other legacies flowing from the communist or precommunist past? Once aspiring
authoritarians take power, they work to fix the political playing field in their favor if they have
the opportunity (Bakke & Sitter 2020). Are postcommunist incumbents better versed at capturing
the state, or are postcommunist democratic institutions simply weak and easy to dismantle?
While we might expect that if the FPÖ in Austria or the League in Italy won a parliamentary majority,
they would wish to follow the same playbook as Fidesz in Hungary and PiS in Poland, we
might ask what keeps them from obtaining such a majority and also whether, if they did, domestic
institutions would fare better in repelling the attack.
Europe’s third shock in two decades, the coronavirus crisis, is now shaping party systems across
Europe. In states where backsliding is already taking place, early evidence indicates that the pandemic
is strengthening the hand of the incumbents who are dismantling democracy (Ádám 2020,
Bustikova & Baboš 2020). Across Europe, however, a severe economic downturn, lower immigration,
and greater demand for competent government may push party competition away from
the cultural dimension and back to issues on the economic dimension. When economies recover,
better welfare states, investment in education, more market regulation, ambitious policies to fight
climate change, and increasing international coordination may yet strengthen the advanced capitalist
democracies that, Iversen & Soskice (2020) argue, have historically been very resilient and
continue to show great promise.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The author is not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might
be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank Courtney Blackington, Lenka Bustikova, Catherine de Vries, Seth Jolly, Tim Haughton,
Hanna Kleider, Gary Marks, and Martin Naunov, as well as anonymous reviewers, for very helpful
comments on earlier versions. I also thank Courtney Blackington for excellent research assistance.
I am grateful for the insights of participants at conferences and seminars at the European University
Institute, King’s College London and Princeton University and to members of the Chapel
Hill Expert Survey (CHES) team.
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