I no 3.4 Constructivism Uwe Flick --■----------------------*----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 1 introduction Jj 88 2 What is constructivism? 88 3 Epistemological assumptions on the nature of social reality 89 4 Construction of knowledge 89 5 Scoal scientific knowledge as a social construction 90 6 Mimesis and world-making in texts 91 7 Constructivism and qualitative research 93 1 INTRODUCTION The construction of social reality 1$ booming as a topic. l*'oi almost all areas of social scientific research there are monographs or collections In which a constructivist approach Is selected: ön socialization (Grundmann 1999), health and Illness (Gawatz and Nowak 1993; Lachmund arid Stollberg 1992); on technological change (Flick 1996); or transsexuality (Hirschauei 1993) lo name but a few. Scientific Findings are also generally treated as social construction (e.g. Latour and Woolgar 1979), which has led to bitter controversies (cf. the debates resulting from Sokal 1996). Hacking (1999) desperately asks 'the social construction of What?'. With regard to qualitative research, consiructlvist Ideas (such as Schulz 1962 or Berger and Luckmann 1966) have been the basis for a variety of methods. Ovei the course of lime, however, little attention has htm paid to these ideas in qualitative research. At present interest In consiructlvist Ideas is again on the increase (e.g. Mick 2002: ch.-1; T. Sutter 1997). 2 WHAT 15 CONSTRUCTIVISM? A number of programmes with differed! departure points are subsumed under the label 'Constructivism'. What is common to all consiructlvist approaches is that they examine the relationship to reality by dealing with constructive processes In approaching it. Examples of constructions are to be found at different levels. 1 In the tradition of Jean Plaget (1937), cognl-' tion, perception of the world and knowledge about it are seen as constructs. Radical constructivism (Glasersfeld 199S) takes this thought to the point where every foim of cognition, because of the neurobiologies! process involved, has direct access only to images of the world and of reality, but not of both. Luhmann (1990a) relates these Ideas to systemic perspectives in order to use them as the basis for a social theory (1997). 2 Social constructivism in the tradition of Schütz (1962), Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Gergen (198S, 1999) enquires after the social conventionalizations, perception and knowledge in everyday life. 3 ConstructIvist sociology of science In the tradition of Fleck (1935/1979). the present-day 'laboratory-constructivisť research (Knorr-Cetina 1981; Latour and Woolgar 1979), seeks to establish how social, historical, local, pragmatic and other factors influence scientific discovery in such a way that scientific facts may be regarded as social constructs ('local products'). (On the distinctions between these different variants of constructivism cf. Knorr-Cetina 1989.) Constructivism Is not a unified programme, but Is developing In parallel fashion In a number of disciplines: psychology, sociology, philosophy, neurobiology, psychiatry and Information science. In what follow* we shall deal briefly with the first two of the three levels we have presented here from the point of view of what is relevant to qualitative research. The empirical programme of (laboratory)'Constructivism has not so far been applied to qualitative research. The following sections are guided by the idea that constructivism is concerned with how knowledge arises, what concept of knowledge is appropriate and what criteria can be invoked in the evaluation of knowledge. For qualitative research this is doubly relevant since, like all research, it engenders knowledge and therefore (at least very often) looks empirically at specific forms of knowledge - for example, biographical, expert or everyday knowledge. 3 EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS ON THE NATURE OF SOCIAL REALITY Alfred Schütz has already claimed that facts only become relevant through their meanings and interpretations: Strictly speaking there arc no such things as facts pure and simple. All facts arc from the outset selected from a universal context by the activities of our mind. There are, therefore, always interpreted facts, either facts looked at as detached from their context by an artificial abstraction or factj considered in their particular setting. In either case, they carry along their interptetational inner and outer horizon. (Schütz 1962: 5) A considerable part of the criticism of constructivism is devoted to the questions of the approach to reality, and it Is for this reason that Mltterer (1999: 486) Insists 'no kind of constructivism is of the opinion that "everything Is constructed"'. Glasersfeld (1992: 30) underlines the point: 'radical constructivism irr no way denies an external reality'. On the other hand, the various types of constructivism, from Schütz to Glasersfeld, do question whether external reality is directly accessible - that is to say, independent of perceptions and concepts CONSTRUCTIVISM (a») that we use and construct. Perception is seen not as a passive-receptive process of representation but as an active-constnictive process of production. This has consequences for the question whether a representation (of reality, a process or an object) can be verified for its correctness against the 'original'. This form of vcrifiability, however, is questioned by constructivism, since an original is only accessible through different representations or constructions. And so the different representations or constntctions can only be compared with one another. For constructivist epistemology, and empirical research based on it, knowledge and the constructions it contains become the relevant means of access to the objects with which they are concerned. 4 CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE Taking three main authors we may clarify how the genesis of knowledge and its functions may be described from a constructivist viewpoint. 1 Schütz (1962: S) begins with this premise: 'All our knowledge of the world. In common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, Involves constructs, i.e. a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations and idealizations, specific to the relevant level of thought organization,' For Schütz, every form of knowledge is constructed by selection and structuring. The individual forms differ according to the degree of structuring and idealization, and this depends on their functions - more concrete as the basis of everyday action or more abstract as a model in the construction of scientific theories. Schütz enumerates different processes which have in common that the formation of knowledge of the world is not to be understood as the simple portrayal of given facts, but that the contents are constructed in a process of active production. 2 Tliis interpretation is developed further in radical constructivism, whose 'core theses' are formulated by Glasersfeld (1992: 30) as follows. I What we call 'knowledge' In no sense repre* sents a world that presumably exists beyond our contact with it. ... Constructivism, like pragmatism, leads to a modified concept of cognition/know I edge. Accordingly knowledge is related to the way in which we organize our experiential world. e A COMPANION ľO QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 2 Radical constructivism hi no sense denies an external reality. ... ' 3 Itadlcal constructivism agrees with Berkeley that it would be unreasonable to confirm the existence oi something that can/could not at some point be perceived. ... 'I Radical constructivism adopts Vico's fundamental idea that human knowledge is a human construct.... S Constructivism abandons the claim that cognition is true' in the sense that it reflects objective reality. Instead it only requires that knowledge must be viable, in the sense that it should fit into the ixperientlal world of the one who knows ...T Seen in this way, knowledge organizes experiences thai first permit cognition ot the world beyond the experiencing subject or organism. Experiences are structured and understood through concepts and contexts that are constructed by this subject. Whether the picture that is lormed in this way is true or correct cannot be determined. But its quality may be assessed through its viability, that is, the extent to which the picture or model permits the subject to find its way and to act in the world. Here an important point of orientation is the question of how the 'construction of concepts' functions (Glasersfeld 199S: 76-88). 3 For social constructionism the processes of social interchange in the genesis of knowledge take on a special significance, and in particular the concepts that are used. In Mils sense Gergen formulates the following 'assumptions for a social constructionism'. TTic terms by which we account (or the world and ourselves are not dictated by the stipulated objects ot such accounts__The terms and forms by which we achieve understanding of t lie world and ourselves arc social artefacts, products of historically and culturally situated Interchanges among people ... . The degree to which a given account of the world or self is sustained across time is nor dependent on the objective validity of the account but on the vicissitudes ol social processes ... . language derives Its significance in human affairs from the way In whjch U functions within patterns of relationship ... . To appraise existing forms of discourse Is to evaluate patterns of cultural life; such evaluations give voice to other cultural enclaves. (Geigen 1994; 4911.) Knowledge Is constructed in processes of social interchange; it is basal on the role of language Construction of concept a and knowlndgn nrr World of experience Natural and social environment Events Activities Interpretation Understanding Attribution of meaning Figur« 3.4.1 Construction and Interpretation as moans of access to the world of e x per I one* in such relationships, and It has above all social functions. The eventualities of the social processes Involved have an influence on what will survive as a valid or uselul explanation. In accordance with these three construcllvKt positions, our access to the world of experience -the natural and social environment and the experiences and activities it contains - operates through the concepts constructed by the perceiving subject and the knowledge deriving from these. These are then used to-interpret experiences, or to understand and attribute meanings (see Figure í.4.1). The ideas of radical and social constructivism relate to cognition ami knowledge in general but not (or only in specific ways) to scientific cognition. In particular, for radical constructivism there Is as yet no translation of the basic ideas into a conceptualization of empirical lesearch (the first guidelines were presented by Schmidt 1998). Mere the focus should be on the importance of constructivism for research, and especially qualitative research. What remains to be clarified is the relationship between knowledge and research (sec section S) and the links between the world ot experience and constructs, between constructs and interpretations, and between interpretations and the world of experience {see section ó). 5 SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION Foi the soi l.il si lem irs Si huti" assumes thai Ihell knowledge starts from everyday understanding: 'The thought objects constructed by social scientists refer to, and are founded upon, thought objects constructed by Ihe common-sense thought oi ,nan "vm8 m nls everyday life iinong l''* 'c"ow mcn' (1962: 6). Social sclen-tllic knowledge is developed on the basis of preexisting everyday knowledge and socially constructed through Ihis developmental process. The main idea is the distinction that Schütz makes between constructs of the first and second degree: 'the constructs of social science are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, that is, constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene'. Accordingly Schütz holds that 'the exploration of the general principles according to which man in daily life organises his experiences, and especially those of the social world, is the first task of the methodology of the social sciences' (1962: 59). For Sehnt/, everyday knowledge and cognition become the basis on which the social scientist develops a more strongly formalized anil generalized 'version of the world' (Goodman 1978). Schutz (1962: 208(f.), therefore, assumes 'multiple realities', of which the world of science represents only one, which is, in part, organized according to different principles compared to the everyday world. Social scientific research becomes a kind of research that, on the basis of pre-existing everyday constructs, constructs another version of the world. Its results - the knowledge and objective meanings that It produces - are social constructs in the everyday world thai Is under investigation and, by extension, constructs in scientific analyses. Schütz'S Ideas were further developed for sociology by Berger and l.uckniaim (1966) and have subsequently exerted a strong Influence, particularly on biographical research (see 3.6, 3.7, 5.11) and on the development of ethnomethod-ology (see 2.3, 3.2, 5.17). Scientific knowledge as text Social scientific analyses are increasingly using the medium of text for their constructs: data are collected as text (for example. In the form of interviews, see 5.2), and processed and Interpreted as such (see 5.10, 5.21). Ultimately, all discoveries are presented in textual form (see 5.22). In concrete terms texl Is already partially used as a metaphor or a concept: from the 'world as a text' in general terms (Gar?, and Kraimcr 1994a) to the city as a text (Darnton 1989); life as a story (Bruiier 1990) to people and Identities as texts (Gcrgen 1988: Shotter and CONSTRUCTIVISM (91 Gergen 1989). A similar direction Is taken by Ideas that there Is no fundamental difference, at the level of modes ol experience, between Interpretations of texts, persons and artefacts (Dennett 1991), or that cognitive processes should first be analysed through the analysis of discourses, rather than memory and experiment (Edwards and Potter 1992; see 5.19). in all these approaches the contexts being investigated and the modes of action and experience are presumed to be in texts or are investigated in them. Social scientific constructs therefore often become textual constructs, linked in part to the idea that everyday constructs are textual constructs. This approach has found particular favour in the context of tin; postmodernist debate and Is related to the most recent developments of symbolic Interactionlsm (see 3.3) and the work of Denzln (see 2.7, S.7). If this thought is pursued further, it may be asked what processes of construction (SchUtz's first or second degree) or of world-maKIng (Goodman) are going on in the transformation of modes of action and experience into texts or at least textlike constructions. To answer ihis question we shall refer lo the concept of mimesis (cf. Gebauer and Wulf 1995), which will also give pointers for a social science working with texts. 6 MIMESIS AND WORLD-MAKING IN TEXTS Mimesis Is concerned with the representation of worlds - and In Aristotle this originally meanl natural worlds - In symbolic worlds. In Blumenberg (198T) this is discussed as 'the imitation of nature'. In the critical theory of Horkheimer and Adorno (1972) and Adorno (1973), the term was used as a counter-idea to the rationality of conceptual thinking in the context of an increasingly scientized world-view (cf. also Wellmer 1985). At present growing interest m/y be detected in a broader understanding of mimesis: 'Mimesis can therefore be used in a comprehensive way to mean representation' (Reck 1991: 65). As an example, the representation of natural Or social contexts In literary or dramatic texts or stage jietformances is often discussed: 'In this interpretation mimesis characterizes the act of prixluciing a symbolic world, which en coin passes both practical and theoretical elements' (Gebauer and VVulf 1995: 3). Current interest also focuses on Ihis 99 (m) a companion to qualitative Rf search COIKtpt oulsi.lr llli'MtiiK ,nul the lhc.Ui,' The debate ihemuinsmlnukliMAgcncnlpflndpl« nut on !"• used lo dtmonuiM.....idcntandlag of the world and texts ill.- individual assimilates riimu-li Of hriM-li i<< tin- world via mimetic processes Mimesis nuk« it possible tot Individuals lo step out "I t hem «Ives, todiaw Uieoutci svorld Into their Inntl World* and to lend expression lo thelt Inferiority, u produces an otherwise unattainable proximity to objects and is thus a necessary condition of understanding' ((Jebauei and Wulf 1995: 2-.1). In applying these considerations to the pro-duction and lune t kmín* i.»-.. ~ nl Mience and its texts mlmctii ■ rap Mntf CM1 !*• identified in the lOlliUMll,'. |il.ln-. III |hr I: .i i ■ ■ ■].■ ileiues mi.» n.uuiives, rf|M>rtt and so on by those undoi investigation,' In the construction Ol texts i»n this bUli ot) Ihr p.nl n) researchers, In (lien inteipretalion nl such constructs and. tlnally, in ll»- reflux 'íl mi, h interpretations into everyday contexts Pill ttihu ot science into everyday life is discussed more fully in the theory ol social lepresen unions i Moscovici 1984) or Malthes (1985). This means that social science has already contributed to determining and constructing the world it is Investigating by means ol its results - so long ej the**, -is individual results, can IKTICt lu themselves (he attention of a hroader publit (if. uhoQergetl 1973 for further iliM iission .it ihm hi this way IB interpretations and modes "i understanding igaln feed back mil) the model ol i ipestenoB. n»- fact ihat in this ; I mi. rpn lations arc ikx Kceptcd OlIťtOf-oni' Nm .ne u.nistormed in .u.otd.ui'«' with ihr rationalities of the everyday worM bas been ihOWT) In MosCOVtd 11961). on the reception <>i psychoanalysis, and utilization research (d Beck ind Uonß 1989, see 6.3) in a number ot dlöerenl cut studies. Mimmsis at a proctll A tnnttiil starting poltit to illustrate mimetic transformation pro* um In tbc production and reception <>l SOdal sdentllU texts may be tound In the Ideas ol Rlcoeui (1981a, \"M). He breaks down the iniiiieti, process, plliytnlly yet seriously', Into Hte llepS ol mimesis,, mimesis, and mimesis, Heroencutkv hnwrvn n.......tnrdwHh recon- itcuctlni u»- enun 11 apnadona <>y which practical expei I i«-s uu-it with «»^ authors, »»i leaden It wIN appeal Macorouery ■t Mír líni ut iiih m.iHMv Hut íl»' leader Is 'hat operilo........n...... I >^ ii>¥|i through ■Ititiin'iiiiirltuii.' i : mg the unity • a ihr navel from minn-ui, to immrm, by wayoi mimesis, fj.....Ul l*M S3) The understanding ol texts - and by extension ot social tealily - becomes an active ptocess of producing leallly In which not only the author of texts, or veislons of the world, is involved but also the person for whom these are produced and who 'reads' or understand! them. For Rlcoeui the three forms- of mimesis arc distinguishes! as follows The mimeli, transformation m the 'processing' ol experiences from I In- so, lal or natural enviK>iiiiient into textual constructs - Into concepts« knowledge or everyday stories to others, Into p.utUiilit typU <>l document during the production ol texts fOI NMlrCh purposes - Is always to be understood as ., process ot construction. According lo Kkoeui. mimesis: Is taking place hen Such Is the realm of minmu. between ihe antecedence and the descendance of the lextrAl ihis level mimesis may be defined at (he configuration of Adlon litis cuiiIíkiiijIIuii h £uverncd by a ichamitliaitnii wlilih I* lihluiu.illy structured in a tradition or Iriidltltinv and n w rxpiesied in individual WOrlB that stand m varying relation-ships to tlwcoMtralrusspMrattd bythisKhenu-•■<... BJcoew l«M The mUnetit ttansl.....utiofl ol '»ch texts in modes oi undent ii I nj ti i isfí nnation takes place in pioi esses ol the evciyday understanding ot nanatives, documents, books, newspajx'rs and soon, and in i \w scientific interpretation nt such nuntlvta, research documents or texts. Rlcoeui refers to this as mimesis,. It 'marks the intersection of the world Of text and the woild of the hearer or reader' 26). Finally, in the reflux ot Rich everyday and/or scienilík inteipiel.illous Into nuuU-sof action via prior undentandlni ol human action and social .......lur.il phenomena, mimesis, plays a tole: Wli.ilevei may lie III. U.llmol Ili.--.i- M.ul.s which lomehoa* ire i.......H ■ rtw Mlon we may jlv* tra i" ..... ■ i -i" word itor) [taken in tbss pn narrative wraei imiiks m out pre- undenlamlinK ltv.it «tlon is human I«» ttir extent th*t it iharastrnwi a lilt- »tmy dial desers-es lo be CONSTRUCTIVISM O '-I Conetruotlon ol concefris and knowledge Mi» h vMiiorti ol th« wo«kl U.......■■-. World ol e*perlorto» Natural eod lociol «nvwonnwnt Evente Axiivit-.» PrmmMJ Neea« Mimo9i6. M,-?-.,-,. Interpretation Understanding Ar. tibu i ion o I irijjn !'| »I........--.,-- iniii Mlmesli) Is thai pre-undentandlng ol whsl innii.ui KHon iv "i »s Mmintks, "l lymbollsm, ii- iimpoiallty fioni this pre-understandhiii whit h n common lo ivwls and their readers. .uiw's ttctlon, and with Union conies the second lorn '»i miniem which a textual and literary. (KKocui I98ia:20) AccoidinR to this view, which Ricoeur formulated to handle llteiary texts, mimetic processes can be lonml ai the following points in social tclenlllit iiinliTsiandlng as an interplay of con-slniiiioti .in,l the Interpretation of experiences [see Plgute I i ' ,.. bauet mil wuii (199S)explain that undei mruUni is I COtUtluctlVe process, by involving the person who understands, extends to under- itandlnf is i whole m social scientific rescan h IIua base this mi (iiHKinun's (1979) theory t>( dlfferenl modes ol world-making and the vet Doni ol the world thlt derive from this as a mull ol cognition! 'knowing in terms ot this model is a matter ol invention: modes of organization 'ate not tound in the world but built into the world"' iGebauer and Wulf 1995: 28». Gebauer and Wull discuss mimesis in processes of cognition In jtenerai terms. Ricoeur develops this concept lor processes of understanding in relation to literature m a manner that emerges without tlie narrow ami siiitt idea of the pot* n.ivai ol a given reality, ami without the con» ipondlng narrow concept ol reality and truth: 'Mimesis In this sense K ahead ol our concepts i refen ■" i the real end truth, it engenders a need as vet unfilled to think more' s • i s .lis i i,n in i I lii-y also lake place in tMCI ■ i. .. nul tin n l" m es- i) . onslni.tion ot te\ tUlllied and texliiab/able versions ol I he world which .ne thus rendered an essible to «>i lal iclem '■ Finally« they also ploy a role in the pro .luiiion ni texts im research purposes - for example, transcrtptSi reports or interpretations this Ida ol the mimetic process can aľ i i" l to a ty|>e ot design (se? 4.1) that is widespread m qualitative research- the reconstruction ol life-histories or IMographies (see 3.6. 3.7) in interviews (sec V2|. In this, narratis'cs (see S.I 11 aic considered to !«■ the appropriate form for the M'pre.eniaiion ot biographical experiences. i.:i. »-in i pirn i 'm supports the thesis ol ihs narrative or pn>nanattve quality of experience' With regard I0 íl»1 nitmctU rel.it ionst ii p iH-tiveen llle-hisloik's and niSnTtiveS Bnmei explains* that Ihr m.....mS between Ule Hi-called and (una I two BalC Nartattve imitates Itte. II ..... ■■ ii'ii.nivi- lire1 m thb sense b the same kimi ni coruttu "nu ni the humui li*njgjnafJon is .i nsrrstlve' Is " Ii oarutrueted t>y human beings tlinnigh ICtlvi rallocmution, by the same kind ul Mtt-ii in.nii'ii tliroviitlt which ivc construct nana-tivec When louieoiic tells yuu his lite... it Is alway-j a togiiillve aililevrineni rather ilun a duough tlie cleai-civstal «vital of someihing univocaUy given In thcend. u is a rasmthv acrn*s*ment. The« isno sikTi tturtK pssslioU^RJily Js life itsetľ U veiy least I n ľ- ■ lin'..ili»-srn«-i/ „| inntwrj KCSl' beyond thai n i untln| om -■ life is »n un i ■ • t.-.ii .iii.iu.-i IMTi 12 it. Seen m ihis wsy rha biographical narration ol one's own Uta M not a portrayal ol tactual lequences n becomes s mlrneth representation i Kpertences thai arc constructed morexen In one's Knowledge and mine s|»ecilicallv tot Mi purpose in the interview - in Ule foilll ol 4 13 52 10 08781 8 (m) a companion to qualitative hesearch a narrative. On the other hand, Ihe narrative provides a general framework within which experiences are oKlered, represented, evaluated and so on - In short, within which they ,ire experienced. The object that qualitative research is investigating (here) already has, in everyday life, the form In which it seeks to Investigate, construct and Interpret It. In the interview situation these everyday modes of interpretation and construction are used to allocate these experiences to a symbolic world - that of science and its texts. The experiences are then interpreted from within this world. Through reconstruct!ngalife by means of particular questions a version t)f the particular experiences is constructed and interpreted. The extent to which Ihe life and experiences actually occurred In ihe form reported cannot be checked, but It can be established what construction <>< both the narrailng subject is presenting, and also which version arises In the research situation. These experiences and the world in which they happened should ultimately be presented and seen in the representation of the results of this reconstruction in a specific way - perhaps in the form of a (new) theory {sec 2.1, 5.13. 6.6) with claims of validity. Mimetic processes create versions of the world which can then be understood and interpreted through qualitative research. Ricoeurš diífereni forms of mimesis and Schiit/'s distinction between everyday and scientific constructs provide further content for the framework that was set up by Goodman with his assumption of different versions of ihe world created by everyday, artistic and scientific modes of construction. For qualitative research construct!vist assumptions become relevant for the understanding of collected data - for example, biographies as constructs (cf. Bude 1984 for discussion}. Here vvc must ask whether qualitative research succeeds In gaining access to the constructs of the interview partner or the members of a research area. As may be shown in the case of objective hermeneutlcs (see S.16). constnictivist assumptions also become relevant for the critical analysis of procedure and methodological requirements (cf. Flick 2000a ior an application to this process of the Idea of mimesis outlined here), or In the sense of some further development (cf. T. Suiter 1997 on the linking of this approach or conversation analysis (see 5.17) to constructivism in the sense given in Luhmann 1990a). In more general terms we may ask. In Ihe sense of social scientific constructivism, what processes of decision-making belong to -ihr qualitative research process (see 4.1) and how they Influence the process of cognition and the desired results (cf. Flick 1995. 2002 for further discussion). Finally, constnictivist assumptions may be used as a starting point for the debate on the question of Justifying the validity of qualitative research (cf. Steinke 1999. and 4.7) - in particular, because the validity of knowledge and its determination are a major problem for radical constructivism which has to be dealt with under the key-word of the viability1 of knowledge, models, theories or discoveries (cf. Glasersfeld 1995). NOTES 1 Here the understanding of mimesis which Brunei develops, with releiciice to Aristotle and Itlcoeur, becomes relevant: 'mimesis was the capturing o( "life m action", an elaboiatlon and amelioration of what happened' (Bruner, 1990: 46). 'Mimesis is a kind of metaphor of reality. ... It refers to reality not in order to copy it but in order to give it a new reading* (Rlcoeur 1901b: 292-293). Mimetic processes can then be understood as a principle of the representation in everyday language of modes of action, events and situations, 'brought' by the latter into a communicable and intelligible version - foi Ihe subject and for others. 2 Viability means tluit knowledge or other constructions must show themselves to be useful and sustainable (capable of life) In the particular context ol use - they must tit and allow the individual to act and survive in the particular environment. Ibis does not mean (hat constructions must be tnie or contabi correct depictions: neither of these can be checked since they cannot be directly compared with the original. FURTHER READING Flick, U. (2002) An Introduction to Qualitative Research, 2nd edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Gergcn, K. J. (1994) Realities and Relationships. Soundings in Social Construction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Glasersfeld. E. von (1995) Radical Constructivism. A Way of Knowing and Learning. London; The Falmer Press.