-no-
4.2        Hypotheses and Prior Knowledge in Qualitative Research
Werner Meinefeld
1    Hypotheses in quantitative and qualitative methodology: an opposition
2    Doing without hypotheses as a result ol the profiling ol methodological position
3    Recent discussion
d    Starting points for a re-oneniation of methodological positions
5    Conclusion
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: 55
■-.,, 157
Methodological justifications of the particular perspective of qualitative research often insist that it is developed in strict separation from the rules of a methodology that aims at standardization and quantification. In view of the dominance and the fully developed state of research in quantitative methods this is not surprising: If this kind of presentation Is not merely a question of didactics, hut also concerns positioning as to content, then there will also arise out of this negatively based self-definition problems In the realization of specifically qualitative research goals. Both self-location by means of exclusion and latent negative results can be seen particularly distinctively by the way hypotheses arc handled in qualitative methodology.
1    HYPOTHESES IN QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY: AN OPPOSITION
>»* l;oi quantitatively oriented methodologlsts the formulation of hypotheses at the beginning of an Investigation Is an Indispensable means of subjecting to systematic control the inevitable theoretical loading of every kind of observation
and the unavoidable selectivity of every kind of research. In the first place it-is considered obligatory to reveal the researcher's prior knowledge and thereby to control it. Secondly, an explicit link is made to the state of available knowledge and a contribution is made to the integration and cumulation of this knowledge. And thirdly, the time-sequencing, and the separation of data collection and data analysis, require a prior elaboration of the theoretical framework, since this defines m<\ icstrlcts the stages in the research and also means that no correction of operational procedures is possible during the data collection, because of the strict phasing of the research process.
Although in qualitative methodology the fact of theory-driven observation is also unquestioned, there is a predominant rejection of hypotheses formulated in advance: precisely because therf is an awareness that knowledge Influences observation and action, researchers wish to avoid being 'fixed' by the hypotheses on particular aspects that they can only obtain 'In advance' from their own area of (scientific and everyday) relevance, but whose 'lit' with the meaning patterns of the Individuals being Investigated cannot be guaranteed In advance, in place of ihe requirement to reveal prior knowledge In (he form of hyiiotheses, therefore.
I54j      A COMPANION TO QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
in qualitative methodology there adses a requirement (01 .1 suspension ol (his piloi knowledge in favour ol ihe greatest possible Openness to the particular meanings and relevances of actors - an openness that Is seen as being endangered by the prior formulation of hypotheses.
The basic problem - the Influence of prior knowledge on observation - is therefore seen from both sides, but the chosen strategy for solving it is aiming in a different direction, since the implications associated with it are constantly being given a different weighting. If, in quantitative methodology, the need for control of the researcher afid the conscious structuring of research activity are in the foreground (while the agreement of the theoretical categories with the meaning patterns of actors is seen as relatively unproblematlc), qualitative methodologlsis require primarily a guarantee of the appropriateness of the categories used by the researcher and an openness to the potential ■other' of the research field (and see control of the Investigator by means of methodological rules us a false 'solution').
2    DOING WITHOUT HYPOTHESES AS A RESULT OF THE PROFILING OF METHODOLOGICAL POSITION
The programmatic opposition that we have sketched of these two responses to the fundamental cpistemologlcal problem appears, from a historical viewpoint, to be less 'naturally given' than a result of the growing competition between two methodological approaches.
In the classic studies of empirical social research we find no explicit treatment of the problem of checking prior knowledge nor even of the problem of prior formulation of hypotheses tcf., for example, the studies of William I. Thomas and Florian Znanieckl, William K Whyte, Howard S, Becker or Paul V. Lazarsreld).' As far as practice in dealing with 'prior knowledge' and 'hypotheses' is concerned. It Is clear to what a great extent the research activity was orlcntei* particularly to the theoretical but also to the everyday knowledge of the researchers, and how greatly these ideas determined the results of their work, by Hrst making possible the collection and structuring of the data material. Conversely, it may
be shown that a formulation including specified hypotheses at the beginning of such studies would often have been completely impossible Whyte and Blanche Geer, for Instance, point out explicitly how completely their research question changed after the 'first days In the Held', and how they had to adapt It to (he peculiarities and possibilities of their object of investigation (Whyte 1955: 317ff.. 320ff.; Geer 1964: 340).
With regard to making this prior knowledge explicit in the form of hypotheses, in the course of working out these two methodological positions - which see themselves as alternatives -during subsequent decades a growing process of contrast and reciprocal delimitation may be distinguished in the methodological procedures that''are felt to be necessary and sensible. These then resulted in the opposing research strategies which we sketched in the first section. On the side of qualitative methodology the programmatic work of Harney G. Glaser and Anselm I.. Strauss (1967), The Discovery of Grounded Theory, is of particular significance. Here the authors expressly require that researchers free themselves voluntarily of all prior knowledge and even dispense with prior reading of theoretical and empirical studie* In their subject area. In order to embark upon the research field In as unprejudiced a way as possible. According lo this approach, the task ol empirical research is not (or al least not primarily) to subject to empirical testing the hypotheses that are systematically derived from 'grand' (armchair) theories, since such theses often did not 'fit' the situations that were to be investigated in concrete cases; empirically based general theories are rather only to be expected when researchers personally derive their categories from the data (see 2.1). The formulation of a sociological theory, therefore, should take place not at the beginning of the research process but at the end: the overriding goal of social research Is not the testing but the generation of theories (1967: 1-18).
The position developed by Glaser and Strati» In deliberate rejection of the 'mainstream' in empirical social research (see 2.1) showed itself in the reception of qualitative methodology -over and alx>ve the grounded theory approach -as extremely influential: a number of authors saw the requirement for doing without hypotheses as a precondition for an interpretative
HYPOTHESES AND PRIOR KNOWLEDGE IN QUALITATWE RESEARCH
M4-
e of social research and elevated the penness' of Its methodology to a core belief in Illative research (e.g. Hoffmann-Riem 1980: Lamnek 1995: 221., 139f.). With this shift attention from ex-ante hypotheses to those jslng during the research process, the funda-lal epistcmological problem of checking the r knowledge which the researcher brings to job was relegated to a background position, was believed that this aspect could be over-oked, not least because the very openness of he methods made possible a correction 'by the 'unsuitable' prior knowledge would be exposed as such in the course of the study. But even if one concedes the different degree of openness of the various methods, this argument overlooks the fact that even the first setting up of data is already an active undertaking on the part of the researcher and is based on the individual's research interest and prior understanding. The requirement for as 'unconditional as possible' an entry Into the field conceals precisely this basic setting up of the field in accordance with the researcher's 'available prior knowledge' at this particular moment. Discoveries about social phenomena do not 'emerge' on their own: they are from the outset constructs of the researcher. The Idealization of the 'unprejudiced nature' of the researcher thai is sometimes to be found In qualitative methodology, and the idea of a 'direct' record of social reality, are therefore untenable from an episte-mological viewpoint (cf. Meinefeld 1995: 287-294).
If we consider this from a distance, it is striking that this methodological idealization is both in contradiction to one of the core theoretical principles of qualitative research ('the interpretation of a situation depends on knowledge') and also not a true reflection of research practice. Glaser and Strauss, in their study Awareness of Dying, which appeared in 1965, openly acknowledge their reliance on prior knowledge of this subject area (1965b: 286ff.).! One explanation for this discrepancy between theoretical insight, practical research and methodological norm might be sought hi the concern to establish as sharply defined an alternative as possible to the prevailing standardizing methodology. Horst Weishaupt, for example, offers the following as a result of his analysis of qualitative research reports: 'The impression emerges that the methodological
debate is determined by concerns about demarcation which are of subordinate Interest for the practice of qualitative social research' (1995: 94). And In a case study In Ihe sociology of science, Jean Converse demonstrates the mixing of methodological and research-policy arguments in the conflict about open and standardized interviews in the United Stales during the Second World War (1984).
3    RECENT DISCUSSION
The impetus for a critical methodological discussion, free from the commitment against ex-ante hypotheses, was provided by Christel Hopf (1983, 1996). Using two empirical studies as examples, she sought to demonstrate that, on ihe one hand, the question to be investigated could indeed require a qualitative procedure, but on the other hand, because of the availability of previous studies, there was a focus on content that made the formulation of ex-ante hypotheses unavoidable.
If hypotheses are rejected In principle, then on the one hand there is no consideration of the very different alms of the hypotheses, and these differ sharply - In terms of their claim to validity and object - in their suitability for qualitative questions. (For example, do they relate to universal laws or to singular facts; do they make claims about the relationship between variables, or are they interested in social processes and meaning patterns? Hopf 1983: 48-50; 1996: Hr.). On the other hand, experience from research practice would speak against an unconditional openness in data collection: the pressure - resulting from the absence of selection criteria - to extensive exploration of all aspects that are possibly of interest conflicts with the intensive nteaning-discovery that is characteristic of interpretative research, and in this situation overburdens the Investigator (19J3: 50-52). A general rejection of ex-ante hypotheses would therefore endanger the realization of genuinely qualitative research goals: It is 'dogmatic and not open to discussion'(1983: 49).
Other authors, in their plea toi .in unprejudiced approach to both the need and the possibility to reflect prior knowledge in qualitative social research, draw attention to the identical effects (from an epistcmological viewpoint) of
31
IM
A COMPANION TO QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
hypotheses and ptloi knowledge In relation to the structuring of subsequent research activity, and therefore demand that I his 'gap' in quallta-tlve methodology be closed. Here we see. In ihe lirsi place, the simple necessity »I icceptmg Ihe general stale ol eplstemologlcal discussion and not laying oneself open lo the accusation of requiring an eplstemologlcal special status for qualitative methods, with this demand foi 'unprejudiced' observation; and secondly this question, which every form of social research must confront, opens up the possibility of reconsidering Ihe relationship between qualitative and quantitative» methodology and redefining both the differences and the common ground (Bottgcr 1998; Meinefeld 1997; Stiobl 1998).
4 STARTING POINTS FOR A RE-ORIENTATION OF METHODOLOGICAL POSITIONS
Mow could these apparently contradictory expectallons be resolved? On the one hand we li ive In ineel I In- epistemologii al ".unni. n( to Include prloi knowledge In methodological control, and on the other we should not abandon Ihe sociological (f priori of allowing the sociological analysis to proceed from the genuine meaning attributions of actors and should not, In the act of Interpretation, impose the categories of the Investigator on the actions.
One precondition foi the solution of this dilemma is, first and foremost, a recognition of the fact that the latter requirement can only be met in an approximate way. It cannot simply be a question of opposing a 'pure' reconstruction of the view of the actors to a recording of social reality in the categories of the Investigator: it is only possible, in all cases, to understand ihe categories of others on the basis of one's own categories (on this point see also Schütz's thoughts on the observation of one's fellows. 1932: 287ff.). Here Is precisely the misunderstanding of a sociological Idea ol understanding. for<*»xample on the pari ol Iheodoie Abel (1948) oi Hans Albeit (1985), who saw (and therefore reacted) 'understanding' as a direct recording ol subjective meaning on ihe basis of individual sensibility, whereas it can only mean identifying
the actions of others as belonging to a particular meaning pattern available In the knowledge of ihe social group In question aiWsubsumlng them in this meaning pattern in the way in which, and to the extent tluit, it 1$ familiar to the person understanding {on this cf. Meinefeld 1995. ch. 1). We have to accept Ihe fundamental restriction thai every observation only lakes on meaning in respect of one's own meaning schemata, and so prior knowledge inevitably gives structure to our observations and must therefore be seen as the foundation of all research. In this way, however, ihe opposition of categories is transformed into a difference of degree, and the fundamental problem exists for all researchers in the same way.
A second step towards the resolution of this opposition might be found in distinguishing research questions according to the nature and extent of ihe knowledge already available of the aiea under investigation. If we consider (he situation of the classic studies mentioned above, ii becomes clear that in these cases a pie-fomiulatlon of content-based hypotheses ts out of the quesilon. On Ihe other hand. If anyone wished to invesllgaie Interaction with the dying loday ihey would scarcely be able io avoid taking note of the prior work of Glaser and Strauss and setting up their own research under consideration of Ihe events repotted there.
ľhís does not necessarily mean, however, that one should no longer be open to new observations. If we can learn to distinguish between the principled methodological openness and the explicitness with which prior knowledge is reflected and expressed. It will be possible fo reconcile the formulation of hypotheses with the reconstruction of object-specific meaning contents. The openness to new matters does not depend on our not taking account, al the level of content, of the old and the familiar, 1ml on ihe how, In methodological terms, we sel up the search for ihe new. Logically, these two levels are Independent of one another - the question of putting prior knowledge into concrete terms and selecting ihe methods to lw used to obtain new knowledge are only related (at the concrete practical level) when, for example, a standardized questionnaire is unable to provide inlormation from beyond the dimensions the researcher
HYPOTHESES AMD PRIOR KNOWLEDGE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH      (i57
i>4-
considers important because there was no loom for ii In ihe chosen instrument. In the first place, however, this does not mean Ihat (he u'sult has been predetermined, as critics sometimes claim: It Is only the framework of die dimensions Involved In the Investigation that has been fixed, but not their concrete manifestations of content. We could indeed find surprising results as to content using this route (Opp 1984: ňSf.). In the second place, it does not mean that the choice of (more) open methods (such as participant observation, see 5.5, or interviews, see 5.2) will per se guarantee an openness of content, prior knowledge that remains implicit, even using these methods, will lead to selective observation and interpretation, because the recognition of whether something is new or not lies with the researcher and not with the individuals under investigation. The openness required in qualitative methodology to the potentially special nature of the Held of investigation is therefore not helped by falling to make prior knowledge explicit, but by a conscious use of methods that permit the recognition and recording of a 'devlailon' In the field of study from what was expected. This does not mean, however, thai I here is a conscious awareness of such an expectation.
As far as the possibility of reflecting prior knowledge is concerned, it should lw noted that this can take a number of different forms.
1    In every case we have at our disposal an everyday prior knowledge on which, however vague and uncertain it may be, we are forced to rely in the absence of belter information in order to be able to carry out any kind of initial orientation In the research field. This prior knowledge can only partially be made explicit, because ultimately an infinite regress is possible here. Hut it is at precisely this level that the basic but noi otherwise reflected nature of the research object is decided, and what may be taken for granted from a cultural viewpoint remains fixed, so lhal Its reflection becomes a (frequently irredeemable) desideratum (for an example cf. Ilourdleu et al. 1991: 44ff.).
2    Furthermore, every researcher, in his or her approach to the research field, has recourse
to a corpus of general theoretical concepts which similarly contribute to ihe researcher's basic definition of ihe object. Although these are to a large extent conscious, they too cannot be made hilly explicit, but ihe requirement for a conscious reflection may be made with a grealer prospect of success. 3 Finally, there are a range of obieci-related concepts which permit the researcher to focus on particular aspects of content In the research area under investigation, and which, even in the context of qualitative research, can therefore facilitate and perhaps require Ihe formulation of ex-ante hypotheses.
With regard to measuring the effects of this prior knowledge on the research process, it should be remembered that this does not begin only when hypotheses are formulated or when one 'enters the field' without hypotheses. If the total research process is to be reflecied methodologically, ihen a fixation on the for-mutation of ex-ante hypotheses {posiilve in quantitative and negative In qualitative methodology) Is not tenable: the development 0Í Ihe researcher's attention begins earlier and In a more fundamental way. In any case, in thinking about the control of Ibis pre-strucluring of limitation, one should be aware that this reflection - at least at the present time - can scarcely be standardized. How It is to be dealt with in the future should be tested in empirical research practice, before any methodological pronouncement is made.
5    CONCLUSION
In the process of self-assurance of having an independent methodology, the decision against ex-ante hypotheses has indeed led to a consolidation of the qualitative position as distinct from quantitative methodology, but u has also led to a claim that Is eplstemologically untenable, and lias restricted I he applicability of qualitative research. Experience in research practice, however, has shown, on the one hand, that the majority ol quantitative research studies also fail to follow ihe norm of testing hypotheses (cf. Meinefeld 1997: 23f.), and on the other hand the examples from Hopf
(im)    a companion to QUALITATIVE research
cited above iuppoil the view Hut In a qualitative leseaich progiamme the testing of hypotheses may also occupy a legitimate pUce. The deciding line about how and to what extent prioi knowledge should be made concrete does not follow the quantitative-qualitative' boundary, but is clearly dependent on other factors. It would be highly desirable If this fact could be ratified methodologically and if an uninhibited way of dealing wiih the pfofattffl Of structuring research activity could be achieved in both qualitative and quantitative social research.
NOTES
I The actual methodological procedur« at this phase of justifying modern empirical «search may be captured very aptly In an observation, where M.uir Jahoda it'1 «'■•■ lhe retrospektiv« over-emphasl* ol iiH'ihiHii>ingk,i| leflectiveness thai characifiiwd thr preface lo the new edition of LazarifHd's The Vnmployed of UarimOutl. published 11 years alter the first edition - a study which «ven today lv wen as .1 model of exemplary empirical »starch; if [this explanation] should give the impression thai these principles were available to 111 dutin«, the study, this would be misleading Wr had no c len r pl.tn, in terms either of contenl 01 mithOd It»«- ntthodl grew oul of concenlritlon 00 ih» problem, noi for their own sake'(Jahodí 1980/81: 139). Furthermore-to complete the puiure - It wemed lc|f|tlmate lo use. as a research ttiategy ■""' method, whatever procedure promised to nuk« it possible to obtain interesting data for the lewaich question (see 2.81.
2 h Is of course true thai In later publications (1987; lOf. and passim; Strauss and Corbin 1990: 48-56) Strauss recogiiife» prior knowledge as an impur-tam souic« of ihfoittscal sensitivity; bur »nee Stimm (Mid itotbln) insist on 'discovery* as a primary goal of qualitative research, they hedge this direction wit» a renewed warning of the risk of 'constrain!' that affects the openness to new matters (19*): Mi,) because ol categories known in advance - and In this way ihey essenllally adhere to the normative demand of the position formulated earlier. Even mote explicitly. Glaser insist* upon dispensing with all prior knowledge ££ KcUe 1994 ii*1. and also the excellent presentations ol the positions of Glaser and Strauss in KeUc 1994:2811t 1
FURTHER READING
Bourdleu, P., Chamboredon, J. C. and Passeron, J. C. (1991) CtěH of Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries. Berlin: de Gruyler. Pt III and ch. 2
Chalmers, A. F. (1982) Whit is This Thing Called Science! Queensland: University of Queensland Press, ch. 3.
Glaser. B. G. and Strauss, A. L. (1967) Toe Discovery of Grounded Theory. Strategies for Qualitative flesearch. Chicago: Aidine. esp. pp. 1-43