W;lÍ ÍW/ÍÍ j ji What Ul\l\ltiri(iT}ism }$ The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, ot the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds dial actions ate light in proportion as they tend 10 promote happiness, wrong a$ they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the ahsence of pain; by unhappincss, pain, and the privation of pleasuic. To give a clear view of rhe moral standard set up hy the theory, much more requires to be said; in patticulai, what things it inrlurlcs in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is felr an open question. Dut these supplementary explanations do not alien the theory oflifr on which rhis theory uf morality is grounded— namely, that pleasure, and ficcdom fiom pain, are the only things deniable as ends; and that all dcsii-ahlr things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) aic dcsiiablc eithci lor the pleasure inherrnl in themselves, or as means to [lie promotion of pleasure and rhe prevention of pain Now, such a theoiy oflifc excites in many minds, and Among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and puipose, inveterate dislike To suppose that Ide has {as they GXptCSS it) no higher end than pleasure—no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit— ihey designate as utterly mean and grovelling: as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicums were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened; and modem holders of rhe doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and Lnglish assailants. When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered) that it is not they, but thcii accuseis, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine arc capable. If this supposition were true, the charge could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation: for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for rhe orhe.r. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felr as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do r.ot satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of Them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not Source: John Smán Mill, Social Htnefil Mi l|, J. S. include their g ran heat ion. I do no;, indcerl, cunsider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in dtawing out chci; scheme of consequences from the utditarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements tequiie to Uc included. Uut there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not hssíh» to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral senriments. a much higher value as pleasures rhan to those of mere sensation, lr must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed rhe superiority of mental over bodtly pleasures chiefly in the gtcatcr permanency, safety, uncostliuess, e*c, uf the former—that I», In their ciicumstanrial advantages rather than In their intrinsic nature. And on all these points utilitarians have fully pioved their case; but they mir;!« have taken the oihcr. and, as it may he called, higher-ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility lu tccoj-nise the IHCI. that some írinth of pleasure are mote desiraoh' anil more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating »II other thins*, «luality i» considered u well as quannry, rhe estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. If I am asked, what [ mean hy difference of quality in pleasures, or whar makes one pleasure more valuable than another, uicicly as u pleasure, except its bciiui great« in amount, there is bur one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, iticspcciive of any fcclinj» of moral obligation to prefer it, that is rhe more desirable pleasure. If one of rhe two is. by those who are competently acquainted with both, plticcd so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign iL for any quantity of the other pleasure which their namre is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account. Now it is an unquestionable fact rhar rhose who arc equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of rhe lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be •S* (■•vi; i iiv; i i., RVBiih'i./ ÍMi'ui 1111 fJ£imiilHHIh) HO p«r<*Wll "1 fet'Img illld lpUSfcÍVItt.0 would he seliish iiiul base, even though they should he persuaded ihiii ihe hiol, rhr dunce, or ilw rascal is better satisfied with his l"t than they arc with ihciis. I hey would nol lesign what they pouqj mute i han he, [orthe most complete satisfaction ot all the desires whieh they have in common wirh him. Ifrhcv ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of unhap-pittcSS so eMietne. thai to escape fiom ii they would CXtthartgf ihrir lot (or almost any other, howevci undesirable in thrir own ryes A hetng of higher faculties requires mote to make him happy, is capable pruhnblyóf more acute suffering, and is-wattfinly at-res'.ihlr* to ;i nr more pninri. than one of an inferior type; hut in spite of these liabilities, he can never lenily wish lo .sink into wtlBl he feels to be Q lower lu-ade of exisrenre. We may give whiit explanation we plyntiľ i>l this unwillingness; wc may attribute ir u> pudí-, n luiiiic which is given indiscriminately to MHiie of ílu- 1110x1 und lo.soinc ol tlie least estiiitublc feelingi i>l whirh mankind an- eapablc; we may refer ii to the love v«f "liberty and pergonal independence, an appeal u» which wie Willi the SloitS one «•! (lie musí eflcriivc moans lot the im.uU.atio» ol it; to the love of pimvi. mi to ihe lüVC wf ŕXdfŕňWW, btuh ftf which Ju lenily eoiei into and contribute ro it bur lis iihkI appiopiialeappellation is n sense ml dignity, which all human brings possess in one form <>r nn* Other, und in. some, though by no means m evaer, piojMuioii to ihcii biejiei fatuities, and which is %t) essential a part ol the happiness ol those in whom it is srning, that norhing which rnnlhris with u i onl.i he, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to ilieni. Whotivci suppose» ihm this piefeience takes place, at a .sacrifice id happiness—that the superior being, in anything like equal cireumsrances. is nor hftppiCl ih.in the infeiioi —confounds the two very dilleieut ideas, of happiness, and loiuciiI. It is in-dispurahle thar rhe being whose capacincs ol enjny-ment are low. has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly-endowed being will always f#>p| rhar any happiness which he Lan Unik lor, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. Bur he can léárn to beat its iiiipeifecrions. il they are at all bearable: and they will not make him unvy the being who i-Indeed unconscious of rhe mi per leer ions, but only because he feels nor at all the good which those imperfections qualify. Ji is better to be a human being dissitislicd than h piy satisfied;.bet lei tu be Socrates dissatisfied than a f A.ŕntŕ. apart from the fiuesrion of intensiry, to those of whit h the animal nature, disioined from the higher famines, is susceptible, they arc entitled on this subject to the tonne regard. I have dwell on this point, as heinp a necessary prtfro'ftt perfectly just conception of Utility' or Happiness, considered as rhe directive rule of human .onduit Bui ii is by no mean* an indispensable condition lo rhe acceptance pi the utilitarian sran-daid; for (Inn standard is nnt the agent s own greatest happiness, hilf the gtcatCM amonnr of happiness »l-toi-etliet, and if u may possibly be doubted whether n noble character is always the luppici lot its no hlene.ss, there can be no dnuhr rhat it makes uthel people happier, and that lite WOFld In general is immensely u gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, eould only attain irs end by rhe generál cultivation t,\ nobleness ol chaiaaei. even if earh individual weieonly hrnrnired by the nobleness of others, and Ills own. so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit Rut rhe bate I'mineianonnf such an ubsuidity as this last, renders reluTiitinn superfluous. According to rhe Grearesr Happiness Principle, .is above explained, the ulrimarc end, with reference to mid (or che sake or which all other things are de-sir.ihle (wherht'rwe are considering uui Own good or that of c»ther people), is an existence exempt as fa: as possible fioin pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test o( qnaliry, and rhe nilc for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by rhosc who, in their opportunities of experience, to which miisr he added their habits of self-consciousness and self-ohscrvatiun, are. hast furnished with the means of comparison. This, being, according to the urihranan opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may accordingly be defined, the rules and preceprs for human conduct, by the obsytvanre. of which an existence stich as has been described might be. to the greatest extern possible*, secured to all mankind, and not to them only, bur, so (ariis the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation. Against the doctrine, howevy;. rises another class or objectors, who say rhar happiness, in an) form, cannot he rhe rational purpose or human lile and action, because, in the first place, it is unarrainablc; and rhev contemptuously ask, What right hast thou to be happy? a question which Mr. CarlySc clenches bv the addition. VChat right, a shorr rime ago, hadsl rhou even tu be' Next, they say, that men can do n ahnui happine»; that all noble human beings have felt this, and could nnr have beeome noble bul by learning the lesson of Bntfitg/tn, or reniinnartnn; which lesson, thuiuugldy leamt and submitted to. they affirm m he rhe beginning and necessary condition ol all s'itt'jc. The first of these objections would go to the root of the matter were ir well founded; lor d no happiness is to be had at all by human hemgs, rhe attain-men; ol it cannot be the end of morality, or of any rational condurr. Though, even m that esse, something might Still be said for rhe unlirarian rheory; sinu- utility includes not solely the pursuit of hap-pine«, bur rhe prevention or mitigation of uilhfip-piness. and if the formrr aim he chunerieal, there will l>e all the giealci scope and more Imperative nee I lie objectors perhaps may doubt whether hunům heinjis. il taught ro consider happiness as che end ol lire, would be satisfied with such a monetäre share of ir But great numbers of mankind have been Sat-e-hed with much lew. The main constituents of a satisfied life appear to be two, eiihei of which by itscll isofirn found sufficient foi the purpose: tranquillity, and excitement. With much rranquilliry. many find thai ilieycan be content with very Bit«? pleasure with much cxriremenr. many ran reconcile themselves to a considerable quantity of pain. There is assuredly no inherent impossibility in enabling even rhc mass ul mankind to unirr horh; since rhe two are ' Írom helnß incomparible chat rhey are tn natural alliance, the prolongation ol e:thei being a preparation lot, ami exciting a wish lor, the othrr. Ir is only those in whom indolence amounts to a vice, that do nor desire excitement aftei on interval ol repose; it is only cttOSV in whom the need of excitement is a disCHKC, thai tri'l the tranquillity which follows e.v riremem dull and insipid, instead of pleasurable m direct piopoitiou to the excitement which preceded il. When people who are rnlerahly formnarc in thcii inuwaid lm do nor find in life sufficient enjoyment ro make it valuable to ihcni. the Lause generally is. Cľu'mg fut nobody bul themselves. TV) those who have neither public not pnvare affection*» the excite menrs of life arr much curtailed, and in any case dwindle' in value as the time appioaches when all selfish inicicsia must be terminated by death: while those who leave after them objects of personal of« feet ion, and especially those who have also cultivated a fellow-feeling with the collective interests of nuinkind, retain as. lively an interest in life on rhc eve ol death as in the vigour of youth and health. Next to selfishness, the principal cause which makes life unsatisloctoty. is want of mental cuirivarion. A cultivated mind—l do nor mean that of a philosopher, hut any mind to which the foundations ui knowledge have been opened, and which has heen taught, in any tolerable degree, ro exercise its faculties—hnds sources of inexhaustible interest in ail rhar surrounds if; in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the imaginations of poetry, rhe incidents of history, rhe ways of mankind past and prcscr.r, and rheir prospects in the future. It is possible, indeed, to become indifferent to all this, and that loo without having exhausted a thniisandrh pan ol it; but only when one has had from the beginning no moral or human interest in these things and has sought in them only the gratification of curiosity. Now there is absolutely no reason in the nature ol things why an amount ol mental culm re sufficient m give an imetligeni intcresr in these oujixts' of eon-" i.iiion, should not be tire iuheiiiauce of .'.nvonr burn in ,i civilised country. As little is rhere an inherent necessity that any human he in y should be rf selfish egotist, devoid of every feeling 01 caiu but those which centre in this own miserable individuality .Something far supciicn to this is suffi-rii'nr'v common even now, to give amplp earnest of what (he human species maybe made Genuine private affections, and a sincere interest in the* public good, are possible, though m unequal degrees, to every rightly biought l|p human being. In a woild in whii.li there is so much ro interest, so much to enjoy, and so mueh also to coriect nud improve, everyone who has this moderate amount oi moral and intellectual requisites i.< eapahle of an existence whii.h may he railed enviable, and unless Stielt a person, through bad luw*. ui subjection re* the will nf others, is denied the liberty re» use rhe sources of hnppEucss. within hi« reach, he will not rail to> find this enviable fJflwnCt, if he escape the positive evils ol life, rhe ([(eat sources ol physical and mental Suffering such aa lltdlgenec, disease, and rhe mikindui-o. worlh- Icssnew, or premature loss ol objects ol aífection, Thr i i stic» oi the pioblem lies, there lore, in the Contest Willi diese calamines, from which it is a iviie good fortune entirely ro escape, which, as things now are cannot; he obviated, und uitcih cannoi be in any material Jegice mitigated. Yer no cine whose opinion deserves □ moment's consideration can doubt that most oi the great positive evils o( the world are in themselves removable, and will, il human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced within li-ino» limits. Poverty, in any sense implying sul-fenng, may be completely extinguished by the wisdom Or society, combined with the good sense and providence of individuals. Even rhar most intractable of enemies, disease, may be indefinitely reduced in dimensions by good physical and mora! education, and propel control of noxious Influences; while the progress oi science holds out a promise foi the future of srill more direct conquests over this dc-rperable foe; And every, advance ir, thac direction relieves us from some, nor only of rhe chances which cut short our own lives, but. what concerns us still more, Which deprive us of those in whom our happiness is wcapi up. As lor vicissitudes of fonunc, and outer disappointments connected wich «oildlv circumstances, these arc principally the elieel cither of «rr>« impnidence, ol ill-regulated desires, or of bad or imperfect social institutions. All rhe grand sources, m shoit. ol human suffering are in a great degree, mam ui rhem almost entirely, conquerable by human &*Mill /fvrtiľj'í tare end ťfíon; and though rhfiľ rŕmoval is grif v-ously slow —rhouijh u long succession of generations will perish in rhc breath before the conquest is completed, l mankind, even in those parti of our present wuild which UK least deep in baibaiism. and ir ofrrn ha» m be done voluntarily by rhr hcu> 01 the marly:, for ihe sake nfsomeihuig which be priľcs more than h»í in.bviJiiul happiness. Km tins something, whar u n, unless rhu happiness of others, or some of the requisites of happiness? It is noble ro be capable of ie-sluing entirely one's own ponion of happiness m .hanccsuf it, bur after all. this belf-sauifKe nuisr hi* ioi some end. It is not its own end; and i( we aic told ibiit Its end in not happiness but virtue, which is bcttci than happiness. I ask, would the sacrifice be made ii the hen> Of marryr did not believe that It would earn loi others immunity from simtlai sacrifices? Would It be made if h« thought rhat his \c nuuciatioti of happiness ioi himself would produce nu liuil lb i any of bis fellow creatuics, but to make their lot like his, and place them also in the condi rum of pei-son.s who have (enounced happiness? All honor to those who can abnegate for themselves the personal enjoyment of life, when by sudí renuncia-liun ihey contribute worthily to increase the amount ol happiness in the woild; but he who docs it, ut professes to do it. for any othei purpose is no more deserving of admiration rhan the ascetic mounted on his pillar. He may be an inspiriting proof of what men can do, but assuredly not an example of what they slonicí Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world's arrangements chat anyone can best serve the happiness of orhcrs by the absolute sacrifice of his own, ycr so long as the world is In that imperfect «ate, 1 hilly acknowledge that the readiness to mgfce such a sacrifice is the highesr virtue which can be found i» man. 1 will add that in this condition o! the wodd, paradoxical us the osserrion may be, the conscious ability ro do without happiness gives the best prospeer of realiring such happiness as is attainable, bor nothing except that consciousness can raise ,i person above the chances of life, by making him feel rhar. let täte and fortune do their wgist. they have no power ro subdue him. which, once Ich, fiees him hum excess ol anxiety concerning the evils of liff and enables him, like many u Stoic in the worst times of rhp Roman Empire, to cultivate in tranquillity the sources of satisfarrion accessible to him without concerning himself about the uncertainty of their duration any mote than about their inevitable cud. Meanwhile, let us utilitarians never cease to claim the morality of self devotion as a possession which belongs by as good a nght to them as eiihei to the Sum ut to die Tianscendenralisr. The utilitarian motaliry dor.i rci:u>;nuc in human beings rhc power ol sactifking their nwn greatest j;ood foi the good n| others, U only refuses to admit that the saciihcc is itself a good. A saciilice which does nor Increase, u; tend to increase, the sum luiul of happiness, ir considers as wasted The only self-renunciation which it applauds is devotion to the happiness, or 10 some of rhr means of happiness, of others either »I mankind collectively or of individuals within the limits imposed by the collective interests ol mail' kind. 1 must again repeat what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, rhar the happiness whkh forms the utilitarian stan, dard of what is nght in conduct is not the agent's own happiness bur that of all concerned. As be-tween his own happiness and rhat of others, ulili-tananism requires htm 10 be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden fule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spiiit of the ethics of uriliry. To do as you would be done by and to love your neighbour as yourself constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality- As the means oi first making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the hap. pincss or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest of every individual as neatly as possible in harmony With the interest of the whole and, secondly, chat education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as w establish in the- mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole—especially between his own happiness and the prarricc of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as rcgaid for the universal happiness prescribes—so rhar not only he may he unahle ro conceive the possibility of PA/íroiM- U. řV.ii»!. .1 Iv. happiness Ua I musel! iiii).Mjffviiií) ••nli mhhiui-i opposed i<> ihr general good, I'm ahn ihm .1 tlirci'l impulse ro pmmiwp ihr ganoral iíO'hI n»ay K- in every individual one ol "hi* habitual wnriyes ol actum And the sentiments connected herťwäŕn rr»a.y fill a latgc and prominent platu in every human being's sen-ticnr cxisrcncc. U rhe impugncis "I the utilitarian moraliry represented it to rhclT own minds in 11 -. í í- its liue character, 1 know nor whar recommendation posstíssed l>y any othei molality they ronld possibly affirm to hi* warning to il. whirt rnůie beautiful or mote exalted development of human nature any othei ethical system can hr supposed tn foster, or what springs of action, uol accessible to the ufilt-rarian, such systems rely on lot Living effect lo iheii mandates 'Ihe objectois to utilitarianism cannot always be charged with represent iii|; il in u discreditable light Gn 'he contrary, those* amitni; rhern who entertain anything like a just idea of its disinrrrrsred ch.ir.n ret mhiu'Iiiih's lnul lault with US sliiudaid AS befog IO0 high for hntnanny. They say it in exacting loo much tc requite thai people shall ahvavs arr from the inducement ol piuinuting the geoefol mtcicsts of so rttery. Um this is i guilty i*| x i lime. even if his ohjee r he to serve another friend ro whom he is under greater obligations: But to speak only of actions dune iiuin the motive of duty and in direct obedience to principle, it. is a misapprehension ut the utilitarian modr oř though" m conceive u ?.5 implying that people should h n their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at !atgc The pre a r majority ol good actions are intended not for the benefit of ihe world bur tor rhar ol individuals, of which the good «;■! the world is made up; and the thought- ol i he inosi viiluoits nutn need not on these occasions travel hryond rhc parricular persons concerned, cxc.epr so far as is necessary ro assure himself rh.ir in benefiting them he is not violating the rights, that is, the legitimate and authorized ex pectations. ol anyone else. The multiplication ol happiness is, according ro the unliranan ethics, the object of virtue The occasion on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do ibis on an extended scale—in other words, to be a public henefacror—are hur exceptional, and on these occasions alone is he called on m consider puhlic utility; in evciy other case, private utility, the in-uu-i or happiness of so tne lew peisons, is ull lie has ro atrf nd to Those alone the Influence of whose actions extends to society in general need concern themselvo habitually about so huge an object. In rhŕ rase of abstinences indeed—of things which l-copl'ľ l'oíbcai to do fiom moral considerations, though the consequences in the p-ailicular case might he hrnefinal—ir would he unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware rhar rhc action u ol a class which, il practised generally, would he generally inmriou.s and lhal lins is the ground ol ill" obligation to abstain from ir. The amount of tegaid tot the public Intettfsi Implied In this recognition is no greater than is demanded by eve t y system of morals, for they all rnjoin to abstain from whatever is manifestly pernicious to society. Ihe s.tiiie Loiisideidliuns dispose ol íuiúthei reproach against the doctrine of utility, founded on a still grossrr misconception of rhr purpose of a stan-daid of morality and of the very meaning of rhr words right mid wrong. It is often affirmed that utilitarianism renders men cold and unsympathizing; that it chills rhcir moral feelings towards individuals; rhat it makes them tegard only the dry and hard consideration of the consequences ol actions, not taking inro their moral estimate the qualities Itotn winch those actions emanate. If the assertion means that tftui do not alluw their judgment respecting the righrnesS or wrongnessof an action tu be influenced by their opinion of the qualifies of rhc person who Jess it, il'.ic is 2 complaint net against utilitarianism but against having any slandatcJ of morality ac all; for certainly no known ethical standatd decides an action to be good or bad because it is done by a good or bad man, still less because done by an amiable, a brave, nr a bencvolcnr man, or thť contrary. These roneide rar ions are relevant nor ro rhc estimation of actions but of persons; and there is nothing in rhc utilitarian theory inconsistent with the fact that there arc other things which interest us in persons besides 'he nghrness and wrongness ot their actions. The 5t : Indeed, with the paradoxical misuse of Ian* 5 - .,-. •!:-.!'. v.:i: p.u; of their system and by which JW hits rhíit has everything, that t>c. and only líc, is fleh, is br.iuriJul. J-. n king. Bur no claim of Ulis description is made fui tne vjrruou« man by iíic utilitarian doctrine. Utilitarians arc quite aware that thcK arc other desinihlc possessions and qualities beside? viituc and nie per'ccrlv willing to allow to all o\ ilu-iH the« lull worth. They art also awaic ihnt a ririhi iitiiori does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character mid that actions Which aic blamable often |iiiua:v'J Jk/uí »|u,iltries entitled to piafsc, When this Is apparent in any partii'ulat case, it modifies rhrir esrimation, nor certainly of the Rtl but of the agent. I C.rant that rheyai«\ notwithstanding, of thr opinion rhar in rhe long lun the bust (»roof of a good char acrer is good actions and resolutely rrfn*r to con' Slita any mental disposition as good of which the predominant tendency is to prndurc bad conduct. Iliif. makes them uii|H)pul;ir with many people, but it is .to unpopularity which rhey must shnte with eveiyoiie who regards ihr disrinction between right and wiung In w serious light, and ihe rcpioHch u nut one which a COftidcnrlrMm utilita tin n need be anxious to tepel. II no more he meanr by the objection than rhar many utilitarians loot on the morality of actions, as measured by the utilitarian sldiidaids, with ton exclusive a regard and do not lay sufficient stress upon lite other beauties of chaiauci which go towards making a human being lovable 01 admlrahlr, rhi'. may be admitted. Utilitarians who have cultivated their moral fťelings but not iheii sympathies nor their artistic perceptions do fall into this- mistake; :»nH so do all other moralists undci the same condirinns. What can be said in excuse iui other moralists is equally available for them—namely, that, if rhere is to be any error, it is bettet lhal it should he on chat side. As a matter of fact, *c may affirm among utilitarians, as among adherents of other systems, theie is every imaginable degree of rigidity and of laxity in rhe application ufihcir standard: some a:e even puritanically rigorous, while Others are as indulgent as can possibly be desired by sinner or by sentimentalist. But on the whole, a doctrine which brings prominently forward the inrerpsr rhat mankind have in the repression and prevention of conduct which violates the moral law, is likely ro be Inferior to no other in turning the sanctions nf opinion against such violations. U is true, the question, Wtiat does violare rhe moiai law! is one on which those who recognise different standards of morality flre likely now and rhen todilfei. But difference of opinion on moral questions was not first introduced into rhe world by utilitarianism, while thai diH'rrine does supply, if nor always an easy, at all even rs a tangible and inrclligihle mode of deciding such differences