

## **7. týden – Ideologie, hegemonie, kontragegemonie a masová media**

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# IDEOLOGY AND THE MASS MEDIA: THE QUESTION OF DETERMINATION

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Our central argument in this paper is that sociologists interested in contemporary mass communications need to pay careful and detailed attention to the ways in which the economic organisation and dynamics of mass media production determine the range and nature of the resulting output. In proposing this we are not arguing that economic forces are the only factors shaping cultural production, or that they are always and everywhere the most significant. Nor are we assuming 'a tight and necessary correspondence between market forces and decisions on the one hand, and the nature of the media's ideological output on the other' (Connell, 1978, p. 71). We do not deny the importance of the controls and constraints imposed by the state and the political sphere, or the significance of the inertia exerted by dominant cultural codes and traditions. Nor do we deny the 'relative autonomy' of production personnel and the pertinent effects of professional ideologies and practices. Nevertheless, for us the crucial term in this couplet is 'relative'. Hence, while we fully endorse Stuart Hall's view that 'the level of economic determination is the necessary but not sufficient condition for an adequate analysis' (Hall, 1978a, p. 239), we would underline the term 'necessary'. In our view, any sociological analysis of the ways in which the mass media operate as ideological agencies which fails to pay serious attention to the economic determinants framing production is bound to be partial. However, despite the considerable upsurge of academic interest in the mass media in Britain over the last decade or so, it is precisely this 'necessary' element that has most obviously been missing from much recent work. The significance of this absence for a more adequate analysis has been made both more conspicuous and more damaging by recent developments in the structure of the British mass media.

The last two decades have seen a massive expansion of the mass media in Britain. The great bulk of this growth has taken place within the private sector, firstly through the development of new products and markets (as in the rapid expansion of the record industry), and secondly through the penetration of advanced capitalist operations into pub-

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lishing where older styles of enterprise had previously predominated, and into the hitherto entirely public, broadcast sector (initially through the introduction of independent television and latterly with the take-off of local commercial radio). By contrast, the countervailing developments within the public sector — the initiation of BBC2, the establishment of BBC local radio, and the experiments with municipal cable networks — have been nowhere near sufficient to re-establish parity between the two sectors. As we have pointed out elsewhere (Murdock and Golding 1977b) this expansion of the private sector has been headed and dominated by a relatively small number of large corporations, with significant interests in a range of core communications sectors and in the cognate areas of leisure and information provision, operating on an increasingly international scale. Far from weakening or dispersing the control that the major communications corporations are able to exercise over cultural production therefore, recent developments have consolidated and strengthened it. The BBC remains the single significant exception to this emerging pattern of conglomerate dominance. It is however an exception. It is not paradigmatic. Indeed there is evidence that in key areas of its operations the Corporation's activities are increasingly governed by essentially capitalistic criteria.

Taking the field of mass communications in contemporary Britain as a whole then, the centre of gravity lies decisively with the communications conglomerates. Consequently, we would argue, sociological analysis must begin by confronting this emerging economic structure and exploring the ways in which its organisation and underlying dynamics shape the range and forms of media production. Ironically however, at the same time that this process of conglomerate domination has accelerated and extended, so the question of economic determinations has been displaced from the centre of academic analysis, and in much recent writing on the media in Britain has disappeared altogether.

One influential justification for this displacement is provided by the various versions of pluralism. Here the links between the cultural and the economic are dissolved, by arguing that possession of the means of production has become a progressively less important source of cultural control in contemporary capitalism, and by emphasising the significance of alternative and countervailing sources of power. In pursuing this argument pluralists usually draw on some version of the 'managerial revolution' thesis. In the case of the mass media this takes the form of emphasising the relative autonomy of production personnel, their monopoly of operational control and the resulting ideological plurality

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of media output. External constraints on production are seen to stem primarily from the various controls imposed by the state. Despite the consistent barrage of criticism aimed at it by radical commentators, versions of pluralism retain a considerable currency within discussions of the mass media in Britain. In its popular variants it furnishes the basic concepts with which owners and practitioners legitimate the present structure of the communications industry (see for example Whale, 1977). In more sophisticated forms it is strongly entrenched in academic studies of mass communications. It underpins the work of one of the most distinguished mass communications researchers in Britain, Professor Jay Blumler (see for example, Blumler, 1977). Here the displacement takes the form of a concentration on the relations between the mass media and political and state institutions, both domains being regarded as independent power blocs essentially separate from the economic structure. Hence for Blumler, pertinent questions about the political and cultural role of the mass media can be adequately examined without reference to the economic structures and dynamics underpinning them (see Gurevitch and Blumler, 1977). A separate but related mode of displacement is offered by the recent work of Daniel Bell with its powerful argument that the economic, political and cultural spheres of modern capitalism now constitute distinctive realms, separated from one another and governed by different and increasingly antagonistic axial principles (Bell, 1976). These assertions of dissociation are not particularly surprising. Indeed they are an integral and necessary element in liberal and conservative critiques of Marxist sociology. What is surprising however, is the appearance of analogous arguments within the Marxist sociology of culture itself.

As Stuart Hall has recently pointed out, the insistence on the importance of economic determinations is 'the cardinal principle of Marxism without which it is theoretically indistinguishable from any other "sociology"' (Hall, 1977d, p. 23). 'When we leave the terrain of "determinations"' he argues, 'we desert not just this or that stage in Marx's thought, but his whole problematic' (Hall, 1977b, p. 52). And yet, the dominant British currents of Marxist work on the sociology of culture, Hall's included, have persistently failed to explore this question of economic determinations with any degree of thoroughness.

To a large extent, this deletion of determination as a significant focus of analysis is rooted in a reaction to the crudities of the reductionist position which presented the mass media as instruments of the capitalist class, and saw their products as a more or less unproblematic

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relay system for capitalist interest and ideologies. This position had its hey-day in the inter-war years and in the early 1950s. Even so it lingers on and continues to find powerful academic supporters. Ralph Miliband's presentation of the role of the media, for example, is often strongly tinged with reductionism, as in this extract from his recent book, *Marxism and Politics*:

Whatever else the immense output of the mass media is intended to achieve, it is also intended to help prevent the development of class consciousness in the working class . . . the fact remains that 'the class which has the means of material production at its disposal' does have 'control at the same time of the means of mental production'; and that it does seek to use them for the weakening of opposition to the established order [Miliband, 1977, p. 50].

Over and against the limitations of this kind of reductionism, contemporary Marxist sociologists of culture have emphasised the relative autonomy and specificity of the cultural sphere, and its irreducibility to class interests and class control, and have looked for the central connections binding the mass media to the power structure, not in its relations to monopoly capital but in its relations to the capitalist state. Both these thrusts have been immensely valuable in that they have addressed crucial but underdeveloped areas in Marxist sociology. The decisive rejection of crude reductionism which they represent was both important and necessary, and continues to be so. However, in its attempts to purge itself of economism, much contemporary work, we would argue, has been 'led to what can be seen as an increasingly debilitating neglect within ideological analysis of precisely the economic level' (Garnham, 1977, p. 345). The result is a curious paradox. On the one hand sociologists of communications working from within a Marxist framework are obliged to evoke economic determination, since this is what distinguishes their position from others. At the same time, the fact that they fail to investigate how these determinants operate in practice severely weakens both the power and the distinctiveness of their analysis. Determination becomes a kind of ritual incantation rather than a necessary starting point for concrete analysis.

In the next section we will look more closely at this paradox in action in the work of the two most important and influential Marxist theorists of communications currently working in Britain — Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall.

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The members of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies have recently described their main aim as 'developing theories of cultural and ideological formations within the broad framework of a Marxist problematic, without resorting either to economism or idealism' (Chambers *et al.*, 1977, p. 109). This aptly characterises not only their own work, but the principal thrust of Marxist cultural studies in Britain more generally. The battle against economism has had various outcomes. It has led Edward Thompson, for example, to reject the central metaphor of base and superstructure altogether and to replace it with a conception of the economy and culture as adjacent domains interacting dialectically. As he put it in a recent interview, 'There are certain value systems that are consonant with certain modes of production, and certain modes of production which are inconceivable without consonant value systems. There is not one which is dependent on the other . . . these two things are different sides of the same coin' (quoted in Mason, 1977, p. 229).

A similar position underpins the argument which Raymond Williams developed in one of the seminal books of modern communications studies, *The Long Revolution* (1965). He presents the 'long revolution' in culture, initiated by the extension of the education and communications systems, as a third current of change alongside the industrial revolution in the economy and the democratic revolution in the political sphere. These three processes together, he argues, define the texture and tempo of contemporary experience. They interact continuously, dialectically, with no one sphere exercising a determining influence over the others. Consequently he argues, it is necessary to study the complex interactions between the spheres of culture, polity and economy 'without any concession of priority to any one of them we may choose to abstract' (Williams, 1965, p. 62). However, in the concrete and polemical analysis of mass communications in contemporary Britain which he published the following year, he is constantly tugged back towards acknowledging the pivotal position of the economic structure and the determinations it exerts on cultural production. He concedes that the growing concentration of control in the hands of the large communications corporations is the key defining characteristic of the emerging situation, and that as a result 'the methods and attitudes of capitalist business' have penetrated more deeply into more and more areas and 'have established themselves near the centre of communication' (Williams, 1968, p. 31). Confronted with these facts his solution is to propose an extension of public ownership as the single most significant lever for change (Williams, 1968, p. 155).

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The tension between Williams' general theoretical stance and his concrete analysis of contemporary mass communications systems has been further sharpened in his later work. Consider these extracts from two of his recent writings:

The insertion of economic determinations into cultural studies is of course the special contribution of Marxism, and there are times when its simple insertion is an evident advance. But in the end it can never be a simple insertion, since what is really required, beyond the limiting formulas, is restoration of the whole social material process, and specifically of cultural production as social and material [Williams, 1977a].

It was impossible, looking at new forms of broadcasting (especially television) and at formal changes in advertising and the press, to see cultural questions as practicably separable from political and economic questions, or to posit either second-order or dependent relations between them [Williams 1976b, p. 90].

Here is the paradox in action. On the one hand he argues forcefully that a close attention to economic determinations is indispensable to a thoroughgoing Marxist sociology of culture. On the other he insists that it is impossible to posit 'second-order or dependent relations' between cultural production and economic dynamics.

Once again, however, when it comes to the concrete analysis of the contemporary mass media he is obliged to concede the centrality of expanding corporate economic control and to recognise its enormous potential for determining the range and form of the coming mass communications system. As he forcefully points out in his book, *Television: Technology and Cultural Form* (1974), the new electronic technologies of data processing, video, satellite communications and cable television.

can be used to affect, to alter, and in some cases control our whole social process . . . These are the contemporary tools of the long revolution towards an educated and participatory democracy, of the recovery of effective communication . . . But they are also the tools of what would be, in context, a short and successful counter-revolution, in which a few para-national corporations could reach further into our lives, at every level from news to psycho-drama, until individual and collective response to many different kinds of

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experience and problem became almost limited to choice between their programmed possibilities [Williams, 1974, p. 151].

In that last sentence particularly, determination returns with a vengeance albeit through the back door of polemics and in a form which is never systematically explored in Williams' more theoretical work.

As we have already noted, Stuart Hall, like Williams, maintains that questions of economic determination are central to a Marxist sociology of culture. However, unlike Williams they make no significant appearance in his substantive analysis of the contemporary mass media. They are announced and placed in a theoretical bracket. This is principally because he locates his central problematic elsewhere, drawing extensively on Gramsci and Althusser, whom he argues, 'constitute the really significant contribution, post Marx, Engels and Lenin, to the development of a Marxist "theory of the superstructures" and of the base/superstructure relation' (Hall, 1977b, p. 64). Both thinkers have exerted a complex and continuing influence on the course of British cultural studies and it would require at least another paper to do justice to this process of assimilation. For the present though, we simply wish to indicate some very basic points of influence.

Both Gramsci and Althusser present the sphere of culture and ideology as increasingly central to the maintenance of modern capitalism's relations of production, but both are at pains to emphasise that the domain of ideology is relatively autonomous and has its own specific dynamics and its own unique effectiveness. Within this definition of the situation, therefore, the field of ideological analysis can be seen not only as a crucial area for analysis in its own right, but as an area whose internal dynamics can be uncovered independently of a consideration of the economic contexts in which it is embedded. In one of his recent articles, for example, Stuart Hall has forcefully argued that the growth of the modern mass media 'coincides with and is decisively connected with everything that we now understand as characterising "monopoly capitalism"' and that in their latest phase of development 'the media have penetrated right into the heart of the modern labour and productive process itself'. Nevertheless, he argues 'these aspects of the growth and expansion of the media historically *have to be left to one side by the exclusive attention given here to media as ideological apparatuses*' (Hall, 1977a, p. 340; our italics). We would argue to the contrary, that the ways in which the mass media function as 'ideological apparatuses' can only be adequately understood when

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they are systematically related to their position as large scale commercial enterprises in a capitalist economic system, and if these relations are examined historically. Given the way in which Hall defines his central problematic, however, this separation of the ideological and the economic dimensions of media operations is entirely understandable. Nevertheless, we would argue that it necessarily results in a partial and truncated explanation of ideological production.

Althusser's influence is also very evident in the phrase 'ideological apparatuses'. Indeed, the extension of what was to be included under the conceptual umbrella of 'ideology' constitutes Althusser's second great contribution to cultural sociology. Within this widened definition, ideology 'was not only a description of a system of relatively formal beliefs; it was rather a description of a body of practices, relationships and institutions' (Williams, 1977b, p. 13). Consequently, as Pierre Macherey has pointed out, 'to study the ideology of a society is not to analyse the systems of ideas, thoughts and representations. It is to study the material operation of ideological apparatuses to which correspond a certain number of specific practices' (quoted in Mercer and Radford, 1977, p. 5). In point of fact, however, most work on the media conducted under this rubric has not examined the 'material operations of ideological apparatuses' and the practices corresponding to them. At least, it has not done so directly. Rather it has approached them obliquely, as they are refracted through the forms of particular media products. Here the decisive influences have come from the various styles of semiological analysis. Semiology has been, in Althusser's phrase, the 'pup' that has consistently slipped 'between the legs' of contemporary Marxist analyses of ideology (Hall, 1977c, p. 30).

Starting from the very reasonable assumption that 'every text in some sense internalises its social relations of production' (Eagleton, 1976, p. 48), this approach takes the argument a stage further and suggests that these relations can be retrieved and explicated through a reading of the text. In order to become cultural goods for public consumption, the raw materials of media output — the events, sets of relations and general ideologies — have to be translated into cultural forms — soap opera, news items, documentary programmes — each of which is governed by particular processes of signification employing a range of codes and sub-codes. Hence media products are messages in code, messages about the nature of society, about the nature of productive relations within the media themselves, and about the nature of the relations between media organisations and other institutional domains and social processes (see Hall, 1973 and 1975).

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The analysis of media products is therefore essentially an act of decoding, an attempt to excavate the various levels of social and ideological relations which are embedded in the form. It is a kind of archaeology of social knowledge. One of the best examples of this technique applied to the contemporary media is Stuart Hall's analysis of the centre piece political discussion in the special edition of *Panorama* before the crucial election of October 1974.

As Raymond Williams has pointed out, 'the television discussion is not only a political event but also a cultural form, and that form indicates many overt and covert relationships' (Williams, 1976a, p. 38). Hall extends this point and uncovers the way in which the programme form contains and reproduces both the structure of the legitimate political domain pivoted upon parliament, and the structure of the relations between broadcasting organisations and the sphere of politics and the state (see Hall *et al.*, 1976 and Hall 1976).

Despite its fertility the analysis is, however, ultimately unsatisfactory. In the first place the programme chosen is atypical of television output in general in at least two important respects. The fact that the final processes of production take place 'live' in the studio means that they are much more clearly visible than in the case of say plays, series or documentaries, where production is fully accomplished before transmission and where the underlying relations of production are concealed rather than revealed by the form. Secondly, the fact that the programme is embedded in a set of public and highly formalised relations, between broadcasters and the political and state apparatuses, makes the reproduction of these relations within the form of the programme relatively easy to detect. More often than not, however, the crucial relations between production personnel and other significant sources of determination and constraint, particularly those in the economic domain, lack this degree of codification and tend to work more covertly and surreptitiously. Consequently it is not just a question of devising more adequate modes of textural analysis and applying them to a comprehensive range of media output. In addition to the problems of typicality common to any case study there is a fundamental methodological difficulty in approaching social and structural relations through the analysis of texts. However well conceived and executed, textural readings remain a variety of content analysis and as such they suffer from the familiar but intractable problem of inference. It is one thing to argue that all cultural forms contain traces of the relations of production underlying their construction, and of the structural relations which surround them. It is quite another to go on to argue that an

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analysis of form can deliver an adequate and satisfactory account of these sets of relations and of the determinations they exert on the production process. They can't. In our view the sociology of culture and communications has been seriously incapacitated by the tendency to over-privilege texts as objects of analysis. Textural analysis will remain important and necessary, but it cannot stand in for the sociological analysis of cultural production. Indeed, if sociology is to make an important contribution to contemporary cultural analysis, then it is primarily in the analysis of social relations and social structures that its strongest claim to significance can and should be staked.

In addition to highlighting problems of methodology, the *Panorama* piece also exemplifies the key conceptual focus of much contemporary British work — namely its concern with the relationship between the media and the state. Here again the twin influences of Gramsci and Althusser have been seminal. Hall and his colleagues follow Gramsci in arguing that, 'in capitalist social formations, the state is the site where the "unity" of the dominant ideology, under the dominance of a leading faction of capital, is *constructed*, and thus where hegemony is secured' (Chambers *et al.*, 1977, p. 114). This emphasis on the pivotal role of the state in organising and orchestrating legitimisation processes is further reinforced by Althusser's very influential conception of the 'ideological state apparatuses'. There is no space here to debate the adequacy of these formulations or to explore the important and complex differences between them. We simply wish to indicate their general influence.

Firstly and most obviously, they have concentrated attention on that sector of the media which is most closely and formally bound to the state and to the political sphere — broadcasting. With the exception of the news coverage in the press, the exclusively commercial sectors of the media have been largely ignored. Secondly, the areas of content singled out for sustained analysis are primarily those concerned with presenting aspects of the political system or state apparatuses — the coverage of parliamentary politics, the legal and judicial systems, the role of the state in industrial relations. Thirdly, within these chosen areas, analysis has concentrated predominantly on actuality presentations — news, current affairs and editorials, and documentaries — and neglected the wealth of pertinent fiction. Once more these skews in attention raise important questions of typicality and generalisability, and these questions are touched in turn by a central problem of conceptualisation.

By displacing economic dynamics from the centre of analysis and concentrating so centrally on the relations between the media and the

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state, this general thrust necessarily results in a partial account of the contemporary situation. Firstly it ignores or glosses over several very important developments. It fails to analyse the growing economic interpenetration of the different media sectors and the consequences of this movement for the structure of control and for the range and forms of the resulting products. Similarly, it ignores the growing internationalisation of the British mass media and the concomitant theoretical problems raised by their position in the global economic system of communications. Despite the theoretical overtures to continental Europe, in its concrete practice the Marxist sociology of culture in Britain remains remarkably parochial. This is a logical but nonetheless regrettable consequence of taking the relations between the media and the nation state, rather than those between the media and trans-national corporate capitalism as the central focus of analysis. However, it is not simply that the prevailing perspective contains important imbalances and hiatuses; it is also that it is unable to produce a convincing account of those areas and processes that it chooses to concentrate on. As we shall suggest with the case of news production, the failure to explore the nature and consequences of economic determinations has produced a partial and truncated explanation. It is not that the role of the state is not a significant dimension of analysis. Clearly it is. However, as we shall argue in more detail in our discussion of cultural imperialism, its role and significance can only be adequately grasped and incorporated into analysis when it is systematically related to the structure and operations of the economic system, both nationally and internationally.

Despite the gaps and problems with their analyses, both Hall and Williams attempt to combine an emphasis on the specific dynamics and effectivity of cultural production with at least an insistence on 'determination in the last instance by the (economic) mode of production'. Recently however, this general project has come under fire from two opposed directions, represented by Barry Hindess and his colleagues on the one side, and Dallas Smythe on the other.

According to Hindess and his collaborators, the attempt to retain both 'determination in the last instance' and the relative autonomy of the cultural sphere is irredeemably flawed at root. Ultimately, they argue, there are only two choices; either you take determinations seriously in which case you are inevitably involved in some variant of reductionism, or you take the tenet of relative autonomy a stage further and treat the cultural sphere as genuinely autonomous. As Barry Hindess has recently put it, 'Either we effectively reduce ideological phenomena to class interests determined elsewhere (basically in the

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economy) . . . Or we face up to the real autonomy of ideological phenomena and their irreducibility to manifestations of interests determined by the structure of the economy' (Hindess, 1977, p. 104). According to this view then, anyone who continues to hold to the tenet of economic determination is inevitably tugged back towards forms of analysis which, however disguised, are fundamentally economistic and reductionist.<sup>1</sup> In order to avoid this undertow it is therefore necessary to reconceptualise the connections between relations of production, and ideological and cultural forms, and to conceive them 'not in terms of any relations of determination "in the last instance" or otherwise, but rather in terms of conditions of existence' (Cutler *et al.*, 1977, p. 314). Consequently, they argue, while certain ideological and cultural forms provide some of the necessary conditions of existence for the continued reproduction of capitalist relations of production, these forms are in no way determined by the economic mode of production. Rather they are generated from within the sphere of culture and ideology itself. Although arrived at by a very different route, this formulation is strikingly similar to Edward Thompson's position outlined earlier. Both are based on a decisive rejection of economic determinations.

A diametrically opposed criticism of the position exemplified by Hall and Williams has come from Dallas Smythe. For him the problem is not that they retain a notion of economic determination, but that they do not follow its implications through in their concrete analysis. According to Smythe, the 'first question that historical materialism should ask about mass communications systems is what economic function for capital do they serve' (Smythe, 1977, p. 1). His answer is that the media's primary function is to create stable audience blocs for sale to monopoly capitalist advertisers, thereby generating the propensities to consume which complete the circuit of production. For Smythe then, the media's role in reproducing ideology is essentially secondary:

What is the nature of the content of the mass media in economic terms under monopoly capitalism? The information, entertainment and 'educational' material transmitted to the audience is an inducement (gift, bribe or 'free lunch') to recruit potential members of the audience and to maintain their loyal attention. [Smythe, 1977, p. 5].

While we endorse Smythe's general project of restoring economic dynamics to a central position in the analysis of mass communications,

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the way he develops his argument is seriously flawed in several crucial respects (see Murdock, 1978). Firstly his analysis is skewed. It concentrates exclusively on the American press and commercial television, both of which have a clear and obvious articulation to consumer advertising. It entirely ignores a number of very important media sectors with a minimal dependence on advertising revenue — notably, paperback publishing, the cinema and the popular music industry. This is no accident. It is symptomatic of Smythe's severely truncated conception of the relations between economic dynamics and cultural production. Ironically, despite his emphasis on the centrality of the economic, his presentation succeeds in severing the crucial links between the economic and ideological dimensions of media production. In his concern to highlight the role that the media plays in the circulation of economic commodities he completely ignores their independent role in reproducing ideologies, and consequently fails to explore the ways in which economic determinations shape the range and forms of media production and its resulting products. He reduces the media entirely to their economic function.

We do not accept that the effective choice is between economism and reductionism on the one hand, and the 'necessary non-correspondence' proposed by Hirst and his colleagues on the other. Rather, we wish to argue for a position that retains the necessary stress on the relative autonomy of cultural production which characterises the work of Williams and Hall, but which takes the question of economic determinations as a central category and focus of analysis.

When Ian Connell argues that 'the media belong first and foremost to the region of ideology' (Connell, 1978, p. 75), he is speaking not only for himself, but out of the dominant tendency of Marxist cultural theory examined above. Clearly the mass media do play a central ideological role in that their products are a key source of images, accounts and legitimations of British capitalism and of the structured inequalities in wealth and power which it generates. Our quarrel, however, is with the phrase 'first and foremost'. For us the mass media are 'first and foremost industrial and commercial organisations which produce and distribute commodities' within a Late Capitalist economic order (Murdock and Golding, 1974a, pp. 205-6). Consequently, we would argue, the production of ideology cannot be separated from or adequately understood, without grasping the general economic dynamics of media production and the determinations they exert.

These economic dynamics operate at a variety of levels and with varying degrees of intensity within different media sectors and different

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divisions within them. At the most general level the distribution of economic resources plays a decisive role in determining the range of available media. For example, as we have argued elsewhere, the absence of a mass circulation radical daily newspaper in Britain is primarily due to the prohibitive costs of market entry and to the maldistribution of advertising revenue (Golding and Murdock, 1978). Economic imperatives also help to determine the general form of available media. The lack of fit between the media systems of many Third World countries and the social needs of their populations — the institutionalisation of domestic, studio-based television in communally oriented outdoor cultures for example — is due in large measure to the historical and economic dominance of the major multi-national corporations. Similarly, dispersed rural populations are not particularly well served by urban-based daily newspapers. Within individual media organisations economic imperatives may play an important role in determining the allocation of productive resources between divisions with varying ratios of costs to audience appeal, as between sports coverage and educational broadcasting, or between foreign and crime news for example. And lastly, as two recent studies of television fiction production have clearly shown, economic considerations may penetrate and frame the forms of particular productions (see Alvarado and Buscombe, 1978, Murdock and Halloran, forthcoming).

How these various levels of determination, either singly or in combination, impinge on particular production situations is a matter for empirical investigation. However it is our contention that such investigations should form a focus of future sociological work on the contemporary media. To illustrate the contrast between the approaches we have been describing and our own perspective we will look briefly at two particular areas. The first is news, and particularly broadcast journalism, which has attracted the attention of analysts working from a variety of theoretical and methodological positions. The second example is cultural imperialism, which by contrast to news, has been largely neglected by sociologists of culture and communications. This oversight seems to us symptomatic of the limitations of approaches which divorce cultural analysis from political economy.

News is an account of events in the world produced for public consumption, and as such is bound to attract analysts interested in the ideological nature of media output. There is certainly no originality in displaying the partial view of affairs included in the news, whatever the medium. It is over fifty years since Walter Lippmann's brilliant essays



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showed how and why 'news is not a mirror of social conditions but the report of an aspect that has obtruded itself' (Lippmann, 1965, p. 216). But more recent research has attempted to show that this partiality is ideological in the sense that it creates a coherent view of reality, and furthermore a view that is derived from and functional for prevailing structures of power.

There are many problems in demonstrating the links between news, ideology, and power structures, and we cannot review all of them in this paper. We do wish, however, to suggest one or two gaps in recent discussions and briefly indicate an alternative approach. It is interesting that many writers have focused their attention on the BBC, and have sought explanations for its output in terms of the complex relationship of the corporation to the state. This is to be expected since much of this work derives from a concern with the theory of the state. It does present problems, however, when examining the news media as a whole, the majority of course being in the private sector.

One recurrent theme in recent analysis of news is the detection of frameworks of understanding within which news is constructed. These are discovered in the analysis of texts by a circumspect reading of the assumptions and nuances of routine journalism. This work is often brilliant and insightful. It does not, however, tell us anything of the social derivation of such frameworks; by whom are they shared and how do they come to be part of the very rhetoric and character of news? It only begs the question to invoke the refrain that news media are part of a system which is 'structured in dominance'.

A common instance of such textual inspection is that of industrial relations news. But the structures discerned in such news, the meticulous balancing of CBI and TUC, the emphasis on disruption and the disturbing effects of strikes on the public, the avoidance of rank and file spokesmen, all add up to a partiality which is not so easily displayed in other areas of news as the implication that such analysis is generalisable would suggest. Far from being a paradigm instance, industrial relations news is exceptional in the clarity with which the limitations of news can be discerned. This clarity invites far too easy an explanation of the sources of news structures. In *Bad News*,<sup>2</sup> the most important of recently published accounts of industrial relations news, the authors are anxious to get beyond economic explanations of media behaviour. They see such explanations as simply based on a view of the influence of commercialism.

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has revealed that critiques which simply stress commercialism are in themselves too limited . . . Although for instance in the buying of receivers and the paying of licences it can be admitted that the mass media or the consciousness industry is in many areas highly profitable and is generally subject to the logic of commercialism, it does serve another and no less important function at the cultural level, a function which is unaltered by the private or public ownership of the medium. This second function, the cultural legitimization of the consensus and the status quo is not subject to the narrow confines of commercialism. It is the role of television as a front-runner medium of cultural legitimization that is served by institutions of broadcasting however funded, whether privately or state owned [Ibid., pp. 13-15].

There are many problems with this view. Not least it is a very constricted view of the realm of the economic, which is rather more than the incidental matter of funding. Second, it is an oddly essentialist view which seems to attribute the ideological character of television culture to something in the nature of the medium. Third, and related to this, it blanks out any discussion of practice in and control of the production process, ruling out, apparently, any voluntarism in the work place.

Most importantly, where do these roles and functions come from? For Stuart Hall the immediate explanation is the power of 'accredited spokesmen', elite sources who provide news in a form acceptable to the dominant view of social order. 'In short the media reproduce the event, already presignified, and they do this because they obey the requirement on them to report 'impartially' what the decision makers say and do, and because the structure of news values orients them in certain predictable and practised ways to these privileged sources of action and information' (Hall, 1975, p. 131). This is the exercise of cultural power, which consists of: '(a) the power to define which issues will enter the circuit of public communications; (b) the power to define the terms in which the issue will be debated; (c) the power to define who will speak to the issues and the terms; (d) the power to manage the debate itself in the media' (Ibid., p. 143). In this account the link between the news and ruling ideologies is explained in two ways, by the shared perspectives of journalists and sources, and the institutional connections between their social milieux, most crucially broadcasting and the state. For a sociologist this begs many questions. Significantly a recent examination of BBC news, based on a study of actual newsroom practice,

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returns to a position akin to our own. In this study Philip Schlesinger argues for the importance of 'the context within which television news is itself produced. This is, despite genuine public service features, a pre-eminently commercial one, . . . Nor can such news be divorced from the political economy of the society and state in which it is produced' (Schlesinger, 1978, p. 245). Another study, even more concerned with the politics of the BBC's interaction with the state, nonetheless emerges from studying production with a focus on the congruence between programme making routines and the needs and interests of ruling groups, and on the way in which commercial imperatives provide a framework which 'underpins the programme-making process and the premises upon which political television rests' (Tracey, 1977, p. 245).

A displacement of analysis to the purely political results in a view of the state as the arena of critical struggle in the search for cultural democracy. Command and control of both the means and the practice of cultural production disappear from view as critical points of conflict. Oddly, this is an approach which is forced to see the media as inert, passive, neutral transmission belts for ideological distribution. Not surprisingly the structures of ownership, control, production, and indeed the complex interplay between the media and other blocs in the power structure all have to be abandoned. By implication any media, in any configuration, would play this role. Power is reduced to influence. This view says that 'it is in politics and the state, not in the media, that power is skewed' (Hall *et al.*, 1976, p. 92). But how then does this skew occur? This limited account of control is a recurrent problem. Thus Hall is left arguing that the media 'install themselves' as dominant in the production and distribution of culture, so that, as we have noted, the historical and economic explanation for this process can be 'left to one side'. He poses the crucial question 'what are the actual mechanisms which enable the mass media to perform this "ideological work"?' Yet the answer he suggests merely poses the question in a different form.

The selection of codes . . . casts these problematic events, consensually, somewhere within the repertoire of the dominant ideologies . . . Hence though events will not be systematically encoded in a single way, they will tend systematically to draw on a very limited ideological or explanatory repertoire, and that repertoire . . . will have the overall tendency of making things 'mean' within the sphere of the dominant ideology [Hall, 1977a, pp. 343-5].

In other words, the news is in the mode of the dominant ideology be-

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cause it draws on the ideology that is dominant for its framework.

To begin to account for these links between ruling ideas and news demands an explanation of the actual processes of production, and of the control of resources which are in the last instance the ultimate boundary of those processes. The relationship of occupational beliefs and practices in journalism is a complex one, but it is only discoverable by reference to the history and political economy of news production.

Broadcast journalism draws many of its assumptions and practices from the press. In the early days of newspapers, after an initial period when publisher-printers seek freedom from licensing or other forms of control, growing commercial prosperity secures the independence of the press and eventually some form of constitutional guarantee of its autonomy. The transformation of a 'political' press, particularly a party-based press, to a mass circulation popular press, is a complex process and it would be misleading to present it as a clear process common to all countries. But there are essentially similar features that can be abstracted. The major change is in the economic base of the press. The 'retail revolution' results in competitive selling of branded products and an advertising industry to promote them. Newspapers are the ideal medium to convey such advertising to their consumer-readers, and advertising gradually replaces sales to a greater or lesser extent as a source of revenue. Consequently, newspaper prices can be reduced and the seeds of the popular mass circulation press are sown. The political party-based press often persists through this 'revolution', though normally forced to concede to the economic logic of the process. Where advertising is limited, political parties may be the only source of subsidy, thus sustaining a party-based press.

The journalistic consequences of this process are important. The search for readers draws newspapers away from a strident factionalism and towards a central neutrality of comparative inoffensiveness. Fact and opinion are distinguished. Their new relative value is captured in the famous 1921 dictum of C.P. Scott, editor of the English *Manchester Guardian*, that 'Comment is free, facts are sacred'. Opinions are caged in editorial columns, facts command the news pages. The distinction is institutionalised in the contrast between the reporter and the journalist, correspondent, or columnist.

Broadcasting began as a technical novelty, and only later was it developed commercially by the more opportunist members of the radio and telecommunications industry, until finally it became the major entertainment form of the twentieth century. It became a news medium at the same time, and news broadcasting was universally advanced to

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the front line in the scheduling considerations of broadcasting executives. Normally television news is the fixed point in a kaleidoscopic world of dramas, quizzes, soap operas, documentaries, and education. Three problems face broadcast journalism in its evolution as a distinct form of programming.

Firstly, broadcasting organisations are normally sanctioned by law and have their operations and structures defined by statute. Legal requirements have to be translated into routine practice, and it is in the consequent attempts to operationalise the generalities of the law that broadcast journalism falls back on the conventions of the press. Secondly, broadcast journalism has to establish a degree of autonomy from the press. Initially it is seen as a competitive threat, particularly to evening newspapers, and it is common for the press to demand limitations on the timing and extent of news broadcasting. Broadcast journalists were usually dependent on the press as a source of news in the early years, and it was only gradually recognised that broadcast news was potentially other than newspaper news distributed in a new way. For many journalists the trend to autonomy became too advanced and threw up a conflict of identity between the role of broadcaster and of journalist. Thirdly, broadcast journalism had to come to terms with the highly regulated distinction between fact and comment which it was constrained to observe by its centrality, close relationships with government, and constitutional position. Newspaper journalism had produced the creed of objectivity. Broadcast journalism had to be more than honest about the debate; it had to be above it. Gradually new creeds of impartiality and balance were developed while the distinction between fact and comment was institutionalised in organisational form by the separation of 'news' and 'current affairs'.

Broadcasting was involved with government from its inception. What was thought to be a technical necessity for national monopoly control of the new medium brought it to the attention of licensing authorities almost as soon as it was weaned from its inventors. This emphasis on the distribution system of the new medium displaced concern with its content. What was licensed was the reception and dissemination technology. As a result the controls seen as suitable for broadcasting were derived, by default, from the understanding and ideologies already evolved by earlier media, especially the press. Broadcasting was different in two vital respects; its output was heterogeneous — both information and entertainment — and it was almost universally organised in a monopoly service closely wedded in one form of relationship to the state. Yet the difficulties and fundamental problems these differences were

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to create went unforeseen in the early years of broadcasting.

Among the many complexities these origins generated was frequently a confused set of regulations governing the production of news. A variety of constitutional, legislative, and administrative strictures circumscribe not merely what news operations may be conducted, but what form news may take. What becomes apparent very often in a careful examination of these, is their studied vagueness, forcing television journalists back on their own definitions of correct professional practice and standards.

Journalistic notions of what is and is not news have been forged in the workshops of a commercial press serving historically particular needs and interests. It is in this process that news values are created. Discussions of news values usually suggest they are surrounded by a mystique, an impenetrable cloud of verbal imprecision and conceptual obscurity. Many academic reports concentrate on this nebulous aspect of news values and imbue them with far greater importance and allure than they merit. News production is rarely the active application of decisions of rejection and promotion to highly varied and extensive material. On the contrary, it is for the most part the passive exercise of routine and highly regulated procedures in the task of selecting from already limited supplies of information. News values exist and are, of course, significant. But they are as much the resultant explanation or justification of necessary procedures as their source.

News values are used in two ways. They are the criteria of selection from material available to the newsroom of those items worthy of inclusion in the final product. Second, they are guidelines for the presentation of items, suggesting what to emphasise, what to omit, and where to give priority in the preparation of the items for presentation to the audience. News values are thus working rules, comprising a corpus of occupational lore which implicitly and often expressly explains and guides newsroom practice. It is not as true as often suggested that they are beyond the ken of the newsman, himself unable and unwilling to articulate them. Indeed, they pepper the daily exchanges between journalists in collaborative production procedures. Far more, they are terse shorthand references to shared understandings about the nature and purpose of news which can be used to ease the rapid and difficult manufacture of bulletins and news programmes. News values are qualities of events or of their journalistic construction, whose relative absence or presence recommends them for inclusion in the news product. The more of such qualities a story exhibits, the greater its chances of inclusion. Alternatively, the more different news

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values a story contains, the greater its chances of inclusion.

We cannot here describe in detail the linkages between social values, news values, and news itself. Research into broadcast news (see Golding and Elliott, forthcoming), based on the approach we are advocating, suggests that the resultant product lacks two crucial dimensions, power and process, and is thus structurally incapable of providing other than an uncritical and consensual view of the world. The invisibility of power, both within and between nations, is caused by many factors; the geography of news gathering, the simplification of the *dramatis personae* of news and the limited arenas which news can survey, which leads to an emphasis on formal political events. Social process similarly disappears as the exigencies of production mould a view of reality which is fragmented and ahistorical.

Analyses which see news as necessarily a product of powerful groups in society, designed to provide a view of the world consonant with the interests of those groups, simplify the situation too far to be helpful. The occupational routines and beliefs of journalists do not allow a simple conduit between the ruling ideas of the powerful and their distribution via the air-waves. Yet the absence of power and process clearly precludes the development of views which might question the prevailing distribution of power, or its roots in the evolution of economic distribution and control. A world which appears fundamentally unchanging, subject to the genius or caprice of myriad powerful individuals, is not a world which appears susceptible to radical change or challenge.

There are three ways in which broadcast news is ideological. First it focuses our attention on those institutions and events in which social conflict is managed and resolved. It is precisely the arenas of consensus formation which provide both access and appropriate material for making the news. Second, broadcast news, in studiously following statutory demands to eschew partiality or controversy, and professional demands for objectivity and neutrality, is left to draw on the values and beliefs of the broadest social consensus. The prevailing beliefs in any society will rarely be those which question existing social organisation or values. News will itself merely reinforce scepticism about such divergent, dissident, or deviant beliefs. Thirdly broadcast news is, for historical and organisational reasons, inherently incapable of providing a portrayal of social change or of displaying the operation of power in and between societies. It thus portrays a world which is unchanging and unchangeable. The key elements of any ruling ideology are the undesirability of change, and its impossibility; all is for the best and change

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would do more harm than good, even if it were possible. Broadcast news substantiates this philosophy because of the interplay of the three processes we have just described.

News evolves then in response to a range of imperatives in its market situation which become incorporated in the working routines and beliefs involved in its production. Occupational ideologies make a virtue of necessity, and such necessities are born of the markets for which news was and is designed. There is, in effect, an evolutionary coincidence between the conventions which define what we mean by news and the ruling ideology. Cultural stratification is thus a function of the emerging structure of ownership and control over the means of cultural production. This is very much more obvious in the case of the press, as we have described at length elsewhere (see Murdock and Golding, 1974a and Golding and Murdock, 1978). Much remains to be done in charting the relationship between news, ideology and the reproduction of social order. Such work cannot progress, however, by confining the analysis of ideology to its determination by the state.

To display the history and economic infrastructures of news media is not to explain the form and function of the ideology they produce. It is quite obviously true, for example, that if British television news is ideological, it is equally so, and in similar ways, on both the commercial and public networks. However to understand the form news takes it is essential to account for its origins as a commodity both within a production process and in history. In an earlier article we have suggested some ways in which the form of ideological statements within news is constructed, and outlined the kinds of factors which may explain these forms (Murdock and Golding, 1974a, pp. 228-230). It is important, too, to understand which news media are available for the articulation of particular ideologies. It is a major task of a media political economy to explain the constricted range of communication outlets and the systematic relationship between this range and prevailing distributions of power and economic control. It is both politically defeatist, and methodologically essentialist, to assume that news is inherently composed of a particular set of ideological formulae. Why are some witnesses 'accredited' and others less so? The operation of the market and its response to changing forces in the organisation and control of production are the crucial mechanisms to explore if we wish to explain the unavailability of particular channels of communication to radical or politically dissident views. It is this task that a political economy of news media can attempt.

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The international diffusion of media companies and their products has become a major feature of mass communications in recent years. In fact this is only an exaggeration of an aspect of the culture industries which has always been present, most notably in publishing. This international growth should be central to the sociology of the media for two reasons. First, contemporary capitalism is characterised by the emergence of multinational companies and the variety of economic relations loosely labelled neo-colonialism. If we are interested in the relationship between the media and structures of power and dominance it is essential to examine the multinational media in this context. Second, if we are concerned to locate the media in an overarching structure of cultural production it is important to make the linkages with language and education. These linkages are starkest in the history of colonial relations and the subsequent development of these relations in the current period.

To focus on texts as ideology is to remain blind to the forces which lie behind the production of these texts. It is interesting that many of the writers discussed earlier in this paper were concerned with language. Yet cultural dependency is a critical arena in which to examine the ties between media, language, culture, and structures of domination (see, *inter alia*, Tunstall, 1977, Mazrui, 1975, and Cardona *et al.*). This would require both an historical and economic approach, analysing the role of indigenous elites in dependent societies, the education industry, as well as news and culture as export commodities.

Similarly a limited concern with the link between culture and the state relies on a sociology of the state which is unable to relate the nation-state to the international economy. It is symptomatic of the misplaced concern of many in the recent rediscovery of cultural sociology that their discussions of the media have totally ignored this international dimension. We suggest this is not merely a question of priorities or interests, but a missing dimension which is bound to result from extracting cultural sociology from the context of political economy.

Most major cultural producers are related to multi-national corporations. Several writers, most notably Schiller (1976), Mattelart (1976), Hamelink (1977) and Varis (1976) have demonstrated the acceleration of this trend in recent years. Yet their work is largely ignored by analysts of the media and the state. It is not that the state is irrelevant. But the relationship of the state to the international economy is a complex question to be explored not ignored, even if one's initial concern is with the state. It is not possible, for example, to analyse the role

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of American media in the American state without discussing the place of the electronics and telecommunications industries in twentieth century American expansionism. Nor is it realistic to relate the British media to the production of class ideologies without an understanding of the changing role of British capital in the post-imperial period. The context of the ebb and flow of state power is its relation to the international economy, particularly flows of capital controlled by international firms; this is precisely what has been referred to as the crisis of incorporation faced by British capitalism in the last thirty years. It is ironic that the priority given to analysis of the state by some writers on the left mirrors an outmoded liberal vision of a global web of nation-states in perpetual political balancing acts. Murray has summarised this development as follows:

Certainly there is a tendency in twentieth century Marxist writing on the world economy to infuse the nation-state with an independence set apart from the range and power of its own national capital. Nation-states become an entity without substance. This, in part, reflects the predominantly political treatment which the state has received in Marxist literature. Until recently it was primarily the repressive role of the state in capitalism which has been emphasised: two recent works by Miliband and Poulantzas have brought out its ideological function. What is remarkable is how little attention has been given to the economic role of the state in capitalism, and it is this which seems to me to be central to any discussion on the robustness of the nation-state in an era of interpenetration of national capitals . . . [Murray, 1975, p. 61].

Even if one wishes to concentrate on the political rather than the economic as a context for the study of ideology, the growth of cultural imperialism should be a particular concern. For many Third World countries the attempt to construct a 'new information order' has become not merely a complement to, but an intrinsic part of the struggle toward a new economic order. Beginning with minor rumblings in the forum of UNESCO in the late 1960s, cultural decolonisation has become a major theme in the 'north-south' dialogue. In important statements at the Algiers non-aligned countries conference in 1973, at the UNESCO General Assemblies in 1974 and 1978, and at major gatherings in Quito, Lima, Tunis, and most controversially Nairobi and New Delhi, the demand for a 'new international order for information' has emerged as a focal point of struggle.<sup>3</sup>

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The objection is to the flow of cultural goods, such as news and television programmes,<sup>4</sup> and to the flow of practices and institutions,<sup>5</sup> which act as a 'Trojan horse' for economic domination, or which in themselves constitute a threat to cultural autonomy or authenticity. None of this debate surfaces in recent work on the politics of the media, even by those writers apparently concerned to exhume the state as a central issue. One of the most interesting lines of inquiry to follow is the role of culture in securing the power of the 'new bourgeoisie' in dependent countries. The link between this group and the wider structure of dependence is very much bound in to the international structure of cultural flows. Their role as cultural brokers, using their membership of a cosmopolitan and mobile elite to lubricate the diffusion of cultural goods and values, is a key function in the international spread of the culture industries. The link between education and publishing exemplifies this.

Publishing, though traditionally a small-scale, even cottage industry, has followed the paths of the other media into diversified conglomerate industries (see Golding, 1978). The largest producers of educational books and materials include such firms as Xerox, CBS, ITT, Westinghouse and so on. Publishing is an international business. In 1977 exports accounted for 36 per cent of British book sales, and increasingly profits are further derived from sales of local subsidiaries in Third World countries. Most books in the Third World are college or school texts. The education and publishing industries are thus inextricably entwined, and both are central to the structure of cultural dependency. To fully explain the relationship of the capitalist state to dependency such links have to be explored. Cultural dependency is itself, however, an aspect of a more fundamental system of economic domination, and only comprehensible as such.

A political economy of cultural dependency is thus best developed by working from theories of imperialism or dependency. Many of these links have been explored by Latin American theorists. Their prime concern is with the historical evolution of capitalism from colonial to imperialistic, to neo-imperialistic phases, and with the corresponding structures of mercantilism, industrial laissez-faire and monopoly capitalism. By concentrating on the conquest and colonisation of Latin America, these writers reject approaches to development in terms of necessary and ubiquitous stages, and concentrate on the role of foreign investment and finance in creating a global structure in which development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin. In looking at the cultural components of this process such theorists, even those

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with a particular interest in the media, have kept the economic context in close focus. Faraone notes that

... in Latin America the press and other media support the hierarchical power structure of society, the ideology of the ruling class. This kind of role of the mass media is a consequence of capitalist class society and the function of international imperialism [Faraone, 1974, p. 23].

Corradi similarly argues that

the task is to analyse the social structures of Latin America and their processes in terms of changes that have taken place in the more inclusive system of international stratification. Social structures and idea-structures can then be studied as substructures of this more inclusive system. In other words what is being developed is a theory of dependent capitalism [Corradi, 1971, p. 40].

Other theorists in the field have stressed similarly the ultimate determining role of economic relations, seeing their own work as dealing

... with questions concerning the nature and dynamics of a super-structure that is the expression of a dependent economic system ... It is in this context that the cultural and ideological system assumes major importance. For it must fulfil a strong need for holding together a system that is heavily divided by inequalities in the distribution of resources [Dagnino, 1973, pp. 129-31].

Duner, similarly, in looking at cultural dependency in the light of his studies of Colombian education, concludes that:

the ideological factor, however, is not a totally independent variable but can well be understood in the light of the prevalent dependency structure. The latter can be seen as expressing the interests on which ideologies rest [Duner, 1973, p. 10].

As yet, work on cultural imperialism has been inconsistent and theoretically uncertain. But enough has been done to suggest that even, in fact particularly, if one's initial concern is with the state or with language, then the international culture industries are a crucial domain to explore. To ignore this area is more than a mistake of emphasis or a

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choice of interests. It is only possible if the links between ideology and power are sought outside the structures of material control, structures whose uncovering must now be an urgent priority for any serious sociology of culture.

## Conclusion

The media make a major contribution to the legitimization of continuing inequalities both within and between nations. It is for this reason that we see the study of mass communications as occupying a central position in the heartland of traditional sociological inquiry into the maintenance of social order. We have suggested two weaknesses in recent attempts to analyse this question. The first derives from an undue emphasis on the links between the media and the state, an emphasis which leaves aside the massive evidence for the historical and political importance of capitalist ownership and control of the means of communication throughout the range of the cultural industries. The second weakness derives from the classic difficulty of inference from content analysis, which in recent guise has led to too much authority being given to the circumstantial evidence provided by qualitative textual analysis.

The new emphasis being given to the study of culture and ideology within sociology is a welcome one. We have suggested in this paper, however, that to make the most of this revival such studies must start by developing a political economy of the culture producing industries. Only then will we have the scaffolding on which a secure account of the relationship between the media and ideology can be built.

## Notes

1. The general case has been argued by Paul Hirst in (Hirst, 1977, 131) and it has been applied to the work of the Birmingham Centre by Rosalind Coward (Coward, 1977a, p. 90).

2. Glasgow University Media Group (1976). For a more extensive study, as yet unpublished, see P. Hartmann (1976). We are not able here, obviously, to enter into a general discussion of either of these studies.

3. Behind the growing debate about 'communications policies' lies a whole complex of issues relating the state to the media multinationals. For a brief critical look at this debate see Schiller (1976, ch. 4.)

4. There is a massive amount of literature on news flows. For a summary and discussion see Harris (1974, 1975). On the flow of TV programmes see Varis (1973).

5. See Cruise O'Brien (1976), Golding (1977), and Pilsworth's paper at the 1978 British Sociological Conference on Culture, at which the papers in this volume were presented.

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