[22] Tower, Hegemony, and Communication Theory Leslie T. Good Hut anyway, on this particular summ« day Bemabe Mon(oy.i walked oul of Raeťs hist a* Onofre's mottled-green, 1953 Chevy pickup with the thrve-kgged dog on lop hiccupped to a »lop al Ihe lown's lone parking meter and, with a di*|>iiited — call II a lonely — "At. C'nImmA««!" Ihe sherill reached (or his dbHon pod Bitterly he began to write, thinking as he did so that if ever all the cantankerous streaks in people like Amarante Cordova, Joe Mnndragón and Onolre Marltneze were united behind a common cause, there would be much mnre than all hell to pay. |ohn Nkhols. TV MUvgio Bt*nfi*M War Introduction Shortly alter the airing of the ABC mini-series polemic, Amtnia. a viewer wrufp io the TV Guide editor: 'AmttA* was thought -provoking, challenging ami debate-inspiring. . . . Unfortunately, one of the premises of democracy is that people nol only be abl» bul willing to think about nul discuss things for themselves, K s is an unrealistic expectation, then the beat we can hope (or is an efficient and relatively enlightened tyranny, whether of Ihe right or ll« left. The point of the show, aflei all, is that we got the government we deserve."1 This viewer, probably innocently and unwittingly, m |ii%l lliose lew «imple sentences, provides a theory ol "power," on« which is strikingly doselo what Martin Camny has called the "official ideology of capitalist democracies" - pluralism.1 Tut briefly, the pluralist thesis of power says that power is a diffuse and empirically verifiable outcome or healthy conflict arming competing interest groups, utually manifested as individual consume! like decisions; and even though bawd on "conflict," '■i 5W Ihr riAitical f.cotomj of ihr Media I 5? ' E«ipue*nd Consumption power-as-pluialism works for Ihe "common good," integrating U5 inlo nur «octal environment, ultimately producing social «Ubdiiy by easing social tensions In ihe absence of overt conflict. CTn—jnm reigns in a Stale o( equilibrium, and "power" becomes irrelevant Power simply exeicises ilse|| out ol business. At the same limr. embedded In the view«'s letter are slalemenls that might, at first Hush, look like critiques of thai pluralist ideology, but which are actually qualified criticism« that ultimatrlv form m ironii articulation i>( apology (oc a "common good" view of power The viewer betray« one of lbe uncillkal biases ol pluralism — lliat we can u n pi oble m a lira II y "choose" our own relation« oi power, m we can at least identity Ihe manifest obstacles In our par I ici pa I ioii m the system By "■■tension, we deserve what we get If our .íp.ilhv pirirntt os from attempting tu exercise the power of choice lhal we Mi have al our disposal. Hem«, while we might nilkt/e our failure to take cunlrol i>( Ihc process, trilkism ol the process rlsel/ Is rendered inapposite In contrast to general "common good" notions ol power — either in pure or apologetic lorn» — ol which pluralism is exemplar, are views of power that question the notion ol social integration as social "stability.* Instead, (hey inteiprel stability as conliol, and provide a critical opening lor examining the nature o( domination and struggle This general contrast form* the basis for a number ol parallel and ongoing debates within Ihe McW and behavioral sciences, most explicitly within social and political theory. I lie debate over contrasting coim-pOoii« of puwrr is also found in communication theory in Ihc form ol the conventional contrast made helween 'mainstream" (I.e.. common good) and "critical" approaches lo con»mimic«lion studies While ono might quarrel with Ihe wiadom ol reducing the underlying debate to method or research pur («ose. the Implicit wlnlaiiliit debate i« one grounded in Ihe nature of the concept of "power." In particular, the debate rests on ways that Ihe intimately related notion ol "consensu*" becomes implicated and inlerpieted by competing Iheoiie* of power. What are generally taken lo be "ma ins I team" approaches to communication include those views thai argue or assume thai communication plays a socially integrating ide. Power is seen as an ultimately integrative force, and communication i« functional in nol only exercising power, bul also, in lum. in producing and maintaining social stability. Traditional development communication campaigns and Ihe field ol journalism, lor example, make such functional, integrative assumptions. To some extent. ||n>«e view« do not test or even acknowledge Iheir own theories ol power, bill simply take them a* given. 1 he assumptions they make about the nature ol power are often quite opaque only implicit in thcr theories of communication. The Fotiutai bionomj of ihr Media t Í09 Power. Hegemony, and Communication Theory / 93 Al the same time, ironically, their assumptions about power suggest lhal power itself is transparent That is, their embedded, hidden theories ot power assume that power Is essentially a phenomenon thai can somehow be made empirically available fur our inspection and crilkism __power is something that cannot hide from us. And since power is potentially transparent lo all, perhaps that is why such "mainstream" approaches to communication studies do not perfoi m a thoroughgoing nrtxil analysis ol Ihe nature of social power and the role that commit-nicalion plays I» creating and sustaining certain lorms nl power. More explicit are criticisms from within what I call a "politic" tradition ol communication theory. In whkh one might locate many — though certainly nol all — contemporary American academk totnmunkatlon studies, as well as a number ol recent European studies. Such criticisms of ihe role that communication plays in power relation« are slill rather genteel in that they amount lo a bemoaning nl t be fin line of social inlegra lion. Those polite critiques essentially languish lor power as pluralism as an ideal model, and note Ihe failure of communication — lor example. the failure of the news or ihe dearth ol public debate — to perlorni its consummate functional, integrative, socially stabilizing work I hough system eiirtsmc** are systematically exposed. Iheir theories aie not theories of social ronlml — they remain implicit theories ol social integration and contain biases in favor of social "stabilitv Iheir analyses are analyses — Indeed, critiques — of relations ol communication, but fall short ol being thoroughgoing, explicit analyses and critiques ol Ihe nature ol power relations by extension. Iheir assumptions about the nalure ol power remain relatively opaque while still implying that power is relatively transparent. So. while ostensibly "critical" in Iheir approach, they lend to be located within tlie broadly defined "mainstream" category ol com n t u rúca t inn «Indies by virtue ol Iheir implicit apologetic stance toward power as a functional "common good" force in sociely "Critical" commu nknlion studies. on, (he other hand, make few apologies for the nature of power relations, and also make explicit their complex assumptions about power hi lad. a "critical" approach to communication is critical hugely because II assumes thai social relations of communication are Insepatable trom social relations ol Power. The "integrative" role ol communication in the exercise of power is analyred and critiqued as a form of social control, ralhei lhan stability, partly in an effort lo create the possibility lor process and social change Furthermore. I argue thai critical approaches lo commu oka t M in also assume lhal all theories ol social tela lions — whether political, social, economic, social- psy chologic» I. cultural, etc. — are also I henries ol power, explicitly or implicitly. The buried assumptions about 9 no Tkr PoUlkol iiMWiv of Ihr Media I 54 / Empire anil Contiimphofi power found in more traditional Approach?« are excavated anďlakj bare. Hence, the "critical" purpose of such broadly defined critical approaches to communication is not only to analyse and critique — In short, (o demysti'y — Ihe nature of power irl.ilMini as social control and the rok* of communication in creating and suslainmi; those relations, but also to demystify Invar*» of social relations. While more traditional approaches to communication presume a kind of apolitical objectivity or autonomy from the social practices Ihey e>amine. ciilical studies presume a "moral" imperative ut drmysti fičal ion as creatine "possibility" — Hni is. as creating a rlimale of questioning all thai is otherwise laken for granted about social action. Such a climate of quesliurimg potentially opens sites lor struggle I« break the slasis of social control. the three very general views about power and communication lhal I have introduced above — Ihe thoroughly integrative view. Ihe apologelically integrative view, and the critical vtrW — are reflected historically within political theory in Stephen Luke*'* classic Irealise. ľtnoer: A Radical Vietor In that work, Lukes defines three bask views of power essentially in terms of three dimensions of opadly: (I) the one-dimensional view* — ■ pluralistic view of entirely transparent decisionmaking behavior: (2) the two-dimensional view — a qualified critique of the overt behavioral focus of pluralism; and (3) the three-dimensional view — a thoroughgoing critique of pluralism, wherŕ power is assumed lobe quite opaque, found, for example, in latent, and thus unobservabte. conflict. Below. E use Lukes's Ihree categories of Ihr concept "power" nol to define, hul I" help elaborate the assumptions r»f Hie three general approaches lo the «tudy of communication and (thus) power (hat I have described. I provide several general examine* as illustrations. Communication as Social Integration: Ihe thoroughly Integrative View I ihdn'i know why ■ done it, and I don't know what food it wouU have done me if I had. Knowing wouldn't have made it any less do"* (Mofly. in Larry McMutlry's Leaving Cheyenne) Ihe first model of power described by Lukes is what he call« a one-dimensional view that focuses on overt decision-ma king behavior as the principle manifestation of power Tills ideal model of "pluralism" assumes lhal the important social issues are (hose key issues clearly on Ihe pubJR agenda. ľower b defined by overt, manifest conflicts over (hose issues — as, for example, wilh traditional political participation in public debate and »"lections and other ballot measures. According The Political E'onomyoíf "objectivity" and "impartiality" this »deal view of Ihe pre** disregards Ihe many complcMties of Ihr agenda-building process, such a« ledum .il and practical new*rooin routine«, constrained snuireieporler relationships, and market pressures, all of whkh lend lo wurk again«! less en Irene lied opinion. And. as John Weslcrganrd has argued, Ihe notion of 'social responsibility" inherently conlradkls itself Journalists deny Iheir own influence, as objective purveyers ol Ihe "news." bul claim responsibility lor public education and. in Hie end. social integration lhal "responsibility" of course, enlails some authority.r The integrative flavor of Ihis general implicit model of one dimensional power is perhaps moel conspicuous In functional studies of media uses and gratification« In general. Ihis approach argue« lhal people choose lousernedia to gratify basic human needs —in particular. Ihe need lobe connected with one's social environment Put, as Philip Elliott observes. il considers neither the mm*of those needs nor Ihe peculiar distribution of social power and opportunity Sine« needs develop within an (tiffin; «el ol social relations, such an approach — based on «imply identifying and describing needs and their gratifications — inevitably supports those existing relations, hiding and suppressing alternatives." And by em pi »as i ring use (I.e.. decision making), this approach, as with more overt polilkally pluralist approaches lo communication, obscure* less obvkxis cowl m latent farina of power and conflirt played out through complex social arrangement« and "logics" lhal ultimately define and limit Ihe parameters within whkh individuals are able lo make chokes. I he following view uf power provides at k~a«l a limited alternative. I lie 111111 if of Communication as Social Integration The Apologetically Integrative View A hule -confessed" evil save« one from aeknowledRing a lot of hidden evil . . il » weM worth Ihe pike of an immiiniration What does il nutter. *ff«* *17. if margarine « just fal. when It goes further than bultri. and costs I«-' Whit den il matter, «ft» a», if Oder I* a little brutal or a little Mind, wlwn it allows us to live so cheaply? (Roland oailhei. "Operation Margarine," In Myttalegur* IHt FoliMol I.nwKWay «fine Mfdla I Hi Power. Hegemony, and Communication Tlieoty ' 57 The Iwo-dimenskinal view of power lhal l.ukes describes is represented primarily by Peter Bachrach and Morion S. Baralz's qualified critique of ihe behavioral fetishism of pluralism.* Tie "second lace ol power" identified by Bachrach and Baralz is «"«decision-making. What I* key lo this view is that not all consensus is "real" — some consensus is merely apparent and lakes the form of «wert conflkt In other words, this model of power account* for Ihe suppression of challenges to the inieiesis of a decision-maker as another important way of e«etri*ing power. When one prevents another from making a decision with regard I« a policy grievance, one has gone beyond simple decision-ma kin g behavior with regard to explicit, key issues. Poffirlrai issues are now M atam And Ihose issues may be kepi off Wie public agenda, as when maternal social groups are prevented from gaining access lo mass media. Thus, ihe process of agenda-building, rather than merely the agenda itself, become« relevant The "agenda" is no longer presumed lo be an unrefraclive mirror of a pluráli«! world, but a moie selective "•presentation of lhal world. Still, in spite of the added critical complexity, the two-dimensional view of power, according lo Lukes, remains merely a qualified critique of ihe behavkiral focus of pluralism because it presents noudecisiim-making as yet another/Win ol decisionmaking The individual i« thus retained as the unil of analysis. Furthermore, il retains the empirical l«cus of pluralism in lhat power continues to be defined in terms of nninŕfŕsr conflkt — wlielher overl or cover! By failing lo escape Ihe essential limitations of Ihe pluialisl model — ds iudn »dualism and empiricism — this ostensible critical view ol" power. I argue, ultimately work* as an apology for "common good" conceptions of power by first displaying its working inefficiencies and imperfections, but then rescuing Ihe ulral model by falling back upon its own limiting assumptions. Mkliael Shapiro has exposed and critiqued Ihe rhctark ol apology as a genre of discourse, and I eilend (he analogy here loexamine a similar genre of communication and power.1" Often, criticisms of a particular mainstream area of CcmaBWitkaHpn Study come from within its own bounds when historical and material i-.thiv motivate researchers lo reconsider the questions Ihey ask. For example, although Ihe assumptions and political biases of traditional development and diffusion research have been criticired sharply frnm outside on both substantive and empirical grounds, scholars working i" lhal tradition have also noted some of Ihe limitations of Iheir earlier work Everett Pogers. lor instance, notes the passing of ihe older behavior-persuasion paradigm with ils built-in assumption lhal developmnil ■vsuli* in Ihe equitable distribution of resources; in lis place, a growing concern with inequitable gap* in knowledge and effects — and how lo 58 / Fmpirt iml Consumption correct them — ha* emerged." SlHl, such criticisms lend lo focns on Ihe failure of campaign? du« lo their incorrect strudure or strategy, rather than In provide a thoroughgoing critique of Ihe underlying model of pluralism upon whkh .inch campaigns aie Intimately premised In Ihe lirftl place. Similarly, recent research areas «ithin journalism and political communication piovide challenges lo the strictly pluralist bent ní traditional ancestors. For example, studies of news "gatekeeping" examine Ihe agend a-building process and consider way» in winch issues are prevented — through Ihe editorial process especially — from ever reaching the public agenda." Those studies probe a deeper level of power than do their pluralist progenitors; they excavate "apparent" consensus and expose Its grounding in covert conflict. The suppression of social voices assume« a certain spotlight as an object of study — nondeeislon making, in Lukes's terms, is recognized as another fate of power. But, as In Lukes's scheme, nondecislon-making. such as gatekeeping, is regarded as yet another form (If more complex and hidden) of decision-making, lmmanenl within this view of power. Ihe active suppression of voices (whether intentional or merely incidental lo Ihe exigencies of production) operates much like a "bad apple." spoiling the "barrel" of otherwise pluralist diversity. The barrel provides both Ihe context and limiting assumptions, but the apple becomes Ihe primary object of analysis and critique Tlie imperfections of the jnu r nalisiic process are diseussed at length, but neither ihe reasons lor Ihose "imperfections" nr,r Ihe larger paradox of Ihe notion of a "free press" in this society are addressed adequately. The growing interes! in socialization and Ihe evnslrtictkin of social reality (or our image of the social world about us) provides — Irom wiihin Ihe research " mainstream" - - another sÍRoiíkanl. if ■Oimli—M limited, challenge lo Ihe static functional, behavioral model ol pluralism lliis general research area provides a significiml corrective for Ihe lack of context of liiimnin.ll "medla-us*" oriented studies. For example, studies of social identity make ait explicit attempt lo identify Ihe links between internal psychological processes and external social processes at differenl level* of analysis n Such an approach potentially provides a way of explaining how needs and wants, expressed socially, come into being within a complex social milieu. Similarly, studies of socialization examine the social process of Integrating individuals Into a larger "legitimate" role structure. Legitimation — a way of explaining or justifying a given social structure and Ihe ideas that support ll — mystifies by preventing people from recognising Ihe conventional, changeable basis of such a social Creation.'* Hence, power implicitly lakes on a form of mediation within this approach lhal Is suggestive of 7"r Potliical Economy ofiht MrJIa I »3 Power. Hegemony, and Communication Theory / W ihe Gremscian view of "hegemony" (which I discuss below). Still, many studies of social reality seem reluctant to lake Ihe critical step of lacklingand analyzing the underlying limiting assumptions of the notion of social integration irsel/. Rather, they often seem content with describing the process and how it can sometimes go wrong Perhaps -Cultivation Analysis," especially of television violence, provides a notable exception from within Ihe research "mainstream." Cultivation theory turns explicilly the entire notion of "corisensus" on it» head by arguing lhal resistance lo Ihe system tí prevented by the cultivation of fear and acquiescence to authority via symbolic representations of power. In other words, we Accept authority in the name of safety.1* Clearly, the theory reinterprets the notions of "Integration" as control and containment of change, and of consensus as consent. Thus, Ihe approach opens ihe door In ihe analysis of litími conflict and the complex exercise of power through social arrangements. In the following section. I present an elaboration of just such a compelling critical alternative to Ihe pluralist thesis and its apologies, whkh lakes a more sophisticated form in the concept of "hegemony." Communication as Social Control: The Critical View "Why do you keep telling me lhal things are going from bad to worse on my estate, my dear fellow'" Ihe landlord says to I'M steward "I know ll without you; can't you Uft about something el»*' You should let me forget about ih* stair of thin«, leave me in ignorance of it. then I thill be happy' (Nikolai Vasihevkh CosjdI. Dorf Sowft) Critical approaches to communication have in common not meiely llial all social relation* and relations of communication are also relations of power; they also assume that those relations of power take Some form of ifimrirMlroii within a complex contextual social web. In other words, 'social integration" is explieiHy recast as "social control " Bui the shapes that social control Is presumed to lake, and the ways relations of domination are accounted for lake many different forms. In other words, there is no single "critkal" approach to the study of communkaikin. much less social theory: the many and varied approaches that fall wilhin this rubric have drawn Irom and built upon a wide range of sometime* deeply conflicting intellectual traditions. For example, poli Ilea I-economic approaches to media studies air grounded In a long tradition of historical materialism They search for both direct and mediated connections between economic power and cultural forms, leading lo questions of media ownership and the role of 516 Hie Political franmir if ihe Unlia I 60 / Empire and Consumption cultural production ilself In general, tuch nulu« provide a material tímlcxt for interpreting the role of culture in reproducing social relation* and identities; they provide an explicit «count oí the dynamics behind the production of ideas and the mystification i«i the whole production process, as opposed to I «plaining ""V content or effect».'* A more static, functional approach lo explaining (he nature of soda) domination is represented by Structuralist Marxism, associated perhaps most strongly with Louis Althusser and Nicos ToulanlM* (in his earlier works). In contrast with the historical focus of political economic analyses, structural analyses In general search for objective structures (economic, political. Ideological) that social action presupposes. According lo Althusser's anti-existentialist argument, power is effected ihrough individuals' willing suhjugatron to ideology, which defines them and locales them within a social structure." Post-slrucluralisl approaches lake a very different tack, preferring nilicism of manifest social practices, rather than analysis of the underlying structures that give rise lo them Michel Foucaull. for instance, focuses on the relationship between power and knowledge in his criticisms ol the privileged discursive practices of institutions (such as mediane) and who gels to "talk" those discourses. Rather than seeking the deep structure of discourse (i.e., language), as a semiotkian might, Foucaull lias stayed with lis surface structures, its "rules of formation" at given historical moments. In general, Foucaull has been more concerned with criticising the use of power lo dominate — where social practices are represented in discursive practices — and less concerned with theorizing about the origin of power relations.11 All critical approaches lo power, such as those illustrated here, cast social relations as relations of domination, thus directly challenging pluralist assumptions about "diffuse* power Further, all confront more or less directly the notion of "consensus" wilh, for example, arguments about myslificatlon or willing subjugation to ideology. Since a thoroughgoing critique of "consensus" is crucial for a thoroughgoing oMqtM of Ihe inadequacy of the pluralist thesis for explaining power relations, it is important lo single out here the criIleal approach thai most explicitly takes apart "consensus" — not only "apparent" consensus, bul also "real" consensus — at a useful level of abstraction. Such an approach embraces Ihe Gramscian theory of "consent." Thus, thai is the approach on which I locus here. And that is also Ihe critical alternative and thoroughgoing challenge lo pluralism reflected in Lukes's third model of power. Unlike Bachrach and Baralz's "second face of power" (Ihe suppression of grievances). Ihe third dimension of power involves Ihe conditioning ol consensus by Ihe preťenlwn of grievances in Ihe firs! place ralh*r The PoliiK«' f