

- a. The primary objective of United States policy is to convince Soviet leaders that it is in the Soviet interest to participate in a system of world cooperation.
- b. Until Soviet leaders abandon their aggressive policies described in Chapter I, the United States must assume that the U.S.S.R. may at any time embark on a course of expansion effected by open warfare and therefore must maintain sufficient military strength to restrain the Soviet Union.
- c. The United States should seek, by cultural, intellectual, and economic interchange, to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that we have no aggressive intentions and that peaceable coexistence of Capitalism and Communism is possible.

Papers of Harry S. Truman: Files of Rose A. Conway

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 24, 1946

My dear Mr. President:

In the course of complying with your directive to prepare a summary of American relations with the Soviet Union, I have consulted the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Navy, Fleet Admiral Leahy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ambassador Pauley, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other persons who have special knowledge in this field. These gentlemen have prepared careful estimates of current and future Soviet policies, extensive reports on recent Soviet activities affecting the security of the United States, and recommendations concerning American policy with respect to the Soviet Union.

Their reports are valuable, not only because of the care and judgment exercised in their preparation, but because of the broad and comprehensive scope of the combined studies. I believe that the simultaneous definition by so many government officials of the problem with which we are confronted is in itself a forward step toward its solution.

There is remarkable agreement among the officials with whom I have talked and whose reports I have studied concerning the need for a continuous review of our relations with the Soviet Union and diligent effort to improve those relations. The gravity with which the problem of Soviet relations is viewed is, in itself, an encouraging sign that every effort will be made to solve it.

Factual statements, studies and opinions have been assembled and summarized and there is submitted herewith the report entitled, "American Relations With The Soviet Union."

Very respectfully,

CLARK M. CLIFFORD
Special Counsel to the President

THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

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AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

A Report to the President
by the
Special Counsel to the President

SEPTEMBER 24, 1946

OUTLINE OF THE REPORT

INTRODUCTION Page 1

- a. Our ability to resolve the present conflict between Soviet and American foreign policies may determine whether there is to be a permanent peace or a third World War.
- b. U. S. policy toward the U.S.S.R. will be greatly affected by the extent of our knowledge of Soviet policies and activities. A forecast of Soviet future policy toward this country can be based on the manner in which the U.S.S.R. has maintained her agreements with this country, and on recent Soviet activities which vitally affect the security of the United States.

CHAPTER I: Soviet Foreign Policy Page 3

- a. Soviet leaders believe that a conflict is inevitable between the U.S.S.R. and capitalist states, and their duty is to prepare the Soviet Union for this conflict.
- b. The aim of current Soviet policy is to prepare for the ultimate conflict by increasing Soviet power as rapidly as possible and by weakening all nations who may be considered hostile.
- c. Soviet activities throughout the world, with respect both to individual states and to international organizations, are in support of this policy of increasing the relative power of the Soviet Union at the expense of her potential enemies.

CHAPTER II: Soviet-American Agreements, 1942—1946 Page 15

- a. By means of written agreements reached at international conferences, the United States Government has sought to lessen the differ-

ences between this country and the U.S.S.R. which have resulted from the conflicting foreign policies of the two nations.

b. Since obtaining Soviet adherence to the principles of the Atlantic Charter in the United Nations Declaration, signed by the Soviet Union on January 1, 1942, the United States has attempted to reach understandings with the Soviet Union regarding peace settlements in Europe and the Far East, and regarding an international organization to preserve the peace.

c. Major agreements were made with Generalissimo Stalin by President Roosevelt at Teheran and Yalta and by President Truman at Berlin. Secretaries of State Hull and Byrnes have also conferred with Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov, and various military and diplomatic representatives of the United States have met in conference with Soviet officials in Washington, Moscow and other European cities.

CHAPTER III: Violations of Soviet Agreements with the United States Page 27

a. Soviet-American agreements have been adhered to, "interpreted," or violated as Soviet officials from time to time have considered it to be in the best interests of the Soviet Union in accordance with Soviet policy of increasing their own power at the expense of other nations.

b. A number of specific violations are described in detail. The principle violations concern Germany, Austria, the Balkan countries, Iran, Korea and Lend-Lease agreements.

CHAPTER IV: Conflicting Views on Reparations Page 51

a. A major issue now in dispute between the U.S.S.R. and the United States is reparations; the divergent views on this issue illustrate the basic conflict in the policies and aims of the two nations.

b. The major agreements concerning reparations were reached at the Berlin Conference in July 1945 and by the Allied Control Council in

March 1946; there have been continuous Soviet violations of these agreements since they were made.

c. Recent statements by Molotov in Paris reveal that the Soviet Union has abandoned the basic policy on reparations to which it had previously given nominal adherence and has embarked on a course of unilateral action.

CHAPTER V: Soviet Activities Affecting American Security Page 59

a. The U.S.S.R. is improving its military position with respect to the United States in such ways, for example, as construction of air bases in northeastern Siberia from which the United States can be attacked, and construction of large numbers of submarines for commerce raiding.

b. The U.S.S.R. is seeking wherever possible to weaken the military position and the influence of the United States abroad, as, for example, in China.

c. The U.S.S.R. is actively directing subversive movements and espionage within the United States.

CHAPTER VI: United States Policy Toward the Soviet Union Page 71

a. The primary objective of United States policy is to convince Soviet leaders that it is in the Soviet interest to participate in a system of world cooperation.

b. Until Soviet leaders abandon their aggressive policies described in Chapter I, the United States must assume that the U.S.S.R. may at any time embark on a course of expansion effected by open warfare and therefore must maintain sufficient military strength to restrain the Soviet Union.

c. The United States should seek, by cultural, intellectual, and economic interchange, to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that we have no aggressive intentions and that peaceful coexistence of Capitalism and Communism is possible.

INTRODUCTION

The gravest problem facing the United States today is that of American relations with the Soviet Union. The solution of that problem may determine whether or not there will be a third World War. Soviet leaders appear to be conducting their nation on a course of aggrandizement designed to lead to eventual world domination by the U.S.S.R. Their goal, and their policies designed to reach it, are in direct conflict with American ideals, and the United States has not yet been able to persuade Stalin and his associates that world peace and prosperity lie not in the direction in which the Soviet Union is moving but in the opposite direction of international cooperation and friendship.

Representatives of the United States have been conferring, bargaining and making agreements with the Soviet leaders, ever since Cordell Hull flew to Moscow in October 1943, in an effort to lay the foundations for a lasting peace settlement in Europe and the Far East through collective agreements and concerted action. The Secretary of State is now in Paris at another of a long series of conferences in which the United States and the Soviet Union each strives for peace settlements to its liking. And yet peace seems far away and American disillusionment over the achievements of peace conferences increases as the Soviet Government continues to break the agreements which were made at Teheran, Yalta and Berlin, or "interprets" those agreements to suit its own purposes.

Our fear of Germany and Japan is gone, but our suspicion of the Soviet Union—and suspicion is the first step

to fear—is growing. Suspicious misunderstanding of the Soviet Union must be replaced by an accurate knowledge of the motives and methods of the Soviet Government. Only through such knowledge will we be able to appraise and forecast the military and political moves of the Kremlin; without that knowledge we shall be at the mercy of rumors and half-truths. Sudden moves, or unexpected or misunderstood moves, by the Soviet Union might, if we do not understand the methods of the Kremlin, lead us into a showdown of force for which we would probably be unprepared, or might lead us into blind or hasty diplomatic retreat. Only through an accurate understanding of the characteristics of the one nation which can endanger the United States will our government be able to make and carry out policies which will reestablish order in Europe and Asia and protect this nation at all times.

In an effort to summarize the information upon which a sound American policy toward the Soviet Union can be based, the following Chapters will present an analysis of Soviet foreign policy, a description of the agreements made by the U.S.S.R. and the United States during the war, an account of the manner in which the Soviet Union has observed or violated those agreements, and a discussion of current Soviet activities affecting the security of the United States. The concluding Chapter describes our present policy toward the Soviet Union and contains recommendations concerning that policy.

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CHAPTER ONE

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

The fundamental tenet of the communist philosophy embraced by Soviet leaders is that the peaceful coexistence of communist and capitalist nations is impossible. The defenders of the communist faith, as the present Soviet rulers regard themselves, assume that conflict between the Soviet Union and the leading capitalist powers of the western world is inevitable and the party leaders believe that it is their duty to prepare the Soviet Union for the inevitable conflict which their doctrine predicts. Their basic policies, domestic and foreign, are designed to strengthen the Soviet Union and to insure its victory in the predicted coming struggle between Communism and Capitalism.

Generalissimo Stalin and his associates are preparing for the clash by many means, all of them designed to increase the power of the Soviet Union. They are assuring its internal stability through the isolation of its citizens from foreign influences and by maintaining strict police controls. They are supporting armed forces stronger than those of any potential combination of foreign powers and they are developing as rapidly as possible a powerful and self-sufficient economy. They are seizing every opportunity to expand the area, directly or indirectly, under Soviet control in order to provide additional protection for the vital areas of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin seeks to prevent the formation of any combination of foreign powers possibly hostile to the Soviet Union by insisting in Soviet participation, with veto power, in any international organization affecting Soviet interest, and by discouraging

through intimidation or otherwise the formation of regional blocs or other international associations which do not include the U.S.S.R. Every opportunity to foment antagonisms among foreign powers is exploited, and the unity and strength of other nations is undermined by discrediting their leadership, stirring up domestic discord, and inciting colonial unrest.

The singleness of purpose and the determination with which Soviet policy is pursued can be explained only in terms of its origin. It is based, not upon the interests and aspirations of the Russian people, but upon the prejudices, calculations and ambitions of the inner-directorate of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. This directorate, the Politburo, controls the government, the police and the armed forces with an iron hand. Its nucleus is a group of professional revolutionaries who have survived revolutions, purges and party-feuds for almost thirty years. This small group of able men, headed by Generalissimo Stalin, possesses great practical shrewdness and a remarkable ability for long-range forethought, but it is isolated within the Kremlin, is largely ignorant of the outside world, and is blinded by its adherence to Marxist dogma. Protective isolation, which has enabled Stalin and his associates to survive the attacks of jealous rivals, and allegiance to the doctrine which has been their inspiration, insure that the myopic approach to world affairs of the Politburo is not affected by conventional diplomacy, goodwill gestures or acts of appeasement.

It is perhaps the greatest paradox of the present day that the leaders of a nation, now stronger than it has ever been before, should embark on so aggressive a course because their nation is "weak." And yet Stalin and his cohorts proclaim that "monopoly capitalism" threatens the world with war and that Russia must strengthen her defenses against the danger of foreign attacks. The U.S.S.R., according to Kremlin propaganda, is imperilled so long as it remains within a "capitalistic encirclement."

This idea is absurd when adopted by so vast a country with such great natural wealth, a population of almost 200 millions and no powerful or aggressive neighbors. But the process of injecting this propaganda into the minds of the Soviet people goes on with increasing intensity.

The concept of danger from the outside is deeply rooted in the Russian people's haunting sense of insecurity inherited from their past. It is maintained by their present leaders as a justification for the oppressive nature of the Soviet police state. The thesis, that the capitalist world is conspiring to attack the Soviet Union, is not based on any objective analysis of the situation beyond Russia's borders. It has little to do, indeed, with conditions outside the Soviet Union, and it has arisen mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before the second World War and which exist today.

Mr. George Kennan, recently Chargé d' affaires of the U. S. Embassy in Moscow, analyzed for the State Department the reasons why the Soviet Union adopted Marxist Communism as a political faith. Kennan wrote in February 1946:

"At the bottom of the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is a traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was the insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on a vast exposed plain in the neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with an economically advanced west, the fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted Russian rulers rather than the Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact

between the western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned the truth about the world without or if foreigners learned the truth about the world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

"It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smouldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for the first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of the Bolshevik regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for the sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of the outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is the fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced the country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security to their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate the importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven by neces-

sities of their own past and present position to put forward a dogma which regards the outside world as evil, hostile and menacing. . . . This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from the outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries-old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in a new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before."

Soviet leaders have taken no pains to conceal the main features of Soviet foreign policy, although many of its subtle manifestations and those aspects of it most objectionable to other nations have been obscured or camouflaged. Recent speeches of Stalin and other Soviet leaders show much less emphasis on Big Three unity and less reliance on the United Nations as a prop of Soviet security and guarantee of international peace. In Moscow on February 9, 1946, in his most revealing statement since the end of the war in Europe, Stalin made the point that capitalism was the cause of wars, including World War II. Stalin stated that the war "arose in reality as the inevitable result of the development of the world economic and political forces on the basis of monopoly capitalism." Stalin in broad political-economic terms described the Soviet Union's past and future war planning and neglected virtually every aspect of the civilian economy. Such public emphasis on an economy adapted to the waging of war can only have been made for definite political purposes, both at home and abroad. It points toward a Soviet future in which a large adequately armed force will be maintained

and strengthened as rapidly as the development of Soviet heavy industry permits.

The Soviet Government, in developing the theme of "encirclement," maintains continuous propaganda for domestic consumption regarding the dangerously aggressive intentions of American "atom diplomacy" and British imperialism, designed to arouse in the Soviet people fear and suspicion of all capitalistic nations.

Despite the fact that the Soviet Government believes in the inevitability of a conflict with the capitalist world and prepares for that conflict by building up its own strength and undermining that of other nations, its leaders want to postpone the conflict for many years. The western powers are still too strong, the U.S.S.R. is still too weak. Soviet officials must therefore not provoke, by their policies of expansion and aggression, too strong a reaction by other powers.

The Kremlin acknowledges no limit to the eventual power of the Soviet Union, but it is practical enough to be concerned with the actual position of the U.S.S.R. today. In any matter deemed essential to the security of the Soviet Union, Soviet leaders will prove adamant in their claims and demands. In other matters they will prove grasping and opportunistic, but flexible in proportion to the degree and nature of the resistance encountered.

Recognition of the need to postpone the "inevitable" conflict is in no sense a betrayal of the Communist faith. Marx and Lenin encouraged compromise and collaboration with non-communists for the accomplishment of ultimate communistic purposes. The U.S.S.R. has followed such a course in the past. In 1939 the Kremlin signed a non-aggression pact with Germany and in 1941 a neutrality pact with Japan. Soviet leaders will continue to collaborate whenever it seems expedient, for time is needed to build up Soviet strength and weaken the opposition. Time is on the side of the Soviet Union, since population growth and economic development will, in the Soviet

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shoulder*

view, bring an increase in its relative strength.

The key to an understanding of current Soviet foreign policy, in summary, is the realization that Soviet leaders adhere to the Marxian theory of ultimate destruction of capitalist states by communist states, while at the same time they strive to postpone the inevitable conflict in order to strengthen and prepare the Soviet Union for its clash with the western democracies.

Soviet activities throughout the world, with respect both to individual states and to international organizations, are in support of the basic Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet Union has consistently opposed Anglo-American efforts to expedite world peace settlements because the longer peace settlements are postponed the longer Red Army troops can "legally" remain in "enemy" countries. Excessively large military forces are being maintained in satellite nations, which the U.S.S.R. is striving to bring under complete control and to make economically dependent upon her. To this end, the Soviets are establishing joint-control enterprises, demanding exorbitant reparations from former enemies, evacuating large quantities of industrial machinery and seizing shipping and industrial properties. To strengthen Soviet economy at the expense of her neighbors, the U.S.S.R. is retaining, either in Russia or in Soviet-occupied areas, large numbers of Germans and Japanese who are being employed in Soviet industry. Beyond the borders now under her control, the Soviet Union is striving to penetrate strategic areas, and everywhere agents of the Soviet Government work to weaken the governments of other nations and to achieve their ultimate isolation and destruction.

The Soviet Union regards control of Europe east of the general line from Stettin to Trieste as essential to its present security. It will tolerate no rival influence in that region and it will insist on the maintenance there of "friendly" governments, that is, governments willing to accept Soviet domination. At present, in Yugoslavia, Albania and

Czechoslovakia there are governments genuinely "sympathetic" to the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. has displayed moderation toward Finland for a variety of reasons connected with the peculiar national character and geographic situation of the Finns. In these countries the Soviet Union seeks to insure its continued predominance by the creation of strong bonds of economic and military collaboration, but it does not have to resort to open coercion.

The elected government of Hungary is willing to be "friendly" but the Soviet Union has apparently remained unconvinced of its reliability in view of the attitude of the Hungarian people. Coercion has therefore been applied in Hungary, as in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, to ensure effective Soviet political control.

The governments now installed in these four countries are notoriously unrepresentative, but the Soviet Union is determined to maintain them by as much force as necessary inasmuch as no truly representative government would be reliable, from the Soviet point of view. In deference to western views, these countries may be allowed to hold elections and some changes in the composition of these governments permitted, but only after violence, intimidation, purges and fraud have insured the election of a Soviet-approved slate.

Soviet policy in Austria is similar to that in Hungary. Having accepted an elected Austrian government and being unable to reconstruct it at will due to the presence of British, French and American occupation armies, the Soviet Union is seeking by means of deportations and property seizures in its own zone and by demands for similar actions in other zones, to gain economic control of Austria and to lay the foundation for Soviet political control when the other occupation forces are withdrawn.

In Germany, the Soviet Union has recently made herself the "champion" of German unification in opposition to what her propagandists have labelled the "imperialistic"

schemes of Great Britain, France and the United States. The Kremlin apparently believes that a German administration strongly centralized in Berlin might eventually be more susceptible than any other to Soviet pressure and also the most convenient means of extending Soviet influence throughout Germany. Moscow recognizes, however, that if Germany were to be unified today, the Communists would not be able to command a majority of the population and might not be able to seize power. Therefore, Moscow opposes the establishment of any central German administration at this time, except on terms which would give Moscow the clear right to repudiate it again at any time if it proved unamenable to Soviet purposes.

The Soviet Government hoped to gain political control of France through the victory of the French Communist Party in French national elections in June, but the defeat of the Soviet protégés led Moscow to sacrifice its fading hope of winning France to the livelier prospect of gaining Germany. The French Communists remain a strong political factor nevertheless, and exercise disproportionate influence through their control of organized labor. That influence will be used to shape French policy in the manner most suitable for Soviet purposes, and to prepare for a renewal of the Soviet attempt to gain control of France by political means.

In Italy the Communist Party is also seeking major influence by political means. For the time being, the Italian Communist Party is embarrassed by the dilemma in which it has been placed by the Trieste issue and its influence was unexpectedly weak in recent elections. Anti-Soviet feeling, aroused by Soviet support of Yugoslav claims to Trieste, has greatly reduced the influence of the Italian Communists, and Soviet efforts to win a dominant role in Italian affairs have received a sharp setback.

As for Spain, the Soviet Union misses no opportunity to raise the question of Franco as a means of embarrassing

and dividing the Western Powers. Any change in Spain might afford a chance for communist penetration and the communist underground in Spain is now being organized and directed by clandestine radio from the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union's main concern regarding the other nations of western Europe is to prevent the formation of a Western Bloc. It will also, of course, encourage the growth of local communist parties.

The Near East is an area of great strategic interest to the Soviet Union because of the shift of Soviet industry to southeastern Russia, within range of air attack from much of the Near East, and because of the resources of the area. The Soviet Union is interested in obtaining the withdrawal of British troops from Greece and the establishment of a "friendly" government there. It hopes to make Turkey a puppet state which could serve as a springboard for the domination of the eastern Mediterranean. It is trying by diplomatic means to establish itself in the Dodecanese and Tripolitania and it already has a foothold in the Mediterranean through its close alliances with Albania and Yugoslavia.

The U.S.S.R. is attempting to form along its Middle Eastern frontier a protective zone of politically subordinate states incapable of hostile action against it and it is seeking, at the same time, to acquire for its own use in those states ports and waterways, pipelines and oilfields. It wishes to ensure continued indirect control of Azerbaijan and northern Iran, and the withdrawal, or reduction, of British military strength and influence in the Arab states. The U.S.S.R. is playing both sides of the Jewish situation by encouraging and abetting the emigration of Jews from Europe into Palestine, by denouncing British and American Jewish policies, and by inflaming the Arabs against these policies. The long-range Soviet aim is the economic, military and political domination of the entire Middle East.

The basic Soviet objective in China, Korea and Japan is

to ensure that these countries remain internally divided and weak until such time as the U.S.S.R. is in a position to exert greater influence there than any other country. The Chinese Communist Party is supported by the U.S.S.R. In Korea the Soviets have shown that they will consent to the unification of the country only if assured of a "friendly" government. Moscow has been extremely critical of the American administration of Japan which has afforded the U.S.S.R. no opportunity to establish the influence it desires.

The Soviets in the remaining areas of the world will seek to undermine the unity and strength of national states, to foment colonial unrest, to stir up diversionary antagonisms between states, and to disrupt any system of international cooperation from which the U.S.S.R. is excluded. Because of their position in world affairs, the United States and Great Britain will be the primary targets of these Soviet activities. In addition to domestic agitation, the U.S.S.R. will try to distract and weaken the United States and Great Britain by attacking their interests in areas of special concern to them, such as South America, India, Africa and the Pacific.

Soviet policy with respect to the United Nations, as with individual nations, is designed to increase the position and prestige of the U.S.S.R. at the expense of other states. It now appears that the Soviet Union joined the United Nations as a matter of expedience and not because of any devotion to abstract principles of peace. The United Nations, to Soviet leaders, is another international arena in which they can propagandize and compete for a dominant position. The Soviet Union will continue to make every effort to impose its will on the organization so that United Nations decisions will, in so far as possible, implement Soviet policy. Soviet tactics will include unrestricted use of the veto power, use of member satellite states to support the Soviet viewpoint and pressure for admission of other satellite states in order to increase the Soviet "bloc."

The Soviet Union is evidently reluctant to withdraw from the United Nations so long as it can carry with it only a small fraction of the other members, for this would leave the majority of the other nations conveniently organized against it. However, if the Soviet leaders decide that membership in the United Nations is working too much to their disadvantage, and that their hand is being called on too many issues, they may decide to withdraw anyway. If they make this decision, they can be expected to use the entire Soviet propaganda machine and all the agencies of Soviet diplomacy to discredit the United Nations.

The Soviet Government is reluctant to commit itself to membership in other international organizations unless it can foresee opportunities to make use of them. Moscow has not ratified the Bretton Woods agreement establishing the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the European Coal Organization or the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe.

The Soviet Union has, however, been active in various nongovernmental international organizations where it is in a good position to dominate proceedings. Soviet trade-unions occupy a leading place in the World Federation of Trade-Unions, and Soviet representatives took an active role in forming such groups as the International Democratic Federation of Women, the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Cooperative Alliance.

CHAPTER TWO

SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENTS,
1942 - 1946

The great differences between American and Soviet foreign policies which are now so apparent were partially concealed during the war by a danger common to both nations—Nazi Germany. Anticipating, however, that differences would arise when hostilities ended, and anxious to secure Soviet participation in a system of collective security, the United States Government sought throughout the war to reach understandings with the Soviet Union regarding peace settlements and an international organization to preserve the peace.

At a series of conferences arranged principally by President Roosevelt, from January 1942 to February 1945, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union entered into written agreements which, had they been adhered to, would have avoided practically all of the causes of disagreement and mistrust now existing between the two countries.

On New Year's Day 1942 at the White House, the Soviet Ambassador on behalf of the Soviet Union signed the Declaration of the United Nations and thereby subscribed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, which Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had formulated in August 1941. By this act, the Soviet Union pledged that it sought no territorial aggrandizement; desired no territorial changes that did not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned; respected the

right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and desired to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security.

Faced with the urgent necessity of stopping the German onslaught, the United States and the U.S.S.R. did not undertake discussions on postwar settlements for some time after the signing of the United Nations Declaration. Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov was President Roosevelt's guest at the White House in June 1942, but their conversations were concerned primarily with speeding up shipments of American supplies to the Soviet Union and the necessity for a "second front" in western Europe in 1942. President Roosevelt, a few months later, urged Generalissimo Stalin to meet with Prime Minister Churchill and him at Casablanca in North Africa in December 1942 or January 1943 but Stalin refused to leave the Soviet Union and President Roosevelt and Churchill would not go to Moscow to see him.

It was not until October 1943 when Secretary of State Cordell Hull and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden traveled to Moscow that the principal allied powers began a serious and detailed discussion of the peace settlements and it was only at the insistence of Hull, strongly supported by frequent radio messages from President Roosevelt, that a statement on the principles of peace was adopted by the conference at that time. Drafted by the U. S. Department of State, and reluctantly accepted by the U.S.S.R., the Declaration on General Security was signed on October 30, 1943, by Molotov, Eden, Hull and the Chinese Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., on behalf of the Chinese Government.

The Declaration set forth, among other items, that the four signatory nations recognized "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sover-

eign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security." They also pledged that "after the termination of hostilities they would not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation."

In addition to the Declaration on General Security, Hull, Eden and Molotov issued a Declaration on Italy, a Declaration on German Atrocities, and a Declaration on Austria which declared that their governments wished to see "a free and independent Austria" re-established.

One month after the Moscow Conference of Foreign Secretaries had ended, President Roosevelt met Stalin for the first time, in company with Churchill, at Teheran. President Roosevelt and Churchill arrived at Teheran fresh from a meeting with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo where the Sino-Anglo-American war against Japan was discussed. The Soviet Union was not at war with Japan and hence no Soviet representative attended the Cairo Conference, which dealt principally with a plan for coordinated air, sea and ground campaigns in Southeast Asia, China, and the mid-Pacific.

The principal discussions in Teheran centered around a strategy for the 1944 campaign in Europe. Political discussions, which had occupied the Foreign Secretaries in Moscow, were replaced by conferences on the Anglo-American and Soviet campaigns against Germany. Although President Roosevelt did discuss with Stalin in a very general manner his views on an international organization, he was not prepared to go into details and there was no attempt on his part to obtain a written agreement from Stalin on political matters. The major achievement of the Teheran Conference was the military agreement reached by the three heads of government and their military staffs. The British and the Americans agreed that they would launch an invasion of northwestern France in May

1944, and support it with a coordinated invasion in southern France. In return, Stalin stated that the Red Army would launch its spring offensive in conjunction with the western invasions.

The military agreement was, of course, "secret" but two other agreements were published at the conclusion of the Teheran Conference. "The Declaration of the Three Powers," dated December 1, 1943, expressed the determination that the three nations would work together "in war and in the peace that will follow." "We shall seek," the Declaration reads, "the cooperation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance."

A second Declaration, also dated December 1, 1943 concerned Iran. Extensive promises of economic support after the war comprise most of the document, but the key sentence occurs at the end. "The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom," wrote President Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, "are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran."

Greatly encouraged by the success of Cordell Hull in Moscow in apparently winning Soviet support for collective security, President Roosevelt rapidly continued making plans in early 1944 for a postwar international organization. At the same time, however, relations with the Soviet Union were growing strained on a number of subjects connected with European politics. A European Advisory Council, composed of representatives of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the U. S., ran into apparently insoluble difficulties over Italy's status and the Soviet Union's plans for Poland pleased neither England nor the United States.

In an effort to come to an agreement on these vexing questions and the important ones concerning the postwar

occupation and control of Germany, President Roosevelt throughout the summer of 1944 sought another meeting with Stalin. Stalin on one pretext after another refused to consider any of the suggested meeting points. President Roosevelt finally gave up and met Churchill in Quebec in September 1944 for discussions on the Pacific War, Italy, and the postwar control of Germany.

While Churchill and President Roosevelt were in Quebec, delegates from Great Britain and the Soviet Union were in Washington at Dumbarton Oaks, discussing proposals for the establishment of a postwar international organization. Soviet participation in the Dumbarton Oaks discussions stemmed directly from the agreement Molotov had made with Hull and Eden in Moscow in October 1943. In meetings lasting several weeks, the general framework of the United Nations was agreed upon and an outline of the organization and functions of the United Nations was prepared for submission to all prospective members.

There were a number of questions left unanswered by the Dumbarton Oaks meetings due to the inability of the British and American delegates to reach agreements with the Soviets. Worried lest these differences cause a long delay in calling a general conference of nations to draft and ratify the Charter of the United Nations, President Roosevelt in November and December of 1944 renewed his efforts to meet Stalin again. The success of the allied armies in re-conquering Europe brought a host of political problems even more pressing than the plans for the postwar international organization, and Churchill joined President Roosevelt in the attempts to arrange a meeting. North Africa, the Middle East, Alaska, and Scotland were suggested but Stalin refused to leave the Soviet Union.

Finally, in February 1945, the three leaders met at Yalta in the Crimea. Discussions at this conference covered a very broad field of military and political subjects. Stalin agreed that the U.S.S.R. would enter the war against Japan approximately three months after the end of the

war against Germany in return for the Kurile Islands and the southern half of Sakhalin Island. It was also agreed that the status quo in Outer-Mongolia would be preserved, that Dairen should be internationalized, the "pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded," that Port Arthur should be restored to the U.S.S.R., and that certain railroads in Manchuria should be jointly operated by China and Soviet Russia. The following was also agreed to: "For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the the Japanese yoke." This agreement concerning Soviet participation in the war against Japan was secret for obvious reasons.

Most of the political agreements of the three powers however were published at the conclusion of the Conference. These concerned the occupation and control of Germany, reparation by Germany, the convening of a United Nations conference to establish "a general international organization to maintain peace and security," broadening the basis of the provisional governments in Poland and Yugoslavia, and a "Declaration on Liberated Europe." By this Declaration, President Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin pledged their "faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter" and jointly declared "their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems." The Declaration restated the "right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live," and promised aid to any liberated state or former Axis satellite state in establishing internal peace, forming representative

governments and holding free elections.

Agreements at Yalta on voting procedure in the Security Council of the proposed international organization and President Roosevelt's pledge to Stalin to support the U.S.S.R.'s demand that the Ukraine and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics be admitted to full membership removed the last Soviet objection to holding a conference to draft the Charter of the United Nations.

This conference was convened in San Francisco on April 25, 1945. Soviet delegates participated fully in all stages of the discussions and the Charter, when completed, had the full support of the Soviet Union.

What differences of opinion there were in San Francisco between the Soviet and the American delegations, sensational though they may have appeared in newspaper headlines at the time, were insignificant compared to the difficulties which arose almost immediately after the Crimean Conference. Stalin assailed President Roosevelt in bitter and vitriolic tones a few days before President Roosevelt's death in April 1945 for an alleged American attempt to make a separate peace with Germany. At the same time, this government was reacting strongly against Soviet activities in Poland, Yugoslavia, and the rest of the Balkans, believing that the U.S.S.R. was violating the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. The American representatives to a conference on German reparations, held at Moscow in accordance with the Yalta agreement, were able to make no headway against Soviet claims for excessive reparations from Germany.

President Truman sent Harry L. Hopkins to Moscow in May 1945 in an effort to reduce the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially over Poland. Stalin promised some concessions to Hopkins but the principal achievement of the journey was Stalin's agreement to meet President Truman and Churchill in Berlin in July. The sudden and complete collapse of Germany in May made another tripartite conference essen-

tial, but the sharpness with which Stalin had replied to President Roosevelt's last messages and President Truman's first ones had given rise to considerable uncertainty as to whether it would ever be possible to meet him again or come to an understanding with him.

At the Berlin Conference President Truman, Prime Ministers Churchill and Attlee and Generalissimo Stalin discussed a wider range of political subjects than had been covered in any of the previous meetings. A Council of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, France and China was established to draft treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland and to propose settlements of European territorial questions. Political and economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany were adopted as were agreements on reparations from Germany, the disposition of the German Navy and Merchant marine, and the removal of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

The status of Austria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Finland, Rumania and Italy was discussed at great length and a number of agreements concerning peace treaties and the reorganization of the governments of most of those countries were also made. Some territorial readjustments were agreed to; President Truman and the British Prime Minister promised to support at a future peace conference Soviet claims to the city of Koenigsberg in East Prussia and the adjoining area. At the insistence of the Soviet delegates, the British and Americans agreed that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier at the peace conference, Poland should receive the former German lands lying east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers, most of East Prussia, and the former free city of Danzig.

Many agreements were reached at Berlin, but not as many as the American representatives had hoped for. Two of the most controversial subjects concerned water-

ways. President Truman's insistence that the Danube River be freed from all restrictions on navigation was blocked by Stalin who introduced a counterproposal that the Montreux Convention governing the Dardanelles be revised. Some of the unsolved questions were omitted from the Conference Communiqué completely; others, like Tangier and the problem of satellite reparations, were left for discussion through normal diplomatic channels.

In the military staff meetings which ran concurrently with the diplomatic discussions, British, Soviet and American Chiefs of Staff discussed Soviet entry into the Pacific war. Details of the Berlin agreements, political and military, over which there has since been controversy, are given in the following chapter.

The Berlin Conference Communiqué included a statement that the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France and China would meet in London in September.

Secretary of State Byrnes, Foreign Secretary Bevin of Great Britain, and Foreign Commissar Molotov accordingly assembled in London to continue the discussions they had carried on in Berlin. They were joined by French and Chinese delegates. The Council of Foreign Ministers or their deputies have been in almost continuous session since that time preparing peace treaty drafts for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

In addition to the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Secretary Byrnes and Bevin conferred with Molotov in Moscow in December 1945. Secretary Byrnes proposed the meeting to see if more progress could be made than had been made at London where the Council of Foreign Ministers had reached an impasse. The Soviet delegation had held in London that peace treaties should be made only by the principal powers who had signed the respective armistices, whereas the other delegations had taken the view that all states which took an active part in the war should be allowed to participate in the peace.

At Moscow in December 1945, Secretary Byrnes, Bevin and Molotov reached a compromise agreement providing that the terms of peace should be drawn up by the principal powers which were signers of the respective armistices, and that the terms should then be submitted to a peace conference of all the states who actively waged war against the European members of the Axis.

It was also agreed at Moscow to establish a Far Eastern Commission composed of representatives of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, China, the United States, France, Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India and the Philippines. This Commission has the authority to formulate principles to govern the control of Japan and its decisions are incorporated into directives to General MacArthur by the U. S. Government. In addition, it was agreed to establish an Allied Council for Japan of representatives of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, China and the United States to advise and consult General MacArthur.

Korea was discussed and in an effort to solve the economic and administrative problems created by the division of Korea into Soviet-occupied and American-occupied zones a joint Soviet-American Commission was established. This Commission was instructed to make recommendations for the formation of a Korean provisional government and for a four-power trusteeship to prepare Korea for independence within five years.

A new subject, not previously discussed at any conference with the Soviets, was the control of atomic energy. It was agreed at Moscow that a United Nations Commission should be appointed to inquire into the problems raised by the utilization of atomic energy and to make recommendations to member governments.

The Foreign Ministers' meetings in Paris in April, May, June and July, 1946 were largely devoted to working out details of the peace treaties now under consideration in Paris and there were no substantive agreements to which the United States and the U.S.S.R. were parties.

A number of agreements and understandings in addition to those which have been briefly recounted in this chapter were entered into by the United States and the Soviet Union during the war years. Those which have a direct bearing on the current relations of the two nations, as well as additional details concerning those which have been described, will be discussed in the following chapter in an analysis of the manner in which the Soviet Union has adhered to these agreements.

CHAPTER THREE

VIOLATIONS OF SOVIET AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES

The Soviet Government will not admit that it has violated any of its international engagements. On the contrary, it usually argues vehemently, both at home and abroad, that it scrupulously fulfills its international obligations. It is very prone to charge other nations with violations while indignantly denying or completely ignoring charges that it has committed similar acts.

Much of the misunderstanding regarding the agreements to which the United States and the U.S.S.R. are signatories results from the different points of view with which the two countries regard postwar problems. As a result, many of the acts of the Soviet Government appear to the United States Government to be violations of the spirit of an international agreement although it is difficult to adduce direct evidence of literal violations. The Soviets resort in particular to two devices in rebutting charges of violation of agreements when, from the American point of view, the spirit of their commitments is being grossly contravened. First, they utilize interpretations which are entirely at variance with the views of other signatories, exploiting to this end the Soviet definitions of terms such as "democratic," "friendly," "fascist," et cetera, which are basically different from the noncommunist understanding of these words. Second, by exerting various forms of pressure, they induce the governments of countries which are occupied by Soviet troops to commit acts

which are in themselves violations of agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party. In both cases the Soviets manage to avoid direct charges of violating their agreements although there is no question where the primary responsibility lies.

Notwithstanding the efforts of the Soviet Government to avoid charges of violating the letter of its agreements, it has considered it necessary in pursuit of its objectives to commit some acts of this kind. Most of these violations have concerned matters of vital interest to the United States. Of those, the most serious are listed briefly below:

(1) *Germany*. The Soviets have refused to implement the Potsdam decisions to administer Germany as an economic unit. As a result there is no free interzonal commerce or common import-export program. Instead of utilizing proceeds from exports to pay for necessary imports to support the German population, the Soviets are crediting exports from their zone to their reparations account, in violation of the spirit of the reparations agreement.

The Soviets have not encouraged "all democratic political parties" in their zone, as provided for in the Berlin Declaration. Only the Communist Party is supported and activities of the democratic parties are hampered in every possible way. Political life in the Soviet zone is not being reconstructed on a democratic basis. Democratic ideas, in our sense of the term, are not being fostered.

The provisions of the Berlin Declaration regarding the elimination of Germany's war potential are also being violated by the Soviets in that the manufacture of war materials, including airplanes, is still continuing in the Soviet zone.

(2) *Austria*. The continued maintenance of unduly large Soviet military forces in Austria has constituted an oppressive burden on the Austrian economy inconsistent with the re-establishment of a free and independent Austria as envisaged in the Moscow Declaration of October

1943 or in the Soviet assurance, at the time of the formation of the Provisional Government, that the Austrians had resisted the Nazis and thus fulfilled the Moscow Declaration conditions.

The Soviet authorities in Austria have refused to regard the question of German assets in Eastern Austria as an appropriate subject for the consideration of the Allied Council. They have consistently attempted to settle the problems connected with this question through bilateral action with the Austrian Government to the exclusion of the Allied Council. They have failed to cooperate with the other occupying powers in working out a constructive program for the development of a sound economic life in Austria as a whole.

(3) *Balkans*. The principle complaint of the United States Government is the failure of the Soviet Chairmen of the Allied Control Commissions in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria to consult with their American and British colleagues in the enforcement of the armistice agreements with these countries. In effect, this has meant that Soviet influence has been paramount and that the American and British representatives have virtually been excluded from all vital decisions affecting the political and economic life of the countries.

In the view of the United States Government, the Soviet Government has failed to carry out the commitment undertaken in the Yalta agreement to assist the peoples of liberated Europe to form interim governments broadly representative of all categories in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment, through free elections, of governments responsible to the will of the people. The nonobservance of this commitment has been particularly flagrant in relation to Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland. In none of these countries can the present government, each of which was established under Soviet pressure and protection, be said to represent the will of the people.

In the armistice agreements with the ex-satellites the latter undertook to restore the legal rights and interests of the United Nations and their nationals in their respective territories and to return their property in complete good order. Heavy Soviet reparation demands and requisitions and nationalization programs, inaugurated at Soviet instigation, have effectively prevented the defeated countries from complying with these provisions of the armistice agreements.

(4) *Iran.* The refusal of the Soviet occupation forces in northern Iran to permit the Iranian Government to send reinforcements to Tabriz when faced with a secession movement in Azerbaijan was a violation of the Teheran declaration in which the Soviet Government expressed its desire to maintain the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.

(5) *Korea.* During the meetings of the Joint Commission set up under the Moscow Declaration of December 1945 the Soviets consistently refused to agree to consultation with the Commission of democratic parties and social organizations in the southern zone on the grounds that many of these groups had expressed opposition to the Moscow decision on Korea. The Commission adjourned without settling this issue. The Soviets have not replied to American requests to resume meetings of the Commission.

(6) *Lend-Lease.* In violation of the Lend-Lease Agreement the Soviets have turned over Lend-Lease or equivalent material to Poland and probably to other countries of eastern Europe without the consent of the United States. They have thus far failed to honor a request to return certain naval vessels delivered to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease. They have also failed to begin conversations with the United States looking to the "betterment of world-wide economic relations," "elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce," and "the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers" as

provided for in the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, and have shown no inclination to apply these principles either in their own commercial relations or in the countries under their control.

The important international agreements to which the United States and the U.S.S.R. are parties, and which the United States considers the Soviet Union has violated in whole or in part, are discussed below in chronological order.

UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION, JANUARY 1, 1942.

The Soviet Union was one of the original signatories of the United Nations Declaration signed at the White House on January 1, 1942 by 26 nations. The Declaration was a broad endorsement of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Since the Declaration was couched in general terms, it is difficult to say that the Soviet Union has violated it, but it is obvious that the Soviet Union's large-scale acquisition of territory since January 1, 1942 is hardly in keeping with the pledge that the U.S.S.R. sought no territorial aggrandizement. The Soviet Union's acquisition of Ruthenia and Bukowina and the drastic readjustment of Poland's eastern frontier cannot be reconciled with the Soviet Union's statement that it desired no territorial changes which were not in accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Ruthless suppression of Anti-Soviet political parties in liberated countries of Eastern Europe is a direct violation of the Soviet Union's promise to respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live. Soviet desire to bring about the fullest possible collaboration between all nations in the economic field, pledged by the U.S.S.R. in its adherence to the United Nations Declaration, is not apparent in recent Soviet behavior in Germany, Austria and Hungary.

PRINCIPLES APPLYING TO MUTUAL AID,
JUNE 11, 1942.

On June 11, 1942 the Soviet Ambassador to the United States and Secretary of State Cordell Hull signed "Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression." Article Three of this document stated that the Soviet Government would not, without the consent of the President of the United States, transfer title to any defense article which it received under Lend-Lease. It also provided that the Soviet Government would not permit the use of any such article by anyone other than an employee of the Soviet Government.

Shortly after the liberation of Warsaw, Poland, the Soviet Government announced the gift to the Polish Provisional Government of 1,000 trucks, mobile power plants, radio equipment and foodstuffs. All of these articles were either Lend-Lease goods or items similar to materials sent to the Soviet Union by the United States under Lend-Lease agreements. No satisfactory explanation of these gifts to the Polish Government has ever been made by the Soviet Government. Subsequently, the U.S.S.R. has provided large quantities of military equipment to Polish, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav armies. Although direct evidence is lacking, there is a strong presumption that Lend-Lease material was included in these shipments. In any event, the material given Poland before the end of the war was a clear violation of Article Three of the agreement signed on June 11, 1942.

Article Five of the agreement provides that the Soviet Union will return to the United States at the end of the "emergency" those defense articles, transferred under the Lend-Lease agreement, which have not been destroyed or lost and which may be determined by the President to be useful to the United States. An American request for the return of certain naval vessels furnished the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease has not yet been granted. Soviet re-

fusal to return these naval vessels is a violation of Article Five of the agreement signed on June 11, 1942.

Article Seven provides that, in the final determination of benefits to be given the United States by the Soviet Government in return for Lend-Lease aid, terms and conditions shall be such as to promote mutually advantageous economic relations and the betterment of world-wide economic conditions. This article was intended to eliminate all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce and to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers. The Soviet Union thus far has not agreed to discuss these matters with the United States nor has it given any evidence of willingness to adopt these principles either in direct trade with the United States or in countries within the Soviet sphere of influence.

MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS,
OCTOBER 1943.

The report of the meeting in Moscow in October 1943 of Secretary of State Hull, Prime Minister Eden and Foreign Commissar Molotov included a Declaration on Austria. The United States Government considers that the continued maintenance of unduly large Soviet military forces in Austria constitutes an oppressive burden on the Austrian economy and is inconsistent with the re-establishment of a free and independent Austria as envisaged in the Declaration on Austria. Recent Soviet seizure of land and industrial properties, together with the removal of factories and the attempted imposition of joint Soviet-Austrian companies, is not in accord with the independence and economic security contemplated for Austria in the Moscow Declaration.

TEHERAN CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 1943.

The most significant agreement reached at the Teheran Conference of Stalin, Churchill and President Roosevelt in

November 1943 concerned military campaigns in Europe in 1944. In return for the Anglo-American pledge to invade France in May 1944, Stalin promised that the Red Army would launch a simultaneous offensive along the entire Eastern Front. Due to a number of military factors, the invasion of Normandy was not launched until June 6, 1944, somewhat later than Stalin was promised at Teheran. However, the Soviet Union kept its side of the bargain and a general offensive on the Eastern Front was begun a few days after the invasion of Normandy.

Although Soviet adherence to the military agreements of Teheran was satisfactory, the U.S.S.R. has violated the Declaration of the Three Powers regarding Iran which was also made in Teheran. On November 29, 1945 the Soviet Government admitted in a note to the United States that Soviet forces in Iran had prevented Iranian troops from moving northward after an outbreak in Azerbaijan. This Soviet action constituted at least indirect aid to the Azerbaijan revolutionaries and was therefore a violation of the Teheran Declaration regarding Iran which stated that "the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in the desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran."

ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WITH RUMANIA, SEPTEMBER 12, 1944.

On September 12, 1944 the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom signed an Armistice Agreement with Rumania. In November 1944 the Russians seized equipment from an American-owned oil plant for shipment to the Soviet Union over the protest of the American Representative on the Allied Control Council and of the American Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow, and despite the fact that the Soviet Government had been duly notified in advance of the American character of this property and

had been asked to see that it was protected. The Soviets continued such actions even after a joint U. S.—British note of protest was dispatched to Moscow in December 1944. These acts prevented the Rumanian Government from fulfilling its obligations to the United States. Under the terms of the Armistice, the Rumanian Government was obliged to restore property belonging to citizens of the United Nations in good order and in the condition it had been in before the war.

The Soviet Government has presented a reparations list to Rumania incapable of being filled. This is in direct violation of the Armistice agreement which provided that Rumania should pay not more than 300 million dollars to the Soviet Union for losses caused to the U.S.S.R. by military operations.

Although Article Three of the Rumanian Armistice Agreement authorized the maintenance of Soviet forces in Rumania, the U.S.S.R. has utilized this article for the continued maintenance of troops after the ending of hostilities. There are at present in Rumania Soviet armed forces far beyond those needed to maintain order despite the fact that the Allied Control Commission Chairman has repeatedly emphasized that Rumania is now a sovereign state entirely capable of managing her own government and maintaining internal order.

Although not authorized by the Armistice agreement, the Soviet Union in September 1945 took over the entire Rumanian Navy, claiming it as war booty. She recently returned to Rumania a few of the older ships.

ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WITH BULGARIA, OCTOBER 28, 1944.

On October 28, 1944 an Armistice Agreement with Bulgaria was signed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. General Crane, United States Representative on the Allied Control Commission, reported

on February 4, 1946 that not once in fourteen months had he been able to establish contact with Soviet Marshal Tolbukhin, his colleague and Chairman of the Control Commission. This failure of the Soviet Chairman to consult his American and British colleagues is a basic violation of the Bulgarian Armistice Agreement.

Bulgaria has shipped no foodstuffs as reparations to Greece, which was provided for in the Protocol to the Armistice Agreement, and she has made only token restitutions to Greece in carrying out other provisions of the Armistice Agreement. Although the failure in question is Bulgaria's, there is no doubt that it has been sanctioned and encouraged by the Soviet Government.

ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WITH HUNGARY, JANUARY 20, 1945.

On January 20, 1945 the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union signed an Armistice Agreement with Hungary. On March 7, 1945 General Key, U. S. Representative on the Allied Control Council for Hungary, requested copies of all documents issued in the name of the Allied Control Commission. Soviet authorities replied that there were none. After that date, Soviet authorities took various measures, some of which directly affected American property, without informing General Key.

Soviet representatives have systematically failed to inform United States and British representatives concerning Hungarian economic conditions. In December 1945 the American Minister to Hungary raised the question of the plans which the Hungarian Government had made to improve economic conditions and requested a prompt reply. The Hungarian Government has failed to reply to the American request and Soviet officials of the Allied Control Commission have also refused to reply. The failure of the Soviet authorities to inform other representatives of the economic conditions of Hungary is a violation of pro-

visions of the Armistice Agreement which provide that the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States shall have the right to receive oral and written information from the Soviet officials of the Allied Control Commission on any matter connected with the fulfillment of the Armistice Agreement.

In January 1946 the Soviet Chairman of the Allied Control Commission put a Soviet Representative on the Hungarian National Bank without the knowledge or concurrence of the United States or British representatives. This is a violation of the revised statutes of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary regarding consultation among members of the Commission.

On January 2, 1946 Soviet authorities seized a Standard Oil field at Lisse and appointed a Soviet Administrator without consulting the United States Representative on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary. On March 22, 1946 the American Representative sent a note to Soviet Marshal Voroshilov asking for the withdrawal of Soviet personnel. No reply has been received. The Soviet Union by this action has violated two articles of the Armistice Agreement. It has prevented the Hungarian Government from restoring all legal rights and interests of the United Nations as they existed before the war and also from returning their property in good order. It has also violated the agreement which provided that an Allied Control Commission would regulate and supervise the execution of the Armistice terms. The Soviet Representative acted unilaterally, without consultation with British and American representatives.

In April 1946 Soviet authorities requested that the British representatives discontinue publication of their news bulletin in Hungary. The United States Government believes that this issue involves a question of principle relative to the scope of Soviet authority under the Armistice terms. The Soviet request appears to the United States to be arbitrary, discriminatory and without legal warrant.

Insistence by Soviet authorities that distribution of a British publication cease is regarded as a derogation of the principle of freedom of the press, and as a denial of the rights of an allied power represented on the Allied Control Council.

There have been many delays in clearance by the Soviets of American official personnel and planes in Hungary. Officials at the American Legation in Budapest have been delayed as much as nineteen days in leaving Budapest. Delay on the part of the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in granting clearance to American officials is a violation of the statutes of the Allied Control Commission which provide that representatives of the United States have the right to determine the size and composition of their own delegation. The Soviets, by arbitrary restrictions concerning entrance to and exit from Hungary, are denying this right to the American representatives.

On June 28, 1946 the Soviet Deputy Chairman of the Allied Control Commission sent a letter to the Hungarian Government on Allied Control Commission stationery demanding the dissolution of various youth groups. This is a direct violation of the statutes of the Allied Control Commission which provide that directives from the Commission on questions of principle will be issued to the Hungarian authorities by the Allied Control Commission only after the British and American representatives have agreed to the directives.

THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 1945.

The Declaration on Liberated Europe, issued by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin on February 11, 1945 as a part of the Report on the Crimean Conference, was regarded by President Roosevelt and Churchill at the time as being one of their major achievements of the Conference. In that Declaration the

United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. declared "their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their separate political and economic problems." It also provided that the three governments would jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions required their assistance in forming interim governments "broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population."

On April 24, 1945 the Soviet Union informed the United States that Dr. Karl Renner had approached the Soviet authorities with an offer to form a provisional Austrian Government. On April 29, 1945, in spite of a request by the United States that no definitive action be taken until the Allies had been able to consult each other, Radio Moscow announced that the Renner Government had been installed. This unilateral action by the Soviet Union constituted a direct violation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe.

The Soviet Union's activities with respect to Bulgaria also contravened the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. That provision of the Declaration concerning Allied assistance to former Axis satellite states in solving their pressing political problems by democratic means was violated by the Soviet Union's refusal to consult with the United States, at our request, on Bulgarian democratic parties and elections. On March 29, 1945 the U. S. Government instructed our Embassy in Moscow to propose that a tripartite Allied Commission be established in Bulgaria to insure that all democratic parties in Bulgaria would have full freedom to bring their separate platforms and slates of candidates to the attention of the electorate. The United States made this proposal because of repeated re-

ports of Communist pressure in Bulgaria to have elections on the basis of a single election list, which would have given Communists a representation out of all proportion to their actual voting strength. On April 11, 1945 Molotov in reply questioned American motives and stated that the Soviet public would be "dumbfounded" if there were foreign intervention in Bulgarian elections.

The Soviet Union has violated provisions of the Declaration on Liberated Europe by making unilateral trade and economic agreements with Hungary. Although the Yalta agreement provided that the three powers should concert their policies in assisting former Axis states to solve their economic problems, on August 23, 1945 the Soviet Union made a trade and economic collaboration agreement with Hungary. On October 13, 1945 the United States and Great Britain sent notes to the Soviet Union presenting their views regarding this action. On October 30, 1945 the Soviet Union replied that the bilateral agreement it had just made with Hungary did not concern other nations.

In December 1945 the U. S. Representative on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary recommended the establishment of a sub-commission to consider Hungarian industry, finance and economics. The Soviet Union refused to consider the establishment of this sub-commission. The United States sent a note to the Soviet Government on March 2, 1946 regarding the grave economic plight of Hungary and calling attention to the burden of reparations and the cost of maintaining an occupation army. Our request that the Soviet Government instruct its representatives to plan an economic program for Hungary with American and British representatives was rejected by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vishinsky on April 21, 1946. On July 27, 1946 the Soviet Union repeated its earlier rejection of the American plan for an Allied sub-commission to aid Hungarian economic rehabilitation. The Soviet position was that this was a matter strictly for the Hungarian Government. This Soviet action was

another violation of the spirit of the Yalta Declaration.

The Soviet Government has also violated the provisions of the Yalta Declaration by its actions in Rumania. On February 27, 1945 Vishinsky demanded that King Michael of Rumania dismiss the Radescu Government. On March 1, 1945 Vishinsky named Groza as the Soviet choice for Premier. Five days later King Michael accepted a Groza Government. At no time during this period did the Soviet authorities consult or keep informed the American and British representatives in Rumania.

Prior to the establishment of the present Polish Government, Soviet actions with regard to Poland were marked by a high degree of unilateralism, in violation of the Declaration on Liberated Europe and earlier Big Three understandings on the Polish question. The Soviet Union resorted to numerous technicalities in dealing with the Lublin (later Warsaw) Government and it concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with the Polish Provisional Government on April 21, 1945 when Anglo-Soviet-American negotiations on the very question of reorganizing this government had reached an impasse. The U.S.S.R. acted entirely unilaterally in violation of its obligations under the Yalta Declaration.

An agreement relating to prisoners of war and civilians liberated by Allied military forces was also signed at Yalta on February 11, 1945. The record of the Soviet Union in carrying out this agreement for the care and repatriation of American and Soviet citizens has not been satisfactory. In general, liberated American prisoners of war in Soviet-occupied areas of Germany were forced to make their way as best they could across Poland to Soviet territory. During their journey across Poland they were forced to rely for food and necessities on the generosity of the Polish people who themselves had very little. When they entered the U.S.S.R., they were gathered together, put in boxcars, and sent to Odessa. The Soviets refused permission for American aircraft to bring in supplies to liberated U. S.

prisoners of war behind Soviet lines or to evacuate the sick and wounded by air. The only United States contact team allowed in Soviet territory was one at Odessa, the traffic point where the Americans were assembled prior to being shipped to the United States. Evacuation of U. S. liberated prisoners of war was accomplished under the most difficult conditions.

With respect to the repatriation of liberated Soviet prisoners of war in U. S. hands, the Soviet interpretation of the Yalta Agreement was that the United States would forcibly repatriate all persons claimed by the Soviet Union to be Soviet citizens. The United States interpretation was that assistance would be given for the repatriation of those who wished to return to the U.S.S.R., while forced repatriation would be limited to those war criminals demanded by the Soviets. The United States has not met many Soviet demands for repatriation of unwilling U.S.S.R. citizens not clearly shown to be war criminals.

The most important military result of the Crimean Conference was the Statement regarding Japan, signed by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. The pledge that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan two or three months after the defeat of Germany was carried out by the Soviet declaration of war against Japan on August 8, 1945. One of the conditions, however, upon which the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan was the internationalization of the port of Dairen. In contravention of the Yalta Agreement, the U.S.S.R. is now attempting to prevent the internationalization of that port.

DECLARATION REGARDING THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY, JUNE 5, 1945.

On June 5, 1945 the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union issued a Declaration regarding the Defeat of Germany. Article 13A specifies that the four Allied Governments occupying Germany will ensure the complete

disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. Despite this agreement, the Soviet Government has not taken adequate steps to demilitarize industrial plants in the Soviet Zone. On the contrary, some of them are still engaged in producing war materials.

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, JUNE 26, 1945.

The Charter of the United Nations was signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945. Article Two of the Charter reads: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations."

Iran appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations on March 19, 1946 against the continuing presence of Soviet troops in northern Iran and against interference "in the internal affairs of Iran through the medium of Soviet agents, officials, and armed forces." On May 24, 1946 the Soviet Ambassador to Iran told the Iranian Government that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran had been completed on May 9, 1946. However, there have been numerous reports to the United States Government since that date that Soviet troops are still in Iran. Soviet failure to withdraw troops from Iran constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

AGREEMENT ON CONTROL MACHINERY IN AUSTRIA, JULY 4, 1945.

On July 4, 1945 the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union signed an Agreement on Control Machinery in Austria. Article Two of this agreement provides that an Allied Council of the four occupying powers shall exercise joint authority in matters affecting Austria as a whole.

The Soviet authorities in Austria have refused to regard the question of German assets in Austria as an appropriate subject for the consideration of the Allied Council. They have consistently attempted in practice to settle the problems connected with this question through bilateral action with the Austrian Government to the exclusion of the Allied Council. They have also failed to cooperate with other occupying powers in working out a constructive program for the development of the sound economic life in Austria as a whole.

**EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION
AGREEMENT, JULY 9, 1945.**

On July 9, 1945 the European Advisory Commission, composed of representatives of Great Britain, United States, the Soviet Union and France agreed that "armed forces and officials of occupying powers will enjoy free and unimpeded access to airdromes assigned to their respective occupancies and their use." The Soviet Union has repeatedly violated this provision, particularly with respect to the Tulln airport near Vienna. The same difficulty has also been experienced in obtaining clearance for air travel by United States civil and military personnel in Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Austria. In addition, there have been numerous incidents of United States aircraft being intercepted, and in some cases fired on, damaged, and forced to land, by Soviet fighter planes. While these acts violate no specific written agreement in areas where the United States does not have occupation forces, they violate international understanding of aviation courtesy and reciprocity. They are acts of intimidation and in some cases actual assault. Excessive curtailment of legitimate air travel by American personnel has resulted. In all cases U. S. personnel have attempted to comply strictly with Soviet decrees although such decrees have been arbitrary. The entire Soviet attitude

toward travel by air by American personnel has been in deliberate violation of the spirit of existing political agreements.

**THE POTSDAM DECLARATION,
JULY 26, 1945.**

On July 26, 1945 President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee issued a proclamation, concurred in by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, defining the terms for Japanese surrender. On August 9, 1945 the U.S.S.R. adhered to the Potsdam Declaration. The Declaration stated, in part, that Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, should be permitted to return to their homes. The Soviets have refused, in violation of this provision, to repatriate Japanese prisoners of war who have fallen into the hands of the Red Army. This violation has been repeatedly brought to the attention of the Soviet Government in Moscow and the Soviet representatives in Tokyo, together with an expression of American willingness to assist in the repatriation. On August 1, 1946 the United States had repatriated 93% of the Japanese in areas controlled by this country; the British had repatriated 80% of the Japanese in their areas; 98% of the Japanese in China had been repatriated; but no Japanese in the Soviet areas in the Far East have been repatriated.

**THE BERLIN CONFERENCE,
JULY 17 to AUGUST 2, 1945.**

On August 2, 1945 Generalissimo Stalin, President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee signed the Protocol and the Report of the Berlin Conference. In the section of the Berlin agreement dealing with Germany, the Allies agreed on the "eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis." The question of Soviet fulfillment of this clause depends, of course, on the in-

terpretation of the term "democratic basis." From the American point of view, Soviet tactics in their zone are not such as to lead to the reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis. In the Soviet zone of Germany everything is done to hamper the activities of the democratic parties. The Communist Party, on the other hand, is encouraged and given every possible support.

The agreement on Germany also provided for the establishment of "certain essential central German administrative departments" to function under the direction of the Allied Control Council. Soviet obstructionism has prevented agreement to set up such departments.

Paragraph 11 of the agreement on Germany provided that the production of arms, ammunition, all types of aircraft, and seagoing ships should be prohibited in order to eliminate Germany's war potential. Production of metals, chemicals and machinery which are directly related to a war economy were to be rigidly restricted to Germany's peacetime needs. Productive capacity not needed for peacetime production should be removed in accordance with the reparations plan or destroyed. In violation of these provisions, the Soviets in their zone have allowed the manufacture of weapons of war and airplanes to continue. The Soviets have refused to permit an investigation of actual conditions as requested by Great Britain and the United States.

Paragraph 14 of the agreement on Germany provided for the treatment of Germany as a single economic unit and other paragraphs provided that the payment of reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. The Soviet Government has persistently refused to take the necessary steps to implement these agreements. The Soviets, while giving lip-service to the proposals to set up central German economic agencies, have not agreed to take any action along these lines. They have also prevented any equitable distribution of essential commodities among the

four zones of occupation. There is no common import-export program. On the contrary, instead of using proceeds from exports from the Soviet zone for the payment of imports required for the German economy as a whole, the Soviets are taking out German exports as reparations. This, from the American point of view, is a direct violation of the Berlin agreement.

There is nothing in the Berlin agreement which authorizes reparations to be removed from current German production. Molotov's recent attempt in Paris to gain recognition for the Soviet claim for 10 billion dollars of reparations from Germany goes far beyond anything envisaged by the United States and Great Britain at Berlin. Reparations in this amount could only be obtained from current production and could not be fulfilled for decades.

The Soviet interpretation of the reparations clauses concerning German assets in East Austria is another violation of the Berlin agreement from the American point of view. The provisions of the agreement are ambiguous in that the terms "German foreign assets" and "Eastern Austria" are not clearly defined; however, Soviet seizure of property taken under duress by the Germans from the Austrians after the Anschluss undoubtedly constitutes a violation of the spirit of the Moscow Declaration of October 1943.

In a section of the Berlin agreement concerning peace treaties, it was agreed that "representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Russia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland." Despite this agreement, the Soviets have not allowed freedom of the press for American correspondents in the Soviet Union nor have they allowed it in countries under Soviet domination. In May 1946 a correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* was ordered to leave Rumania within five days despite the protest of the United States delegation to the Allied Control Commission. The same correspondent and three others were refused entry into Bulgaria a few weeks later. No explanation was ever given.

Under the terms of the Berlin agreement concerning Germany, unfinished German naval vessels were to be reported to a TriPartite Naval Commission. Incomplete vessels were to be destroyed by a specific date. Approximately twenty-seven naval vessels (destroyers, minesweepers and submarines) were under construction in East German shipyards at the time of the Soviet occupation of that area. However, these vessels have not been reported to the Naval Commission by Soviet representatives. Recent American intelligence reports state that construction has been continued on at least four of these vessels. Photographs have been received in Washington taken during March and April 1946 showing new construction at some shipyards in the Soviet zone.

MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, DECEMBER 1945.

At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1945, it was agreed that an American-Soviet commission would be called for a conference within two weeks at Seoul, the capital of Korea, to establish coordination in economic and administrative matters in Korea. The Soviet delegates to the conference were late in arriving and, when they did arrive, they refused to consider a number of problems clearly within the scope of the Moscow agreement. These included the improvement of the rail and water transport systems, the removal of the 38 degree barrier to Koreans, and other measures vital to the economic rehabilitation of Korea. The Moscow agreement provided that the joint commission assist in the formation of a Provisional Korean Government. The agreement stipulated that, for this purpose, the commission should consult Korean democratic parties. When the Commission convened, the Soviets refused to consult with several of the democratic parties in the American zone of Korea. The Soviet position, a clear violation of the agreement

made at the Moscow Conference, led to the adjournment *sine die* of the joint commission. The Soviets have since failed to reply to requests from the American Army commander in Korea to reconvene the commission so that it may carry out the task assigned by the Moscow agreement.

It was agreed in Moscow in December that the Rumanian Government would be required to admit opposition political leaders into the cabinet and to insure free elections. These requirements have not been met. Parties in opposition to the present left-wing government are not permitted to use the radio; their leaders have been arrested, beaten or otherwise molested; their meetings have been broken up; their newspapers suppressed; their editors punished and their members otherwise subjected to an organized campaign of terrorism. The Soviet Union, either through the Soviet-dominated Allied Control Commission or other agencies, has done nothing to prevent this situation and has, in fact, refused to collaborate with the United States and Great Britain in the formulation of a joint note of protest to Rumania.

In Bulgaria, as in Rumania, the outstanding failure of the U.S.S.R. has been its refusal to broaden the government under the Moscow agreement.

MILITARY AGREEMENTS

In addition to the agreements which have been discussed in this chapter, a number of military agreements relating to the war against Germany and Japan were made by the United States and Soviet Union informally and without agreed written text. In general, the Soviet Union made an effort to live up to the military agreements. Performance by the Russians in many of their undertakings were not entirely satisfactory and in some cases this was due to unsatisfactory Soviet facilities, poor equipment, and poorly-trained personnel. The Soviets apparently

made an effort to carry out most of the military agreements to the best of their ability.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONFLICTING VIEWS ON REPARATIONS

Reparations from the defeated Axis nations has become one of the major issues of dispute between the Soviet Union and the United States and the conflicting views on this subject illustrate clearly the conflicting foreign policies of the two nations.

At the Teheran Conference in November 1943, when Stalin spoke of reparations from Germany, Roosevelt agreed that the Soviet Union was entitled to recompense for war damage to her farmlands and industries. At Yalta in February 1945 the Three Powers agreed that reparation in kind should be exacted from Germany and that an allied commission, under a Soviet chairman, should meet in Moscow at an early date to settle the amount and nature of reparations and the share to which each Allied nation was entitled. Stalin asked for twenty billion dollars in reparations for the Soviet Union. Roosevelt said that he would willingly support any claims for reparations for the U.S.S.R. but not to the extent that the German people would starve. Churchill warmly opposed the Soviet figure of twenty billions, and he and Eden argued that an excessive figure of reparations would so impoverish Germany that the Allies would have to feed and finance her later. Soviet and British debate at Yalta on reparations was bitter and acrimonious, but a protocol on reparations was finally drawn up and signed by the Three Powers. It stated that Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war but it took into account British opposition and did not name a

sum. General principles on reparations were outlined and the separate proposals of the British and the Soviets were set forth in detail in the protocol for the Allied Commission on Reparations to consider in Moscow.

Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley, the U. S. Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations, arrived in Moscow early in June 1945 and began five weeks of technical discussion and argument with Soviet and British delegations. Mr. Pauley proposed eight general principles which were finally agreed to by the Soviet and British members of the Commission in mid-July. The Commission then moved to Berlin and its discussions were merged with those of the Big Three and the three Foreign Ministers who were meeting in Berlin. The agreement on principles formed the basis of the section of the Berlin Protocol dealing with reparations which was signed by President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee on August 2, 1945.

U. S. aims with respect to reparations were clearly stated at Moscow and in Berlin. The United States is interested, not in getting money or goods from Germany to repay in small part the cost of the war, but in long-range security. The reparations agreements reached in Moscow and Berlin, as they are understood by Great Britain and the United States, supplement and support the economic principles for the control of Germany which were adopted by Stalin, Attlee and President Truman. These principles were devised to eliminate Germany's war potential and to decentralize her excessive concentration of economic power.

The United States upheld its views on reparations in order to avoid the mistake of the economic settlements following World War I, when reparations were obtained from current German production. Reparations from current production could not be obtained without extensive foreign credits for imports, and it was necessary for Great Britain and the United States to finance German imports and the rebuilding of German industry. As the British

pointed out at Yalta, Great Britain has no intention of financing such imports again and, as Ambassador Pauley made abundantly clear in Moscow and in Berlin, the United States has not either.

In Moscow in June 1945 the Soviet Representative asked for reparations to the amount of ten billion dollars. Ambassador Pauley agreed to use that figure for discussion purposes only; he did not agree that the U.S.S.R. should have that amount.

The Soviet desire to set so large a figure for reparations meant that Germany could foot the bill only if her industry were rebuilt and the reparations were paid from current production over a period of years. It also meant, from the American point of view, that large imports would be necessary to maintain a high rate of productivity. If the products of the rebuilt German industry were drained off by the Soviet Union as reparations rather than used in normal world trade to pay for the imports, the imports probably would be paid for by the Western Allies who, in effect, would thus be paying for the reparations the Soviet Union would be getting. The Soviet demands in Moscow and Berlin of ten billion dollars appeared to the United States to have a triple aim: first, of using reparations as an excuse for the rebuilding of German industry; second, of increasing the military strength of the Soviet Union by obtaining current production from German industry for a number of years and third, of ensuring that any central administration in Germany would be under an obligation to the U.S.S.R. which it could not meet for many years, thus making it dependent on the Kremlin's benevolent disposition.

One of the basic principles agreed to in Moscow read as follows:

"In order to avoid building up German industrial capacity and disturbing long-term stability of economies of the United Nations, long-run payment of reparations

in the form of manufactured products shall be restricted to a minimum."

A second agreement was that:

"to a maximum extent, reparations shall be taken from the existing national wealth of Germany."

In addition to these two principles, fundamental in the eyes of the American delegation, it was agreed at Berlin that:

"Payment of reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stock shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports."

The last point had been repeatedly urged upon the Soviets by Ambassador Pauley, and in a letter to I. M. Maisky, Soviet Representative on the Commission, Mr. Pauley explained the matter in this fashion:

"Surely we both understand there can be no current annual reparations from Germany except as more goods are shipped out of Germany than are shipped in, i.e., there must be a large export balance. An export balance cannot be produced in Germany without some imports, such as food, alloys, cotton, etc. If these indispensable imports (without which there would be no exports of certain highly important types) are not a charge against the exports, then you, or we or some other economy will have to pay for the imports. Neither the U.S.S.R., nor the U.S.A., can think of recommending

to its people a reparations plan which overlooks this elemental fact."

The United States thought that, by the written acceptance of the principles of the Moscow and Berlin agreements, the Soviet Union would abide by them and that there was a common understanding among the Three Powers on reparations, especially after Stalin himself agreed in Berlin that the figure of ten billion dollars was too high. The United States Government's hopes were ill-founded.

Although the Allied Control Council for Germany agreed on March 28, 1946 on a "Plan for Reparations and the Level of Postwar German Economy in Accordance with the Berlin Protocol" which was satisfactory to all three powers, disturbing reports reached Washington at the very time this Plan was being drawn up that the Soviets had not dismantled many of the industrial plants in their zone of Germany but were, on the contrary, producing war materials in them. They were also believed to be confiscating the production of non-war industries without reporting the fact to the powers occupying the western zones of Germany and in direct violation of the agreement that "the proceeds of exports from current production and stock shall be available in the first place for payment of imports."

The spirit of the Berlin agreements on reparations was challenged directly on July 9, 1946 by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in a statement on Germany to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris. Molotov announced two principles as policies of the Soviet Union which, in effect, amount to a repudiation of the Berlin decisions. Molotov said:

"The Soviet Government insists that reparations from Germany to the amount of ten billion dollars be exacted without fail because this amount is but a small portion

of the enormous damage that had been done to the Soviet Union by German occupation Naturally, these reparations must include not only equipment but also commodities out of current production of Germany."

Molotov's insistence upon obtaining ten billion dollars and deriving a considerable part of it from current production is a complete reversal of the whole purpose of the Moscow agreements and the Berlin decisions. The Berlin Protocol purportedly settled the problem of reparations on the basis primarily of Allied security objectives with respect to Germany. It had been continually pointed out by the British and the Americans to the Soviet Representatives in Moscow and in Berlin that setting a specific dollar valuation on reparations was not consistent with our aim of demilitarizing Germany. Molotov is not only repudiating the spirit of the Berlin decisions but is taking a position contrary to the earlier Soviet claim that the U.S.S.R. wants to secure the economic disarmament of Germany.

The new policies announced by Molotov in Paris were followed up almost immediately on lower levels. In Berlin, Marshal Sokolovsky approached General Clay with a proposal that dismantling of factories in the Soviet zone be postponed, perhaps as much as ten years, and current production from these plants taken as reparations.

Molotov's statement at the Paris Conference, taken with the information available on Soviet activities in Eastern Germany, indicates that the Soviet Government apparently has adopted a German policy which embodies the following points. The Soviets will press for ten billion dollars in reparations. They will take a substantial part of this ten billion dollars from the current production of industrial plants in the eastern zone of Germany for an indefinite number of years. They will contend that Soviet troops shall remain in Germany until these reparations payments have been completed. With respect to removal

of industrial facilities from Germany, the Soviets can be expected to attempt to justify the retention of as large a capacity in the Soviet zone as possible, and they will oppose any effort to treat Germany as an economic unit to the extent that it means production in the eastern zone of Germany will be used to pay for imports rather than as reparations to the Soviet Union.

If the above assumptions are correct, the United States faces a situation in which it appears that the Soviets have abandoned the policy to weaken Germany but are relying instead on their belief that a reasonably strong Germany is more to their advantage than a weak Germany.

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CHAPTER FIVE

SOVIET ACTIVITIES AFFECTING
AMERICAN SECURITY

A direct threat to American security is implicit in Soviet foreign policy which is designed to prepare the Soviet Union for war with the leading capitalistic nations of the world. Soviet leaders recognize that the United States will be the Soviet Union's most powerful enemy if such a war as that predicted by communist theory ever comes about and therefore the United States is the chief target of Soviet foreign and military policy.

A recent Soviet shift of emphasis from Great Britain to the United States as the principle "enemy" has been made known to the world by harsh and strident propaganda attacks upon the United States and upon American activities and interests around the globe. The United States, as seen by radio Moscow and the Soviet press, is the principle architect of the "capitalistic encirclement" which now "menaces the liberty and welfare of the great Soviet masses." These verbal assaults on the United States are designed to justify to the Russian people the expense and hardships of maintaining a powerful military establishment and to insure the support of the Russian people for the aggressive actions of the Soviet Government.

The most obvious Soviet threat to American security is the growing ability of the U.S.S.R. to wage an offensive war against the United States. This has not hitherto been possible, in the absence of Soviet long-range strategic air power and an almost total lack of sea power. Now,

however, the U.S.S.R. is rapidly developing elements of her military strength which she hitherto lacked and which will give the Soviet Union great offensive capabilities. Stalin has declared his intention of sparing no effort to build up the military strength of the Soviet Union. Development of atomic weapons, guided missiles, materials for biological warfare, a strategic air force, submarines of great cruising range, naval mines and mincraft, to name the most important, are extending the effective range of Soviet military power well into areas which the United States regards as vital to its security.

The Soviet Union is maintaining the strength of the Red Army by conscription along conventional lines. Large reserves are being built up and the army is so organized that it can be expanded rapidly. The mechanization of the Soviet Army has proceeded steadily since the end of the war. The Soviets have been regrouping and modernizing their ground units to the extent that a new type of army, the "mechanized army," has been formed. This modernization, which appears to include the organic integration of tank and infantry units and the mechanization of infantry and artillery elements, is expected, in the near future, to increase materially the mobility of the Red Army. Great emphasis is placed on discipline, rigid observance of military formalities and intensified training. The Army is being maintained in a state of constant readiness for war and is placed strategically to move against any part of the Eurasian continent. The armies of Soviet satellite states are also being organized, trained and equipped along Soviet lines. A purge of anti-Soviet officers within these forces is bringing them tightly under Soviet control.

The Kremlin apparently realizes that a lack of sea power and air power was a major factor in the failure of Germany to win the first and second World Wars. This has inspired an aggressive determination to avoid the mistakes which led to the failure of Napoleon and Hitler to

defeat nations possessing great sea power. The Soviet Union has begun to increase the strength and effectiveness of the Red Navy. Greatly deficient in surface ships, naval aviation and amphibious craft, the Soviet Union is now taking energetic steps to overcome these shortcomings. The U.S.S.R. is making an intensive effort to obtain an important share of German, Italian and Japanese naval vessels and she has refused to return some U. S. naval vessels which were loaned to her under Lend-Lease. The Soviet Merchant Marine is being augmented to support Soviet operations in Middle Eastern, Northern European and Far Eastern waters. Soviet naval expansion, particularly in submarine warfare, is greatly assisted by possession of captured German shipyards, tools and technical personnel. The Soviet Union is developing as rapidly as possible a fleet of submarines designed for offensive action against sea communications, naval forces and shore installations of Great Britain and the United States. Intelligence reports indicate that the U.S.S.R. has failed to destroy captured German submarines, as it agreed to do under the Berlin Protocol, and in addition is rushing to completion submarines which were captured in an incomplete state in German shipyards. The Soviet Union is believed to be developing coastal sea communications in the Arctic areas and is striving to become efficient in Arctic operations.

The Soviet effort to develop naval power is matched by an interest in air power. Great stress is now being placed on the creation of a strategic air force, an element which the Soviet Union lacked during the recent war. Airfields are being developed in Eastern Siberia from which strategic air forces could attack the North American continent. The Soviets are expending a great deal of energy in developing electronics, guided missiles and atomic bombs.

The Soviet civil air program calls for great expansion of the air base system and the creation of a huge air trans-

port fleet. In countries controlled by the Soviet Union, United States participation in civil air programs has been blocked, whereas the U.S.S.R. has assured the participation of its own civil air fleet by political and military pressure. Possession of a large air transport fleet will greatly strengthen the Soviet strategic position.

Although the Soviet Union at the present moment is precluded from military aggression beyond the land mass of Eurasia, the acquisition of a strategic air force, naval forces and atomic bombs in quantity would give the U.S.S.R. the capability of striking anywhere on the globe. Ability to wage aggressive warfare in any area of the world is the ultimate goal of Soviet military policy.

In addition to increasing her own military strength to a point where an attack on the United States would be possible, the Soviet Union is jeopardizing the security of the United States by her efforts to weaken the military position and to destroy the prestige of the United States in Europe, Asia and South America. Red Army troops and Red Air Force planes, maintained in combat readiness, outnumber American units in Germany, Austria and Korea in overwhelming strength, thus placing our forces literally at the mercy of the Soviet Government.

In Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria U. S. representatives work under conditions imposed by Soviet commanders designed to make their official lives as unbearable as possible. Despite the charters under which the control councils were established, the Soviets have consistently pursued a policy of stifling all U. S. influence in these countries, demeaning U. S. representatives and the United States itself in the eyes of local populations, and letting nothing stand in the way of solidifying complete Soviet control. American representatives on Allied Control Councils have not been allowed to travel freely, discuss important matters, or question effectively the unilateral action taken by Soviet chairmen in the name of the Allied Control Councils. In general, U. S. representatives on the

Councils are in complete ignorance of the manner in which Council policy is being carried out by the Soviets.

In countries where the United States enjoys a degree of equality with the Soviet Union, as in Austria and Germany, the Soviets block with the veto American efforts to bring about changes. Soviet representatives apparently follow the policy of carrying out only those agreements which are in their own interest. Soviet representatives seldom openly repudiate an agreement but they nullify it by equivocation, inertia, delay, red tape and evasion.

A number of Soviet activities in the United States zone of occupation in Germany have adversely affected American efforts to restore efficient government and maintain order. Soviet espionage activity has flourished, German scientists have been kidnapped, former German pilots now working in the United States zone have been enticed into the Soviet zone, Soviet agents have illegally entered the American zone for the purpose of collecting documents on German atomic research, and German jet propulsion experts have been recruited through German intermediaries for service with the Soviets.

Soviet activities in other areas are comparable to those in Europe. Encroachments in the Middle East are steadily weakening the British and American positions and strengthening Soviet political and military influence there. Our continued access to oil in the Middle East is especially threatened by Soviet penetration into Iran.

The U.S.S.R. has a widespread intelligence net in China covering all phases of American activity, but the Soviet propaganda program presents an even greater danger. This campaign is designed to discredit American forces in China, to convince all political groups in China that American forces should be evacuated at once and to arouse suspicion as to American postwar aims in the Far East. The Soviets, by supplying captured Japanese military material to the Communists, not only endanger the United States Marines in North China but also by prolonging the

Chinese civil strife make more difficult, if not impossible, the attainment of the American aim of a unified and stable Chinese Government.

In Japan, the Soviet mission to the Allied Council, which was established under the terms of the Moscow agreement of December 1945, is over twice the size of the combined total of all other missions. Its members form an extensive espionage, subversive and sabotage net. The head of the Soviet mission to the Allied Council has shown himself completely hostile to American occupation authorities and his attitude makes it obvious that the U.S.S.R. resents the U. S. position in Japan. He and his subordinates have tried to create friction among the Japanese and to disrupt Allied plans for the democratization of Japan. He has placed subjects on the Council agenda for the purpose of criticizing the occupation, distorting General MacArthur's accomplishments, and endeavoring to demonstrate to the Japanese that he is taking the lead in necessary reforms, in order to show that the Soviet Union alone is the champion of the Japanese worker and peasant. The Soviet Council member has used the Council as a sounding board for Soviet anti-occupation and anti-American propaganda. He has sought to slow down and disrupt the repatriation program by complaining against the use of certain Japanese Navy vessels for repatriation and by demanding that some of these vessels be turned over to the Soviet Union. He has refused to consider any plan whereby the Soviet Union would assist in repatriating Japanese by using captured Japanese shipping already in its possession.

In South America the Soviet propaganda is intended to discredit the United States, break down hemispheric solidarity, and alienate the Latin republics so as to prevent the flow of essential raw materials to the United States in the event of a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Moscow is making a determined effort on all political

fronts to discredit American intentions in securing bases in the Atlantic and the Pacific. Wherever possible, as in Iceland, the issue of American bases is injected by the Communists into local political disputes in such a way that the United States appears to have "aggressive, imperialistic" designs. While our interests in Iceland are being condemned, the Soviet Union has expressed an interest in establishing a base on Spitzbergen where she is ostensibly operating coal mines.

In addition to building up its own military strength and undermining U. S. influence wherever possible, the Soviet Government is actively directing espionage and subversive movements in the United States.

Two major intelligence organizations are engaged in large-scale espionage in this country. They are the groups controlled by the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Intelligence Department of the Red Army and they operate in this country under the cover and protection of diplomatic and consular establishments. The results of espionage operations in the form of reports, photographs, films, etc., are transmitted to Moscow by diplomatic pouch carried by diplomatic couriers.

The Soviet Government has taken advantage of every opportunity to send its official representatives to the United States. Once they arrive in this country no restrictions are placed on their movements except that permission must be obtained by Soviet representatives to visit certain industrial plants having War and Navy classified contracts.

An example of a group of Soviet specialists who have entered the United States for an exhaustive survey of considerable espionage value is the case of ten engineers who are touring the principal cities of the United States at the present time. They ostensibly entered the country to receive training in the use of air compressors at a factory in Ohio. Upon their arrival in this country, the Federal Works Agency provided the Soviet engineers with let-

ters of introduction to municipal officials in various parts of the country. They are now touring the United States taking copious notes, obtaining blueprints, diagrams and photographs of electrical, sewage, gas and water systems, power plants, transportation terminals, bridges and other strategic points in such cities as Washington, New York, Chicago and Philadelphia. They also intend to visit the principal cities of the west coast. It is obvious that these Soviet engineering specialists are here for purposes other than to study air compressors. One of them is Senior Engineer of Gas Heating of the Moscow City Committee; one is the Chief of Water Supply of the Moscow Soviet; one is Chief of Dwelling Construction of the Moscow Soviet; one is Senior Engineer of the Moscow Gas works, and another is Chief of the Technical Department of the Moscow Soviet.

The Soviets have been successful in getting their agents out of the United States without any record of their departure. There was a brazen disregard of United States sailing regulations when Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Zabolotin, the head of the Red Army Intelligence Activity in Canada, departed from the port of New York on a Soviet vessel which did not file a list of the passengers aboard.

The Soviet espionage ring in this country has found it easy to load baggage aboard Soviet vessels without Customs inspection. A shortage of personnel makes it impossible for the United States Customs, without special instructions, to maintain an adequate watch on Soviet vessels for the purpose of determining who goes aboard and what luggage is placed aboard prior to sailing.

The Soviet intelligence services also operate through diplomatic and other representatives of various nations controlled by the U.S.S.R. Soviet use of diplomats of other nations for espionage purposes has been noted most frequently among the representatives of the Soviet-dominated regimes of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. An example is Colonel Alexander Hess, former Assistant Military and Air Attache of the Czech Embassy in Washing-

ton, D. C. Colonel Hess was an espionage agent of the Soviet Red Army Intelligence, under the direction of Major General Iliia Saraev, recently the Soviet Military Attache in Washington. Use of the representatives of other governments provides not only a greater number of channels for intelligence work but also masks the operations of Soviet intelligence services.

Important elements of both the Ministry of Internal Affairs Intelligence System and the Red Army Intelligence System are found in Amtorg and in the Soviet Purchasing Commission, especially in the field of industrial and technical espionage. The Amtorg Trading Corporation was incorporated under the laws of the State of New York in 1924 but it is recognized as an official organization of the Soviet Government. Since its establishment, Amtorg has been used as a cover for espionage activities. When Lend-Lease privileges were extended to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission was established in the United States. It has been used consistently as a cover for espionage activity. The Tass News Agency, an official Government news agency, has also been used as an espionage cover.

The Soviet Government, by utilizing the membership of the Communist Party in the United States, has thousands of invaluable sources of information in various industrial establishments as well as in the departments of the Government. In this regard it must be remembered that every American Communist is potentially an espionage agent of the Soviet Government, requiring only the direct instruction of a Soviet superior to make the potentiality a reality.

The Soviet Government depends upon the Communist Party in the United States for assistance in propaganda as well as in espionage. Use of the American Communist Party is similar to the manner in which the Soviet Government uses Communist Parties all over the world. One of the major activities of the American Communist Party

at present is the dissemination of violent and widespread propaganda in favor of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and, conversely, opposing the foreign policy of the United States. An important feature of this campaign is the propaganda urging the return to the United States of our armed forces now abroad, in order that the Soviet Union may have a free hand.

One of the objectives of the American Communist Party is the subversion of the armed forces of the United States. Important activities in this connection were the recent soldier demonstrations relating to demobilization and the recent anti-caste agitation. There is continuous Communist propaganda within the United States Army and from without to promote left-wing sentiment among soldiers. Strong and continuous efforts are being made to infiltrate the educational service of the Army and to color the material used in indoctrination and education of troops. A definite campaign, in the making at present, is being sponsored by the Communist Party to indoctrinate soldiers to refuse to act in the event the United States Army is called on to suppress domestic disturbances, to take over essential industries, or to operate public utilities.

Another objective of the Communist Party in the United States is to capture the labor movement. This would enable the Party to cripple the industrial potential of the United States by calling strikes at those times and places which would be advantageous to the Soviet Union, to prepare for sabotage in the event of war with the Soviet Union (particularly in the production of atomic weapons), and to engage in industrial espionage. The main reason for the intense Soviet activity in the World Federation of Trade-Unions (with which the C.I.O. is affiliated) is to sidetrack the United States Government and to obtain influence directly over an important section of the American public. In this way, the Kremlin hopes to be able to exert pressure on the United States Government, so to speak, through the back door. The effort to influence

U. S. action on Spain by working through this labor element is a good example of the uses to which the Soviet Government wishes to put the international labor movement.

CHAPTER SIX

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

The primary objective of United States policy toward the Soviet Union is to convince Soviet leaders that it is in their interest to participate in a system of world cooperation, that there are no fundamental causes for war between our two nations, and that the security and prosperity of the Soviet Union, and that of the rest of the world as well, is being jeopardized by aggressive militaristic imperialism such as that in which the Soviet Union is now engaged.

However, these same leaders with whom we hope to achieve an understanding on the principles of international peace appear to believe that a war with the United States and the other leading capitalistic nations is inevitable. They are increasing their military power and the sphere of Soviet influence in preparation for the "inevitable" conflict, and they are trying to weaken and subvert their potential opponents by every means at their disposal. So long as these men adhere to these beliefs, it is highly dangerous to conclude that hope of international peace lies only in "accord," "mutual understanding," or "solidarity" with the Soviet Union.

Adoption of such a policy would impel the United States to make sacrifices for the sake of Soviet-U. S. relations, which would only have the effect of raising Soviet hopes and increasing Soviet demands, and to ignore alternative lines of policy, which might be much more compatible with our own national and international interests.

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The Soviet Government will never be easy to "get along with." The American people must accustom themselves to this thought, not as a cause for despair, but as a fact to be faced objectively and courageously. If we find it impossible to enlist Soviet cooperation in the solution of world problems, we should be prepared to join with the British and other Western countries in an attempt to build up a world of our own which will pursue its own objectives and will recognize the Soviet orbit as a distinct entity with which conflict is not predestined but with which we cannot pursue common aims.

As long as the Soviet Government maintains its present foreign policy, based upon the theory of an ultimate struggle between Communism and Capitalism, the United States must assume that the U.S.S.R. might fight at any time for the twofold purpose of expanding the territory under communist control and weakening its potential capitalist opponents. The Soviet Union was able to flow into the political vacuum of the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Near East, Manchuria and Korea because no other nation was both willing and able to prevent it. Soviet leaders were encouraged by easy success and they are now preparing to take over new areas in the same way. The Soviet Union, as Stalin euphemistically phrased it, is preparing "for any eventuality."

Unless the United States is willing to sacrifice its future security for the sake of "accord" with the U.S.S.R. now, this government must, as a first step toward world stabilization, seek to prevent additional Soviet aggression. The greater the area controlled by the Soviet Union, the greater the military requirements of this country will be. Our present military plans are based on the assumption that, for the next few years at least, Western Europe, the Middle East, China and Japan will remain outside the Soviet sphere. If the Soviet Union acquires control of one or more of these areas, the military forces required to hold in check those of the U.S.S.R. and prevent still further acquisitions

will be substantially enlarged. That will also be true if any of the naval and air bases in the Atlantic and Pacific, upon which our present plans rest, are given up. This government should be prepared, while scrupulously avoiding any act which would be an excuse for the Soviets to begin a war, to resist vigorously and successfully any efforts of the U.S.S.R. to expand into areas vital to American security.

The language of military power is the only language which disciples of power politics understand. The United States must use that language in order that Soviet leaders will realize that our government is determined to uphold the interests of its citizens and the rights of small nations. Compromise and concessions are considered, by the Soviets, to be evidences of weakness and they are encouraged by our "retreats" to make new and greater demands.

The main deterrent to Soviet attack on the United States, or to attack on areas of the world which are vital to our security, will be the military power of this country. It must be made apparent to the Soviet Government that our strength will be sufficient to repel any attack and sufficient to defeat the U.S.S.R. decisively if a war should start. The prospect of defeat is the only sure means of deterring the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union's vulnerability is limited due to the vast area over which its key industries and natural resources are widely dispersed, but it is vulnerable to atomic weapons, biological warfare, and long-range air power. Therefore, in order to maintain our strength at a level which will be effective in restraining the Soviet Union, the United States must be prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare. A highly mechanized army, which can be moved either by sea or by air, capable of seizing and holding strategic areas, must be supported by powerful naval and air forces. A war with the U.S.S.R. would be "total" in a more horrible sense than any previous war and there must be constant research for both offensive and defensive

weapons.

Whether it would actually be in this country's interest to employ atomic and biological weapons against the Soviet Union in the event of hostilities is a question which would require careful consideration in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. The decision would probably be influenced by a number of factors, such as the Soviet Union's capacity to employ similar weapons, which can not now be estimated. But the important point is that the United States must be prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare if necessary. The mere fact of preparedness may be the only powerful deterrent to Soviet aggressive action and in this sense the only sure guaranty of peace.

The United States, with a military potential composed primarily of highly effective technical weapons, should entertain no proposal for disarmament or limitation of armament as long as the possibility of Soviet aggression exists. Any discussion on the limitation of armaments should be pursued slowly and carefully with the knowledge constantly in mind that proposals on outlawing atomic warfare and long-range offensive weapons would greatly limit United States strength, while only moderately affecting the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union relies primarily on a large infantry and artillery force and the result of such arms limitation would be to deprive the United States of its most effective weapons without impairing the Soviet Union's ability to wage a quick war of aggression in Western Europe, the Middle East or the Far East.

The Soviet Government's rigid controls on travellers, and its internal security measures, enable it to develop military weapons and build up military forces without our knowledge. The United States should not agree to arms limitations until adequate intelligence of events in the U.S.S.R. is available and, as long as this situation prevails, no effort should be spared to make our forces adequate and strong. Unification of the services and the adoption

of universal military training would be strong aids in carrying out a forthright United States policy. In addition to increasing the efficiency of our armed forces, this program would have a salutary psychological effect upon Soviet ambitions.

Comparable to our caution in agreeing to arms limitation, the United States should avoid premature disclosure of scientific and technological information relating to war materiel until we are assured of either a change in Soviet policies or workable international controls. Any disclosure would decrease the advantage the United States now has in technological fields and diminish our strength in relation to that of the U.S.S.R.

In addition to maintaining our own strength, the United States should support and assist all democratic countries which are in any way menaced or endangered by the U.S.S.R. Providing military support in case of attack is a last resort; a more effective barrier to communism is strong economic support. Trade agreements, loans and technical missions strengthen our ties with friendly nations and are effective demonstrations that capitalism is at least the equal of communism. The United States can do much to ensure that economic opportunities, personal freedom and social equality are made possible in countries outside the Soviet sphere by generous financial assistance. Our policy on reparations should be directed toward strengthening the areas we are endeavoring to keep outside the Soviet sphere. Our efforts to break down trade barriers, open up rivers and international waterways, and bring about economic unification of countries, now divided by occupation armies, are also directed toward the re-establishment of vigorous and healthy noncommunist economies.

The Soviet Union recognizes the effectiveness of American economic assistance to small nations and denounces it bitterly by constant propaganda. The United States should realize that Soviet propaganda is dangerous (es-

pecially when American "imperialism" is emphasized) and should avoid any actions which give an appearance of truth to the Soviet charges. A determined effort should be made to expose the fallacies of such propaganda.

There are some trouble-spots which will require diligent and considered effort on the part of the United States if Soviet penetration and eventual domination is to be prevented. In the Far East, for example, this country should continue to strive for a unified and economically stable China, a reconstructed and democratic Japan, and a unified and independent Korea. We must ensure Philippine prosperity and we should assist in the peaceful solution, along noncommunistic lines, of the political problems of Southeast Asia and India.

With respect to the United Nations, we are faced with the fact that the U.S.S.R. uses the United Nations as a means of achieving its own ends. We should support the United Nations and all other organizations contributing to international understanding, but if the Soviet Union should threaten to resign at any time because it fails to have its own way, the United States should not oppose Soviet departure. It would be better to continue the United Nations as an association of democratic states than to sacrifice our principles to Soviet threats.

Since our difficulties with the Soviet Union are due primarily to the doctrines and actions of a small ruling clique and not the Soviet people, the United States should strive energetically to bring about a better understanding of the United States among influential Soviets and to counteract the anti-American propaganda which the Kremlin feeds to the Soviet people. To the greatest extent tolerated by the Soviet Government, we should distribute books, magazines, newspapers and movies among the Soviets, beam radio broadcasts to the U.S.S.R., and press for an exchange of tourists, students and educators. We should aim, through intellectual and cultural contacts, to convince Soviet leaders that the United States has no aggres-

sive intentions and that the nature of our society is such that peaceful coexistence of capitalistic and communistic states is possible.

A long-range program of this sort may succeed where individual high-level conversations and negotiations between American and Soviet diplomats may fail in bringing about any basic change in the Soviet outlook. The general pattern of the Soviet system is too firmly established to be altered suddenly by any individual—even Stalin. Conferences and negotiations may continue to attain individual objectives but it appears highly improbable that we can persuade the Soviets, by conferences alone, to change the character of their philosophy and society. If they can be influenced in ways beneficial to our interests, it will be primarily by what we do rather than by what we say, and it is likely to be a slow and laborious process.

Our best chances of influencing Soviet leaders consist in making it unmistakably clear that action contrary to our conception of a decent world order will redound to the disadvantage of the Soviet regime whereas friendly and cooperative action will pay dividends. If this position can be maintained firmly enough and long enough, the logic of it must permeate eventually into the Soviet system.

Cooperation by the Soviets can result in increased trade. The United States Government must always bear in mind, however, that questions as to the extent and nature of American trade should be determined by the overall interests of this country. It should also bear in mind that, while Soviet policy can conceivably be influenced by the hope of obtaining greater economic assistance from this country, it is unlikely that the Soviet Government will entertain sentiments of gratitude for aid once it has been granted and it is unlikely to be induced by goodwill gifts to modify its general policies. For the time being, economic aid granted to the Soviet Government or other governments within its sphere, and the fruits of private trade with persons inside these countries, will go to

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strengthen the entire world program of the Kremlin. This is also true of the proposals to send American engineers, scientists and technicians to share the benefits of their education and experience with Soviet counterparts. So long as Soviet industry is devoted to building up the Soviet military potential, such proposals have a direct bearing on American security.

Within the United States, communist penetration should be exposed and eliminated whenever the national security is endangered. The armed forces, government agencies and heavy industries are the principal targets for communist infiltration at present.

Because the Soviet Union is a highly-centralized state, whose leaders exercise rigid discipline and control of all governmental functions, its government acts with speed, consistency, and boldness. Democratic governments are usually loosely organized, with a high degree of autonomy in government departments and agencies. Government policies at times are confused, misunderstood or disregarded by subordinate officials. The United States can not afford to be uncertain of its policies toward the Soviet Union. There must be such effective coordination within the government that our military and civil policies concerning the U.S.S.R., her satellites, and our Allies are consistent and forceful. Any uncertainty or discrepancy will be seized immediately by the Soviets and exploited at our cost.

Our policies must also be global in scope. By time-honored custom, we have regarded "European Policy," "Near Eastern Policy," "Indian Policy" and "Chinese Policy" as separate problems to be handled by experts in each field. But the areas involved, far removed from each other by our conventional standards, all border on the Soviet Union and our actions with respect to each must be considered in the light of overall Soviet objectives.

Only a well-informed public will support the stern policies which Soviet activities make imperative and which the

United States Government must adopt. The American people should be fully informed about the difficulties in getting along with the Soviet Union, and the record of Soviet evasion, misrepresentation, aggression and militarism should be made public.

In conclusion, as long as the Soviet Government adheres to its present policy, the United States should maintain military forces powerful enough to restrain the Soviet Union and to confine Soviet influence to its present area. All nations not now within the Soviet sphere should be given generous economic assistance and political support in their opposition to Soviet penetration. Economic aid may also be given to the Soviet Government and private trade with the U.S.S.R. permitted provided the results are beneficial to our interests and do not simply strengthen the Soviet program. We should continue to work for cultural and intellectual understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union but that does not mean that, under the guise of an exchange program, communist subversion and infiltration in the United States will be tolerated. In order to carry out an effective policy toward the Soviet Union, the United States Government should coordinate its own activities, inform and instruct the American people about the Soviet Union, and enlist their support based upon knowledge and confidence. These actions by the United States are necessary before we shall ever be able to achieve understanding and accord with the Soviet Government on any terms other than its own.

Even though Soviet leaders profess to believe that the conflict between Capitalism and Communism is irreconcilable and must eventually be resolved by the triumph of the latter, it is our hope that they will change their minds and work out with us a fair and equitable settlement when they realize that we are too strong to be beaten and too determined to be frightened.

Dec. 1, 1951

- f. This calls attention to the importance of the Middle East and to control of the Mediterranean.
- g. If the Soviet effort could be diverted from its East-West axis to a North-South line Soviet logistical problems would be multiplied.
- h. This involves the creation of a strategic reserve in the Middle East and control of the territories bordering the Mediterranean as strategic necessities.
- i. The consolidation of these territories may be a more effective protection for Europe than U.S. divisions in a defensive posture along the Iron Curtain.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

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Document 60

Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files

September 3 1952

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thanks very much for your letter of August eleventh about the present condition of our relationship with the Soviet Union.

Your letter was most interesting and informative and I appreciate your taking the time to send it to me.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Honorable George F. Kennan
American Ambassador
American Embassy
Moscow, U.S.S.R.