

by Pentagon planners to forecast the course and characteristics of a future war with the Soviet Union. JCS 626/3 (Document 40), addressed itself to the problems of logistics and access to strategic materials which might arise in such a war. JCS 1844/13 (Document 41), code-named HALFMOON, was the first emergency war plan actually approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a guide for detailed operational planning. It in turn was succeeded by OFFTACKLE, JSPC 877/59 (Document 42), the plan for fiscal 1950, which showed significant political and military changes from its predecessor. The final document in the group, DC 6/1 (Document 43), is a strategic concept for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Drawn up in the NATO Defense Committee, it illustrates the extension of American strategic planning into the field of alliance relationships.

The documents in Part III of this chapter reflect the efforts of American planners to come to grips with the strategic implications of the atomic bomb, a problem not fully worked out in the emergency war plans. NSC 30 (Document 44) was the first formal National Security Council paper on the subject; not surprisingly in view of the novel nature of the weapon, it argued against making prior commitments regarding the use or non-use of the bomb in combat. The Army General Staff study, "Brief on the Pattern of War in the Atomic Warfare Age" (Document 45), is a tentative effort to evaluate the extent to which the advent of atomic weapons had changed the nature of war. JCS 1952/1 (Document 46) summarizes plans for using atomic weapons in connection with the JCS 1844/13 (HALFMOON) emergency war plan (Document 41). The assumptions behind this plan were challenged by a review committee headed by Air Force Lieutenant General H. R. Harmon, which wrote a report (Document 47) questioning the efficacy of atomic weapons in a general war with the Soviet Union. PPS 58 (Document 48) is an attempt by the Policy Planning Staff to anticipate the effects on American and world opinion of a demonstrated Soviet atomic bomb capability—a capability that became fact late in the summer of 1949. Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington assessed the impact of that development for American security in a letter to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson in November, 1949 (Document 49). There ensued an intense debate within the government over how the United States should respond to this development. The last two documents in this chapter reflect this debate, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocating construction of a thermonuclear, or super-bomb (Document 50) and Kennan arguing, unsuccessfully as it turned out, against depending at all on weapons of mass destruction (Document 51).

It should be noted that, of the war plans printed in this chapter, only

four—JCS 1844/13, JSPC 877/59, JCS 1952/1, and DC 6/1—had been approved, even for planning purposes, by the beginning of 1950. The elaborate apparatus erected to formulate United States national security policy still had produced no approved intermediate or long-range war plan, and even the approved short-range plans depended on levels of budgeting, forces, and logistic support beyond what was available at the time. It was with these deficiencies in mind that President Truman authorized the sweeping review of national security policy which, in the spring of 1950, produced NSC-68 (Document 52).

PART I: THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

35

S E C R E T

Guidance for Discussions on the Military Aspects of Regulation of Armaments

JCS 1731/22

June 5, 1947

[Source: *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1947, I, 485-86*]

JCS 1731/22, the conclusions of which are printed below, set forth in general terms the Pentagon's views on the subject of arms control. Not surprisingly, the document reflected a certain skepticism regarding prospects for effective regulation of armaments as long as international tensions remained high. It also stressed the importance of safeguards in any control plan, and cautioned in particular against relinquishing prematurely the high-technology weapons on which postwar U.S. military strength largely rested. The latter argument closely resembles that set forth the previous year in Clark Clifford's September 24, 1946, memorandum for President Truman (see Document 4).

Conclusions

12. The following preamble and principles regarding the military aspects of the problem of regulation and reduction of armaments are basic to the security interests of the United States:

PREAMBLE

Armaments do not cause war. They result, rather, from the causes of war. Disarmament in itself will neither remove the causes of war nor prevent war. War and armaments can only be eliminated when the ideological, political,

economic and other causes of war are exorcised. Concurrently with all disarmament negotiations, supreme effort must be continued to eliminate these causes. A highly important feature of this effort is the codification and establishment of a complete body of international law as envisaged by Article 13 of the Charter of the United Nations.

PRINCIPLES

- a. There should be no unilateral disarmament by the United States by international agreement, nor should there be a unilateral reduction of armaments, by any means, which jeopardized the military security of the United States.
- b. In any program, commitment or schedule for abolition or regulation and reduction of armaments, the establishment of effective safeguards, including international inspections and punishments, against violation and evasion of agreements is an essential prelude to the implementation of each step in the agreed program.
- c. Once agreements on safeguards are reached, evasion will still be feasible unless the veto is eliminated in so far as these specific agreements are concerned. It follows that this possibility must be obviated to satisfy our military security interests.
- d. Commitments or agreements regarding abolition or regulation and reduction of any armaments should neither become effective nor be rigidly cast until after the peace treaties have been consummated and the collective security forces contemplated by Article 43 of the United Nations Charter have been effectively established to preserve international security.
- e. The first step to be accomplished in the control of armaments is the establishment of an effective system for the international control of atomic energy (U.S. [Baruch] Proposal).²
- f. The next step is the establishment of an effective system for the international control of other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.
- g. Until the above principles are established and implemented the

2. Brackets in source text. On June 14, 1946, the United States government presented to the United Nations a plan for internationalizing control of atomic energy in phases which would protect the United States from the risks involved. The proposal became known as the Baruch Plan after Bernard Baruch, United States representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. [Ed. note]

United States cannot determine its military needs for self-preservation as recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

- h. Pending establishment and implementation of the principles enumerated above, discussions regarding regulation and reduction of conventional armaments should be directed toward solution of the questions of how and when rather than what elements of armaments should be regulated and reduced.
- i. Undue reduction of the mechanical weapons in which we excel, such as long-range bombers, naval forces and mechanized ground forces, would jeopardize the power of self-preservation of the United States.
- j. All moves toward regulation and reduction of armaments which accomplish merely the abolition or limitation of destructive and complicated weapons operate to the advantage of nations primarily superior in manpower and to the disadvantage of nations superior in technology and industrial capacity.
- k. The armament requirements for self-preservation of the United States will increase greatly if we fail to retain and to acquire by negotiation the advanced bases needed for our own use and if we neglect to deny them to potential enemies.
- l. Until an effective system of international security is established, our own requirements in armaments for security will be greater than those of an aggressor nation.
- m. The extensive and general reduction that we have already made since V-J Day in our own armaments should be an important consideration in arriving at the terms of any future program for regulation or reduction of armaments.
- n. Any attempt again to resolve the problem of regulation and reduction of conventional armaments on the basis of a differentiation between offensive and defensive weapons, or other comparative formulae, will be impractical, unrealistic and contrary to the interests of the United States.