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TOP SECRET

*Brief of Joint Outline Emergency War Plan (OFFTACKLE)*

JSPC 877/59

May 26, 1949

[Source: Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on deposit in the Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C.]

Because emergency, or short-range, war plans were keyed to available forces in any given fiscal year, they required at least annual revision. Perhaps the rapidly changing political and military circumstances of the latter 1940s would have necessitated frequent revision in any case. Because of the approach of the new fiscal year, and to take into account such developments as the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and the worsening situation of Chinese Nationalist forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1949 directed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to prepare a new emergency war plan for the first two years of a war beginning on July 1, 1949, based on forces available in fiscal year 1950. The strategic concept: "In collaboration with our allies, to impose the war objectives of the United States upon the USSR by destroying the Soviet will and capacity to resist, by conducting a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia and a strategic defensive in the Far East."

The resulting Joint Outline Emergency War Plan, named OFFTACKLE, differed from its predecessor HALFMOON-FLEETWOOD-DOUBLESTAR (Document 41) in several respects. Foremost in importance, OFFTACKLE was the first postwar plan to have the advantage of proceeding from statements of national interest devised in the State Department and in the National Security Council, notably NSC 20/4 (see Document 23). The Joint Chiefs of Staff had long resented the absence of such guidance, and immediately incorporated it into formulations of national objectives and strategic concepts in war planning. In other important differences from earlier plans, OFFTACKLE evinced less exaggerated views of Soviet capabilities, stressed coordination with new allies, and downgraded the importance of retaining or retaking Middle East oil.

Like earlier plans and papers, OFFTACKLE stressed the American reliance on atomic counteroffensives to blunt Soviet operations and to deprive the Soviet Union of warmaking capability. Interestingly, the plan also noted that "intelligence estimates indicate that the USSR will not have atomic bombs available in fiscal year 1950."

OFFTACKLE was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 8, 1949. Subsequently its name was changed to SHAKEDOWN, and later still to CROSSPIECE.

*I. The Problem*

1. To prepare a joint outline emergency war plan for the first two years of a war beginning on 1 July 1949 based on forces available under the FY 1950 budget.

*II. Basic Assumption*

2. On 1 July 1949, war has been forced upon the United States by acts of aggression by the USSR and/or her satellites.

*III. Assumptions*

3. a. The following countries will be allied with the Soviet Union: Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary, Poland, Albania, Czechoslovakia, and North and Central China (including Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang).
- b. Although the following countries would desire to ally with the Anglo-American powers their political or strategic situation would be so precarious that they could not be relied upon and would be likely to be rapidly overrun by the Soviet Union: Austria, Greece, Iran, Finland, West Germany, South China, and South Korea.<sup>10</sup>
- c. Yugoslavia's objective will be to avoid active participation and especially to forestall occupation by Soviet troops. Yugoslavia will attempt to attain these objectives, probably by professing neutrality, possibly by professing adherence to the USSR. A profession of neutrality would probably be accompanied by sub-rosa assistance to the USSR. In either case, Yugoslavia will resist general occupation by Soviet troops, but might permit the passage of Soviet troops across Yugoslavia. Whenever Yugoslavia becomes sufficiently important strategically to the USSR, the latter will overrun and occupy it.
- d. The following countries will be allied against the Soviet Union: United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, Ceylon, the British Colonial Empire, France, the Benelux Countries, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Italy, Iceland, and the Philippine Islands, together with their overseas possessions.
- e. The following countries will attempt to remain neutral but will be friendly disposed towards the Anglo-American Powers and will join them if attacked by the Soviet Union: Turkey and Spain.
- f. The following countries will remain neutral if permitted to do so: Ireland, Switzerland, Sweden, and Afghanistan. Ireland and Switzerland will resist attack by either side but will ally with the

10. East Germany and North Korea have already been occupied by the Soviet Union. [Note in source text]

Anglo-American Powers if attacked by the Soviets. Sweden and Afghanistan may submit to occupation by the Soviets.

- g. The Arab States deeply distrust the USSR and, if they were unable to remain neutral, would prefer to support the Anglo-American Powers, in spite of great disillusionment over U.S. and U.K. policy toward Palestine. However, because political turmoil in the Arab States will probably continue, the Arab governments, although unlikely to oppose the use by Western Powers of territories and resources in Arab control, will be unable (even though willing) to afford any significant cooperation, at least initially. Israel, although unlikely to offer effective opposition to the Western Powers, would be reluctant to afford them any cooperation.
- h. Other Asiatic countries, including India and Pakistan, but excluding Soviet satellites, can be expected to remain neutral but might be prepared, under pressure, to make their economic resources, and possibly their territories, available to the Anglo-American Powers.
- i. While the countries which have signed the Atlantic Pact will have improved economically and militarily, they will be unable, with the exception of the United Kingdom, to effectively resist being overrun and occupied by Soviet forces.
- j. Other countries of Central and South America will be Allied with the United States in accordance with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.<sup>11</sup>
- k. High governmental approval will be obtained and atomic weapons will be used by the United States. Atomic weapons will be used by the USSR if available. (Intelligence estimates indicate that the USSR will have no atomic bombs available in fiscal year 1950.)
- l. Biological and chemical warfare may be used by either side subject to considerations of retaliation. The Soviets will have biological weapons sufficiently advanced to use on a limited scale, but the Allies will not have sufficient quantities to permit offensive employment in the period under consideration. Both the United States and the USSR have chemical warfare weapons developed for employment on a major scale.
- m. At best, war will be preceded by a period of political negotiations and increasing tension. Under these conditions the Allies may have a few months warning that war is likely. The decision to start the

main attack might be taken by the Allied governments in which case the Allies should be able to take certain preparatory measures. On the other hand, war may break out without warning.

- n. Present estimates indicate that the regaining of Middle East oil is not vital<sup>12</sup> but will be highly desirable. Regaining these resources by the end of the second year of the war will provide insurance against the adverse effect of presently unforeseeable factors (JCS 1741/15).<sup>13</sup>

#### *IV. National War Objectives*

4. The national objectives of the United States with respect to the USSR are set forth in NSC 20/4 (JCS 1903/3).<sup>14</sup> Pertinent extracts are:

##### *U.S. Objectives and Aims Vis-à-Vis the USSR*

19. To counter the threats to our national security and well-being posed by the USSR, our general objectives with respect to Russia, in time of peace as well as in time of war, should be:

- a. To reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations.
- b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the United Nations charter.

In pursuing these objectives due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions inherent in our way of life.

22. In the event of war with the USSR we should endeavor by successful military and other operations to create conditions which would permit satisfactory accomplishment of U.S. objectives without a predetermined requirement for unconditional surrender. War aims supplemental to our peacetime aims should include:

- a. Eliminating Soviet Russian domination in areas outside the borders of any Russian state allowed to exist after the war.
- b. Destroying the structure of relationships by which the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in countries not under communist control.
- c. Assuring that any regime or regimes which may exist on traditional Russian territory in the aftermath of war:
  - (1) Do not have sufficient military power to wage aggressive war.
  - (2) Impose nothing resembling the present iron curtain over contacts with the outside world.

12. Subject to confirmation by responsible government agencies. [Note in source text]

13. Not printed. [Ed. note]

14. See Document 23. [Ed. note]

11. The Rio Pact of September 2, 1947. [Ed. note]

- d. In addition, if any Bolshevik regime is left in any part of the Soviet Union, insuring that it does not control enough of the military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable it to wage war on comparable terms with any other regime or regimes which may exist on traditional Russian territory.
- e. Seeking to create postwar conditions which will:
  - (1) Prevent the development of power relationships dangerous to the security of the United States and international peace.
  - (2) Be conducive to the successful development of an effective world organization based upon the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
  - (3) Permit the earliest practicable discontinuance within the United States of wartime controls.

*V. Mission*

5. To accomplish the military defeat of the USSR and her satellites to a degree that will bring about a political and military situation which will permit the United States to accomplish the national objectives outlined in NSC 20/4 (JCS 1903/3).

*VI. Over-all Strategic Concept*

6. In collaboration with our Allies, to impose the war objectives of the United States upon the USSR by destroying the Soviet will and capacity to resist, by conducting a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia and a strategic defensive in the Far East.

*VII. Basic Undertakings*

- 7. In collaboration with our allies:
  - a. To insure the integrity of the Western Hemisphere and to promote and develop its war-making capacity.
  - b. To secure, maintain, and defend such bases, land and sea areas, and lines of communication as are required for the execution of the concept.

VIEW "A"<sup>15</sup>

c. To conduct, at the earliest practicable date, a strategic

VIEW "B"

c. To conduct, at the earliest practicable date, a strategic

15. While plans were under discussion, divergent views among the military services were presented in this fashion for consideration at higher levels of the Joint Staff Organization. The

air offensive against the vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity.

air offensive against the vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity, and against other elements of the Soviet offensive military power.

- d. To stabilize the Soviet offensive as early as practicable by means of air, sea, land, and special operations.
- e. To initiate development of the offensive power of the armed forces for such later operations as may be necessary for achievement of the national war objectives.
- f. To provide essential aid to our Allies in support of efforts contributing directly to the over-all strategic concept.
- g. Exploit at the earliest practicable date the psychological weaknesses of the USSR and its satellites by information activities and other special operations.

*VIII. Estimate*

8. *Outbreak of War.* There is a possibility that war will occur at any time as a result of miscalculation by the USSR or a satellite as to the extent that the United States or other Western Powers would or could resist their present policy of expansion. It is also possible that the active opposition of the Allies to Soviet expansion policy may induce the Soviets to believe that it would be advantageous or even mandatory for them to anticipate any increase in this opposition by starting a war themselves. Such war would come with little or no warning.

9. *Operations by the Soviets.* Should war eventuate within the period covered by this plan, the Soviets can be expected to launch offensives into western and northern Europe, southern Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. It is doubtful, however, whether the Russians have the command ability and resources to undertake all these campaigns concurrently. It is estimated that the early objectives of the Soviets, not in order of priority, would be:

- a. Seizure of the Middle East and its oil resources.

moderate differences in language between Views A and B reflect the Navy's opposition (View A) to an enlarging strategic air war, which would imply a greater role and a greater share of resources for the Air Force (View B). In later versions of this plan, View A won out. [Ed. note]

- b. Destruction or neutralization of all forces of the Allies on the Eurasian land mass.
- c. Seizure or neutralization of those areas from which the Western Powers might swiftly and effectively strike at the USSR.
- d. Neutralization or seizure of the United Kingdom.
- e. Expansion and consolidation of positions in the satellites, China, and Korea.
- f. Disruption of the Allied war-making capacity by subversion and sabotage.
- g. Disruption of vital Allied lines of communication by aggressive submarine warfare, mining and air operations.
- h. Accomplishment of diversionary attacks on Allied-held territory for the purpose of causing mal-deployment of Allied forces.

#### *IX. Brief of Allied Plan of Action*

10. *General.* The Allied plan of action is based on three distinct but interrelated series of operations:
- a. Essential defensive tasks.
  - b. A strategic air offensive.
  - c. Operations in Western Eurasia which have as their immediate aim the securing of as much of Western Europe as is possible from Soviet military control, and as their ultimate aim the military defeat of forces of the USSR.
11. *Defensive Tasks.* The following defensive tasks must be accomplished on an austerity basis, regardless of the direction of any offensive:
- a. Insure the security of the Western Hemisphere to include:
    - (1) Defense of the continental United States.
    - (2) Defense of the Fairbanks-Anchorage-Kodiak area of Alaska.
    - (3) Defense of the Venezuelan oil area.
    - (4) Defense of the Panama Canal.
  - b. Insure the security of Iceland, Greenland, and the Azores.
  - c. Insure the continued availability of Okinawa as a base for military operations. Defend Japan with forces initially available on D-day plus such minor augmentations as can be made available during the first few months of the war.
  - d. Secure the lines of communication from the United States and Canada to the United Kingdom, Straits of Gibraltar, Central Africa, South America, Alaska, Okinawa, and Japan.

12. *Strategic Air Offensive.* This operation requires immediate utilization of the forces available as of D-day for a maximum exploitation of the atomic bomb.

#### VIEW "A"<sup>16</sup>

It is recognized that the degree of success of the initial atomic offensive will largely determine the speed with which the war will be brought to a successful conclusion and the subsequent course of Allied action. Therefore, operational and logistic support priorities must be established to permit the early initiation of a concentrated strategic air offensive to destroy the war-making capacity of the USSR. This air offensive will be sustained until decisive results are attained or until Soviet capabilities are so reduced as to permit the accomplishment of this end by employment of forces on a scale which would not jeopardize the national economy.

#### VIEW "B"

It is recognized that the degree of success of the initial atomic offensive will largely influence subsequent Allied action. Therefore, operational and logistic support priorities must be established to permit the early initiation of this effort. This air offensive will be continued until Soviet military capabilities are so reduced as to permit the commitment to action of Allied military forces on a scale which would not jeopardize the national economy.

#### 13. *Operations in Western Eurasia.*

- a. The security of the United States requires, with respect to continental Europe, the pursuance of a continuing policy to develop at the earliest possible moment, with the Nations of Western Europe, the capability of holding a line covering the Western Europe complex preferably no farther to the west than the Rhine. The logical extension of this line involves the United Kingdom on the left flank and the Cairo-Suez area on the right flank. Realizing that the accomplishment of this purpose is infeasible with the forces which will be available in FY 1950, this plan envisages the holding of a substantial bridgehead in Western Europe. Or, if this proves in-

16. Here, View A is that of the Air Force; View B is that of its competitors in the contest for strategic missions and resources. Subsequently, this passage read: "A strategic air offensive with atomic and conventional bombs will be initiated at the earliest possible date subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities. This offensive will be aimed at vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity and at the retardation of Soviet advances in western Eurasia. Operational and logistic support priorities will be established to permit the earliest initiation of this effort." See JCS 1844/46, 8 November 1949, p. 353, National Archives, Modern Military Records Branch (not printed). [Ed. note]

feasible, the earliest practicable return to Western Europe in order to prevent the exploitation and Communization of that area with long-term disastrous effects on U.S. national interests.

b. Accordingly, the concept of operations for this plan includes the following basic tasks in the following order of priority:

(1) Secure the United Kingdom against invasion, and defend it against air attack to the degree necessary to insure its availability as a major base for all types of military operations.

(2) Maintain Allied control of the Western Mediterranean-North African area (to include Tunisia) to the extent necessary to ensure continued capability of carrying on effectively military operations in that area. This will involve holding on the Pyrenees line if possible, and at a minimum, that area of the Iberian Peninsula which is necessary to secure the western entrance to the Mediterranean.

(3) Maintain Allied control of the Cairo-Suez area to facilitate support of the Turks and other friendly forces in the general vicinity, to enable Allied air forces, both land- and sea-based, to support friendly forces in the Eastern Mediterranean littoral, to permit the launching of strategic air bombing attacks against remunerative targets from bases in that area, and to exploit natural resources and any enemy weaknesses in the Middle East.

c. Secure air and sea lines of communication to Allied forces deployed to accomplish the tasks outlined in subparagraph b above.

14. *Phasing.* It is recognized that the following phases are only approximate and that they will inevitably overlap to a varying degree with each individual operation or campaign, and that they may be materially changed as Soviet intentions are transmitted into actual operations. This plan of action for the first two years of war is developed in three time phases with subsequent operations shown under a fourth phase.

a. *First Phase.* The first phase (estimated from D to D + 3 months) covers the period during which the initial atomic offensive of the war will have been largely completed and its effects evaluated; from this evaluation will stem the next phase of the war. During this period allied forces will be deployed to undertake those tasks listed in paragraphs 11 to 13 inclusive above and operations to impede Soviet offensives.

b. *Second Phase.* The second phase (estimated from D + 3 to

D + 12) is one of continuing the air offensive; of applying all other available forces to stagnate Soviet advances initially, and later, to enhance the Allied military position in Western Eurasia; and at the same time, generating the forces required to permit the realization of allied military objectives in Western Europe.

c. *Third Phase.* The third phase (estimated from D + 12 to D + 24 months) is a period during which the allied forces will continue the operations set forth for the first and second phases and will undertake the exploitation of allied efforts of earlier phases to defeat the Soviet forces in Western Europe by invasion if necessary.

d. *Fourth Phase.* The fourth phase (estimated from D + 24 to the end of the war) is covered in this plan only in general terms. A broad estimate of the possible scheme of operations which might be followed should the war continue for more than two years is set forth.

## *X. General Tasks (All Phases)*

### *15. Introduction*

a. In this section, and those which follow, the specific tasks which must be undertaken to implement the concept and carry out the Allied plan of action are defined. Insofar, as practicable, the tasks are discussed under the respective phases. In the case of continuing tasks, the change in nature of these tasks for each of the time phases is indicated. Where no appreciable change is expected in a continuing task, or in the cases of tasks which should be completed within a certain time phase, it is dropped from further discussion.

b. In the case of the more important tasks, the deployment of forces for each specific task is contained in the discussion thereof. A restatement of such deployments, and a recapitulation for each service are contained in the annexes to this plan. Deployments to specific tasks must not be considered as inviolate. There are areas of activity in which specific forces will have to be employed in the execution of more than one task.

c. This plan is not written with any particular command organization in mind, although it is inevitable that certain tasks will fall naturally into the existing structure. Implementation of this plan, in

which tasks will be specifically assigned to present or prospective commands, will be accomplished by implementation directives.

16. *Cooperation*

- a. This plan is not the result of combined planning. However, information on the plans of our allies and their capabilities was used to the extent it was available. It was assumed that the United Kingdom, our principal ally, would deploy the forces essentially as indicated in the latest combined plan. Redeployment of U.K. forces might result in a material strengthening of the tasks listed under Priorities 1 and 2 to such an extent that a more substantial base area could be assured.
- b. General consideration is given to the assistance which the United States may expect from its allies in waging the war envisaged by this plan. One of the most important U.S. tasks will be the effective utilization of this assistance. This will require both political and military consultations to insure that plans for the implementation of this concept be effectively coordinated among all the Allies in order to make maximum use of Allied assistance as it becomes available.

17. *Aid to Allies.* A separate plan will be prepared to provide feasible aid to those nations whose contribution to the Allied war effort will assist in the implementation of the overall strategic concept, including the minimum necessary to those nations vital to the execution of this plan. Initially the amount of this aid will be modest and must be allocated only to the most vital tasks.

18. *Unconventional Warfare.* Guidance for the conduct of military psychological warfare and other means of unconventional warfare in the support of current joint emergency war plans is being prepared. When approved, this guidance will be furnished to commanders operating directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[Paragraphs 19 through 48 constituted a detailed discussion of the tasks, forces available, and operations in the anticipated phases of the war as outlined above. Ed. note]

*Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area*

DC 6/1

December 1, 1949

[Source: *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1949*, IV, 352-56]

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 opened a new era militarily as well as politically for the United States. One of the first necessities for America and its new allies was to state objectives and agree on a general approach to the problems of mutual defense. In essence, the signatories of the NATO treaty, through their representatives to the Defense Committee of the organization, pledged cooperation in peace and combination in war. They called for planning, preparation, standardization, and joint exercise in peace in the conviction that these would lead to strength in war if they did not in fact deter the Soviet Union from ever attacking at all. The United States received primary responsibility for strategic atomic bombing in war; the United Kingdom assumed a leading role in defending the ocean lines of communication; and NATO's other nations recognized their obligation to provide ground forces and tactical aircraft in Europe at least in the initial phases of any future war.

## I

*Preamble*

1. The attainment of the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty requires the integration by the parties to the Treaty of those political, economic, and psychological, as well as purely military means, which are essential to the defense of the North Atlantic area. Of particular significance is the requirement that the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty be accomplished in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The parties to the Atlantic Treaty have declared:

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

2. For the purpose of, first, preventing war, and, second, insuring in the event of war the effective application of the military and industrial strength of the Treaty nations in a common defense, the military means available to the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty must be effectively coordinated. As a basis for such coordination a common strategic concept for the defense of