

event of international agreement on the control of atomic weapons this conclusion should be reconsidered.)

(3) Urgently develop and execute a firm and coordinated program (to include legislation if necessary) designed to suppress the communist menace in the United States in order to safeguard the United States against the disruptive and dangerous subversive activities of communism.

(4) To the extent necessary to implement (1) above, initiate civilian and industrial mobilization.

(5) Vigorously prosecute a domestic information program, designed to insure public understanding and non-partisan support of our foreign policy.

#### B. FOREIGN

(1) In our counter-offensive efforts, give first priority to Western Europe. This should not preclude appropriate efforts in the case of other countries of Europe and the Middle East, which are immediately threatened by world communism and where loss of freedom would most seriously threaten our national security.

(2) Urgently adopt and implement the European Recovery Program.

(3) Strongly endorse the Western Union and actively encourage its development and expansion as an anti-communist association of states.

(4) Work out an appropriate formula which will provide for:

(a) Military action by the United States in the event of unprovoked armed attack against the nations in the Western Union or against other selected non-Communist nations.

(b) Initiation of political and military conversations with such nations with a view to coordination of anti-Communist efforts.

(5) Assist in building up the military potential of selected non-communist nations by the provision of machine tools to rehabilitate their arms industries, technical information to facilitate standardization of arms, and by furnishing to the extent practicable military equipment and technical advice.

(6) When we have developed a program for suppressing the communist menace in the United States (12A.(3) above), cooperate closely with governments which have already taken such action and encourage other governments to take like action.

(7) Encourage and assist private United States citizens and organizations in fostering non-communist trade union movements in those countries where that would contribute to our national security. Measures of assistance should include consideration of individual income tax deductions for that purpose.

(8) Intensify the present anti-communist foreign information program.

(9) Develop a vigorous and effective ideological campaign.

(10) Develop, and at the appropriate time carry out, a coordinated program to support underground resistance movements in countries behind the iron curtain, including the USSR.

(11) Establish a substantial emergency fund to be used in combatting Soviet-directed world communism.

(12) Make unmistakably clear to the Kremlin at an opportune time, and in an appropriate manner, United States determination to resist Soviet and Soviet-directed communist aggression so as to avoid the possibility of an "accidental" war through Soviet miscalculation of how far the Western Powers might be pushed.

13. Effectuation of the above policies requires bi-partisan support.

*The Attitude of This Government Toward Events in Yugoslavia*

PPS 35

June 30, 1948

[Source: *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1948, IV, 1079-81*]

PPS 35, written within days after news broke of the Tito-Stalin split, constituted the first explicit recognition within the U.S. government of the possibility that a communist state might exist independent of Moscow's control. From this realization that the international communist movement was no longer a monolith, the Policy Planning Staff developed a strategy for taking advantage of such fissures, actual and potential, to achieve the goals of containment (see also Documents 22 and 24).

Secretary of State Marshall approved PPS 35 on July 1, 1948, and as NSC 18 it was submitted to the National Security Council, where action on the document was neither requested nor taken.

#### *Discussion*

1. The defiance of the Kremlin by the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party creates an entirely new problem of foreign policy for this Government. For the first time in history we may now have within the international community a communist state resting on the basis of Soviet organizational principles and for the most part on Soviet ideology, and yet independent of Moscow.

If the Soviet satellite area disintegrates further, either now or in the more

distant future, this situation may arise in other instances as well. For this reason, the attitude we take now may constitute an important precedent.

Furthermore, our attitude at this time may have an important influence on *whether* the rift between Tito and Moscow spreads to Russia's relations with other members of the satellite area or serves to weld those other members still more tightly to the Kremlin.

It necessary, therefore, that this Department and its representatives abroad be extremely circumspect in the handling of all matters which might be taken to reflect this Government's attitude toward the Tito-Stalin imbroglio.

2. It is essential to bear in mind certain outstanding facts which are already apparent in this situation:

- (a) Yugoslavia remains a communist state, dedicated to an ideology of hostility and contempt toward the "bourgeois capitalist world", and committed at home to government by the methods of communist totalitarian dictatorship. Its leaders have continued to demonstrate right up to this moment a sincere concern for the unity of the communist world in the face of "capitalist imperialism". It would therefore be a frivolous and undignified error on our part to assume that because Tito had fallen out with Stalin he could now be considered our "friend".
- (b) The disunity within the communist world which has been demonstrated by these events must be profoundly humiliating and disagreeable to *all* the parties concerned. Efforts will certainly be made, from one side or both, to patch up the rift for the sake of appearances. It is too early to hazard any guesses as to the success of these efforts. But it can be stated with assurance that even though they might be outwardly and momentarily successful, the damage done to the movement by this episode can probably never be entirely repaired. A new factor of fundamental and profound significance has been introduced into the world communist movement by the demonstration that the Kremlin can be successfully defied by one of its own minions. By this act, the aura of mystical omnipotence and infallibility which has surrounded the Kremlin power has been broken. The possibility of defection from Moscow, which has heretofore been unthinkable for foreign communist leaders, will from now on be present in one form or another in the mind of every one of them.
- (c) The Russians will seek intently for any mistakes in the handling of this situation by the western countries which can be exploited as a

means of bringing pressure to bear on Tito to come back into the fold and as a means of discouraging other satellite figures from following Tito's example.

If the western world now fawns on Tito this will be exploited by Moscow to arouse feelings of disgust and revulsion throughout the international communist movement and among Tito's own followers. This would help to undermine his position with his own followers and to bring Yugoslavia back into the fold. Such a course would also arouse strong, and justifiable, criticism in this country.

If, on the other hand, the western world is too cold toward Tito, ridicules him in his present international loneliness, and repulses any advances that may be made by him toward closer association with the west, this will be used by the Moscow communists as proof that foreign communists have no alternative but to stay with Moscow: that desertion only places them at the mercy of the wolves of capitalism.

### *Conclusions*

1. The Department and all its representatives should observe extreme circumspection in discussing the Yugoslav differences with the Cominform. Bearing in mind that Yugoslavia is still a communist state and is still led by men who have consistently adopted an arrogant and hostile attitude toward this country and the western world in general, we should not detract from the dignity of our own position by exhibiting an excessive friendliness toward the Yugoslav leaders or indulging in exaggerated hopes that they will soon become an integral part of the western world. On the other hand, we should be careful not to create the impression that Tito has been held up to ridicule by the west just *because* he has been eliminated from the communist family.

2. The line which should be adhered to by representatives of the Department in private conversation, with respect to the attitude of this Government, should be substantially as follows:

This Government would welcome a genuine re-emergence of Yugoslavia as a political personality in its own right. Its attitude toward a Yugoslav Government which had cut loose from Moscow would depend primarily on the behavior of that government with regard to this country, to the other European countries, and to the international community in general. We recognize that Yugoslavia's internal regime continues to be one which is deeply distasteful to our people and that as long as such a regime exists, Yugoslav-

American relations can never take on quite the cordiality and intimacy which we would wish. On the other hand, we also recognize that if Yugoslavia is not to be subservient to an outside power its internal regime is basically its own business. The character of that regime would not, in these circumstances, stand in the way of a normal development of economic relations between Yugoslavia and this country or—as far as we are concerned—between Yugoslavia and the countries of western Europe provided Yugoslavia is willing to adopt a loyal and cooperative attitude in its international relationships. However, the question of Yugoslavia's economic relationship with the countries of western Europe who are participating in the European Recovery Program is primarily a matter for those countries themselves rather than for us. If the Yugoslavs should demonstrate a wish to establish better relations with the west, this Government would not stand in the way of such a development.

3. The line which should be adhered to by representatives of this Department in discussing the *interpretation* of events in Yugoslavia should be substantially as follows:

Tito's defiance of the Cominform does not mean that Yugoslavia has "come over" to the west. Yugoslavia remains a communist state and its negative attitude toward the western democracies is as yet unchanged. Efforts will certainly be made to patch up the differences between Belgrade and Moscow. It is too early to predict what the success of these efforts will be. In any case, however, the international communist movement will never be able to make good entirely the damage done by this development. For the first time in the history of the movement, a servant of the international communist movement controlling territory, armed forces and a political organization, has defied, with at least temporary success, the authority of the Kremlin. This example will be noted by other communists everywhere. Eventually, the non-Russian communists will come to appreciate that they have no future as the servants of Kremlin policies.

#### *Recommendation*

The Policy Planning Staff recommends that the above conclusions be made the basis of a guidance directive to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, and of instructions to all diplomatic missions and to important consular offices, to the end that representatives of this Government will exhibit a uniform reaction to the recent developments in Yugoslavia.

#### *U.S. Objectives with Respect to Russia*

NSC 20/1

August 18, 1948

[Source: Records of the National Security Council on deposit in the Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C.]

NSC 20/1 originated in response to a request from Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal for a "comprehensive statement of national policy" with regard to the Soviet Union, on the grounds that until such a statement was prepared, "no logical decisions can be reached as to the proportion of our resources which should be devoted to military purposes. . . ." Drafted by the Policy Planning Staff, this document represented the most complete exposition up to that time of the objectives the policy of containment was supposed to accomplish.

The document established two basic goals for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union: (1) reduction of the power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to the point that they would no longer threaten international stability; and (2) accomplishment of a fundamental change in the theory and practice of international relations as applied by the Soviet government. Unlike NSC 7 (Document 20), NSC 20/1 stressed the distinction between the Soviet Union and the international communist movement, and, in line with the reasoning in PPS 35 (Document 21), held out the possibility of driving a wedge between the two of them as a means of implementing U.S. policy objectives.

NSC 20/1 emphasized the desirability of achieving containment's desired results by means short of war, although it recognized the possibility that war might come, whether by inadvertence or design. The final portion of the document dealt with the question of what U.S. policy should be in that eventuality. It is noteworthy for its stress on the neutralization, rather than the elimination, of Soviet power, and for its implied rejection of the World War II doctrine of unconditional surrender.

#### *I. Introduction*

It is plain that Russia, both as a force in its own right and as a center for the world communist movement, has become for the time being the outstanding problem of U.S. foreign policy, and that there is deep dissatisfaction and concern in this country over the aims and methods of the Soviet leaders. The policies of this Government are therefore determined in considerable measure by our desire to modify Soviet policies and to alter the international situation to which they have already led.

1. Forrestal to Sidney W. Souers, July 10, 1948, quoted in NSC 20, "Appraisal of the Degree and Character of Military Preparedness Required by the World Situation," July 12, 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1948*, I (part 2) 589-592.