

***Foreign Policy Analysis and Globalization:
Public Opinion, World Opinion, and the Individual***
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As commonly defined, international politics as a field examines the sources of conflict and cooperation between and among states and international actors within the international system. As a distinct branch of international politics, foreign policy analysis (FPA) considers a specific aspect of this larger question by focusing on the processes by which specific international actors (primarily state governments and leaders) make choices. Tracing back to the classic work of Richard Snyder and his collaborators (1962), the result has been an enormous literature on "how leaders, groups, and coalitions of actors can affect the way foreign policy problems are framed, the options that are selected, the choices that are made, and what gets implemented" (Hermann 2001b:1).

In the coming years, the challenge for FPA will be to integrate ongoing transformations in international political structures and processes into theories regarding government processes and individual behaviors. During this transformative period, new processes will likely develop both across and within traditional state boundaries while at the same time the main actors will probably remain the same. As such, FPA will need to develop new understandings regarding the nature of policymaking among the various actors who create foreign policy. As for the international system, several overarching future visions of world politics have come to dominate popular intellectual discussion. Francis Fukuyama's (1992) "End of History" view suggests that liberalism, democracy, and the latter's emphasis on individual rights have triumphed ideologically over all competitors. In this vision, the future path of international affairs is an increasingly peaceful coexistence in a slowly enlarging democratic zone with potential conflicts existing between the democratic and nondemocratic zones. An apocalyptic vision comes from Robert Kaplan's (2000) analysis in which he suggests that societal breakdown in the developing world (characterized by poverty, inequality, instability, and strife) will eventually spread to the developed world and encompass the entire globe. Samuel Huntington (1996) expects conflict to emerge among various cultural civilizations (Islamic, Judeo-Christian, Eastern Orthodox, and Confucian) in a manner that at once potentially supercedes loyalties to the state internally while at the same time providing affiliative motivations among states within a particular civilization. Thomas Friedman (1999) identifies globalization associated with the free flow of economic goods and services across the globe as the key international variable. Nations that embrace globalization will thrive; those that do not will wither. While pointing to traditional balance of power considerations as a

continuing foundation for international relations, Charles Kupchan (2002: 318-319) believes that international politics and internal state dynamics will increasingly be affected in unpredictable ways by digital technology's influence on productivity, economies of scale, and the creation of "atomized and individualized" modes of production. And, John Mearsheimer (2001) emphasizes the continued dominance of the balance of power and state competition in an anarchical world.

Although an analysis of these competing analytical perspectives lies beyond the scope of this essay, they provide a useful starting point. Except for Mearsheimer's view, one commonality among these various perspectives is the notion that in the future there will be greater movement of capital, people, ideas, and goods across increasingly porous international borders. The challenge for FPA will be to adapt to these increasingly dynamic processes. This essay argues that to do so FPA will need to further integrate into its examination of foreign policy formulation the expanded opportunities that exist for pressure from the public, world opinion, and globalized citizens.

The changing international context will require that the field emphasize the influence of cross-border foreign policy processes as well as exploit data sets that have not been previously used (see the discussion of comparison by Kaarbo in this symposium).

Ironically, while the barriers to participation by actors outside traditional political systems recede, attention to the importance of policymakers and the foreign policy processes they employ, in mediating these pressures should grow.

Comparative Public Opinion

By the mid-1970's, the received knowledge regarding US public opinion and foreign policy held that the public was largely inattentive, emotional, with unstructured beliefs, and little influence on foreign policy. The foreign policy failure of Vietnam led to a reexamination of these conceptions and eventually led to a reformulation of most of these views. In subsequent years, scholars clearly demonstrated that the public reacted reasonably to foreign policy events, held structured attitudes, and seemed to influence policy (Holsti 1992). In the last decade, scholars have trained their attention on specifying the conditions that determine the public's influence and on a widening array of potential intervening variables (Graham 1994; Powlick and Katz 1998; Foyle 1999).

Even though much progress has been made in our understanding of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, most of this scholarship has occurred substantively about the United States. Although some attention was previously paid to examining the effects of different types of domestic structures (Eichenberg 1989; Risse-Kappen 1991), the literature has only recently begun to test whether the revisionist views on public opinion and foreign policy apply in non-US contexts (for example, Bjereld and Ekengren 1999; Isernia 2000; La Balme 2000; Sinnott

2000; Isernia, Juhasz, and Rattinger 2002). Still, this comparative research has examined mostly data from advanced industrialized democracies in western Europe. The challenge is to push beyond this data set to become even more broadly comparative in order to understand which aspects of the previous knowledge are structurally inherent within democratic contexts and which are context bound-based on specific institutional arrangements, levels of democratic development, or cultural factors. Future evaluations of previous findings in reference to nontraditional data sources, such as developing countries, could yield startling results (Aydinli and Mathews 2000).

In this field in particular, given that much of what we know about public opinion and foreign policy at both the theoretical and empirical level was developed in reference to the United States and tested only in a limited manner beyond it, we need to do more comparative analysis. Because scientific polling was begun in the US context when the United States was already an advanced democracy, our concepts about the use of public opinion and the process of how polling and public opinion became institutionalized in the political process (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995) may be context bound to one country. For example, it is very possible that in developing democracies the roles of individuals and the institutionalization of polling will interact in a way that is not anticipated by the US literature (see, for example, Zilberman 2002). Because democratization and the institutionalization of public opinion polling are occurring at the same time, teasing out causal mechanisms will also be particularly challenging. Still, given the long history within FPA of grappling with just such questions methodologically (George 1979a; George and McKeown 1985; Neack, Hey, and Haney 1995; Kaarbo and Beasley 1999), the field is well positioned to provide insights into these issues.

Although difficult, sorting out these problems empirically is an important task not only for scholarly reasons but for applied politics as well. For instance, the democracy and war literature has pointed to potential differences in behavior between developed democracies and those that are in the process of democratizing (see for example Mansfield and Snyder 1995). In a similar vein, we might expect that public opinion and its influence on foreign policy could vary in significant ways that would be theoretically and practically significant. Consider that, even though a Western democracies have both elections and traditions of liberalism, many developing democracies are better characterized as illiberal democracies because they lack an emphasis on the rule of law and basic political freedoms (Zakaria 2003).

This distinction becomes particularly important when we try to understand why it is that politicians pay attention to public opinion: whether as a result of the practical in need to win elections, or of some broader ideational or normative process. Future FPA research should help find the answer.

Transnational Processes and World Opinion

Beyond the influence of public opinion within a single state, the emerging international system will require FPA to give greater attention to cross-national processes that influence decisions. Although much of the current literature focuses on how domestic society, governmental politics, and foreign policy processes affect a particular state's foreign policy choices, greater emphasis will need to be placed in the future on the role of world opinion, the cross-state influence of domestic actors (state A responding to state B's public), and the activities of globalized citizens.

Discussions concerning the potential influence of world opinion on policy go back a long way. Consider the emphasis Woodrow Wilson placed on it when he argued that the opinion of the world's publics would force post-World War I states into more pacific relations based on openness and international agreements.

Although history certainly proved Wilson's vision incorrect or at least ill-timed, the case can be made that the influential world opinion that he envisioned is likely to become increasingly significant in a globalized world. The effects of world opinion are, however, not likely to be uniformly stabilizing or peace inducing and instead will depend greatly on the context.

World opinion has long been a source of concern for policymakers. For example, attention to world opinion existed within US President Dwight Eisenhower's administration even at the height of the Cold War when realist concerns such as power and position were thought to predominate. Two instances illustrate how concerns with world opinion constrained the Eisenhower Administration from pursuing actions that policymakers might have thought prudent for purely national security reasons. First, early in the administration, both Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles concurred that they could not use nuclear weapons as an effective instrument of policy because of the constraints of world opinion (Memorandum of Discussion, Special Meeting of the NSC on March 31, 1953). Subsequent deliberations on the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina and during the Taiwan Straits crises suggest that concerns about world opinion continued to limit their use. Second, in their deliberations about US policy toward the Offshore Islands in the Taiwan Straits in the period immediately before the 1954 crisis, the meeting notes record that Eisenhower (after observing that the world did not favor US belligerence to preserve the islands) did not desire to become "involved in a major war where world public opinion would be wholly against the United States, because that, he said, was the kind of war you lose. World public opinion was a tremendous force to be reckoned with" (Memorandum of Discussion, August 18, 1954). Even though one could argue that the reason world opinion was important was based on geopolitical calculations focused on winning the hearts and minds of the world's citizens in the Cold War's ideological struggle, the context of the

discussion hints that world opinion might require greater consideration in FPA. In the current international situation, world opinion seems poised to influence policy through global norms (Barkan 2000) and internationalized legal processes (Glaberson 2001) as well as through direct expressions of public sentiment. Assuming that the world becomes even more globalized and barriers to the movement of persons, material, capital, and ideas among states are increasingly removed, members of the public are likely to become more aware of and concerned with the substance and processes involved in policymaking in foreign countries. When the bottom line for multinational corporations depends on the behavior and choices of governments and individuals from around the globe, self-interested persons will likely make financial and investment choices based on their perceptions of the state of the economy and politics in these other countries. One only needs to look at the global financial crisis during 1997-1998 to see the potential influence that groups of individual investors can have on national economies. Given that state economies will likely become increasingly more dependent on the choices of a large number of individuals who are stateless with respect to their financial loyalties, leaders and foreign policymakers at all levels will have to become increasingly responsive to the attitudes of citizens in countries other than their own if they are to remain successful.

State actors already are beginning to consider globalized forces and internationalized actors (for example, bond markets, international investors, tourist travel money, global norms, and so on). To formulate foreign policy successfully, leaders increasingly must anticipate and react to these forces. As a result, FPA needs to become responsive to this chain of events by focusing even more on cross-national bureaucratic, public, interest group, and decision-making dynamics. Although those analyzing foreign policymaking probably will continue to study decision makers in governments, our attention to how these actors perceive and choose to interact with each other should shift, emphasizing the broader context and these expanded processes. The public will likely seize upon this transformation in context as well. On numerous issues ranging from landmines, free trade, environmental policy and labor standards, citizens of the world have begun to think in a manner consistent with notion of world opinion and have acted to influence the choices of national leaders (Deibert 2000; Edwards and Gaventa 2001) To a certain extent, the technology of the Internet is beginning to allow individuals to conduct their own foreign policies and exact costs upon nation-states whose policies displease them. For example, after the United States spy plane incident with China in early 2001, reports surfaced regarding Internet attacks on US sites from individuals in China and on Chinese web sites by US citizens as a form of protest (Becker 2001). The protest movement in the United States against the 2003 Iraq war also employed unique "denial of service" attacks against the Congress by

inundating both traditional telephone lines and e-mail accounts with expressions of opposition to the war as well as employing the Internet as an organizational tool for more traditional street protests. Individuals are beginning to act as globalized citizens, evidencing in some circumstances more loyalty to broader concepts than to their individual states.

The questions scholars will need to address center around the growing potential. At the most basic level, what is world opinion? Should we conceive of it as a new entity different from traditional public opinion within nation-states? If so, what causes it to emerge and what are the determinants of its influence? Does it have an influence, or is it just more of a nuisance to policymakers? Or, is it just an echo of the chimera of world opinion that Woodrow Wilson referred to in the beginning of the previous century? What are the processes through which world opinion acts? Are some methods more effective in influencing policy than others? Are individuals shifting their loyalties from the traditional nation-state to a more globalized perspective? What are the implications of such a shift for policy processes and outcomes?

The Individual and Foreign Policy Processes

As technology progresses the power in the hands of individual citizens to react to the foreign policies of nation-states could influence traditional state leaders to alter their policies accordingly. Interestingly, it was clear in the 2003 United States-Iraq war that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's strategy for defeating the United States, despite dramatic substantive disparities in military capabilities, relied on public opinion within the United States and broader world opinion. Emboldened in part by large demonstrations around the globe against US intervention, Hussein apparently concluded that world opinion could spur national actors to restrain the United States. Barring that, he hoped that his forces could inflict such large casualties that public opinion within the United States would cause US forces to withdraw. He also appears to have counted on world opinion, and Arab opinion in particular, to react to devastation in Iraq in a manner that would thwart US action (Gordon 2003a, 2003b). This interpretation of what happened is interesting for two reasons. First, given the factors that normally determine US public support for conflict—such as the interests at stake, policy objectives, acting with an ally, elite consensus, and costs (both financial and human) relative to threat (Klarevas 2002), Hussein appears to have fundamentally misread the US domestic situation. Second, President George W. Bush seems to have been rather impervious to considerations of world public opinion. After massive international protests against possible US action in February 2003, Bush noted that "size of protest—it's like deciding, well, I'm going to decide policy based upon a focus group. The role of a leader is to decide policy based upon security, in this case, the security of the people. Evidently, some of the world doesn't view Saddam Hussein as a risk to peace. I respectfully

disagree" (Stevenson 2003;A1). This difference in views regarding world public opinion points to another important area for further investigation: the role of the individual policymaker in mediating the societal influences of public and world opinion.

Although much attention recently has focused on the role that domestic politics play in shaping foreign policy, most of the work outside of FPA has emphasized the importance of domestic structure and society at the expense of the policymaker. Future research should emphasize the role of the individual and decision-making processes in mediating second image societal pressures (discussed in the previous section) because the future environment will likely allow even greater room for individual and governmental process variability. An increasingly globalized international environment provides foreign policy leaders with a new set of institutional actors that they need to consider. Although it is now common to argue that domestic political calculations influence foreign policy choices (see, for example, Putnam 1988; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Fearon 1994; Milner 1997; Auerswald 2000), these analyses currently tend to assume that leaders react in an undifferentiated manner to domestic pressures. However, even though these pressures are likely to be experienced by all policymakers, leaders should not be expected to react in the same manner to such pressures (see, for example, Holsti 1976a, 1976b; Hermann and Hagan 1998) Greenstein 2000; Byman and Pollack 2001).

For instance, when scholars argue that foreign policy leaders consider electoral factors in their choices, it is often assumed that all foreign policy officials calculate and react to these pressures in the same way. However, research on the influence of public opinion on the foreign policy decisions of US presidents suggests that even though all presidents are generally aware of the public, interest group, and electoral incentives and the costs involved in a foreign policy choice, systematic and predictable variation in responses to these pressures exists across individuals (Foyle 1999). In short, a large body of literature indicates that we need to factor in how individual leaders perceive, interpret, and react to pressures from society across states with similar and varying institutional structures and within a single state (for example, Hermann and Kegley 1995; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998; Rosati 2000). With increasing globalization, FPA will be critical in sorting out the interaction among the international, domestic, and individual levels of analysis and their effect on policy. Just as some business leaders have proven adept at seizing the implications of the new opportunities provided by shifts in technology, some political leaders embrace avenues to enhance their political fortunes; others try and fail; and still others sense no opportunity at all (Hagen 1994). For these reasons, FPA needs to become increasingly attentive to the cross-national nature of domestic political influences and to non-us cases-an effort that is already underway

(Beasley et al. 2001; Stern and Sundelius 2002).

In addition, the radical change in technology associated with computers and the Internet, rather than undermining the role of leaders in formulating foreign policy, might just enhance their ability to ascertain, anticipate, and respond to world opinion if they can creatively marshal the new technologies to their ends. The response of business leaders to the Internet might be instructive. Unlike the dot-com failures, many established companies combined traditional business methods with the new technologies to enhance their connections with customers and expand their businesses (Kurtzman and Rilkin 2001). Similarly, the US military employed the Internet in its information warfare plan in the 2003 war against Iraq, albeit with limited results (Shacker and Schmitt 2003).

In the future, perceptive leaders might use the Internet as a diplomatic tool in yet unforeseen ways to enhance their connections to their citizens and the citizens of other nations (Dizard 2001). Although government web sites exist that provide both information and opportunities to detail the leader" none have employed the web as an additional force in governance on the scale adopted in business. As the speed and complexity of international politics increases, leaders could find that traditional methods of assessing citizen sentiment (polling, elections, letters, press, and so on) do not adequately address their needs in determining the intensity and nuance of public attitudes. Emerging evidence suggests that within the United States presidents already employing these tools to measure public opinion are doing so in a differentiated manner (Murray and Howard 2002). Just as some businesses have successfully seized upon the Internet as a means to enhance their traditional functions, the web could serve such a purpose for leaders in a globalized future. Although some have claimed that the increasing speed of media communications hampers policymakers, the data suggest that the media's need for instant news allows savvy politicians to shape the message in a manner previously unthinkable (Strobe! 1997). Similarly, the Internet provides an opportunity for creative politicians to interact with world opinion in ways limited only by their imagination. If this broader effort proves successful, FPA will have a great deal to offer to proponents of the study of strategic interaction and constructively in understanding international politics. By emphasizing how individuals and governments interact with each other in a specified institutional context, the strategic interaction-rational choice literature places an emphasis on outcomes, given a certain specified set of preferences, rather than on process. Joseph Lepgold and Alan Lamborn (2001) have recently argued that strategic choice and cognitive approaches have much to gain from scholarly interaction and that cognitive theories could benefit from engaging the strategic environment to a greater extent. Other foreign policy analysts have also begun to move in this direction (Hagen and Hermann 2001; Hermann 2001a; Walker 2003).

Foreign policy analysis can also provide important assistance to the strategic interaction literature by assessing where foreign policy preferences come from and how these preferences are translated into policies. Strategic interaction research at the international level largely takes preferences as given and assumes that the transmission from preferences into outcomes is mediated by the institutional environment, the configuration of the actors' preferences, and their strategic behavior given these factors. When domestic politics are included in these models, assumptions are made about the preferences of various domestic actors. Outcomes are then analyzed by examining how the preferences of the various actors interact within a specified domestic institutional environment. Because the factors (that is, the preferences of either states or actors within states) that strategic choice theorists take as given are exactly the factors on which FPA focuses (that is, the origin of preferences), there is no reason that these two approaches necessarily conflict. In fact, some scholars (for example, Bueno de Mesquita 2002) with a strategic interaction perspective are now emphasizing the need to examine domestic processes. In short, strategic choice theorists can assist foreign policy scholars in examining the transition from policy choice to outcome while FPA can provide strategic choice theorists assistance in explaining the elusive question of where preferences (whether of individuals, groups, or governments) come from. In addition, some FPA scholars (for example, Schafer and Crichlow 2002) have begun to link the quality of the decision process with the quality of the international outcome in a systematic fashion. In this interaction, foreign policy analysts would do well by identifying and specifying how and when their theories are most relevant as has been attempted in the past (Holst 1976b; Hermann and Hagan 1998).

Constructivists contend that ideas matter a great deal in determining international behavior by shaping how concepts such as anarchy, international norms, and shared beliefs about the direction of the world are understood in the world community (Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992; Katzenstein 1996). In the US context, evidence suggests that these ideational factors are, indeed, quite important in shaping the US approach to foreign policy in a manner that connects individual level variables with international behavior. Recent analyses of US foreign policy have pointed to the importance of national identity and its effect in transcending political perspectives within the United States (Nan 2002; Kagan 2003). In turn, the US identity as expressed in the foreign policies of the United States interacts in interesting ways with the identities of other states having varying ideational foundations. Although these perspectives point to a generalized identity that all US foreign policymakers are said to share, Walter Russell Mead (2002) has outlined several competing foreign policy identities that exist within the United States.

Depending on the identities of the individuals in power and the political coalitions

within the government, different approaches to US foreign policy emerge. What is interesting in all these perspectives is the similarity to concepts within FPA—such as the operational code (George 1979b; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999), image theory (Herrmann et al, 1997; Schafer 1997), problem representation (Sylvan and Voss 1998), and worldlier (Hagen 1994; Young and Schafer 1998). Given these tools, FPA would seem to have much to offer ideational perspectives by systematically analyzing the sources, structure, and effects of these competing perspectives on foreign policymaking.

providing an opening for intellectual engagement between these two to research.

Conclusion

Just as the real world of international politics is becoming increasingly globalized and interactive, scholarship in FPA needs to do the same. With regard to study of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, we should encourage greater engagement with the domestic contexts in which public opinion forms and attempts to affect policy. Similarly, the exploration of whether and how the emerging process of world opinion influences policy should become a focus of attention. Finally, FPA's understanding of individual decision processes could form the basis for productive conversations with scholars engaged in examining strategic interaction and interested in approaching the study of international relations from a constructively perspective. On all these fronts, foreign policy analysts currently have both the conceptual and methodological tools to contribute to the exploration of important international political questions. Let the work begin.