Nations and Nationalism 2 (l), 1996, 35-44. 0ASEN 1996
Nationalism and national
movements: comparing the past and
the present of Central and Eastern
Europe*
MIROSLAV HROCH
FilosoJcka Faculta, University Karlovy, nam. J. Palacha 2, 110 00 Praha 1,
Czech Republic
ABSTRACT. This article compares the `new nationalism' in post-communist
countries since the 1980s with the `classical' national movements of the nineteenth
century. Looking for analogies and differences between these two processes, it seeks to
achieve a better understanding and more profound interpretation of contemporary
`nationalism'. Most important analogies are: both national movements emerged as a
result of (and as an answer to) the crisis and disintegration of an old regime and its
value system; in both cases we observe a low level of political experience among the
population, the stereotype of a personalised nation, and of a defensive position.
Similarly both movements define their national border by both ethnic and historical
borders: in both cases, the nationally relevant conflict of interests plays a decisive role.
Among the differences are: the extremely high level of social communication in the
twentieth-century movements, combined with a `vacuum at the top' (the need for new
elites) and with deep economic depression. The `contemporary' national movements
fought for the political rights of undoubtedly pre-existing nations (above all, for full
independence), while the `classical' ones fought for the concept of a nation-to-be,
whose existence was not generally accepted. Nevertheless, in both cases, similar
specifics of the nation-forming process under conditions of a `small nation' can be
observed. The author does not view nationalism as a `diseare'or external force: but
rather as an answer given by some members of the nation to new challenges and
unexpected conflictsof interests, which could be interpreted as national ones.
The exciting experience of the current `revival of nationalism' represents for
a historian of nation-forming processes a kind of testing ground, giving him
the opportunity to verify his theories. The primary aim of this article is to
determine whether or not we could use the results of historical research on
the nation-forming process in order to explain current nationalism, national
movements and ethnic conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe.
This article is an enlarged version of the paper given at the second ASEN Annual
Conferencein February 1992 at the London School of Economics.
36 Miroslav Hroch
~~~ ~
Five or six years ago, when the first strong expressions of the `new
nationalism' emerged, the question was above all: how to explain the
sudden emergence of nationalist feelings, proclamations and actions? The
most frequent and `fashionable'answer was the following: under communist
rule, nationalism was forbidden, but it had survived from pre-communist
times and it now becomes again the active ideology, because communism
did not solve the `national problem'. We could give some persuasive
empirical and theoretical arguments against this `fridge theory', but I do not
think that it would be useful to present them here: this `fridge theory' has
been disproved by the experience of the last five years and has become a
thing of the past.
Nevertheless, what survives is the concept of nationalism as some kind of
epidemic disease, which can be and has to be treated: the only problem
seems to be to find the right medicine and the proper method of treatment.
At the outset I have to admit that I strongly disagree with this voluntaristic
concept. We have to find a deeper explanation of this phenomenon. As a
historian, I have tried to understand and interpret it in its ancestry, in its
historical perspective.
First of all, it is necessary to say something about the term itself. I have
my doubts concerning the explanatory competence of the term `nation-
alism', which is used in so many different meanings that it makes mutual
understanding difficult. For this reason, I use this term only in its limited
sense, which is its original one, i.e. not as a synonym for national identity or
a national programme, but as a state of mind (collective mentality), that
gives priority to the interests and values of one's own nation over all other
interests and values. Trying to interpret the national conflicts and changes
of the last decade, I regard it as more practical to use the term `national
movement', understood as organised efforts to achieve all the attributes of a
`fully fledged' nation, i.e. to obtain all attributes characterising already
existing nation-states.
To make my interpretations more comprehensible, it is necessary to
formulate some premises, without attempting to give a detailed explanation.
We cannot interpret the phenomenon `nationalism' without taking into
account the real existing large social group `nation', which emerged as
the result of a long nation-forming process, which had its prehistory in
Middle Ages.
The key element of the analysis of this nation-forming process is not
`nationalism', but national identity.
The nation-forming process, the emergence of modern nations during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was not an `error of history', as
some intellectuals suggest, but a natural part of the transformation of
modern European society, parallel to industrialisation, capitalism,
constitutionalism etc.
The emergence of nations, national identities and nationalisms is not a
specifically Eastern development, but part of an overall European
Nationalism and national movements 31
development, naturally including some typological differences and a
high degree of unevenness in time.
Analyzing nationalism in the proper, narrow sense of the word, we
should prefer unbiased causal examination to moralistic preaching and
denunciations.
Living under Soviet rule, nations in Eastern and Central Europe experi-
enced limited independence or even total loss of independence. They lived not
only under the political, but also under the cultural and economic rule of the
communist nomenclatura. It was understandable that some members of these
nations started a national agitation, trying to persuade members of their own
nation that the time for a renewed full national existence was coming. This
was the moment when new national movements started.
National movements are, nevertheless, a much older phenomenon.
Originally, national movement was one of two main types (forms) of
nation-forming process during the nineteenth century. To understand this
view, I have to mention some actual dates. At the beginning of the
nineteenth century, there existed in Europe only eight state-nations with a
more or less developed literary language, a tradition of high culture and
established ruling elites: the English, French, Spanish (Castilian), Dutch,
Portuguese, Danish, Swedish and later Russian nation-states. The nation-
forming process inclined in these cases towards a modern nation as a
community of equal citizens and passed for an integral part of political
modernisation of the state.
On the other hand, there existed at the very same time more than thirty
ethnic groups (nationalities) without statehood, or with a weak or no
continuity of literary language and without `their own' ruling elites. All of
them lived within the territory of multiethnic empires, e.g. the Habsburg
and Ottoman empires, tsarist Russia, but also Great Britain, Spain and
Denmark. This was the situation, which I called originally a nation-forming
process under conditions of a `small nation'. Today, I accept the more
suitable term `non-dominant ethnic group'. Sooner or later, some members
of this group decided to start national agitation demanding all the attributes
of a fully fledged nation: they started the decisive phase of their national
movement. In some cases, this national agitation started very early, around
the year 1800 (the Greeks, Czechs, Norwegians, Irish), in some others one
generation later (the Finns, Croats, Slovenes, Flemish, Welsh etc.), or even
during the second half of the nineteenth century (Latvians, Estonians,
Catalans, Basques etc.). If national agitation was successful, it achieved the
support of the masses and opened the way to a fully formed nation.
Sometimes, national agitation did not achieve its goal or had to fight for
mass support for a very long time (the Flemish, Welsh, Byelorussians).
Nationalism in the narrow sense of the word was but an accompanying
component of this process, not its main force. Its participation and influence
in the national movement strengthened during the third phase (the phase of
mass movement).
5
38 Miroslav Hroch
Is this type of national movement we know from the nineteenth century,
comparable with those we have witnessed since the 1980s? My answer is
affirmative: the points of departure of each process are analogous, as are
their goals, which can be divided into three groups:
1 Political demands, which in contemporary national movements are
strongly concentrated towards independence, while in the nineteenth-
century in most cases self-administration and some degree of autonomy
were preferred.
Cultural demands, which tried to establish and strengthen an indepen-
dent culture and national literary language.
Social demands, which asked for a just division of national income and
tried to achieve a full social structure in the emerging national society,
corresponding to the stage of capitalist transformation of the multi-
ethnic state.
If we compare the historical explanation of `classical'national movements
with contemporary developments, we find some significant analogies and,
naturally, also some differences. Let me summarise them, illustrating the
possibilities of interpreting current developments as part of long-term
processes.
1 The transition to the decisive phase of national agitation occurred
almost at the same time as the old regimes and social systems were in crisis.
As old ties disappeared or weakened, the need for a new group identity
brought together, under the auspices of one national movement, people
belonging to different classes and groups. Similarly, following the break-
down of the systems of planned economy and communist control, old ties
disappeared. Under conditions of general uncertainty and lack of con-
fidence, the national idea assumed an integrating role. These were stressful
circumstances, and people usually over-estimated the protective effect of
their national group.
2 Identification with a national group includes, as it did in the last
century, the construct of the personified and personalised nation. The
glorious history of this personalised nation is understood as the, or a,
personal past of each of its members. Its defeats are understood as personal
failures and continue to affect their feelings. As a result of this personalisa-
tion, people regard their own nation - which they equate with themselves -
as one body. If any misfortune befalls a small section of the nation, then the
whole `body' feels the pain of that misfortune. If a small group belonging to
the ethnic group - even if living in a different state from the `mother-nation'
- is endangered by assimilation, the members of the personified nation
interpret it as an amputation of a part of the national `body'.
3 Like the classical national movements, the personalised and personified
national body needs a distinct space. This space was - and is also today -
defined in two different and controversial ways. First, it is defined in terms
of its ethnic homogeneity, a homogeneity which is primarily delimited as a
linguistically (or religiously) bound cultural space. Secondly, it is defined by
2
3
Nationalism and national movements 39
historical frontiers of `national' territory, which could, in many cases, also
include other ethnic groups and minorities. This second criterion is
symptomatic of the so-called `historical nations', for example, Magyars
regarding the historical kingdom of Hungary as their own national body,
Czechs similarly in `their' historical Kingdom of Bohemia and Margravate
of Moravia, Croats, who look upon all three parts of the medieval kingdom
(Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia) as `their own' etc. These situations have even
more analogies today for, besides the established historical nations,we find a
new group of nations - that is, nations which enjoyed their independence
(including state borders) during the short inter-war period, for example,
Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and even those whose independence was
only realised during the Second World War as Nazi `protectorates', the case
of Croats and Slovaks. Furthermore, in such cases, many leaders of national
movements interpret state frontiers as national frontiers, and regard the
ethnic minorities within `their own' territory as outlanders, in the end
worthless enough to be expelled or to have their national identity neglected.
4 National agitation began during the nineteenth century, usually in
conditions when members of the non-dominant ethnic group did not have
any political experience in civic society, nor any political education. For
these reasons, they could hardly formulate political arguments and slogans
for civil and human rights in the modern sense of the word. `Freedom' for
Czech or Estonian peasants meant the abolition of feudal domination and
the free .use of their farmland, not freedom of speech or parliamentary
elections. The notions of common language and customs, however, were
much more comprehensible to them. Having spent more than fifty (or even
seventy) years under dictatorial regimes, the mentality of the people is once
again such that in many countries, linguistic, cultural and social demands
play a surrogate political role. Nevertheless, the importance of ethnicity is
not equally prevalent in all modern day national movements. In some cases,
especially under conditions of Soviet rule, the language of the ruling nation
remained a symbol of political oppression in the eyes of, for example
Estonians and Lithuanians, even when the character of political oppression
differed from that of the nineteenth century. In these recent cases the
language of a small nation fighting for independence was automatically
viewed as the language of liberty.
5 During the nineteenth century, members of non-dominant ethnic
groups were disadvantaged by the unwillingness of ruling nations to accept
the real equality of all languages, that is, equality of the language of the
ruling nation with the language of the non-dominant ethnic groups. The
members of ruling nations, for example, Germans or Magyars (after 1867),
refused to learn and use the language of ethnic groups living in `their'
territory. After the emergence of the new independent national states in
1918-19, members of the former ruling nations became national minorities
in the newly formed states. Yet they remained unwilling to accept the
equality of language of the small, but now ruling, nations of for example,
40 Miroslav Hroch
Czechs, Romanians, Serbs, Croats, etc., and this made for potentially
explosive situations at the threshold of the Second World War. Currently,
members of the former ruling nations, and particularly Russians (and also
Serbs), have once again, as a result of successful national movements,
become minorities in the newly emerged and emerging states, such as
Estonia, Lithuania and Croatia. The parallel between the real fate and
historical role of the Volksdeutscheand the potential role of the Volksrussen
is striking.
6 National movements sanctified some national demands by the fact that
their non-dominant ethnic group was endangered through assimilation: they
emphasised their defensive character. Similarly today, the defence of
`national existence', of `national rights' creates an illusion of moral
immunity, which is stressed especially by the nationalist wing of the
movement.
7 The overestimation of ethnic elements and linguistic demands is
symptomatic of a specific feature of contemporary national movements. It is
the illusion of a `replay', of a `repeat performance'. The leaders of the new
national movements, believing that they could utilise the successful methods
of their `classical' national movements, hold that old ethnic values can be
resuscitated. This `replay' mentality makes it difficult for a researcher to
distinguish between real and replayed needs, between stereotypes and
sincerely formulated demands.
8 If we ask why national agitation during the nineteenth century
achieved the support of the masses, we find everywhere (besides intensified
social communication and mobility) one factor, which was undervalued in
traditional research on `nationalism'. This factor could be called `nationally
relevant conflict of group interests', which means social and political
conflicts or tensions that coincided with linguistic (or eventually religious)
differences. Let me illustrate this kind of conflict by some examples: a
conflict between peasants belonging to the non-dominant ethnic group and
the landlords from the dominant nation; between the `centre' and the
`province'; between traditionalist village and the town; between new
academics from the non-dominant ethnic group and the old elites belonging
to the ruling nation. Nationally relevant conflicts of interests of today may
differ in part from those of the nineteenth century, but they also play an
important role as an integral element of new national movements.
There exist, nevertheless, not only similarities and analogies but also
important differences. To mention them means also to take them into
account as explanatory factors in recent research.
1 National movements during the nineteenth century constituted a part
and a form of the nation-forming process - and the fully fledged nation
emerged as a result, which was not at all a self-evident result. Contemporary
national movements enter the battlefield in the name of a nation which
came into existence just before they started. The goal in 1990 was not to
create a new entity, but to restore the previously existing one.
Nationalism and national movements 41
2 There is an important difference caused by the immense intensity of
social communication. For this reason, all the processes that we know from
the nineteenth century are highly accelerated.
3 The modern mass media are now strong enough to manipulate
populations, to distort or intensify in what they portray conflicts of interests
where they do not exist, that is, to promote or diminish the danger of
aggressive nationalism.
4 There is a difference in social structure. The present situation, marked
by the `vacuum at the top' as a result of the sudden disintegration of the
system of planned economy and the nomenclatura ruling class, is unique in
European history. New elites, educated under the old regime but belonging
to the new national movements, are successfully trying to achieve the status
of ruling elites. As the educated members of non-dominant ethnic groups
tried to achieve ruling status during the nineteenth century, they had to fight
for each single position among the established elites of the ruling nation. At
the same time, they had to maintain the way of life and the value system of
these established ruling classes. In the recent cases, there is no previous
establishment and upward social mobility is not influenced by any surviving
traditional systems or moral norms - except individual and national
selfishness. I must point out that the disintegration of the old nomenclatura
ruling class has not occurred in all the countries under survey. In countries
such as Serbia nationalism has been manipulated by them in order to enable
them to stay in power.
5 During the nineteenth century, nationally relevant conflicts were above
all conflicts which resulted from modernisation and reflected the general
trend of economic growth joined to social improvement. In the recent cases,
these conflicts are instead a response to a short-term depression and decline,
to the fact that the `cake' has become smaller. Even though this does not
imply that this decline is irreversible, the psychological effect is strong:
events being condensed into a short period of a few years, allows short-term
decline to act in the same way as long-term decline.
So much for the situation at the turn of the decade. What changed,
however, during the last four or five years? Most national movements
quickly achieved their principal goal: political independence. New nation-
states are emerging in Slovenia, Slovakia, Byelorussia, Macedonia and so
on. For this reason, national movements in most countries are disappearing,
after having achieved their main goals. Nevertheless, what about nation-
alism and conflicts between nation-states? Let us start by giving some actual
cases. Since the retreat of the Yugoslav army, we hear very little about
Slovene nationalism; since the division of Czechoslovakia, nationalist group-
ings in Slovakia have become weaker and they have almost disappeared in
the Czech Republic. In Poland, nationalist slogans get no real support.
Nationalist parties lost in last elections in Lithuania and Hungary and
similar developments seem to be happening in Ukraine and Bulgaria. The
only regions where nationalism gained strength are those where national
42 Miroslav Hroch
movements did not achieve their goals: in former Yugoslavia and in Russia.
It would be too optimistic to say that nationalism in post-communist
countries is definitely disappearing, but there is no doubt that it is weaker
than it was five years ago when the national movements started.
This positive trend is not the merit of the `European idea' or of anti-
nationalist humanist intellectuals, but the result of social and political
changes. In most of the cases mentioned above, the nation-states became
independent without being seriously endangered from abroad. Social
tensions and conflicts of interests are still strong, but those which are
nationally relevant are rare, especially in monoethnic states, such as Poland,
Slovenia or the Czech Republic. At the same time, the vacuum at the top in
these states is filled and there are some signs of economic improvements for
the future.
This is, nevertheless, only one side of the coin. On the other side, there
are countries where nationalist conflicts ended in bloodshed. Remember
Bosnia, Croatia, the Caucasus. How can we explain this difference?
If we accept the view that the nationalism is not an abstract disease but a
state of mind of actual human beings, we are able to formulate the
precondition for its strengthening, as occurs in some European regions.
Favourable conditions for a growing force of nationalism can be sum-
marked as follows:
The vacuum at the top is still not filled and the fight for political power
and for leading positions in the economy are not limited by old value
systems or by the `rules of the game' of democratic civil society: the
struggle for these positions becomes the nationally relevant conflict of
interests.
The decline of the economy and the standard of living is hopelessly
deep and the ethnic situation allows the agitators to denounce `the
others' as responsible for backward developments.
The difference between the nations is not defined primarily by
differencesof language, but by religion.
The political culture is forgotten or absent and is difficult to improve,
sometimesbeing related to low levels of education.
The members of the former ruling nation were degraded to the level of
an ethnic minority under the rule of the former oppressed nation.
The national tradition and myth, the `collectivememory', includes the
tradition of fighting and dying for the nation as an extremely positive
and morally binding value.
If we project these six points into concrete historical developments, we
find without a doubt a striking and convincing coincidence of these factors
only in one European country: in Bosnia. In other regions, we find only
some of these factors, and on the other hand, these six destabilising factors
are almost absent in countries with lower levels of the nationalist attitudes
mentioned above.
To summarise, the first point of my conclusion is: the `new nationalism'
Nationalism and national movements 43
operates in different countries with rather different emphases. The explosion
of aggressive nationalism that we are observing in former Yugoslavia is a
rather unique case and cannot be generalised as the main trend in all former
communist countries.
On the contrary, we are observing a retreat of nationalism in some of
them, as a result of changing social and political realities. Even though this
retreat cannot be generalised, it is an important sign for two reasons. Above
all, it demonstrates the importance of the nationally relevant conflict of
interests as a stimulating force of nationalism. Secondly, it allows us to put
the phenomenon `nationalism' into an appropriate framework.
Nationalism - this has to be stressed once more - is not a malady, not a
virus which could be exterminated forever by an appropriate treatment.
Nationalism is a potential function and product of actually existing national
identities. As long as nations exist, nationalism will remain as a latent
answer to problems and challenges. In this sense, it can be regarded as a
latent danger - not only in Eastern Europe, but also in Western Europe.
Sometimes, the difference between the `nationalist East' and the `demo-
cratic West' is based to the concept of democracy as the best treatment
which can be used to prevent or exterminate nationalism. The relation
between democracy and the nation-forming process is, nevertheless, more
complicated. Naturally, constitutionalism and democracy are an inevitable
condition of civil society, but it would be a wrong deduction to say that
national movements and democracy exclude each other. On the contrary, in
many cases, the oppressed nations perceived democracy as a suitable
instrument to be used by their national movement.
For this reason, democracy cannot be regarded as a universal treatment
for nationalism. The decisive role that emerging or weakening nationalism
plays, as in the past, is in response to nationally relevant conflicts of
interests, conditioned by a high intensity of social communication and
mobility. These conflicts of interests can under given conditions be either
real or constructed. The emergence of nationally relevant conflicts of
interests in reality is usually an answer to some social, economical or
political crisis and, for this reason, cannot be prevented by learned
arguments or humanist speeches. Nevertheless, its constructed form could
be avoided by responsible mass media. Even though this sounds utopian, it
is proven by experience that emergent nationalism will find it difficult to
persuade a majority, if it happens under conditions of constitutionalism and
high political culture.
The usual concluding question, addressed to `experts', is: what must be
done? I cannot escape this question, but I prefer its modified version: what
can be done? Naturally, the historian is not qualified to recommend
treatments: he prefers to summarise and generalise empirical observations.
The utopian concept of creating a civil society as an alternative to the
national one has failed. It is not the place here to analyse the reasons for
this failure: one of these reasons is, nevertheless, its ignorance of reality, its
44 Miroslav Hroch
neglect of actual nations and of existing conflicts of interests after the
breakdown of Communism.
However, the central problem is how to prevent conflicts of interests
expanding into nationally relevant ones. One way, as mentioned above, is to
avoid artificially constructed conflicts `produced' by mass media. Naturally,
this is difficult under conditions of a free society. Even more difficult is to
prevent real emerging conflicts: can it happen through social engineering or
by improving the economic conditions? If we accept the fact that conflicts of
interest are inevitable, then the only way seems to be - at least in theory -
to avoid the transformation of these conflicts into national ones. This can
only partially be influenced by moralistic preaching, but it can be proved by
historical record that under conditions of political culture and the potency
of political consensus, this transformation can be avoided or minimalised.
In such cases, the conflict of interests would be expressed in political terms,
instead of being translated into national terms. Nevertheless, all these
considerations will remain merely as some kind of intellectual game, until
we learn how to improve the economy and political culture of post-
communist countries.