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# Administrative Power, Internal Pacification

SOC 403

The nation-state, let me repeat, is the sociologist's 'society'. The nonchalant use of the term 'society' in the literature of sociology belies the complexity of the changes creating that bounded and unitary whole that is its usual referent. I say this not in order to prohibit use of the concept in the social sciences but to point to a range of problems it ordinarily conceals. Unlike traditional states, the nation-state is a power-container whose administrative purview corresponds exactly to its territorial delimitation. How is this administrative power generated? This will be the topic that will occupy my attention in the first part of this chapter. But it leads on to further issues. For the creation of such administrative capabilities is immediately related to the combined influences of industrialism and urbanism. And it is important in turn to analyse how these connect to key aspects of the nation-state as a capitalist society, which means elucidating the nature of class structure in relation both to sovereignty and democracy. A word of warning to the reader: in this chapter I shall assume greater familiarity with ideas introduced in the first volume of this work than I have done hitherto since, although they are essential to the arguments deployed, there is not room enough to provide a full justification of them.

## Administrative Power I: Communication and Information Storage

Several factors concerned with the extension of communication are deeply involved with the consolidation of the administrative

unity of the nation-state. They include: the mechanization of transportation; the severance of communication from transportation by the invention of electronic media; and the expansion of the 'documentary' activities of the state, involving an upsurge in the collection and collation of information devoted to administrative purposes. However, the second and third of these have increasingly merged in the twentieth century as electronic modes of the storage of information have become more and more sophisticated. Moreover, electricity becomes increasingly involved in the means of mechanical propulsion. All three are tied together in terms of the scheme of concepts that inform this book. Each represents a mode of biting into time and space, providing the means of radically increasing the scope of time-space distanciation beyond that available in class-divided societies.

The simplest, and most effective way of analysing the direct impact of innovations in transportation is via the notion of time-space convergence.<sup>1</sup> Somewhere about the middle of the eighteenth century, was initiated a series of innovations in modes of transportation, paring down the time taken to make journeys from one point to another. In all traditional states there were road systems of some kind, often of a fairly complex sort, as in the Roman Empire. Small bands of individuals could move quite rapidly over long distances, particularly if there were staging-posts where fresh horses could be obtained. The Vikings were able to make very fast — as well as on occasion very long — voyages, which compare favourably with anything achieved later, until the advent of mechanically powered vessels. However, the main impetus underlying such forms of (relatively) swift transportation was very often military, commercial long haulage being slow and usually confined to rivers or seas. Until the eighteenth century, Europe was no different from anywhere else in these respects. Roads were generally extremely poor, except for a few highways between major cities and ports. In Britain, a 'turnpike boom' began about the middle of the eighteenth century, prior to which 'the roads throughout the Kingdom were extremely bad and almost impassable, so that it was very difficult to convey from place to place either bulky or heavy articles. Wheel carriages could be little used, and pack horses were the general means of conveyance.'<sup>2</sup>

Not until around the turn of the nineteenth century was there a cohesively organized network of turnpikes, providing for reasonably cheap commercial transportation, in which respect they were in any case undercut for bulk transport by the rapidly developing canal system. The stage-coach system was the first modern rapid-transit form of transportation operating regularly and over a wide spatial pattern. It was also the first to be organized in terms of a time-table, even if those in use well into the nineteenth century were very haphazard and poorly co-ordinated by the standards of subsequent rapid-transit systems. A timetable is one of the most significant of modern organizational devices, presuming and stimulating a regulation of social life by quantified time in a manner quite unknown to prior types of society. Timetables are not just means of using temporal differences in order to identify and specify regularized events — the arrival and departure of coaches, trains, buses or planes. *A time-table is a time-space ordering device, which is at the heart of modern organizations.*<sup>3</sup> All organizations, up to and including the world system today, operate by means of time-tables, through which the sequencing of activities in time-space is choreographed. Organizations have always involved some sort of time-table — the invention of the calendar, for example, was a characteristic feature of traditional states. But only within regularized time-space settings, organized via 'clock time', can time-tables assume a more precise form. The monastery may have been the earliest example of such a setting,<sup>4</sup> but the commodified time inherent in capitalist production undoubtedly was its most decisive propagator. Time-space convergence provides, then, a dramatic index of the phenomenon of which it is by now barely possible to speak without relapsing into cliché — the shrinking world. But lying behind time-space convergence there is the more diffuse, but profoundly important, phenomenon of the increasingly precise co-ordination of the time-space sequencing of social life.

It is somewhat specious to focus mainly upon the mechanization of transportation in interpreting the dissolution of the segmental character of class-divided societies. The effects of such mechanization would have been much more limited were it not for its conjunction with the invention of electronic communication. Without the telegraph, and subsequent electronic communication modes, rapid-transit transportation would be confined to a few

journeys per day for a small minority and a tiny proportion of manufactured goods. Mass transportation demands precisely timed and 'spaced' movement, which in turn presumes the capability of communicating 'ahead of time' what is planned. Only given these can an overall traffic system be reflexively monitored and thus comprehensively 'organized'. Thus, rather than the steam train, it is Bradshaw's directory, co-ordinated by telegraphic communication, that epitomizes modern transportation. Contemporaries understandably enough were awed by the railway, 'a plexus of red, a veritable system of blood circulation, complicated, dividing, and reuniting, branching, splitting, extending, throwing out feelers, offshoots, taproots, feeders.'<sup>5</sup> But the combination of the railway and the telegraph was what brought this complex into being, not the locomotive and its rails on their own.

Most historians and sociologists perhaps do not recognize the extended process that was involved in the spread of mechanized modes of transportation, a process that did not culminate until the introduction of world standard time in 1884. At the Prime Meridian Conference held in Washington during that year, following a series of acerbic political debates, Greenwich was adopted as the zero meridian. The globe was partitioned into twenty-four time zones, each one hour apart, and an exact beginning of the universal day was fixed.<sup>6</sup> In some states, railways and other transport time-tables were quite quickly brought into line with these delimitations, but in others more chaotic practices prevailed. How far one or the other was the case depended substantially upon the pre-existing system. As late as 1870 in the USA there were some eighty different railway times.<sup>7</sup> However, in 1883 representatives of the railroads met to establish a uniform time, referred to as 'the day of two noons', since in the eastern part of each region clocks were put back at midday.<sup>8</sup> When the Washington Conference was held, France — whose delegates were the most bitter opponents of the choice of Greenwich as the zero meridian — still had four different regional times, none of which was readily convertible to Greenwich time. Paris time, nine minutes and twenty-one seconds in front of Greenwich, was adopted as the time of the railways, and in 1891 this was made the statutory time for the whole of France. Curiosities remained. The trains were in fact scheduled to run five minutes behind their

'official' times, so as to give passengers opportunity to board in a leisured way. Nonetheless, it was the French who initiated the International Conference on Time, held in Paris in 1912; this was the congress that set up a uniform method of specifying accurate time signals and transmitting them around the world.<sup>9</sup>

The separation of communication from transportation which the telegraph established is as significant as any prior invention in human history. It reduces to a minimum what geographers call the 'friction of distance'. Separation in distance had always been not only separation in time, but had been directly correlated with the expenditure of costs and effort. More or less instantaneous communication may not eliminate either cost or effort, but it does break the coincidence of these with spatial segregation. Postal networks are, of course, a major supplement to the telegraph and its successor, the telephone. Figures 2 and 3 show the increasing time-space convergence between New York and San Francisco.




Figure 2 Postal time-space convergence between New York and San Francisco




Figure 3 Telephone time-space convergence between New York and San Francisco<sup>10</sup>

Postal services of a national and international type originated in the eighteenth century. But early postal communications were both slow and sporadic. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, mail was rarely transported at more than ten miles an hour over lengthy distances.<sup>11</sup> The point already made about modern transportation systems in general — that co-ordination in time-space is as important as the mechanization of the actual channel of movement — applies to postal services as a transport communication device. But highly efficient postal systems certainly antedate their telephone counterparts. In the USA, a fully national telephone service has only existed since the laying of the first transcontinental cable in 1915. Even then trunk-calling was time-consuming compared with later on. In 1920, some quarter of an hour was needed to make such a call, involving the collaboration of as many as eight operators. As figure 3 indicates, by 1930 improvements in network connections cut down the average service time to two minutes; the introduction of automatic switching equipment reduced this to one minute in 1950. The coming of direct long distance dialling reduced this to as long as it takes to compose the number and for someone to answer the call.

In telephone communications there is almost complete time-space convergence both within states and internationally. There is small difference between placing a local call and one across thousands of miles.<sup>12</sup> Of course the telephone is only one among a range of electronic media that permit more or less instantaneous (or, if it is preferred, delayed) communication over indefinite distances. Television has developed as a 'one-way' medium of communication, but there is no intrinsic reason why it should remain so, since various forms of two-way link are in principle, and in some cases in practice, possible. Facsimile, video and computer transmission represent more novel forms of actual and potential communication, the likely impact of which social life is still largely unknown, but which will undoubtedly further extend processes of time-space convergence.

I mention these phenomena here not in order to attempt to bring the discussion of the nation-state through to the present day. My point is to emphasize the significance to the consolidation of the nation-state in the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of the separation of the communication of information from transportation. The initial leap forward in the

administrative power generated by the nation-state was accomplished prior to the development of electronic communication. But modern societies have been 'electronic societies' longer than we ordinarily imagine and 'information societies' since their inception. There is a fundamental sense, as I have argued, in which *all* states have been 'information societies', since the generation of state power presumes reflexively monitored system reproduction, involving the regularized gathering, storage, and control of information applied to administrative ends. But in the nation-state, with its peculiarly high degree of administrative unity, this is brought to a much higher pitch than ever before.

In discussing traditional states, Innis makes a distinction between communication media which 'emphasise time' and those which 'emphasise space'.<sup>13</sup> The former are durable but heavy, and are the main textual materials of the earlier civilizations. Stone, clay and parchment belong in this category. They carry the marks of the written word over very lengthy passages of time but are not conducive to the generation of administrative power across wide spans of space. Papyrus and paper tend to be less long-lasting but are light, more easily transportable and also more easily reproducible. The Roman conquest of Egypt, according to Innis, was peculiarly important to the expansion of the Empire, not primarily because of the territory thus acquired, but because it allowed access to large supplies of papyrus which were then used widely to carry administrative documentation. Following the fall of Rome, the European states reverted to the use of the parchment codex, papyrus virtually disappearing after the eighth century. Paper was initially used mainly for commercial purposes, as credit documents and bills of exchange. Texts of any length, including scholarly texts, continued to be inscribed on parchment until the development of the printing press. The invention of printing was a phenomenon as important to the formation of the absolutist state as the other factors mentioned in chapter 6. It would be difficult to overestimate the generalized impact of printing in the shaping of modernity.<sup>14</sup> Printing is the first major step in the mechanization of communication and, in making documents and texts widely available, it initiated the process of drawing European culture away from mimetic imagery in material, intellectual and artistic domains.

So far as the state is concerned, the most important

consequence of the easy and cheap availability of printed materials was an enlargement of the sphere of the 'political'. The growth of a 'public sphere' of state administration is inseparable from textually mediated organization. The discursive arena thereby opened up is quite mistakenly described if it is regarded as one in which 'free speech' is in principle possible. It is not primarily speech which is at issue, however important debating chambers might become. Rather it is the 'intertextuality' of the exchange of opinions and observations via texts that are 'freely available' — in Ricoeur's terms, distanced from their authors — that marks the decisive shift in the lurch towards a new form of state. I shall pursue this theme in a later section but for the moment I want to concentrate upon the implications for the enlargement of the administrative power of the state. What printing made possible, and what it was increasingly used for during the phase of the consolidation of absolutism, was a very profound furtherance of the surveillance operations of the state. It was essential to the codification of law upon which Weber rightly places so much stress. Laws had long been in some part written but in the preceding scribal culture their influence was necessarily limited and diffuse. Printed codes of law, within an increasingly literate culture, made for the increasing integration of 'interpreted' law within the practice of state administration and for a much more consistent and direct application of standardized juridical procedures to the activities of the mass of the population. But the sphere of the law is only one area in which such changes can be observed. Records, reports and routine data collection become part of the day-to-day operation of the state, although of course not limited to it.

As good a single index as any of the movement from the absolutist to the nation-state is the initiation of the systematic collection of 'official statistics'. In the period of absolutism, such data-gathering was particularly concentrated in two areas, at least as regards the internal affairs of states. One was that of finance and taxation, the other the keeping of population statistics — which tended, however, until the eighteenth century to be localized rather than centralized. The first bears witness to the significance of fiscal management, already alluded to. The second is to do with a phenomenon I shall discuss in the next section — a preoccupation of the centralizing state with maintaining internal

'order' in respect of rebellion, vagabondage and crime. The official statistics that all states began to keep from about the middle of the eighteenth century onwards maintain and extend these concerns. But they also range over many sectors of social life and, for the first time, are detailed, systematic and nearly complete. They include the centralized collation of materials registering births, marriages and deaths; statistics pertaining to residence, ethnic background and occupation; and what came to be called by Quételet and others 'moral statistics', relating to suicide, delinquency, divorce and so on.

There is a very important point to be made about official statistics. From the time of their first beginnings onwards students of society have regarded them as offering a fund of material that can be used to chart the characteristics of social organization and social change. The origins of empirical social research in the social sciences are closely bound up with the use of official statistics as an index of processes of social activity.<sup>15</sup> Durkheim's *Suicide* is only one among many nineteenth-century works to have relied upon the analysis of such statistics to substantiate its conclusions. Now it might well be accepted that, given certain reservations about the manner of their collection, official statistics are an invaluable source of data for social research. But they are not just 'about' an independently given universe of social objects and events, *they are in part constitutive of it*. The administrative power generated by the nation-state could not exist without the information base that is the means of its reflexive self-regulation. Other implications also derive from this. Social science, even its earliest formulations did not come fresh-faced and innocent to an ordered array of empirical data. The collection of official statistics is impossible without those involved having a systematic understanding of the subject-matter that is the concern of those statistics. Such an understanding is progressively monitored, in the modern state, by much the same methods as 'independent' social scientists use to analyse the data thus produced. From this it follows that the social sciences have themselves been persistently implicated in the phenomena they set out to analyse. The connections involved here are in some part empirical (because the collection of modern statistics normally involves learning processes used to 'systematize' and 'improve' them) but also conceptual or theoretical. The discourses of social science

are recurrently absorbed into what it is that they are about, at the same time as they (logically) draw upon concepts and theories already employed by lay actors.<sup>16</sup>

Social science, in other words, has from its early origins in the modern period been a constitutive aspect of that vast expansion of the reflexive monitoring of social reproduction that is an integral feature of the state. In the period of absolutism, two forms of discourse were particularly relevant in this respect. One, which I have previously mentioned, was the discourse of early political theory, constitutively entangled in the formation of the modes of sovereignty that distinguish the absolutist state from traditional ones. The other, belonging to a slightly later phase, is the discourse of early economic theory, which helped to give the modern senses to 'economic', 'economy', 'industry' and a whole set of surrounding terms. However, these usages only became firmly established in the nineteenth century and it is economics, together with sociology and psychology, that have been most deeply involved with the rise of the administrative power of the nation-state. In saying this, I do not mean to claim that the social sciences cannot in some part stand outside that power and subject it to analysis and critique, as I consider myself to be doing in this text. But we should recognize that one of the features of the modern state — and of modern organizations in general — is the systematic study and utilization of materials relevant to their own reproduction.

## Administrative Power II: Internal Pacification

Surveillance as the mobilizing of administrative power — through the storage and control of information — is the primary means of the concentration of authoritative resources involved in the formation of the nation-state. But it is accompanied by large-scale processes of internal transformation which have their origins in substantial part in the development of industrial capitalism and which essentially can be represented as producing internal pacification. The meaning of 'internal pacification' needs to be carefully understood and interpreted against the backdrop of the character of the internal administration of traditional states. It is a question which returns us to the theme of violence.

As I have previously pointed out, in traditional states the

concept of 'deviance' makes very little sense, except within the restricted locales of the ruling groups. The administrative scope of the state did not extend to encompass the practices of the local community, even within cities where these were spatially distant from the centres in which state power was most concentrated. Moreover, patterns of violence did not resemble those which have become familiar in the (Western) nation-state. In traditional states the relatively insecure hold of the political centre over the means of violence meant that there could be little possibility of 'policing' in the modern sense; that there were always potential sources of challenge, of a military kind, to the centre; and that bandits, marauders, pirates, urban and rural gangs of various sorts tended to be ever-present.

From the sixteenth century onwards within the European societies, fears were constantly expressed in ruling circles about 'popular disturbances'. But although many of these involved traditional modes of protest, they mark the beginnings of a new relationship between state and populace. Two partly independent but increasingly convergent trends of development appear to be involved. One was in most countries substantially the result of the early emergence of capitalistic economic activity, turning loose large numbers of dispossessed peasants, who became semi-unemployed cash-crop labourers or settled in towns and cities as a potentially querulous mass, only partially absorbed into the new social setting. The other was the establishing of remedial organizations in specific types of locale that separated off certain categories of individuals from the remainder of the population. This is the process, or set of processes, that Foucault calls 'sequestration'.<sup>17</sup> In seventeenth century England, it has been estimated, the 'army of poor and jobless' amounted to between 10 and 20 per cent of the adult population, with this figure rising in times of economic crisis to some 30 per cent. Acknowledgement of this as a 'social problem' of large proportions on the part of those in ruling circles was undoubtedly one of the main reasons for the creation of work-houses and the early 'hospitals'.<sup>18</sup>

Since the hospital was the prime model involved in the early phases of the mushrooming of carceral organizations, it is worth briefly commenting on its origins in relation to later developments. 'Hospitals', sometimes in forms to which the modern sense of the term could be applied — concentrating upon the care of the sick

and infirm — have a long history outside Europe.<sup>19</sup> Thus hospitals in Byzantium were specialized agencies of this sort, although they were always closely associated with monasteries. For example, the monastery hospital established by John Commenos in 1112 had five separate wards caring for different types of illness, each ward having about a dozen beds in it. Every ward had two physicians, with full-time assistants and orderlies, together with administrators responsible for the organization as a whole; there was also an out-patient department. There were a few hospitals resembling this in Europe in the Middle Ages, such as that at the Abbey of St Gall, in Switzerland, built in the ninth century.<sup>20</sup> The Abbey building contained a hospital with a number of wards, tended by a chief physician and other doctors. But such organizations bear only a marginal relation to those constructed from the seventeenth century onwards. The religious influence and the monastic model remained strong but the new organizations were often established by the state, and their concern was more with crime and vagrancy than with the care of the sick.<sup>21</sup>

If carceral organizations have their origins in the period of absolutism, they only assumed the guise with which we are familiar today in the course of the transition to the nation-state. There is no need to accept the whole sweep of Foucault's arguments to acknowledge that 'disciplinary power' becomes associated with a range of organizations involving new modes of regularizing activities in time-space.<sup>22</sup> Prisons and mental asylums become differentiated from other organizations, like medical hospitals, in which individuals are not incarcerated against their will. 'Deprivation of freedom' becomes the main punitive mode, replacing those spectacular forms of punishment of which Foucault writes but which were, in fact, never more than the dramatic exceptions to more mundane forms of pre-existing sanctions.<sup>23</sup> The enforced deprivation of liberties is clearly in some part an expression of the centrality which 'democratic' or citizenship rights come to assume within the state. The debate — particularly as stimulated by Foucault's writings — over how far the trend towards confinement as a punitive sanction conforms to humane ideals,<sup>24</sup> is in some respects misguided. The point is not only that there occurred a transition from one type of punishment (violent, spectacular, open) to another (disciplinary, monotonous, hidden), but that a new nexus of coercive relations was established

where few were located before. The creation of a perceived need for 'law and order' is the reverse side of the emergence of conceptions of 'deviance' recognized and categorized by the central authorities and by professional specialists. These are intrinsic to the expansion of the administrative reach of the state, penetrating day-to-day activities — and to the achievement of an effective monopoly of violence in the hands of the state authorities.

The major schismatic conflicts within the Western nation-state become class struggles and struggles associated with the rise of mass movements of various types. The 'criminal' is specifically no longer a rebel but a 'deviant', to be adjusted to the norms of acceptable behaviour as specified by the obligations of citizenship. In previous types of society, the regularized acquiescence of the mass of the population had not been sought or required by ruling classes, except according to fairly narrow criteria of material submission. The maintenance of 'order' — a term which does not have the same application in any case in those types of society — was a matter of a combination of local community control together with the possibility of armed intervention when necessary. But, in the nation-state, imprisonment plus policing largely replaces both these influences. 'Civil war', where it occurs, normally is henceforth clearly distinguishable from even quite substantial violent confrontations between the state authorities and fractious class groupings or other organized dissident groups.

'Disciplinary power' as described by Foucault depends perhaps primarily upon surveillance in the sense of information-keeping, especially in the form of personal records of life-histories held by the administrative authorities. But it also involves surveillance in the sense of direct supervision. In this sense, prisons and asylums share some of the generalized characteristics of modern organizations, including the capitalistic work-place, but a range of other organizations as well. All involve the concentration of activities either for a period of the day, or for a period in individuals' lives, within specially constructed locales. We may regard disciplinary power as a sub-type of administrative power in general. It is administrative power that derives from disciplinary procedures, from the use of regularized supervision, in order either to inculcate or to attempt to maintain certain traits of

behaviour in those subject to it. Since, in previous eras, the monastery was one of the few locales in which large portions of people's lives could be concentrated, it is not surprising that some of the main features of disciplinary power originate there. Disciplinary power is built around the time-table just like other more spatially diffuse aspects of modern organizations. But in this case time-tables are used to organize the time-space sequencing of settings of action within physically restricted locales, in which the regularity of activities can be enforced by supervision of individuals who might not otherwise acquiesce. Supervision demands either continued observation (as, for example, in the case of a teacher confronting a classroom of pupils) or ready access to such observation when it is thought necessary (as in the instance of devices that can be used to keep a watch upon prisoners when they are in their cells). In the sense that disciplinary power involves observation, Foucault is right to take Bentham's panopticon as its epitome, regardless of how far it was actually used as a model by those who designed or operated prisons or other organizational locales.

But Foucault is mistaken in so far as he regards 'maximized' disciplinary power of this sort as expressing the general nature of administrative power within the modern state. Prisons, asylums and other locales in which individuals are kept entirely sequestered from the outside, as Goffman has made clear, have to be regarded as having special characteristics that separate them off rather distinctively from other modern organizations. In virtue of the fact that it is 'total' in its effects upon inmates, the former type of organization specifically disrupts the ordinary routines through which human agents live their lives.<sup>25</sup> Goffman's notion of 'total institution' may or may not have been consciously coined in awareness of its affinities to 'totalitarianism' but certainly the concentration camp is, in recent times, the most dramatic and frightful example of enforced sequestration. The use of techniques of surveillance in such enclosed and brutally time-tabled settings undeniably has set a malign stamp on the modern era. One can see from this regard why Foucault chooses to accentuate the implications of those forms of disciplinary power that were perhaps often first established for essentially humanitarian motives. But we still have to insist that it is the work-place or,

more generally, the specialized locale within which administrative power is concentrated, that is prototypical of the Western nation-state. Characteristic of the work-place setting of the business firm or of the school, and most other modern organizations, is that the individual only spends part of the day within their walls; and that during that segment of the day the application of disciplinary power is more diffuse than in 'total institutions'. In all organizations, in virtue of the dialectic of control, there is some sort of 'effort bargain' that is explicitly or implicitly concluded by participants. But outside locales of forcible sequestration, this is one which both *de jure* and *de facto* acknowledges strict limits to the degree to which activities can be forcibly constrained to fit designated or desired patterns. There are certainly quite close architectural similarities between, for example, nineteenth-century prisons and factories in Britain and in other countries. As has been remarked, the thoughts of the early industrial entrepreneurs readily turned to looking for sources of docile, unfree labour in their attempts to create stable conditions of production within the enterprise. One historian observes that, 'There were few areas of the country [Britain] in which the modern industries, particularly textiles, if carried on in large buildings, were not associated with prisons, workhouses and orphanages.'<sup>26</sup> But as the same writer goes on to add, one of the most important characteristics of industrial capitalism is that wage-labour is 'free'. Hence the imposition of disciplinary power outside contexts of enforced sequestration tends to be blunted by the very real and consequential countervailing power which those subject to it can, and do, develop.

This suggests that there are two substantive features of the association of disciplinary power with the modern state that should be distinguished. On the one hand, there takes place a marked impetus towards the expansion of this form of power, made possible by the establishment of locales in which the regularized observation of activities can be carried on in order to seek to control them. This is important for the nature of the modern work-place and, thereby, is a major tie connecting industrial capitalism (as a mode of economic enterprise) to the nation-state (as an administratively co-ordinated unit). It is not, as such, part of the directive influence of the state apparatus, but a generalized phenomenon enhancing internal pacification through

promoting the discipline of potentially recalcitrant groups at major points of tension, especially in the sphere of production. This is distinguishable from a growth in disciplinary power linked to, and expressive of, the sanctions that those in the state apparatus are able to wield in respect of 'deviance'. It is this second aspect that is most closely meshed with the development of surveillance as the policing of the routine activities of the mass of the population, by specialized agencies separate from the main body of the armed forces.

Internal pacification involves several related phenomena, all to do with the progressive diminution of violence in the internal affairs of nation-states. One element, given particular prominence by Foucault, is the disappearance of violent forms of punishment associated with the legal system. Perhaps the most striking single index of this is to be found in the history of capital punishment. In post-medieval times, capital punishment could be meted out for a range of transgressions, many of them seemingly quite trivial. On the other hand, the killing of another person could often be atoned for by payment of a fine and, in practice, was frequently sanctioned by the local community or by kin groups rather than by the state. Regarding murder as at the peak of the scale of crimes, whatever level in the social hierarchy the perpetrator might be, and separating murder unequivocally from the killing of alien populations in times of war, are attitudes peculiar to the past two centuries or so. They reflect both the primacy that 'bourgeois rights' assume and their connection with universal citizenship within the sovereign state.

Public executions were still carried out in England until well into the eighteenth century. Hangmen were well-known figures to the general public, and brought to their work various sorts of personal idiosyncracies and forms of exhibitionism.<sup>27</sup> Those malefactors who were done to death at Tyburn were taken through the streets in an open cart, followed by a lengthy cortège of officials. They died slow, lingering deaths, although friends were allowed to shorten their sufferings by pulling at their legs on the scaffold. Although the practice died out well before that of public execution itself, in earlier times corpses were often disposed of publicly. Gibbeting was the most common of such procedures. A corpse would be boiled or tarred and hung up in a chair or wicker suit at the scene of the crime, on a busy thoroughfare or at



a special gibbet place. The most evident feature of capital punishment subsequent to the disappearance of public executions was the progressive introduction of techniques attempting to minimize both suffering and any sense of spectacle. The objective also became that of avoiding mutilation. Scaffolds were designed in such a way as to drop the condemned person just far enough to dislocate the neck, but not far enough to break blood vessels. Executions became concealed in time as well as in space, being early in the morning or late at night, rather than in the middle of the afternoon, as public executions used to be. As Lofland points out,

Historic executions were noisy; pounding to bend bodies on to the wheel; hammering to attach bodies in crucifixion; fire crackling and wood tumbling to prepare pots for human boiling . . . The modern desire is for silent techniques. Virtually no effort has been spared to make English hanging quiet. At the beginning of the modern period, hanging drop doors were baffled with bales of cotton and, when the technology became available, rubber cushions and spring catches were used.<sup>26</sup>

The elimination of punishment-as-spectacle undoubtedly is rich in implications, but one main element involved is a transferral of the sanctioning capacities of the state from the manifest use of violence to the pervasive use of administrative power in sustaining its rule. Capital punishment has today been abolished in most Western countries. But in the preceding period it was no longer a method of inflicting bodily pain, designed to impress the rest of the population with the command over force possessed by the state. Rather, it became the final sanction in a hierarchy of the removal of liberties. Its 'silence' and 'concealment' no doubt have to do with the realization that the sanction of putting someone to death is not in fact just a further step in the progressive deprivation of the rights of citizenship, but an entirely distinct phenomenon. The shift from capital punishment to life imprisonment as the most weighty sanction is thus in line with the 'new logic' of punishment that emerges in conjunction with the expansion of administrative power. Of course, one must recognize that many other forms of violence are widely carried on inside the police stations and prisons of the modern world. But these are not generally part of a scale of punishment whereby violence is used

in order publicly to display to potential wrongdoers the likely outcome of any malfeasance. On the contrary, they usually have to be employed in a surreptitious fashion.

In local communities within traditional states, where custom was the principal binding force, there were often blood feuds and other forms of violent encounter between individuals and kin groups. Peasants living at any distance away from the main concentrations of armed force of the state authorities, or of their local lord, could not be effectively protected from bandits or bands of armed raiders. This was true in most areas of traditional China, for instance, right up to the twentieth century, notwithstanding the fact that China was probably in some more central regions the most successfully pacified of all large imperial states.<sup>29</sup> Travel was always a fraught enterprise in such states and merchants of any affluence virtually always moved in armed caravans, even for journeys of quite short distance. Finally, within cities themselves there were very often 'no go' areas in which, even with armed protection, those from other sections would fear to venture.

The development of the absolutist state was undoubtedly associated with major advances in internal pacification, although the level of day-to-day violence was always widely variable at different periods and in different places. According to Le Goff and Sutherland, as has been mentioned previously, in most of rural France under the *Old Regime* there was a prevalence of 'violence, rowdiness, petty thieving and the like'.<sup>30</sup> If Macfarlane is right about rural England, on the other hand, the level of personal safety in the seventeenth century was considerably higher than in most parts of continental Europe. According to him, in Kirkby Lonsdale and its environs it was fairly common for women to travel on their own, and for people to cross the moors alone at night, even when carrying sums of money. A large amount of movement went on in the region, seemingly without fear of robbery. Battles between wandering youth gangs, quite frequent in some areas of rural England, were apparently absent there.<sup>31</sup> Although the anxieties expressed by commentators at the time cannot necessarily be taken at their face value, it seems definitely to have been the case that the larger cities, towards the latter part of the eighteenth century, all contained areas in which the levels of murder and armed robbery were very high by subsequent

standards. It is only in this period, however, that the notion of 'lawlessness' becomes widely used. Modern policing, with its characteristic mixture of informational and supervisory aspects of surveillance, was both made possible and seen to be necessary by the wholesale transferral of populations from rural to urban environments. Horace Walpole wrote in 1752 of journeys in London that 'one is forced to travel, even at noon, as if one were going to battle.'<sup>32</sup> Referring to English cities in general of the period, the Webbs wrote of 'despair of conveying any adequate picture of the lawless violence, the barbarous licentiousness, and the almost unlimited opportunities for pilfering and robbery offered by the unpoliced streets'.<sup>33</sup>

The rapid expansion of a newly urbanized population, in which changing modes of life took some while to become established, created unsettled conditions of 'lawlessness'. To an extent, these might have diminished of their own accord with more stable patterns of residence. But undoubtedly the main influence became the control which the new types of policing, in conjunction with the sanctioning mechanisms of codified law and imprisonment, were able to achieve. 'Criminal' activities became much more clearly distinct from other sources of social strife, and these in turn became plainly differentiated from the external military engagements of states. Comparing London, Stockholm and New South Wales during the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Gurr concludes that in each case there is a clear trend towards a decline in common crimes of violence — a finding amply confirmed in other studies.<sup>34</sup> Until about the turn of the nineteenth century, even in Britain long-distance travel meant risking the attentions of robbers or highwaymen. But during that century these phenomena rapidly became nothing more than a memory, invested not infrequently with a romantic image that bore little relation to the past reality in question. Of course, in other parts of Europe such a level of internal pacification took considerably longer to achieve. As late as the early twentieth century travel was unsafe in some mountainous and forested areas of France and remains so in some part up to the present day in Sicily or Turkey.<sup>35</sup>

Another aspect of internal pacification is of quite elemental importance to the themes of this book.<sup>36</sup> This is the eradication of violence, and the capability to use the means of violence, from

the labour contract — the axis of the class system. Closely integrated with, and dependent upon, the other forms of internal pacification, it is a major feature of the separation of the 'economic' from the 'political', although one that is ordinarily ignored in most writings on the subject. It connects closely with processes of social change I shall discuss in the next section, and only the outlines need be sketched here. In industrial capitalism — in contrast to pre-existing class systems — employers do not possess direct access to the means of violence in order to secure the economic returns they seek from the subordinate class. Marx entirely correctly laid considerable emphasis upon this, even if he did not pursue its implications. 'Dull economic compulsion', plus the surveillance made possible by the concentration of labour within the capitalistic work-place, replaces the direct possibility of coercion by the use of force. Of course, employers did not relinquish the use of sanctions of violence without some reluctance and the class struggles waged by workers have often involved violence. But these facts do not compromise the key importance of 'bourgeois rights' in the formation of a 'demilitarized' system of production. This is one of the most significant elements of the liberal-democratic state — that the rights of freedom of disposal of labour-power, for which the bourgeoisie actively fought, carry with them the intrinsic limitation of the power of employers in the work-place to hiring and firing workers and to supervising 'management'. These are not in any way negligible sources of control. However they are only possible in a society which has been internally pacified in other ways and in which 'bourgeois rights' are more than the mere sham freedoms Marx seemingly took them to be.<sup>37</sup>

Most of this book, except where it moves on to the terrain of the global state system, is concerned with the European nation-state. But it is perhaps appropriate at this point to make a few comments about modern states in which the use of force has continued to play a much more direct role in the co-ordination of the labour-force in the sphere of production. If in these states the regulation of work by 'dull economic compulsion' remains undeveloped, it is probably in some substantial part a result of the peripheral involvement of capitalism historically with the use of unfree labour. In countries with an economic background of this sort, the insulation of economy and polity characteristic of the

European nation-state has not been achieved. Other aspects of internal pacification may be correspondingly also less securely developed — in respect, for example, of the existence of armed gangs who perpetuate organized terrorism in pursuit of political goals.<sup>38</sup>

A final characteristic of internal pacification, intimately connected with the others, but nevertheless distinguishable from them, is the withdrawal of the military from direct participation in the internal affairs of state. It is this which seemed to many nineteenth-century thinkers to confirm the thesis of the essentially pacific character of industrial capitalism. What it involves, however, is not the decline of war but a concentration of military power 'pointing outwards' towards other states in the nation-state system. The consolidation of the internal administrative resources of the state dislocates administrative power from its strong and necessary base in the coercive sanctions of armed force. I do not want this statement to be misunderstood. In the nation-state, as in other states, the claim to effective control of the means of violence is quite basic to state power. But the registering of the more or less complete success of this claim, made possible by the expansion of surveillance capabilities and internal pacification, radically lessens the dependence of the state apparatus upon the wielding of military force as the means of its rule. The distinction between the military and civilian police is symbol and material expression of this phenomenon. At the same time, the fact that this distinction is rarely clear-cut, that the police may have paramilitary sections employed in cases of what is regarded as serious civil disturbance, and that the military may be directly called in, are evidence enough that the differentiation is usually full of tension.

#### Urbanism, Regionalization and Sequestration

In class-divided societies, for reasons already elucidated, cities were a main foundation of the generation of both allocative and authoritative resources. The relation of modern urbanism to the nation-state is quite different, as is the character of urban life as such.<sup>39</sup> The spread of modern urbanism is undoubtedly prompted above all by the emergence of industrial capitalism as the dominant form of production system. But, in its consequences

and in its intrinsic form, modern urban development is very different from previous cities. It forms a 'created environment', in which the transformation of nature is expressed as commodified time-space; as such it is the *milieu* of all social action, no longer a distinct physical entity and social sector within a broader societal totality. The commodification of time and of space is the condition of those processes of time-space sequencing described earlier as characteristic of modern organizations, including the nation-state, as the most prominent new power-container.

In saying this, I do not mean to deny the importance of either regionalization within the territory of the state or of social systems that stretch across states. In many respects nation-states and the global areas covered by the nation-state system are more definitely regionalized than the traditional states that preceded them. The administrative unity they display is primarily a phenomenon confined to the scope of the state apparatus. The interdependence, economic and political, of the world in which nation-states exist should not be identified with homogeneity. Some of the main forms of regionalization are the following.<sup>40</sup>

1 The regionalized distribution of nation-states themselves, as core and peripheral states economically, as power-blocs politically and as distinctive and autonomous centres of power within a global patchwork of states.

2 The differential-regional distribution of industry, in a division of labour in and across states. Industrial production is by its very nature regionalized, since various types of industry tend to develop, or to be placed, in distinct spatial settings and areas. This applies not only to fairly generalized regional distributions within and between states but also within quite restricted settings, such as the spatial positioning of industrial areas in certain types of urban neighbourhoods. 'Uneven development' can be associated with any or all of the types of regionalization mentioned in (1) or (2).

3 The differential regional concentration of populations, regardless of whether or not this is expressed in the shape of cultural, ethnic or linguistic variations. The populations of nation-states tend to be much more unevenly spread than those of traditional states, partly because of the limitations of rural economy in the latter and of the very high density urban agglomerations assume in the former. The concentration of large

masses of individuals within relatively restricted spatial areas is undeniably one of the most stunning differences between the modern and the traditional world. Up to the seventeenth century there were probably only about 100 million people in Europe, which was considerably more densely populated than the other continents. Today there are some half this number who live in the conurbation occupying the comparatively tiny area stretching from Boston to Washington on the Eastern Seaboard of the USA.

4 There are many clear-cut and diffuse regional variations between neighbourhoods and locales within the built-up sections of the created environment. These are, of course, sometimes planned but are probably more often unintended results of the intersection of product, labour and housing markets. On a smaller scale, regionalization between and within the concretely situated locales that are the settings of organizations is often pronounced and significant. The degree of differentiation among the neighbourhoods of traditional cities and between the locales in which day-to-day life was carried on was usually quite low. Most large, internally differentiated locales were either public buildings or the sites of religious communities. But such locales become commonplace in modern society, being themselves containers for the generation of administrative power. The internal regionalization of locales is involved in a direct way with the hierarchies of offices characteristic of bureaucracy, but also with many other aspects of the differentiation of social activities.

Sequestration is one form of regionalization, and there can be no doubt that its influence is not confined to spheres of forcible incarceration. Concealment and revelation take on new meanings and a new resonance in the created environment of modern urbanism and in a society where massively developed surveillance is so important to the operations of power. Where disciplinary power is strongly focused, for example, settings in which those subject to supervision can avoid being observed by superordinates become of particular significance in the dialectic of control. Sequestration is of such importance to the tissue of day-to-day social life because of its connection with those aspects of human experience that were previously more or less freely exposed to view, if usually surrounded by ritual practices and prohibitions. In spite of the criticisms made by historians of Ariès' discussion of changing Western attitudes towards death, the general outlines of

the analysis he makes seem valid. Traditionally, he argues, death was a phenomenon integrated with life, with the continuity of social activities.

The spectacle of the dead, whose bones were always being washed up to the surface of the cemeteries, as was the skull in Hamlet, made no more impression upon the living than did the idea of their own death. They were as familiar with the dead as they were familiarised with the idea of their own death.

Somewhere in the sixteenth century this began to change, for reasons that do not have a single source but that converge to produce a consistent trend.

Like the sexual act, death was henceforth increasingly thought of as a transgression which tears man from his daily life, from rational society, from his monotonous work, in order to make him undergo a paroxysm, plunging him into an irrational, violent and beautiful world . . . This idea of rupture is something completely new.<sup>41</sup>

The demands of the early health reformers to remove burial grounds from churches and city centres were, in Ariès' view, an initial symbolic expulsion of the dead from the community of the living. It preceded and helped shape the 'suppression' of death that is characteristic of more recent times. But whatever its origins, which are certainly both historically and psychologically complex, this 'suppression' is not limited to the material evidence of mortality. Not only death is sequestered from the ordinary activities of daily life; so are other phenomena which, in becoming 'detached' from the normal run of social life, produce specific sources of anxiety or distress — including both madness and physical illness of a serious sort. If Elias is right, Ariès' comment on sexuality also signals an important social change, even if sexual behaviour is not organizationally confined in the same way as the other phenomena. There is good reason to be as cautious about some of Elias's historical claims as there is those of Ariès, but it does seem that sexual activity used to be engaged in more openly than subsequently came to be the case.<sup>42</sup>

Whatever the sources of these changes, their consequences are probably very significant for the tissue of day-to-day social life in modern states. I have argued elsewhere that routinization, knowledgeably yet tacitly organized by agents in the flow of their

action, is fundamental to the reproduction of institutionalized practices.<sup>43</sup> In tribal and in class-divided societies, tradition infuses the routine and gives it moral sources through which day-to-day life connects to the existential parameters of human life, to the relations of human beings with nature, birth, sickness and death. The 'existential contradiction' via which human beings live their lives — that they are part of inorganic nature, and relapse into it at death, yet are not of nature, in so far as they live also in consciousness of their finitude — is not separated from the organized dynamics of social life. In the modern state, existential contradiction is almost completely expunged by structural contradiction, the main locus of which is precisely the state itself.<sup>44</sup> One outcome is that the routinization of day-to-day social life is precarious, resting upon a relatively shallow psychological base and not integrated with moral principles that provide means of meeting existential dilemmas. The sequestration of death, sickness and madness, and the privatizing of sexuality, are both a result of this situation and, at the same time, a condition of the stability of the routine.

In virtue of sequestration, therefore, a range of experiences that are psychologically troubling do not intrude upon the main body of activities individuals carry out in the course of their daily lives. Such experiences are removed from possible intrusion into the continuity of routinized activities and pushed instead to the outer margins of those contexts in which most daily social life is enacted. I do not mean to propose some sort of functionalist account either of the origins of sequestration or of its implications once widely established. The development of sequestered locales is partly to be explained in terms of influences promoting carceral organizations and partly in terms of the emerging primacy of 'technical' methods of attempting to 'treat' 'mental' and physical illness. The outcome of sequestration is not in any generalized way functional for the continuity of social activities. In respect of feelings of ontological security, the members of modern societies are particularly vulnerable to generalized anxiety. This may become intense either when, as individuals, they have to confront existential dilemmas ordinarily suppressed by sequestration, or when, on a larger scale, routines of social life are for some reason substantially disrupted. The emptiness of the routines followed in

large segments of modern social life engender a psychological basis for affiliation to symbols that can both promote solidarity and cause schism. Among these symbols are those associated with nationalism, and I shall return to the issues thus raised in chapter 8.

# Určeno pouze pro studijní účely

8

## Class, Sovereignty and Citizenship

### Polyarchy

The development of sovereignty, as concept and reality, is of major significance in relating what at first sight look to be quite opposed developments: the authority of the absolutist monarch and the coming of the modern democratic state. At the same time as the drive towards sovereignty generates a centralization of resources in the hands of the ruler, it stimulates a generalized awareness that political power depends upon collective capabilities which the figure of the monarch may signify, but to which the traditional trappings of kingly rule have little relevance.

There are two contrasting interpretations of the development of modern democracy, with both of which I shall take issue. On the one hand there is the familiar Marxist account, which seeks to explain the origins of democratic participation in terms of class dynamics. Although such an account can and has been given with widely varying degrees of subtlety, its basic outline is clear enough. The main transformative influence shaping the emergence of democratic politics is the development of capitalism and the class struggles this entails. 'Bourgeois freedoms' involve a range of civil and political liberties achieved through the conflicts that ranged the members of the rising capitalist class against the land-owning aristocracy. 'Bourgeois rights', which were proposed by their advocates as universal, in fact serve to legitimate the dominance of the capitalist class. While Marx might admit — especially in his more detailed studies rather than his more abstract pronouncements — that struggles involving such rights may have a certain independence from class conflict, for the most part they are seen as the surface expression of class division. An opposing view is

taken by many of Marx's critics. Thus Bendix effectively seeks to reverse the Marxist position, arguing that while struggles over civil and political rights were in certain historical circumstances conjoined to class conflicts, in fact the former have primacy over the latter. Neither the origins nor the consequences of the democratization of the modern state are in a significant way conditioned by class conflict. Thus the struggles that seemed to Marx to be the very prototype of class conflict in nineteenth-century Europe are seen as strivings on the part of excluded groups to achieve full membership of the democratic polity.<sup>1</sup>

Before assessing these rival positions, some conceptual and substantive observations should be made. Few concepts are more fiercely debated than that of democracy. I shall not try to trace the course of those debates, but shall follow Lindblom in regarding 'democracy', in its broadest sense, as equivalent to 'polyarchy'.<sup>2</sup> Polyarchy means rule by the many, and involves 'the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens considered as political equals.'<sup>3</sup> Electoral systems, as modes of ensuring such 'responsiveness of government' are the prime, but not the only, procedural means of creating polyarchy and courts of appeal the main mechanism of sustaining it. Lindblom concerns himself mostly with the first of these, but the second is arguably just as important in respect of the formulation he offers. For, as he indicates, polyarchy depends upon debates and persuasion which (in principle) counter the arbitrary use of power. I include as courts of appeal not only parliaments, debating chambers and law courts, but also any arena in which debate that influences policy decisions is carried on — in particular the press and, in recent times, electronic media. There is one major respect in which I depart from Lindblom's usage. He limits the notion of polyarchy to 'bourgeois' or 'liberal democracies'. I wish to make it a much more encompassing concept, such that liberal democracy is only one type of polyarchy. Although in the European nation-state polyarchic systems have predominantly taken the form of liberal democracy, other types of government in nation-states of all kinds tend strongly towards polyarchy. There is, in short, a generic association between the nation-state and polyarchy which it will be my aim to help explicate.

Polyarchy, Lindblom makes clear, depends upon the existence of a range of rights attributed to the members of a given

population. At this point, however, we have to acknowledge an important phenomenon associated with sovereignty. Polyarchy evidently has something to do with what Marx called 'bourgeois rights'. Now 'bourgeois rights', in their classic formulations in the American and French Revolutions, are universal rights. They apply in principle to the whole of humanity and it is not surprising to find that even their radical critics, such as Marx, took this for granted. As the expression of underlying economic transactions that are also potentially universal in nature, they have no particular connection with the boundaries of states. In fact, 'bourgeois rights' have been everywhere actualized within sovereign states. They are, thus, more appropriately regarded as *citizenship rights* and I shall henceforth use that term to refer to them.

Lindblom lists the following as the rights and prerogatives associated with polyarchy:<sup>4</sup>

- 1 Freedom to form and join organizations
- 2 Freedom of expression
- 3 Right to vote
- 4 Eligibility for public office
- 5 Right of political leaders to compete for support
- 6 Right of political leaders to compete for votes
- 7 Alternative sources of information
- 8 Elections to decide who is to hold top authority
- 9 Organizations for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

The modes in which these are given concrete form obviously may vary very considerably and phrases such as 'freedom of expression' conceal a veritable hornets' nest of potentially divergent interpretations. Nonetheless, this is a useful formulation for general purposes of the analysis of modern political systems. I propose to add to it, however, the classification of citizenship rights provided by T. H. Marshall.<sup>5</sup> Marshall distinguishes three types of citizenship rights — the 'civil', 'political' and 'social' (although I shall call the third of these 'economic' rights). Lindblom's list consists mainly of civil and political rights, plus the means of their realization. Civil rights are those involved mainly under categories 1, 2, 7 and 9 in his list. They are legally guaranteed rights of individuals freely to associate with one

another, to live where they want, to enjoy freedom of speech and justice in respect of accusations of 'deviant' behaviour. The remainder are political rights and prerogatives, concerning the participation of individuals in the exercise of political power, as voters, or in a more direct way in the practice of politics. Economic citizenship rights are distinguishable from both these categories. They concern the right of everyone within the state to enjoy a certain minimum standard of life, economic welfare and security.

### Polyarchy, Citizenship

Why should it be the case that there are inherent connections between the nation-state and democracy (understood as polyarchy)? I want to interpret these connections, in a generalized way at least, as bound up with the dialectic of control, in relation to the concentration of administrative resources in the nation-state. In class-divided societies, I have suggested, there was no 'government' in the modern sense. The administrative reach of the state authorities left largely untouched the day-to-day life of the local communities in which the large mass of the population lived. The dialectic of control in class-divided societies, in relation to the power of the state, can be characterized as a matter of 'segmental autonomy'. That is to say, since the level of interdependence of the political centre and its subject population was relatively low, the 'effort bargain' made involved the maintenance of a large amount of local community autonomy, so long as certain obligations to the state were met, in return for which the state provided a limited range of reciprocal services. The use or threat of the use of military power tended to be ever-present in sustaining the administrative reach of the state apparatus, because the level of time—space distancing it was able to command was low compared, at least, with the modern state. In the latter, the build-up in administrative power (generated above all by the extension of surveillance in the various senses noted above) marginalizes the state's dependence upon control of the means of violence as a medium of rule of its subject population. However, administrative power that depends upon the mobilization of social activities via the expansion of surveillance necessarily increases the reciprocal relations between

those who govern and those who are governed. The more reciprocity is involved, the greater the possibilities the dialectic of control offers subordinate groups to influence the rulers. I take this to be the 'structural backdrop' against which polyarchy develops, first of all in the shadow of the absolutist state and then more openly and directly in the course of the transition to the nation-state.

I assume one implication of this argument to be that Parsons's interpretation of 'power deflation' has considerable relevance — in somewhat amended form — to understanding the character of the modern state.<sup>6</sup> Parsons claims that systems of domination involve sustaining the confidence of those in subordinate groups in their rulers. When such confidence, for whatever reason, begins to wane, the amount of power generated in the system diminishes — it becomes 'ungovernable'. It is only in such circumstances of power deflation that the widespread use or threat of the use of force is necessary in order to sustain governmental control. As an account of the basis of the administrative power of the nation-state and its connections to polyarchy, this is helpful and plausible, although various qualifications have to be made. The mass of the population does not necessarily have to have 'confidence' in the system of rule, only pragmatic acceptance of their obligations in relation to it. The use of violence (military force) may be more directly involved in the initial establishing of the administrative order than Parsons allows, not just confined to conditions of power deflation. But it is in circumstances of power deflation that polyarchic influences will tend to come under pressure or be dissolved.

There are many contingent conditions that might bring about power deflation, but in a general way it is likely to be strongly conditioned by struggles over the three basic types of citizenship rights. In order to demonstrate why this should be the case, I shall return to the work of Marshall, examining his own account of the formation of citizenship rights in a critical way.<sup>7</sup> Marshall characterizes his typology of the three forms of citizenship right negatively by reference to feudalism and, positively, by reference to the organizational focus of each. In the feudal system, rights were not universal, in other words, not applicable to every member of a national polity. Those in the various estates and corporations effectively belonged to separate communities, having

different rights and duties in relation to one another. Moreover, these rights and duties tended to form single clusters; only since the eighteenth century have the three strands of citizenship rights become distinct from one another. This is partly because each has a different organizational focus or, at least, the first two do. The main institutional focus of the administration of civil rights is the legal system. Political citizenship rights have as their focal points the institutions of parliament and local government. The third — economic rights — apparently in Marshall's eyes lack such an organizational location, which is perhaps why he chooses the diffuse term 'social rights' to refer to them.

Marshall's discussion is explicitly focused on Britain and he does not claim that his scheme applies with equal cogency in other contexts. His thesis is that the three aspects of citizenship have developed at different rates over the past two or three centuries, with each serving as a sort of platform for the others. The main formative period of the development of civil or legal rights was the eighteenth century, when rights of the liberty of the individual, and full and equal justice before the law, became firmly established. Thus the right to live and work where one pleases becomes generally accepted, something which in earlier centuries was for many prohibited both by custom and by statute. The traditional view, Marshall says, only gradually ceded place to the new principle that restrictions on the movement of the population are 'an offence against the liberty of the subject and a menace to the prosperity of the nation'.<sup>8</sup> The legal system was primarily involved in advancing this idea, the judiciary delivering a series of judgements that progressively freed individuals from their bondage to the places where they were born and the occupations they were born into. Civil freedoms were essentially the end process in the dissolution of the remnants of feudal society. They were the necessary foundation for the emergence of political rights; for only if the individual is recognized as an autonomous agent does it become reasonable to regard that individual as politically responsible. The establishment of universal political rights belongs to the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. This process, according to Marshall at least, was not so much one of the formation of new rights as the extension of old ones, previously the monopoly of the privileged few, to the whole of the political community. Economic rights



belong almost wholly to the twentieth century. The nineteenth century, the period of ascendant industrial capitalism, was a period at which those who were most adversely affected by the play of economic forces had little protection against deprivation. Poverty was regarded as an indication of social inferiority; in Britain paupers placed in the work-house forfeited the rights possessed by other citizens, to virtually the same degree as imprisoned criminals or the certified insane. But in the twentieth century this became reversed, largely as a consequence of the effects of political citizenship. With the establishment of the universal franchise, the organized working class was able to secure the political strength to consolidate welfare or economic rights *as rights*.

The development of citizenship rights, particularly those of the second and third types, according to Marshall, has substantially undermined the class divisions which he accepts are inherent in capitalist society. As he puts it:

In the twentieth century, citizenship and the class system have been at war . . . The expansion of social rights is no longer merely an attempt to abate the obvious nuisance of destitution in the lowest ranks of society . . . It is no longer content to raise the floor-level in the basement of the social edifice, leaving the super-structure as it was. It has begun to remodel the whole building, and it might even end by converting the skyscraper into a bungalow.<sup>9</sup>

Marshall's views on these matters are somewhat different from the ideas that Bendix and others taking a comparable standpoint have developed. In Marshall's conception, citizenship rights, and the political struggles associated with them, do not have a more profound role to play than class conflict in modern societies; rather, the two tend to balance one another. Citizenship rights do not dissolve class division and cannot do so, in the context of a capitalist society at any rate, although they do mellow the tensions deriving from class conflict. The encounter between citizenship and the capitalist class system results in a negotiated truce, a 'class compromise' rather than an unqualified victory for either side. I think this view — in some key respects at any rate — is a correct one, although I want to put it to use in a rather different way than Marshall has in mind. This means criticizing some aspects of what Marshall has to say; detaching the analysis from

the specifically British context of development; and relating the discussion of citizenship rights back to that of surveillance.

So far as the first of these problems goes, we should register an objection to Marshall's tendency to treat the development of citizenship rights as brought about by something of a natural process of evolution, helped along where necessary by the beneficent hand of the state. In Britain, as in other societies, there was little conceded by the state authorities without conflict. There has not only been a 'struggle' between citizenship and class, but a struggle to achieve the rights of citizenship themselves — although one which, if my argument is correct, the underprivileged have been able to muster considerable resources to pursue their claims. In Britain, the sequence of achievement of citizenship rights Marshall describes does make sense. Civil rights were in some substantial part established prior to political rights and these, in turn, before economic rights. Even in Britain, however, the picture is rather more complicated than Marshall would allow; some kinds of civil rights, for example, have only been achieved in the twentieth century (others have arguably also been eroded or diminished). Developments elsewhere cannot be readily portrayed as a successive movement through the three stages of citizenship rights, since the order of their realization is quite different. Thus in nineteenth-century Germany, Bismarck conceded various welfare rights to the working-class specifically in order to prevent the realization of the political rights Marshall describes.

Rather, then, than seeing the three categories of citizenship rights as phases in the overall development of citizenship, it is more plausible to interpret them as three arenas of *contestation* or *conflict*, each linked to a distinctive type of surveillance, where that surveillance is both necessary to the power of superordinate groups and an axis for the operation of the dialectic of control. Civil rights are intrinsically linked to the modes of surveillance involved in the policing activities of the state. Surveillance in this context consists of the apparatus of judicial and punitive organizations in terms of which 'deviant' conduct is controlled. Marx tends to discuss civil rights as the category of 'bourgeois rights' *par excellence*, legitimating the dominance of capital over wage-labour. While there are some aspects of the Marxist position that are undoubtedly valid, it is essential to see

that civil rights, and the more-or-less chronic struggles surrounding them, have a generic and independent significance in modern states:

<i>Civil rights</i>	Surveillance as policing
<i>Political rights</i>	Surveillance as reflexive monitoring of state administrative power
<i>Economic rights</i>	Surveillance as 'management' of production

Like the other two types of rights, civil rights have their own particular locale. That is to say, there is an institutionalized setting in which the claimed universality of rights can be vindicated — the law court. The law court is the prototypical court of appeal in which the range of liberties included under 'civil rights' can be both defended and advanced. Of course it would be wrong to see the law court as the only setting in which struggles over the form and bounds of policing are enacted; they occur in virtually all situations in which surveillance of this type is carried out, including the sequestered contexts of disciplinary power. The same should be emphasized about political rights, where the institutionalized locale of contestation — parliament or the council chamber — is the formal setting for the discursive representation of rights, but where a whole variety of extra-parliamentary contestations are also possible. Marshall does not connect economic rights with a distinctive locale and in one sense there is good reason for this, because there is not the same sort of relevant debating chamber. But I would suggest that the locale in which struggles over economic rights are focused is the work-place, the surveillance in question being that of 'management' over a labour-force. If there is not an institutionalized court of appeal here, this reflects phenomena of major significance in the class structure of capitalism. The main organized agency of struggle over economic rights is the union and it is in the mechanics of industrial arbitration that we find the settings of contestation in relation to this type of surveillance.

Capitalism entails a class society and to develop the analysis further we must consider how class relations influence, and are influenced by, the various forms of citizenship right. In explicating

these influences, it will be helpful to return to the critical assessment of Marshall's views. This involves using Marx against Marshall, but subsequently I shall tip the scales the other way, using Marshall against Marx. I have emphasized elsewhere the significance of the capitalist labour contract in the organization of capitalist enterprise.<sup>10</sup> The capitalist labour contract is a primary element in the separation of the spheres of the 'economic' and the 'political'. Now, various points have to be made about this in relation to Marshall's views. The insulation of the economic from the political was in some part achieved by the very legal freedoms Marshall refers to as civil rights. Such rights and prerogatives should not be seen as being created 'outside' the sphere of the state, but as part and parcel of the emergence of the 'public domain', separated from 'privately' organized economic activity. Civil rights thus have been, from the early phases of capitalist development, bound up with the very definition of what counts as 'political'. Civil and political citizenship rights developed together and remain, thereafter, open to a range of divergent interpretations which may directly affect the distribution of power. Moreover, economic rights cannot be regarded as just on a par with the two other types of citizenship right, because it is in the nature of capitalist society that these express an asymmetry of class domination. Marx regarded civil and political rights as liberties which are universal in principle but in practice favour the rule of the dominant class. In substantial degree, Marx was surely right about this. The capitalist labour contract, particularly in the early period of the expansion of capitalist enterprise, excludes the worker from formal rights over the control of the work-place. This exclusion is not incidental to the capitalist state, but vital to it, since the sphere of industry is specifically defined as being 'outside politics'. Given this perspective, we can explain why economic citizenships rights are not to be regarded just as an extension of civil and political rights, and why they do not have their own specific courts of appeal.

The three types of surveillance are, in some respects, knit together and, in other respects, dislocated by the class character of capitalist society. As I have just pointed out, civil rights are of particular significance at the juncture that connects and separates the economic and the political. The class asymmetry this relation involves both gives workers' movements a particular historical

importance and, at the same time, tends to separate the struggles of the labour movement at two different sites. In each of these, citizenship rights tend to be a focus of class conflict, rather than standing opposed to it as Marshall suggests. In the political sphere, the formation of labour or socialist parties (actively resisted by pre-existing governments in many countries) has been geared to winning the universal franchise and then either to implementing, defending or expanding economic rights. Here labour movements, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, have been able to build upon a combination of civil and political rights, which have often been broadened in the process. But in the realm of industry the situation was, and continues to be, different. The separation of the economic from the political meant that, in the early years of capitalist development, the worker who walked in through the factory gates sacrificed all formal, and much actual, control over the work process.

What was in prior types of society an integral element of production — a significant degree of control by the worker over the process of labour — had to be won all over again in the new surveillance settings of modern production. In all capitalist countries unionization, backed by the threat or actuality of the withdrawal of labour-power, has formed the principal source of the power that subordinates can wield in the work-place. The emergence of the strike, or threat of it, as a major sanction in the dialectic of control in work settings, can be readily traced to the novel conditions of modern production. Peasants tend to be dispersed, as Marx points out in a famous passage in the *Eighteenth Brumaire*.<sup>11</sup> The development of the capitalist work-place provides settings in which collective action is facilitated. But just as important is the fact that the propertylessness of workers, upon which the dominance of entrepreneurs is founded, becomes itself a resource. Being dependent upon co-ordinated labour-power, employers are vulnerable to its collective withdrawal, as well as to a range of other stratagems workers can use to achieve a substantial measure of control where formally they are allocated none.

In my view, therefore, it is more valid to say that class conflict has been a medium of the extension of citizenship rights than to say that the spread of such rights has blunted class divisions. *All*

*three forms of citizenship right distinguished by Marshall are double-edged.* As aspects of surveillance, they can be mobilized to expand the control the members of the dominant class are able to maintain over those in subordinate positions. But, at the same time, each is a lever of struggle, which can be used to counter that control. In a capitalist society, class domination provides the most important single institutional axis around which these struggles converge and, in that respect, Marx's view is still cogent. But it does not follow from this that surveillance is an epiphenomenon of class, or that the modes of generating power which it provides will disappear with the transcending of the capitalist class system. Conflict centred upon 'bourgeois rights' is not necessarily class conflict, and the level and nature of their realization has to be regarded as altogether more problematic than Marx believed.

#### Citizenship, Ideology and Nationalism

Traditional states, I have proposed, opened out a public sphere directly related to the monitoring operations of the state, but confined to a very small 'public'. The term 'public', as an adjective and as a noun, has a number of possible shadings of meaning. A phenomenon which is public is 'open to view', rather than concealed; and it pertains to a generalized body of persons rather than to those in particular contexts of co-presence. Each of these aspects of the 'public' again helps emphasize the importance of writing in the traditional state. A list, or file, or a text, are of necessity 'open' in the sense that they become distanced from their authors in a way in which spoken communication cannot be — at least, until the advent of electronic modes of information storage. Written documents also shed the contextual confinement of speech in virtue of that very distancing: they potentially reach an indefinitely wide audience. How far the existence of writing supports a public sphere in respect of state power may vary widely, depending upon the scope of literacy, the nature of the documentation involved, and the communicative settings in which the information thus stored is utilized. But the development of states is necessarily convergent with the formation of modes of discourse which constitutively shape what state power is.

It is in the nature of agrarian states that the discursive

articulation of administrative power is relatively limited, by and large not reaching the mass of the population. Distinctive of the modern state, however, is a very considerable expansion of the reflexive monitoring of state activity. The development of state sovereignty expresses and further stimulates a new form of administrative order, signalled by the formation of the absolutist state, but maximized in the nation-state. A state can only be 'sovereign', in the terms of political theorists of the sixteenth century and afterwards, if large segments of the population of that state have mastered an array of concepts connected with sovereignty.<sup>12</sup> Now such mastery need not be wholly discursive, especially among those who are subject to the administration of the state rather than directly involved in that administration. But when Machievelli, Bodin and others began writing about 'politics', they were not only describing a series of changes, nor even only making policy recommendations; they were helping to constitute what the modern state *is* as a novel ordering of administrative power. The development of notions of citizenship, as pertaining to membership of an overall political community, are intimately bound up with this. In many cases the mass of the population of traditional states did not know themselves to be 'citizens' of those states, nor did it matter particularly to the continuity of power within them. But the more the administrative scope of the state begins to penetrate the day-to-day activities of its subjects, the less this theorem holds. The expansion of state sovereignty means that those subject to it are in some sense — initially vague, but growing more and more definite and precise — aware of their membership in a political community and of the rights and obligations such membership confers.

The development of printing, and the extension of literacy, create a broadened realm of the 'public' — indeed for the first time it makes sense to apply that term as a noun as well as an adjective. Printing vastly expands not only the capabilities of reflexive monitoring of the state, but the distancing of communication from oral contexts. Not until the period of the emergence of the nation-state, however, do the potentialities of printing become fully recognized and utilized. The epoch at which the regularized collection of official statistics becomes established is the same as that in which a flurry of journals, gazettes, newspapers and

pamphlets appear, reaching mass audiences. Gouldner has commented on this in a cogent way:

At first, such publications were more likely to combine commentary on literature with 'news'. But by 1800 the news predominated, as parliaments and political centres became of wider interest, and as the spread of markets into national and international systems meant that distant events could affect local prices and supplies . . . The emergence of the mass media and of the 'public' are mutually constructive developments . . . With the growth of the mass media, exemplified at first by printing, numerous persons were now exposed to a continuous flow of information, at more or less the same time. Information becomes decontextualised, for it must be made intelligible, interesting and convincing even to persons of diverse backgrounds and interests, persons who do not know one another and do not meet and interact.<sup>13</sup>

Some of the main dimensions of ideology in modern states are to be discovered in the nature and scope of discursive articulation of information available in the 'public' domain. In the context of the modern state, the capability of different groupings to discursively formulate policies or programmes that express their interests and to make space in the public domain for promoting them, are vital. While in the nation-state all members of the population share an array of concepts constitutive of its sovereign and polyarchic character, these may be mainly ordered in practical consciousness rather than being available to be discursively formulated as reasons for action. Although this theorem applies at all levels of society, it is likely to be strongly weighted in favour of the more privileged strata and, more generally, the dominant class.

Of course it is not only the degree and nature of the discursive formulation of interests that matters. There are at least three more substantive aspects of those discursive formulations which exist that influence the ideological shadings of symbol systems.

1 The definition of what is to count as 'political' and, therefore, in principle open to intervention or control on the part of the state. There is a direct tie here between the state and the class system in capitalist society, since the 'depoliticizing' of economic relations is basic to class domination.

2 The definition of practices, programmes and policies that are in the 'general interest', as opposed to those that favour the sectional interests of groups or classes. The more the state becomes administratively unified, the greater the degree to which government must appeal to the 'general interest' (in some formulation or other) in order to sustain a basis for its rule. Again, there tend to be strong pressures promoting a class bias, since although it is not directly 'run' by entrepreneurial groups, in capitalist societies the state apparatus is materially dependent upon the prosperity of economic enterprises for its sources of revenue.

3 The articulation of 'historicity' in relation to planned or actual trends of social change.<sup>14</sup> The reflexive monitoring of all states involves the invention of 'history' in some sense or another — the documented interpretation of the past that provides an anchorage for anticipated developments in the future. But only in the modern West does 'history' become 'historicity' — the controlled use of reflection upon history as a means of changing history.

Ideological aspects of nationalism can effectively be analysed in terms of these three categories.<sup>15</sup> Nationalism is certainly not wholly ideology. But it does tend to be linked in definite ways to the administrative unification of the state.<sup>16</sup> Sovereignty, citizenship, nationalism — these tend to be connected phenomena for reasons it will be my aim to try to illuminate.

A useful classification of the main explanatory approaches to nationalism is that offered by Breuille.<sup>17</sup> One group of approaches consists of those associated with Marxism. Gellner has caustically labelled Marxist views of nationalism the Wrong Address Theory: 'Just as extreme Shi'ite Muslims hold that Archangel Gabriel made a mistake, delivering the Message to Mohamed when it was intended for Ali, so Marxists basically like to think that the spirit of history or human consciousness made a terrible boob. The awakening message was intended for *classes*, but by some terrible postal error was delivered to *nations*.'<sup>18</sup> It is manifestly the case that Marx paid little attention to the nature and impact of nationalism, and the comments he does make are mostly neither instructive nor profound.<sup>19</sup> Subsequent Marxists have been very much concerned with 'the national question', but it cannot be pretended that the literature thereby generated has done a great

deal to illuminate the nature or origins of nationalism. None of the various Marxist interpretations which seek to treat nationalism as some kind of masked expression of the interests of the dominant class has much plausibility either. The most illuminating account of nationalism produced in recent times<sup>20</sup> by an author affiliated with Marxism is probably that given by Nairn.<sup>21</sup> According to Nairn, nationalism has its source in the uneven development of regions within the world capitalist economy. Traditional Marxist views saw class struggle as 'the motor of historical change, nationality a mere epiphenomenon of it. Hence, it was literally inconceivable that the former should be eclipsed by the latter.' It is in the effects of the expansion of capitalism, not in its class system as such, that the roots of nationalism are to be found. 'As capitalism spread, and smashed the ancient social formations surrounding it, they always tended to fall apart along the fault-lines contained inside them. It is a matter of elementary truth that these lines were nearly always ones of nationality (although in certain well-known cases deeply established religious divisions could perform the same function).'<sup>22</sup>

But Nairn's view, where it is plausible at all, only seems relevant to forms of anti-colonial nationalism, not to the first development of nationalism in the European states. The main forms of nationalism in Europe did not for the most part come about in areas of marked economic deprivation. German nationalists in the mid-nineteenth century, for example, may have been concerned with Germany's 'backwardness' relative to the leading European states, but to regard this as the principal origin of German nationalism is quite unconvincing. In other cases, the development of nationalism was most marked in the strongest states, not the weaker or more ill-formed ones.<sup>23</sup> How far Nairn's arguments apply even to the emergence of nationalism in colonial or post-colonial regions must be doubted. There are obviously general relationships between capitalist development on a global scale and the formation of nationalist sentiments. But whether or not nationalism becomes significant in a given area, and its specific symbolic content, cannot readily be explicated in such a way.

A second approach, which is appealing because it does appear more directly to address these issues, is that associated with Deutsch and others.<sup>24</sup> Deutsch lays great emphasis upon the

development of internal communications within states as leading to the creation of a common sense of moral and political identity. In this view some of the factors I have identified as contributing to the heightening of the administrative power of states are regarded as directly responsible for the stimulating of nationalist sentiments. However, on closer scrutiny, the theory is unconvincing since there is neither any inevitable connection between the intensification of communication and the consolidation of states, nor does the theory explain why such consolidation should be intrinsically accompanied by nationalism. Gellner's position bears a definite similarity to that of Deutsch, but Gellner does seek to indicate why nationalism should be associated with the diffusion of communications. The economies of industrialized states depend upon a homogenizing of culture, mass literacy and 'a fairly monolithic education system'.<sup>25</sup> The exigencies of industrialism thus demand the diffusion of common modes of thought and belief throughout the whole population. Nationalism is precisely the attachment of such modes of thought and belief to the state which is the means of their co-ordination. How far this analysis is an advance beyond that of Deutsch, however, is open to question. As has been previously stressed, there is no intrinsic reason to be found in industrial production as to why an industrialized society should be a nation-state. Moreover, Gellner's analysis again does not seem satisfactorily to distinguish the nation-state from nationalism.

Finally, there are 'psychological' interpretations of nationalism.<sup>26</sup> Neither Deutsch nor Gellner has much to say about the content of nationalism, which is regarded as more or less irrelevant to its nature or to its appeal. But nationalist sentiments, in their first origins and in their subsequent guises in the twentieth century, do tend to involve some common symbols. Attachment to a homeland, associated with the creation and perpetuation of certain distinctive ideals and values, traceable to certain historically given features of 'national' experience — these are some of the recurrent traits of nationalism. Most psychological theories of nationalism associate these notions with the need of individuals to be involved in a collectivity with which they can identify. Since previous groupings that could fulfil this need, such as the local community or kinship group, have been largely dissolved, the symbols of nationalism provide a modern substitute.

Nationalism not only offers a basis of group identity, it does so in the context of showing this identity to be the result of distinct and precious achievements. While it may be a relatively new type of doctrine, nationalism appeals to a desire for an identity securely anchored in the past. This type of approach offers an analysis both of the first origins of nationalism and of its subsequent varieties. The disintegrative impact which is wrought upon pre-existing traditional cultures by modern economic and political development creates a search for renewed forms of group symbolism, of which nationalism is the most potent. Nationalism engenders a spirit of solidarity and collective commitment which is energetically mobilizing in circumstances of cultural decay.<sup>27</sup>

Although I shall argue that the psychological dimensions of nationalism are indeed important, the origins and character of the postulated need for identity remain too vague for this type of theory to be particularly satisfactory. It has little to say about why nationalism should be connected with states, or about how it might relate to asymmetries of power and therefore to ideology. Moreover, nationalist sentiments tend to surge and decline; they are not so much a part of regular day-to-day social life as those symbols connected with the smaller groups which it is claimed fulfil the same psychological needs.

I have mentioned these various interpretations of nationalism not simply to object to them, but to make the argument that an explication of the origins of nationalism should incorporate elements from each, placing these, however, in a different framework from them all. My intention is not to offer an analysis that necessarily holds good for all the variant forms which the phenomenon has assumed in the twentieth century, but to concentrate mainly upon nationalism in the European nation-state. An account of nationalism in such a context should illuminate the following characteristics:

- 1 its *political* character, that is, its association with the nation-state;
- 2 its relation to industrial capitalism, and more specifically *ideological characteristics* of nationalism involved with class domination;
- 3 its likely *psychological dynamics* since, as a range of sentiments and attitudes rather than an institutionalized set of practices,

it is difficult to resist the supposition that there are some distinctive psychological processes involved; and  
4 its particular *symbolic content*.

Let me work back through these, beginning with the question of the content of nationalism as a symbol system. Whatever their differences, nationalist ideals tend to tie a conception of the 'homeland' — a concept of territoriality, in other words — to a myth of origin, conferring cultural autonomy upon the community which is held to be the bearer of these ideals. 'The solidarity that a nationalist desires is based on the possession of the land: not any land, but the historic land; the land of past generations, the land that saw the flowering of the nation's genius.'<sup>28</sup> Looking to the legitimacy of past generations as supplying cultural autonomy is what Breuilly calls 'historicism', and this has more than a passing connection with the historicity of which I spoke earlier. Here again, we have a case where historians and philosophers, claiming for the most part to describe particular circumstances, have provided ideas that have helped to constitute those very circumstances. Herder's writings are in some respects not representative of those that informed versions of nationalism outside Central Europe but, in other ways, they provide an exemplary illustration of historicism as a source of nationalist thought. 'History' for Herder is more than just writing about the past, it is the means of grasping the cultural unity of a collectivity. Understanding a culture and its specific course of development involves apprehending it in its totality, distinct from other, divergent sets of cultural values. Language is of key importance in this, because it is necessarily the product of a community, pre-existing any particular generation of individuals and carrying within it the main dimensions that render the cultural system in question unique.

On first inspection, such ideas seem completely discrepant from the 'bourgeois ideals' of classical liberalism, which have a universal character. Indeed we might see here an opposition between (say) British utilitarian thought and German Romanticism. But a closer appraisal, in the context of the involvement of such views with nationalist symbolism, indicates a powerful, if attenuated, relation between them, mediated by sovereignty and citizenship, as portrayed diagrammatically in figure 4.




Figure 4

If we are to make sense of this relation, and the impact that ideas associated with it have had upon the world, we have to see it as a three-way series of connections rather than a two-way one. Ideas such as those developed by Herder can be extended in two directions. One regards the cultural accomplishments of a given state as so distinct and priceless that they are elevated to an intrinsic superiority over others. A 'historical mission' is constructed which, in certain circumstances, may offer a vehicle for the most virulent forms of aggressive nationalism. But to regard this baneful course as the only one that can be cultivated on the basis of 'cultural historicism' is certainly mistaken.<sup>29</sup> For such ideas can be used, as Herder intended them to be, to effect a union between cultural diversity and concepts of political organization of a universal character. Linguistically mediated cultural values are the carriers of divergent processes of history. But to be a member of the community which is the repository of those values can be construed in an egalitarian way, since all are legatees of the same collective experience. Moreover, while the distinctiveness of other communities might be acknowledged, these can be accorded equal status in what is seen to be an inherent cultural diversity of humankind. There are a series of possible ties and tensions between nationalism, sovereignty and citizenship, depending upon the direction in which these ideas are channelled. Where nationalism is canalized primarily towards sovereignty — particularly in circumstances where there are several contenders for statehood, or where an existing state is strongly embattled — nationalist sentiments may take an exclusivist turn, emphasizing the superiority of one 'nation' over its contenders. Here citizenship rights are likely to be poorly developed or constricted — especially

civil and political rights. Where citizenship rights are more substantially founded or actualized, they tend to influence the connections between sovereignty and nationalism in an opposite direction, stimulating more polyarchic forms of nationalist sentiment.

This is one dimension of what so many students of nationalism have pointed to — its Janus-faced character, as generating both virulent forms of national aggressiveness, on the one hand, and democratic ideals of enlightenment, on the other. But there is a psychological aspect to this too.<sup>30</sup> Nationalist sentiments, I have pointed out, tend to be fairly remote from most of the activities of day-to-day social life, except in fairly unusual and often relatively transitory conditions. This is one phenomenon which a psychological interpretation of nationalism must account for. Another, rarely mentioned in the literature but a rather pervasive feature of nationalism, is its association with leader-figures. While nationalist feelings are no doubt often experienced and expressed in a diffuse way, in circumstances in which they are strongly espoused there normally seems to be a leader who in some way acts as a focal point for their expression. An account of the routinization of social activity in the time-space settings of the created environment can help us elucidate the nature of these phenomena. In the contexts of the modern state, the routinized character of most day-to-day life is not grounded in the moral schemes of tradition. In such circumstances ontological security is tenuously founded psychologically, depending upon the enactment of 'morally meaningless' routines, protected by the sequestration of events and experiences which might otherwise threaten it. Where 'moral meaning' has retreated to the margins of the private and the public, the communality supplied by national symbols (including in particular a common language, as perhaps the most potent carrier of communal experience) supplies one means of support for ontological security, particularly where there is a perceived threat from outside the state.

In circumstances where the ontological security of individuals is put in jeopardy by the disruption of routines, or by a generalized source of anxiety, regressive forms of object-identification tend to occur. Individuals are likely to be swayed by the influence of leader-figures, identification with whom is based on a relatively strong affective dependence. The regressive affiliation with leaders, and with the symbols linked to their leadership, if the

Le Bon/Freud theory of leadership is correct, is based on the heightened suggestibility produced by situations that generate high levels of anxiety. Mass support may, therefore, be generated for policies and causes about which, in other circumstances, individuals may either be fairly indifferent or sceptical. Such support is likely to be volatile in more than one sense. Its durability will tend to be limited and it may move between stances which seem to be quite discrepant from one another. All nationalist leaders advocate populist doctrines in one sense or another, but in some instances identification may be made with a figure exemplifying the more 'democratic' forms of nationalism, while in others it will be with the more aggressively 'exclusivist' types. Here, therefore, we can see a psychological basis for the Janus-faced character of nationalism.

It follows from what has been said so far that nationalism can neither be interpreted as some sort of aberration produced by Western intellectuals, as in Kedourie's view, nor simply as an ideology promoted by dominant classes, as in traditional versions of Marxism. Nationalism is anchored psychologically in distinctive features of modern societies and its content is linked to the historicity they engender. Nonetheless, nationalist sentiments and symbols are not ideologically neutral and, at this point, it is relevant to relate the earlier discussion of ideology both to nationalism itself and to the question of why nationalism has an inherently political dimension. These problems seem fairly easy to illuminate in the light of what has been argued earlier in this chapter. Nationalism is the cultural sensibility of sovereignty, the concomitant of the co-ordination of administrative power within the bounded nation-state. With the coming of the nation-state, states have an administrative and territorially ordered unity which they did not possess before. This unity cannot remain *purely* administrative however, because the very co-ordination of activities involved presumes elements of cultural homogeneity.<sup>31</sup> The extension of communication cannot occur without the 'conceptual' involvement of the whole community as a knowledgeable citizenry. A nation-state is a 'conceptual community' in a way in which traditional states were not.<sup>32</sup> The sharing of a common language, and a common symbolic historicity, are the most thorough-going ways of achieving this (and are seen to be so by those leaders who have learned from the experience of the first 'nations'). But only in those instances where political



boundaries fairly closely coincide with existing language-communities is the convergence between the nation-state and nationalism a relatively frictionless one. In all other cases — by far the majority in the modern world — the advent of the nation-state stimulates divergent and oppositional nationalisms as much as it fosters the coincidence of nationalist sentiments and existing state boundaries.

The origins of oppositional nationalism are certainly strongly influenced by the spread of industrial capitalism, in the European context and world-wide. Uneven development takes a regionalized form, in which peripheral areas both within states and within the nation-state system are systematically disadvantaged. But nationalist movements are not just one type of oppositional movement among others, protesting in some sort of way directly against the deprivations of capitalism. They mark the injection of historicity into areas where the pre-existing hold of traditional modes of behaviour has been eroded, associating such historicity with the claim to administrative sovereignty. It is because nationalism is inherently linked to the achievement of administrative autonomy of the modern form that all nationalist movements are necessarily political, no matter how much they may be infused with symbolism of other sorts.

Now of course nationalist symbols can be, and very frequently have been, deliberately fostered or manipulated by dominant groups to support their sectional interests. There is no great difficulty in understanding the ideological value nationalist beliefs and values may have in these terms. Nationalism is a form of sentiment that can be utilized to mobilize the support of the overall national community for policies that have quite discrepant consequences for different sections or classes within that community. But this is in some ways the least interesting and significant of the ideological ramifications of nationalism. More deeply layered ideological implications are to be traced to the fact that the conditions involved in the reflexive monitoring of the modern state, as a surveillance apparatus, are the same as those that help generate nationalism. Since the discursive capabilities involved in monitoring social reproduction become of essential importance to the state, it is around the intersection between discursive consciousness and 'lived experience' that the ideological consequences of nationalism will cluster. As the 'moral

component' of sovereignty, nationalist symbols provide a core of political discourse that significantly shapes both the rhetoric of national solidarity and of opposition. Nationalism helps naturalize the recency and the contingency of the nation-state through providing its myths of origin. But, at the same time, the discourse of national solidarity helps block off other possible discursive articulations of interest. The discursive arena of the modern polity treats what 'politics' is as inherently to do with the bounded sphere of the state. Thus if programmes of reform on the part of subordinate classes (or other groupings) are to succeed, they have normally to be made to appear in 'the national interest'. But dominant classes have much less difficulty representing their own policies as in 'the national interest' than do oppositional groups, since they have much more influence over the style and form of what can be discursively articulated.