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Action Systems and Social Systems

We consider social systems[1] to be constituents of the more general system of action, the other primary constituents being cultural systems, personality systems, and behaviorial organisms; all four are abstractly defined relative to the concrete behavior of social interaction. We treat the three subsystems of actions other than the social system as constituents of its environment. This usage is somewhat unfamiliar, especially for the case of the personalities of individuals. It is justified fully elsewhere, but to understand what follows it is essential to keep in mind that neither social nor personality systems are here conceived as concrete entities.

The distinctions among the four subsystems of action are functional. We draw them in terms of the four primary functions which we impute to

[1] See Chapter 2 of *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and our articles "Social Systems and Subsystems" and "Interaction" in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968); and the introductory materials in T. Parsons, E. Shils, K. Naegele, and J. Pitts (eds.), *Theories of Society* (New York: Free Press, 1961).

all systems of action, namely pattern-maintenance, integration, goal-attainment, and adaptation.[2]

An action system's primary integrative problem is the coordination of its constituent units, in the first instance human individuals, though for certain purposes collectivities may be treated as actors. Hence, we attribute primacy of integrative function to the social system.

We attribute primacy of pattern-maintenance—and of creative pattern change—to the cultural system. Whereas social systems are organized with primary reference to the articulation of social relationships, cultural systems are organized around the characteristics of complexes of symbolic meaning—the codes in terms of which they are structured, the particular clusters of symbols they employ, and the conditions of their utilization, maintenance, and change as parts of action systems.

We attribute primacy of goal-attainment to the personality of the individual. The personality system is the primary *agency* of action processes, hence of the implementation of cultural principles and requirements. On the level of reward in the motivational sense, the optimization of gratification or satifaction to personalities is the primary goal of action.

The behavioral organism is conceived as the adaptive subsystem, the locus of the primary human facilities which underlie the other systems. It embodies a set of conditions to which action must adapt and comprises the primary mechanism of interrelation with the physical environment, especially through the input and processing of information in the central nervous system and through motor activity in coping with exigencies of the physical environment. These relationships are presented systematically in Table 1.

There are two systems of reality which are environmental to action in general and not constituents of action in our analytical sense. The first is the *physical environment*, including not only phenomena as understandable in terms of physics and chemistry, but also the world of living organisms so far as they are not integrated into action systems. The second, which we conceive to be independent of the physical environment as well as of action systems as such, we will call "*ultimate reality*," in a sense derived from traditions of philosophy. It concerns what Weber[3] called "problem of meaning" for human action and is mediated into action primarily by the cultural system's structuring of meaningful orientations that include, but are not exhausted by, cognitive "answers."[4]

In analyzing the interrelations among the four subsystems of action—

[2] The four-function theory is presented in our introductory essay, "An Outline of the Social System," in *Theories of Society*, pp. 30–79, and more briefly in Societies, p. 28.

[3] Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963).

[4] Cf. Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System" in Michael Banton (ed.), *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion* (New York: Praeger, 1966).

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Table 1 Action

Subsystems	*Primary Functions*
Social	Integration
Cultural	Pattern Maintenance
Personality	Goal Attainment
Behavioral Organism	Adaptation

* The shaded area represents the social subsystem's environment.

This table presents the barest schematic outline of the primary subsystems and their functional references for the *General System of Action*, of which the social system is one of four primary subsystems, that concentrated about integrative function. A somewhat more elaborate schema is presented in Table 1, p. 26 of *Societies*; and a general rationale of this schema has been presented in Parsons, "Some Problems of General Theory in Sociology" in John C. McKinney and Edward Tyriakian (eds.), *Theoretical Sociology* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970).

and between these systems and the environments of action—it is essential to keep in mind the phenomenon of *interpenetration*. Perhaps the best-known case of interpenetration is the *internalization* of social objects and cultural norms into the personality of the individual. Learned content of experience, organized and stored in the memory apparatus of the organism, is another example, as is the *institutionalization* of normative components of cultural systems as constitutive structures of social systems. We hold that the boundary between any pair of action systems involves a "zone" of structured components or patterns which must be treated theoretically as *common* to *both* systems, not simply allocated to one system or the other. For example, it is untenable to say that norms of conduct derived from social experience, which both Freud (in the concept of the Superego) and Durkheim (in the concept of collective representations) treated as parts of the personality of the individual, must be *either* that *or* part of the social system.[5]

It is by virtue of the zones of interpenetration that procsses of interchange among systems can take place. This is especially true at the levels of symbolic meaning and generalized motivation. In order to "communicate" symbolically, individuals must have culturally organized common codes, such as those of language, which are also integrated into systems of their social interaction. In order to make information stored in the central nervous system utilizable for the personality, the behavioral organism must have mobilization and retrieval mechanisms which, through interpenetration, subserve motives organized at the personality level.

[5] Talcott Parsons, "The Superego and the Theory of Social Systems" in *Social Structure and Personality* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

Thus, we conceived social systems to be "open," engaged in continual interchange of inputs and outputs with their environments. Moreover, we conceive them to be internally differentiated into various orders of subcomponents which are also continually involved in processes of interchange.

Social systems are those constituted by states and processes of social interaction among acting units. If the properties of interaction were derivable from properties of the acting units, social systems would be epiphenomenal, as much "individualistic" social theory has contended. Our position is sharply in disagreement: it derives particularly from Durkheim's statement that society—and other social systems—is a "reality *sui generis*."

The structure of social systems may be analyzed in terms of four types of independently variable components: values, norms, collectivities, and roles.[6] Values take primacy in the pattern-maintenance functioning of social systems, for they are conceptions of desirable types of social systems that regulate the making of commitments by social units. Norms, which function primarily to integrate social systems, are specific to particular social functions and types of social situations. They include not only value components specified to appropriate levels in the structure of a social system, but also specific modes of orientation for acting under the functional and situational conditions of particular collectivities and roles. Collectivities are the type of structural component that have goal-attainment primacy. Putting aside the many instances of highly fluid group systems, such as crowds, we speak of a collectivity only where two specific criteria are fulfilled. First, there must be definite statuses of membership so that a useful distinction between members and nonmembers can generally be drawn, a criterion fulfilled by cases that vary from nuclear families to political communities. Second, there must be some differentiation among members in relation to their statuses and functions within the collectivity, so that some categories of members are expected to do certain things which are not expected of other members. A role, the type of structural component that has primacy in the adaptive function, we conceive as defining a class of individuals who, through reciprocal expectations, are involved in a particular collectivity. Hence, roles comprise the primary zones of interpenetration between the social system and the personality of the individual. A role is never idiosyncratic to a particular individual, however. A father is specific to his children in his fatherhood,

[6] See Talcott Parsons, "General Theory in Sociology" in R. K. Merton, L. Broom, and L. S. Cottrell, Jr. (eds.), *Sociology Today* (New York: Basic Books, 1959, and Harper, 1965).

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but he is a father in terms of the role-structure of his society. At the same time, he also participates in various other contexts of interaction, filling, for example, an occupational role.

The reality *sui generis* of social systems may involve the independent variability of each of these types of structural components relative to the others. A generalized value-pattern does not legitimize the same norms, collectivities, or roles under all conditions, for example. Similarly, many norms regulate the action of indefinite numbers of collectivities and roles, but only specific sectors of their action. Hence a collectivity generally functions under the control of a large number of particular norms. It always involves a plurality of roles, although almost any major category of role is performed in a plurality of particular collectivities. Nevertheless, social systems are comprised of *combinations* of these structural components. To be institutionalized in a stable fashion, collectivities and roles must be "governed" by specific values and norms, whereas values and norms are themselves institutionalized only insofar as they are "implemented" by particular collectivities and roles.

The Concept of Society

We define society as the type of social system characterized by the highest level of self-sufficiency relative to its environments, including other social systems.[7] Total self-sufficiency, however, would be incompatible with the status of society as a subsystem of action. Any society depends for its continuation as a system on the inputs it receives through interchanges with its environing systems. Self-sufficiency in relation to environments, then, means stability of interchange relationships and capacity to control interchanges in the interest of societal functioning. Such control may vary from capacity to forestall or "cope with" disturbances to capacity to shape environmental relations favorably.

The physical environment has an adaptive significance for a society in that it is the direct source of the physical resources which the society can exploit through its technological and economic mechanisms of production. The allocation of access to physical resources, in order to be linked with the division of labor through the ecological aspect of society, requires a territorial distribution of residential locations and economic interests among the various subgroupings of the population. The physical environment has a second significance for societies in that, because of the importance of physical force as a preventive of undesired action, effective societal goal attainment requires control of actions within a territorial area. Hence, there are two contexts of societal self-sufficiency that concern, respectively, economic and political functioning in relation to the physical environment, through technology and through the organized use of force in the military and police functions.

[7] See *Societies*, Chapter 2.

A third context of societal self-sufficiency concerns the personalities of individual members in a special mode of interpenetration with the organisms involved. The organism links directly to the territorial complex through the importance of the physical location of actions. But its main link with the social system involves the personality; this primary zone of interpenetration concerns the status of *membership*. A society can be self-sufficient only in so far as it is generally able to "count on" its members' performances to "contribute" adequately to societal functioning. No more than in the other interchanges involved in self-sufficiency, need this integration between personality and society be absolute. Yet one could not speak of a society as self-sufficient if the overwhelming majority of its members were radically "alienated."

The integration of members into a society involves the zone of interpenetration between the social and personality systems. The relation is basically tripartite, however, because parts of the cultural system as well as parts of the social structure are internalized in personalities, and because parts of the cultural system are institutionalized in the society.

At the social level, the institutionalized patterns of *value* are "collective representations"[8] that define the *desirable types* of social system. These representations are correlative with the conceptions of types of social systems by which individuals orient themselves in their capacities as members. It is the members' consensus on value orientation with respect to their own society, then, that defines the institutionalization of value patterns. Consensus in this respect is certainly a matter of degree. Hence self-sufficiency in this context concerns the degree to which the institutions of a society have been *legitimized* by the consensual value commitments of its members.[9]

At the cultural level, social values comprise only part of a wider system of value, since all other classes of objects in the action system must be evaluated too. Values are related to such other components of a cultural system as empirical knowledge, expressive symbol systems, and the constitutive symbolic structures that compose the core of religious systems.[10] Ultimately, values are mainly legitimized in religious terms.

[8] "Collective Representations" is a concept introduced by Durkheim to designate the cultural basis of social organization. He used it especially in his analysis of religion. We shall treat values, in Weber's sense, as special forms of collective representatives. See Talcott Parsons, *Structure of Social Action* (New York: Free Press, 1968), Chapter 11.

[9] Cf. "An Outline of the Social System," in *Theories of Society*.

[10] See Talcott Parsons, "Introduction" to the section "Culture and the Social System" in *Theories of Society*.

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In the context of cultural legitimation, then, a society is self-sufficient to the extent that its institutions are legitimized by values that its members hold with relative consensus *and* that are in turn legitimized by their congruence with other components of the cultural system, especially its constitutive symbolism.

It is essential to remember that cultural systems do not correspond exactly with social systems, including societies. The more important cultural systems generally become institutionalized, in varying patterns, in a number of societies, though there are also subcultures within societies. For example, the cultural system centering on Western Christianity has, with certain qualifications and many variations, been common to the whole European system of modernized societies. Two modes of the relation of one society to other societies are discussed in the present book. First, all societies we speak of as "politically organized" are involved with various other societies in "international relations" of various types, friendly or hostile. We shall extend this conception and regard these relations as themselves constituting a social system which can be analyzed with the same general concepts as other types of social system. Second, a social system may be involved with the social structure and/or the members and/or the culture of two or more societies. Such social systems are numerous and of many different kinds. American immigrant families often retain effective kinship relations with people in the "old country," so that their kinship systems have both American and foreign "branches." Something similar can be said of many business firms, professional associations, and religious collectivities. Although the Roman Catholic Church, for example, is a social system, it clearly is not a society since its self-sufficiency is very low by our criteria. Its control of economic resources through the organization of production is minimal; it lacks autonomous political control of territorial areas; in many societies, its members constitute a minority. Thus we must take account of both social systems which are "supersocietal" in being comprised of a plurality of societies and social systems that are "cross-societal" in that their members belong to a plurality of different societies.

The Subsystems of Society

In accord with our four-function scheme for analyzing systems of action, we treat a society as analytically divisible into four *primary* subsystems (as shown in Table 2). Thus, the pattern-maintenance subsystem is particularly concerned with the relations of the society to the cultural system and, through it, ultimate reality; the goal-attainment subsystem or the polity, to the personalities of individual members; the adaptive subsystem, or the economy, to the behavioral organism and, through it, the physical world. These divisions are clearest and most

Table 2 Society (more generally, social system)

Subsystems	*Structural Components*	*Aspects of Developmental Process*	*Primary Function*
Societal Community	Norms	Inclusion	Integration
Pattern Maintenance or Fiduciary	Values	Value Generalization	Pattern Maintenance
Polity	Collectivities	Differentiation	Goal Attainment
Economy	Roles	Adaptive Upgrading	Adaptation

This table attempts to spell out, a little more elaborately, a four-function paradigm for the *society*, or other type of social system, conceived as an integrative subsystem of a general system of action. The societal community, which is the primary subsystem of reference for the present analysis, is placed in the left hand column; the other three follow it. Corresponding to this set is a classification in the second column, by the same functional criteria, of four main structural components of social systems. In the third column follows a corresponding classification of aspects of process of developmental change in social systems which will be used extensively in the analysis that follows. Finally, the fourth column repeats the designation of four primary functional categories.

Except for the developmental paradigm, this schema was first fully presented in the author's "General Introduction, Part II: An Outline of the Social System" in *Theories of Society*. For general comparison with Tables 1 and 2, please consult *Societies*, Tables 1 and 2, pp. 28 and 29, and the accompanying explanatory note.

important for societies advanced on the scale of modernity. However, the complexity of the relationships, both among subsystems of action and among subsystems of society, prevent these divisions from ever being very neat. For example, kinship structures must be located in all three of the above-mentioned subsystems. Through their relation to food, sex, biological descent, and residence, they are involved with the organism and the physical environment. As the individual's primary source of early learning of values, norms, and modes of communication, they are very much involved with the pattern-maintenance system. As the primary source of socialized services, they are involved with the polity.

Within this framework, the core of a society as a social system is the fourth component, its integrative subsystem. Because we treat the social system as integrative for action systems generally, we must pay special attention to the ways in which it achieves—or fails to achieve—various kinds and levels of internal integration. We will call the integrative subsystem of a society the *societal community*.

Perhaps the most general function of a societal community is to articulate a *system* of norms with a collective organization that has unity and cohesiveness. Following Weber, we call the normative aspect the system of legitimate order; [11] the collective aspect is the societal community

[11] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947).

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as a single, bounded collectivity. Societal order requires clear and definite integration in the sense, on the one hand, of normative coherence and, on the other hand, of societal "harmony" and "coordination." Moreover, normatively-defined obligations must on the whole be accepted while conversely, collectivities must have normative sanction in performing their functions and promoting their legitimate interests. Thus, normative order at the societal level contains a "solution" to the problem posed by Hobbes —of preventing human relations from degenerating into a "war of all against all."

It is important not to treat a structure of societal norms as a monolithic entity. Hence we distinguish four components analytically, even though they overlap greatly in specific content. Our distinctions concern the grounds of obligations and rights as well as the nature of sanctioning noncompliance and rewarding compliance or unusual levels of performance.

The Core: The Societal Community

Our core category, the societal community, is relatively unfamiliar—probably because it is generally discussed in religious and political rather than social terms. In our view the primary function of this integrative subsystem is to define the obligations of *loyalty* to the societal collectivity, both for the membership as a whole and for various categories of differentiated status and role within the society. Thus in most modern societies willingness to perform military service is a test of loyalty for men, but not for women. Loyalty is a readiness to respond to properly "justified" appeals in the name of the collective or "public" interest or need. The normative problem is the definition of occasions when such a response constitutes an obligation. In principle loyalty is required in any collectivity, but it has a special importance for the societal community. Organs of government are generally the agents of appeals to societal loyalty as well as agents of implementation of the associated norms. However, there are many instances in which government and justified community agency do not directly coincide.

Particularly important are the relations between subgroups' and individual's loyalties to the societal collectivity and to other collectivities of which they are members. *Role-pluralism*, the involvment of the same persons in several collectivities, is a fundamental feature of all human societies. On the whole, an increase in role-pluralism is a major feature of the differentiation processes leading toward modern types of society. Therefore, the regulation of the loyalties, to the community itself and to various other collectivities, is a major problem of integration for a societal community.

Individualistic social theory has persistently exaggerated the significance of individual "self-interest" in a psychological sense as an obstacle to the integration of social systems. The self-interested motives of individuals are, on the whole, effectively channeled into the social system through a variety of memberships and loyalties to collectivities. The most immediate problem for most individuals is the adjustment of obligations among the competing loyalties in cases of conflict. For example, the normal adult male in modern societies is both an employee and a member of a family household. Although the demands of these two roles often conflict, most men have a heavy stake in fulfilling loyalties to *both*.

A societal community is a complex network of interpenetrating collectivities and collective loyalties, a system characterized by both functional differentiation and segmentation. Thus kinship-household units, business firms, churches, governmental units, educational collectivities, and the like are differentiated from each other. Moreover, there are a number of each type of collective unit—for example, a very large number of households, each comprised of only a few persons, and many local communities.

Loyalty to the societal community must occupy a high position in any stable hierarchy of loyalties and as such, is a primary focus of societal concern. However it does not occupy the highest place in the hierarchy. We have stressed the importance of cultural legitimation of a society's normative order because it occupies a superordinate position. It operates in the first instance through the institutionalization of a value-system, which is part of both the societal and the cultural systems. Then its subvalues, which are specifications of general value patterns, become parts of every concrete norm that is integrated into the legitimate order. The system of norms governing loyalties, then, must integrate the rights and obligations of various collectivities and their members not only with each other, but also with the bases of legitimation of the order as a whole.[12]

In its hierarchial aspect, the normative ordering of the societal community in terms of memberships comprises its *stratification* scale, the scale of the accepted—and, so far as values and norms are integrated, legitimized—*prestige* of subcollectivities, statuses, and roles and of persons as societal members. It must be coordinated both with universal norms governing the status of membership and with the elements of differentiation among the functions of subcollectivities, statuses, and roles, which do not as such imply a hierarchy. The concrete stratification system, then, is a complex function of all these components.

Role-pluralism renders the problem of the status of individuals in a stratification system especially complex. Stratification mechanisms have generally treated individuals as diffusely integrated in large collective systems, membership in which defines their status. Lineages, ethnic groups, "estates," and social classes have operated in this way. However

[12] On these matters, see Robert N. Bellah, "Epilogue," in *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia* (New York: Free Press, 1965).

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modern society requires a differentiation of individual statuses from diffuse background solidarities, giving modern systems of stratification a distinctive character.[13]

The position of a subcollectivity or individual in the stratification system is measured by the level of its or his *prestige* or capacity to exercise *influence.* Influence we conceive to be a generalized symbolic medium of societal interchange, in the same general class as money and power. It consists in capacity to bring about desired decisions on the part of other social units without directly offering them a valued *quid pro quo* as an inducement or threatening them with deleterious consequences. Influence must operate through persuasion, however, in that its object must be convinced that to decide as the influencer suggests is to act in the interest of a collective system with which both are solidary. Its primary appeal is to the collective interest, but generally on the assumption that the parties involved have particular interests in promoting the collective interest and their mutual solidarity. Typical uses of influence are persuasion to enter into a contractual relation "in good faith" or to vote for a specific political candidate. Influence may be exchanged for *ad hoc* benefits or for other forms of influence, in a sense parallel to that in which monetary resources may either be used to obtain goods or pooled or exchanged. Influence may also be exchanged for other generalized media such as money or power.[14]

Societal Community and Pattern-Maintenance

The bases of cultural legitimation transcend direct contingencies of influence, interests, and solidarity, being grounded at the societal level in *value commitments.* By contrast with loyalty to collectivities, the hallmark of a value-commitment is greater independence from considerations of cost, relative advantage or disadvantage, and social or environmental exigency in the meeting of obligations. The violation of a commitment is defined as illegitimate: its fulfillment is a matter of honor or conscience which may not be comprised without dishonor and/or guilt.

Although this may sound very restrictive, as indeed such commitments often are, the degree and kind of restrictiveness involved depends on a variety of factors. Commitment to values in general implies the assumption of an obligation to help implement them in concrete action. Especially where the value system is "activistic," as it generally is in modern societies, this implies realistic acceptance of certain conditions of collective action.

[13] Talcott Parsons, "Equality and Inequality in Modern Society, or Social Stratification Revisited," *Sociological Inquiry*, 40/2 (Spring 1970).

[14] Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence," *Politics and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1969).

Thus, value *systems* contain a category of commitments to "valued association," solidarity in legitimate collective relationships and enterprises. What associations are valued is a matter that varies widely among societies. It is almost impossible to ensure the legitimacy of association by restricting legitimation to quite specifically defined acts, however, because actors need scope for considerable discretion if they are to implement their values under varying circumstances. One major factor in setting the breadth of this scope is the level of generality of the legitimating values. For example, an injunction not to exploit others in economic transactions is very different from a specific prohibition of lending money at interest. The *generalization* of value systems, so that they can effectively regulate social action without relying upon particularistic prohibitions, has been a central factor in the modernization process.

At the cultural level, the relevant aspect of values is what we ordinarily call moral. It concerns the evaluation of the objects of experience in the context of social relationships. A moral act implements a cultural value in a social situation involving interaction with other actors. As a matter of interaction, it must involve standards which bind the interactors reciprocally.

Moral values comprise only one component of the value-content of a cultural system, others being, for example, aesthetic, cognitive, or specifically religious values. Cultures also become differentiated on bases other than the moral, so that religion, art as expressive symbolization, empirical knowledge (eventually science), also become independent, differentiated cultural systems. A highly differentiated cultural system along with complex modes of articulation, is a hallmark of modern societies.[15]

Societal Community and the Polity

In addition to the aspects of a societal normative order centering about membership and loyalty and about cultural legitimation, we must consider a third. Influence and value-commitments operate voluntarily, through persuasion and appeal to honor or conscience. However, no large and complex social system can endure unless compliance with large parts of its normative order is *binding*, that is negative situational sanctions attach to noncompliance. Such sanctions both deter noncompliance—in part by "reminding" the good citizen of his obligations—and punish infraction if, as, and when it occurs. The socially organized and regulated exercise of negative sanctions, including threats of using them when intentions of noncompliance are suspected, we call the function of *enforcement.* The more highly differentiated a society, the more likely en-

[15] Talcott Parsons, "Introduction" to "Culture and the Social System" in *Theories of Society.*

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forcement is to be performed by specialized agencies such as police forces and military establishments.[16]

Regulated enforcement requires some mode of determining the actual fact, agency, and circumstances of the infraction of norms. Among the specialized agencies that operate in this connection are courts of law and the legal profession. A complex normative order requires not only enforcement, however, but also authoritative interpretation. Court systems have very generally come to combine the determination of obligations, penalties, and the like for specific cases with interpretation of the meaning of norms, often a very general problem.[17] Less developed societies tend to reserve the latter function to religious agencies, but modern societies entrust it increasingly to secular courts.

These problems raise questions about the relation between a societal community and the polity. In our analytical terms, the concept *political* includes not only the primary functions of government, in its relation to a societal community, but also corresponding aspects of any collectivity.[18] We treat a phenomenon as political in so far as it involves the organization and mobilization of resources for the attainment of the goals of a particular collectivity. Thus business firms, universities, and churches have political aspects. In the development of modern societies, however, government has increasingly become differentiated from the societal community as a specialized organ of the society that is at the core of the polity.

As it has become differentiated, government has tended to center on two primary sets of functions. The first concerns responsibility for maintaining the integrity of the societal community against generalized threats, with special but not exclusive reference to its legitimate normative order. This includes the function of enforcement and a share in the function of interpretation, at least. Moreover, the general process of governmental differentiation creates spheres within which it becomes admissible explicitly to formulate and promulgate new norms, making legislation part of this function also. The second primary function, the executive, concerns collective action in whatever situations indicate that relatively specific measures should be undertaken in the "public" interest. This responsibility ranges from certain inherently essential matters, such as defense of territorial control and maintenance of public order, to almost any issue deemed to be "affected with a public interest."[19]

[16] Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process" in *Sociological Theory and Modern Society* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

[17] Extremely suggestive in this regard is Lon Fuller, *The Morality of Law* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

[18] Talcott Parsons, "The Political Aspect of Social Structure and Process" in David Easton (ed.), *Varieties of Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). (Reprinted in *Politics and Social Structure*.)

[19] *Ibid;* see also Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics; A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

The basic relations between government and the societal community may be ascribed. Even early modern societies defined the common people as simply "subjects" of a monarch, ascriptively obligated to obey his authority. Fully modern levels of differentiation, however, have tended to make the power of political leadership contingent on the support of very extensive proportions of the population. In so far as this is true, we shall distinguish roles of political leadership from positions of authority more generally.

Differentiation between leadership and authority necessitates special generalization of the medium we call power.[20] We define power as capacity to make—and "make stick"—decisions which are *binding* on the collectivity of reference and on its members in so far as their statuses carry obligations under the decisions. Power must be distinguished from influence for the promulgation of binding decisions differs importantly from attempts to persuade. By our definition, a citizen exercises power when he casts his vote because the aggregate of votes bindingly determines the electoral outcome. Only a little power still is power, just as one dollar, though only a little money, very definitely is money.

Societal Community and the Economy

A fourth component of the normative order concerns matters of practicality. Its most obvious fields of application are the economic and technological; its governing principle is the desirability of efficient management of resources. Even where issues of collective loyalty, binding obligations, and morality are not involved, the action of an individual or collectivity will be disapproved if it is unnecessarily wasteful or careless. In modern societies, the normative aspect of these considerations is especially clear in the regulation of the use of labor as a factor of production in the economic sense. Commitment to the labor force involves an obligation to work effectively within the legitimate conditions of employment.[21] As Weber noted, there is a crucial moral element in this obligation. But short of the moral emphasis, rational economic and technological action is very generally approved, while deviation from the relevant standards of rationality is disapproved.

The differentiation of autonomous structures necessitates the development of a generlized monetary medium in association with a market system. Money and markets operate where there is a sufficiently complex division of labor and where spheres of action are sufficiently differentiated from political, communal, or moral imperatives.[22] Of the generalized

[20] Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power," in *Politics and Social Structure.*

[21] Neil J. Smelser, *The Sociology of Economic Life* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

[22] *Ibid;* see also Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, *Economy and Society* (New York: Free Press, 1956).


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mechanisms of societal interchange, money and markets is the least directly involved with the normative order as it centers in the societal community. Hence, practical rationality is regulated mainly by institutional norms, above all the institutions of property and contract which have other bases of sanction.[23]

Methods of Integration in Increasingly Differentiated Societies

The Legal System

What we have been treating as the societal normative order comes very close to what is generally meant by the concept of law. Much discussion of the law stresses the criteria of bindingness and enforceability, associating law primarily with government and the state. Other lines of analysis stress the consensual elements in the normative validity of law, a theme which permits emphasis on the importance of its moral legitimation. We treat law as the general normative code regulating action of, and defining the situation for, the member units of a society.[24] It is comprised of the components just reviewed integrated into a single system.

Very generally, modern legal systems contain constitutional components, whether written as in the United States or unwritten as in Britain. In the zone of interpenetration between the pattern-maintenance system and the societal community, the constitutional element defines the main outline of the normative framework governing societal relationships in general—as in the American Bill of Rights. On modern levels of differentiation, such content is clearly not religious, since its normative validity is framed for the societal system, not the full range of action in general. Indeed, there has been a modern tendency to dissociate specific religious commitment from the constitutional rights and obligations of citizenship. Because religious affiliation generally involves the formation of collectivities, it must always be articulated in the societal community. However, the two need not be coextensive.

Neither is the constitutional element "purely moral," for moral considerations too extend over a wider range than do societal values. Constitutional norms articulate with the societal community and involve the component of societal loyalty in the form of valued association; law concerns the morality of citizenship, but not necessarily all morality. Furthermore, the moral element can provide the grounds for legitimized revolts against a societal normative order, varying from minor civil disobedience to revolution.

Although the constitutional element is presumptively enforceable, enforcement always raises a question of whether the organs of government are legitimately acting in a constitutional—and back of that a moral—sense. Hence, a second aspect of the constitutional element is the normative definition of the broad functions of government, including the extent and limitations on powers of the various governmental agencies. Constitutional law in this sense becomes increasingly important as the societal community comes to be differentiated from its government. The powers of government then need specific justification, for the societal community would not be adequately protected from arbitrary uses of power if it were to grant blanket legitimacy to its "rulers" to act upon their own interpretations of the public interest.[25]

It is crucial that "executive" authority comes to be differentiated from the governmental functions that have direct constitutional relevance. In premodern societies explicit legislation as a differentiated function is minimal, because the normative order is mainly *given* in a tradition or founding revelation. Hence, the legitimation of a continuing legislative function is a distinctively modern development. With a good many qualifying complications, it has tended to require that the legislative process should actively involve the societal community through a system of representation. The trend has been to make the power to legislate contingent upon the legislators' interaction with the interested elements of the community, ultimately the total electorate in most modern societies.[26] Indeed, a similar contingency generally applies to occupants of executive authority. The changeability of the law, which has resulted from these developments, has made it particularly important to have differentiated provision for concern with the "constitutionality" of law. Although the American system of judicial review is special in various respects, modern constitutions have very generally established some agency that is not purely governmental, especially in the executive sense, to pass judgment on constitutional issues.

It is under this broad constitutional framework that the lower order functioning of the legal system proceeds. It consists in the making of binding decisions, for the most part by officially "authorized" agencies (usually courts of law), and in various processes of their implementation by administrative procedures. It is particularly important that the extraconstitutional content of law is not confined to specific acts of legislation, nor

[23] The classic analysis of the significance of property and contract for social systems was developed by Emile Durkheim in *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1933).

[24] Cf. Fuller, *op. cit.*; also his *Anatomy of the Law* (New York: Praeger, 1968).

[25] On our usage of the concept of legitimation, compare Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*.

[26] Cf. Parsons, "The Political Aspect of Social Structure and Process" in *Varities of Political Theory*.

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to publicly binding decisions of executive agencies. It also includes elements of both the legal tradition generated in court decisions that stand as precedents, and the "administrative law" of generalized "rulings," rather than particular case decisions, promulgated by administrative agencies (but subject to legislative and judicial review).

Our whole discussion of normative order and its relation to the polity applies in principle to *any* social system, although the relation between government and the societal community is of principal importance. One source of this importance is that in general, only government is authorized to use socially organized physical force as an instrument of compulsion. Indeed an effective governmental monopoly of force is a major criterion of integration in a highly differentiated society.[27] Moreover, only government is entitled to act for the societal collectivity as a whole in contexts of collective goal-attainment. Any other agency that directly presumes to do so commits a revolutionary act *ipso facto*.

Membership in the Societal Community

In discussing the legitimate order of society, we have frequently refered to the collective aspect of the societal community. Our multiple criteria of a society indicate that the relation between these two primary aspects must be complex, especially in that the jurisdiction of the norms cannot neatly coincide with community membership. The most obvious discrepancy derives from the territorial basis of societies. Territorial jurisdiction requires that normative control is to some extent independent of actual membership in the societal community. For example, temporary visitors and long term "resident aliens," as well as the property holdings of "foreign" interests, must be regulated.

These considerations indicate that a particularly important part of the relation between the normative and the collective aspects of a societal community concerns their mutual relations to government. Government cannot simply "rule," but must be legitimized in governing a relatively bounded community by taking responsibility for the maintenance of its normative order. At one extreme, the principal content of the normative order may be considered more or less universal to all men. However, this raises acute problems of how far such highly universalistic norms can be effectively institutionalized in the actual operations of so extensive a community. At the other extreme, both government and the normative order may apply only to a particular small community. Within the broad range of variation between these extremes, modern societal communities have generally taken a form based upon nationalism. The development of this form has involved both a process of differentiation between societal community and government and reform in the nature of societal community, especially with respect to membership.

[27] Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*.

The immediate background for the development was, for the most part, a more or less "absolute" monarchy in which the individual was considered a "subject" of his king. It was important that this "direct" relation of subject to sovereign replaced the tangle of particularistic solidarities which characterized feudal society. However, the "subject" pattern of societal membership was in turn replaced by a citizenship pattern.

The first phase in the development of the citizenship complex was the creation of a legal or civic framework that fundamentally redefined the boundary-relations between the societal community and the government or "state." [28] A critical aspect of the new boundaries was the definition of "rights" of the citizen, the protection of which became an important obligation of government. In the early phase, the protection of rights probably went farthest in English Common Law of the 17th century. However, it was a pan-European development that also produced the German conception of the *Rechtsstaat*. The process was simplified in Protestant areas because the citizens had to deal with only one main focus, the political authority, which organizationally controlled the church as well as the state.[29] In England the first phases of religious toleration within Protestanism comprised an essential part of the broader process of establishing citizen rights.

The second main phase in the development of citizenship concerned participation in public affairs. Although the legal rights of the first phase did protect attempts to influence government, especially through rights of assembly and freedom of the press, the next phase institutionalized positive rights to participate in the selection of governmental leadership through the franchise. The spread of the franchise "downward" in the class structure has often been gradual, yet there has been a conspicuous common trend toward universal adult suffrage, the principle of one citizen, one vote, and secrecy of the ballot.[30]

A third main component of citizenship is "social" concern with the "welfare" of citizens, treated as a public responsibility.[31] Whereas legal rights and the franchise support capacities to act autonomously in the status of citizenship, the social component concerns the provision of realistic opportunities to make good use of such rights. Hence, it attempts

[28] Our entire discussion of citizenship is heavily in debt to T. H. Marshall's *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1965).

[29] Cf. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Introduction" to *Party Systems and Voter Alignment* (New York: Free Press, 1968).

[30] Stein Rokkan, "Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting, and Political Participation" in *European Journal of Sociology*, II (1961): 132–52.

[31] Marshall, *op. cit.*

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to ensure that adequate minimum standards of "living," health care, and education are available to the masses of the population. It is particularly notable that the spread of education to ever wider circles of the population, as well as an upgrading of the levels of education, has been closely connected with the development of the citizenship complex.

The development of modern institutions of citizenship has made possible broad changes in the pattern of nationality as a basis of the solidarity of the societal community. In early modern society, the strongest foundation of solidarity was found where the three factors of religion, ethnicity, and territoriality coincided with nationality. In fully modern societies however, there can be diversity on each basis, religious, ethnic, and territorial, because the common status of citizenship provides a sufficient foundation for national solidarity.

The institutions of citizenship and nationality can nevertheless render the societal community vulnerable if the bases of pluralism are exacerbated into sharply structured cleavages. Since the typical modern community unifies a large population over a large territory, for example, its solidarity may be severely strained by regional cleavages. This is particularly true where the regional cleavages coincide with ethnic and/or religious divisions. Many modern societies have disintegrated before varying combinations of these bases of cleavage.

Societal Community, Market Systems, and Bureaucratic Organization

Where societal solidarity is emancipated from the more primordial bases of religion, ethnicity, and territoriality, it tends to foster other types of internal differentiation and pluralization. The most important of these are based on economic, political, and associational (or integrative) functions. The economic category refers above all to the development of markets and the monetary instruments essential to these functions, which, we have noted, presuppose the institutionalization in new forms of contract and property relations. Thus, they rest on the "rights" component of citizenship, for an economy that is purely "administered" by agencies of central government would violate the freedoms of private groups to engage in market transactions autonomously. Once the market system of an economy is highly developed, however, it becomes very important to government as a channel for the mobilization of resources.

In the earlier phases of modernization, markets are primarily commercial, involving trade in physical commodities, and secondarily financial, involving operations of lending and borrowing. The large scale entrance of the primary factors of production into the market system is the principal hallmark of the "industrial" phase of economic development. In addition to the advances in technology, this centers on the social *organization* of the productive process, involving new forms of the utilization of manpower in bureaucratic contexts.[32]

In discussing the political aspect of societies above, we were rather selective. We dealt primarily with the relation of government to the total societal community, stressing the direct articulation between them in the "support" system. This system concerns primarily the interaction of leadership elements, both within and aspiring to governmental positions, and elements of the social structure that are not directly involved in the governmental system as such. The processes of interaction comprise both the interchange of political support and leadership initiative, and the interchange of governmental decisions and "demands" from various interest groups. These interchanges constitute a system requiring a certain equilibration if the polity is to be stably integrated with the societal community.

The other principal operative structure of government is the administrative organization, including military establishment, through which policy decisions are implemented. In general, bureaucratization developed primarily though not exclusively, in governments. Among its most important features is the institutionalization of roles as *offices* that have relatively well defined spheres of official function, authority, and "power" that are separated from the incumbent's private affairs. Offices are differentiated on two bases, function performed for the organization and position in the hierarchy or "line" authority.[33]

The development of bureaucratic organization in general necessitates that the relevant form of office be an *occupational* role, an incumbent being "appointed" through some kind of "contract of employment." Hence his family's subsistence generally depends on his salary or wage remuneration. In turn, this requires a "labor market" for the allocation of human services in terms of negotiations over employment opportunities and conditions.

A major feature of an industrial economy is the bureaucratic organization of production and, correspondingly, the mobilization of manpower through labor markets. By a complex progression through a number of phases, the economy has produced an immense proliferation of bureaucratic organization outside the governmental sphere. One principal stage was based upon the "family firm" of early industrial "capitalism," which was bureaucratized at the "labor" but not the managerial level.

We consider bureaucratic organization to be primarily political because it is oriented in the first instance to collective goal-attainment. In the case of the business firm the collectivity is a private group within the societal community; in the case of government it is the whole community

[32] Smelser, *op. cit.*

[33] Talcott Parsons, *Structures and Process in Modern Societies* (New York: Free Press, 1960), Chapters 1–5.

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organized for collective goal-attainment. Nevertheless we treat employment as a form of membership in a collectivity, leaving aside the problem of its relations to membership through other modes of participation in economic enterprise. Of course, private bureaucracy is not confined to economic production, but is found in churches, universities, and many other types of collectivity.

The market systems we have discussed are involved in interchange between the economy and the pattern-maintenance system, on the one hand, and the economy and the polity on the other. They do not directly involve the societal community since its functions vis-à-vis these subsystems are regulative through the general normative order more than directly constitutive. We must also emphasize the distinction between the "commercial" markets, dealing with physical commodities, and the "labor" markets, dealing with human services, including those at high levels of competence and responsibility. From a sociological point of view, we find confusing the economists' common practice of treating "goods and services" together as *the* primary output of the economy.

Associational Organization

A third main type of structuring that modern societal collectivities make possible is the "associational." Perhaps the prototype of an association is the societal collectivity itself, considered as a corporate body of citizens holding primarily consensual relations to its normative order and to the authority of its leadership. A major trend of modern associations has been toward a certain egalitarianism, manifested most clearly and importantly in the three aspects of citizenship which we have discussed.

A second trend of associational structure is toward voluntariness. Of course, this principle can never be applied strictly to compliance with a normative order or collective decisions, for an element of bindingness is essential to all collectivities. However, it often applies almost literally to decisions to accept and retain membership, an alternative to compliance always being resignation. The relationship between the societal community and government, however, is special. Other associations exist under a general governmental and societal protection, but the very basis of security itself rests on the fundamental combination. Hence, elements of compulsion and coercion are present in the enforcement of the societal normative order that are absent in other cases. The equivalent of "resignation," which is emigration, entails a far heavier cost than does the relinquishment of other associational memberships. In principle it also entails accepting another societal-governmental order, whereas in the case of divorce, one need not remarry.

A third major characteristic of associational organization, which very

definitely applies to the societal collectivity and to governmental agencies, is the importance of procedural institutions.[34] Although particularly significant in the legal system, they also permeate the processes of associational decision-making, both at the level of representative bodies and at that of membership participation. In general, procedural systems consist of two levels, each governed by a code of rules. The first regulates the discussions by which interested parties may attempt to persuade the participants in the making of binding decisions. It has many forms, but generally meetings are conducted according to rules of order which a presiding officer is responsible for implementing. Discussion within associations is a primary sphere of the operation of influence as a medium for facilitating social process. From the viewpoint of an interested party, discussion serves to improve the chances of having his view prevail; from the viewpoint of the collectivity, it facilitates an approach to consensus.

The second level concerns the actual process of deciding itself. In courts of law, the deciding agency is a jury, judge, or panel of judges. However, by far the most common practice—within juries and judicial panels as elsewhere—is voting, with its general tendencies toward the principles of one member: one vote and the equal weighting of votes, the logical consequence of which is majority rule. In any case, decision by voting must follow rules fixed in advance, including the expectation that decisions arrived at by correct observance of the procedural rules will be accepted by all defeated elements. In such cases as the election of governmental leadership this may be a focus of very severe strain; implementing this requirement is a paramount test of the institutionalization of "democratic" solidarity.

Concurrent with the development of associationalism in government, there has been a vast proliferation of associations in other sectors of society. Political parties articulate with governmental process, but also with many sorts of associated "interest groups," most of which represent a variety of operative collectivities. There are also associations organized about innumerable "causes," as well as interests of diverse sorts, for example, recreational, artistic, etc.

In two broad contexts, highly important operative functions of modern societies are performed almost entirely by associational structures. The first is the involvement of "fiduciary" boards in the larger-scale sectors of business enterprise and in many other types of "corporate" organizations. In relation to "executive management," they somewhat parallel the relation of the legislature to the executive organs of a modern government. Sometimes the members of such boards are in some sense elected, e.g. by stockholders, but often not. In any case, they have largely replaced the

[34] Compare Weber's concept of formal rationality in *Max Weber on Law and Society*, Max Rheinstein (ed.), (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

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kinship element as the "nonbureaucratic" top of the predominantly bureaucratic structures of business.[35] In the "private nonprofit" sector, too, ultimate control, especially in regard to financial responsibility, tends in some sense to be held by fiduciary boards.

The second very large associational development concerns the professions.[36] Though much professional function has traditionally been performed in the framework of individual "private practice," professionals have long tended to associate in order to advance their common interests, including the maintenance of professional standards of competence and integrity. Higher education has gained increasing prominence in this complex, not least in the training of practicing professionals. Hence, the profession of higher education, and of scholarly research, has also been acquiring greater relative importance. It is notable that the core structure of the academic profession, the faculty, is basically associational.

All three of the main types of operative organization (markets, bureaucracy and associational structures) have been growing increasingly prominent in the processes of differentiation and pluralization of modern societal communities.

Processes of Evolutionary Change

Although it has been the most prominent in the foregoing discussion, we consider differentiation to be one of *four* main processes of structural change which, interacting together, constitute "progressive" evolution to higher system levels. We call the other three processes adaptive upgrading, inclusion, and value generalization (in application to social systems).[37]

Differentiation is the division of a unit or structure in a social system into two or more units or structures that differ in their characteristics and functional significance for the system. We have already discussed a complex instance of differentiation: The emergence of both the modern family household and the modern employing organization from the more diffusely functioning peasant family household, which involved changes in many roles, collectivities, and norms. A process of differentiation results in a more evolved social system, however, only if each newly differentiated component has greater adaptive capacity than the component that previously performed its primary function.

[35] In *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* Weber emphasizes that all bureaucracies must be headed nonbureaucratically.

[36] Talcott Parsons, "Professions" in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.*

[37] This paradigm was originally presented in Talcott Parsons, "Some Considerations on the Theory of Social Change" in *Rural Sociology*, 26 (Sept. 1961): 219–39. It is also discussed in somewhat more detail with some revisions in *Societies*, Chapter 2.

Adaptive upgrading is the process by which a wider range of resources is made available to social units, so that their functioning can be freed from some of the restrictions on its predecessors. Modern factories, require much more generalized commitments to render service from those who engage in production than did peasant households, but can produce a greater variety of goods much more economically.

The enhanced complexity of a system undergoing differentiation and upgrading necessarily raises problems of integration. In general, these problems can be met only by the *inclusion* of the new units, structures, and mechanisms within the normative framework of the societal community. For example, when employing organizations become differentiated from the family household, the authority systems of both types of collectivity must gain articulation within the society's structure of norms.

Finally, the foregoing processes must be complemented by *value generalization* if the various units in the society are to gain appropriate legitimation and modes of orientation for their new patterns of action. We noted above that the general value patterns of a society must be specified to the great variety of situations in which action is socially structured. We are now stating an obverse point, namely that when the network of socially structured situations becomes more complex, the value pattern itself must be couched at a higher level of generality in order to ensure social stability.

We also wish to call attention to one further aspect of processes of evolutionary development. In discussing the generalized media of interchange among units of a social system, namely influence, political power, money, and value commitments, we have attended primarily to their most obvious function of facilitating routine interchange among the differentiated units of social system. However, they may also facilitate creative increases in the extent and level of operations within social systems. Modern economists have shown that money, through the process of lending and investment, can be a primary instrument for increasing the level of economic production as well as for facilitating exchange in a system of division of labor. We have argued elsewhere that this fundamental property of money, i.e., its capacity for expanding economic productivity through the credit mechanism, has analogues in the operations of the other generalized media, above all power and influence.[38] Thus, the power mechanism can operate to increase the long-run effectiveness of the polity and influence can be used to enhance the capacity for solidarity of the societal community.

Briefly, anchorage in a higher-order subsystem of action is the basic condition of the upgrading effects of a generalized medium of interchange.

[38] Cf. "On the Concept of Political Power" and "On the Concept of Influence," *Politics and Social Structure.*

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On a very broad basis, therefore, cultural development is essential for the evolutionary advance of social systems. For example, religious developments underlie all major processes of value generalization, and the advancement of empirical knowledge underlies the institutionalization of new technologies. Sufficient levels of value generalization, implemented above all through the legal system, are prerequisite to major steps of inclusion in the structure of a societal community. A consensual base that promotes adequately extensive operation of the influence mechanism is necessary for major developments in the system of political power. Certain degrees of heightened political integration are prerequisite to the expansion of money economies beyond relatively simple levels.[39]

[39] See S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.), *Max Weber on Charisma* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), esp. his "Introduction."

three

pre-modern foundations of modern societies

In *Societies* we discussed the development of cultural innovation in the small "seed bed" societies of ancient Israel and Greece. Our analysis focused upon the conditions under which major cultural advances could develop and eventually become dissociated from their societal origins. These two models were chosen because of their central contributions to later social evolution. Elements derived from "classical" Hebrew and Greek sources, after undergoing further basic development and combination, comprised some of the main cultural components of modern society. Their focus was Christianity. As a cultural system Christianity proved in the long run able both to absorb major components of the secular culture of antiquity and to form a matrix from which a new order of secular culture could be differentiated.

Christian culture—including its secular components—was able to maintain clearer and more consistent differentiation from the social systems with which it was interdependent than either of its forebears had been. Because of such differentiation from society, Christian culture came to serve as a more effective innovative force in the development of the total sociocultural system than had any other cultural complex that had yet evolved.

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aments. Furthermore, the "visible" church, the concrete collectivity ıuman believers and their clerical leaders, was conceived as a purely ıan association. The attribute of divinity, the status of the church he "mystical Body of Christ," belonged only to the invisible church, company of *souls* in Christ.[54]

On this basis human society could not consist, as Thomism had l, of two layers with profoundly different religious statuses: the Church, h divine and human, and purely human secular society. Rather, it was eved to consist of *one* society, *all* members of which were both "bodies" ecular beings and "souls" in their relations to God. This view repreted much more radical institutionalization of the individualistic comıents of Christianity than had Roman Catholicism.[55] It also had found egalitarian implications, which have taken long to develop, vever—and have done so very unevenly.

A further consequence of the elimination of the priesthood's sacraıtal powers was that the special sphere that Roman Catholic tradition ed "faith and morals," and in which the visible Church held guardian- over all persons, was gravely undermined. Although many Protestant vements have attempted to continue ecclesiastical enforcement in this ere, there has been a strong inherent tendency in Protestantism to ine it as ultimately the individual's own responsibility. Similarly, the cial form of stratification *within* the medieval Church, the differentiaı between laity and members of the religious orders, lost its legitimation Protestantism. On the human level of a "way of life," all "callings" had same basic religious status; the highest religious merit and perfection ıld be attained in secular callings.[56] This attitude included marriage— her himself left his monastery and married a former nun, symbolizing change.

This major change in the relations between church and secular iety has often been interpreted as a major loss of religious rigor in or of worldly indulgence. This view seems a major misinterpretation, vever, for the Reformation was much more a movement to upgrade ular society to the highest religious level. Every man was obligated to ıave as a monk in his religious devotion, though not in his daily life; t is, he was to be guided mainly by religious considerations. It was a isive turn in the process, which dated from early phases of Christianity, permeate the "things of this world" with religious values and create a ity of Man" in the image of God.[57]

[54] *Ibid.*
[55] Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: bner, 1958).
[56] *Ibid.*
[57] *Ibid.*; Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, Vol. II; Ernst Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress* ston: Beacon, 1953); and Talcott Parsons, "Christianity" in *International Encycloia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

The institutionalization of this conception of a religiously grounded human society implied the possibility of establishing a societal community with a corporate character something like that of the Church itself, above all of the Protestant conception of a church that dispensed with the stratification in the Roman Catholic conception. For the larger types of secular society, this effort required a mode and level of political integration far surpassing those of the medieval and Renaissance period. The Reformation came to play a central part in legitimating some of the most important new territorial monarchies, most immediately the German principalities, with whom Luther formed alliances.[58] Not only were these alliances probably essential to the survival of the movement itself, but they also initiated a type of church-state organization that could develop further certain essential ingredients of modern society. In England the Reformation was percipitated somewhat differently when Henry VIII converted to Protestantism, opening the way for basic changes in the Church and in its relations with secular society.

Where Protestant *state churches* were formed, there was a tendency (except in England) toward both religious and political conservatism, especially in Lutherism, which prominently allied itself with territorial monarchical regimes. The Calvinist branch has been much more conspicuously involved in broad movements stressing the independence of religious groups from political authority,[59] most notably in the United States. Developments within American Protestantism made an early separation of church and state religiously, as well as politically, acceptable.

[58] G. R. Elton, *Reformation Europe* (Cleveland: Meridian, 1965).
[59] Important exceptions are discussed in J. J. Loubser, "Calvinism, Equality, and Inclusion," in S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.), *op. cit.*

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The outcome of the struggle between Reformation and Counter-ormation was a double step toward pluralization and differentiation. : English-Dutch wing was more advanced, a harbinger for the future. development within the Empire posed the crucial problem of integra- *across* the Protestant–Roman Catholic line. Many historians of modern ope have recognized only stalemated conflict here. Yet religious tolera- . has been extended to Roman Catholics in Protestant polities and ı to Protestants in Roman Catholic polities, though generally without cal sacrifice of the establishment principle.

Religious pluralization was part of a process of differentiation be-en the cultural and societal systems that reduced the rigidity and ıseness of their interpenetration. Religious *legitimation* of secular ety was retained without committing governmental authority to the ct implementation or enforcement of religious goals.

The development of modern secular culture, with its high level of erentiation from society as a whole, has been important to the con-ıing interpenetration of religion and society. The focus of this develop-ıt shifted northward in the seventeenth century to England and land but also to France and parts of Germany. *Relative* cultural decline he heartland of the Counter-Reformation was clear after Galileo. The ural importance of France indicated the equivocal nature, by Counter-ormation standards, of its Roman Catholicism. Yet politically "reac-ary" powers could be open to secular culture, as was Prussia under lerick the Great. In general, secular culture found Protestantism more genial than Roman Catholicism throughout this period.

The emergence of "sovereign" territorial states divided the Holy nan Empire. They were first successfully established in France and land, which had been at best nominally part of the Empire at any e, and next in Spain, also on the geographical fringe. Then Prussia Austria developed on the border of the "German" area, shifting the pire's center of gravity toward the eastern frontier. In the central s of the old Empire, territorial principalities proliferated largely through erence of the princes to the Reformation.[5]

These developments also showed a certain cohesion of the European em, as all four of the leading political-territorial states were frontier s of the system. Both the northwest triangle and the Iberian penninsula d the open sea and participated in the great maritime expansion of ope. The latter also was partially occupied by the Moors whose occupa- . of much of the peninsula almost through the fifteenth century tured the militant authoritarianism of Hispanic Catholicism.[6]

[5] Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Origins of Modern Germany* (New York: Capricorn,).

[6] Americo Castro, *The Structure of Spanish History* (Princeton: Princeton Uni-ty Press, 1954).

Imperial "gravitation" toward the east was also associated with frontier conditions. The boundary between the Germanic and Slavic peoples had been unstable for many centuries—and was complicated even before the Reformation by relations between the Roman and Ortho-dox branches of Christianity. Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland were ethnic-ally non-German but had become Roman Catholic. Especially after the fall of Byzantium the great Orthodox power was Russia, still peripheral to the Western system. The Germanic drive to organize and protect—and on occasion to dominate—the western Slavs eventuated in Hapsburg involvement with Hungary and Bohemia in an unstable multi- or non-national state. Incorporation of the non-German frontier peoples was complicated by Ottoman expansion, which remained a major threat until the late seventeenth century; Austria thus served as a defender of all *Christian* Europe.[7]

These developments at the borders of the European system "hollowed out" its center, especially in the Germany of "particularism," or *Klein-staaterei*. The center failed to develop major territorial units, although a few like Saxony and Bavaria approached such status; numerous other "states" were very small indeed. These principalities did usually swallow up the free cities of the Empire, however. The independence of the urban bourgeois classes was undermined by monarchy, aristocracy, and official-dom, abetted by the devastation and disorganization of wars. This part of Europe, thus generally fell behind the Northwest in economic develop-ment and became a power vacuum before the ambitions of the stronger powers.[8]

We have been speaking deliberately of the "territorial" state, rather than of the "national" state. Only in England, France, and perhaps Scandinavia were ethnic community and governmental organization ap-proximately coextensive. In Spain diverse local elements gradually de-veloped a common language, at least among the upper classes. Prussia became more or less purely German, partly through Germanizing of large Slavic elements. Austria was conspicuously multiethnic, including large German, Slavic, and Hungarian elements. Switzerland achieved a special limited form of multiethnic political integration and religious pluralism. The small German states divided the ethnic "German nation" into nu-merous political units, leaving "Germany" even more disunited than "Italy."

Except in the northwest the lack of coincidence between ethnic group and territorial organization hindered the development of liberalizing societies based on independent and solidary societal communities as oc-curred in the northwest area. The main territorial units either lacked the

[7] Oscar Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962).

[8] Bryce, *op. cit.*, and Barraclough, *op. cit.*

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ietal community.[14] Although the English Roman Catholic minority v has considerable strength, England has by and large escaped this blem.

France failed to "solve" its religious problem in an even more radical se than Holland did. The outcome of the severe Reformation struggle ; a Roman Catholic victory and suppression of the Protestant movement. ›testantism in France has never since involved more than small, though portant, minorities. This weakness did not, however, secure the position the Roman Catholic Church. *Secular* anticlericalism, based on the lightenment of the eighteenth century became a major political theme the Revolution.[15] This conflict has persisted in France down to the sent.

The basic French pattern has greatly influenced the definitions of igious legitimacy in other modern societies too, particularly in the Latin tholic countries (including those of Latin America) but also in Ger- .ny and Eastern Europe. It has also contributed to the antireligious ment in modern socialist movements, especially communism.

These European developments constitute a type of differentiation of : societal community and the religious system that in some respects ers an alternative to the pattern that emerged in seventeenth-century ıgland and has reached its fullest development in the United States. ıe "Anglo-Saxon" pattern builds, however, on certain central religious ditions of Western society while accommodating societal solidarities ıt cut across the historic religious particularisms. Indeed, the range of igious commitments and solidarities that can be treated as compatible th societal membership has steadily broadened. Secular anticlericalism, wever, especially in its communist version, remains closer to the formula *cuius regio, eius religio*, with the implication that "nonconformists" must excluded from the societal community.

The Polity and Societal Community

The societal community, as the main zone of :egration between a normative structure and a collectivity structure in ıich certain crucial role loyalties of individuals are centered, has always ›olved both primary reliance on religious legitimation and unity under :learly structured political authority. "Absolutism" represented a solu- ›n of the political aspects of the solidarity problems that arose from st-Reformation developments.[16] It required, however, that government—usually a monarchy—provide a central symbol on which loyalty could focus; such a symbol was enhanced by religious and ethnic unity. Indeed, religion and ethnic affiliation were the primary bases on which European society divided into territorial political units in early modern times,[17] with the general result that government and societal community were relatively undifferentiated. Nevertheless, in certain Western societies, there has been a tendency, under special conditions, to differentiate the two. England made an early and strong start in this direction, in contrast to France, an "absolutist" state in which government was identified with the societal community.

Ethnically, England, like France, had the problem of a "Celtic fringe," but only in Ireland was religion a seriously complicating factor. Ireland, where among the mass of the people Celtic ethnic affiliation coincided with Roman Catholicism and with class and geographical separation from England, was the prime area in which integration failed. Precisely in the critical period of the seventeenth century Cromwell fought bitter wars against the Irish, but the Roman Catholic Irish were never integrated into a "United Kingdom" as part of a unified societal community. Wales, though mainly Celtic, had a geographic disadvantage in maintaining its independence. It became predominantly Protestant, though more Nonconformist than was most of England, and posed no major problem of religious schism. The Scots developed an indubitable ethnic consciousness but fluctuated violently between Roman Catholicism and a more radical Protestantism than that of the English. The Scottish Stuarts became the focus of the Roman Catholic threat to the English religious constitution. Once the Protestant alternative had been consolidated, however, Scottish Presbyterianism became a major element in British Protestant denominational pluralism. Despite Ireland, therefore, Britain became relatively united ethnically, which contributed to its ability to afford religious pluralism within the bounds of Protestantism.[18]

Within a societal community, regional and ethnic differences are cut across by "vertical" axes of differentiation on the bases of power, prestige, and wealth. The geographical location of the center of societal organization—in Britain London—is a point of intersection.

A complex society requires substantial stratification, and it is all the more crucial in times of important innovation. As contributing to the innovative process is a function of the *kind* of stratification, we would expect to find important changes in stratification in the seventeenth century. Indeed, both the landed aristocracies that had developed from the feudal order and the urban patriciates were being transformed, and their relations with each other and with other groups were changing.

[14] S. M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Introduction," in Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), *eavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignment* (New York: Free Press, 1968).
[15] See Palmer, *op. cit.*
[16] See Max Beloff, *The Age of Absolutism, 1660–1815* (New York: Harper, 52).

[17] Kohn, *op. cit.*
[18] *Ibid.*

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'e judicial and administrative than legislative. Furthermore, there was one central *parlement* but a whole series of regional *parlements*. The *ement* of Paris had only the precedence of primus inter pares, rather 1 the exclusive position occupied by the Parliament of Westminster.

The deprivation of political power among the French aristocracy ns related to the group's ambivalent role in the eighteenth century. one hand, it developed a "snobbish" exclusiveness vis-à-vis all "bour- is" elements, many of whom had surpassed its members in political ition, wealth, and cultivation.[27] On the other hand, it was particularly minent as a sponsor of modernizing cultural movements, notably in ilosophy," and thus contributed crucially to the French Enlighten- it.[28] Both these developments rendered problematic the position of French aristocracy as the legitimate élite of the societal community. aristocracy's dependence on the monarchy for its *social* prestige was ibined with dissociation from the rest of the societal community in ns of both government power and the cultural "mediocrity" of the imon man. The whole structure of crown, the two *noblesses*, and Church was placed against the bourgeoisie and all the other classes,[29] s fostering the split in French society that erupted in the Revolution.

England developed differently as it departed from the initial sym- iis between government and aristocracy. Instead of "disfranchising" the tocracy, the monarchy became its "creature." The executive functions government and the societal community underwent a process of dif- ntiation focused on the "support system,"[30] which articulated the . This system was centered in Parliament. In contrast to France, liament had consolidated a position of "real power" by 1688.

This power did not mean, however, "government by aristocracy," simple obverse of the French solution. First, the national aristocracy too diffuse actually to "govern"—one reason why both the Stuarts Cromwell successfully advocated strong executive authority. Eventu- there developed the system of cabinet government under a constitu- ial monarch who "reigned" but did not govern. Second, there was special character of the British aristocracy. Primogeniture in England, iforced by entail, had tended to keep estates intact over generations l to produce continuous social gradations between the titled nobility

[27] Elinor Barber, *The Bourgeoisie in Eighteenth Century France* (Princeton: ceton University Press, 1955).
[28] Palmer, *op. cit.*
[29] See especially Moore, *op. cit.*, and Ford, *op. cit.*
[30] Talcott Parsons, "The Political Aspects of Social Structure and Process," in id Easton (ed.), *Varieties of Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- l, 1966). Reprinted in *Politics and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1969) pter 13.

and their untitled collaterals, the "gentry," who might or might not be closely related to titled families. This system favored both upward mobility into the aristocracy and indefinite extension of the status of "gentleman" downward from the titled nobility.

The status of the gentry became formalized in the House of Commons. As there were too many gentlemen for the Commons to be simply an assembly of an estate of the realm, as was the House of Lords (to which every peer belonged), it became a *representative* body.[31] As the Commons became increasingly important relative to the Lords, the distinction between those actually exercising political power and their constituencies became important. The gentry as a whole became a constituency, not a component, of government.

During the earlier period the aristocracy, as a major component of the societal community, constituted the most active element in the support system of government yet remained relatively independent of governmental organization. Furthermore, representative participation in government facilitated the gradual emergence of a party system under which elements of society could influence the policies and selection of active executive leadership somewhat responsive to the constituencies.[32]

The second main type of inherited privilege was that of the urban upper class, which rested primarily on commerce. Because the rural sector of the economy was generally still predominant, territorial consolidation under the monarchies gave primacy to rural interests and was less favorable to urban upper groups: a major reason why the most highly urbanized areas were for a long time not incorporated in territorial monarchies but defended the "free city" pattern.

Holland was an exception. In winning its independence from Spain, it became primarily a federation of urban communities led by merchant groups. It experienced considerable difficulty in integrating its rural areas, however, and lacked the cohesion of its rivals. Yet, in avoiding the social dominance of a landed aristocracy, it set an important example for future development.

England's middle position facilitated a synthesis. The representative character of the House of Commons provided machinery for the political involvement of important bourgeoise groups, and the line between them and the untitled gentry did not become rigid as in France.[33] This flexibility

[31] C. H. McIlwain, *The High Court of Parliament* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1910); and F. W. Maitland, *The Constitutional History of England* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1908).
[32] See Lewis Namier, *England in the Age of the American Revolution* (2nd ed.; London: Macmillan, 1961).
[33] See Archibald S. Foord, *His Majesty's Opposition 1714–1830* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964).

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nmon origins and some common features. The new Continental monhies tended to maintain the Roman legal tradition and its emphasis the "unitary" authority of the state.[39] This tradition tended to make il law the instrument of government by bringing the dominant group legally trained people into governmental service, often as the core of developing civil services.[40] Civil administration was thus differentiated m the military, which remained largely in the hands of the aristocracies. e Continental legal systems generally promoted the effectiveness of ernment more adequately than did the British one,[41] yet the latter de possible a more advanced state of differentiation and integration ween government and the societal community.

The Economy and Societal Community

The crucial economic developments in England ing the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries centered on the enclosure vement and its complex aftermath. Most important was the growth commercial farming, oriented toward markets, as distinct from the rly subsistence farming of the medieval type, under which the sale of duce extended only to neighboring towns.[42] The major break with the system was the development of a large export trade with the wool nufacturers of Flanders and Italy. The increase in large-scale sheep ing required displacement of considerable elements of the tenant oulation, for sheep raising was less labor-intensive than was crop raising l was hindered by the traditional open-field system of manorial agriture.

Many of the gentry and even noble landowners actively promoted change, either becoming commercial farmers themselves or renting ir lands to commercial tenants. The secular owners of previously lesiastical lands, especially of monasteries that had been dissolved, were traditional in estate management than the Church had been. Many mbers of the gentry also engaged, directly or through agents, in nonicultural economic enterprise, particularly various commercial ventures. e general process was by no means complete by the end of the seventh century, but, along with the other factors that we have reviewed, ad already had two major consequences.

First, the proportion of peasants who were individual tenants, or even ependent proprietors, had diminished. Instead, agricultural laborers

[39] See the discussion in Talcott Parsons, *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative spectives* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).
[40] Ford, *op. cit.*
[41] This aspect was emphasized by Weber; see Max Rheinstein (ed.), *Max Weber Law in Economy and Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954).
[42] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York: Beacon, 1957).

appeared,[43] and the surplus rural population tended to leave the countryside and gradually became a laboring class in the towns. A new concern with indigence and vagabondage emerged[44] in response to the dislocations and human suffering that they entailed; from then on, the "poor laws" were to be a prominent issue. The "peasant class" was sufficiently weakened so that struggles over its rights and position were not as prominent in England as in France.[45]

Second, the land-owning classes tended to become "defeudalized." Their economic position came to depend increasingly upon the market success of their farming and other enterprises rather than upon the enforcement of feudal obligations on a peasant class. This increased the productivity of agriculture, but it also gave the aristocracy more economical flexibility, enabling it to incorporate increasingly large commercial and then industrial elements.[46] This relaxation created a common interest and a partial fusion with the predominantly urban upper classes, but certainly partly at the expense of the peasantry.

The situation in France was almost the reverse. There the aristocracy was economically dependent upon the crown.[47] Because of the independence of the French Church from Rome, the crown had far-reaching control of ecclesiastical appointments, which, along with military commissions and the sale of civil offices, it used to fortify the loyalty of important aristocratic elements. In addition, the aristocracy was dependent upon priveleged exemptions from taxes and upon enforcement of obligations upon the peasantry.[48] French agricultural traditions were thus not conducive to reorganization in the interest of productivity. The peasantry remained relatively intact and in potentially sharp conflict with the landowning class, which helped to entrench the *combination* of monarchy, aristocracy, and Church further under the ancien régime,[49] as well as fostering peasant support for the Revolution, though in some circumstances, as in the Vendée, the peasants did swing to the other side.[50] Furthermore, in France there was little reason for urban groups to support the old regime. In Holland aristocracy was much weaker, but there were

[43] An interesting reflection of the situation is that the classical economists, particularly Ricardo, generally took commercial agriculture as a paradigmatic use in their analyses. It was the agricultural laborer, the employee of a commercial farmer, who was primarily discussed in connection with wage theory.
[44] *Ibid.*
[45] Moore, *op. cit.*
[46] *Ibid.*
[47] Ford, *op. cit.*, and Moore, *op. cit.*
[48] Moore, *op. cit.*; see also Georges Lefebvre, *The Coming of the French Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1960).
[49] Palmer, *op. cit.*
[50] Moore, *op. cit.*; and Charles Tilly, *The Vendée* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).

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stocracy and government in England. Much of the English aristocracy came an active political *constituency* of government, instead of remain- ʒ part of the undifferentiated structure of government without an op- rtunity to play a decisive part in it. This pattern permitted later tension, so that larger groups could gain inclusion in the political aspect citizenship.[53]

The consolidation of the common law and the supremacy of Parlia- ent in government were closely connected with Puritanism and the ecial religious settlement that emerged in England.[54] Denominational d political pluralism expressed the differentiation of the societal com- unity from religious collectivities and governmental organization. Both pects involved a process of inclusion associated with that of differentia- n. Legitimate status of full membership in the societal community was corded to religious dissenters and to political opponents of the group rrently in office as long as they constituted a "loyal opposition." The gal system, both in its normative content and in its structural indepen- nce, was a primary mechanism regulating the boundary relations among ese differentiated elements. It is crucial that there were *legally* institu- nalized rights of religious and political dissent. England never resorted a written constitution that would formally bind the "crown in Parlia- ent" as the theoretical sovereign of the realm; nor were the courts of w ever accorded the power of judicial review, in the sense of authorization declare acts of Parliament unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the record nfirms the essential effectiveness of the legal institutionalization of "con- tutional" limitations upon the powers of government, despite the close lation between government and the coercive sanctions of the courts.

The differentiation of societal community and economy focussed on e "commercialization" of agriculture, especially as it affected the landed terests of the gentry. Generally rural communities have undifferentiated criptive structures particularly resistant to modernization. The orientation English agriculture to the market, however, created commercial interest at linked the rural communities "horizontally" with the towns, rather an "vertically" with a feudal type of aristocratic governmental hierarchy, d reduced the severity of the "peasant problem."

In the towns a parallel process of differentiation was breaking down e particularism of the guild system. As England was on the whole less banized than were some areas of the Continent, it was important that major rural interest favored this differentiating process. The primary *stitutional* foundations of a differentiated market economy were laid in ngland well before the mechanical inventions and other innovations of

[53] Marshall, *op. cit.*

[54] See David Little, *Religion, Law, and Order* (New York: Harper and Row, 69).

the industrial revolution. The Puritan influence was very important as well, perhaps especially in the orientations of the innovative merchant groups but also among the gentry, many of whom were Puritans.

The economic phase of English development seems also to have promoted pluralism in the community structure. The processes of differentiation, which occurred within both rural and urban communities, strengthened a community of economic interests that cut across the old distinction. This trend was important above all in view of the political power of the landed classes. Economic differentiation provided a basis on which future urban groups could be included in a single solidary system. Rural-urban conflicts were not as severe in England as elsewhere in subsequent periods; compared with the situation in France, conflict between the bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy was mild.

The process of adaptive upgrading was most obviously associated with economic development. Not only in England, but also in the whole northwestern triangle, the seventeenth century was a period of substantial economic advance. There were progressive increases in the "extent of the market," both internally and externally, for each political unit.

Though within societies as social systems adaptive capacity is focussed in the economic sphere, it is affected by developments in both the cultural and personality systems. On the cultural side, the most conspicuous process of upgrading was the general development of secular culture, with its emphasis upon cognitive rationality in philosophy and science. This trend was furthered in Holland and England by the values of ascetic Protestantism.[55] Although the growth of cognitive and rational culture had not yet had primary consequences for the structure of society, it had an impact. After Newton and Locke, for example, cultural leaders could not ignore the implications of the new science and philosophy for a vast range of concerns; they were equipped with a new level of adaptive resources.

The central development related to the adaptive aspect of personality was the emphasis of ascetic Protestantism upon the orientational complex that Weber called "worldly asceticism." It enhanced motivation to achievement in "worldly callings." The "situation" for giving meaning to such achievement was culturally "defined" as "this-worldly," rather than as "other-worldly," oriented toward the building of the good society and not only toward the salvation of souls in the afterlife. It was universalistic and

[55] Merton's analysis of the relations of Puritanism and science in England has been not "refuted" but merely qualified by recent research. See Robert K. Merton, "Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England," *Osiris*, 4 (1938) reprinted in *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Chapter 18, (rev. ed.; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957); see also Joseph Ben-David, *The Sociology of Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971).

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or society frozen at an early modern level. In many respects its in-
ısigent traditionalism isolated it from the rest of Europe.[1]

Austria, held together by royal and aristocratic intermarriage and nan Catholic allegiance, contrasted sharply with Spain in its handling ethnic heterogeneity. Although at first committed to the Counter- ormation, the Austrian Habsburgs later accepted a limited religious :alism established by the settlement of 1648. They were thus ana- onistic in their lack of concern with political nationality, but they yed an important integrative role by maintaining a large political ıcture that became first ethnically and then religiously pluralistic.[2] ıt the Empire eventually disintegrated under the centrifugal forces of ionalism does not negate its importance over a long transitional period. leed, as late as the Holy Alliance, Austria was the focus of conservative egrationism in Europe. Furthermore, it played an important role in diating Russia's entry into the European system, a role encouraged by tual conflict with Napoleonic France.

The particularistic area of Germany resembled the Counter-Reforma- ı center despite its religious diversity. Its small states were necessarily the defensive also, threatened as they were with absorption by their ger neighbors. As in the Italian states, major structural innovations were ibited.[3]

The Prussian role in the European system, conditioned by the open tern frontier, crystallized on the basis of a special variant of the Prot- ant pattern. The Hohenzollern rulers had converted to Calvinism, ereas the bulk of the population adhered to Lutheranism. What emerged s a special form of the Protestant "national church" that amalgamated two elements.[4] Calvinism, within the activist pattern of ascetic Prot- antism, postulated the general dominance in the community of a igious élite, the predestined elect, setting it above even the faithful otestant common people. It was also strongly collectivist in that it con- ved any Calvinist community to be founded upon its religiously ordained ssion. This orientation—activist, authoritarian, and collectivist—well ed the Prussian monarchy as a boundary unit seeking to expand at the st of the Slavs. Furthermore, it dovetailed with the Lutheran emphasis the ligitimacy of duly constituted authority in maintaining a given order d in checking disorder, which might include almost any major change.

[1] Americo Castro, *The Structure of Spanish History* (Princeton: Princeton Uni- sity Press, 1954).

[2] James Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire* (rev. ed.; London: Macmillan, 1904).

[3] Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Origins of Modern Germany* (New York: Capri- n, 1963).

[4] Christine Kayser, "Calvinism and German Political Life," Unpublished doc- al dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1961.

Calvinism was admirably suited to a forcible governing class, Lutheranism to its subjects. Along with the general unsettlement of any changing frontier community, this religious situation helps to explain Prussian advances in rationalizing both military and civil administration.

Like most of Continental Europe, Prussia was organized about a land-owning aristocracy, the Junkers. The Junkers did not become a parliamentary opposition to royal absolutism as had the English gentry; instead they were a primary support of the monarchy, particularly in a military capacity. As in England, however, they transformed their traditional estates into commercial farming operations oriented toward the export of grain. The changes nonetheless incorporated the old rigid class structure, which was strengthened when the agricultural workers who migrated to the new industries were replaced largely by Polish laborers.[5]

Before the nineteenth century, Prussia's most important advances were in governmental effectiveness; in both military and civil bureaucratic administration it set new standards for Europe.[6] Certainly Prussia's military record, considering its size and resources, made it the Sparta of modern Europe. All classes in its hierarchically organized population came to accept a stringent conception of duty, much like the one formulated by Kant, but in this instance duty specifically to the state. The state managed to combine a relatively amenable lower group, a traditionally military landed gentry, and a not very large or strong but very urban-oriented upper *Bürgertum* in a highly effective operating organization.[7] Gradually, it took advantage of the "liberal-national" movements in the German world, rather than being threatened by them, a trend culminating in the career of Bismarck.

Prussia's effectiveness as a sovereign state enabled it to extend its political domination over other territories; it gained control of practically all northern Germany, foreshadowing the exclusion of Austria from leadership in the unification of Germany. When the German Empire was constituted in 1871, it included a large Roman Catholic minority (nearly one-third of the population), the reverse of the settlement of 1648, which had included a Protestant minority in the old Roman Catholic Empire.[8] Prussia's expansion into other parts of Germany, however, produced severe strains in the societal community, the religious diversity of which was not yet adequately integrated in a pluralistic structure.

Almost coincidentally with Prussia's expansion, the new Germany

[5] See the account of Weber's early researches in Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1962); see also Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York: Wiley, 1964), Chapters 4, 6.

[6] Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 1660–1815* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Barraclough, *op. cit.*

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production processes and eventually to the production of "factors of luction." There were also various intermediate products like the "gray ı" that putting-out merchants bought from weavers. Transportation commercial-mediation services between spatially separated producers consumers became necessary. Raw materials, primary production, and land itself became increasingly involved in the market nexus.

We have a special interest in two other "factor" markets, however, e for capital and labor. The former entered a new stage of develop- .t in the Renaissance, a major symptom of which was the religious :roversy over the morality of "usury."[15] Long before the industrial lution, money lending had existed on a substantial scale organized noney markets of various sorts, some already "international." Com- .es in which individuals could invest free of the contingent liabilities artnerships also existed. By the end of the seventeenth century England essed the beginnings of a central bank, a mark of its economic ad- :ement.

Nevertheless, the industrial revolution saw a proliferation of financial kets at a new level of organization. These developments did not cul- ate until the middle of the nineteenth century, however, when general rporation acts were adopted in England and in most of the American :s[16] and organized securities markets were established. One major ıntage of German industry, when it surpassed British industry in the nineteenth century, was the superior organization and spirit of enter- : of its investment banking system.[17]

Expanded financial markets provided more flexible mechanisms of stment for the increasingly complex and expanding economic system. 'e and more, money went beyond its functions as a medium of ex- ıge and measure of value to become the primary control mechanism he economic process. Control of money was used to influence the :ation of resources through the market mechanism. More important, new dependence of credit creation upon large-scale financial institu- s provided a type of built-in mechanism of economic growth.

The extension of the productive "chain" was of primary importance hysical production, especially in connection with the mechanisms of gration and stabilization of the economy as a whole. Increasing shares esources were devoted to the early and intermediate stages of the :ress from raw materials to consumable products.

[15] Benjamin Nelson, *The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal rhood* (2nd ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

[16] For an analysis of these legal developments and their importance, see J. Wil- Hurst, *Law and the Conditions of Freedom* (Madison: University of Wisconsin , 1956).

[17] Landes, *op. cit.*

A particularly important trend in this connection has been the development of *generalized* physical facilities. Transportation facilities like railways would seldom be economically viable if limited to the transportation of one product. Once lines existed between given centers, however, they could be used for many purposes. Similar considerations applied to provision of mechanical power. The steam engine was one of the principal innovations of the early industrial revolution; electric power and the internal-combustion engine arrived later. Sources of energy, transmission of energy and fuel, and modes of using power were thus enhanced. Finally, the development of "tools to make tools." the machine-tool industry, also contributed to the technology of many different industries.[18]

These technological developments were closely interdependent with changes in the social organization of the productive process, especially of labor as a factor in production. The critical development was the differentiation of labor (or, more technically, of services) from the diffuse matrix in which it had been embedded. This differentiation involved distinguishing the work-role complex from the family household and also increased the "mobility of labor"—the readiness of households to respond to employment opportunities by changing residences or learning new skills. These changes affected the structures of family systems and local communities profoundly. Many features of the modern form of nuclear-family kinship structure gradually emerged during the nineteenth century. And industrial society became urbanized to a degree never before known in history.

These processes established what sociologists call the *occupational role,* specifically contingent upon status in an employing organization structurally distinct from the household.[19] Usually the employing organization has only one member in common with the household; it also has premises, disciplines, authority systems, and property distinct from those of the household. Typically the employed person receives (according to his employment status and role performance) a money income that is the main source of his household's access to the market for consumer goods. The employing organization markets its product and pays the employee wages or a salary, whereas the typical peasant or artisan sold his own products. The organization thus comes between the worker and the consumer market.

The spread of occupational roles extended the range of consumer markets because of consumers' increased dependence upon money incomes in meeting their wants. But Adam Smith's famous dictum "The division of labor depends on the extent of the market" is important in this con-

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] Neil J. Smelser, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).

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what "counted" in the societal community ever more closely with rnment, while pressing subjects not closely participating in government its aristocratic penumbra into positions of dubious inclusion in the onal community. As almost everywhere on the Continent, the central rnment, reinforced by the Counter-Reformation, pressed its diffuse ns to authority. The tradition of legally protected rights was much ter on the Continent than in England.

Within the framework of a high level of national consciousness, the ch Revolution demanded a community that included *all* Frenchmen abrogated the special status of the *privilegiés*. The central concept was *enship*, the claim of the *whole* population to inclusion.[25]

The famous slogan of the Revolution, *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité,* odied the new conception of community. *Liberté* and *Égalité* symzed the two central foci of dissatisfaction, political authoritarianism privilege; *Fraternité* referred primarily to the broader context of being, "brotherhood" being a primordial symbol of community.

In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the symbol of liberty two distinct references.[26] One was paramount in England, where Adam h stressed economic liberty, especially in contrast with the governtal control associated with mercantilism. The other was paramount in ice, where Rousseau was the most important author. It emphasized liberty of the societal community, of the "people" vis-à-vis government. The problems of liberty of the people in this sense and liberty of individual were not clearly distinguished, especially in the political re. It was the tyranny of the regime that had to be eliminated. The itorial tendencies of the Revolution emerged only after the power of old regime had been at least temporarily broken.

The problem of equality is even more subtle. Whereas one can think berty primarily in terms of casting off restraints, equality inherently lves relations among units that are *positively* valued. Units that claim ht to equality cannot legitimately oppose recognition of the equality thers. Whereas in the context of liberty the evil is illegitimate cont, in the context of equality it is illegitimate *discrimination*. The idey of equality has often suggested that all differences of status or funcare illegitimate, particularly if they are hierarchical. Social systems ire varying kinds and degrees of social differentiation on two dimen, however: a qualitative division of labor (in the Durkheimian sense) a hierarchy.

The French Revolution, stressing both liberty and equality, focused not only upon political authority but also upon the partially distinct system of privilege for the aristocracy. Tensions had been exacerbated by the association of the *noblesse de robe* with the monarchy and the older aristocracy under the ancien régime, so that the "people" stood *against* the "privileged," who were indissolubly identified with the government. There has been enormous ideological distortion of the European aristocracies' frivolity and social irresponsibility at the expense of the people. The critical issue of "privilege" was actually the hereditary ascription of status, which conflicted with the standards of either achievement or equality or both. The Revolution raised the question of whether privilege can be a meaningful *reward* or even legitimated on instrumental grounds—unless it is demonstrated that no other way of institutionalizing responsible leadership is possible. The French Revolutions attack on the principle of privilege was mainly led by the higher bourgeoisie, many of whose members were richer than were most aristocrats and, if not more powerful in the formal sense, perhaps more influential in governmental affairs.

In England, aristocracy, which included the gentry, was much more "private" and less identified with the regime. In fact, reform movements were often led by members of the aristocracy; the "French" question of aristocracy versus bourgeoisie was not nearly so explicitly raised.

The Revolutionary concept of equality, in relation to differential instrumental qualifications and the hierarchical dimension of social status, emphasized *equality of opportunity*. To the extent that this emerging value pattern was institutionalized, achievement and achievement capacity became the primary criteria of eligibility for differentially valued statuses. The attainment of a status or its retention under competitive pressure could then be evaluated as a reward for significant contribution to the social system. This complex gave support to a major normative component of the industrial revolution.

The main thrust in the French Revolution, however, was against inherited aristocratic privilege and toward equality of membership status, which must be distinguished from equality of opportunity, even though the two are interdependent. The pattern of privilege under the ancien regime had divided the societal community into two primary status classes. The "common man" was a "second-class citizen," who was denied by his hereditary status access to privileges enjoyed by the aristocracy, perhaps especially tax exemptions.[27]

Marshall has analyzed equality of membership as possessing three primary components, civil, political, and social.[28] The French Revolution

[25] *Ibid.*; see also Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship.*

[26] See Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* ıbridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1965).

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senses that we have outlined, but also bound together in a national, onomous solidarity. This societal community was to be differentiated n government as its superior, legitimately entitled to control it. Yet the ree of its differentiation was still far from completely modern, particuy in regard to its incomplete pluralization.

French society during the nineteenth century institutionalized the nocratic pattern of societal community only partially and unstably.[33] e French Right held tenaciously to the patterns of the old régime down the present century. It led several "experiments" in monarchical resation and maintained a de facto ascendance in social prestige for the tocracy and a strong, though contested, position for the established man Catholic Church. This conflict within France was exacerbated by survival of the older system in most of the Continent, despite the ead of revolutionary patterns, especially through Napoleon's conquests.

Although England went much farther in the process of pluralization, act closely connected with its leadership in the industrial revolution, ical pressures toward democratization were absent, and the franchise extended only gradually from 1832 on. Aristocracy remained strong in tish society throughout the nineteenth century, though it was less "rigid" n in most Continental countries and less of an impediment to pluraic differentiation and gradual democratization.[34]

The struggle over democratization was a major component of Euron social conflict during the nineteenth century. Napoleon was in cer1 respects the heir of the Revolution. The restored "legitimism" of the ly Alliance was directed not only against French "imperialism" but also inst Revolutionary ideas. Significantly, its breakdown in 1848 started in nce but then became especially intense on the eastern fringe of the ropean system.

Through the nineteenth century leadership of the European system nained in the northwest sector, where an increasingly sharp "dialectical" flict emerged between the British and French attitudes. Both were estial to the emerging synthesis, the one emphasizing economic producty and pluralization of the social structure, the other democratization the nation-state, nationalism and a new kind of societal community.

There were also important developments in the less advanced areas, vever. The emergence of imperial Germany represented a major disturce to the European system. It fully exploited the potentials of both industrial revolution and the undemocratic "authoritarian" state while nce and Britain were still insufficiently strong and unified to cope with

[33] See Stanley Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community," in fmann *et al.*, *In Research of France* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 3).

[34] Marshall, *op. cit.*

the new power by genuinely *synthesizing* the components of modern society.

At the same time, the shadow of the "collossi" of the East and the West fell over the European system. Russia had emerged to assume a major role in the European system by contributing crucially to Napoleon's defeat and had become a primary participant in the settlement of Vienna and a guarantor of the Metternich system. By the time of World War I the United States had also emerged as unequivocally important to "the system."

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the new lead society and contemporary modernity

six

The industrial and democratic revolutions were
cts of the great transformation by which the institutional bulwarks of early modern system were progressively weakened. European monar-s have survived only where they have become constitutional. Aristocracy twitches but mostly in the informal aspects of stratification systems—here is it structurally central. There are still established churches, but on the less modern peripheries like Spain and Portugal is there severe iction on religious freedom. The broad trend is toward denominational alism and the separation of church asd state, though the communist ıtries present special problems. The industrial revolution shifted pri-y economic organization from agriculture and the commerce and han-ıfts of small urban communities and extended markets.

The emergence of "full" modernity thus weakened the ascriptive ıework of monarchy, aristocracy, established churches, and an economy ımscribed by kinship and localism to the point at which it no longer cised decisive influence. Certain modern components that had already :loped to some degree by the eighteenth century became increasingly ortant, particularly a universalistic legal system and secular culture, :h had been diffused through Western society by means of the Enlightenment. Further developments in the political aspects of societal community emphasized the associational principle, nationalism, citizenship, and representative government. In the economy differentiated markets developed for the factors of production, primarily labor. "Occupational" services were increasingly performed in employing organizations that were structurally differentiated from households. New patterns of effectively organizing specific functions arose, especially administration (centering in government and the military) and the new economy. The democratic revolution immensely stimulated the former, the industrial revolution the latter. Weber saw that in a later phase the two patterns tend to fuse in the bureaucratization of capitalist economy.[1] They have also, however, begun to fuse in other contexts, notably the associationalizing of the technological base of modern efficiency.

We have seen that the modern structural pattern initially crystallized in the northwest corner of Europe, whereas a secondary pattern subsequently emerged in the northeast corner, centering on Prussia. A striking parallel development occurred in the second main phase of modernization. The United States, the "first new nation," has come to play a role approximately comparable to that of England in the seventeenth century.[2] America was fertile soil for both the democratic and industrial revolutions and for combining them more intimately than had been possible in Europe. By the time of Tocqueville's visit, a synthesis of the French and English revolutions had already been achieved: The United States was as "democratic" a society as all but the extreme wing of the French Revolution had wished for, and its level of industrialization was to surpass that of England. We shall therefore concentrate in the following discussion upon the United States.

The Structure of the Societal Community

Behind the developments outlined in the preceding paragraphs were a very special religious constitution and societal community. The United States was in a position to make new departures from the principal ascriptive institutions of early modern society: monarcry, with its "subjects," rather than citizens; aristocracy; an established church; an economy committed to localism and only a little division of labor; and an ethnically defined societal community, or "nation."

American territory was initially settled mainly by one distinctive group of migrants. They were "nonconformists" in search not so much of freedom from persecution as of greater religious independence than they could en-

[1] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947).

[2] Seymour M. Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1963).

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ɔlved the first and second, whereas the third became important only in mid-nineteenth century.

The civil component includes guarantees of what were called "natural ıts"—in Locke's formulation, "life, liberty, and property." They were ɔlified and specified by the French Declaration of the Rights of Man the American Bill of Rights. The revolutionary movement in France encouraged by the fact that English and American law had already itutionalized many of these rights. The concept of "equality before the " characterizes the civil component of equality of membership if it is ən to include both procedural and substantive protections. Here "law" ıns not only that enforceable through the courts but also the general terning of the society's normative order.

The "political" component of citizenship focusses upon the democra-franchise. Although the principle of equality among citizens in the "fi-" voice of government dates from the ancient Greek polis, the French ʋolution applied it to the government of a large-scale society and to all people. It is impossible for modern government to give equal direct par-pation to all citizens. Developments have therefore been in the direction *epresentative* institutions, in which political equality is focused upon the :ction of top governmental leadership, generally through participation ın electoral system. The forms of these institutions vary in important ʋs,[29] especially between the "presidential" and "parliamentary" types between "republics" and "constitutional" monarchies.

Despite such variation all European political systems, except the com-nist ones but including many such overseas societies of European origin the United States and some members of the British Commonwealth, 'e evolved toward a common pattern.[30] This pattern includes two com-ıents of equality and two contextual features.

The first component of equality is universality of the franchise. The in trend has been toward universal adult suffrage; women's suffrage was ıpted early in the present century in most Western nations. Only minors, :ns, and small classes of disqualified persons are now generally excluded. e other component of equality has been elimination of the *weighting* ʋotes. Historically, various systems have weighted votes unequally, either ılicitly as in the Prussian class system of voting or implicitly as in dis-ninatory apportionment in the United States. The trend is, however, ırly toward the principle of one citizen, one vote, both in access to the ls and in the weight of each vote in determining electoral outcomes.

The first contextual feature is the system of formal electoral proce-

[29] See S. M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Introduction," in Lipset and Rokkan, *avage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignment* (New York: Free Press, 1965).

[30] Stein Rokkan, "Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting, and Political Participation," in *opean Journal of Sociology* (1961), 132–52.

dure, including rules of eligibility for voting and rules by which votes are "counted." The latter aspect is critical in establishing a *binding* relation between the individual voter's choice and the effects of many such choices on the outcome. The second contextual development is secrecy of the ballot, which further differentiates government and societal community by protecting the individual's independent participation in each. It guards the voter from pressures not only from status superiors (for example, employ-ers) but also from status peers (for example, fellow union members).[31] This "barrier" favors political pluralization relative to the rest of the so-ciety and discourages unanimous "bloc" voting (for example, *all* trade-union members voting for socialist or other "left" parties) and encourages minorities within each interest group (or religious, ethnic, or local group) to vote differently from the majority. This structure enhances community flexibility and the possibility of both restraining and mobilizing govern-ment as an agency of change responsible to the community.

In one sense, the "social" component of citizenship is the most fun-damental of the three.[32] Some form of equality of social condition as an aspect of "social justice" has been a primary theme of Western history since the French Revolution but one that did not become institutionally salient until much later. It seems that the full emergence of this theme had to await reduction in the inequalities of governmental absolutism and aristocracy, which raised new tensions between the imperatives of equality of opportunity and equality of membership. The central principle may perhaps be that members of the society must have realistic, not merely formal, opportunities to compete, with reasonable prospects of success but that the community should not accord full membership to those inherently excluded from the opportunity complex. Allowance is thus made for those, like children, who are inherently unable to compete; those, like the un-skilled poor, who are severely handicapped through no fault of their own and must be "helped" to compete; and those, like the aged, who must be supported. Furthermore, there should be a "floor" under the competitive system that defines a standard of "welfare" to which all members are *entitled* as a matter of "right," not as a matter of "charity."

The third Revolutionary catchword, *Fraternité*, suggested a synthesis of the other two at a more general normative level. In a certain sense, it was the ultimate embodiment of the implications for secular Society of the Reformation. The solidary societal community that it proclaimed could not be a two-class system in any of the medieval senses—Church and state, clergy and laity, or aristocracy and commons—but had to be a *unitary* community. Its members were to be considered not only free and equal, in

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] See Marshall, *op. cit.*

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tion: The advancing division of labor made possible increasing pro-
tivity and a rise in the standard of living among the general population.
In the factories roles were generally "occupationalized" from the
:om up. The first to become employees were propertyless wage workers,
mill hands of the textile industry. Management was generally based
n proprietorship. The owner, usually a kinship group, organized pro-
tion, raised capital, set up factories, employed and supervised workers,
marketed the products. The early "capitalistic" industrial firm was
s a "two-class system," consisting of the proprietary lineage on one
: and the employees on the other.[20] This system was the structural
s for the Marxist conception of "class conflict" in capitalistic society,
which ownership and organizational authority are assumed always to
rate together.

Finally, we must discuss a problem that has been very much mis-
erstood, largely for ideological reasons. The industrial revolution
erged under a "free enterprise" system and very likely could not have
inated under any basically different one. Furthermore, we argue that
ee-enterprise economy, rather than socialism in the sense of govern-
ntal operation of the whole economy, remains the main focus of
lution. Private economic enterprise and government organization of
nomic matters are not, however, related in a "zero-sum" manner: An
ease in one does not require a corresponding decrease in the other.
Durkheim demonstrated,[21] a highly developed free-enterprise economy,
npared to a more primitive form of economic organization, requires
ronger governmental structure, not a more restricted one.

A universalistic legal system, a central feature of any industrial
ety, cannot exist without strong government. Furthermore, increasingly
nplex regulatory functions are necessary to the economy, as to other
ects of society, for example, in the control of the cyclical disturbances
t upset early industrial economies.

Government and economy are interdependent. Government requires
ible resources, which are increased by increments in productivity and
the mobility of resources in a developed market system. Similarly,
ernment, in its own participation in the labor markets, benefits from
mobility of manpower.

This interdependence involves the interchange of money and power
ween the market system and the system of formal organization. Not
y government but also such private organizations as firms participate
he power system; conversely government participates in the market

[20] See Reinhard Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry* (New York: Wiley,
5).

[21] Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Macmillan,
3).

system. The power of private units is dependent upon that of government in two critical respects beside the general institutionalization of property and contract. First, the corporation as a legal entity is at least in part a "delegation" of public authority on the basis of a publicly granted and revocable charter. The use of authority within corporate organizations is *legitimated* by this authorization.[22] Second, modern economies depend upon the credit mechanism for capitalization. Extension of credit involves the use of power by credit agencies, especially banks; they make funds available to borrowers, funds that they themselves do not "own," and bind themselves with legally enforceable contracts. This enforceability provides the basis of confidence in the time-extendability of loan relations, which partake of the inherent risk of investments that cannot "pay off" except over a considerable period.

In a modern society, underdevelopment of the power system is thus highly deleterious to the economy, and underdevelopment of the monetary and market systems is highly deleterious to the polity.

The Democratic Revolution

The democratic revolution was part of the process of differentiating the polity and the societal community. As do all processes of differentiation, it produced integration problems and, where it was successful, new mechanisms of integration.

In European societies the focal point of these problems was some degree of popular support for government in the societal community. The starting point was the conception of ordinary people as "subjects" of their monarch, with almost totally ascriptive obligations to obey his authority, which was often claimed to be divinely ordained.[23] Although the English crown's monopoly of governmental authority had fallen in the seventeenth century, as it had in a different way in Holland, even the English regime was far from "democratic"; it was rather sharply aristocratic.

Intellectual discussion during the Enlightenment made clear the internal tensions in the Continental territorial monarchies, exacerbated by the visibility of the British and Dutch examples.[24] This strain was particularly acute in France, which had gone farthest in developing the national-ethnic basis of community while at the same time retaining an old-regime absolutism. The "common" people, including some high in the bourgeoisie, were still "subjects," whereas the aristocracy, closely allied to the crown, had consolidated its privileges. These developments identi-

[22] Hurst, *op. cit.*

[23] J. W. Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixtennth Century* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1960).

[24] R. R. Palmer, *The Age of Democratic Revolution* (2 vols.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959 and 1964).

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ıme the primary site of the second major phase of the Industrial Revo-
ɔn. The buildup that established the political position of imperial
many did not immediately include any major economic advance beyond
of early modern Europe generally. The major change came
risingly slowly,[9] considering how long the British example had been
lable. Furthermore, it centered not in the main areas of Prussian
ciency" but in the territories about the Rhineland, which were gen-
y more Roman Catholic than Protestant.[10]

Until the spread of the industrial revolution to the Continent, Britain,
sia, and France had been in the forefront of change. In the differentia-
of the European system as a whole, we may attribute primacy of
-attaining functions to the Northwest, for the most important new
tutional developments and structural differentiation were emerging
e. These processes increased the adaptive capacity of the system, par-
larly in economic terms and in England.

For this same period, we may assign primacy of the more general
ɔtive function to Prussia. It had become the most important stabilizer
Europe's open eastern frontier. Furthermore, it had pioneered in the
lopment of instrumentally effective collective organization, a gen-
zed resource that has since been diffused throughout all functional
ɔrs of modern societies.

The Industrial Revolution

The late eighteenth century saw the beginning
ıe two developments marking the transition from the early phase of
tern modernity to the one that has crystallized in the mid-twentieth
ury. These changes are usually called the industrial revolution and
democratic revolution. The former began in Great Britain, whereas the
r erupted in France in 1789.

The emergence of these developments in the northwest sector of
ɔpe capped the main developmental trends of the earlier period. As
ll major structural changes, they occasioned severe strains where they
rged and even more severe strains when they spread into areas less
prepared for them.

The main developmental trend after the Reformation stressed, under
ıctivist value system, the adaptive and integrative capacities of so-
es, which involved new orders of differentiation and increased organic
arity in Durkheim's sense. The industrial revolution was part of this
l, in that vast increases in economic productivity entailed immense
ısion of the division of labor in the social sense. As we have em-

[9] See David Landes, *The Rise of Capitalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

[10] See Rainer Baum, "Values and Uneven Political Development in Imperial
ıany," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1967.

phasized, such extensions in differentiation produce a functional need for new integrative structures and mechanisms. The democratic revolution involved primarily the integrative aspect of the societies; it focused on the political meaning of membership in the societal community and thus on the justification of inequalities in wealth and, more important, in political authority and social privilege.

Our primary interest in the industrial revolution is not in its technological and strictly economic aspects but in associated changes in social structure. It should be noted, however, that the technological changes had revolutionary economic effects. They made possible extremely large cost savings, lower prices, and the development of many new products.[11] In England the process began in the cotton-textile industry and spread to the "heavier" industries, whereas on the Continent and in the United States the main development broadly coincided with the spread of the railroads.[12]

The structural key to the industrial revolution is the extension of the market system and of the attendant differentiation in the economic sector of the social structure. The market system itself, however, did not undergo a sudden revolution but only a long and continuous evolution. The distinctive prosperity of England and Holland especially, but also of France, before the new inventions undoubtedly resulted from the development of their market systems, which in turn depended upon legal and political security and legal frameworks based on property and contract, which favored the extension of commercial enterprise. English and Dutch prosperity was also a function of both relatively light governmental pressures on economic resources, especially the absence of large standing armies, and of an absence of the sharp aristocratic objections to "trade" that prevailed in most Continental countries.

Before the industrial revolution the most developed sector of the market system was finished commodities, generally luxury goods.[13] The most important exception in England was the production for export first of wool, then of woolen cloth. In some areas grain was an important market commodity, but most foodstuffs and articles of general consumption entered the market system only within local limits, if at all. Typical was the exchange of foodstuffs grown in the immediate locality for handicrafts products of a "market" town.[14]

From this focus the market system could spread in several directions. From the consumer product, it could extend "back" into earlier stages of

[11] There is an enormous literature on these problems. Landes, *op. cit.*, is a thorough and particularly illuminating survey.

[12] J. H. Clapham, *Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815–1914* (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1963).

[13] See Max Weber, *General Economic History* (New York: Adelphi, 1927) *op. cit.*, and his *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947).

[14] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon, 1957).

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ıovative in that the mandate for achievement was applicable to all men ɪ was to build a new "kingdom," not to perpetuate tradition.

Encouragement of this type of personal orientation had selective ɛcts in different spheres. One was to enhance the relevance of scientific ·estigation. Another was the broad pressure for a certain type of in-idualism in English law.[56] There was, however, a special connection :h the economic sphere, through market relations. This connection did t develop primarily, as has so persistently been alleged, because the .rket opened the doors to "self-interest" or "materialism." Rather, it /eloped because the market mechanism constituted the first massive titutional context within which it was possible to isolate individual ıievements and contributions from a diffuse matrix of irrelevant ties. .e market represented a differentiation of the social structure to the point which differential opportunity, evaluation of individual contributions, ɪ in some sense proportional rewards were possible on a wider scale than ɛr before. This possibility seems to us the primary significance of the ınection between the Protestant Ethic of individual achievement and expression in market activity, made famous by Weber.[57]

[56] Little, *op. cit.*

[57] The connection between Protestant religious orientations and modern eco-ɴic ethics has long been the subject of academic debate. The classics of the debate Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Scrib-, 1958); and R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York: :ntor, *Books*, 1947). See also R. W. Green (ed.), *Protestantism and Capitalism* ɔston: Heath, 1959); and Talcott Parsons, "Richard Henry Tawney," *American :iological Review* (December 1962).

five

counterpoint and further development: the age of revolutions

The Differentiation of Europe in the Age of Revolutions

The Counter-Reformation societies tended drastically to "freeze" the process of differentiation, as we indicated in the last chapter, primarily because of the relations between their political regimes and a very defensive Church. Not only Protestantism but also many modernizing trends had to be opposed, especially those that might foster the independence of universalistically oriented units from the core structure of government, aristocracy, and church. These units included the "business" elements, those advocating more extensive and more democratic political participation, and "intellectual" groups, which by the eighteenth century were viewed with great suspicion by the authorities. The heartland of the Counter-Reformation, the Italian states and the papacy, served a primarily pattern-maintenance function in the general European system.

Spain became the most militant spokesman for the pre-Reformation order of society, often seeming "more Catholic than the Pope." In its secular social structure, Spain offered perhaps the prime example of a

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ɔortant conflicts of interest between the commercial urban groups and rural society of the "hinterland." [51]

The export trade in wool supported the new level of English com- ·cial activity. It strengthened urban commercial interests centered in ıdon, the seat of government, as well as the commercial and financial ter and a major port. The "putting-out system" [52] between spinners . weavers of wool in the countryside and the wool merchants provided escape from the restrictive rules of the urban guilds. Merchants in the ns "staked" countryside weavers who had home looms with yarn, ected the finished cloth, and sent it to London merchants for export. is system provided yet another bridge of economic interest between land-owning gentry and the upper groups in the towns.

The differentiation engendered by these economic changes was ilar to the kind that emerged between governmental organization and ietal community. The medieval differentiation between town and .ntry involved only very partial economic differentiation. Its basis is distinction between primary or "extractive" production (notably agri- ture) and trade and manufacture (mostly handicrafts) involved the nomic division of labor but extended economic and other functions ɔugh *whole communities*. A rural village was thus an agricultural unit, l a neighboring town was a unit for the provision of manufactured goods. ıer functions, like government, were centralized and could not be ead equally through all the small community units.

The "squires" long held much of the local power, and the gentry ıtributed the "social" leaders of "county society." The employment of ant farmers by owners, however, differentiated their own functions as ial and political leaders in the local community from those of economic ıduction in which their land was a factor of production. When farms ;ame more specifically economic enterprises, agricultural laborers and ant farmers were employed in something closer to modern occupational ɛs than the heriditary status of villein had been, and the standards of cess for enterprise became linked to solvency through market operations. rough the market, land owners established connections with groups ;side their own rural communities, especially merchants and "putting- :" entrepreneurs. This trend proliferated through specific markets eco- ɔmic relations that did not coincide with relations of other sorts, for .mple citizenship in local communities. Although the participants in : economic system could thus be divided generally into an "agricultural erest," a "mercantile interest," and, increasingly, a "manufacturing erest," it became more and more difficult to identify these interests

[51] Palmer, *op. cit.*

[52] See Edwin F. Gay, "Putting-Out System," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sci- es* (New York: Macmillan, 1934).

with whole communities rather than with differentiated units within communities.

Conclusion

Our major thesis has been that England had become by the end of the seventeenth century the most highly differentiated society in the European system, having advanced farther in this direction than had any previous society. Taking the societal community as our main point of reference, we have discussed the differentiation of religion, government, and economy from it.

First, the combination of a Protestant establishment with significant toleration and denominational pluralism broke the traditional European fusion of religion and government with the societal community. Not only was English government obligated to accord major rights to religious nonconformists, but also citizenship in the societal community was no longer bound to traditional religious conformity. This separation entailed both a new mode of integration and greater differentiation, in that the acceptable societal community was no longer confined to the coreligionists of the king (*eius religio*) but *included* Protestant nonconformists as well.

These developments involved generalization of the value level of the pattern-maintenance system in English society in two respects. First, the basis of value consensus had to be "moral," in the sense of being more general than any one denominational position would be. The Reformation and the splintering of Protestantism threatened the solidarity of the societal community. In England denominational religious commitment was, however, differentiated from moral consensus at the societal level. Second, there emerged a common commitment to the value of rational knowledge of the world, partly but not wholly because of its practical utility. Although not without strain, philosophy and science *as such*—not only, for example, Anglican philosophy and science—came to be regarded as "good things," supported across the religious spectrum, including Roman Catholicism.

Given the establishment of a "national" community, two main mechanisms of differentiation between the societal community and government developed. One was a government in which highly influential elements of the societal community were constituents of representative bodies rather than members of government; the critical role was played by the House of Commons. The second main mechanism was the law. More than any other legal system, English law drew a clear distinction between the status of member in the societal community with rights that the government was obligated to observe and the status of "subject" of the king as chief of government.

This differentiation was reinforced by the trend of relations between

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in turn facilitated by the relatively pluralistic political system in-
ding the crown, the City of London, and the aristocracy, itself divided
ween nobility and gentry.

This pluralism made relatively easy the inclusion of other emerging
nents in the societal community. Indeed the constituency of the
use of Commons was gradually extended not only to the boroughs but
he nineteenth century to a broad mass electorate as well. By the late
enteenth century England had both a relatively firmly integrated na-
ial state and a relatively pluralistic support system, which favored
ıre democratization in a step-by-step manner, rather than through
upt revolutionary change.

These political circumstances were strongly reinforced by the English
gious constitution and by development of the common law. Univer-
stic legal principles and the broad conception of the "rule of law,"
distinguished from arbitrary authority, were institutionalized in legal
ems practically all over Europe after the Renaissance, building on
nan traditions. Yet the common law was distinctive in three important
l related ways.[34] First was judicial independence from the crown, which
ne to a head with the ultimately successful struggle of Chief Justice
ke against James I.[35] Second was the closely corporate character of the
ıl profession, organized about the Inns of Court. Third was the em-
ısis upon legal embodiment of private rights and interests, sometimes
inst the privileges of government, sometimes in areas outside the normal
ge of governmental concern.[36] This process had two aspects. The first
olved the "rights of Englishmen," including habeas corpus, fair trial
l counsel, the protection of homes against arbitrary search, and ulti-
tely free speech, assembly, and the like. The second involved property
l contract, essential foundations of the industrial revolution. Coke's
ıck on the "monopolies" established by royal charter was of great
ıificance, a legal precursor of Adam Smith's attack on mercantilism.

English legal developments contributed substantially to differentiat-
government from the societal community. Law became less an instru-
nt of government and more a mediating "interface" between the two.
ıad to serve the needs of government but was sufficiently independent
serve pluralistic private needs as well. Government was thus placed in
dual position of defining and enforcing certain legally embodied re-
ctions on its own powers.

[34] See Maitland, *op. cit.*, and F. W. Maitland, *English Law and the Renaissance*
mbridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1901).
[35] Maitland, *English Law and the Renaissance*, McIlwain, *op. cit.*, and Roscoe
nd, *The Spirit of the Common Law* (Boston: Beacon, 1963).
[36] Pound, *op. cit.*

The legal profession came to occupy an interstitial status. It became established that judges, even in the exercise of the judicial powers of the House of Lords, should be professional lawyers. Both judges and barristers, the core of the legal profession, however, served mainly private clients, which might include government agencies.

Members of the legal profession—including judges—became the primary guardians of the rights of the general public, especially "civil" rights[37] and those of property, contract, and torts.[38] The independence of the judiciary and the bar seems also to have been related to the emergence of the second main branch of the British legal profession, the solicitors, who lacked the privilege of pleading in court but were the principal legal advisers to groups of all sorts. Through the solicitors the legal system penetrated the pluralistic structure of interest groups; through he bar and judiciary it maintained its delicate relation to government. The Inns of Court were in many ways reminiscent of medieval guilds. They resisted the "streamlining" of law that occurred on the Continent, the formalization of university training, the appointment of the most influential group of lawyers as civil servants, and an examination system to guarantee competence.

Although judges were public officials, they were also lawyers trained in an extragovernmental profession and *responsible* to the traditions of the common law. The barristers and solicitors, though private professional practitioners, also had public prerogatives and responsibilities. Furthermore, the adversary system acquired a special status. More than on the Continent, legal actions were conducted between private parties, each represented by counsel,before a judge and often heard by a jury under *procedural* rules. The judge tended to become an umpire rather than a decision maker. Furthermore, the courts themselves shaped law, especially in rendering decisions and setting precedents relatively independently of royal decrees and acts of Parliament.

The English system left the boundaries of the legal system quite open, permitting tentative approaches to consensus before full "legalization" of a norm and its enforcement by governmental authority were reached. Appeals to collective solidarity, moral standards, and practicality thus had a place in the system other than through high-level policy determination.

Continental legal systems differed from that of England, despite

[37] See T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1965).
[38] In Durkheim's terms, this development indicated a new emphasis on "restitutive" over "repressive" law. See Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (London: Macmillan, 1933).

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The landed aristocracies were the most important upper class, pro-
ing the support in prestige for the early development of modern terri-
ial monarchies.[19] The monarch was generally not only the chief of
e but also the "first gentleman" of his society, the apex of a complex
ictured hierarchy of social prestige. The aristocracy itself was a seamless
of lineages, an affinal collectivity bound by intermarriage and eligibility
intermarriage.[20]

Aristocratic lineages have tended to be anchored in local interest
ictures, especially in land. Historic landed proprietorship was, however,
iffuse superiority status, including not only ownership but also elements
political control and social ascendance.

The rise of the early modern state reduced the political power of
ticularistically defined aristocratic subgroups, especially their autono-
us territorial and military jurisdiction, in favor of a prestige position
t supported the monarchy.[21] Adequate economic support for those
stige positions rested largely in land ownership. In predominantly
al areas, therefore, economic elements were not radically different
m a more diffuse social matrix, the apex of which was local aristocracy.[22]

Under feudal conditions the whole aristocracy of Europe was, in
iciple, a single "seamless web." This unity was incompatible, however,
h division into national states. Religious differences resulting from the
formation created barriers to intermarriage and helped to contain the
tocracy supporting a prince within *eius religio*, but it did not eliminate
problem. In England, since the Tudor period "foreign" dynasties
e been more the rule than the exception: the Scottish Stuarts, the
tch House of Orange, and the German Hanoverians. Had this cos-
politanism extended to all the aristocracy, it would have impeded the
isolidation of ethnic-national identities. It is important, then, that
gland and France, the two leading national states, split on religious
l linguistic lines so that their aristocracies became basically distinct
m each other—and from others.

Along with the "nationalization" of the aristocracy, the integration
top political authority with aristocracy was a primary factor in enabling
al governments to establish their authority over national societal com-
nities.[23] This possibility in turn depended largely upon the military
ictions of aristocracies.

[19] See Palmer, *op. cit.*, and Beloff, *op. cit.*

[20] This conception of "affinal collectivity" has been much influenced by the
ıor's discussions with Charles D. Ackerman.

[21] Palmer, *op. cit.*, and Beloff, *op. cit.*

[22] See Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy:
d and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon, 1966).

[23] Beloff, *op. cit.*, and John B. Wolf, *The Emergence of the Great Powers* (New
k: Harper, 1962).

The process of differentiation between government and societal com-
munity was also focused on the relations between monarchy and aris-
tocracy, as shown by the deep conflicts of interest between the two. The
political power institutionalized in *specific* aristocratic status was greatly
lessened. Yet the new total power position of aristocracies varied greatly,
as the examples of England and France show.

Broadly speaking, the differentiation occurred in France in such a way
as to leave the aristocracy overwhelmingly dependent upon its social
prestige. On the whole, it was deprived not only of the exercise of political
power but also of the functions of contributing major contingent support
to political authority and of exerting a major influence over governmental
policy.[24] The sign of this outcome was the brilliant court of Versailles.
Centralization at the court loosened the attachment of the aristocracy
to their local communities, depriving them of local political power, which
in turn facilitated the encroachment of the central government on local
affairs.[25]

These remarks apply most directly to the older, more 'feudal" aris-
tocracy, the *noblesse d'épée*. The position of the newer aristocracy rela-
tively recently risen from bourgeois origins and based predominantly on
legal training, reinforced the integration of aristocracy and crown. The
legal profession was closely associated with the crown through public
offices merging administrative and judicial components. As legal officials,
the French lawyers stood between the crown and both the older aristoc-
racy and the bourgeoisie. There was considerable upward mobility through
these intermediate circles, partly through the sale of offices. Yet the up-
wardly mobile elements generally sought to attain the status of nobility
and to make their offices hereditary.[26]

Economically the *noblesse de robe* was primarily dependent upon the
crown both for various perquisites of its offices and, to the extent that it
held land, for enforcement of feudal dues and obligations upon the
peasantry. It lacked an independent economic base comparable to that
of the English landed gentry.

The Church was closely integrated into this system. More than in
England, high clerical offices went to members of aristocratic lineages.
Furthermore, there was no equivalent of English Protestant Noncon-
formism. This absence contributed to the militant anticlerricalism of the
Revolutionary opposition to the ancien régime. There was a collegial
aspect to the *noblesse*, in the form of the *parlements*. In contrast to the
British parliamentary system, however, the *parlements* were considerably

[24] Franklin L. Ford, *Robe and Sword: The Regrouping of the French Aristocracy
After Louis XIV* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953).

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] Palmer, *op. cit.*

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ıic solidarity that can focus such communities or included small seg-
ıts of larger ethnic communities for which their governments could
presume to speak. For political authorities in this precarious situation
ıe form of fundamental religious legitimation was especially important.
ɜir insecurity also contributed to political authoritarianism or "abso-
sm" and fear of concessions to popular participation in government.
ɜir peoples were "subjects," rather than "citizens."

The religious fission of European society and the emergence of
ɜreign states precipitated severe crises that culminated in the seven-
ıth century. No functional equivalent of the old Empire appeared, and
matter of religious legitimation remained a serious weakness of the
ɜrnational system, as its power relations lacked adequate normative
ılation.[9] This situation favored nearly chronic states of war and in-
ited the constructive use of political power that could have emerged in
etter-integrated collective system.

The Northwest

England, France, and Holland, each in a different
ı, took the lead in the power system of the seventeenth century. Dutch
ependence represented a major defeat for Spain. As the Austrians were
.vily engaged against the Turks, Continental hegemony fell to the
nch. Though not yet a paramount force in Continental affairs, Eng-
d did become the paramount maritime power during this century.

These three nations were the "spearhead" of early modernity. The
st important developments occurred in their societal communities.
e variations among the forms of the three societal communities were
nense, but each contributed major innovations relative to national
.darity. In particular, the English conception of national identity pro-
ed a basis for a more clearly differentiated societal community.[10] This
ˈerentiation proceeded on three fronts—religious, political, and economic
ach involving normative considerations. Legal innovations were thus
ical, especially those that favored associational rather than bureaucratic
entials of the structure of national community. They were closely re-
ɜd to the emergence of parliamentarianism and more developed market
nomies.

Religion and Societal Community

As noted earlier, the Reformation deprived the
sible" church of its sacramental character. Subsequently, under the

[9] Bryce, *op. cit.*, and Troeltsch, *op. cit.*

[10] See Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1961).

formula *cuius regio, eius religio*, the tendency was to bring the church under tighter secular control, as there was no international Protestant church capable of reinforcing ecclesiastical independence. The Protestant churches thus tended to become state or "national" churches, and conformity was enforced through political authority.

A second, "Puritan" phase, based on Calvinism in England and Holland, led to religious pluralism *within* Protestantism, which contrasted sharply with the religious character of Prussia, several other Protestant German principalities, and Scandinavia.

In seventeenth-century England differentiation of the religious system from the societal community could not occur without heavy involvement in politics. The Long Parliament, the Civil War, the establishment of the Commonwealth, the Restoration, and the Revolution of 1688 involved not simply political issues but also the religious future of England and much else as well. English religious development involved not only the conversion of the crown to Protestantism but also a broadening of the Elizabethan measure of religious toleration.[11] The *political* legitimacy of the Nonconformists became firmly established, preventing a return to a politically established church with a monopoly of religious legitimacy. Furthermore, through Nonconformism, the Church of England was exposed to influences from the religious "left," which could have been repressed in a purely "state church" system. Indeed, the "evangelical" wing of the Church of England has been fundamental to subsequent English development.

Interestingly, the long and severe repression of Roman Catholicism in England[12] contributed to this outcome. Greater tolerance for Roman Catholicism during the eighteenth century might well have led to a second Stuart restoration and perhaps a serious attempt at a Roman Catholic reestablishment. The solidarity of a basically Protestant societal community and the relative absence of religious tension facilitated such developments as extension of the franchise. Had the English "right" been obliged to uphold the "true Church," as well as monarchy and aristocracy, the strains would have been even more severe than they were, especially under the impact of the American and French Revolutions.[13]

Seventeenth-century Holland went considerably farther than England did in religious toleration. Over the long run, however, its religious constitution has proved less stable. A nineteenth-century Roman Catholic revival created a "columnar" structure among religious groups of approximately equal strength, thus introducing a severe religious rift into the

[11] W. K. Jordan, *The Development of Religious Toleration in England* (3 vols; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932–1940).

[12] The Catholic Emancipation Act was not passed until 1830.

[13] See R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution* (2 vols; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959 and 1964).

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the first crystallization of the modern system

four

We have chosen to date the beginning of the
:m of modern societies from certain seventeenth-century developments
:he societal community, especially the bearing of religion on the
:imation of society, rather than, as is usual, from eighteenth-century
ution toward "democracy" and industrialization.

After the Reformation shattered the religious unity of Western Chris-
lom, a relatively stable division arose, roughly along the north-south
All Europe south of the Alps remained Roman Catholic; a Roman
iolic "peninsula" thrust into northern Europe, with France as its
t important component. Protestantism in Switzerland enjoyed the
ection guaranteed by the special nature of Swiss independence. Al-
igh Vienna was predominantly Protestant at the start of the seven-
th century, the Hapsburgs were able to "recatholicize" Austria, aided
:he Turkish occupation of Hungary, where Protestantism was strong.

As religious struggle intensified, the "southern tier" of political units
;olidated. In the sixteenth century this consolidation involved a union
he two most important states, Austria and Spain, under the personal
of the Hapsburg Emperor Charles V. The "middle" of this empire
protected by the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily, immediately adjacent
to the Papal States. The presence of the papacy in Italy and the extent of Hapsburg power made continued effective independence of the Italian city-states impossible.

The Counter-Reformation enforced a particularly close alliance between Church and state, exemplified by the Spanish Inquisition. In comparison to the "liberal" trends within late medieval and Renaissance Roman Catholicism, the Counter-Reformation Church stressed rigid orthodoxy and authoritarianism in its organization. Civil alliance with the Church in enforcing religious conformity fostered the expansion and consolidation of centralized government authority. Such enforcement was undertaken in the name of the Holy Roman Empire, with its special religious legitimation and divinely ordained Emperor.[1] By that time the political structure of the Empire was far more integrated than it had been in the Middle Ages.

Nevertheless, the Empire was vulnerable, in that it centered in the loosely organized "German nation"—Austria's population was only partly German by that time, and the Hapsburgs had assumed the crowns of Hungary and Bohemia through personal unions. The Treaty of Westphalia, which had ended the bitter Thirty Years' War, had not only made Holland and Switzerland independent of the Empire, but had also drawn the religious line *through* the remaining parts; many of the German princes had chosen Protestantism for their domains under the formula *cuius regio, eius religio*. Far more than the defection from Rome of Henry VIII, this choice undermined the legitimation of the old secular structure of Christendom, for the Empire had been conceived as the "secular arm" of the Roman Catholic *system* of basic unity. The settlement was an uneasy compromise, acceptable only as an alternative to the indefinite continuation of a highly destructive war. Nevertheless, it ended any realistic expectation that a Roman Catholic European system could be restored.[2] For more than three centuries the heartland of the Counter-Reformation remained tenaciously resistant to many modernizing processes, citadels of monarchial legitimism, aristocracy, and semibureaucratic states of the older type.

Although the Protestants dreamed of prevailing throughout Western Christendom, they soon splintered into different branches and never developed a conception of unity corresponding to that of medieval Roman Catholicism.[3] This fragmentation furthered the development of independent territorial monarchies based on unstable integration of absolutist political regimes and "national churches."[4] It also, however, contained the seeds of the *internal* religious pluralism that was to advance rapidly in England and Holland.

[1] James Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire* (rev. ed.; London: Macmillan, 1904).
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, Vol. II (New York: Harper, 1960).
[4] G. R. Elton, *Reformation Europe, 1517–1559* (Cleveland: Meridian, 1963).