two Action Systems and Social Systems W e consider social systems' to be constituents of the more general system of action, the other primary constituents being cultural systems, personality systems, and behaviorial organisms; all four are abstractly defined relative to the concrete behavior of social interaction. W e treat the three subsystems of actions other than the social system as constituents of its environment. This usage is somewhat unfamiliar, espe- cially for the case of the personalities of individuals. It is justified fully elsewhere, but to understand what follows it is essential to keep in mind that neither social nor personality systems are here conceived as concrete entities. The distinctions among the four subsystems of action are functional. W e draw them in terms of the four primary functions which we impute to 1 See Chapter 2 of Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, (Engle- wood Cliff.;, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and our adicles "Social Systems and Sub- systems" and "lntenction" in the lntornationnl Encyclopcdin of the Social Scionces (New York: Macmillan, 1968); and the introductory materials in T. Panons, E. Shils, K.Naegele, and J. Pitts (eds.), Theories of Society (New York: Frec Press, 1961). all systems of action, namely pattern-maintenance. integration. goal-attain- ment, and adaptation.? An action system's primary integrative problem is the coordination of its constituent units, in the first instance human individuals, though for certain purposes collectivities may be treated as actors. Hence, we attribute primacy of integrative function to the social system. W e attribute primacy of pattern-maintenance-and of creative pat- tern change-to the cultural system. Whereas social systems are organized with primary reference to the articulation of social relationships, cultural systems are organized around the characteristics of complexes of symbolic meaning-the codes in terms of which they are structured, the particular clusters of symbols they employ, and the conditions of their utilization, maintenance, and change as parts of action systems. W e attribute primacy of goal-attainment to the personality of the individual. The personality system is the primary agency of action processes, hence of the implementation of cultural principles and requirements. On thelevel of reward in the motivational sense, the optimization of gratifica- tion or satifaction to personalities is the primary goal of action. The behavioral organism is conceived as the adaptive subsystem, the locus of the primary human facilities which underlie the other systems. It embodies a set of conditions to which action must adapt and comprises the primary mechanism of interrelation with the physical environment, especially through the input and processing of information in the central nervous system and through motor activity in coping with exigencies of the physical environment. These relationships are presented systemat- ically in Table 1. There are two systems of reality which are environmental to action in general and not constituents of action in our analytical sense. The first is the physical environment, including not only phenomena as under- standable in terms of physics and chemistry, but also the world of living organisms so far as they are not integrated into action systems. The second, which we conceive to be independent of the physical environment as well as of action systems as such, we will call "ultimate reality," in a sense derived from traditions of philosophy. It concerns what Weber3 called "problem of meaning" for human action and is mediated into action primarily by the cultural system's structuring of meaningful orienta- tions that include, but are not exhausted by, cognitive "answers." In analyzing the interrelations among the four subsystems of action- Z T h e four-function theory is presented in our intmductory essay, "An Outline of the Social System," in Theories of Society, pp. 30-79, and more briefly in Societies, p. 28. 3Max Weher, The Sociology of Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963). 4 Cf. Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System" in Michael Banton (ed.), Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion (New York: Pncger, 1966). Určeno pouze pro studijní účely Subsystems Primary Functions Social Integration * The shaded area represents the social subsystem's environment. This table presents tile harest schematic outline of the primary subsystems and their functional references for the General System af Action, of which the social system is one of four primary subsystems, that concentrated about integrative function. A somewhat more elaborate schema is pruented in Table 1, p. 26 of Societies; and a rationale of this schema has been presented in Panons, "Some Pmhlcms of General Theory in Sociology" in John C. McKinney and Edward Tyriakian (eds.), Thcorctical Sociology (New Yorli: Appleton-Century-Cmfts, 1970). and between these systems and the environments of action-it is essential to keep in mind the phenomenon of interpenetration. Perhaps the best- known case of interpenetration is the internalization of social objects and cultural norms into the personality of the individual. Learned content of experience, organized and stored in the memory apparatus of the organism, is another example, as is the institutionalization of normative components of cultural systems as constitutive structures of social systems. We hold that the boundary between any pair of action systems involvcs a "zone" of structured components or patterns which must be heated theoretically as common to both systems,not simplyallocated to one system or the other. For example, it is untenable to say that norms of conduct derived from social experience, which both Freud (in the concept of the Superego) and Durkheim (in the concept of collective representations) treated as parts of the personality of the individual, must be either that or part of the social sy~tem.~ It is by virtue of the zones of interpenetration that procsses of inter- change among systems can take place. This is especially true at the levels of symbolic meaning and generalized motivation. In order to "communi- cate" symbolically, individuals must have culturally organized common codes, such as those of language, which are also integrated into systems of their social interaction. In order to make information stored in the central nenrous system utilizable for the personality, the behavioral or- 6 Talcott Panons, "Tl~cSuperego and the Theory of Social Systems" in Social Structure and Personality (New York: Free Pms, 1964). ism must have mobilization and retrieval mechanisms which, through erpenetration, subserve motives organized at the personality level. Tlius, we conceived social systems to be "open." engaged in continual terchange of inputs and outputs with their environments. Moreover, we conceive them to be internally differentiated into various orders of subcomponents which are also continually involved in processes of inter- change. Social systems are those constituted by states and processes of social interaction among acting units. If the properties of interaction were de- rivable from properties of the acting units, social systems would be epi- phenomenal, as much "individualistic" social theory has contended. Our position is sharply in disagreement: it derives particularly from Durkheim's statement that society-and other social systems-is a "reality sui generis." The structure of social systems may be analyzed in terms of four types of independently variable components: values, norms, collectivities, and roles? Values take primacy in the pattern-maintenance functioning of social systems, for they are conceptions of desirable types of social systems that regulate the making of commitments by social units. Norms, which function primarily to integrate social systems, are specific to particular social functions and types of social situations. They include not only value components specified to appropriate levels in the structure of a social system, but also specific modes uf orientation for acting under the functional and situational conditions of particular collectivities and roles. Collectivities are the type of structural component that have goal- attainment primacy. Putting aside the many instances of highly fluid group systems, such as crowds, we speak of a collectivity only where two specific criteria are fulfilled. First, there must be definite statuses of membership so that a useful distinction between members and nonmembers can generally be drawn, a criterion fulfilled by cases that vary From nuclear families to political communities. Second, there must be some differentiationamong members in relation to their statuses and functions within the collectivity, so that some categories of members are expected to do certain things which are not expected of other members. A role, the type of structural component that has primacy in the adaptive function, we conceive as defining a class of individuals who, through reciprocal expec- tations, are involved in a particular collectivity. Hence, roles comprise the primary zones of interpenetration between the social system and the personality of the individual. A role is never idiosyncratic to a particular individual, however. A father is specific to his children in his fatherhood, @SeeTalcott Parsons, "General Theory in Sociology" in R. K. Merton, L. Bmom. and L. S. Cottrell, Jr. (eds.), Socblogy Today (New York: Basic Books, 1959, and Harper, 1965). 6 thcorctical orifntations 7 theoretical orientations Určeno pouze pro studijní účely but he is a father in terms of the role-structure of his society. At the same time, be also participates in various other contexts of interaction, filling, for example, an occupational role. The reality sui generis of social systems may involve the independent variability of each of these types of structural components relative to the others. A generalized value.pattern does not legitimize the same norms, collectivities, or roles under all conditions, for example. Similarly, many norms regulate the action of indefinite numbers of collectivities and roles, but only specific sectors of their action. Hence a collectivity generally functions under the control of a large number of particular norms. It always involves a plurality of roles, although almost any major category of role is performed in a plurality of particular collectivities. Nevertheless, social systems are comprised of combinations oE these structural com- ponents. To be institutionalized in a stable fashion, collectivities and roles must be "governed" by specific values and norms, whereas values and norms are themselves institutionalized only insofar as they are "im- plemented" by particular collectivities and roles. The Concept of Society W e define society as the type of social system characterized by the highest level of self-sufficiency relative to its environ- ments, including other social system^.^ Total self-su5ciency, however, would be incompatible with the status of society as a subsystem of action. Any society depends for its continuation as a system on the inputs it re- ceives through interchanges with its environing systems. Self-sufficiency in relation to environments, then, means stability of interchange relation- ships and capacity to control interchanges in the interest of societal func- tioning. Such control may vary from capacity to forestall or "cope with" disturbances to capacity to shape environmental relations favorably. The physical environment has an adaptive significance for a society in that it is the direct source of the physical resources which the society can exploit through its technological and economic mechanisms of pro- duction. The allocation of access to physical resources, in order to be linked with the division of labor through the ecological aspect of society, re- quires a territorial distribution of residential locations and economic interests among the various subgroupings of the population. The physical environment has a second significance for societies in that, because of the importance of physical force as a preventive of undesired action, effective societal goal attainment requires control of actions within a territorial area. Ileuce, there are hvo contexts of societal self-su5ciency that con- ? See Societies,Chapter 2 cem, respectively, economic and political functioning in relation to the physical environment, through technology and through the organized use of force in the military and police functions. A third context of societal self-sufficiencyconcerns the personalities of individual members in a special mode of interpenetration with the orga- nisms involved. The organism links directly to the territorial complex through the importance of the physical location of actions. But its main link with the social system involves the personality; this primary zone of interpenetration concerns the status of membership. A society can be self- sufficient only in so far as it is generally able to "count on" its members' performances to "contribute" adequately to societal functioning. NO more than in the other interchanges involved in self-sufficiency,need this integration behveen personality and society be absolute. Yet one could not speak of a society as self-su5cient if the overwhelming majority of its members were radically "alienated." The integration of members into a society involves the zone of inter- penetration behveen the social and personality systems. The relation is basically tipadte, however, because parts of the cultural system as well as parts of the social structure are internalized in personalities, and because parts of the cultural system are institutionalized in the society. At the social level, the institutionalized patterns of value are "collec- tive representations" a that define the desirable types of social system. These representations are correlative with the conceptions of types of social systems by which individuals orient themselves in their capacities as mem- bers. It is the members' consensus on value orientation with respect to their own society, then, that defines the institutionalization of value pat- terns. Consensus in this respect is certainly a matter of degree. Ilence self-sufficiency in this context concerns the degree to which the institu- tions of a society have been legitimized by the consensual value commit- ments of its rnembers.O At the cultural level, social values comprise only part of a wider system of value, since all other classes of objects in the action system must be evaluated too. Values are related to such other components of a cultural system as empirical knowledge, expressive symbol systems, and the constitutive symbolic structures that compose the core of religious systems.I0 Ultimately, values are mainly legitimized in religious terms. "Collective Reprercnbtions" is a concept intmduced by Durkheim to designate the cultunl basis of social organization. Hc wed it crpecially in his analysis of religion. W e shall trnt values, in Wcbeis senrc, ar special forms ot collective reprcrentativcr. See Talcott Parsons,Struehire of SocialAction (NewYork: Free PNS, 1968), Chapter 11. Cf. "An Outline of the Social System," in Theories of Socicfy. 'Osee Tslcott Parsons, "Introduction" to t l ~ esection "Culture and the Social System" in Thcorics of Society. theoretical nrinntntinnr 9 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely In the context of cultural legitimation, then, a society is self-sdcient to the extent that its institutions are legitimized by values that its members hold with relative consensus and that are in tnm legitimized by their congruence with other components of the cultural system, especially its constitutive symbolism. It is essential to remember that cultural systems do not correspond exactly with social systems, including societies. The more important cultural systems generally become institutionalized, in varying patterns, in a number of societies, though there are also subcultures within so- cieties. For example, the cultural system centering on Western Christi- anity has, with certain qualifications and many variations, been common to the whole European system of modemized societies. Two modes of the relation of one society to other societies are discussed in the present book. First, all societies we speak of as "politically organized" are involved with various other societies in "international relations" of various types, friendly or hostile. W e shall extend this conception and regard these rela- tions as themselves constituting a social system which can be analyzed with the same general concepts as other types of social system. Second, a social system may be involved with the social structure and/or the mem- bers and/or the culture of two or more societies. Such social systems are numerous and of many different kinds. American immigrant Families often retain effective kinship relations with people in the "old country," so that their kinship systems have both American and foreign "branches." Something similar can be said of many business firms, professional associa- tions, and religious collectivities. Although the Roman Catholic Church, for example, is a social system, it clearly is not a society since its self- su5ciency is very low by our criteria. Its control of economic resources through the organization of production is minimal; it lacks autonomous political control of territorial areas; in many societies, its members con- stitute a minority. Thus we must take account of both social systems which are "supersocietal" in being comprised of a plurality of societies and social systems that are "cross-societal" in that their members belong to a plurality of different societies. The Subsystems of Society In accord with our four-function scheme for analyzing systems of action, we treat a society as analytically divisible into four primmy subsystems (as shown in Table 2). Thus, the pattern- maintenance subsystem is particularly concerned with the relations of the society to the cultural system and, through if ultimate reality; the goal- attainment subsystem or the polity, to the personalities of individual mem- bers; the adaptive subsystem, or the economy, to the behavioral organism and, through it, the physical world. These divisions are clearest and most 10 thcorcticd orientations Table 2 Sacieb (more gcoenlly, rocin1system1 Strucfurol Aspects of Develop Components mental Process Primnry Function ~ocichlCommunity Norms lndusion Integration Pattern Maintenance Values Valuc Cenenlilation Pattern Maintenance or Fiduciary Polity Collcctivitia Differentiation Goal Attainment Economy Roles Adaptive Upgnding Adaphtion This table attempts to spell out, a little more elahontely, a four-function for the sacicty, or other type of social system, conceived as an integntive subrystcm of a genenl system of action. Tile socichl community, which is the primary subrystcm of reference for the present analysis, is placed in the left hand column; the other three follow it. Companding to this set is a classification in the second column, by thc n m e functional criteria, of four main rtructunl components of social systems. In the third column follows a corresponding classification of aspects of process of de- vclopmeuhl change in social systems which will be used extensively in the annlyris that follows. Finallv. the fourth column repeats the designation of four primary functional.. . categories. Except for the dcvclopmenhl paradigm, this schema was first fully presented in thc author's "Genenl Introduction, Part 11: An Outline of the Social System" in ThcoriEs of Society. For genenl comparison with Tables 1 and 2, please consult Socictiss, Tabla 1 and 2, pp. 28 and 29, and the accompanying explanatory note. important for societies advanced on the scale of modernity. However, the complexity of the relationships, both among subsystems of action and among subsystems of society, prevent these divisions From ever being very neat. For example, kinship structures must be located in all three of the above-mentioned subsystems. Through their relation to food, sex, biological descent, and residence, they are involved with the organism and the physi- cal environment. As the individual's primary source of early learning of values, norms, and modes of communication, they are very much involved with the pattern-maintenance system. As the ~rimarysource of socialized services, they are involved with the polity. Within this framework, the core of a society as a social system is the fourth component, its integrative subsystem. Because we treat the social system as integrative for action systems generally, we must pay special attention to the ways in which it achieves-or fails to achieve- various kinds and levels of internal integration. W e will call the integrative subsystem of a society the societal comrnunify. Perhaps the most general function of a societal community is to articulate a system of norms with a collective organization that has unity and cohesiveness. Following Weber, we call the normative aspect the system of legitimate order; 'l the collective aspect is the societal community 11 Max Wcbcr, Thc Theory of Sociol ond Economic Organiiatian (New Yorli: Oxford University Prss, 1947). Určeno pouze pro studijní účely as a single, bounded collectivity. Societal order requires clear and definitc integration in the sense, on the one hand, of normative coherence and, on the other hand, of societal "harmony" and "coordination." Moreover, normatively-defined obligations must on the whole be accepted while conversely, collectivit~esmust have normative sanction in performing their functions and promohng their legitimate interests. Thus, normative order at the societal level contams a "solution" to the problem posed by Hobhes --of preventing human relations from degenerating into a "war of all against all." It is important not to treat a structure of societal norms as a mono- lithic entity. Hence we distinguish four components analytically, even though they overlap greatly in specific content. Our distinctions concern the grounds of obligations and rights as well as the nature of sanctioning noncompliance and rewarding compliance or unusual levels of performance. The Core: The Societal Community Our core category, the societal community, is relatively unfamiliar-probably because it is generally discussed in religious and political rather than social terms. In our view the primary function of this integrative subsystem is to define the obligations of loyalty to the societal collectivity, both for the membership as a whole and for various categories of differentiated status and role within the society. Thus in most modem societies willingness to perform military service is a test of loyalty for men, but not for women. Loyalty is a readiness to respond to properly "justified" appeals in the name of the collective or "public" in- terest or need. The normative problem is the definition of occasions when such a response constitutes an obligation. In principle loyalty is required in any collectivity, but it has a special importance for the societal com- munity. Organs of government are generally the agents of appeals to societal loyalty as well as agents of implementahon of the associated norms. Iiowever, there are many instances in which government and justified community agency do not directly coincide. Particularly important are the relations between subgroups' and individual's loyalties to the societal collectivity and to other collectivities of which they are memben. Role+luralism, the involvment of tlie same penons in several collectivities, is a fundamental feature of all human societies. On the whole, an increase in role-pluralism is a major feature of the differentiation processes leading toward moden; types of society. Therefore, the regulation of the loyalties, to the community itself and to various other collectivities, is a major problem of integration for a societal community. Individualistic social theory has persistently exaggerated the sign& cance of individual "self-interest" in a psychological sense as an obstacle 12 theoretical aricntotions integration of social svstems. The self-interested motives of indi- are, on the whole, effectively channeled into the social system a variety of memberships and loyalties to collectivities. The most problem for most individuals is the adjustment of obligations the competing loyalties in cases of conflict. For example, the adult male in modern societies is both an employee and a mem- family household. Although the demands of these two roles often nflict, most men have a heavy stake in fulfilling loyalties to both. A societal community is a complex network of interpenetrating col- d collective loyalties, a system characterized by both functional on and segmentation. Thus kinship-household units, business s, churches, governmental units, educational collectivities, and the are differentiated from each other. Moreover, there are a number of type of collective unit-for example, a very large number of house- c11 comprised of only a few persons, and many local communities. Loyalty to the societal community must occupy a high position in ny stable hierarchy of loyalties and as such, is a primary focus of societal wever it does not occupy the highest place in the hierarchy. tressed the importance of cultural legitimation of a society's tive order because it occupies a superordinate position. It operates first instance through the institutionalization of a value-system, part of both the societal and the cultural systems. Then its sub- hich are specifications of general value patterns, become parts of ry concrete norm that is integrated into the legitimate order. The em of norms governing loyalties, then, must integrate the rights and of various collectivities and their members not only with each t also with the bases of legitimation of the order as a wh01e.~ In its hierarchial aspect, the normative ordering of the societal com- munity in terms of memberships comprises its stmtificoh'on scale, the scale of tlie accepted-and, so far as values and norms are integrated, legiti- mized+restige of subcollectivities, statuses, and roles and of persons as societal memben. It must be coordinated both with universal norms governing the status of membership and with the elements of differentia- tion among the functions of subcollectivities, statuses, and roles, which do not as such imply a hierarchy. The concrete stratification system, then, is a complex function of all these components. Role-pluralism renders the problem of tlie status of individuals in a stratification system especially complex. Stratification mechanisms have generally treated individuals as diffusely integrated in large collective systems, membership in which defines their status. Lineages, ethnic groups, "estates," and social classes have operated in this way. However "On thae matters, see Robert N.Bellall, "Epilogue," in Religion and Progrcss in Modcm Asia (New York: Prcc Press, 1965). 13 theoretical oricntntions Určeno pouze pro studijní účely modem society requires a differentiation of individual statuses from diffuse background solidarities, giving modem systems of stratification a distinc- tive character.'" The position of a subcollectivity or individual in the stratification system is measured by the level of its or his prestige or capacity to exercise influence. Influence we conceive to be a generalized symbolic medium of societal interchange, in the same general class as money and power. It consists in capacity to bring about desired decisions on the part of other social units without directly offering them a valued quid pro quo as an inducement or threatening them with deleterious consequences. Influence must operate through persuasion, however, in that its object must be con- vinced that to decide as tlie influencer suggests is to act in the interest of a collective system with which both are solidary. Its primary appeal is to the collective interest, but generally on the assumption that the parties involved have particular interests in promoting the collective interest and their mutual solidarity. Typical uses of influence are persuasion to enter into a contractual relation "in good faith" or to vote for a specific political candidate. InRuence may be exchanged for ad hoc benefits or for other hrms of influence, in a sense parallel to that in which monetary resources may either be used to obtain goods or pooled or exchanged. Influence may also be exchanged for other generalized media such as money or power." Societal Community and Pattern-Maintenance The bases of cultural legitimation transcend direct contingencies of influence, interests, and solidarity, being grounded at the societal level in aalue cornn~itmcnts.By contrast with loyalty to col- lectivities, the hallmark of a value-commihnent is greater independence from considerations of cost, relative advantage or disadvantage, and social or environmental exigency in the meeting of obligations. The violation of a commitment is defined as illegitimate: its fulfillment is a matter of honor or conscience which may not be comprised without dishonor and/or euilt.m~ ~-~ Although this may sound very restrictive, as indeed such commitments oten are, the degree and kind of restrictiveness involved depends on a variety of factors. Commitment to values in general implie; the assump- tion of an obligation to help implement them in concrete action. Especially where the value system is "activistic," as it generally is in modem societies, this implies realistic acceptance of certain conditions of collective action. 'Valcott Parsons, "Equality and Inequality in Modcm Society, or Social Stratifi- cation Revisited," Sociological Inquiry, 4011 (Spring 1970). '4 Talcott Penons, "On the Concept of Influcncc," Politics ond Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1969). contain a category of commitments to "valued associa- timate collective relationships and enterprises. What ued is a matter that varies widely among societies. le to ensure the legitimacy of association by reshict- gitimation to quite specifically defined acts, however, because actors scope for considerable discretion if they are to implement their ues under varying circumstances. One major factor in setting the is the level of generality of the legitimating values. nction not to exploit others in economic transactions a specific prohibition of lending money at interest. value systems, so that they can effectively regulate relying upon particularistic prohibitions, has been central Factor in the modernization process. At the cultural level, the relevant aspect of values is what we or- concerns the evaluation of tlie objects of experience context of social relationships. A moral act implements a cultural lue in a social situation involving interaction with other actors. As a atter of interaction, it must involve standards which bind the interactors values comprise only one component of the value-content of ers being, for example, aesthetic, cognitive, or speci- .Culture; also become differentiated on bases other ral, so that religion, art as expressive symbolization, empirical y science), also become independent, differentiated s. A highly differentiated cultural system along with com- lex modes of articulation, is a hallmark of modem ~ocieties.'~ Societal Community and the Polity In addition to the aspects of a societal normative order centering about membership and loyalty and about cultural legitima- tion, we must consider a third. Influence and value-commitments operate voluntarily, through persuasion and appeal to honor or conscience. How- ever, no large and complex social system can endure unless compliance with large parts of its nonnative order is binding, that is negative situational sanctions attach to noncompliance. Such sanctions both deter noncom- pliance-in part by "reminding" the good citizen of his obligations-and punish infraction if, as, and when it occurs. The socially organized and regulated exercise of negative sanctions, including threats of using them when intentions of noncompliance are suspected, we call the function of enforcement. The more highly differentiated a society, the more likely en- 16 Talcott Parsons, "Introduction" to "Culture and the Social System" in Theories of society. Určeno pouze pro studijní účely forcement is to be performed by specialized agencies s and military establi~hments.'~ Regulated enforcement requires some mode of determining the ac- tual fact, agency, and circumstances of the infraction of norms. Among the specialized agencies that operate in this connection are courts of law and the legal profession. A complex normative order requires not only en- forcement, however, but also authoritative interpretation. Court systems have very generally come to combine the determination of obligations, penalties, and the like for specific cases with interpretation of the mean- ing of norms, often a very general problem." Less developed societies tend to reserve the latter function to religious agencies, but modem societies entrust it increasingly to secular courts. These problems raise questions about rhe relation between a societal community and the polity. In our analytical terms, the concept political includes not only the primary functions of government, in its relation to a societal community, but also corresponding aspects of any ~ollectivity.'~ W e treat a phenomenon as political in so far as it involves the organiza- tion and mobilization of resources for the attainment of the goals of a par- ticular collectivity. Thus business firms, universities, and churches have political aspects. In the development of modem societies, however, gov- ernment has increasingly become diEerentiated from the societal com- munity as a specialized organ of the society that is at the core of the polity. As it has become differentiated, government has tended to center on two primary sets of functions. The first concerns responsibility for main- taining the integrity of the societal community against generalized threats, with special but not exclusive reference to its legitimate normative order. This includes the function of enforcement and a share in the Function of interpretation, at least. Moreover, the general process of governmental differentiation creates spheres within which it becomes admissible expli- citly to formulate and promulgate new norms, making legislation part of this function also. The second primary function, the executive, concerns collective action in whatever situations indicate that relatively specific measures should be undertaken in the "public" interest. This responsibility ranges ftom certain inherently essential matters, such as defense of terri- torial control and maintenance of public order, to almost any issue deemed to be "affected with a public interest." 10 'UTalcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Placc of Force in Social Pmccrr" in Sociological Tl~eoryand Modem Society (New York: Frcc Press, 1967). '7 Extremely suggestive in this regard is Lon Fuller. Thc Morolity of Low (Ncw Haven: Yale University Press, 1964). 'STalcott Parsons, "The Political Aspect of Social Structure and Pmcess" in David Easton (ed.), Varictim of Political Theory (Englervaod Clilis, N.J.: Prenticc-Hall, 1966). (Reprinted in Politics and Social Structure.) 10 Ibid; see also Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingltam Powell, Comjlnmtive Poli- tics; A Dcvclopmcntol App~ooch(Boston:Little, Brown, 1966). The basic relations between government and the societal community be ascribed. Even early modem societies defined the common people ly "subjects" of a monarch, ascriptively obligated to obey his au- Fully modem levels of differentiation, however, have tended to e power of political leadership contingent on the support of very tensive proportions of the population. In so far as this is true, we shall tinguish roles of political leadership from positions of authority more Differentiation between leadership and authority necessitates special neralization of the medium we call power.20W e define power as capacity ke-and "make stick"-decisions which are binding on the collec- of reference and on its members in so far as their statuses carry obli- ahons under the decisions. Power must be distinguished from influence or the promulgation of binding decisions differs importantly from at- empts to By our definition, a citizen exercises power when he sts his vote because the aggregate of votes bindingly determines the lectoral outcome. Only a little power still is power, just as one dollar, ough only a little money, very definitely is money. Societal Community and the Economy A foulth component of the normative order oncerns matters of practicality. Its most obvious fields of application are e economic and technological; its governing principle is the desirability efficient management of resources. Even where issues of collective loy- a ty, binding obligations, and morality are not involved, the action of an I or collectivity will be disapproved if it is unnecessarily wasteful careless. In modern societies, the normative aspect of these considera- ons is especially clear in the regulation of the use of labor as a factor of production in the economic sense. Commitment to the labor force involves an obligation to work effectively within the legitimate conditions of em- ployment?' As Weber noted, there is a crucial moral element in this obli- gation. But short of the moral emphasis, rational economic and techno- logical action is very generally approved, while deviation from the relevant standards of rationality is disapproved. The differentiation of autonomous structures necessitates the devel- opment of a generlized monetary medium in association with a market system. Money and markets operate where there is a sufficiently complex division of labor and where spheres of action are sufficiently differentiated from political, communal, or moral imperatives?? Of the generalized XTelcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power," in Politics and Sociol Stluctur~. Smelrer, Thc Sociology of Economic Life (Englewood Prentic~I%~1963). "Ibid: see also Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelrer, Economy and York: Free P m , 1956). Určeno pouze pro studijní účely mechanisms of societal interchange, money and markets is the least directly involved with the normative order as it centers in the societal community. Hence, practical rationality is regulated mainly by institutional norms, above all the institutions of property and contract which have other bases of sanction.% Methods of Integration in Increasingly Differentiated Societies The Legal System What we have been treating as the societal normative order comes very close to what is generally meant by the con- cept of law. Much discussion of the law stresses the criteria of bindingness and enforceability, associating law primarily with government and the state. Other lines of analysis stress the consensual elements in the norma- tive validity of law, a theme which permits emphasis on the importance of its moral legitimation. W e treat law as the general normative code regu- lating action of, and defining the situation for, the member units of a society.?' It is comprised of the components just reviewed integrated into a single system. Very generally, modern legal systems contain constitutional compo- nents, whether written as in the United States or unwritten as in Britain. In the zone of interpenetration between the pattem-maintenance system and the societal community, the constitutional element defines the main outline of the normative framework governing societal relationships in general-as in the American Bill of Rights. On modem levels of differen- tiation, such content is clearly not religious, since its normative validity is h m e d for the societal system, not the full range of action in general. Indeed, there has been a modem tendency to dissociate specific religious commitment from the constitutional rights and obligations of citizenship. Because religious affiliation generally involves the formation of collectivi- ties, it must always be articulated in the societal community. However, the two need not be coextensive. Neither is the constitutional element "purely moral," for moral con- siderations too extend over a wider range than do societal values. Consti- tutional norms articulate with the societal community and involve the component of societal loyalty in the form of valued association; law con- cerns the morality of citizenship, but not necessarily all morality. Fnrther- 28Thcclnssic analysis of the rignificancc of property and contract for social syr. tems war developed by Emile Durkheim in T11cDivirion of Labor in Society (New York: Macmillnn, 1933). ?4 Cf.Fuller, op. cit.; also his Anatomy of the Ldlv (New York: Praegcr, 1968). the moral element can ~rovidethe grounds for legitimized revolts st a societal normative order, varying From minor civil disobedience ution. though the constitutional element is presumptively enforceable, ment always raises a question of whether the organs of government egitimately acting in a constitutional--and back of that a mora1-sense. ce, a second aspect of the constitutional element is the normative nition of the broad functions of govemmenf including the extent and ~tationson powers of the various governmental agencies. Constitutional in this sense becomes increasingly important as the societal community es to be differentiated from its government. The powers of government en need specific justification, for the societal community would not be equately protected from arbittary uses of power if it were to grant blanket egitimacy to its "rulers" to act upon their own interpretations of the It is crucial that "executive" authority comes to be differentiated from the governmental functions that have direct constitutional relevance. In modem societies explicit legislation as a differentiated function is mini- 5 because the normative order is mainly gisen in a tradition or found- revelation. Hence, the legitimation of a continuing legislative Eunction distinctively modem development. With a good many qualifying com- ations, it has tended to require that the legislative process should ac- ly involve the societal community through a system of representation. trend has been to make the power to legislate contingent upon the atos' interaction with the interested elements of the community, tely the total electorate in most modem societie~."~Indeed, a similar gency generally applies to occupants of executive antllority. The angeability of the law, which has resulted from these developments, has ade it particularly important to have differentiated provision for concern with the "constitutionality" of law. Although the American system of jodi- cial review is special in various respects, modem constitutions have very generally established some agency that is not purely governmental, espe- cially in the executive sense, to pass judgment on constitutional issues. It is under this broad constitutional framework that the lower order functioning of the legal system proceeds. It consists in the making of hind- ing decisions, for the most part by officially "authorized" agencies (usually courts of law), and in various processes of their implementation by ad- ministrative procedures. It is particularly important that the extraconsti- tutional content of law is not confined to specific acts of legislation, nor ?-"Onour unge of the concept of legitimation, compare Weber, The T h ~ o vof Saciol and Economic Organimtion. 20 Cf.Parsons, "n~ePolitical Aspect of Social Stmcturc and Pmcess" in Varilies af Politieol Theory. 19 theoretical orientations Určeno pouze pro studijní účely to publicly binding decisions of executive agenc ludes ele men& of both the legal tradition generated in court decisions that stand as precedents, and the "administrative law" of generalized "rulings," rather than particular case decisions, promulgated by administrative agencies (but subject to legislative and judicial review). Our whole discussion of normative order and its relation to the polity applies in principle to any social system, although the relation behveen government and the societal community is of principal importance. One source of this importance is that in general, only government is authorized to use socially organized physical force as an instrument of compulsion. Indeed an effective governmental monopoly of force is a major criterion of integration in a highly differentiated society.?? Moreover, only govern- ment is entitled to act for the societal collectivity as a whole in contexts of collective goal-attainment. Any otl~eragency that directly presumes to do so commits a revolutionary act ips0 facto. Membership in the Societal Community In discussing the legitimate order of society, we have frequently refered to the collective aspect of the societal community. Our multiple criteria of a society indicate that the relation between these two primary aspects must be complex, especially in that the jurisdiction of the norms cannot neatly coincide with community membership. The most obvious discrepancy derives From the territorial basis of societies. Territorial jurisdiction requires that normative couh.01 is to some extent independent of actual membership in the societal community. For exam- ple, temporary visitors and long term "resident aliens," as well as the property holdings of "foreign" interests, must be regulated. These considerations indicate that a particularly important part of the relation between the normative and the collective aspects of a societal community concerns their mutual relations to government. Government cannot simply ''rule," hut must be legitimized in governing a relatively bounded community by taking responsibility for the maintenance of its normative order. At one extreme, the principal content of tlie normative order may be considered more or less universal to all men. Ilowever, this raises acute problems of how far such liigllly universalistic norms can be effectivelyinstitutionalized in the actual operations of so extensive a com- munity. At the other extreme, both government and the normative order may apply only to a particular small community. Within tlie broad range of variation between these extremes, modem societal commuuiti.es have generally taken a form based upon nationalism. The development of this form has involved both a process of differentiation behveen societal com- "7 Weber, The Theory of Socizl and Economic Orgonimtion. form in the nature of societal community, ally w i h respect to membership. e immediate background for the development was, for the most mnre or less "absolute" monarchv in which the individual was con-.---.- - ..-.. a "subject" of his king. It was important that this "direct" relation ect to sovereign replaced the tangle of particularistic solidarities characterized Feudal societv. However, the "subject" pattern of so-.. .~.-. 1 membership was in turn replaced by a citizenship pattern. The first phase in the development of the citizenship complex was . creation of a leeal or civic framework that fundamentally redefined-boundary-relations between the societal community and the govern- t or "state." 28 A critical aspect of the new boundaries was the defini- of "rights" of the citizen, the protection of which became an impor- obligation of government. In the early phase, the protection of rights ly went farthest in English Common Law of the 17th century. er, it was a pan-European development that also produced the rman conception of the Rechtsstaat. The process was simplified in testant areas because the citizens had to deal with only one main focus, political authority, which organizationally controlled the church as 1as thestate.20 In England the first phases of religious toleration within testanism ccmprised an essential part of the broader process of estab- e second main phase in the development of citizenship concerned tion in public affairs. Although the legal rights of the first phase to infiuence government, especially through rights dom of the press. the next phase institutionalized. . ve rights to participate in the selection of governmental leadership gh the franchise. The spread of the franchise "downward" in the structure has often been gradual, yet there has been a conspicuous mmon trend toward universal adult suffrage,the principle of one citizen, e vote, and secrecy of the ball0t.3~ A third main component of citizenship is "social" concern with the elfare" of citizens, treated as a public resp~nsibility.~~Whereas legal hts and the franchise support capacities to act autonomously in tlie s of citizenship, the social component concerns the provision of re- c opportunities to make good use of such rights. Hence, it attempts 28 Our entire diacursion of citizenship is heavily in debt to T. H. Marrhall's C h s , Citizenship, dnd Social Development (Garden City, N.Y.:Anchor Boob. 1965). 3 Cf.Seymour Martin Lipzet and Stein Rokkan, "introduction" to Party Systems and Votcr A~ignrn~nt(New York: Free Press, 1968). 30Stein Rokkan, "Masr Suffngc, Sccrct Voling, and Political Participation" in Europeort lourndl of Sociology, I1 (1961): 132-52. "MMarrhall, op. cit. 21 thcorctical ori@nhtions Určeno pouze pro studijní účely to ensure that adequate minimum standards of "living," health care, and education are available to the masses of the population. It is particularly notable that the spread of education to ever wider circles of the popula- tion, as well as an upgrading of the levels of education, has been closely connected with the development of the citizenship complex. The development of modem institutions of citizenship has made possible broad changes in the pattern of nationality as a basis of the soli- darity of the societal community. In early modem society, the strongest foundation of solidarity was found where the three factors of religion, ethnicity, and territoriality coincided with nationality. In fully modem societies however, there can be diversity on each basis, religious, ethnic, and territorial, because the common status of citizenship provides a suffi- cient foundation fur national solidarity. The institutions of citizenship and nationality can nevertheless render the societal community vulnerable if the bases of pluralism are exacerbated into sharply structured cleavages. Since the typical modem community unifies a large population over a large tenitory, for example, its solidarity may be severely strained by regional cleavages. This is particularly true where the regional cleavages coincide with ethnic and/or religious divisions. Many modem societies have disintegrated before varying combinations of these bases of cleavage. Societal Community, Market Systems, and Bureaucratic Organization Where societal solidarity is emancipated from the more primordial bases of religion, ethnicity, and territoriality, it tends to foster other types of internal differentiation and pluralization. The most important of these are based on economic, political, and associational (or integrative) functions. The economic category refers above all to the de- velopment of markets and the monetary instruments essential to these Functions, which, we have noted, presuppose the institutionalization in new forms of contract and property relations. Thus, they rest on the "rights" component of citizenship, for an economy that is purely "admin- istered" by agencies of central government would violate the freedoms of private groups to engage in market transactions autonomously. Once the market system of an economy is highly developed, however, it becomes very important to government as a channel for the mobilization of resources. In the earlier phases of modernization, markets are primarily commer- cial, involving trade in physical commodities, and secondarily financial, involving operations of lending and borrowing. The large scale entrance of the primary factors of production into the market system is the principal hallmark of the "industrial" phase of economic development. In addition to the advances in technology, this centers on the social organization of 22 thcorctical orientations p&;+;.;,:~?&$~e...productiveprocess, involving new forms of the utilization of man- bureaucratic contexts?? discussine the oolitical asoect of societies above, we were rather. --.--.-~~~ -~ .e. W e dealt primarily with 'the relation of to the total community, stressing the direct articulation between them in the rt" system. This system concerns primarily the interaction of leader- ements, both within and aspiring to governmental positions, and ents of the social structure that are not directly involved in the gov-- ernmental svstem as such. The Drocesses of mteraction comprise both the ange of political support and leadership initiative, and the inter- of governmental decisions and "demands" from various interest ups. These interchanges constitute a system requiring a certain equili- tion if the polity is to be stably integrated with the societal community. The other principal operative structure of government is the adminis- ve organization, including military establishment, through which pol- decisions are implemented. In general, bureaucratization developed manly though not exclusively, in governments. Among its most impor- features is the institutionalization of roles as ofices that have rela- y well defined spheres of official function, authority, and "power" e separated from the incumbent's private affairs. Offices are differ- tiated on two bases, function performed for the organization and posi- 'n the hierarchy or "line" authority.% The development of bureaucratic organization in general necessitates tbe relevant form of office be an occupational role, an incumbent "appointed" through some kind of "contract of employment." his family's subsistence generally depends on his salary or wage eration. In turn, this requires a "labor market" for the allocation of man services in terms of negotiations over employment oppoltunities A major feature of an industrial economy is the bureaucratic organ- tion of production and, correspondingly, the mobilization of manpower rough labor markets. By a complex progression through a number of ases, the economy has produced an inimense proliferation of bureau- atic organization outside the governmental sphere. One principal stage as based upon the "family firm" of early industrial "capitalism," which was bureaucratized at the "labor" but not the managerial level. W e consider bureaucratic organization to be primarily political be- cause it is oriented in the first instance to collective goal-attainment. In the case of the business firm the collectivity is a private group within the societal community; in the case of government it is the whole community 82 Smelrer n h eit-...-...., . . .... "TTaott P~arrons,Structuresand P~occssin Modem Societies (New York: Free Press, 1960), Chapters 1-5. Určeno pouze pro studijní účely organized for collective goal-attainment. Neve ment as a form of membership in a collectivity, of its relations to membership through other modes of participation in economic enterprise. Of course, private bureaucracy is not confined to economic production, but is found in churches, universities, and many other types of collectivity. The market systems we have discussed are involved in interchange between the economy and the pattern-maintenance system, on the one hand, and the economy and the polity on the other. They do not directly involve the societal community since its functions vis-8-vis these subsys- tems are regulative through the general normative order more than directly constitutive. W e must also emphasize the distinction between the "com- mercial" markets, dealing with physical commodities, and the "labor" markets, dealing with human services, including those at high levels of competence and responsibility. From a sociological point of view, we find confusing the economists' common practice of treating "goods and ser- vices" together as the primary output of the economy. Associational Organization A third main type of structuring that modern societal collectivities make possible is the "associational." Perhaps the pm- totype of an association is the societal collectivity itself, considered as a corporate body of citizens holding primarily consensual relations to its normative order and to the authority of its leadership. A major trend of modem associations has been toward a ccrtain egalitarianism, manifested most clearly and importantly in the three aspects of citizenship which we have discussed. A second trend of associational structure is toward voluntariness. Of ' course, this principle can never be applied strictly to compliance with a nor- mative order or collective decisions, for an element of bindingness is es- sential to all collectivities. However, it often applies almost literally to decisions to accept and retain membership, an alternative to compliance always being resignation. The relationship between the societal community and government, however, is special. Other associations exist under a gen- eral governmental and societal protection, but the very basis of security itself rests on the fundamental combination. Hence, elements of compul- sion and coercion are present in the enforcement of the societal normative order that are absent in otl~ercases. Tlle equivalent of "resignation," tvliich is emigration, entails a far heavier cost than does the relinquishment of other associational memberships. In principle it also entails accepting an- other societal-governmental order, whereas in the case of divorce, one need not remarry. A third major characteristic of associational organization, which very societal collectivity and to governmental agencies, procedural institutions?4 Although particularly signi- em, they also permeate the processes of associational at the level of representative bodies and at that of n. In general, procedural systems consist of two a code of rules. The first regulates the discussions rties may attempt to persuade the participants in the isions. It has many forms, but generally meetings are ed according to rules of order which a presiding officer is responsi- mplementing. Discussion within associations is a primary sphere of ration of inEuence as a medium for facilitating social process. From wpoint of an interested party, discussion serves to improve the es of having his view prevail; from the viewpoint of the collectivity, litates an approach to consensus. The second level concerns the actual process of deciding itself. In iding agency is a jury, judge, or panel of judges. ever, by far the most common practice-within juries and judicial s as elsewhere-is voting, with its general tendencies toward the prin- ne vote and the equal weighting of votes, the logi- ch is majority rule. In any case, decision by voting n advance, including the expectation that decisions a t by correct observance of the procedural rules will be accepted defeated elements. In such cases as the election of governmental rship this may be a focus of very severe strain; implementing this re- rement is a paramount test of the institutionalization of "democratic" Concurrent with the development of associationalism in government, re has been a vast proliferation of associations in other sectors of society. cal parties articulate with governmental process, but also with many of associated "interest groups," most of which represent a variety of erative collectivities. There are also associations organized about innu- erable "causes," as well as interests of diverse sorts, for example, recrea- In hvo broad contexts, highly important operative Functions of mod- em societies are performed almost entirely by associational structures. The &st is the involvement of "fiduciary" boards in the larger-scale sectors of business enterprise and in many other types of "corporate" organizations. In relation to "executive management," they somewhat parallel the rela- tion of the legislature to the executive organs of a modem government. Sometimes the members of such boards are in some sense elected, e.g. by stockholders, but often not. In any case, they have largely replaced the "Compare Wcbeis concept of formal ntionality in MUXWebcr on Low and Society, Max Rlleinstcin (ed.), (Cambridge: Harvnrd University PNS, 1954). thooreticul orientations 25 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely ldnship element as the "nonbureaucratic" top o by which a wider range of re- reaucratic structures of business.3K In the "private nonprofit" sector, too, al units, so that their functioning can be ultimate control, especially in regard to financial responsibility, tends in ns on its predecessors. Modern factories. some sense to be held by fiduciary boards. mmihnents to render setvice from those The second very large associational development concerns the pr fes~ions.8~Though much professional function has traditionally been per- formed in the framework of individual "private practice," professionals ergoing differentiation have long tended to associate in order to advance their common interests, tion. In general, these including the maintenance of professional standards of competence and new units, structures, integrity. Iligher education has gained increasing prominence in this com- of the societal corn- plex, not least in the training of practicing professionals. Hence, the pro- become differentiated fession of higher education, and of scholarly research, has also been ac- quiring greater relative importance. It is notable that the core structure of the academic profession, the faculty, is basically associational. All three of the main types of operative organization (markets, bu- reaucracy and assocktional structures) have been growing increasingly prominent in the processes of differentiation and pluralization of modem societal communities. Processes of Evolutionary Change must be couched at a higher level of generality in order to ensure Although it has been tlie most prominent in the foregoing discussion, we consider differentiation to be one of four main processes of structural change which, interacting together, constitute "pro- nary development. In discussing the generalized media of inter- gressive" evolution to higher system levels. W e call the other three proc- among units of a social system, namely influence, political power, esses adaptive upgrading, inclusion, and value genenlization (in applica- and value commitments, we have attended primarily to their most tion to social systems)."" Differentiation is the division of a unit or structure in a social system into two or more units or structures that differ in their characteristics and functional significance for the system. W e have already discussed a corn- plex instance of differentiation: The emergence of both the modem fam- ily and modern employing organization fro diffusely functioning Peasant family household, which involved changes in labor. W e have argued elsewhere that this fundamental property of many roles, collectivities, and norms. A process of differentiation results ney, i.e.. its capacity for expanding economic productivity through the in a more evolved social system, however, only if each newly differentiated component has greater adaptive capacity than the component that previ- ously performed its primary function. '5 In The Theory of Social and Economic Organizntion Webcr emphasizes that all bureaucncier must be headed nonburcaucntically. 3oTalcott Parsons, "Professions" in the Interndtiondl Encyclopsdin of the Socis1 Sciences. =?This pandigm was originally presented in Talcott Parrons, "Some Considcn- tions on the Theory OF Social Change" in Rural Sociology, 26 (Sept. 1961): 219-39. It is also discussed in somewhat more detail with some revisions in Socictics, Cltapter 2. . . can he used to enhance the capacity for solidarity of the societal com- munity. Briefly, anchorage in a higher-order subsystem of action is the basic condition of tlie upgrading effectsof a generalized medium of interchange. .In Cf. "On the Concept of Politinl Power" and "On the Concept of Influence," Polities end Socinl Structure. 27 theoretical ~TiCntatiom Určeno pouze pro studijní účely On a very broad basis, therefore, cultural development is essential for the evolutionary advance of social systems. For example, religious develop. ments underlie all major processes of value generalization, and the ad- vancement of empirical knowledge underlies the institutionalization of new technologies. Sufficient levels of value generalization, implemented above all through the legal system, are prerequisite to major steps of in- clusion in the structure of a societal community. A consensual base that promotes adequately extensive operation of the influence mechanism is necessary for major developments in the system of political power. Certain degrees of heightened political integration are prerequisite to the expansion of money economies beyond relatively simple levels."O no See S. N.Eirenstadt (ed.), M a Wcbsr on Chnrismn (Chingo: University of Chicago P m , 1968), q.his "lntmduction." 28 theoreticdl orientations ree modern sscieties In Societies we discussed the development of cul- novation in the small "seed bed" societies of ancient Israel and . Our analysis focused upon the conditions under which major 1 advances could develop and eventually become dissociated from societal origins. These two models were chosen because of their cen- contributions to later social evolution. Elements derived from "clas- 1" Hebrew and Greek sources, after undergoing further basic elopment and combination, comprised some of the main cultural onents of modem society. Their focus was Christianity. As a cultural Christianity proved in the long run able both to absorb major com- ponents of the secular culture of antiquity and to form a matrix from which a new order of secular culture could be differentiated. Christian culture-including its secular components-was able to maintain clearer and more consistent differentiation tom the social sys- tems with which it was interdependent than either of its forebears had been. Because of such differentiation from society, Christian culture came to serve as a more effective innovative force in the development of the total sociocultural system than had any other cultural complex that had yet evolved. 29 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely aments. Furthermore, the. "visible" church, the concrete collectivity luman believers and their clerical leaders, was conceived as a purely nan association. The attribute of clivinity, the status of the church he "mystical Body of Christ," belonged only to the invisible church, company of souls in Christ.".' On this basis human society could not consist, as Thomism had 1, of hvo layers with profoundly different religious statuses: the Church, k divine and human, and purely human secular society. Rather, it was eved to consist of one society, all members of which were both "bodies" ecular beings and "souls" in their relations to God. This view repre- ted much more radical institutionalization of the individualistic com- ,ents of Christianity than had Roman Catholicism."s It also had found egalitarian implications, which have taken long to develop, iever-and have done so very unevenly. A further consequence of the elimination of the priesthood's sacra- ztal powers was that the special sphere that Roman Catholic tradition ed "faith and morals," and in which the visible Church held guardian- over all persons, was gravely undermined. Although many Protestant vements have attempted to continue ecclesiastical enforcement in this ere, there has been a strong inherent tendency in Protestantism to ine it as ultimately the individual's own responsibility. Similarly, the cia1 fonn of stratiiication within the medieval Church, the differentia- I between laity and members of the religious orders, lost its legitimation rotestantism. On the human level of a "way of life," all "callings" had same basic religious status; the highest religious merit and perfection ild be attained in secular callings.""is attitude included marriage- 5 e r himself left his monastery and married a former nun, symbolizing change. This major change in the relations between church and secular iety has often been interpreted as a major loss of religious rigor in or of worldly indulgence. This view seems a major misinterpretation, vever, for the Refonnation was much more a movement to upgrade ular society to the highest religious level. Every man was obligated to lave as a monk in his religious devotion, though not in his daily life; t is, he was to be guided mainly by religious considerations. I t was a :isive turn in the process, which dated f ~ o mearly phases of Christianity, permeate the "things of this world" with religious values and create a ity of Man" in the image of God.6' 64 Ibid. 55 Ma- Weber, The Pratestcznt Ethic and the Spirit of Cnpita2ism (New Yorli: bner. 19581. 66 Ibid. ' Ibid.; Tmeltsch, op. cit., Vol. 11; Emst Troeltsch, Protcstnnt*m and Progress ston: Beacon, 1953); and Talcott Parsons, "Christianity" in Internetiom1 Encyclo- in of the Socinl Sciences (New Yak: Mamillan, 1968). The institutionalization of this conception of a religiously grounded human society implied the possibility of establishing a societal community with a corporate character something like that of the Church itself, above all of the Protestant conception of a church that dispensed with t l ~ e stratification in the Roman Catholic conception. For the larger types of secular society, this effort required a mode and level of political integra- tion far surpassing those of the medieval and Renaissance period. The Reformation came to play a central part in legitimating some of the most important new territorial monarchies, most immediately the German principalities, with whom Luther formed alliances."8 Not only were these alliances probably essential to the survival of the movement itself, but they also initiated a type of church-state organization that could develop fnrtller certain essential ingredients of modern society. In England the Reformation was percipitated somewhat differently when Henry VIII converted to Protestantism, opening the way for basic changes in the Church and in its relations with secular society. Where Protestant sfate churches were formed, there was a tendency (except in England) toward both religious and political conservatism, especially in Lutherism, which prominently allied itself with territorial monarchical regimes. The Calvinist branch has been much more con- spicuously involved in broad movements stressing the independence of religious groups from political auth~rity,~nmost notably in the United States. Developments within American Protestantism made an early sepa- ration of church and state religiously, as well as politically, acceptable. G. R. Elton, Refomtion Europe (Cleveland: Meddian, 1965). 6o Important exceptions are discussed in J. J. Loubser, "Calvinism, Equality, and Inclusion," in S. N. Eisenshdt (ed.), op. cit. pro-modem foundstions of modom societies +re-modern founddtions of modem sacietim 49 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely The outcome of the struggle between Reformation and Counter- oimation was a double,step toward pluralization and differentiation. : English-Dutch wing was more advanced, a harbinger for the future. develspment within the Empire posed the crucial problem of integra- across the Protestant-Roman Catllolic line. Many historians of modem ope have recognized only staiemated conflict here. Yet religious tolera- has been extended to Roman Catholics in Protestant polities and 1 to Protestants in Roman Catholic polities, though generally without cal sacrifice of the establishment principle. Religious pluralization was part of a process of differentiathn he- En the cultural and societal systems that reduced the rigidity and lseness of their interpenetration. Religious legitimation of secular ety was retained without committing governmental authority to the ct implementation or enforcement of religious goals. The development of modem secular culture, with its high level of zrentiation from society as a whole, has been important to the con- ling interpenetration of religion and society. The focus of this develop- it shifted northward in the seventeenth century to England and land but also to France and parts of Germany. Relative cultural decline he heartland of the Counter-Reformation was clear after Galileo. The ural importance of France indicated the equivocal nature, by Counter- ormation standards, of its Roman Catholicism. Yet politically "reac- iary" powers could be open to secular culture, as was Pmssia under ierick the Great. In general, secular culture found Protestantism more genial than Roman Catholicism throughout this period. The emergence of "sovereign" territorial states divided the Holy nan Empire. They were first successfully established in France and :land, which had been at best nominally part of the Empire at any 2, and next in Spain, also on the geographical fringe. Then Prussia Austria developed on the border of the "German" area, shifting the pire's center of gravity toward the eastern frontier. In the central .s of the old Empire, territorial principalities proliferated largely through erence of the princes to the Reformation." These developments also showed a certain cohesion of the European em, as all four of the leading political-territorial states were frontier s of the system. Both the northwest tiangle and the Iberian penninsula :d the open sea and participated in the great maritime expansion of ope. The latter also was partially occupied by the Moors whose occupa- of much of the peninsula almost through the fifteenth century tured the militant authoritarianism of Hispanic Catholici~m.~ 5 GeoAIey Bamclough, The 0"gim of Mad- Gcrmnny (New Yo*: Capricorn, t ) . 0 Americo Castro, The Structure of Spanish History (Princeton: Princeton Uni- ty Press, 1954). the first crystallization of the modem system Ii Imperial "gravitation" toward the east was also associated with frontier conditions. The boundary between the Germanic and Slavic peoples had been unstable for many centuries-and was complicated even before the Reformation by relations between the Roman and Ortho- dox branches of Christianity. Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland were ethnic- ally non-German but had become Roman Catholic. Especially after the fall of Byzantium the great Orthodox power was Russia, still peripheral to the Western system. The Germanic drive to organize and protect- and on occasion to dominate-the western Slavs eventuated in Hapsburg involvement with Hungary and Bohemia in an unstable multi- or non- national state. Incorporation of the non-German frontier peoples was complicated by Ottoman expansion, which remained a major threat until the late seventeenth century; Austria thus served as a defender of all Christian Europe.' These developments at the borders of the European system "hollowed out" its center, especially in the Germany of "particularism," or KIein- staaterei. The center failed to develop major territorial units, although a few like Saxony and Bavaria approached such status; numerous other "states" were very small indeed. These principalities did usually swallow up the free cities of the Empire, however. The independence of the urban bourgeois classes was undermined by monarchy, aristocracy, and official- dom, abetted by the devastation and disorganization of wars. This part of Europe, thus generally fell behind the Northwest in economic develop- ment and became a power vacuum before the ambitions of the stronger power^.^ W e have been speaking deliberately of the "territorial" state, rather than of the "national" state. Only in England, France, and perhaps Scandinavia were ethnic community and governmental organization ap- proximately coextensive. In Spain diverse local elements gradually de- veloped a common language, at least among the upper classes. Prussia became more or less purely German, partly through Germanizing of large Slavic elements. Austria was conspicuousl~~multiethnic, including large German, Slavic, and Hungarian elements. Switzerland achieved a special limited form of multiethnic political integration and religious pluralism. The small German states divided the ethnic "German nation" into nu- merous political units, leaving "Germany" even more disunited than "Italv." Except in the northwest the lack of coincidence between ethnic group and territorial organization hindered the development of liberalizing societies based on independent and solidary societal communities as oc- curred in the northwest area. The main territorial units either lacked the 7 Oscar Halecki, The Limits and Divin'om af European Histo?, (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Nohe Dame Press, 1961). 8 Bryce, ap. cit., and Bamdough, op. cit. tho first crystallistian of thc modem system 53 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely ietal Although the English Roman -Catholic minority v'has considerable strength, England has by and large escaped this blem. France failed to "solve" its religious problem in an even more radical se than E-Iolland did. The outcome of the severe Reformation struggle i a Roman Catholic victoqr and suppression of the Protestant movement. ttestantism in France has never since involved more than small, though ?ortant, minorities. This weakness did not, however, secure the position the Roman Catholic Church. Secular anticlericalism, based on the lightenment of the eighteenth century-became a major political theme the Rev~lution.~"~his conflict has persisted in France down to the sent. The basic French pattern has greatly influenced the definitions of igious legitimacy in other modem societies too, particularly in the Latin tholic countries (including those of Latin America) but also in Ger- .ny and Eastern Europe. It has also contrihuted to the antireligious ment in modem socialist movements, especially communism. These European developments constitute a type of differentiation of : societal community and the religious system that in some respects ers an alternative to the pattern that emerged in seventeentll-century ,gland and has reached its fullest development in the United States. te "Anglo-Saxon" pattern builds, however, on certain central religious ditions of Western society while accommodating societal solidarities it cut across the historic religious particularisms. Indeed, the range of igious commitments and solidarities that can he treated as compatible th societal membership has steadily broadened. Secular anticlericalism, wever, especially in its communist version, remains closer to the formula mius regio, eius religio, with the implication that "nonconformists" must excluded from the societal community. The Polit)? and Societal Community The societal community, as the main zone of :egration between a normative structure and a collectivity structure in iich certain crucial role loyalties of individuals are centered, has always rolved both primary reliance on religious legitimation and unity under :learly structured political authority. "Absolutism" represented a solu- ,n of the political aspects of the solidarity problems that arose from st-Reformation developments.10 I t required, however, that govemment- 14 S. M. Lipset and Stein Rol;lian, "Introduction," in Lipset and Rokbn (edr;.), zovage Structures, Party System and Voter Alignment (NewYork: Free Press, 1968). 15 See Palmer, op. cit. 10 See Max BeloE, The Age of A b s o l u ~1660-1815 (New Yolk: Harper, 5 2 ) . the frst crystallization of the modern system usually a monarchy-provide a central symbol on which loyalty could focus; such a symbol was enhanced by religious and ethnic unity. Indeed, religion and ethnic a5liation were the primary bases on which European society divided into territorial political units in early modem times,>?with the general result that government and societal community were relatively undifferentiated. Nevertheless, in certain Western societies, there has been a tendency, under special conditions, to differentiate the two. England made an early and strong start in this direction, in contrast to France, an "absolutist" state in which government was identified with the societal community. Ethnically, England, like France, had the problem of a "Celtic fringe," but only in Ireland was religion a seriously complicating factor. Ireland, where among the mass of the people Celtic ethnic affiliation coincided with Roman Catholicism and with class and geographical separation from England, was the prime area in which integration failed. Precisely in the critical period of the seventeenth century Cromwell fought bitter wars against the Irish, but the Roman Catholic Irish were never integrated into a "United Kingdom" as part of a unified societal com- munity. Wales, though mainly Celtic, had a geographic disadvantage in maintaining its independence. It became predominantly Protestant, though more Nonconformist than was most of England, and posed no major prohlem of religious schism. The Scots developed an indubitable ethnic consciousness but fluctuated violently behveen Roman Catholicism and a more radical Protestantism than that of the English. The Scottish Stuarts became the focus of the Roman Catholic threat to tlle English religious constitution. Once the Protestant allernative had been consoli- dated, however, Scottish Presbyterianism became a major element in British Protestant denominational pluralism. Despite Ireland, therefore, Britain became relatively united ethnically, xvhich contrihuted to its ability to afford religious pluralism within the hounds of Protestanti~m.'~ Within a societal community, regional and ethnic differences are cut across by "vertical" axes of differentiation on the bases of power, prestige, and wealth. The geographical location of the center of societal organization-in Britain London-is a point of intersection. A complex society requires substantial stratification, and it is all the more crucial in times of important innovation. As contributing to the innovative process is a function of the lrind of stratification, we would eh7ect to find important changes in stratification in the seventeenth cen- tur);. Indeed, both the landed aristocracies that had developed from the feudal order and the urban patriciates were being transformed, and their relations with each other and with other groups were changing. Kohn; ofi. cit. l a Ibid. 57 the frst cq~stalli~tiono f thc modem system Určeno pouze pro studijní účely .e.judicial and administrati.ve than legislative. Furthermore, there was m e cenbal parlementbut a whole series of regional parlements. The ement of Paris had only the precedence of primus inter pares, rather 1 the exclusive position occupied by the Parliament of Westminster. The deprivation of political power among the French aristocracy ns related to the group's ambivalent role in the eighteenth century. one hand, it developed a "snobbish" exclusiveness vis-a-vis all "bour- is" elements, many of whom had surpassed its members in political ition,.wealth, and c~ltivation.'~On the other hand, it was particularly minent as a sponsor of modernizing cultural movements, notably in ilosophy," and thus contrihutecl crucially to the French Enlighten- ~ t . ~ ~Both these developments rendered problematic the position of French aristocracy as the legitimate 6lite of the societal community. :aristocracy's dependence on the monarchy for its social prestige was lhined with dissociation from the rest of the societal community in ns of both government power and the cultural "mediocrity" of the lmon man. The whole structure of crown, the two nobksses, and Church was placed against the bourgeoisie and all the other ~lasses,"~ s fostering the split in French society that erupted in the Revolution. England developed differently as it departed from the initial sym- ;is between government and aristocracy. Instead of "disfranchising" the tocracy, the monarchy became its "creature." The executive functions :overnment and the societal community underwent a process of dif- :ntiation focused on the "support system," which articulated the t. This system was centered in Parliament. In contrast to France, liament had consolidated a position of "real power" by 1688. This power did not mean, however, "government by aristocracy," simple obvene of the French solution. First, the national aristocracy too difise actually to "governw-one reason why both the Stuarts Cromwell successfully advocated strong executive authority. Eventu- there developed the system of cabinet government under a constitu- la1 monarch who "reigned" but did not govern. Second, there was special character of the British aristocracy. Primogeniture in England, forced by entail had tended to keep estates intact over generations I to produce continuous social gradations between the titled nobility Z'Elinor Barber, The Bourgeoisie in Eighteenth Cmtuql Fmnce (Princeton: ceton University Press, 1955). ....-.,-v.-.-. ' 0 See especially Moore, op. cit., and Ford, ap. cit. 80 Talcott Parsons, "The Political Aspects of Sodnl Structure and Process," in id Easton fed.). Varieties of Political Theanr lEnelewood Cliffs. N.I.: Prenticc- 1. 1966). ~&riAiedin ~oliti=sand Social ~ t d & r e TN~WYork: Free Press. 19691 the frst crystallization of the modem system and their untitled collaterals, the "genhy," who might or might not he closely related to titled families. This system favored both upward mobility into the aristocracy and indefinite extension of the status of "gentleman" downward From the titled nobility. The status df the gentry became formalized in the House of Com- I mons. As there yere too many gentlemen for the Commons to be simply an assembly of.an estate of the realm, as was the House of Lords (to which every peer belonged), it became a representative As the Commons became increasingly important relative to the Lords, the dis- tinction between those actually exercising political power and their constituencies became important. The gently as a whole became a con- stituency, not a component, of government. During the earlier period the aristocracy, as a major component of the societal community, constituted the most active element in the support system of government yet remained relatively independent of governmental organization. Furthermore, representative participation in government facilitated the gradual emergence of a party system under which elements of society could influence the policies and selection of active executive leadership somewhat responsive to the constituencies?? The second main type of inherited privilege was that of the urhan upper class, which rested primarily on commerce. Because the rural sector of the economy was generally still predominant, territorial con- solidation under the monarchies gave primacy to rural interests and was less favorable to urban upper groups: a major reason why the most highly urbanized areas were for a long time not incorporated in territorial monarchies hut defended the "bee city" pattern. Holland was an exception. In winning its independence from Spain, it became primarily a federation of urhan communities led by merchant groups. I t experienced considerable di5cnlty in integrating its rural areas, however, and lacked the cohesion of its rivals. Yet, in avoiding the social dominance of a landed aristocracy, it set an important example for future development. England's middle position facilitated a synthesis. The representative character of the House of Commons provided machinery for the political involvement of important bourgeoise groups, and the line between them and the untitled gentry did not become rigid as in France."=This flexibility :I1 C. H. Mcnwain, The High Court af Parlinment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1910); and F. W. Maitland, Thc Consh'tutionol History of Englnnd (Cam- bridge. Eng.: Cambridge University Pms, 1908). See Lewis Namier, Englmd in the Age of the American Revolution (2nd ed.; London: Mamillan, 1961 ) . 'LsSer Archibald S. Foord, Hi- Majesty's Opposition 1714--1830 (Oxford: Ox- ford Univerrity Press, 1964). the first crystallization of the modern system 61 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely nmon origins and some common features. The new Continental mon- hies tended to maintain the Roman 'legal tradition and its emphasis the "unitary" authority of the state.*U This tradition tended to make il law the instrument of government by bringing the dominant group legally trained people into governmental service, often as the core of : developing civil services.'" Civil administration was thus differentiated m the military, which remained largely in the hands of the aristocracies. e Continental legal systems generally promoted the effectiveness of rernment more adequately than did the British one;" yet the latter de possible a more advanced state of differentiation and integration ween government and the societal community. The Economj~and Societal Community The crucial economic developments in England ing the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries centered on the enclosure ,vement and its complex aftermath. Most important was the growth commercial farming, oriented toward markets, as distinct from the ~rlpsubsistence farming of the medieval type, under which the sale of tduce extended only to neighboring townsF The major break with the system was the development of a large export trade with the wool nufacturers of Flanders and Italy. The increase in large-scale sheep :ing required displacement of considerable elements of the tenant >ulation,for sheep raising was less lahor-intensive than was crop raising 1 was hindered by the traditional openaeld system of manorial agri- ture. Many of the gen- and even noble landowners actively promoted change, either becoming commercial fanners themselves or renting ir lands to commercial tenants. The secular owners of previously lesiastical lands, especially of monasteries that had been dissolved, were : traditional in estate management than the Church had been. Many mbers of the gentry also engaged, directly or through agents, in non- icultural economic enterprise, particularly various commercial ventures. e general process was by no means complete by the end of the seven- nth century, but, along with the other factors that we have reviewed, lad already had two major consequences. First, the proportion of peasants who were individual tenants, or even ependent proprietors, had diminished. Instead, agricultural laborers 80 See the discussion in Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evalutionay and Comparotivc ;pectives (Englewood CliEs. N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). 40 Ford, 00. cit. *l This aspect was emphasized by Weher; see Max Rheinstein (ed.), Max Webcr Low in Economy and Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Hamrd University Press, 1954). a Karl Polanyi, The Great Tmnsfomation (New York: Beacon, 1957). the first cystollization of the modem system appea~ed,~:'and the surplus rural population tended to leave the counw- side and gradually became a laboring class in the towns. A new concern with indigence and vagabondage emerged * in response to the dislocations and human suffering that they entailed; from then on, the "poor laws" were to be a prominent issue. The "peasant class" was su5ciently weal;- ened so that struggles over its rights and position were not as prominent in England as in France.'" Second, the land-owning classes tended to become "defeudalized." Their economic position came to depend increasingly upon the market success of their fanning and other enterprises rather than upon the en- forcement of feudal obligations on a peasant class. This increased the productivity of agriculture, but it also gave the aristocracy more economical flexibility, enabling it to incorporate increasingly large commercial and then industrial elements:'0 This relaxation created a common interest and a partial fusion with the predominantly urban upper classes, but certainly partly at the expense of the peasantq. The situation in France was almost the reverse. There the aristoc- racy was economically dependent upon the crown."' Because of the in- dependence of the French Church from Rome, the crown had far-reaching control of ecclesiastical appointments, which, along with military commis- sions and the sale of civil oaces, it used to forti% tbe loyalty of important aristocratic elements. In addition, the aristocracy was dependent upon priveleged exemptions from taxes and upon enforcement of obligations upon the peasant~y.~SFrench agricultural traditions were thus not con- ducive to reorganization in the interest of productivity. The peasan- remained relatively intact and in potentially sharp conflict with the land- owning class, which helped to entrench the combination of monarchy, aristocracy, and Church further under the ancien 16gime,"~as well as fostering peasant support for the Revolution, though in some circum- stances, as in the VendCe, the peasants clid swing to the other side.6u Furthermore, in France there was little reason for urban groups to support the old regime. In Holland aristocracy was much weaker, but there were 4 U n interesting reflection of the situation is that the classical economists, par- ticularly Ricardo, generally tool: commercial agriculture as a paradigmatic use in them analyses. It was the agricultural laborer, the employer oE a commercial fanner, ~vlvhowas primarily discussed in connection with wage theory. 4s ThM 46 IVIoore, op. =it. 40 Ibid. "'Ford, op. cit., and Moore, op. cit. .Lb Moore, op. cit.: see also G~orgesLefebvre, The Coming of thc F~enchRn~alu- tion (New Yorl;: Vintage, 1960). Palmer, op. cit. ""A'loorc, op. cit.; and Charles TiUy, The Vend& (Cambridge, Mass.: Hnrvard University Press, 1964). the fiwt cystaliizction of the modem system 65 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely stocracy and government in England. Much of the English aristocracy came an active political'constituency of government, instead of remain- :part, of the undifferentiated structure of government without an op- rtunity to play a decisive part in it. This pattern permitted later tension, so that larger groups could gain inclusion in the political aspect citi~enship."~ The consolidation of the common law and the supremacy of Parlia- :nt in government were closely connected with Puritanism and the ecial -religious settlement that emerged in England.*L Denominational d political pluralism expressed the differentiation of the societal com- imity from religious collectivities and governmental organization. Both ?ects involved a process of inclusion associated with that of differentia- In. Legitimate status of full membership in the societal community was corded to religious dissenters and to political opponents of the group rrently in office as long as they constituted a "loyal opposition." The :a1 system, hoth in its normative content and in its structural indepen- nce, was a primary mechanism regulating the boundary relations among ese differentiated elements. It is crucial that there were IegaZLj?institu- ~nalizedrights of religious and political dissent. England never resorted a written constitution that would formally bind the "crown in Parlia- ent" as the theoretical sovereign of the realm; nor were the courts of N ever accorded the power of judicial review, in the sense of authorization declare acts of Parliament unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the record nfirms the essential effectiveness of the legal institutionalization of "con- tutional" limitations upon t l ~ epowers of government, despite the close lation between government and the coercive sanctions of t l ~ ecourts. The differentiation of societal community and economy focussed on e "commercialization" of agriculture, especially as it affected the landed terests of t l ~ egentry. Generally rural communities have undifferentiated zriptive structures particularly resistant to modernization. The orientation English agriculture to the market, however, created commercial interest at linked the rural communities "horizontally" with the towns, rather an "vertically" with a feudal type of aristocratic governmental hierarchy, ~dreduced the severity of the "peasant problem." In the towns a parallel process of differentiation was breaking down e particularism of the guild system. As England was on the whole less banized than were some areas of the Continent, it was important that major rural interest favored this differentiating process. The primary stitutiond foundations of a differentiated market economy were laid in xgland well before the mechanical inventions and other innovations of 59 Marshall, op. cit. "4 See David Little, Religion, Law, and O~dcr(New York: Harper and Row, 6 9 ) . 3 the first c'ystallizntion qf the modem syst- the industrial revolution. The Puritan influence was very important as well, perhaps especially in the orientations of the innovative merchant groups but also among the gentry, man?; of whom were Puritans. The economic phase of English development seems also to have promoted pluralisn~in the community structure. The processes of differ- entiation, which occurred within hoth rural and urban communities, strengthened a community of economic interests that cut across the old distinction. This trend was important above all in view of the political power of the landed classes. Economic differentiation provided a basis on which future urban groups could be included in a single solidary system. Rural-urban conflicts were not as severe in England as elsewhere in subse- quent periods; compared with the situation in France, conflict between the bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy was mild. The process of adaptive upgrading was most obviously associated with economic development. Not only in England, hut also in the whole northwestern triangle, the seventeenth century was a period of substantial economic advance. There were progressive increases in the "extent of the market," both internally and externally, for each political unit. Though within societies as social systems adaptive capacity is focussed in t l ~ eeconomic sphere, it is affected by developments in both the cul- tural and personality systems. On the cultural side, the most conspicuous process of upgrading was the general development of secular culture, with its emphasis upon cognitive rationali* in philosophy and science. This trend was furthered in Holland and England by the values of ascetic Protestantism.s6 Although the growth of cognitive and rational culture had not yet had primary consequences for the structure of society, it had an impact. After Newton and Locke, for example, cultural leaders could not ignore the implications of the new science and philosophy for a vast range of concerns; they were equipped with a new level of adaptive re- sources. The central development related to the adaptive aspect of personality was the emphasis of ascetic Protestantism upon the orientational complex that Weber called "worldly asceticism." It enhanced motivation to achieve- ment in "worldly callings." The "situation" for giving meaning to such achievement was culturally "defined" as "this-worldly," rather than as "other-worldly," oriented toward the building of the good society and not only toward the salvation of souls in the afterlife. It was universalistic and 6 W ~ r t ~ n ' ~analysis of the relations of Puritanism and science in England has been not "rehzted" b"t merely qualified by recent research. See Robert Kr Mcrton, "Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England," OsiriF, 4 (1938) reprinted in Sa&Z Theorv and Social Structure. Chanter 1 8 ( r e v e d . Glencne Ill.:~~ ~ .~~L~ --- - ., \ .... - - . - ~ ~ - - -, -.~~ ~ ; e ePress. 19571: see al;o ~or&h Ben-David. he Socialaev of Science (Enelewaod the first crystallizntian of the modem system 69 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely or socieiy frozen at an. early. modem level. In many respects its in- isigent traditionalism isolated it from the rest of Eu1ope.l Austria, held together by royal and aristocratic intermarriage and nau Catholic allegiance, contrasted sharply with Spain in its handling ethnic heterogeneity. Although at first committed to the Counter- ormatiou, the Austrian Habsburgs later accepted a limited religious :alism established by the settlement of 1648. They were thus aua- 3nistic in their lack of concern with political nationality, but they ved an important integrative role by maintaining a large political tcture that became first ethnically and then religiously plurali~tic.~ at the Empire eventually disintegrated under the centrifugal forces of ionalism does not negate its importance over a long transitional period. leed, as late as the Holy Alliance, Austria was the focus of conservative zgrationism in Europe. Furthermore, it played an important role in diating Russia's entq into the European system, a role encouraged by tual conflict with Napoleonic France. The particularistic area of Germany resembled the Counter-Reforma- 7 center despite its religious diversity. Its small states were necessarily the defensive also, threatened as they were with absorption by their :er neighbors. As in the Italian states, major structural innovations were ibited?' The Prussian role in the European system, conditioned by the open tern frontier, crystallized on the basis of a special variant of the Prot- ant pattern. The Hohenzollem rulers had converted to Calvinism, ereas the bulk of the population adhered to Lutheranism. What emerged s a special form of the Protestant "national church" that amalgamated : two element^.^ Calvinism, within the activist pattem of ascetic Prot- antism, postulated the general dominance in the community of a igious a t e , the predestined elect, setting it above even the faithful )testant common people. I t was also strongly collectivist in that it con- ved any Calvinist community to be founded upon its religiouslj, ordained ssion. This orientation-activist, authoritarian, and collectivist-well :ed the Prussian monarchy as a boundary unit seeking to expand at the i t of the Slavs. Furthermore, it dovetailed with the Lutheran emphasis the ligitimacy of duly constituted authority in maintaining a given order d in checking disorder, which might include almost any major change. IAmerico Castro. Tho StTucture of Seanish Hiztory (Princeton: Princeton Uni- sity Press, 1954). 2 James Bryce, The Holy Roman Em#ire (rw. ed.; London: Mamillan, 1904). 8 GeoffIey Barraclough, Tho Origins of Modern G m n y (New York: Capri- TI, 1963). 4 Christine Kayrer, "Calvinism and German Political Life," Unpublished doc- a1 dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1961. counter#oint and fur the^ dweZo#mmt: the age of mrolutions Calvinism was admirably suited to a forcible governing class_Lutheranism to its subjects. Along with the general unsettlement of any changing frontier community, this religious situation helps to explain Prussian ad- vances in rationalizing bo'h military and civil adminisbation. Like most of Continental Europe, Prussia was organized about a land-owning aristocracy, the Junkers. The Junkers did not become a parliamentary opposition to royal absolutism as had the English gentry; instead they were a primary support of the monarchy, particularly in a milita~ycapacity. As in England, however, they transformed their tradi- tional estates into commercial fanning operations oriented toward the e x ~ o r tof grain. The changes nonetheless incorporated the old rigid class structure, which was strengthened when the agricultural workers who migrated to the new industries were replaced largely by Polish lab~rers.~ Before the nineteenth century, Prussia's most important advances were in governmental effectiveness; in both military and civil bureaucratic administration it set new standards for Europe."ertainly Prussia's military recors, considering its size and resources, made it the Sparta of modem Europe. All classes in its hierarchically organized population came to accept a stringent conception of duty, much like the one formulated by Kant, but in this instance duty specifically to the state. The state managed to combine a relatively amenable lower group, a traditionally military landed gentry, and a not very large or strong but very urban-oriented upper Biirgerfum in a highly effective operating organization.7 Gradually, it tool: advantage of the "liberal-national" movements in the German world, rather than being threatened by them, a trend culminating in the career of Bismarck. Prussia's effectiveness as a sovereign state enabled it to extend its political domination over other territories; it gained control of practically all northern Germany, foreshadowing the exclusion of Austria from leader- ship in the unification of Germany. When the German Cmp'ire was con- stituted in 1871, it included a large Roman Catholic minority (nearly one-third of the population), the reverse of the settlement of 1648, which had included a Protestant minority in the old Roman Catholic Empire.9 Pmssia's expansion into other parts of Germany, however, produced severe strains in the societal community, the religious diversity of which was not yet adequately integrated in a pluralistic structure. Almost coincidentally with Prussia's expansion, the new Germany Wee the account of Weber's early researches in Reinhard Bendir, Mar Weber: An Jntellcctud Pahait (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1962);see also Reinhard Bendix, Notion-Building and Citbnship (New Sorli: Wilq., 1964). Chapters 4, 6 . 0 Hans Rozenberg, Burcrtucrecy, Aristocracy, and Autocmcy: The P~ussinnEx- perience, 1660-1815 (Cambridge, Mass.: I-Iarvard University Press, 1958). Ibid. 73 counter#aint and further dwelopmsnt: the dge of revolutions Určeno pouze pro studijní účely production processes and eventually to the production of "factors of luction." There were also variousintermediate products like the "gray 1" that putting-out merchants bought 'from weavers. Transportation comriiercial-mediation services between spatially separated producers consumers became necessary. Raw materials, primaq~production, and land itself became increasingly involved in the market nexus. W e have a special interest in two other "factor" markets, however, e for capital and labor. The former entered a new stage of develop- t in the Renaissance, a major symptom of which was the religious :roversy over the morality of "usury." l6 Long before the industrial lution, money lending had existed on a substantial scale organized noney markets of various sorts, some already "international." Com- es in which individuals could invest free of the contingent liabilities artnerships also existed. By the end of the seventeenth century England essed the beginnings of a central bank, a mark of its economic ad- :ement. Nevertheless, the industn'al revolution saw a proliferation of financial lcets at a new level of organization. These developments did not cul- ate until the middle of the nineteenth century, however, when general rporation acts were adopted in England and in most of the American s lo and organized securities markets were established. One major intage of German industry, when it surpassed British industry in the nineteenth century, was the superior organization and spirit of enter- :of its investment banking system.17 Expanded financial markets provided more flexible mecllanisms of stment for the increasingly complex and expanding economic system. .e and more, money went beyond its functions as a medium of ex- lge and measure of value to become the primary control mechanism he economic process. Control of money was used to influence the :ation of resources tl?rough the market mechanism. More important, new dependence of credit creation upon large-scale financial institu- s provided a type of built-in mechanism of economic growth. The extension of the productive "chain" was of primary importance hysical production, especially in connection with the mechanisms of ati ion and stabilization of the economy as a whole. Increasing shares esources were devoted to the early and intermediate stages of the ress from raw materials to consumable products. Benjamin Nelson. The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal rhood (2nd ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). ' 0 For an analysis of thwe legal developments and their importance, see J. Wil- Hunt, Lms and the Conditiolls of Freedom (Madison: Univenity o Wisconsin , 1956). 1' Landes, op. cit. counterpoint and further dn,elapment: the ogc of revolutions A particularly important trend in this connection has been the de- velopment of generalized physical facilities. Transportation facilities like railways would seldom be economically viable if limited to the eansporta- tion of one product. Once lines existed behveen given centers, however, they could be used for many purposes. Similar considerations applied to provision of mechanical power. The steam engine was one of the principal innovations of the early industrial revolution; electric power and the intemal-combustion engine arrived later. Sources of energy, transmission of energy and fueL and modes of using power were thus enhanced. Finally, the development of "tools to make tools." the machine-tool industry, also contributed to the technology of many different industries.lE These technological developments were closely interdependent with changes in the social organization of the productive process, especially of labor as a factor in production. The critical development was the dif- ferentiation of labor (or, more technically, of services) from the d i h s e matrix in which it had been embedded. This differentiation involved dis- tinguishing the work-role complex from the family household and also increased the "mobility of labor"-the readiness of housel~oldsto respond to employment opportunities by changing residences or learning new skills. These changes affected the structures of family systems and local com- munities profoundly. Many features of the modem form of nnclear-family kinship structure gradually emerged during the nineteenth century. And indushial society became urbanized to a degree never before known in history. These processes established what sociologists call the occufiationat role, specifically contingent upon status in an employing organization structurally distinct from the household.'" Usually the employing organiza- tion has only one member in common with the household; it also has prem- ises, disciplines, authority systems, and property distinct from those of the household. Typically the employed person receives (according to his employment status and role performance) a money income that is the main source of his household's access to the market for consumer goods. The employing organization markets its product and pays the employee wages or a salary, whereas the typical peasant or artisan sold his own prod- ucts. The organization thus comes between the worker and the consumer market. The spread of occupational roles extended the range of consumer markets because of consumers' increased dependence upon money incomes in meeting theu wants. But Adam Smith's famous dictum "The division of labor depends on the extent of the market" is important in this con- 1s Ibid. 10 Neil J. Smelser, Sociol Change in the Indurtn'dl RevoZution (Chicago: Uni- vemty of Cllicago Press, 1959). counterflaint and further development: thc nge of rnrolutions 77 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely what "counted" in the societal comununit!- ever illore closel>-with mment, while pressing subjectsnot closel!) participating in government its aristocratic penumbra into positiom of dubious inclusion in the ~ n a lcommunity. As almost everywhere on the Continent, the central mment, reinforced by the Counter-Reformation, pressed its diffuse 1s to authority. The tradition of legally protected rights was much :er on the Continent than in England. Within the frameworlc of a high level of national consciousness, the ch Revolution demanded a community that includcd all Frenchmen abrogated the special status of the priviZegi6s. The central concept was enship, the claim of the whole population to i n c l u ~ i o n . ~ The famous slogan of the Revolution, Libertd, Egalitd, Fratemitd, odied the new conception of community. Liberfd and EgaZitd sym- :ed the two central foci of dissatisfaction, political authoritarianism privilege; Fratmnitd refel'ed primarily to the broader context of be- ing, "brotherhood" being a primorclial symbol of community. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the symbol of liberty turo distinct references.'Wne was paramount in England, where Adam :h stressed economic liberty, especially in contrast with t l ~ egovem- tal control associated with mercantilism. The other was paramount in Ice, where Rousseau was the most important author. It emphasized liberty of the societal community, of the "people" vis-8-vis govern- t. The problems of liberty of the people in this sense and liberty of individual were not clearly distinguished, especially in the political re. It was the Qqanny of the regime that had to be eliminated. The [torial tendencies of the Revolution emerged only after the power of 2ld regime had been at least temporarily broken. The problem of equality is even more subtle. Whereas one can think be* primarily in terms of casting off restraints, equality inherently lves relations among units that are positively valued. Units that claim h t to equality cannot legitimately oppose recognition of the equality thers. Whereas in the context of liberty the evil is illegitimate con- nt, in the context of equality it is illegitimate discrimination. The ide- 17 of equality has often suggested that all differences of status or func- are .illegitimate, particularly if they are hierarchical. Social systems ire varying lcinds and degrees of social differentiation on two dimen- ;,however: a qualitative division of labor (in the Durld~eimiansense) a hierarchy. 'Il~eFrench Revolution, stressing both liberty and equality, focused '6 Ibid.; see also Bendis, Ndtion-Building nnd Citizenship. 'U See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Rnlolution ?bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967j . counterpoint and further deirelopmcizi: illc a,oc of io.olutions not only upon political authorit!. but also upon the partially distinct slstem of privilege for the aristocracy. Tensions had been exacerbated by the as- sociation of the noblesse de robe with the monarchy and the older aristo- cracy under the ancien r&gime, so that the "people" stood against the "privileged," who were indissolubly identified with the government. There has been enormous ideological distorbon of the European aristocracies' frivolity and social irresponsibility at tlle expense of the people. 7'11e criti- cal issue of "privilege" was actually the hereditary ascription of status, which conflicted with the standards of either achievement or equality or both. The Revolution raised the question of whether privilege can be a meaningful reu~ardor even legitimated on instrumental g~ounds-unless it is demonstrated that no other way of institutionalizing responsible lead- ership is possible. The French Revolutions attack on the principle of privi- lege was mainly led by the higher bourgeoisie, many of whose members were richer than were most aristocrats and, if not more powe~fulin the formal sense, perhaps more influential in governmental a h u s . In England, aristocracy, which included the gentry, was much more "private" and less identified with the regime. In fact, reform movements were often led by members of the aristocracy; the "French" question of aristocracy versus bourgeoisie was not nearly so explicitly raised. The Revolutionary concept of equality, in relation to differential in- strumental qualifications and the hierarchical dimension of social status, emphasized equality of oppodnity. To the extent that this emerging value pattern was institutionalized, achievement and achievement capacity be- came the primary criteria of eligibility for differentially valued statuses. The attainment of a status or its retention under competitive pressure could then be evaluated as a reward for significant contribution to the social system. This complex gave support to a major normative component of the industrial revolution. The main thrust in the French Revolution, however, was against in- herited aristocratic privilege and toward equality of membership status, which must be distinguished from equality of opportunity, even though the two are interdependent. The pattern of privilege under the ancien regime had divided the societal community into two primary status classes. The "common man" was a "second-class citizen," who was denied by his hereditary status access to privileges enjoyed by the aristocracy, perhaps especially tas exemptions.?' Marshall has analyzed equality of membership as possessing three primary components, civil, political, and social.'8 The French Revolution 2a T. H. Marshall, ClassS C i h n s h i p , and Social Development (Garden City, NS: Anchor, 1965). counterpoint and further dwaIopment: the nge of revolutions 81 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely senses that we have outlined, but also bound together in a national, onomous solidarity. This societal community was to be differentiated n government as its superior, legitimately entitled to control it. Yet the ree of its differentiation was still far from completely modern, particu- y in regard to its incomplete pluralization. French society during the nineteentl~century institutionalized the nocratic pattern of societal community only partially and unstably.a" e French Right held tenaciously to the patterns of the old rkgime down 2 the present century. It led several "ex~eriments" in monarchical res- ltion and maintained a de facto ascendance in social prestige for the tocracy and a strong, though contested, position for the established man Catholic Church. This conflict within France was esacerbated by survival of the older system in most of the Continent, despite the :ad of revolutionary patterns, especially through Napoleon's conquests. Although England went much farther in the process of pluralization, act closely connected with its leadership in tlle industrial revolution, ical pressures toward democratization were absent, and the franchise ; extended only gradually from 1832 on. Aristocracy remained strong in tish society throughout the nineteenth century, though it was less "rigid" n in most Continental countries and less of an impediment to plura- ic differentiation and gradual democratizati~n.~~ The struggle over democratization was a major component of Euro- n social confiict during the nineteenth century. Napoleon was in cer- 1 respects the heir of the Revolution. The restored "legitimism" of the ly Alliance was directed not only against French "imperialism" but also inst Revolutionary ideas. Significantly, its brealcclown in 1848 started in nce but then became especially intense on the eastern fiinge of the ropean system. Through the nineteenth century leadership of the European system mined in the northwest sector, where an increasingly sharp "dialectical" iGct emerged between the British and French attitudes. Both were es- tial to the emerging sjmthesis, the one emphasizing economic produc- ty and pluralization of the social structure, the other democratization ihe nation-state, nationalism and a new kind of societal community. There were also important developments in tile less advanced areas, vever. The emergence of imperial Gemany represented a major distur- Ice to the European system. It fully exploited the potentials of both industrial revolution and the undemocratic "authoritarian" state while nce and Britain were still insufficiently strong and unified to cope with See Stanley Hofhnann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community," in Emann et nl., In Resmrch of P~avce(Cambridge, Mass.: I-laward Univenity Press, 2 , counterpoint and further development: the age of rrvalutions the new power b!, genuinely synthesizing tlie components of modem so- ciee. At the same time, the shadow of the "collossi" of the East and the West fell over the European system. Russia had emerged to assume a major role in the European system by contributing crucially to Napoleon's defeat and had become a primary participant in the settlement of Vienna and a guarantor of the Metternich system. By the time of \World Mrar I the United States had also emerged as unequivocally important to "the system." Určeno pouze pro studijní účely The industrial and democratic revolutions were cts of the great transformation by which the institutional bulwarks of early modern system were progressively weakened. European monar- s have sunrived only where they have become constitutional. Aristocracy twitches but mostly in the informal aspects of stratification systems- here is it structurally central. There are still established churches, but on the less modem peripheries like Spain and Portugal is there severe iction on religious freedom. The broad trend is toward denominational alism and the separation of church asd state, though the communist itries present special problems. The industrial revolution shifted pri- y economic organization from agriculture and the commerce and han- lfts of small urban communities and extended markets. The emergence of "full" modernity thus weakened the ascriptive ~eworkof monarchy, aristocracy, established churches, and an economy lmscribed by kinship and localism to the point at which it no longer cised decisive influence. Certain modern components that had already :loped to some degree by the eighteenth century became increasingly ortant, particularly a universalistic legal system and secular culture, :h had been difEused through Westem society by means of the En- lightenment. Further developments in the political aspects of societal cornmunit). emphasized the associational principle, nationalism, citizen- ship, and representative government. In the economy differentiated mar- kets developed for the factors of production, primarily labor. "Occupa- tional" services were increasingly performed in employing organizations that were structurally differentiated from households. New patterns of effec- tively organizing specific functions arose, especially administration (center- ing in government and the military) and the new economy. The democratic revolution immensely stimulated the former, the industrial revolution the latter. Weber saw that in a later phase the two patterns tend to fuse in the bureaucratization of capitalist ec0nomy.l They have also, however, begun to fuse in other contexts, notably the associationalizing of the technological base of modem efficiency. W e have seen that the modem structural pattern initially crystallized in the northwest corner of Europe, whereas a secondary pattern subse- quently emerged in the northeast comer, centering on Prussia. A striking parallel development occurred in the second main phase of modernization. The United States, the "first new nation," has come to play a role approxi- mately comparable to that of England in the seventeenth century." Amer- ica was fertile soil for both the democratic and industrial revolutions and for combining them more intimately than had been possible in Europe. By the time of Tocqueville's visit, a synthesis of the French and English revolutions had already been achieved: The United States was as "demo- cratic" a society as all but the extreme wing of the French Revolution had wished for, and its level of industrialization was to surpass that of England. W e shall therefore concentrate in the following discussion upon the United States. The SLructure of the Societal Community Behind the developments outlined in the preced- ing paragraphs were a very special religious constitution and societal com- munity. The United States was in a position to make new departures from the principal ascriptive institutions of early modem society: monarcry, wit11 its "subjects," rather than citizens; aristocracy; an established church; an econom!r committed to localism and only a little division of labor; and an ethnically defined societal community, or "nation." American territory was initial151settled mainly by one distinctive group of migrants. They were "nonconformists" in search nut so much of freedom from persecution as of greater religious independence than they could en- 'Mas TVebcr. Tlzc Thcory of Social and Economic Organi=ation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947). 'Seymour M. Lipset, The First Ncn, Ndtion (New York: Basic Book, 1963). the new lead socicfy and cantcmparnry modemi* 57 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely ~lvedthe first and second, whereas the third became important only in. . mid-nineteenth centuj. Thecivil component includes guarantees of what were called "natural ~ts"--in Loclce's formulation, "life, liberty, and property." They were llified and speci,fiedby the French Declaration of the Rights of Man the American Bill of Rights. The revolutionary movement in France encouraged by the fact that English and American law had already itutionalized many of these rights. T h e concept of "equality before tlle " characterizes the civil component of equality of membership if it is %nto include both procedural and substantive protections. Here "law" Ins not only that enforceable through the courts but also the general terning of the society's normative order. The "political" component of citizenship focusses upon the democra- hnchise. Although the principle of equality among citizens in the "fi- " voice of government dates from the ancient Greek polis, the French iolution applied it to the government of a large-scale society and to all people. It is impossible for modem government to give equal direct par- pation to all citizens. Developments have therefore been in tile direction epresentative institutions, in which political equality is focused upon the :ction of top governmental leadership, generally through participation 1n electoral system. The Forms of these institutions vary in important n,m especially behveen the "presidential" and "parliamentary" types I between "republics" and "constitutional" monarchies. Despite such variation all European ~oliticalsystems, except the com- nist ones but including many such overseas societies of European origin the United States and some members of the British Commonwealth, .e evolved toward a common pattem."O This pattern includes two com- lents of equality and two contextual features. T h e first component of equality is universality of the franchise. The in trend has been toward universal adult sueage; women's sueage was tpted early in the present century in most Western nations. Only minors, :ns, and small classes of disqualified persons are now generally excluded. e other component of equality has been elimination of the weighting iotes. Historically, various systems have weighted votes unequally, either #licitlyas in the Prussian class system of voting or implicitly as in dis- ninatory apportionment in the United States. The trend is, however, lrly toward the principle of one citizen, one vote, both in access to the 1s and in the weight of each vote in determining electoral outcomes. The first contextual feature is the system of formal electoral proce- ' 0 See S. h'1. Lipret and Stein Rokkan. "Introduction," in Lipret and Rokkan, maage Stmchrrcs, P n q Systems, and Voter Alignment (New York: Free Press, 1965). 8 0 Stein Rokkan, "Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting, and Political Participation." in opeon Tournel o f Sociology (1961), 132-52. dure, including rules of eligibility for voting and rules by which votes are "counted." The latter aspect is critical in establishing a binding relation behveen the individual voter's choice and the effects of many such choices on the outcome. The second contextual development is secrecy of the ballot, which further differentiates government and societal community by protecting the individual's independent participation in each. It guards the voter from pressures not only from status superiors (for example, employ- ers) but also from status peers (for example, fellow union members)."l This "barrier" favors political pluralization relative to the rest of the so- ciety and discourages unanimous "bloc" voting (for example, all trade- union members voting for socialist or other "left" parties) and encourages minorities within each interest group (or religious, ethnic, or local group) to vote differently from the majority. This structure enhances communitti flexibility and the possibility of both restraining and mobilizing govern- ment as an agency of change responsible to the community. In one sense, the "social" component of citizenship is the most fun- damental of the three?" Some form of equality of social condition as an aspect of "social justice" has been a primary theme of Westem historp since the French Revolution but one that did not become institutionally salient until much later. It seems that the full emergence of this theme had to await reduction in tlle inequalities of governmental absolutism and aristocracy, which raised new tensions between the imperatives of equality of opportunity and equality of membership. The central principle may perhaps be that members of the society must have realistic, not merely formal, opportunities to compete, with reasonable prospects of success but that the community should not accord full membership to those inherently excluded from the opportunity complex. Allowance is thus made for tl~ose, like children, who are inherently unable to compete; those, like the un- slcilled poor, who are severely handicapped tl~roughno fault of their own and must be "helped" to compete; and those, like the aged, who must be supported. Furthermore, there should be a "floor" under the competitive system that defines a standard of "welfare" to which all members are entitled as a matter of "right," not as a matter of "charity." T h e third Revolutionary catchword, Fratemiti, suggested a synthesis of the other two at a more general normative level. In a certain sense, it was the ultimate embodiment of t l ~ eimplications for secular Society of the Reformation. The solidary societal community that it proclaimed could not he a two-class system in any of the medieval senses-Church and state, clergy and laity, or aristocracy and commons-but had to be a unitary community. Its members were to be considered not only free and equal: in "1 Ibid. 3" See Marshall, op. cit. counterpoint and fu*her de~mlopmcnt:the age of mmolutiom 83 counterpoint find %*her desrrloprnent: the age of rorolutions Určeno pouze pro studijní účely tion: The advancing division of labor made possible increasing pro- ti&ty and a rise in the standard.of living among the general population. In the factories roles were generally' "occupationalized" from the :om up. The first to become employees were propertyless wage workers, mill hands of the textile industry. i\/lanagement was generally based n proprietorship. The owner, usually a kinship group, organized pro- tion, raised capital, set up factories, employed and supervised workers, marketed the products. The early "capitalistic" industrial firm was s a ':two-class system," consisting of the proprietary lineage on one : and the employees on the other.'" This system was the structural s for the Marxist conception of "class conflict" in capitalistic society, which ownership and organizational authority are assumed always to rate together. Finally, we must discuss a problem that has been very much mis- .erstood, largely for ideological reasons. The industrial revolution :rged under a "free enterprise" system and very likely could not have :i&ed under any basically different one. Furthermore, we argue that .ee-enterprise economy, rather than socialism in the sense of govern- ltal operation of the whole economy, remains the main focus of lution. Private economic enterprise and government organization of nomic matters are not, however, related in a "zero-sum" manner: An .ease in one does not require a corresponding decrease in the other. Durlcheim demon~trated,~~a highly developed free-enterprise economy, ]pared to a more primitive form of economic organization, requires ronger governmental structure, not a more restricted one. A universalistic legal system, a central feature of any industrial ety, cannot exist without strong government. Furthermore, increasingly lplex regulatory functions are necessary to the economy, as to other Scts of society, For example, in the control of the qrclical disturbances t upset early industrial economies. Government and economy are interdependent. Government requires lble resources, which are increased by increments in productivity and the mohility of resources in a developed marlcet system. Similarly. emment, in its own participation in the labor markets, benefits from mohility of manpower. This interdependence involves the interchange of money and power men the marliet system and the system of formal organization. Not Y government but also such private organizations as firms participate :he power system; conversely government participates in tlle market "0 See Rcinhard Bendix, W o r k dnd Authority in Industv (New Yark: Wiley, 5). Emile Durkheim, The Dhkion of Labor in Society (New Yock: Mamillan, 5 ) . counterpoint and further development: the nge of revozzttions system. The power of private units is dependent upon that of government in two critical respects beside the general institutionalization of property and contract. First, the corporation as a legal entity is at least in part a "delegation" of public authority on the basis of a publicly granted and revocable charter. The use of autllority within corporate organizations is legitimated by this authori~ation.~"Second, modem economies depend upon the credit mechanism for capitalization. Extension of credit involves the use of power by credit agencies, espec~allybanks; they make funds available to borrowers, funds that they themselves do not "own," and hind themselves with legally enforceable contracts. This enforceability provides the basis of confidence in the time-extendability of loan relations, which partake of the inherent risk of investments that cannot "pay off' except over a considerable period. In a modern society, underdevelopment of the power system is thus highly deleterious to the economy, and underdevelopment of the monetary and market systems is highly deleterious to the polity. The Democratic Revolution The democratic revolution was part of the process of differentiatingthe polity and the societal community. As do all processes of differentiation, it produced integration problems and, where it was successful, new mechanisms of integration. In European societies the focal point of these problems was some degree of popular support for government in the societal community. The starting point was the conception of ordinary people as "subjects" of their monarch, with almost totally ascriptive obligations to obey his authority, which was often claimed to be divinely ordained.= Although the English crown's monopoly of governmental authority had fallen in the seventeenth century, as it had in a different way in Holland, even the English regime was far from "democratic"; it was rather sharply aristocratic. Intellectual discussion during the Enlightenment made clear the internal tensions in the Continental territorial monarchies, exacerbated by the visibility of the British and Dutch examples."' This strain was particularly acute in France, which had gone farthest in developing the national-ethnic basis of community while at the same time retaining an old-regime absolutism. The "common" people, including some high in the bourgeoisie, were still "subjects," whereas the aristocracy, closely allied to the crown, had consolidated its privileges. These developments identi- ' "Hurst, 00. cit. J. W. Allen. A Histon, of Politicnl Thought in thc Sixtennth Centuqi (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1960). '4 R.R.Palmer, The Age of Dcmociniic Rn~olution( 2 "01s.; Princeton: Prince- ton Univenity Press, 1959 and 1964). counterpoint and further dcvclopmant: the age of resolutions 79 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely irne the primary site of thesecond major phase of the Industrial Revo- In. The buildup that establi'shed the political position of imperial many did not immediately include any major economic advance beyond of early modem Europe generally. The major change came risingly s l ~ w l y , ~considering how long the British example had been lable. Furthermore, it centered not in tile main areas of Prussian ciency" but in the territories about the Rhineland, which were gen- y more Roman Catholic than Protestant.lo Until the spread of the industrial revolution to the Continent, Britain, :sia, and France had been in the forefront of change. In the clifferentia- of the European system as a whole, we may attribute primacy of -attaining functions to the Northwest, for the most important new tutional developments and structural differentiation were emerging e. These processes increased the adaptive capacity of the system, par- larly in economic terms and in England. For this same period, we may assign primacy of the more general ~tivefunction to Prussia. It had become the most important stabilizer :urope's open eastem frontier. Furthermore, it had pioneered in the :lopment of instrumentally effective collective organization, a gen- zed resource that has since been difised throughout all functional Irs of modem societies. The Industrial Revolution The late eighteenth century saw the beginning l e two developments marking the transition from the early phase of item modernity to the one that has crystallized in the mid-twentieth ury. These changes are usually called the industrial revolution and iemocratic revolution. The former began in Great Britain, whereas the r erupted in France in 1789. The emergence of these developments in the northwest sector of lpe capped the main developmental trends of the earlier period. As 11 major structural changes, they occasioned severe strains where they rged and even more severe strains when they spread into areas less prepared for them. The main developmental trend after the Reformation stressed, under lctivist value system, the adaptive and integrative capacities of so- es, which involved new orders of differentiation and increased organic arity in Durkheim's sense. The industrial revolution was part of this I, in that vast increases in economic productivity entailed immense xion of the division of labor in the social sense. As we have em- See David Landes, The Rise of Capitalin (New ibrli: Mamillan, 1966). ' 0 See Rainer Baum, "Values and Uneven Political Development in Imperial lany." unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1967. counterpoint and further development: the age of raiolutions ~hasized,such extensions in differentiation produce a functional need for new integrative structures and mechanisms. The democratic revolution involved primarily the integrative aspect of the societies; it focused on the political meaning of membership in the societal community and thus on the justification of inequalities in wealth and, more important, in political authority and social privilege. Our primary interest in the industrial revolution is not in its tech- nological and strictly economic aspects but in associated changes in social structure. It should be noted, ho\vever, that t l ~ etechnological changes had revolutionary economic effects. They made possible extremely large cost savings, lower prices, and the development of many new products.ll In England the process began in the cotton-textile industry and spread to the "heavier" industries, whereas on the Continent and in the United States the main development broadly coincided with the spread of the railroads.12 The structural key to the industrial revolution is the extension of the market system and of the attendant differentiation in the economic sector of the social structure. The marlcet system itself, however, did not undergo a sudden revolution but only a long and continuous evolution. The distinctive prosperity of England and I-Iolland especially, but also of France, before the new inventions undoubtedly resulted from the develop- ment of their marlcet systems, which in turn depended upon legal and political security and legal Erameworl~based on property and contract, which favored the extension of commercial enterprise. English and Dutch prosperity was also a function of both relatively light governmental pres- sures on economic resources, especially the absence of large standing armies, and of an absence of the sharp aristocratic objections to "trade" that prevailed in most Continental countries. Before the industrial revolution the most developed sector of the market system was .finished commodities, generally luxury goods.l"e most important exception in England was the production for export first of wool, then of woolen cloth. In some areas grain was an important market commodity, but most foodstuffs and articles of general consumption entered the market system only within local limits: if at all. Typical was the exchange of foodstuffs grown in the immediate locality for handicrafts products of a "market" town.'" From this focus the market system could spread in several directions. From the consumer product, it could extend "back" into earlier stages of l1 There is an enormous literature an these problems. Landcs, op. cit., is a thor- ough and particularly illuminating survey. J. I-I. Clapham, Economic Dmolopment of Fmnce and Gemdny, 1815-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1963). l8 See Max Weber, General Economic History (New Yorl;: Adelphi, 1927) 00. cit., and his The Theory of Social and Economic Organimtion (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 19t7). - 14 Karl Polanyi. The Grant Tmnsfomation (Boston: Beacon, 1957) counterpoint and further dcvr?loprnent:the age af revolutions 75 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely iovative in that the mandate for achievement was applicable to all men 1was to builda new "kingdom,". not to perpetuate tradition. Encouragement of this type of personal orientation had selective :cis in different spheres. One was to enhance the relevance of scientific estigation. Another was the broad pressure for a certain type of in- idualism in English law."o There was, however, a special connection Ih the economic sphere, through market relations. This connection did t develop primarily, as has so persistently been alleged, because the rket opened the doors to "self-interest" or "materialism." Rather, it (eloped because the market mechanism constituted the fixst massive titutional context within which it was possible to isolate individual lievements and contributions horn a difise matris of irrelevant ties. .e market represented a differentiation of the social structure to the point a j ~ d$ B ~ ~ E ~ ~ @ ~ which differential opportunity, evaluation of individual contributions, rl in some sense proportional rewards were possible on a wider scale than ~ ~ 51 before. This possibility seems to us the primary significance of the ~nzctionbetween the Protestant Ethic of individual achievement and expression in market activity, made famous by Web.~r.~' 5 0 Little, op. cit. 6'The connection between Protestant religious orientations and modem eco- nic ethics has long been the subject of academic debate. The classics of the debate Max Weber, The P~otcstnntEthic nnd the Spirit of Cripitalism (New Yorlr: Scrib- ; 1958); end R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: :ntor. Boolis, 1947). See also R. W. Green (ed.), Protestantism and Cdpitblism ,ston: Ileath, 1959); and Talcott Parsons, "Richard Hcnly Tawney," American :ioIogical Revins (December 1962). r e w @ 3 3 ~ % i @ ~ ~ s five the first nysta1Zi;ation of the modem system The DSerentiation of Europe in the Age of Revolutions The Counter-Reformation societies tended dras- tically to "freeze" the process of differentiation, as we indicated in the last chapter, primarily because of the relations between their political regimes and a very defensive Church. Not only Protestantism but also many modernizing trends had to be opposed, especially those that might foster the independence of universalistically oriented units from the core structure of government, aristocracy, and church. These units included the '%usiness" elements, those advocating more extensive and more demo- cratic political participation, and "intellectual" groups, which by the eighteenth century were viewed with great suspicion by the authorities. The heartland of the Counter-Reformation, the Italian states and the papacy, served a primarily pattern-maintenance function in the general European system. Spain became the most militant spokesman for the pre-Reformation order of society, often seeming "more Catholic than the Pope." In its secular social structure, Spain offered perhaps the prime example of a 71 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely tortant conflicts of interestbetween the commercial urban groups and rural society of the "hinterland.': The export trade in wool supporied the new level of English com- :cia1 actiGty. It strengthened urban commercial interests centered in ,don, the seat of government, as well as the commercial and .financial ter ind a major port. The "putting-out system"" between spin~lers weavers of wool in the countryside and the wool merchants escape from the restrictive rules of the urban guilds. Merchants in the n s "staked" countryside weavers who had home looms with ypm, ected the finished cloth, and sent it to London merchants for export. is system provided yet another bridge of economic interest between land-owning gently and the upper groups in the towns. The differentiation engendered by these economic changes was ilar to the lcind that emerged between governmental organization and ietal community. The medieval differentiation between town and n t q involved only very partial economic differentiation. Its basis is distinction between primary or "extractive" production (notably agri- ture) and trade and manufacture (mostly handicrafts) involved the nomic division of labor but extended economic and other unctions >ugh whole communities. A rural village was thus an agricultural unit, I a neighboring town was a unit for the provision of manufactured goods. ler functions, like government, were centralized and could not be ead equally through all the small community units. The "squires" long held much of the local power, and the gentry ltrihuted the "social" leaders of "county society." The employment of ant farmers by owners, however, differentiated their own unctions as ial and political leaders in the local community from those of economic duction in which their land was a factor of production. When farms :ame more specifically economic enterprises, agricultural laborers and ant farmers were employed in something closer to modern occupational zs than the heriditary status of villein had been, and the standards of cess for enterprise became linked to solvency tl~roughmarket operations. rough the marlcet, land owners established connections with groups :side their own rural communities, especially merchants and "putting- :" entrepreneurs. This trend proliferated through specific markets eco- nic relations that did not coincide with relations of other sorts, For mple citizenship in local communities. Although the participants in : economic system could thus be divided generally into an "agricultural erest;" a "mercantile interest," and, increasingly, a "manufacturing erest" it became more and more difficult to identify these interests "1 Palmer, op. cit. 3' Scc Edwin F. Gay, "Putting-Out System," in EncycIo#cdia of the Social Sci- es (New Yorl;: i\/Ilncrnillan, 1934). with whole communities rather than with differentiated units within communities. Conclusion Our major thesis has been that England had become by the end of the seventeenth centuq the most highly differen- tiated society in the European system, having advanced farther in this direction than had any previous society. Taking the societal community as our main point of reference, we have discussed the differentiation of religion, government, and econorn!. from it. First, the combination of a Protestant establishment with significant toleration and denominational pluralism broke the traditional European usion of religion and government with the societal community. Not only was English government obligated to accord major rights to religious nonconformists, but also citizenship in the societal community was no longer bound to traditional religious conformity. This sepa~ationentailed both a new mode of integration and greater differentiation, in that the acceptable societal community was no longer confined to the coreligionists of the Icing (eius religio) but included Protestant nonconformists as well. These developments involved generalization of the value level of the pattem-maintenance system in English society in hvo respects. First, the basis of value consensus had to be "moral," in the sense of being more general than any one denominational position would be. The Reforma- tion and the splintering of Protestantism threatened the solidarity of the societal community. In England denominational religious commitment was, however, differentiated hom moral consensus at the societal level. Second, there emerged a common commitment to the value of rational knowledge of the world, partly but not wholly because of its practical utility. Although not without sbain, philosophy and science 'as such- not only, for example, Anglican philosophy and science--came to be re- garded as "good things," supported across the religious spectrum, includ- ing Roman Catholicism. Given the establishment of a "national" community, two main mecl~anisrnsof differentiation between the societal community and gov- ernment developed. One was a government in which highly influential elements of tlle societal community were constituents of representative bodies rather than members of government; the critical role was played by the House of Commons. The second main mechanism was the law. &lore than any other legal system, English law drew a clear distinction behveen the status of member in the societal community with rights t l ~ a t the government was obligated to observe and tile status of "subject" of the lcing as chief of government. This differentiation was reinforced by the trend of relations between the first cqistnllzzdtzorr of the modem system the first cq,stolli;ntion of thc modcrn system 67 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely in turn facilitated by the relatively pluralistic political system in- Jing the crown, the City of London, and the aristocracy, itself divided ween nobility and gentry. This pluralism made relatively easy the inclusion of other emerging nents in the societal community. Indeed the constituency of the use of Commons was gradually extended not only to the boroughs but h e nineteenth century to a broad mass electorate as well. By the late znteenth century England had both a relatively firmly integrated na- la1 state and a relatively pluralistxc support system, which favored Ire democratization in a step-by-step manner, rather than through- ~ upt revolutionary change. These political circumstances were strongly reinforced by the English ~ o u sconstitution and bv development of the common law. Univer-> A stic legal principles and the broad conception of the "rule of law," iistinguished from arbitrary authority, were institutionalized in legal ems practically all over Europe after the Renaissance, building on nan traditions. Yet the common law was distinctive in three important I related ways.3' First was judicial independence from the crown, which le to a head with the ultimately successful struggle of Chief Justice ke against James I.35 Second was the closely corporate character of the 11 profession, organized about the Inns of Court. Third was the em- ~sisupon legal embodiment of plivate rights and interests, sometimes inst the privileges of govemmenf sometimes in areas outside the normal ge of governmental con~ern.!'~This process had two aspects. The &st ~ l v e dthe "rights of Englishmen," including habeas corpus, fair trial I counsel, the protection of homes against arbitrary search, and ulti- tely free speech, assembly, and the like. T h e second involved property L contract essential foundations of the industrial revolution. Colce's ~ c kon the "monopolies" established by royal charter was of great ~ificance,a legal precursor of Adam Smith's attack on mercantilism. English legal developments contributed substantially to differentiat- government from the societal community. Law became less an instru- nt of government and more a mediating "interface" between the two. lad to serve the needs of government but was sufficiently independent serve pluralistic private needs as well. Government was thus placed in dual position of defining and enforcing certain legallv embodied re- ctions on its own powers. 34 See Maitland, o#. cit., and F. W. Mnitlnnd, English Law dnd the Renaissance .mbridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Prar, 1901). as Maitland. English Lms end the Rr?nnFrsance, Mcnwain, 09. cit., and Roscoe- - ~ ~ ~ - . ~ nd. The ~ o i r i tof are Common Law (Boston: Beacon, 1963) io ~ o u n h ,op. cit. the first crystallizdtion of the modem system Tile legal profession came to occupy an interstitial status. It became established that judges, even in the exercise of the judicial powers of the House of Lords, should be professional lawyers. Both judges and barristers, the core of the legal profession, however, served mainly private clients, which might include government agencies. Members of the legal profession-including judges-became the primary guardians of the rights of the general public, especially "civil" rights 3' and those of propem, contract, and torts.38 Tile independence of the judiciary and the bar seems also to have been related to the emer- gence of the second main branch of the British legal profession, the solicitors, who lacked the privilege of pleading in court but were the principal legal advisers to groups of all sorts. Through the solicitors the 'egal system penetrated the pluralistic structure of interest groups; through i e bar and judiciary it maintained its delicate relation to government. The .,~ns of Court were in many ways reminiscent of medieval guilds. They resisted the "streamlining" of law that occurred on tile Continent, the formalization of university training, the appointment of tlle most influen- tial g o u p of lawyers as civil servants, and an examination system to guarantee, competence. Altl~oughjudges were public officials, they were also lawyers tTained in an extragovernmental profession and responsible to the traditions of the common law. The barristers and solicitors, though private professional practitioners, also had public prerogatives and responsibilities. Further- more, the adversary system acquired a special status. More than on the Continent, legal actions were conducted between private parties, each represented by counse1,before a judge and often heard by a jury under procedural rules. The judge tended to become an umpire rather than a decision maker. Furthermore, the courts themselves shaped law, especially in rendering clecisions and setting precedents relatively independently of royal decrees and acts of Parliament. The English system left the boundaries of the legal system quite open, permitting tentative approaches to consensus before full "legaliza- tion" of a norm and its enforcement by governmental authority were reached. Appeals to collective solidarity, moral standards, and practicality thus had a place in the system other than through high-level policy de- termination. Continental legal systems differed from that of England, despite "See T. H. Rilarrhall, Cla~s,Citizenshie, and Social Dnrelopment (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1965). :'a In Durlrl~eim'sterms, this development indicated n new emphasis on "restitu- tivc" over "repressive" law. See Cmile Durliheirn. The Division of Labor in Society (London: Macmillan, 1933) the first crystallizdtion of the modem system 63 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely The lanaed aristocracies were the most important upper class, pro- ing the support in prestige' for the early development of modern terri- :a1 monarchies.1° T h e monarch was generally not only the chief of :e hut.al'so the "first gentleman" of his society, the apex of a complex ~cturedhierarchy of social prestige. The aristocracl~itself was a seamless of lineages, an affinal collectivity bound by intermarriage and eligibility Aristocratic lineages have tended to be anchored in local interest ~ctures,especially in land. Historic landed proprietorship was; however, ifFuse superiority status, including not only ownership but also elements political control and social ascenclance. The rise of the early modern state reduced the political power of ticularistically defined aristocratic subgroups, especially their autono- us territorial and military jurisdiction, in favor of a prestige position t supported the m o n a r c l ~ y . ~ ~Adequate economic support for those stige positions rested largely in land ownership. In predominantly a1 areas, therefore, economic elements were not radically different rn a more diffuse social m a t r i ~the apex of which was local aristocracy." Under feudal conditions the whole aristocracy of Europe was, in ~ciple,a single "seamless web." This unity was incompatible, however, h division into national states. Religious differences resulting from the omlation created barriers to intermarriage and helped to contain the tocracy supporting a prince within eius religio, but it did not eliminate problem. In England, since the Tudor period "foreign" dynasties ,e been more the rule than the exception: t l ~ eScottish Stuarts, the tch House of Orange, and the German I-Ianoverians. Had this cos- politanism extended to all the aristocracy, it would have impeded the solida at ion of ethnic-national identities. It is important, then, that gland and France, the hvo leading national states, split on religious 1 linguistic lines so t l ~ a ttheir aristocracies became basically distinct rn each other-and from others. Along with the "nationalization" of the aristocracy, the integration top political authority with aristocracy was a primary factor in enabling a1 governments to establish their authority over national societal com- n i t i e ~ ? ~This possibility in turn depended largely upon the military lctions of aristocracies. % G e ePalmer. op. cit., and Bcloff, op. cit. ZOThis conception o "a5nal collectivity" has been much influenced by the lor's discussions At11 Charles D. Ackerman. "Palmer, ap. cit., and Beloff, op. cit. 2" See Barrington Maoic, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Dernocrac),: d end Pcdsont i n the hldking of the A40dcm \-(/oild (Boston: Bcacon, 1966). 'a Belaff, ap. cit., and John B. WOE,The Emergence of the Grcot Powers (New Ic: Ilarper, 1962). the fist ciystn1li;ntion of the m o d e m F t e m T h e process of differentiation between government and socielal com- munity was also focused on the relations between monarchy and aris- tocracy, as shown b!~ the deep conflicts of interest behveen the two. Tile political power institutionalized in specific aristocratic status was greatly lessened. Yet the new total power position of aristocracies varied greatly, as the examples of England and France show. Broadly speaking, the differentiation occurred in France in such a way as to leave the aristocmcy ovenvhelmingly dependent upon its social prestige. O n the whole, it was deprived not only of the exercise of political power but also of the functions of contributing major contingent support to political authority and of exerting a major influence over governmental policy.?.' The sign of this outcome was the brilliant court of Versailles. Centralization at the court loosened the attachment of the aristocracy to their local communities, depriving them of local political power, which in turn facilitated the encroachment o the central government on local afbirs.'" These remarlis apply most directly to the older, more 'feudal" aris- tocracy, the noblesse ZLpLe. The position of the newer aristocracy rela- tively recently risen from bourgeois origins and based predominantly on legal training, reinforced the integration of aristocracy and crown. The legal profession was closely associated with the crown through public o5ces merging administrative and judicial components. As legal officials, the French lawyers stood between the crown and both the older aristoc- racy and the bourgeoisie. There was considerable upward mobility through these intermediate circles, partly through the sale of offices. Yet the up- wardly mobile elements generally sought to attain the status of nobility and to make their offices hereditar)i."a Economically tile noblesse de robe was primarily dependent upon the crown both for various perquisites of its offices and, to the extent that it held land, for enforcement of feudal dues and obligations upon the peasantry. It lacked an independent economic base comparable to that of the English landed gentry. T h e Church was closely integrated into this system. hlIore than in England, high clerical offices went to members of aristocratic lineages. Furthermore, there was no equivalent of English Protestant Noncon- formism. Tl1is absence contributed to the militant anticlerricalism of the Revolutionaly opposition to the ancien rigime. There was a collegial aspect to the noblesse, in the form of the parlements. In contrast to the British parliamentary system, however, the parlements were considerably 3'Franklin L. Ford, R o b e dnd Sword: The Regrouping of the F ~ e n c hAristocmcy After Louis SlV (Cambridge, Pvlass.: Harvard University Press, 1953). 2" Ibid. ' 0 Palmer, ap. cit. the first crystalli~tionof the m o d e m system 59 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely xic solidarity that can focus such communities. or included small seg- ~ t sof larger ethnic communities for which their governments could presume to speak. For political authorities in this precarious situation le fo& of fundamental religious legitimation was especially important. :ir insecurity also contributed to political authoritarianism or "abso- sm" and fear of concessions to popular participation in government. :ir peoples were "subjects," rather than "citizens." The religious fission of European society and the emergence of =reign states precipitated severe crises that culminated in the seven- 1t11 century. No functional equivalent of the old Empire appeared, and matter of religious legitimation remained a serious weakness of the :rnational system, as its power relations lacked adequate normative llation? This situation favored nearly chronic states of war and in- ited the constructive use of political power that could have emerged in etter-integrated collective system. The Northwest England, France, and Holland, each in a different r, took the lead in the power system.of the seventeenth century. Dutch ependence represented a major defeat for Spain. As the Austrians were vily engaged against the Turks, Continental hegemony fell to the nch. Though not yet a paramount force in Continental a&irs, Eng- d did become the paramount maritime power during this century. These three nations were the "spearhead" of early modernity. The st important developments occurred in their societal communities. e variations among the forms of the three societal communities were nense, but each contributed major innovations relative to national darity. In particular, the English conception of national identity pro- ed a basis for a more clearly differentiated societal community.1o This 'erentiation proceeded on three fronts-religious, political, and economic :ach involving nonnative considerations. Legal innovations were thus ical, especially those that favored associational rather than bureaucratic :entials of the sbructure of national community. They were closely re- :d to the emergence of parliamentarianism and more developed marlcet ,nomies. Religion and Societal Community As noted earlier, the Reformation deprived the sible" church of its sacramental character. Subsequently, under the 0 Bryce, op. cit., and Traeltsch, ap. cit. 10 See Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1961). the first crystollirrztian of thc modem system formula clrius regio; ezus religio, the tendency was to bring the church under tighter secular control, as there was no international Protestant church capable of reinforcing ecclesiastical independence. The Protestant churches thus tended to become state or "national" churches, and con- formity was enforced through political authority. A second, "Puritan" phase, based on Calvinism in England and Holland, led to religious pluralism ivithin Protestantism, which contrasted sharply with the religious character of Prussia, several other Protestant Geman principalities, and Scandinavia. In seventeenth-century England differentiation of the religious sys- tem from the societal community could not occur without heavy involve- ment in politics. The Long Parliament, the Civil War, the establishment of the Commonwealth, the Restoration, and the Revolution of 1688 in- volved not simply political issues but also the religious future of England and much else as well. English religious development involved not only the conversion of the crown to Protestantism but also a broadening of the Elizabethan measure of religious toleration.'l The political legitimacy of the Nonconformists became firmly established, preventing a return to a politically established church with a monopoly of religious legitimacy. Furthermore, through Nonconformism, the Church of England was ex- posed to influences from the religious "left," which could have been re- pressed in a purely "state church" system. Indeed, the "evangelical" wing of the Church of England has been fundamental to subsequent English development. Interestingly, the long and severe repression of Roman Catholicism in England" contributed to this outcome. Greater tolerance for Roman Catholicism during the eighteenth century might well have led to a second Stuart restoration and perhaps a serious attempt at a Roman Catholic reestablishment. The solidarity of a basically Protestant societal community and the relative absence of religious tension facilitated such developments as extension of the franchise. Had the English "right" been obliged to uphold the "true Church," as well as monarchy and aristrocracy, the sbrains would have been even more severe than they were, especially under the impact of the American and French Revolutions.1" Seventeenth-century Holland went considerably farther than England did in religious toleration. Over the long run, however, its religious con- stitution has proved less stable. A nineteenth-century Roman Catholic revival created a "columnar" structure among religious groups of appro^. mately equal strength, thus introducing a severe religious rift into the 11'1~.K. Jordan, The Development of Religious Tolerntion in England (3 "01s; Cambridge, Mais.: Ilarvard University Press, 1932-1910). ??The Catholic Emancipation Act was not parsed until 1830. la See R. R. Palmer, The Age of the Damocratic Resolution (Z-01s; Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1959 and 1964). the first crystallizetion of the modern system 55 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely four W e have chosen to date the beginning of the :m of modem societies From certain seventeenth-century developments he societal community, especially the bearing of religion on the imation of society, rather than, as is usual, from eighteenth-century ution toward "democracywand industrialization. After the Reformation shattered the religious unity of Western Chris- lom, a relatively stable division arosc, roughly along the north-south All Europe south of the Alps remained Roman Catholic; a Roman lolic "peninsula" thrust into northern Europe, with France as its t important component. Protestantism in Switzerland enjoyed the ection guaranteed by the special nature of Swiss independence. Al- ~ g hVienna was predominantly Protestant at the start of the seven- th century, the Hapsburgs were able to "recatholicize" Austria, aided h e Turkish occupation of Hungary, where Protestantism was strong. As religious struggle intensified, the "southern tier" of political units iolidated. In the sixteenth century this consolidation involved a union he two most important states, Austria and Spain, under the personal of the Hapsburg Emperor Chades V. The "midclle" of this empire protected by the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily, immediately adjacent to the Papal States. The presence of the papacy in Italy and the extent of Hapsburg power made continued effective independence of the Italian city-states impossible. The Counter-Reformation enforced a particularly close alliance be- tween Church and state, exemplified by the Spanish Inquisition. In com- parison to the 'liberal" trends within late medieval and Renaissance Roman Catholicism, the Counter-Reformation Church stressed rigid orthodoxy and authoritarianism in its organization. Civil alliance with the Church in enforcing religious conformity fostered tile expansion and consolidation of centralized government authority. Such enforcement was undertaken in the name of the Holy Roman Empire, with its special religious legitimation and divinely ordained Emper0r.l By that time the political structure of the Empire was a1 more integrated than it had been in the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, the Empire was vulnerable, in that it centered in the loosely organized "German nationu-Austria's population was only partly German by that time, and the Hapsburgs had assumed the crowns of Hungary and Bohemia through personal unions. The Treaty of Westphalia, which had ended the bitter Thirty Years' War, had not only made Holland and Switzerland independent of the Empire, but had also drawn the religious line through the remaining parts; many of the German princes had chosen Protestantism for their domains under the formula cuius regio, eius religio. Far more than the defection from Rome of Henry VIII, this choice undermined the legitimation of the old secular structure of Chris- tendoq for the Empire had been conceived as the "secular arm" of the Roman Catholic system of basic unity. The settlement was an uneasy compromise, acceptable only as an alternative to the indefinite continuation of a highly destructive war. Nevertheless, it ended any realistic eqecta- tion that a Roman Catholic European system could be rest~red.~For more than three centuries the heartland of the Counter-Reformation remained tenaciously resistant to many modernizing processes, citadels of monarchial legitimism, aristocracy, and semibureaucratic states of the older type. Although the Protestants dreamed of prevailing throughout Western Christendom, they soon splintered into different branches and nwer de- veloped a conception of unity corresponding to that of medieval Roman Catholici~m.~This hagmentation furthered the development of inde- pendent territorial monarchies based on unstable integration of absolutist political regimes and "national churches." * It also, however, contained the seeds of the intemnl religious pluralism that was to advance rapidly in England and Holland. James Bryce, The Holy Roman Emeire (rev. ed.; London: Mamillan, 1904). 2 Thirl *Ernst Troelbch, The Social Teachirrgs of the Chr*tiorr Churches, Vol. I1 (New York: Harper. 1960). 4G. R. Elton, Reformotion Europe, 1517-1559 (Cleveland: Meridian, 1963). the first nysinllizdtion of the modem system 51 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely