Nations and Nationalism 3 (2), 1997, 165-179. 0ASEN 1997
The creation and dissolution of the
multinational state: the case of
Yugoslavia*
DUSK0 SEKULIC
The Flinders University of South Australia
ABSTRACT. The article draws on Randall Collins' interpretation of a Weberian
sociologyof legitimacy and the importance of geostrategy in explaining the contrasts
between the creation and dissolution of Yugoslavia. The creation of Yugoslavia is
interpreted as the outcome of the expansionist policy of the Serbian elite which was
justified by the inclusionof all the ethnic Serbs into one state and made possible by the
geostrategicallyweak positions of the Croatian and Slovenianelites. Different starting
positions and motivations for unification led to a struggle among elites over the
definition of the newly united state, particularlyover the centralisation-federalisation
issue. The situation of communist Yugoslavia was a different one - the country was
balancing between the `East' and the `West'. This balance - which, along with the
memories of the `liberation struggle', was the main source of the legitimacy of the
regime-was destroyed with the cessation of the cold war. The newly created situation
had two important results. First, the potential threat from the communist east had
disappeared. Second, Slovenia and Croatia were attracted to the idea of integration
into western Europe. This situation was substantially different than in the period of
the creation of the Yugoslav state, in which western Europe was perceived as a
potential threat to the existence of Croatia and Slovenia. Now, the perception of
threat came from the east - from the `unreformed'Serbia. The attraction to the west
was much weaker in Serbia, where the old communist power structure stayed intact.
The new situation, and the political elites' perception of it, created the tension which
finally destroyed the basis of the multinationalstate.
Geostrategy and Legitimacy
Why was Yugoslavia created and why did it disappear from the map of the
world? Under the impact of its forceful and bloody dissolution many are
inclined to assert that it was an artificial creation from the beginning. But
what does an artificial creation mean? Clearly the concept of artificiality
required qualification, unless we accept the proposition that every multi-
national state is an artificial creation.
* I would like to thank the Earhard Foundation for financial support for my research on
transformation of post-communist Europe on which the present paper is based.
166 Dusko Sekulic
If we try to operationalise the concept then its meaning would stem
from the fact that Yugoslavia was created at Versailles by the victorious
powers, against the will of the people, most internal political actors and
the historical viability of the region. We would be able to claim this only if
the forces in favour of the creation of a Yugoslav state did not exist. But
they did exist, so we cannot argue that Yugoslavia was imposed against
the will of all the people, unless we propose (as, for example, many
nationalists or Marxist philosophers claim) that we know some iron law of
history and that the formation of a Yugoslav state was violating some
such basic law (e.g., the impossibility of the long-term survival of
multinational states, or the reversal of the trends of history in the direction
of socialism etc.).
Denying the artificiality does not mean that I am advocating some a
priuri historical viability of this state, or an historical necessity of south
Slav people to form such a state. In my opinion this approach is fruitless
and instead of engaging in such discussions I think that a much better
procedure is to analyse the social forces, strategies and goals of different
actors, as well as the geopolitical factors leading to the creation, and later
dissolution, of Yugoslavia. Historical options are always open and only an
analysis of these complex forces can give us an answer to any particular
outcome.
The concrete social reality of a particular event, in this case the creation
and dissolution of a state, is a complex phenomenon, which is very difficult
to explain with a single theory. It is a reality where a multitude of social
processes, actors and events are going on in parallel. Usually theoretical
approaches have a tendency to grasp one of these processes, but not the
totality of them. We can say that these approaches are possible explanations
of different levels of reality, which are not mutually exclusive but interactive.
Geostrategical explanations are important, but different from cultural
explanations, although geostrategical and cultural processes are often
linked. Where one or the other approach has the tendency to diminish the
significance of the processes on the other level, this is not dealt with from
the perspective of a single approach.
We will start to explore the creation and dissolution of Yugoslavia from
the geostrategical perspective. The framework used will be Collins' elabora-
tion of Weber's theory of politics (Collins 1986). The main theme is that the
internal legitimacy of the regime is the result of the geostrategical success of
the state. Of course, geostrategy is not only important as an independent
variable producing legitimacy but is also an explanatory scheme for
interpreting the strategies used by different actors involved in geostrategical
games. In the following analysis I will try to explore this theme using the
example of Yugoslavia.
The case of Yugoslavia 167
The creation of Yugoslavia
Legitimacy
The central thesis in Collins' (1986) interpretation of Weberian political
sociology is legitimacy. What is new is the emphasis on the importance of
the external success of the state for its internal legitimacy.
The thrust of Weber's thought is .. . that politics works from the outside in, and
that external, military relations of states are crucial, determinants of their internal
politics ... How is legitimacy gained and lost, and who will get it under what
conditions? Weber is suggesting that it is tied to the power position of the state in
the international arena. (p. 145)
The legitimacy of the Yugoslav state, and the differing prestige of the
leading elites of various South Slav national groups, can be explained
exactly in these terms. South Slavs were ruled by the two empires which
went into decay at different periods in time. The fact that the Ottoman
empire entered the period of its decline first, contributed to the earlier
emancipation of the Slavs under its control. The Serbs, being the strongest
group, regained in this way the role of the `Piedmont' of the South Slavs
(MacKenzie 1994). Croat and Slovenian political leaders could only envy
the expansionism and gradual success of the struggle for independence of
the newly created Serbian political elite. Starting with the revolt of 1804the
process of gaining autonomy within the Ottoman empire began, and from
1830s on it evolved into gradual expansion of the Serbian state. From that
time on, with many set-backs, the Serbian political leadership gradually
created and then expanded its autonomous state, first under the formal
Turkish protectorate and later as an independent political entity. The Croat
and Slovenian political leaderships, being part of the still strong Austrian
(and later Austro-Hungarian) empire were not in a position to realistically
aspire for independence.
During its successful expansion, Serbia gained control over Macedonia,
Kosovo and Sandzak as a result of the uprisings against the Turks and the
two subsequent Balkan wars. Serbia was also on the victorious side at the
end of the First World War. At this time, the programme of the Serbian
interior minister, Ilija Garasanin, called `Nacertanije', which designed
expansionist long-term goals for Serbian policy as outlined in the Memor-
andum of 1844,could finally be realised (MacKenzie 1985).
From the standpoint of legitimacy the most important element in this
whole development was that the status of Serbia among other South Slav
elites was tremendously enhanced. For a moment we can return to Collins:
the prime example of modem `national autonomy' movements are those that
dismantled the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires in the Balkans. Yet these
were precisely the states that were crumbling under the external geopolitical
pressures; `ethnic' nationalism is merely the form in which the fragmentary states
surviving the breakup were organised. The ethnic purity of many of these states has
168 Dusko Sekulic
been a myth; Yugoslavia, for example, incorporated several ethnic groups, as a kind
of miniature Austrian-Hungarianempire in itself. And at the same time that Austria-
Hungary was breaking up, the Russian empire was incorporating even more
disparate ethnic groups in central Asia and the Caucasus, having overridden the
ethnic division of the Ukraine, White Russia, and the Baltic. In this case, `ethnic
nationalism' was cast in a different form, one appropriate for a consolidating empire
- pan-Slavism and its extensions, which attempted to claim a greater ethnic unity
appropriate to an expanding state. (Collins 1986: 153)
The essence of Collins' argument is a denial of the perception that states
are simply created along ethnic lines. Depending on the geostrategical
advancement, at the same time that some multinational empires were
disintegrating, others (for example, the Russian empire), were expanding.
The creation of Yugoslavia follows a very similar logic to the creation of the
Russian empire. On the one hand, it was the result of the disintegration of
the greater multinational Austro-Hungarian empire, but, on the other hand,
it was a culmination of the expansion of the smaller, Serbian empire.
Yugoslavia was defucto created as the result of a Serbian mini-expansion as
a stage in the process which began in the nineteenth century. As Russia was
expanding, regardless of its ethnic boundaries, even some potentially new
ethnic groups were merging (Ukrainians and White Russians, for example).
The same logic was guiding Serbian expansionism. Although in comparison
with Russia, it should be noted that by 1900 perhaps only half of the
ethnically Serbian population lived within the boundaries of a Serbian state.
The other half lived within the Ottoman and Habsburg monarchies. Because
of that fact the expansion of the Serbian state was justified by the
incorporation of the ethnic Serbs into it. But parallel with this incorporation
process a peculiar expansionism was going on. The essence of this
expansionism was the denial of ethnic separateness to some groups clearly
developing separate identities. The cases in point are Macedonians, Bosnian
Muslims and even Montenegrins. The non-existence of clear ethnic
boundaries among many Slavic and even non-Slavic groups in the Ottoman
and Habsburg empires was used as a pretext for territorial expansion. If
everywhere around the Serbian state Serbs are living under foreign rule,
then it is a `natural' right of the Serbian state to incorporate these
territories. The roots of this type of expansion can be found in the famous
Vuk Karadzic pamphlet (1849) claiming that all stokavian speaking people
are de fucto Serbs. This type of analysis was used later to justify the
expansionist policy of the Serbian state. We can conclude that the expansion
of the Serbian state was on the one hand based on the incorporation of the
ethnic Serbs into the Serbian state. When that basis for expansion was
shaky the ethnic groups inhabiting the targeted territories were simply
proclaimed to be Serbs unaware of their true identity.
In that process the role of the ideology of Yugoslavism was a very
complex one. The fact that Yugoslavism was advocated even more by the
non-Serbian political elites indicates the importance of the geostrategical
The case of Yugoslavia 169
explanation. On the one hand, the idea was stronger in the `Slavicperiphery'
(Slovenia, Istria, Dalmatia) constantly under pressure of Germanisation,
Hungarisation and Talianisation. Support of the Slavic hinterland, unifica-
tion of fragmented Slavic cultural and political `space' was the only hope
for resisting the pressures of expanding `western' empires. On the other
hand, the Serbian political elites, especially after 1830s, were much weaker
supporters of the Yugoslav idea seeing it as `calculated to stop the
expansion of the Serbian national consciousnessto its rightful limits' (Banac
1984: 79). The legitimacy that Serbia had achieved as the result of its long-
term geostrategical success helped to enhance Serbian prestige. Stronger ties
between Serbs and Croats in 1848 were significant signal of this. Under
Prince Mihajlo Obrenovic, Serbia become a magnet for Serbs, Bulgars and
even some Croats. One of the originators of the Yugoslav idea, Bishop
Josip Juraj Strossmajer of Croatia was attracted by the Mihajlo's policies
and successes of Serbia (MacKenzie 1994 162). Yugoslavism was the form
in which these political elites were able to participate in the successes of the
Serbian elites (Korunic 1989). In the same way, the merging of ethnona-
tional identities was also going on with attempts to replace the particular
identities with the Yugoslav one (Marijanovic 1913).
We can conclude that the legitimisation of the creation of Yugoslavia
was the result of the Serbian geostrategical advances starting at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. We can also regard Yugoslavism as
Pan-Slavism in miniature. As Pan-Slavism was a reflection of the Russian
geostrategical advances, so the strengthening of the Yugoslav idea can also
be seen as a reflection of Serbian geostrategical successes. The geostrategical
weakening of Austria-Hungary undermined the political forces loyal to it
and gave strength to `pro-Yugoslav' sentiments. On the other side, the
earlier weakening of the Ottoman empire allowed for the earlier Serbian
autonomy and then expansion without the need of the backing of the
Yugoslav idea.
Geopolitical context
The creation and dissolution of Yugoslavia came about as a consequence of
major geopolitical changes. The creation of the first Yugoslav state was the
result of the First World War, the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian
empire and the `New World Order' established at that time. I am not
denying the obvious fact that the creation of the Yugoslav state was a
consequence of the peace process after the First World War, and that the
major power players of that time had their own interests in creating and
shaping the Yugoslav state.
One important goal was the creation of viable states preventing the
German Drang nach Osten. (Although here it must be noted that many were
claiming that the preservation of the Austro-Hungarian empire in some
democratised form would serve the purpose much better.) For this reason
170 Dusko Sekulic
Yugoslavia appeared to be a much more viable solution than the eventual
small patchwork of states created out of the wreckage of the Austro-
Hungarian empire. A special role was the impression created in France and
Great Britain by the heroic actions of the Serbian army. The creation of
Yugoslavia was at that moment regarded as a simple extension of the base
of this Serbian army for its eventual role in some future conflict. An echo of
these views can be heard even today by some Western leaders' statements
about the `Serbs as traditional allies', a statement of very dubious validity
taking into account developments during and after the Second World War.
But the role of these strategic interests are in my opinion of secondary
importance. The role of the political forces inside Yugoslavia, favouring the
creation of such a state, were of much greater significance.
Italian and Austrian aspirations for Yugoslav territory were another
important factor influencing the developments towards Yugoslav unity
(Tepsic 1970). Yugoslavia, or rather the political elites of the different
national groups, were in different positions regarding the neighbours'
territorial aspirations. Croatian and Slovenian elites, with no armies, being
part of the defeated empires and under the pressure of internal revolu-
tionary turmoil, were in no position to resist Italy and even Austria, without
Serbian military backing. On the other hand, Serbia was in a much better
position to solve satisfactorily its disputes and problems with Bulgaria,
Romania and Albania.
The defeated states in the First World War waited for their `revenge'
until the Second World War, and their revanchist appetites put them on the
side of the Axis powers. Yugoslavia was then dismembered to satisfy these
aspirations. That came more than twenty years later. At the moment of the
creation of the Yugoslav state the outside threat of Italy and Austria was a
crucial one. The fact that this threat was mainly oriented towards Slovenia
and Croatia, the parts of the former Austro-Hungarian empire in internal
disarray, with no army and a very unstable international position,
significantly influenced the internal bargaining relations of the Croatian and
Slovenian political elites (Jankovic 1983).
Internal strategies
The internal strategies could be divided according to the main calculations
about the future of this part of the world. There was almost a consensus
among the political elites in the Slavic parts of the Austro-Hungarian
empire, encompassing Slovenian and Croatian lands, that the goal should
be increased autonomy and self-determination. The difference was in the
estimation of how this should be achieved and what would be the main
course of events and international changes creating a framework for action
in the direction of self-determination.
The crucial division was based on the projection of the future of the
Austro-Hungarian empire. If the empire survived, it should be changed
The case of Yugoslavia 171
from within according to federal principles, so that the dreams of Southern
Slav unification held by the South Slavs within the empire would be realised.
The opposite viewpoint started from the proposition that the empire would
not survive (that it would be destroyed) so that the future realisation of
hopes for self-determination lay in the creation of the new state of South
Slavs- which meant unification with Serbia. The first line was more popular
among the politicians active within the Austro-Hungarian empire, whereas
the second approach was advocated more by those who left the Austrian
empire and formed the London committee (Krizman 1977, 1989).
As it became obvious that the empire could not survive, the second line
of thinking prevailed and unification became predominant. But, as described
earlier, the main division emerged between those who advocated unification
as a more or less disguised Serbian expansion and those who saw in this
unification the creation of a new entity where the three national groups
(Serbs, Slovenes and Croats) would have the same rights and equal status.
Politically this division was operationalised as the centralism-federalism
dilemma. Centralism was advocated mostly by the Serbian political elite,
which was in the strongest political position, and federalism proposed
mostly by the Croat political leaders.
This controversy ended with the clear victory of the Serbian political
elites and the new state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, was
established as a centralised monarchy. The reason for this was the fact that
the political and military positions of the advocates of centralism, Serbian
politicians, on the one hand, and advocates of federalism, mostly Croatian
political leaders, on the other, were very different. Serbia was on the
victorious side with the army as the basis of its political power. On the
other hand, the political leaders of Croatia (and Slovenia) were an
appendage of a multinational state which was defeated in the war and was
in the process of disintegration. The revolutionary ferment from inside, the
international threats (the Treaty of London of 26 April 1915promised Italy
large portions of Slovenia, the whole of Istria, northern Dalmatia and most
of the islands in exchange for a declaration of war on Austria-Hungary),
and the lack of a reliable army, weakened the bargaining position of the
non-Serbian political elites. They rushed into the creation of a common
state clearly under Serbian domination.
It is often claimed that the unification and creation of the Yugoslav state
was the result of the `will of the people', which is a highly dubious
statement. The willingness of the political elites of the Slav parts of the
Austro-Hungarian empire to unite under Serbian leadership could be
ascribed mainly to its politically weak position and hopes for democratic
equality in the new state. It is very difficult to judge the prevailing attitudes
of the ordinary people. If the results of the parliamentary elections of 1920
are interpreted as some kind of plebiscite for or against unification then
support for unification in Croatia was relatively weak. In Croatia-Slavonia,
the only region where it competed, the HPSS (Croat People's Peasant Party)
172 Dusko Sekulic
won a clear majority of 52.55 per cent of votes. If we add the votes of
autonomists and Frankists who were also clearly against unification (5.23
per cent and 2.48 per cent respectively), it would show over 60 per cent of
voters were against unification in that region. In Dalmatia the support for
unification was much stronger with votes in favour of the `Yugoslav Club'
parties of almost 28 per cent, compared to less than 3 per cent in Croatia-
Slavonia (Burks 1961; Banac 1984: 387-92).
These results, combined with the history of uprisings and dissatisfaction,
especially among peasants in Croatia, are a clear indicator that the rushed
unification was more the result of the actions of political elites than of any
kind of political movement based on popular support.
With the centralisation of Yugoslavia and the dissatisfaction of Croatian,
but also other non-Serbian, anti-centralist political elites, the stage was set
for the constant conflicts and instability which characterised the Yugoslav
political scene between the two world wars. Because of these deep divisions
Yugoslavia was unable to maintain parliamentary democracy and in 1929
(after the leader of the Croat Peasant Party, Stjepan Radic, was assassinated
in parliament) King Alexander introduced a dictatorship in the hope that
with it the warring national divisions could be overcome. That proved to be
a false hope and in 1934 the king was assassinated by Croat and
Macedonian extremists during his visit to Marseilles.
On the eve of the Second World War, in 1939, the regent Pavle
negotiated the autonomy of Croatia, although this autonomy was never
accepted by a majority of the political elite in Serbia. Banovina Croatia,
created as a possible first step toward the federalisation of Yugoslavia, was
short lived because Yugoslavia was occupied and divided by Germany,
Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria.
Some major conclusions from this brief analysis of the political and
historical forces operating in the period of the creation of Yugoslavia are
the following.
First, the international environment, hostile and with territorial aspira-
tions towards the South Slav part of the dissolving Austro-Hungarian
empire, pushed the Croat and Slovenian political elites into Yugoslavia as a
second-best solution. These elites rushed into Yugoslavia, even under
centralist conditions unacceptable to them, because they perceived it as a
lesser evil than the loss of territory and division between Italy, Serbia and
eventually Hungary and Austria. This rush into Yugoslavia was also
stimulated by the pre-revolutionary ferment and civil disorder, which
threatened to slip control out of the hands of the new government.
Second, popular support for unification was never tested, and according
to the results of the elections in 1920, together with unrest, specially among
Croat peasantry, it did not enjoy widespread popularity.
Third, the concepts and ideological bases of unification differed signifi-
cantly between the Serbian and the non-Serbian (Croat-led) political elites.
Serbian elites viewed centralisation and the destruction of the cultural and
The case of Yugoslavia 173
political traditions of the autonomous regions as a prerequisite for building
a strong and unified state. In practice that meant Serbian domination in the
newly formed state, and for all practical purposes the expansion of the
Serbian political institutions to the rest of the state. In contrast, the political
leaders of the Austro-Hungarian South Slav regions were advocating the
creation of a federal state, and not the simple expansion of the pre-existing
Serbian state.
These ideologies of the Serbian and non-Serbian political elites were the
basis of the permanent conflict in the Yugoslav state. One view was based
on expansion (liberation from the Ottoman empire, the Balkan wars and
now victory in the First World War), which was linked to the territorial
enlargement of the Serbian state, and viewed the creation of the new state
as a simple extension of the process which started with the anti-Ottoman
uprisings and the creation of a free Serbian state in the second half of the
nineteenth century. The other elite view hoped to create a completely new
political structure as the culmination of long-existing hopes for South Slav
unification but on a democraticand egalitarianbasis.
This division underpinned all the conflicts of the `old' Yugoslavia. At
first it was limited only to the upper strata of the respective societies.
Although anti-monarchist (anti-Austrian, -Hungarian and -Italian) feelings
were strongly present among the wider Croat, Slovenian and Bosnian
population, the Yugoslav idea did not have much popular support.
Unification, except of course among Serbs living in Austria-Hungary, was
not deeply rooted either. Animosity against Serbs was not based on
traditional hostility and Croat peasants lived peacefully together or along-
side Serbian settlersin Croatia. There is no history of their mutual conflicts,
but, on the contrary, there is a history of mutual cooperation. It was only
when the Yugoslav state was created that anti-Serbian feeling started and
spread to the non-elite strata of society over persecution and resentment
concerning the denial of some basic rights (e.g. discrimination against
practisingthe Catholic faith). The lack of interest in Yugoslavism among the
wider population of non-Serbs evolved on the basis of negative experience.
It moved in the direction of anti-Serbianism and anti-Yugoslavism,because
the Yugoslav idea, although historically mostly advocated by Croatian
elites,became equated with Serbian domination.
The dissolution of Yugoslavia
Legitimacy
In accordance with the Weber-Collins approach to legitimacy based on
geostrategical success, we will try to interpret the decline of the legitimacy of
Yugoslavia. Many have attributed the dissolution of Yugoslavia to the
death of the great leader, but the disintegration started six to seven years
after Tito's death and culminated only ten years later. The main reasons for
174 Dusko Sekulic
this slow dissolution lay in the fact that basic legitimacy was preserved
because the fundamental geopolitical position stayed unchanged. This static
geostrategical situation is the true explanation of Yugoslavia's survival. It
did not disintegrate because of Tito's death, although there was an
undeniable weakening of central power after that event. However, its demise
occurred because of change in the wider political environment and the total
decline of internal legitimacywhich resulted from it.
The legitimacy of the Yugoslav regime was not based on support for
communism, which was an ideology accepted by only a small minority of
the population. It was based much more on memories of the liberation war
against Nazi occupation where the resistance was led by the communists.
Nationalism, Weber insists, is a specially political sentiment. It is `linked to
memories of a common political destiny' (Weber 192Y68: 923). `It was the
history of having fought together, as part of a common state, against
common enemies, for common political ideals, that constitutes the bond of
political solidarity' (Collins 1986: 152). In that sense, a particular nation-
alism, different from `ethnic nationalism', was created in Yugoslavia. The
fact that Yugoslavia was defended against a common enemy, that through
this struggle it became a part of the victorious coalition (as Serbia was in
the First World War) helped to create a special sense of belonging to the
state. This was also enforced by the new political elite emphasising the
dangers of an internal enemy, those political forces defeated in the civil war
which was going on in parallel with the liberation struggle:
The ruling class need not base its claims to domination entirely on some ideology
proclaiming the justice of its rule; a challenge from some other class can be even
more effective in stirring up the emotions buttressing or establishing its legitimacy. It
then becomes the defender of order against the party of disorder, where `disorder'
means explicitly violence in the streets, threats to persons and property. (Collins
1986: 160-1)
This `internal enemy',in the form of political exiles, was constantly elevated
in political importance regardless of its actual fragmentation and political
insignificance, and depicted as a part of the fascist world (which was
partially true). The fear of civil disorder was constantly evoked by
reminding the people of the atrocities of the civil war and by creating the
perception that the existing regime was the only guarantor of peace and
stability. The source of this power to maintain peace and stability was based
on the fact that the communist regime was part of the victorious coalition
and that the nationalist forces were allied with the fascist powers. The post
Second World War order was based on anti-fascism which gave an
important element of legitimacy to the communist regime.
The most important single source of legitimacy was the threat from the
`East'. The Yugoslavs lived in a relatively open and liberal society compared
to other Eastern bloc countries. The fact that in spite of being a communist
country, they enjoyed greater freedoms and a higher standard of living than
The case of Yugoslavia 175
their communist neighbours created a specific `negative legitimacy' and
pride in being a liberal communist society. This negative comparison was
more important than the positive comparison with the Western European
countries. On several occasions, particularly in 1948 and 1968, the
Yugoslavs expected an invasion from the East and according to many the
important element in Tito's decision to crush the Croatian Spring was the
threat from Brezhnev. (Of course it is an open question whether he used this
threat as an excuse to create a consensus within the elite circles or whether it
was a real threat.) With the geostrategical retreat of the Soviet Union from
Eastern Europe the reasons for this negative legitimacy disappeared,
attention was focused on positive legitimacy towards the West, and ethnic
nationalist mobilisation prevailed.
Geopolitical context
The geopolitical context also played a crucial role in the dissolution of
Yugoslavia. But this time the forces operating on the political leaders,
especially on the leaders of the `western'part of Yugoslavia, were pushing
them in the opposite direction from that which had prevailed at the time of
the creation of Yugoslavia.
In the case of the creation of Yugoslavia, the West, particularly Italy,
was the `danger' pushing the leaders into the arms of Serbia. But in the
eighties the West was not perceived as a danger any more. It was the other
way around; the process of European integration, economic prosperity and
the disappearance of any revanchist aspirations made Europe attractive for
the reform-minded,communist leaders of Slovenia and Croatia. Their main
preoccupation became how to join Europe and not how to escape it. The
last congress of the Communist Party of Slovenia, still in communist-ruled
Yugoslavia, was held under the slogan Evropa z h j (Europe now). This
evolution toward liberal communism, first in Slovenia and later in Croatia,
was accompanied by the opposite process in Serbia. There the evolution
went in the reverse direction culminatingin the replacement of the moderate
leadership of Ivan Stambolic with the radical Slobodan Milosevic. Milose-
vic's leadership was much more reluctant regarding the opening towards
Europe as reflected in a stronger alliance with the Soviet Union, particularly
when Gorbachev slowed down the reform process. This pro-European
strategy, characterising the western part of the still communist Yugoslavia,
and the pro-Eastern stance, characterising Milosevic's leadership in Serbia,
were important elements in the division of Yugoslavia. The split become
final when, after the first free elections, the western part (Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also Macedonia) elected anti-communist and
nationalistic governments, while Serbia and Montenegro kept their commu-
nist regimes (in Serbia under a new socialist label, while in Montenegro the
name was not even changed).
The survival of such an unlikely alliance of communist and anti-
176 Dusko Sekulic
communist parts of the country was possible only in two ways. First, by
creating an even looser federation-confederation, in order to allow the
western part to go its own way toward further integration into the Western
world and the east to stay on as the bulwark of communism. Second, by the
use of force to crush one or the other option. Taking into account the
imbalance of military power, and the inclinations of the Yugoslav army, the
chances of the western part using force against the eastern part were
minimal, but the chances of the east achieving military victory over the west
were substantial.
The western republics (Slovenia and Croatia) offered a new confederal
treaty (Cohen 1993: 178-81). The idea of an asymmetric federation was for
a long time in use, especially in Slovenia (59-65). Milosevic, encouraged by
European pressure to keep Yugoslavia intact, flatly rejected the proposals
directed toward further confederalisation and instead offered the solution of
centralisation. When that was unacceptable to the western part of the
country, he started the war to restructure Yugoslavia.
Another element should also be taken into account, and that is the
dissolution of world communism and the lack of pressure from the USSR.
From the moment when communist Yugoslavia become an independent
actor on the international scene, and that means after the Tito-Stalin split
in 1948, its autonomy was dependent to a very extensive degree on the
balance of power between two antagonistic world blocs. Yugoslavia was
probably saved from a Soviet invasion mainly because of the fear of
Western counter-intervention in 1948 (Bilandzic 1985: 158-63). The position
of Yugoslavia from that time on can be described as a free floating entity
kept alive by contradictory pressures from the West and East. With the
disappearance of the one supportive pressure, the Warsaw Pact-USSR, the
balance was lost and Yugoslavia fell.
This balance was important not only from a geostrategic standpoint but
also because it enabled Yugoslavia to enjoy significant economic help from
the West, as the show case communist state breaking its ties with the USSR,
and at same time not being forced to fully join, in the sense of internal
changes, the Western camp. That also increased the internal legitimacy of
Tito's communist regime creating the image of liberating Yugoslavia from
Soviet domination, in spite of the fact that it had brought it under the
Soviet sphere of influence in the first place.
The interest and involvement of the West in Yugoslav affairs faded with
the disappearance of Yugoslavia as an example of a communist dissident,
while the capability and willingness of the USSR to intervene also
diminished. Yugoslavia, without outside pressures to hold it together, no
charismatic leadership, and with no possibility of creating and sustaining
internal legitimacy, because of the crisis of communism and the deterior-
ating economic situation, simply exploded. The internal forces keeping it
together were too weak or too clumsy, but the forces acting in the direction
of dissolution were not capable of managing the transition in a peaceful
The case of Yugoslavia 177
way. A bipolar world held Yugoslavia together as the result of pressures
from both sides; the disappearance of bipolarity meant the collapse of the
outside forces keeping Yugoslavia intact.
conclusions
The geostrategical explanation is important in understanding the dynamics
of the creation and dissolution of Yugoslavia. Geostrategy operates on three
different levels. First, on the level of international actors and their
perception of the importance of the creation or the dissolution of an entity
like Yugoslavia; Second, on the level of the interaction of geostrategical
considerations and internal elite strategies; Third, on the production of
legitimacy as the result of geostrategical successor failure.
The important element in the short-term explanation of the creation of
Yugoslavia was the willingness of the non-Serbian elite to accept the
Yugoslav state as a better solution than its disintegration and domination
by the hostile surrounding powers. In that perspective Serbian domination
looked to be a lesser evil than domination by Italy or Hungary. This
considerationwas also strengthened by the high esteem the Serbian elite was
held in, resulting from its successes in creating and maintaining indepen-
dence over the longer run.
These different perceptions, determined by different, long-term, historical
positions, planted the sceds for the conflict which would constantly under-
mine the stability of Yugoslavia between the wars. This was a conflict
between centralisation, rooted in the perceptions of the Serbian elite that
Yugoslavia was just an extension of the long-term expansion of Serbia, and
federalism, where Yugoslavia was perceived by the non-Serbian elites as the
framework for an equal development of all national entities included in the
new state. It was only from this period that we have, for example, the
widespread Serbo-Croatian conflict at the popular level. Before the creation
of Yugoslavia, the popular nationalisms of the two nations were not
directed against each other. At the elite level, we have anti-Croatianism and
anti-Serbianism, which is the logical consequence of nation formation and
consolidation in the nineteenth century. At the popular level, before the
peasant masses in Croatia began to feel that Serbian domination in
Yugoslavia was directed against their interests, there was no popular anti-
Serbianism. This internal divisiveness contributed to the fast dissolution of
Yugoslavia as a consequence of Nazi aggression.
In explaining the events of post Second World War communist
Yugoslavia, geostrategical factors were again of immense importance.
Yugoslavia was between two existing blocs, balancing between the two.
Internal stability was maintained exactly on the basis of this balance. The
pro-Western forces were kept at a distance because of the `reality'of Soviet
influence. Any move directly outside the `socialist camp', could bring the
178 Dusko Sekulic
danger of internal dissolution and `brotherly help' from the Eastern
neighbour. On the other side more dogmatic, communist forces were kept at
bay because the whole internal legitimacy of the system was built on the fact
of successful struggle against Nazi occupation and Soviet pressure. This
perception of the successfulmaintenance of independencecreated some deep
inroads into the popular legitimacy of the communist regime. We can say,
paradoxically, that the regime was popular not because it was communist,
but because it successfully resisted the Soviet communist pressure and
created stabilitywhere nobody expected that it could be achieved.
With the dissolution of world communism the situation dramatically
changed. The fact that the west, particularly Italy, Austria and Gemany,
was not perceived by elites and the population at large to be any kind of
danger, but, on the contrary, pillars of the European integrative processes,
removed the motivation so important in the creation of the first Yugoslavia.
The goal of the political leaders in Slovenia and Croatia was not to escape
but to join Europe. They were prevented in their moves by the Serbian
integrationalist strategy of unifying Yugoslavia on a more pro-Russian and
anti-European basis. The disappearance of the Soviet threat removed the
sources of internal legitimacy of the regime and allowed the explosion of
pro-Western sentiments. Consequently the shifts in external pressures, the
attractiveness of the West and the disappearance of the threat from the
East, totally destroyed the internal consensus and Yugoslavia exploded
under cross-pressures and the attractions provided by the changes in the
geopolitical environment.
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