Soviet and post-Soviet
Challenges to the study of nation and state building
GLENN GOSHULAK
York University,Canada
ABSTRACT Since the collapse of the Soviet multinational state-empire,
nationalism in post-Soviet states has been the subject of an ever-increasing number
of studies. Post-Soviet scholars have adopted a wide variety of studies on different
aspects of the relationship between nation- and state-building projects. In the midst
of this burgeoning interest in post-Soviet nationalism, however, there has been
relatively little interest in the Soviet era itself. Recent studies provide a valuable
re-assessment of some aspects of the `national question' in the Soviet Union.
However, the scope of these studies has been relatively limited, and primarily
undertaken as historical research. An example can be found in the works of Ronald
Suny and Terry Martin. These two authors have re-opened evaluations of the early
Soviet period and the `national question'. However, they focus mostly on the
Leninist and Stalinist periods of Soviet history (Martin, 2001; Suny and Kennedy,
1999). Most recent studies of the Soviet Union generally do not study the entire
Soviet project; and even if they do, very few have attempted to link it to the post-
Soviet projects taking place today. With the exception of Ronald Suny and Rogers
Brubaker, (Brubaker, 1996; Suny, 1999), there has been relatively little theoretical
discussion of the Soviet nationalities model and its importance for understanding
nationalism.
KEYWORDS nationalism q Ukraine
This article will highlight two interrelated issues and problems for the study
of nationalism in the Soviet/post-Soviet context. First, the influence of the
Soviet period on post-Soviet state building remains largely understudied.
Second, studies in post-Soviet nationalism tend to focus primarily on
empirical research, while working with ­ either implicitly or explicitly ­
essentialist conceptions of nations and national identity. Those who study
the Soviet period, however, tend to overemphasize the role of state leaders
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and intellectuals in the nationalities policies of the Soviet regime. Both of
these approaches reflect a limitation of existing universal theories of
nationalism. A post-Soviet perspective, while benefiting from valuable
aspects of existing theories of nationalism, would be better informed by a
more contextually valid framework. This framework would not seek to
replace existing theory, but to modify and extend it to reflect the unique-
ness of the Soviet context.
I propose that in studying both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, we
need to look at both state and society, not as separate social processes in
nation and state building, but as part of the connection between Soviet and
post-Soviet state building experiences. This article will use the Ukrainian
case to highlight some key issues and problems of existing approaches to
Soviet and post-Soviet nationalism, as well as point out some possible new
avenues of analysis.
Studies of nationalism in post-Soviet Ukraine reveal some of the limi-
tations of current research into nationalism. As Yaroslav Hrytsak and
Louise Jackson have noted, while there are ample empirical studies of
Ukrainian nationalism, there is a need for more theoretically sensitive
approaches (see Hrytsak, 2000: 263; Jackson, 1998: 102). I would amend this
observation somewhat. I argue that while few scholars of national identity
and nationalism in Ukraine have incorporated serious theoretical analysis
in their studies, there are underlying assumptions about nations and
national identity within these empirical studies. Therefore, we need to
examine both the applicability of existing theories and the possibility of
alternate frameworks of analysis.
WESTERN THEORIES, SOVIET CONTEXT
It is no great insight to observe that the overwhelming majority of theor-
etical literature on nationalism is written from a western perspective. The
predominant explanation for non-western nationalisms is that they are the
inheritors of the western model, which has been diffused throughout the
globe. While many scholars of postcolonial nationalism have pointed out
the ethnocentric/Eurocentric nature of universal approaches, a similar
critique has not taken place within the area of post-Soviet studies. Instead,
most scholars of post-Soviet nationalism tend to unproblematically assume
the validity of such theories for the post-Soviet context. In this article, I will
examine two of the dominant tendencies among universal theories of
nationalism, and their impact on studying nationalism in Ukraine and other
post-Soviet states. While existing theories do offer some valuable insights
for studying nationalism, there are some serious limitations that need to be
addressed.
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THE MODERNIST PARADIGM
The dominant paradigm in theories of nationalism, as Anthony Smith
identifies it, is the modernist approach (Smith, 1998). This approach locates
the rise and development of nations and nationalisms within the emergence
of capitalism and capitalist states. Two of the more influential examples of
modernism can be found in the works of Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest
Gellner. Hobsbawm's approach, while firmly located within the modernist
framework, is guided primarily by his own ideological disdain for national-
ism. For Hobsbawm, nationalism is just a product of a particular stage in
capitalism, and therefore doomed to `wither away' as capitalism is trans-
formed. It is therefore not surprising that he applauds the efforts of the
Soviet Union in containing nationalism:
Hence, as we can now see in melancholy retrospect, it was the great
achievement of the communist regimes in multinational countries to limit the
disastrous effects of nationalism within them . . . The USSR's potential for
disruption, so long kept in check (except during World War II), is now patent.
In fact, the `discrimination' or even `oppression' against which champions of
various Soviet nationalities abroad used to protest, was far less than the
consequences of the withdrawal of Soviet power. (Hobsbawm, 1992: 180)
Hobsbawm warns that the collapse of the Soviet Union leaves post-Soviet
states with the potential for disaster. He argues that in the absence of a
Soviet mechanism for containing nationalism, the tendency within post-
Soviet states will be the construction of a dichotomy between the dominant
nation and the `other'. `[I]n post-communist societies ethnic or national
identity is above all a device for defining the community of the innocent
and identifying the guilty who are responsible for "our" predicament;
especially once communist regimes are no longer there to function as scape-
goats' (Hobsbawm, 1992: 174). For Hobsbawm, therefore, nationalisms in
post-Soviet states are merely the remnants of an earlier, exclusionary form
of identity, reappearing as a result of the collapse of the communist regimes
that had contained them.
Ernest Gellner has provided a more systematic and less ideological
approach to post-Soviet nationalism. However, he also studied nationalism
from within a modernist framework. Gellner's unique contribution to
theories of nationalism is his theory of `high culture'. According to Gellner,
the movement from agrarian to industrialized societies creates the
conditions for the development of inclusive, egalitarian forms of identity,
through mobilization and educational policies. For Gellner, modern
nationalisms were formed out of these processes (Gellner, 1987).
Amid the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Gellner wrote an article
addressing the Soviet collapse and the future of nationalism within a post-
Soviet world. He identified five historical stages of nationalism within the
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`Eastern European' context (Gellner, 1991). While the first four stages
represented the various developments of nationalism as a political
movement, the fifth stage symbolized the transcendence of nationalism
from an exclusionary to an egalitarian project. In essence, this last stage
represented nationalism as it exists in western nation states today (the
development of this western model of nationalism was described in
Gellner's `high culture' model):
It is marked by the greater and better diffused affluence of later industrialism.
This means that hostility between culturally distinct groups is not exacerbated
so much by jealousy and by the humiliation of a poverty visibly and consciously
associated with ethnic status and treated as `backwardness'. More advanced
industrialism also modifies the occupational structure and standardizes cultures,
so that their mutual differences become, at least in some measure, merely
phonetic rather than semantic . . . (Gellner, 1991: 131)
Gellner argued that, while nationalisms in Eastern and Southern Europe
were in the fourth stage of development, the Soviet Union had effectively
contained and `frozen' nationalism, so that the nationalisms which emerged
in 1991 were essentially the late 19th-century forms of nationalism (stage
two), in which the `one nation one state' principle predominated. For
emerging post-Soviet states, the only hope of avoiding some of the disasters
of the 20th-century in other parts of `Eastern Europe' was to `catch up
quickly'.
While Gellner did not share Hobsbawm's disdain for nationalism, both
he and Hobsbawm shared the assumption that the Western model of
nationalism, which developed as a result of the particular formation of capi-
talism within these states, is not applicable to the Soviet case. Given the
nature of the Soviet project ­ as a non-capitalist project ­ this is a quite
reasonable claim. However, a further assumption of the authors is more
problematic. For Hobsbawm and Gellner, since the Soviet case does not
reflect a capitalist model of modernization, the development of nationalism
is seen to have been aborted. Due primarily to the powerful control of the
Soviet state/Communist party over Soviet society, nationalism was
submerged in its 19th-century form.
PROBLEMS OF ESSENTIALISM
An overall tendency in modernist theories of nationalism is the attempt to
offer a universal explanation for the power of nationalism. Writing from a
Marxist perspective, Benedict Anderson emphasizes that there is a strong
connection between language and nation. He illustrates this by using an
example from Ukrainian history. Anderson notes how quickly the Ukrain-
ian language was transformed from a peasant to a literary language in the
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19th-century, and points to its importance in the construction of Ukrainian
identity. `The use of this language was the decisive stage in the formation
of an Ukrainian national consciousness' (Anderson, 1991). While
Anderson's theory of nationalism is quite complex, he emphasizes that
language ­ as a specifically capitalist form ­ is the crucial link to under-
standing the mass mobilization of people into a nation. For Anderson,
language is viewed as a crucial element in the construction of nations. The
development of a `private-property language', in which no language has any
apparent worth over the next, is viewed by Anderson as being critical for
the mass growth of the nation. Most importantly, the development of `print
capitalism' provided the media through which to transmit this new kind of
language and, subsequently, community:
What, in a positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was a half-
fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and
productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and
the fatality of human linguistic diversity. (Anderson, 1991: 42­3)
There are several problems with Anderson's concept of print-capitalism. As
Anthony Smith argues, assigning such a prominent role to print-capitalism
is most dangerous because of its reductive explanatory value:
This view of the nation as primarily a text and discourse inevitably suggests a
leading causal role for print technology and print-capitalism, one which leaves
little room for other modes of cultural representation and omits other vital
factors in the rise of nations and the spread of nationalism. (Smith, 1998: 138)
A further problem with Anderson's approach is the association between
print technology and capitalism. Is the connection between capitalism and
print language simply coincidental? Or is the development of print tech-
nology a particular capitalist process? If so, what exactly makes this specific
form of technology a capitalist form?
Anderson's theory combines elements of essentialism with modernism.
His construction of `print capitalism' as a major factor in the mass mobiliz-
ation of the `imagined community' is derivative of Karl Deutsch's
communication approach, which emphasized the role of communication
structures in the mobilization of nationalist movements (Deutsch, 1966).
However, it is curious that Anderson specifies print language as a specific-
ally `capitalist' form of technological innovation. One possible explanation
is that Anderson is attempting to link his theory within modernist
parameters: i.e. that mass nationalism is essentially a product of the emerg-
ence of capitalism. This is certainly a possibility, given Anderson's own
acceptance of the basic parameters of the modernist approach. This does
not mean that Anderson's theory is limited to print language as the sole
factor in the `imagining' of the nation. What is critical, however, is that he
attempts to essentialize its mass nature within the emergence of capitalism.
A different approach to understanding nations and nationalism stresses
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the links between national identity and ethnicity. Although Anthony Smith
acknowledges that nations are primarily modern communities, he argues
that they have roots in premodern forms of belonging, which are linked by
ethnicity. Smith attempts to maintain a balance between viewing nations as
modern (capitalist), while rooted in primordial communities (ethnicity).
This dual nature of nationhood reveals itself in Smith's analysis of Ukrain-
ian nationalism. On the one hand, Ukrainian identity in the 19th-century is
referred to as a `nation-in-the-making' or `ethnic category', because it does
not have a long history to draw upon (Smith, 1996: 110). However, Smith
also argues that during the 19th-century an `ethnic' conflict developed
between Russians and Ukrainians. The source of Ukrainian nationalism
was Russian westernization: `In the case of the Ukrainians, it was the in-
cipient westernization of Russia and the onset of industrialization in the
latter half of the 19th-century that turned a literary movement into a social
and political nationalism' (Smith, 1992: 55).
In analyzing nationalism in the post-Soviet era, Smith rejects Gellner and
Hobsbawm's claim that nationalism was successfully contained and `frozen'
in its late 19th-century form. However, his analysis reveals a tendency to
reduce the study of nations and nationalism to an ethnic essentialism.
Although language and religion are viewed as significant factors, they
become subverted within an ethnic explanation:
as the recent interest in religion in various parts of the Soviet Union
demonstrates, language did not so much replace as preserve ethnic identities
whose fuller articulation requires a `religious' dimension to the extent that such
a dimension is inseparable from a distinctive `ethnohistory' and from a
continuing, if hitherto unspoken, sense of ethnic election. (Smith, 1992: 62)
The Ukrainian case highlights a weakness of Smith's assumption. While
industrialization was beginning to take place in the late 19th-century, it was
very selective and isolated. Few of the workers in the new industries were
Ukrainian; the vast majority remained in the village. It was here that the
beginnings of a Ukrainian national movement began to emerge (Guthier,
1990). The Ukrainian case highlights the complex nature of nationalism. In
Western Ukraine (Galicia), which was under Habsburg rule, a much more
significant movement began to develop in the late 19th-century. This was
spurred on by the continued oppression of Ukrainian peasants under the
Polish gentry, and was also aided by the electoral representation given to
Ukrainian peasants (see Kann, 1970; Subtelny, 2000).
Modernism and the Soviet experience
A common aspect of the approaches of Gellner, Hobsbawm, Anderson,
and Smith, is that, in attempting to provide a universal framework, they
oversimplify what are, in different contexts, very complex nationalist move-
ments.
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One problem with Gellner's approach is that it denies the applicability
of his `high culture' model to the Soviet project. Upon closer examination
of the Soviet project, the changes that took place during the Soviet period
exhibit a striking similarity to those described by Gellner in his `high
culture' model. Mass industrialization and migration of the Soviet peoples
reflected a movement from `Agraria' to `Industria', as described in Gellner's
model (see Lewis, 1971; Liber, 1992). In the Soviet Union, education ­
Gellner describes this as `exo-education' ­ also played a significant role in
promoting a sense of `Sovietness' among the population (see Simon, 1991).
Even if we acknowledge that the `high culture' project of the Soviet Union
was unique, this does not justify studying it outside of the modernization
model, as Gellner and Hobsbawm do. Instead, we need to study the Soviet
Union as an alternate form of modernization, which, while sharing some
similarities with the western (capitalist) model, is also unique in many
aspects.
A further problem with Gellner's `high culture' model is the claim that
it promotes an egalitarian, non-ethnic form of identity. This is the model to
which Gellner is referring in his identification of the fifth stage of national-
ist development in the Eastern European context. This reflects the same
assumptions about national identity as the `civic' model, which is often
portrayed ­ implicitly or explicitly ­ as a polar opposite of `ethnic' identity.
In this way, the more civic-oriented western forms of nationalism are
viewed as polar opposites to the ethnic-oriented nature of (backwards, non-
modern) post-Soviet nationalisms. As Taras Kuzio has argued, the
civic/ethnic nation dichotomy is very problematic (see Kuzio, 2000). Not
only are lines between civic and ethnic concepts more blurred in practice;
in addition, the myth of a dichotomy between `civic' Western Europe and
`ethnic' Eastern Europe is dangerous and misleading. By accepting
Gellner's argument that Eastern European nationalisms were `frozen' in
their 19th-century (supposedly ethnic) forms, this myth is simply being rein-
forced.
`Nationalising states'
Rogers Brubaker has provided a very influential analysis of the links
between the Soviet and post-Soviet period. Brubaker argues that, contrary
to the claims of Gellner and Hobsbawm, national identity was `insti-
tutionalized' in the Soviet Union (Brubaker, 1996). Yuri Slezkhine notes
that federalism in the Soviet Union was more than just a tool for propa-
ganda:
Uncompromisingly hostile to individual rights, they eagerly, deliberately and
quite consistently promoted group rights that did not always coincide with those
of the proletariat. `The world's first state of workers and peasants' was the
world's first state to institutionalize ethnoterritorial federalism . . . (Slezkhine,
1994: 415)
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Brubaker goes beyond simply understanding the nature of the Soviet state.
In describing the post-Soviet states, he refers to them as `nationalising
states':
These are states that are conceived by their dominant elites as nation-states, as
the states of and for particular nations, yet as `incomplete' or `un-realized'
nation-states, as insufficiently `national' in a variety of senses . . . Almost all of
the twenty-odd new states of post-Communist Eurasia can be understood in this
sense . . . (Brubaker, 1996: 79)
Brubaker's analysis shares some of the assumptions of the modernist
approach; specifically, that the post-Soviet states are producing `exclusion-
ary,' essentialized expressions of national identity in their state building
projects. While Brubaker does not specifically define the nation in terms of
language or ethnicity, others have used his model for such purposes. In the
early 1990s, Ian Bremmer argued that in Ukraine, there were regional
divisions between Russians and Ukrainians, and that the source of this
division was primarily ethnic (Bremmer, 1994). According to Bremmer, an
escalated conflict between these two communities was a distinct possibility
in the early years of independence.
Dominique Arel also applied Brubaker's model, modifying it to reflect
what he saw as the special nature of Ukrainian identity. Arel argued that
the conflict between identities in Ukraine was primarily linguistic, not
ethnic (Arel, 1995). According to Arel, regional conflicts between eastern
and western Ukraine, if they were to escalate, would be mobilized along
linguistic lines of identification.
The developments in empirical research on national identity in Ukraine
during the 1990s reveal that most scholars have been uncomfortable with
essentializing explanations. While early studies emphasized the role of
ethnicity and language in national identity, more recent studies have chal-
lenged the simple dichotomy between Eastern Russian/Russophone and
Western Ukrainian/Ukrainophone identities (see Barrington, 1997;
Craumer and Clem, 1999; O'Loughlin and Bell, 1999). Brubaker's desig-
nation of post-Soviet states as `nationalising states' reinforces the myth of
two diametrically opposed types of national projects: `civic' versus `ethnic'.
A second problem with Brubaker's analysis is that it rejects the agency
of society and social forces in the construction of national identity, and in
relations between various national communities within states. Ronald Suny
and Michael Kennedy do not completely reject the utility of studying
nationalism from a state-society perspective. However, they argue that the
most important element is the role of intellectuals, who are seen to
construct the nation:
Although we do not disregard the broad structural and discursive frameworks
and social dynamics that provided the context in which nations have been
constructed or doubt that the popular exercise of nationalist visions and the
utilization of national ideology by states have greater explicit social
ETHNICITIES 3(4)
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consequence, we are concerned here with the `quiet politics' . . . of nationalism
that establishes the possibilities for what states and societies might do. In their
contestation of the meaning of the nation, intellectuals are disproportionately
involved in such quiet politics. (Suny and Kennedy, 1999: 2)
The authors provide a valuable point about the role of intellectuals. They
emphasize the process of nation building as one of `articulation', which
involves `a measure of fit between a cultural product and the social environ-
ment' (Suny and Kennedy, 1999: 5). What is absent in this analysis,
however, is any conception of effective limitations on the actions of intel-
lectuals. The restraints on intellectuals are identified as the social environ-
ment in which they operate, but (supposedly) this does not provide much
resistance to their nation-building projects.
This is one of the valuable contributions of empirical research on
Ukrainian identity. By focusing on the social environment in which post-
Soviet state and nation building take place, these studies reveal how society
affects the actions of both state leaders and intellectuals. However, these
studies need to be located within a wider theoretical perspective. What is
needed is an approach that is able to provide a comprehensive framework
for studying the unique nature of national identity in the post-Soviet states.
In essence, we need to bring the study of the role of state and society back
together.
ALTERNATE APPROACHES AND FRAMEWORKS?
Providing an alternate theoretical approach to studying post-Soviet nation-
alisms does not mean abandoning the existing theoretical literature on
nationalism. The problem, however, is that there are some very problem-
atic assumptions that need to be addressed. First, Gellner's model suggests
that factors such as urbanization and migration policies are influential in the
changing nature of national identities. Despite Gellner's objections, the
Soviet project reflects Gellner's model of `high culture', both as a
movement from an agrarian to industrial state, and in the cultural project
of creating a supranational identity.
In a recent thorough and insightful historical reassessment of Lenin,
Stalin, and the nationalities question, Terry Martin refers to the Soviet
Union as an `affirmative action empire' (Martin, 2001). Martin argues that
one of the unique features of the Soviet Union was its ability to draw upon
the experiences of the Habsburg empire in dealing with the nationalities
question. In doing so:
Russia's new revolutionary government was the first of the old European
multiethnic states to confront the rising tide of nationalism and respond by
systematically promoting the national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and
GOSHULAK q SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET
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establishing for them many of the characteristic institutional forms of the
nation-state. (Martin, 2001: 1)
Martin's analysis is a crucial reassessment of the Leninist and Stalinist
periods. His research reveals that the nationalities question was a complex
problem for the Soviet leadership, not only in the effort to build `socialism
in one country', but also as a response to the continuing pressures from the
many different national identities within the former empire.
While Martin's study is important, it is limited in its historical scope.
What is needed is a way to study the whole Soviet experience and, most
importantly, how the Soviet experience influences state building projects
today. One possible avenue of investigation involves studying post-Soviet
states as postcolonial states. While the Soviet Union does not neatly fit into
the category of empire, it is more problematic to define it as a state. As
Alexander Motyl suggests, an empire is a particular kind of state, `a highly
centralized, territorially segmented, and culturally differentiated state
within which centralization, segmentation, and differentiation overlap'
(Motyl, 1998: 18).
Michael Hechter's concept of `internal colonialism', while offering an
alternative to traditional colonial approaches, is also problematic. In
attempting to explain how the Celtic identity survived within the British
empire, Hechter pointed out that ethnic separatism was a cultural response
to the continued political and economic dominance of the core (Hechter,
1975). Internal colonialism focuses on the relationship between political,
cultural, and economic factors. However, there are problems when applied
to the Soviet case. In the Ukrainian case, increased interaction between the
core (Russians) and the periphery (Ukrainians) did not necessarily lead to
the reinforcement of ethnic difference.
Graham Smith describes the specific nature of the Soviet state as a form
of `federal colonialism'. According to Smith, the federal colonial structure
of the Soviet Union was highlighted by two paradoxes. First, while national
self-determination was denied to the republics, a degree of localism was
tolerated. The relationship between the centre and local (often nativized)
administrators, while dominated by the central Party, was complex and
changed over time. Second, while the state attempted to create an all-union
form of identity, it provided some ­ albeit limited ­ social space for identity
building at the regional level (Smith et al., 1998: 5­6).
Reassessing the nature of colonialism from the level of the state is an
important aspect of creating a distinctly post-Soviet theoretical perspective.
However, we also need to evaluate the role of society in understanding
nationalism today. In assessing the causes of Soviet collapse, Alexander
Motyl is somewhat ambivalent about the role of society and social forces.
Motyl admits that the Soviet state, despite its totalitarian nature, was never
fully able to control Soviet culture (although he never explains what he
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501
means by culture). While acknowledging that social forces were not simply
passive, Motyl argues that they were released primarily as a result of the
state's attempt to reform itself (Motyl, 1990). Society, therefore, did not
provide any impetus for change; instead, it was simply the recipient of state
actions.
State and society
Studying the post-Soviet/ postcolonial state from both above (the state) and
below (society) allows for a more balanced and sophisticated approach.
One possible framework for a new model can be found in the state-society
approach developed by Joel Migdal (Kohli et al., 1994; Migdal, 2001). In
studying third world states, Migdal and others have concluded that the
relationship between state and society needs to be studied as a symbiotic
relationship, rather than as two separate spheres of activity. The `state-in-
society' model involves studying struggles and coalitions among social and
political forces as a complex web of interactions.
The state-in-society model is useful in studying post-Soviet states in two
important aspects. First, it highlights elements of both continuity and change
in the transition from a colonial to postcolonial state. In what Migdal
describes as the `transformative state', both state and social actors are forced
to reorient themselves. For state leaders, legitimizing and solidifying their
position in power often involves creating a unique quality for their state.
Creating a `national idea' is part of this project of state building. This process
includes the invocation of historical symbols, the promotion of a
cultural/ethnic/linguistic basis, and the articulation of inclusiveness/ex-
clusion for minorities within the state. However, this process is never smooth
or easy. The success of state leaders in promoting a `national idea' is depen-
dent on creating alliances with political and social forces.
In the Ukrainian case, the complex relationship between state and
society is evident in the nation building and state building project under-
taken by Ukraine's first president, Leonid Kravchuk. Legitimizing the idea
of a Ukrainian state meant providing some kind of rationale for the unique-
ness of the Ukrainian state. As leader of an independent Ukrainian polity,
Leonid Kravchuk attempted ­ to a limited degree ­ to construct a trans-
formative state. He called for the restoration of the Ukrainian language and
culture and promoted the adoption of Ukrainian historical symbols (Kuzio,
1998: 127­8). Kravchuk emphasized that he was defending the interests of
Ukraine, but was careful about how he characterized its inhabitants. He
referred to them as the `people of Ukraine' rather than `Ukrainian people',
a more ethnically neutral way to avoid offending ethnic Russians (Motyl,
1995: 115). While utilizing symbols and myths from Ukrainian historical
experience, Kravchuk emphasized from the very beginning that the new
state was a state for all its citizens:
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I have one great aim. I am not saying that in our generation we can create a
complete and mighty Ukrainian power; rather, the great aim lies in creating, in
laying the foundations of statehood so that the people have a state of their own,
their own native state . . . Not Ukrainians but all the people living on our land,
Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Poles, Hungarians, everyone. (Kravchuk, 1992)
When dealing with sensitive historical issues, Kravchuk avoided offending
either the Ukrainian or Russian historiographic perspectives. When asked
whether he thought Kyiv was the cradle of the Russian state, Kravchuk
responded:
The matter is that Kiev has never been the cradle of the Russian state. It was a
cradle of the Kievan Rus incorporating different lands. This is a historical fact
which nobody calls into question. However, we don't make it a basic principle
of our relations with Russia and Byelorussia. We refer to this fact as a purely
historical one. (Kravchuk, 1993)
Kravchuk's role as leader of the Ukrainian state and as promoter of Ukrain-
ian identity might appear surprising, given that he was once the ideological
chief for the Ukrainian Communist Party. However, the transition from
colonial to postcolonial state should not be seen as a complete break. In
many cases, those who were in positions of power within colonial adminis-
trations are often best suited to transforming themselves in the postcolonial
environment.
In the `transformative state', political and social forces are also forced to
reorient themselves within the postcolonial environment (Kohli et al., 1994:
13­14). In the post-Soviet environment, many of the social forces that
emerged in the late 1980s have become reoriented as political parties and
organizations. As political parties, these various groups maintain a dual
function within state and society. While they are part of the institutional
structure of the state, at the same time, political parties attempt to aggre-
gate support from society. In this sense, they have links both to the state
and society (see Ware, 1996).
During the late 1980s, a variety of nascent social forces began to emerge
­ although quite timidly ­ in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The most
prominent of these emerging forces was `Rukh' (`Movement for Pere-
stroika'). While Rukh's beginnings were initially a reawakening of the
suppressed dissident movement (Paniotto, 1991), what aided the develop-
ment of Rukh into a political force was the development of an alliance with
members of the Communist Party (Dawson, 1996: 76­7)
The problems and dilemmas of postcolonial transition for both state and
social forces can be seen in the relationship between Rukh and Leonid
Kravchuk. While Kravchuk had defeated Rukh's candidate in the first-ever
presidential elections, he needed political allies to help solidify his hold on
power. Likewise, Rukh, although wary of Kravchuk, was not strong enough
ETHNICITIES 3(4)
503
as a political force. What developed, therefore, was an uneasy ­ yet
temporary ­ accommodation between two seemingly opposing forces.
The state­society approach can also help in reassessing the nature of the
Soviet state.
As Miroslav Hroch notes, it cannot simply be assumed ­ as Gellner and
Hobsbawm do ­ that the Soviet state was always effective in its state-
building and, especially, its nation-building efforts:
The conventional view that current turmoil is the result of the release of
irrational forces that were long suppressed ­ `deep-frozen' as it were ­ under
communism, and are now in full revival after a lapse of fifty years, is evidently
superficial. Such a conception is extravagant ­ closer to the world of fairy-tales
than of historical processes. (Hroch, 1996: 89)
While the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a dominant force in
both state and society, there were periods when its grip was weakened
slightly. One aspect of the state-in-society model entails providing `an
anthropology of the state' (Kohli et al., 1994: 15­16). Migdal argues that we
need to `disaggregate' the state: to avoid treating it as a unitary actor by
looking at different levels of interaction both within the state and between
state and society.
Even in the most oppressive regimes, such as the Soviet Union, the state
was not as monolithic as the totalitarian model suggests. First, the relation-
ship between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the state was
sometimes complex and difficult (see Laird, 1970: 101). Second, the
relationship between Moscow and the various republics often led to the
development of centre­periphery conflicts. While the centre (Moscow)
controlled the periphery (republics), loyalty to the centre was not always
absolute. In the Ukrainian republic, pressures to satisfy both the centre and
local sometimes led to a conflict between loyalties to the Party and ­
especially for nativized Party bureaucrats ­ loyalties to local interests
(Beissinger, 1988).
The Ukrainian Republic reveals some of the variations in Communist
Party control of state and society. While the Communist Party was hostile
towards Ukrainian nationalism and marginally tolerant of Ukrainian
identity, at various periods it was unable or unwilling to silence the
emerging voices of dissent, both within the Party and in Ukrainian society.
During the 1960s, expressions of nationalist sentiment and discontent over
the status quo emerged in two distinct forms: first, in the writings of a small
but dedicated group of dissidents (see Bilocerkowycz, 1988); second,
discontent extended to the top of the Ukrainian Communist Party leader-
ship. Petro Shelest, First Secretary of the Ukrainian SSR from 1965 to 1972,
was an adamant defender of Ukraine's economic interests. While his
defense of Ukrainian identity and culture did not mean he was a nationalist,
GOSHULAK q SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET
504
his career represents a link between the `national communism' of the 1920s
and its revival ­ albeit in a different form ­ in the late 1980s (Pelenski, 1975).
Even though expressions of national identity were isolated and marginal-
ized, they were never fully extinguished (either by design, or through sheer
survival). In the 1980s, the symbol and expression of discontent re-emerged;
in the social movements and within the Ukrainian Party itself, anti-colonial
sentiments began to emerge, as Party members, officials and emerging
social organizations began openly questioning the correctness of Moscow's
policies.
STATE-SOCIETY APPROACH AS AN ORGANIZING
FRAMEWORK
In drawing attention to the state-society approach, I am not suggesting that
existing theories and approaches have no useful value. On the contrary,
looking at nationalism in post-Soviet states can involve drawing from and
highlighting valuable aspects of nationalism which theorists have pointed
to. For example, Migdal agrees that we need to examine the role of symbols
as part of the `imagining' of the nation, or creation of a `high culture', for
this is part of the nation building process:
No state can monitor all its rules; each needs what Peter Berger and Thomas
Luckman called `legitimating universes', a constellation of symbols justifying
state domination. It is this need that lies behind the attempts by states to shape
the moral or symbolic order of their populations . . . It is the transformation of
people as they adopt the symbols of the state and the transformation of the
state as it incorporates symbols from society ­ both seemingly `non-political'
processes ­ that an anthropology of the state can illuminate. (Kohli et al., 1994:
15)
National identity is often used in the creation and maintenance of legiti-
macy. However, this does not mean that the tools used for creating a
national (state) identity are always effective. This is because the legitimacy
process itself is conditioned by the struggles that take place both within and
between the state and society. How the nation is conceived, therefore, is an
object of struggle and accommodation.
In addition, ethnicity and language, as pointed out by Anderson and
Smith, play crucial roles in the formation and articulation of the nation.
However, in different contexts, these factors are part of the matrix of state-
society relations, and will interplay with other factors in different ways. The
state-society approach, therefore, is not meant to constitute a theory of
nationalism. Rather, it is a framework for organizing and explaining
nationalism from the post-Soviet context.
ETHNICITIES 3(4)
505
CONCLUSION
The state-society model is important in that it points out the need for new
directions in the research of post-Soviet nationalisms. As an organizing
framework, this approach does not seek to replace as much as include and
go beyond existing studies and approaches. To better understand national-
ism today, we need to challenge the notion that all the really important
questions about nations and nationalism have been answered. In addition,
the issue of the Soviet national question needs to be reopened, not only as
an historical event, but also in understanding issues of continuity and
change in the transition between Soviet and post-Soviet state and nation
building. Finally, existing theories of nationalism cannot be assumed to be
as universal as they attempt to be. We need to reassess how much of these
theories apply or do not apply to the Soviet case. In the end, it is hoped that
the study of nationalism in general can be better served.
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GOSHULAK q SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET
GLENN GOSHULAK is an adjunct professor of Political Science at York
University and an Associate Member of the Centre for Russian and East
European Studies at the University of Toronto. He has written articles on
the national question in post-Soviet studies and is currently working on
a comparative study of ethnic conflict in Crimea and Kosovo. Address:
Department of Political Science,York University,Toronto,Ontario,Canada.
[email: ggosh@yorku.ca]