SINCE World War I1 some 50 former colonial or dependent terri- tories have become independent states in the sense that they have become member states of the United Nations. Now that: these coun- tries have been granted sovereignty over their own peoples, it is ap- parent that independence or sovereignty refer to proximate achieve- ments, even where these terms have a clear legal meaning. Many of these newly independent countries still face the task of building a national political community, and we do not lrnow whether they will succeed. Their efforts may be compared with the nation-building of Western countries during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Ideally we should be able to analyze both processes in the same terms. An earlier generation of social scientim would have had little hesitation in doing so; having confidence in the progress of manlcind, they adhered to a theory of social evolution that posited stages through which all societies must pass. Today there is more uncertainty about the ends of social change and more awareness of its costs. Belief in the universality of evolutionary stages has been replaced by the realization that the momentum of past events and the diversity of so- cial structures lead to merent paths of development, even where the changes of technology are identical. We have in fact little experience with studies of social change that would encompass the discrepancies of timing and structure between nation-building then and now. Still, the course of events has placed such studies on the agenda of the social sciences once again. As a result, the earlier and simpler theories of evolution are being replaced, however haltingly, by an interest in comparative studies of economic and political modernization. This more Merentiated understanding of our changing social order poses an intellectualchallenge. The following studies are offered as an attempt to enhance our understanding of "development" by a re-examination of the European 1 Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 2 Nation-Building and Citizenship experience. The social and political changes of European societies provided the context in which the concepts of modern sociology were formulated. As we turn today tu problems of development in the non-Western world, we employ concepts that have a Western derivation. In so doing, we can proceed in one of two ways: by formnlating a new set of categories applying to all societies, or by rethinlcing the categories familiar to us in view of the transformation and diversity of the Western experience itself. These studies adopt the second alternative in the belief that the insights gained in the past should not be discarded lightly. PROGRAMMATIC SUMMARY The common theme of these studies is the analysis of authority relationships. Following an interpretation of public and private au- thority in Western societies from medieval patterns to those of the modem nation-state, we will contrast these patterns with those charac- teristic of Russian civilization. This analysis of the European esperi- ence is then used as a vantage-point for comparative studies of the preconditions of political modernization in Japan and of current efforts at nation-building in India., The major themes of these studies may he.~summarized. as follows. 1. Western European societies have been transformed from t h e x s ~ tate--societies of the Middle Ages to the .absolu_d_st,regimes of the eighteenth c e n q and thence to the class societies of plebiscitarian democracy.. in the nation-states of -&e twentieth century. I begin .-with the type of "public" authority characteristic of the medieval political community. Within this framework I characterize the tra- ditional authority relationships which are an aspect of the rank-order of medieval society. The political and social order of medieval Eu- rope underwent major transformations, ultimately producing the na- tion-state and a growing equalitarianism. An attempt is made to sys- tematize Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis of this great transformation. 2. m+dzalistic authority relationships replace the traditional rela- tions henveen masters and servants. Prompted by the economic op- portunities and equalitarian ideas of an emerging industrial society, employers explicitly reject the paternalistic world view, but the same constellation of forces also gives rise to new forms of social protest. One can contrast the protest typical of the medieval political community with the protest typical of Western societies in their era of industrialization and democratization. This is the problem on Studies of Our Changing Social Order 3 which Marx focused attention, and it should now be possible to recast his analysis in the perspective of history. Following this reinterpre- tation of social protest, I focus attention on the extension of citizen- ship to the lower classes, .in order to get linkages be&veen changes in authority structure and in social relations. Starting from a condition of society in which the vast majority of the people were considered objects of rule-literally "subjects"-Western societies have steadily moved to a condition in which the rights of cidzenship are universal. Where these rights are stiIl withheld, codict is ap- parent and often violent. 3. Next I tun to the resulting characteristics of the Western na- tion-state. By developing a n a w i d e s y s t e m - o f . public-authority, governments undergo a process of bureaucratization which is analyzed in contrast with the patrimonial of administration that it sup- planted. The analysis of bureaucracy as a self-contained system is then supplemented by a n interpretation of policy implementation un- der conditions of conflicting group pressurii, a development that has become an~outstaidingfeature of the modem welfare state. 4. Changes in authority structure and social relations reveal broadly comparable patterns in the societies of Western Europe and, 71nctatis 7>zr~trtndis,in their frontier settlements abroad (if we ignore for the moment developments which may be called arrested by comparison, such as those of Spain or Southern Italy). However, there also exists turd cleavage of long standing within Europe, b_e~gen.West t. .T&b&g the characteristics of the Western social stmc%e us more sharply, it is useful to contrast them with certain res of Russian civiIization, and in particular with those aspects of authority and social relations in an industrial setting that are symp- omatic of the historically new phenomenon of- totalitarianism. 5. Important as studies of Western societies and their structural transformations are, they no longer d c e in a world in which many countries have recently become independent states and in which all underdeveloped countries want to develop. The very fact of differ- ential development calls attention; however, to the preconditions that favor nation-building and indusaialization in some countries and not in others. An attempt is made to compare these preconditions for Japan and Prussia. Both of these countries were ''late-comers," but both possessed an effective, nation-wide public anthorlty prior to the rapid indusuialization of their economies. 6. The assumption of a national authority does not apply to an economically underdeveloped country such as .In&&, even though Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 4 Nation-Building and Citizenship . . India is notable for the relati& stability' of her government since in- dependence. .& in other new nations, the success of India's drive toward industrialization is by no means assured, and the creation of a national political community is stiU at issue. Here we also examine public authority and social relations in a nation-wide contear. His- torically, as well as in her contemporary setting, India presents a snilcing conuast to the European experience: the hiatus benveen her modernizing elite who at present exercises authority and the strength of "communal" ties in the population at large. Examination of that hiatus can lead, however tentatively, to a formuladon of some of the alternativesbefore India today. The studies just summarized can be understood urithout the theo- retical considerations that are given in the remainder of this chapter. But for those interested it is necessary to state the approach to the study of social change underlying these studies, their s p e a c concern with the problem of authority, and the historical context within which that approach and concern havetheir place. THE STUDY OF SOCLAL CHANGE L i e the concepts of other disciplines, sociological concepts should be universally applicable. The concept division of labor, for instance, refers to the fact that the labor performed in a collectivity is spe- cialized; the concept is universal because we lmow of no collectivity without such specialization. Where reference is made to a principle of the division of labor over time-irrespective of the pydcular in- dividuals performing the labor and of the way labor is subdivided (whether by sex, age, slcill, or whatever)-we arrive at one meaning of the term social o~gnnization,We lmow of no society that laclcs such a principle. It is possible to remain at this level of universal concepts. A whole series of mutually related concepts can be elabo- rated deductively in an effortto construct a frameworlc of concepts applicable to all societies. But in such attempts the gain in generality is often won at the expense of analytic utility. Efforts in "pure theory" should be subjected to periodic checlcs to ensure that con- cepts and empirical evidence can be related one to the other. Uni- versal concepts such as the division of labor require spe&cations that will bridge the gap between concept and empirical evidence, but such specifications have a limited applicability. Many other concepts of socio-historical codgurations-bureaucracy, estates, social class- are similarly limited. It is more illuminatingto learn in what ways the Studies of Our Changmg Social Order 5 division of labor in one social structure diFers from that in another than to reiterate that both structures have a division of labor. These considerations point to a persistent problem in sociology. Concepts and theories are o%cnlt to relate to empirical findings, w?de much empirical research is devoid of theoretical significance. Many sociologists deplore this hiatus, but the difticulties persist and tend to reinforce the claims of pure theory on one hand and pure methodology on the other. The following studies attempt to steer a course between this Scylla and Charybdis by relying upon familiar concepts as a base line from which to move fonvard. Since these concepts have a Western derivation, it is necessary to rethink them in terms of the extent and limits of their applicability. But since they are selected so as to encompass major transformations of society, they may also serve as a framework within which a good many, more detailed empirical studies take on added significance. Such critical use of familiar concepts is adopted here in the belief that the changing social order of Western societies can provide the foundation for stud- ies of social change outside the Western orbit-as lone as oremature e L - generalizationsof alimited experienceare avoided. In this introductory discussion I consider terminological questions as well as certain general assumptions of the conventional approach to tbe study of social change before formulating the frameworlc to be adoptedinthe followingstudies. Industrialization, modernization, and development are terms fre- q u ? . 3 ~ ~ i d ~ i ncurrent discussions of social change. To avoid mis- understanding it is necessary to state how these terms will be used in the following discussion. By indurtl.ialimtion I refer to econonzic changes brought about by a teclkology based on inanimate sources of power as well as on the continuous development of applied scien- tific research. Alodernization (sometimes called social and political dwelopnzent) refers to all those social and political changes that accompanied industrialization in many counuies of Western civiliza- tion. Among these are urbanization, changes in occupauonal struc- ture, social mobility, development of education-as well as political changes from absolutist institutions to responsible and representative governments, and from a laissez-faire to a modern welfare state. More simply, the two Terms refer to the technical-economic and the socio- political changes familiar to us from the recent history of Western Europe. The term developnze~ztmay be used where reference is made to related changes in both of these spheres. There is nothing inherently wrong about using the history of Western societies as the Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 6 Nation-Building and Citizenship basis of what we propose to mean by deuelopment-as long as the purely nominal character of this definition is understood. The his- tory of industrial societies must certainly be one basis for our defi- nitions in this field. Trouble arises only when it is assumed that these are "real" dehitions, that development can mean only what it has come to mean in someWestern societies. The term industrialization and its synonyms or derivatives refer to processes by which a society may change from a preindustrial, or traditional, or underdeveloped to an indusmal, or modem, or de- veloped condition. This idea of change suggests, albeit vaguely, that a number of factors are at worlc such that change with regard to one or several of them will induce changes in one or more depend- ent variables. Since the idea of such correlated changes culminating in an indusmal society is a widely accepted theory of our changing social order, itwillbe useful to consider it at the outset. One form of that theory-technological determinism-may be cited here as illustration. Its most consistent formulation is found in the worlc of Thorstein Veblen. In comparing English economic develop- ment with that of Germany and Japan, Veblen modifies the Marsian contention that the industrially more developed country shows the less developed country the image of its own future. Marx had based this conclusion on the argument that England was the "classic ground" of the capitalist mode of production and hence the appropriate illus- tration of his theoretical ideas, which concerned the "natural laws of capitalist production" that would work "with iron necessity to- wards inevitable results." * In his comparison between England and Germany, Veblen modies this interpretation b y drawing attention to the dserences between the a v o countries. After pointing out that modem technological advance was not made in Germany but bor- rowed by her from the English-speaking world, Veblen states that: Germany combines the results of English experience in the development of modern technology with a state of the other arts of life more nearly equivalent to what prevailed in England before the modem industrial regime came on; so that the German people have been enabled to mlre up the technological heritage of the English without having paid for it in the habits of thought, the use and wont, induced in the English community %SeeIlarl Ma% Cnpitd (New York: Modern Library, 1936). p. 13. From the preface to the first edition. Nore, inddcntdy, tbat Manr employs here the analogy between his procedure and that of the physicd sciences. Just as the physicist examines phenomena where they occur in their most typical form, so the study of capiwlirmmust use England as its chief illustration. Studies of Our Changing Social Order 7 by the experience involved in achieving it. iModern technology has come to Germany ready-made, without the culmal consequences which its gradual development and continued use has entailed upon the people whose experience initiated it and determined the course of its development.? Veblen emphasizes especially that in England the "state of the in- dustrial arts" has had time to affect the customs and hahits of mind of the people, whereas in such countries as Germany and Japan where industrialization occurred later, ancient ways had been confronted suddenly b y the imperatives of a modern technology. This sudden confrontation of the "archaic" and the modem made for a n "unstable cultural compound." In contrast to i\iianr who considered such "transitions" largely in terms of "predicting" their eventual disappear- ance, Veblen notes the peculiar character of this "transitional phase" in Germany and Japan. H e describes the "want of poise" charac- teristic of German society, which makes for instability but also for ttversatility and acceleration of change" as well as for aggression." In the case of Japan, he emphasizes the special strength of the country arising from the combination of modern technology with "feudalistic fealty and chivalric honor." In making such observations (in 1915), Veblen notes that little can be expected in the near future, because as yet the new technology has had little effect in inducing new habits of thought. But i72 the long v-un the "institutional consequences of a workday habituation to any given state of the industrial arts will necessarily . .. be worked out." Thus, Veblen anticipates the transformation in habits of thought as an inevitable consequence of a people's adaptation to modem technology. Veblen's theory is characteristic of a large class of approaches to the study of development which view the old and the new society in terms that are mutually exclusive. The more there is of modernity, the less there is of tradition-if not now then in the long run. Ex- ?Thomein Veblen, Imperinl Gemzany and the Indzminl Relrolz~tion(New York: Vilring Press, 1954), pp. 85-86. Originally published in 1915. In the same year Veblen also applied this andysis to Japan. See Thorstcin Veblen, "The Oppor- trinity of Japan," Essayr in Our Chnnginr Order (New York: Viling Press, 1934). erp. p. 252. Veblen's approach, as characterized here, was reformulated and systematized subsequently by Willim F. Ogb- Social CClnge (New Yorlr: Viking Press, 1932). pnrrim, though Ogburn has smted thm he was not familiar with Veblen's work when he developedhis ~ndysisof s o d change. Veblen, hzperinl G e m n y , p. 239. Veblen, Esrayr, p. 251. fiSee Inzperinl ~ i r n m n y ,p. 239. See the comparable prognostication for Japm is Errnys, pp. 254-255. Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 8 Nation-Building and Citizenship amples of this approach can be cited beginning, say, with Adam Ferguson's contrast between aristocratic and commercial nations and ending, for the time being, with empirical studies such as Robert Redfield's Folkczslns~eof Yzscnta72, or Talcott Parsons' theory of pat- tern variables. T o be sure, the early nineteenth-century contrasts between tradition and modernity barely disguised a largely ideological reaction to a rising commercial civilization, while later versions are more detached and circumspect. But even where the earlier invidious contrasts between the "golden age" of the past and the modem decay of civilization receive less credence than formerly, it is still di5cult to avoid the generalizations implicit in this intellecmal legacy. W e are so attuned to the idea of a close association among the different elements of "tradition" or "modernity" that wherever we h d some evidence of indusaialization we loolc for, and expect to h d , those social and political changes which were associated with industrializa- tion in many countriesof Western civilization. Implicit in this approach is the belief that societies will resemble each other increasingly, as they become "fully industrialized." Sim- ilarly, economically baclward societies will become like the economi- cally advanced countries-if they industrialize successfully. Yet these views, conditional as they are on "full industrialization," have little warrant. The industrial societies of today retain aspects of their traditional social structure that have been combined with economic development in various ways. They are like each other with reference to aspects covered by the adjective "industrial" such as the occnpa- tional structure, the urban concentration of the population, and others. Even that asserdon is more complex than it appears to be, but it is merely tautological, if all "nonindustrial" aspects of such societies are tacitly eliminated from the comparison. Thus, 'Lindustrialsoci- ety" is not the simple concept it is sometimes assnmed to be, the in- dustrialization of economically backward societies is an open question, and the idea of tradition and modernity as mutually exclusive is simply false. The most general experience is that modem, industrial societies retain their several, divergent traditions. It is, therefore, appropriate to consider the phenomenon of "partial development" in positive tams, as Joseph Schumpeterhas done. Soda1 structures, types and amtudes are coins that do not readily melt. Once they are formed they persist, possibly for cen&es, and since differ- ent structures and types display different degrees of abfiry to suIvive, we almost always find that actual group and national behavior more or Studies of Our Changing Social Order 9 less departs from what we should expect it to he if we Pied to infer it from the dominant forms of the productive proces~.~ That is, social structures and attinides persist long after the conditions which gave rise to them have disappeared, and this persistence can have positive as well as negative consequences for economic develop- ment, as Schumpeter empba~izes.~Accordingly,.our concept of de- velopment must encompass not only the products and by-products of industrialization, but also the various amalgams oftradition and mod- ernity which malce all developmenti "partial." However, this formulation does not do justice to the case. It may mean no more than that countriescoming late to the process will not develop along the lines of Western countries like England or France, Marx and Veblen to the contrary notwithstanding. All countries other than England have been or are "(leveloping" in the sense that they adopt from abroad an already developed technology and various politi- cal institutions while retaining th(ir indigenous social structure fre- quently dubbed "archaic," "feud& or L'traditional." Unless we as- sume that development once initiated must run its course, we must accept the possibility that the tensions of the social structure induced by a rapid adoption of foreign technology and institutions can be enduring rather than transitory fe'atures of a society. Accordingly, our understanding of the changing social order will be seriously de- ficient, if it is modeled on the idea of an inverse relation between tradition and modernity. Industriilkation and its correlates are not simply tantamount to a rise of modernity at the expense of tradition, so that a "fully modem" society lacking all tradition is an abstraction without meaning. These considerations will be applied to the societies of Western Europe, Russia, Japan, and India which are examined in the following chapters. The development of each reflects this interplay-be-eeen.. ---- ~adj5on~.an&.moLe_~tly!..Today, all these societies except India are highly industrialized. All of these societies (including India) also pos- sess relatively viable governments, and this fact sets them apaa from "developing" societies marked by political instability. Westem Eu- rope, Russia, and Japan have unquestionably undergone the whole- sale transformation of their social structures to which the term "de- n Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalin71, Socialiniz, and Devizocracy (N~,"yoiorli:H~~~~ and Brothers, 1917). PD.12-13. rZbid., pp. 135-137. ' h e r e Schumperer analyzes the importance of earlier ruling groupsfor polidcd smcmes which facilitated economic development by middle- class entrepreneurs. Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 10 Nation-Building and Citizenship velopment" refers. India is the only exception in this respect. It, therefore, provides us with an opportunity to examine how far the categories appropriate for the analysis of.successful development can be applied meaningfully to a sociey whose development is uncertain. Such cautious exploration seems indicated as long as the discrepancies to which the "partial development" refers are not assnmed to be merely transitory complications. Important as industrialization is as a factor promoting social change, and similar as many of its correlates are, the fact remains that the English, French, German, Rus- sian, or Japanese societies are as distinguishable from each other today as they ever were. Moreover, it is probable that some or many "de- veloping" societies will not "develop" in the sense in which that term can be applied to the industrialized countries of the modem wodd. To thinlc ohenvise is to accept a neo-evolutionist approach which treats the eventual development of all societies (and the universality of processes of change) as aforegone conclusion. Accordingly, concepts pertaining to industrialization, moderniza- tion, and development are concepts of limited applicability. Siice so far relatively few societies have developed, our first task is to fom- date categories with regard to the transformation of these few socie- ties. Our understanding of "development" derives from this context and employs concepts appropriate to it. As we turn today to the "developing" areas of the non-Western world, we must be on our guard against the bias implicitin that Westem derivation. The source of this bias is not simple provincialism. After all, the degree to which modem social scientists are exploring the four comers of the earth in their quest for social knowledge is probably unique in tbe &ory of ideas. There is a cosmopolitan awareness of the diversity of cultures and great tolerance for the unique qualities of each people. Yet this awareness and tolerance are also associated with a sciendfic spirit that tends to conceive of complex societies as natural systems with defined limits and invariant laws governing an equilibriating process. As a consequencethere is a strong tendency to conceive of a social srmcture and its change over time as a complex of factors that is divisible into independent and dependent variables. The search is on for the discovery of critical independent variables. If we can only discover them, we will have talcen the first step toward planning the change of society in the desired direction. Control of critical variables will automatically entail planned change in a host of dependent variables as well. Ultimately, this imagery is derived from the model experiment in which all factors but one are held con- Studies of Our Changing Social Order 11 stant in order to observe the effects that follow whe11the one factor is varied deliberately and by degrees subject to esact measurement. It is readily admitted, of course, that in the social sciences we are far from appro,uimating this model, but hopefully this deficiency will be overcome in time. Perhaps since every approach malces a priori assumptions, there is good reason to develop inquiries based on these assumptions as far as may be. However, these are not the only pos- sible assumptions. In particular, studies of social change in complex societies may hold in abeyance the tasks of causal analysis and prediction while concen- trating on the preliminary task of ordering the phenomena of change to he analyzed further. Before we can fruitfully ask how social change has come about, or what changes are likely to occw in the future, we should lcnow what changes have occurred, that is, what we want to explain and on what we mnst base our predictions. Ac- cordingly, the studies assembled in this volume stay closer to the historical evidence than would be possible on the assumption that societies are natural systems, but they attempt conceptualizations of their own that go beyond what many historians (though not all) will find an acceptable level of abstraction. It will be useful to formulate this approach here in general terms. The studies to follow will ex- emplifyit and show its utility and limitations. As an abstract proposition most social scientists would agree that "order" and "change" mnst receive equal attention in the analysis of societies. The h s t term points to the pattern or structure of social life, the second to its flnidity. In practice, it has been diflicnlt to achieve a proper balance in this respect. "Pure theory" and "pure empiricism" are the twin horns of this dilemma. There are those who criticize the insistence on direct observation and exhaustive gath- ering of facts as "antitheoretical," as well as those who criticize every concept as an oversimpliiication and out of touch with social life as it 'Lreally"is. What is worse, both criticisms are offered in the name of science, as if that word were a magic wand with which to clear the path to lmowledge and be one up on your colleagues. Such fetishism among scholars points to the persistent di5culty of relating concepts and theories to empirical findings, and yet the latter make little sense without them. The stndy of social change is a strildng case in point. AU sbcial structures have a time dimension which exceeds the life- span of any individual. That is, societies retain certain of their char- acteristics while individuals come and go. But the specification of Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 12 Nation-Building and Cidzenship such enduring (structural) characteristics is a matter of abstraction or inference. Only the behavior of individuals in interaction with others can be observed directly. Of course, such observation of be- havior can note changes over time, but the time-span covered is neces- sarily limited and usually too short to encompass major changes of social structure. It is necessary, therefore, to extend the time-span of observable changes by relying on abstractions from the historical evidence in order to arrive at propositions concerning social change. Such propositions are not generalizations in the o r d i n q sense. They assert rather that one type of structure has ceased to revaail and another has taken its place. T o make such an assemon it is first necessary to "freeze" the 5nidity of social life into patterns or struc- tures for purposes of analysis. Obviously, this procedure is hazardous. Wherever possible, an attempt should be made to checlc the abstrac- tions used in terms of indexes derived from historical documentation or behavioral observation. But it is no argument to say that state- ments concerning long-run social changes involve abstractions. The only valid criticism is to show that another abstraction than the one proposed is in better accord with the lcnown evidence and provides a more useful tool of analysis. All studies of social change must use a "before-and-after" model of analysis. The first step is to identify the society or societies to be studied and to malce sure that in some definable sense we have the same society after the change as before. This is usually achieved by talcing certain geographic, cultural, and historical entities such as coun- tries as givens. Note that this initial step already implies a temporal limitation, since we usually mean, say, by American society, the en- during social structure since the end of the eighteenth century. For certain purposes we might include the colonial period but we surely will exclude the Indian mbes which constituted "American" society before Columbus. Our next step is to formulate a model of the earlier social structure which has since undergone change. By this I mean that we identify that structure in such a way that we can distinguish it from other structures. In doing this, we must be on our guard against the "fallacy of the golden age." It is indispensable to provide a base line of an earlier social structure if we are to study social change. But we must avoid conceiving that change as a falling away from an initial condition which is often idealized unwittingly merely by contrasting it with later structures. Therefore, our madel of the initial condition should encompass the range of patterns and, from some standpotrt, the assets and liabilities that are compatible with it. Studies of Our Changing Social Order 13 The model must allow us to observe that "range" without forcing us to say that the social structure towhich it refers has changed already. This usually means, as we s h d see later, that a social structure is identified by two (or more) p+ciples of thought and action which are antagonisticand complementary, but not mutually exclu~ive.~ In this way we conceive of tlie future as uncertain, in the past as well as the present. -We do riot lmow where currently observed changes may lead in the long mri; hence we must keep the possibility of alternative developments conceptually open. For the present this is relatively easy to do, since we are genuinely uncertain. But the same consideration applies to thepast, and here we must be on guard against the "fallacy of retrospective determinism." The task is com- plicated by our laowledge of the historical outcome, which makes us more lmowing than we have aright to be. The fact is that the eventual development of past sodial structures was uncertain as well. It is, therefore, useful to concep&alize the conflicting tendencies in- herent in any complex society. he "unity" of past societies is more often than not an illusion derived from implicit contrasts with the later structure of the same sociejr. Bug in facf feudalism was com- patible with strong as well as we+ kings; the rule of law is compatible with major changes of emphasis, say, between the rights of the indi- vidual property holder and the cl+s of public convenience and wel- fare.; democratic institutions retain identifiable characteristics even though the nature of institutions or political parties has changed greatly. In all such cases the same structure is com- patible with much variation. If we comprehend both, we wiU understand order and change as simultaneous characteristics of so- ciety. I One can approach such comprehension by systematically asking questions contrary to the manifest evidence in order to bring out those capacities of the structure which any limited body of evidence rends to omit. By exposing observation$at any one time to a wider range of comparison with the past (or j with other social structures) than is sometimes customary, we may approach an understanding of social structure and change without at the same time moving too far away BFor B theoretical discussion of this type of concept formation, see Reinhard Ben& md Bennett Berger, "Imagesof Society and Problems of Concept-Forma- uon in Sociology,"in LleweUp Grosr,ted., Sy7ilporiu7n on Sociolo~cnlTheory (Evansron: Row, Peterson & Co., 1957). pp. 92-118. Rel~tedpoints are also talcen up in Reinhard Ben* "Concepts and Gcnadizauons in Cornpararive SociologicalSmdies,''A71zericm Sociological Review, Val. 28 (19.53). pp. 532-539. Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 14 Nation-Building and Citizenship from the evidence. In this way we impart a salutary degree of nominalism to the terms we use in referring to social sttuctures.' Comparative sociologicalstudies are especially suited to elucidate such structures, because they increase the "visibility" of one structure by contrasting it with another. Thus, European feudalism can be more sharply defined by comparison, say, with Japanese feuddim, the sig- nificance of the Church in Western civilization can be seen more clearly by contrast with civilizations in which a comparable clerical organization did not develop. Such contrasts can help us identify the issues confronting men in their attempts to develop their country along the lines of one pattern or another. And by using this com- parative perspective in our analysis of the piecemeal solutious which men have found for the characteristic problems of their society, we can bring into view the historical dimensions of a socialsnucture. A comment concerning fz~nctio?zalin7zmay be added here, albeit without attempting a consideration of the extensive literature on this subject. The idea of society as an interdependent system possessing regularities of its own emerged in the transition from the estate so- cieties of the late medieval period to the equalitarian societies ushered in by the French Revolution. This model is adapted to (and pro- jected from) the new interdependencies that developed with the in- stitution of private property and subsequently with the legal and po- litical extension of individual rights to other areas of social lile. Inter- dependencies with regularities of their own exist in all societies, but unless we propose to develop a set of categories applicable to all such "systems" everywhere and at all times we must fall back upon the construction of more limited models, for example, such types of social structure as "feudalism." Such models are inductive in so far as they are developed by reference to the cluster of amibutes brought to prominence by the comparative method, and deductive in so far as they employ the principle of "logical coherence" for the sake of conceptual clarity. If functionalism is merely a term which empha- sizes the scholar's interest in the interdependence of atizibutes in a given social structure, then the following formulations use a "func- tional approach." Their purpose is to set up models that are based O I t may he added that in this way we &o supplement the observations of pardcipating social acton without losing sight of them endrely. The fom that some social actors are aware not only of their own milieu bur of the sociecy in which they live is ane reason why the social theorist should in my judgment deal with this "theoretical consciousness" as p m of his evidence, though he must always remaia detached from it in his own worlt. Social actors not only d e h e their situation, abide by norms, and.adhere to values-they also theorize about their sodecy! Studies of Our Changing Social Order 15 on logical simpwcations of the evidence but that can serve the or- derly isolation and analysis of particular clusters of attributes. The "logical coherence" of such models should not be attributed to so- ciety, however. If the term "functionalism" is used so as to imply such coherence as an attribute of society, then the typological ap- proach employed here is not a "functional" one. THEORETICAL PERSPECTTVES : The studies of social change contained in this volume malce com- parisons and contrasts between similar phenomena in a given society over time, or in several societies. Statements concerning "similarity" require a process of abstraction which allows us systematically to ex- amine men in d8erent times and places and to use their actions as clues to the structure of their societies. To this end the following studies use the distinction between formally inrcnted maho~itytypi- cally entailing relations of cornman$ and obedience, and customarily or voluntarily established associat@ns typically involving relations based on &ties of ideas and interests, or state and society for short.fo Since my use of this disti&tion is indebted to Max Weber's work, a brief exposition of his appro+h is appropriatehere. Weber employs nvo broad criteria for the analysis of social actions. One type of action is based on coqsiderations of material advantage irrespective of personal or social obligations (Vergesellscbaftung). The other type of action is promp'tedby a sense of solidariv with others-for example, ldnship relatioh, the feeling of a5nity among professional colleagues, or the code of conduct observed by members of an aristocracy (Vergenzeinschafn~). The constant interweaving of economic utility and social a5nidy in the sense, say, that business- men develop codes of ethics in their business or devoted parents loolc to the social and economic advantage in the marriage of their daugh- ter, represents one recurrent them4 in Weber's work. Indeed, this 10 The profusion of more or less nverlappbg terms is the bane of sociology. and the following discussion is no&I am so+ to say, free of that evil. The disdnc- don hetween smre and society has only limited npplicohility, presupposing as it does the existence of territorial nation-sites. But the distinction herwcen for- m d y instated authority and 6 i t i e s of ilrerest giving rise to associations among men is found in dl societies, and the emphasis here is on this universal. This is the reason why the present discussion relies on Mau Weber's worli rather thm on the otherwise lucid and insishcful discussion of Ernest Barker, Principles of Sociol and Politicnl Tl~eory(Oxford: Clyendon Press, 1951), esp. pp. 2-5, 42 ff. The follow in^ formulation is based an Reinhard Bendiw,Mox Weber, An Intellec- tual Pommt (&den City: Anchor Boolci, Douhledny & Co., 19621, pp. 473178. Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 16 Nation-Building and Citizenship conceptualization is also a method of analysis. Repeatedly, Weber inquires into the ideas and &ties associated with the apparently most single-minded pursuit of gain and into the economic interests associated with the apparently most other-worldly pursuit of religious salvation. Even then, the approach is limited to social relationships (sometimes referred to as a "coalescence of interests") arising from actions which are construed as a reasoning, emotional, or conventional pursuit of "ideal and material interests." 'I Men may be guided not only by considerationsof utility and affnity, but also by a belief in the existence of a legitimate order of authority. In this way Weber wishes to distinguish between social relations (such as the supply-and-demand relations on a market) that are maintained by the reciprocity of expectations, and others that are maintained through orientation toward an exercise of authority. The latter ori- entation typically involves a belief in the existence of a legitimate order. Identifiable persons maintain that order through the exercise of authority. Action, and especially social actions which involve social relationships, may be governed in the eyes of the participants by the conception that a legitimate order exists.'= This order endures as long as the conception of its legitimacy is shared by those who exercise authority and those who are subject to it. In addition, a legitimate order depends upon an organizational structure maintained by the persons who exercise authority and claim legitimacyfor thisexercise. A social relationship will be called a formal organization, where the admission of outsiders is governed by l i m i ~ gor exclusive rules and where compliance with the regulations [of that organization] is guaranteed by the actions of a chief and, usually, an adminisnative staff, who are spe- dcally oriented towards the enforcement of these regulations. . . .ln ItTo get at the main ourline of Weber's frameworlt. I omit all lesser disdncdons, such as the subdivision of reasoning or cdc~ladngncdons into insrrumcnral and value-oriented behavior, and I use common-sense words in lieu of Weber's com- plex terminology. =?MaxWeber, Wimcbaft und Gerellrcbaft (Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 19?5), I, p. 16 (dted as Weber, W u G hereafter). For a somewhat ditferent nanslation see Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Econonzic Orgnnizotion (New Po~k:OxfordUniversivPress, 1947). p. 124. WztG, I, p. 27. For a somewhat different translation see Tlhory, @.145-146. Since this translation was published in 1947, the term "formal organ~zation"has become so f d a r in the sociological literature and it is so accurate a rendition of Weber's term TTerbnnd that I prefer ro use it rather than "corporate group!' Stodiesof Our Changing Social Order 17 The shared conception of a legitdate order and the persons in formal organizations who help to mainth that order through the exercise of authority constitute a netwodlc of social relations which Wers ' qualitatively from the social re~atibnshi~sarising out of a "coalescence of interests." In this way actions may arise from the "legitimate order" and affect the pursuit of interests in the society, just as the latter has multiple effects upon the exercise of authority. Throughout his work* Both those in high office and thd public are affected by whatever shared_~derstandingsdetermine the character of the political com- munity. Ultimatery;it is a question:of "good wiU" whether the laws and regulations of political authority are implemented effectively by the officials and sustained by public compliance and initiative.i6 Administrative efficiency and pub4c cooperation are desiderata in any country. Everywhere they are in short supply; they wax and wane with circumstances, sentiments?and the efforts made to enhance them. This fluidity is suggested by the pluase "good will." Any exercise of authority depends upon the wiUingness of officials and the public to respond positively to commands or rules (or at least not too negatively); hence ultimately the official relies on the existence of good will. The single policeman exercising his authority in a crowd of people can suppose, for the most part, that the crowd will allow I k to exercise that authority, much as a bank functions effectively 1,4Fora lucid, modem exposition of thi; consensud basis of government see Joseph Tnssman. Oblization md the Bodv Politic (New Yorlc: Oxford Univer-- siy Press, 19601, Chap. 2. ='The phrase "good will" refers to n fdendlv but acauicscent diseosition which often borders on or blends with indifference.' This wkmgness to iet others pro- ceed is much doser to the nccountanr's concept of good will as a salable =set arising from the rcpuration of a business than it is to Kmt's "notion of n will which deserver to be highly estccmed forirsdf and is good without n specific objective." Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 20 Nation-Building and Citizenship as long as the depositors are confident that they can get their checks cashed whenever they want to do so. Effective authority thus de- pends upon cumdative, individual acts of compliance or confidence. Those in authority proceed on the assumption that the requisite com- pliance or confidence will be forthcoming; it is only on this basis that the policeman can hope to order a crowd or the bank can invest its funds for long periods. Pnhlic good will in these cases consists in the willingness to let the policeman or the bank proceed; and these authorities do so on the assumption that they possess an implicit man- date (or credit) which will become manifest through the public's will- ingnessto let:them proceed. It is hard to discern such an underlying agreement for several rea- sons. Persons in o5cial positions, in proceeding as if good will is forthcoming, do so presumably because it has been forthcoming in the past. Under ordinary circumstances this expectation turns out to be justified; the requisite, shared understandings are found to exist -though the evidence is indirect. Public compliance and coopera- tion are similarly implicit. In nontotalitarian countries most citizens have few contacts with public oficials. Their private lives are mainly outside the lien of government, and ready compliance with laws or rules further minimizes the occasions for legal and administrative action. Although citizenship allows for more active participation, there are only a few instances in which it requires positive action- for example, payment of taxes, jury duty, military conscription and service, applicationfor a passport. But circumstances may not be ordinary. Then the extent and the limits of the implicit agreement are tested, and these intangible foun- dations of the political community become exposed. Most 05cials and citizens shy away from such tests. O5cials become apprehensive that in exercising their legal authority they may not meet with that d u r n of public cooperation which they require in order to do their duty. Since under ordinary circumstances it can be assumed that compliance will be forthcoming once the official's action is ini- tiated, it is only logical to hesitate when extraordinary circumstances put that assumption in doubt.1° The citizen is in an analogous di- lemma. The fewer contacts he has with the government, the less chance there is that his law abidance is put to the test. He lmows himself to he ignorant of many laws and rules and he also lmows that laThis is presumably one foundation for the rule of thumb according to which judges and administrators tend to confinethemselves to the case before them, in terms of its spec& amibutes, rather than consider its wider policy implications. i Studies of Our Changing Sodal Order 21 I ignorance does not exempt him from punishment. Again, under ordinary circumstances this lcnowledge may trouble him only occa- sionally (e.g., when income-tax re+ fall due). But in some criti- cal situations these apprehensions become acute, because easy-going and passive compliance su5ces no longer. When the citizen is con- fronted with policies with whic? he violently disagrees on moral grounds, ready compliance as the marlc of good citizenship becomes a doubtful virtue. Since ethical c4oices of this lcind are usually di5- cult and often demand great perskal sacrifice, most citizens prefer to be savedthe pain of standingnp y d being counted. Yet there is a positive side to these tests and apprehensions. The very existence of the underlying akreement may be in doubt, if 0 5 - cials are too fearful and fail to exercise their formally constituted authority in critical situations. c+ainly, the extent and the limits of that agreement become manife~only as o5cials take actions the consequences of which are uncertain. Critical situations may be han- dled successfully: after having talskn o5cial inidative, public authori- ties find that the requisite public cooperation is forthcoming. In such cases prompt action in the face of uncertainty is, indeed, a means of building up shared understandings between the government and its I people. But cumulative causation can worli both ways. Critical situ- ations successfully handled by p~hlico5cials will strengthen the political community by i n c r e d g everyone's awareness of the shared understandings. O5cial acbons which meet with public de- fiance reveal the area in which fodmal authority is out of step with the willingness of the public to cbmply, and, in addition, raise the specter of a similar discrepancy in bther areas that have not yet been tested. iI It is too simple, of course, to refer to the "public" in the singular, since there are many publics. A gjven o5cial action usually involves some publics rather than the "public at large," and any given public is likely to he involved in some of i!s interests rather than in all. Ever : since Roussean and the French devolution made the consensus of 1 the "general will" the touchstone of the national political commn- ~nity, it has been apparent that nothing Wre a nationwide consensus is either possible or necessary. ~ d epassive compliance with which citizens ordinarily allow o5cials fo carry out their duties already ' encompasses substantial disagreements which may be ignored simply because they are not articulated i n a politically significant way. Those who argue and grumble wden they get tra5c tickets do not pose a problem for the regulation bf tra5c. In the field of political Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 22 . Nation-Building and Citizenship opinion there is evidence of a s i w c a n t division between those who are politically active and the public at large. The activists show sub- stantial agreement concerning the legal order and the rules of the game, while the public at large shows much dissension and often little suppon for the rules of the game. But ordinarily such public sentiments are dissipated in small tallc. Even where dissension is ar- ticulated on a spec& issue and poses serious problems for the main- tenance of the legal order, it is often combined with consensus on other issues so that there is some leverage for bargaining and pressure tactics. Only the total disloyalty or ostracism of a section of the population is a genuine hazard to the underlying agreement of such a community, though coercion can malce a nation-state endure even in the presence of that hazard to its foundations, as South Africa demonsuates. These examples assume the existence of the nation-state. In the context of t h F ~ e s t e r nexperience that assumption tends to be d e n for granted, although one must remember that considerable govern- mental instabilityis compatible with the nation-state. However, there are many countries which have not succeeded in attaining even a minimum of long-run stability, that is, minimal agreement concern- ing the rules that are to govern the resolution of conflicts. Under such conditions dissension escalates and tends to prevent effective gov- ernment. In addition, one should remember that too much agreement is a hazard as well. Nazi Germany, in its later phase, exemplifies a pathology of success rather than failure. The proverbial rule-minded- ness of the Germans is certainly a major buttress of public authority, but it was exploited by a criminal regime to ensure the acquiescence, connivance, or cooperation of a whole population in the systematic extermination of the Jews and other peoples designated as undesirable. HISTORICAL PERSPECTWES The exercise of authority will be discussed primarily in relation to changes in the structure of societies since the industrial and demo- cratic revolutions of Westem Europe in the eighteenth century. Ac- cordingly, it is necessary to formulate in abstract terms those aspects of the exercise of authority which are specific to the structureal transformations of Western societies. As the discussion proceeds and comparisons are added with countries outside the Western orbit, this basic formulation will be modified as this appears appropriate for the particular analyticpurposes intended at that point. Studies of Our Changing Social Order 23 Although authority and social rel!yions are ~elntizlelyautonomous spheres of thought and action in all societies, it is probably true that the separation of these "spheres" is gkeatest in Western societies since the eighteenth century. Already 4medieval Europe, the exercise of authority bad given rise to the &o competing structures of patri-.~~~ ~ monialism and feudalism: govemmeht as an extension of the royal Iidiiidhold as against government baskd on the fealty between landed nobles and their ling. This tension between.~ .~ royal authority and the society of estates was a charactenec of medieval.politicd life. A sirnil& duality between state and society has been characteristic of many Western societies since the b e b g of the present era in the eighteenth century. A nation-wide karlcet economy emerged, based on the capacity of individuals to enter into legally binding agree- ments. This legal and economic dkvelopment occurred at a time when piblic idairs were in the handsof a privileged few-a restriction which was reduced and eventually e+ated through the extension of the franchise. Both the growth of a marlcet economy and the gradual . . ~ ..~... . ege+on~.of the franchise gave rise itointerest groups and political parties whichmobilized people for cbllective action in the economic and political spheres, thus transforming the social structure of modem society. On the other hand, in the dhere of public authority, access to o5cial positions was gradually separated from k h i p ties, prop- erty interests, and inherited privileg+. As a result, decision-making at the legislative, judicial, and ad&strative levels hecame subject to impersonal rules and attained a ceitain degree of freedom vis-li-uis the constellations of interest arisingin {he society. These pervasive, structural transformations of Western societies will be examined in more detail (sek Chapter 2). They have been accompanied by major changes of intellectual perspective; indeed the social theories that were advanced to interpret these transformations have necessarily been a part of the sbcieties they sought to compre- end. Weber's categoric distinction qetween legitimate authority and constellations of interests is itself a late outgrowth of our changing cia1 order and intellectual development. In order to use such a stinction as an analytical tool, we must remain aware of its limited licability, and this is best achieved by understanding its historical text. By learning how men come to thinlc as they do about the eties in which they live, we may acquire the detachment needed protect us against the unwitting ayoption of changing intellectual fashions and against a neglect of the $mitations inherent in any theo- Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 24 . Nation-Building and Citken+p retical framework. To thisend a brief ldok backward in the history of ideasdlbe useful. Medieval European culture was based on the belief in a supreme deity, whereas in modem European culture man and society along with nature are conceived as embodying discoverable laws which are consideredthe "ultimate reality!' As CarlBeclcer has put it: In the thirteenth centurythe key wordswould no doubtbe God, sin, grace, salvation, heaven and the like; in the nineteenth century, matter, fact, mat- ter-of-fact, evolution, progress. . . .In the eighteenth century the words without which no enlightened person could reach a resdul condusion were name, natural law, &st cause, reason. . . .lr The substitution of nature for God indicates the emergence of the modem world view, as this is reflected in literature, for example. Since antiquity "reality" bad been represented in a heroic and a satiric- comic mode. The object of this older literature had been a poetic representation of reality as it should be, in terms of ideal contrasts between virtue and vice, benveen heroes and fools or lmaves. These contrasts disappeared only in the naturalistic representations of nine- teenth-century literature, since realism left no room for the older, unself-consciously moralistic view of the world. Similarly, premod- em historiography consisted in what we would consider a moralistic chronicling of events, an assessment of history in terms of a moral standard accepted as given and unchanging. This perspective ex- tended even to the facts of economic life. For these facts were treated in the context of estate management in which instructions concerning agriculture, for example, occw side by side with advice on the rearing of children, marital relations, the proper management of servants, and so forth. Here the moral approach to human rela- tions was not at all distinguished from economic and technical con- siderations, because both are considered part of a divinely ordered universe. The common element in these premodern perspectives is the effort to discover "the moral law" which has existed, from the. _ begmnmg of tune, asthe centralfact of a wodd created by God. In this view history consists in the unfolding of the divine law and of man's capacity to understand it and follow its precepts. To be sure, men cannot fully understand the providential design. But through their thoughts and actions, they reveal a pattern or order of which they feel themselves to be a vehicle or vessel, even thongh they 17 Carl Beclter, The Heawenly City of the Eigbteentla Century Philosoplaerr (New Haven: Yule UniversityPress, 1932), p. 47. ~mdie;of Our Changing Social Order 25 understand it to reason is not questioned, even though his remains forever partial, just as the ends of human action are not in doubt, though in an ulti- mate sense they remain unlcnown. One may speak broadly of a pre- modem world view as long as kven the most passionate controver- sialists do not question the existehce of the moral law and the divine ordering of the universe, thougk it is m e that gradually since the Renaissancethisworld view becodes attenuated. This long transitional period cbmes to an end with the emergence of concepts that are basic to modem social science such as economy, society, and the state together fith ,less basic but equally modern ideas such as the public, intellectuals, ideology, and others. Based on a wholly secular conception of1 man, such as that formulated by Hobhes, concepts such as econonly and society refer to a system of interdependence possessing a lawfulness or regularity of its own which must be understood as such ratbet than by reference to a Divine will. The following examples are given to illustrate how during the eight- eenth and early nineteenth c e n b men came to consider this in- I ninsic lawfulness of society. I In Rousseau's view the social drder can be and ought to be based on the general an idea which presupposes that the individual acts for the whole community. 1hsuch a society, as George Herbert Mead has pointed out, ". . .the citizen can give laws only to the extent that his volitions are an expression of the rights which he recognizes in others . . . [andl Lhich the others recognize in him. .. ."ls This approach provides !Imodel for a society based on con- sent so that the power of rule-dahg can be exercised by and for all. Such consent is directly relaedd to the institution of property. As Mead states: I If one wills to possess that whidh is hi own so that he has absolute conuol over it as property, he do& so on the assumption that everyone else will possess his own property and exercise absolute control over it. That is, the individual wills his control over his property only in so far as he wills the same sort of control for everyone else over property.'" Thus, the idea of a reciprocal recognition of rights specifically pre- I supposes the equality of citizens as property owners. In this model of society equal men assert themshves and easily accept the assertions Is G. H. Mead, Move7nents of Tl~ougl~tin the Nineteenth Cenniry (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1936). p. 21! "[bid., p. 17. Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 26 Nation-Building and Citizenship Studies of Our Changing Social Order 27 of others, thus leading to the self-regulation of society. T o this day the idea iduences our conception of the marlcet and the sociological analysis of reciprocal expectations through which men interact in so- ciety. T w o observations may be added with regard to the conception of society as a nnnlrnl order and of the economy as a Self-regulating mechanism. In his Idens for n Univwsnl History, Immanuel I h t notes that personal decisions are free and yet part of a pattern of collective behavior with a regularity of its own. The selection of a marriage partner is an entirely personal decision, but in the aggregate marriages conform to an impersonal, statisticalpattern.- Individual human beings, each pursuing his own ends according to his indination and often one against another (and even one entire people against another) unintentionally promote, as if it were their guide, an end of nature which is nnlcnown to them. They thus work to promote that which they would care little for if they linew about it.20 Here "nature" is invoked as a regulative principle, a concept some- where between the traditional idea of the deity and the nineteenth century concept of factual regularity. One may see an analogy be- tween ICant's concept of nature and the classical economists' idea of men's "propensity to truclc, barter, and exchange one thing for an- other," which enhances the "wealth of nations" if left to itself, thus revealing the worldngs of what Adam Smith calls the "invisible hand." The economists' model and a positive evaluation of the marlcet with its jnxtaposition of individual smving and over-all regularity is strik- ingly expressed in this passage by Hegel: There are certain universal needs such as food, drink, clothing, etc., and it depends endrely on accidental circumstances how these are satisfied. The ferdlity of the soil varies from place to place, harvests vary from year to year, one man is industrious, another indolent. But this mcdley of arbitrariness generates universal characteristics by im own worldng; and tbis apparendy scattered and thonghdess sphere is upheld by a necessity which automatically enters it. T o discover this necessary element here is the object of political economy, a science which is a credit to thought be- cause it finds laws for a mass of accidents. ...The most remarlcable thing here is this mutual interloclung of particulars, which is what one would 20 Carl J. Friedrich, ed, The Pi~ilosopbyof Knnt, Znnmnriel ICantls Morn1 and Politicnl TTTn'tings (NewYorlr: The Modern Library, 1949). p. 117. In the pansla- don quoted here, the word "rarely" before "unimcntiondy" does not rnn1;e sense and does not correspond to anything equivalent in the original; it has, therefore,been omitted. least expect because at first sight ever)/rhing seems to be ~ivenover to the arbitrariness of tile individual, and it has a parallel in the solar system which displays to the eye only irregular movLmeom, though its laws may none the less be ascertained.?l I Accordingly, such concepts as ecd7zonzy and society represent the recognition of a 7~hrrcrlsocial ordeli possessing regularities which can be investigated. i At the same time, social theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were aware that this nafLral social order existed side by side with the'stnte, an institutional frame-ivorlc which, in contrast es- pecially to the marlcet, depended upbn the subordination of private to public interest. The development df this distinction between society and the state has been traced e~sewl\ere.?~Here it is d c i e n t to in- dicate briefly how Weber's categories for the analysis of social rela- tions and the exercise of authority depresent a synthesis and develop- ment of two major intellectual traditions within the context indicated above. 1 One of these traditions is that of English empiricism from Hobbes ito the Utilitarians, which makes human behavior in its sensory aspects the starting point of analysis. Weper accepts this tradition by ac- lcnowledgiag the basic importance of "material interests," but then modi6es it by insisting upon the 'idml interests1' involved even in the most single-minded pursuit of gain! If this insistence suggests that Ihe approaches the udlitarian positio? from the standpoint of German idealism, it must be said also that he approaches the idealization of social solidarity (so prominent in consemative thought during the nineteenth century) from the standpoint of utilitarianism. For by his analysis of the economic interests involved in every relationship based on honor or spiritual ideals, p b e r implicitly criticizes writers from Rousseau and de Maistre to Durkheim and Toennies for their praise of the community and socialinkegration. A t the same time Weber recognizes the importance of the problem of integration. H e seeks to solve it through an adaptation of Hegel's theoretical synthesis, the second intellecmal tradition which greatly a n e n c e d him. Hegel had aclmo+ledged that a certain degree of cohesion is achieved in society by tile coalescence of interests which ..i T. M. &ox, ed., Hegcl'r Pbiloso$by df Rigbt (New Yorli: Odord Univer- sity Press. 1942). p. 258. For an analysis of Americnn consrimtioo~min terms OF its derivadon from this basic idea of dlassicd economics see Sheldon Wolin, :$ ,., :i Politics nnd TTision (Boston: Little,Brown Si Co., 19601,pp. 388-393. ,>- --See the discussion by Ernest Barker, op. kt.,pp. 1-88. j ~i Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 28 ' Nation-Building and Citizenship. . occurs through the mechanism of the market. But he insisted that individuals ire capable of transcending their private interests, while government officials possess a "consciousness of right and a de- veloped intelligence" which enables them to encourage the fullest development of the citizens. With the sovereign controlling at the top and interest groups exerting influence from the side of the public, the officials are prevented from using their sl& and education ''as a means to an arbitrary tyranny." 2n Weber develops this Hegelian position by giving it a less idealistic interpretation. He believes, like Hegel, that not only the coalescence of interests on the market hut cultural norms and conventions produce a degree of social cohesion. In his view individuals frequently transcend their private interests un- der the pervasive influence of a dominant status group. Lice Hegel, Weber believes that social stability depends also on guvemment and the exercise of authority. That exercise remains within hounds to the extent that rulers and ruled share a belief in the existence of a leeu- mate order. Such a belief may echo Hegel's statements concermng the official's consciousness of right and the individual's transcendance of his private interests, but Weher's analysis constantly emphasizes the materialistic aspect of such idealism. Still, Weber retains Hegel's distinction between "Civil Society" and the "State" by distinguishing the type of consciousness and the type of action appropriate to each. One can say that in his view Civil Society is characterized by the groups formed through the coalescence of material and ideal inter- ests. The State, on the other hand, is based on a shared belief in a legitimate order, and its exercise of authority depends on an admin- istrative organizationwith imperatives of its own. Although reference has been made to Max Weber's work, it is well to remember that the broad distinction between authority and asso- ciation or state and society has been a recurrent theme of social thought until recently. In the utilitarian contrast between the "nat- ural identity" of interests on the marlcet and the "artificial identifica- tion of interests" through the agencies of government, in Emile Durltheim's concern not only with the group integration of the in- '"ec Iho* ed., oP. cit, pp. 161, 193, 280. In these passages Hegel combines the i d e h of individual freedom with the ideas of enlightened absolutism by claim- ing &at the free individual and rhe o5cid of an enlightened absolute ldng ( a d thus socie~yand government) m n d in a relntiou of reciprocal support. Weher gives a "materialjsric" interpreradon of the insights embedded in Hcgel's view of stare and society in a manner that is annlogous to Maoi's materialistic intcrpre- ration of Hegel's philosophy of history. Studiej of O u r Changing Social Order 29 dividual hut also with the use ofl'state authority to protect the indi- vidu4 or in W. G. Sumner's distinction between "crescive" and "en- acted" institutions-we have repeAted references to these two aspects of human association. There ark signs that this tradition has been abandoned: several authors have ahempted to show that the distinction 1between state and society is spurious by interpreting all political phe- nomena as by-products of the sdcial structure. ~ u tis this shift of intellectual prespective a scientific reflection of our changing social jeopardized by codicting group advance, or is it rather an uncritical order in which public interests are pressures (as they always are) and in which there is a marlted deep in the effort to identify public interests? '' Analysis of the transformation of Western societies can provide a framework for an apdroach to this question, although a full answer would require other hvestigations than those attempted in this volume. I24For a peuetradng yldysis nnimated by this question see Wolin, op. cit., esp. Chaps. 9-10. Určeno pouze pro studijní účely xE following tinee chapters fi the transformation of Western E is to state x e m e a n t by the* eties. The approach is greatly u Tocqueville and Max Weber, two sics. If the worlc of these men i then perhaps we should uy to UI velop their analysisfurther. T o x u e d l e- analyzes the transfc the ."aristocratic.. ~ .~~ nationsy..of j e the present and future, covering a NO one doubts that the feudal orc equalitarian social struchlre, how dnction are subject to dispute. Nt lution marlred a transition despite ties. Moreover, Tocqueville's ad tyranny of the future uses implici enables him to cope intellectual$ as well as transformatioos of the that he is dealing with genuine dk relations and political institutions : time-span he chooses to consider. distinctions that they enable us to of the social structure, either wit or between Werent civilizations. Part One nulate benchmarlcs for analyzing ~peansocieties. Their objective jcdmodernizaa~of these soci- :bted to the worlcs of Alexis de thors often cited as modem clas- Iluminating, as is often asserted, ~rstandwhy and attempt to de- lation of Western societies from i to t h e "demqgaric nations" of me-span of some seven centuries. is sharply distinguished from an :r much the details of that dis- me doubts that the French Revo- U equally unquestioned continui- ttedly speculative fears about a a "logic of possibilities," which vith contingencies of the future ast. In this way he malces sure ~ctionsbetween patterns of social the beginning and the end of the It is the merit of such long-run nceptualize siflcant dimensions 1 the same civilization over time 3ut it also follows that these dis- Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 32 Nation-Building and Citizenship 1 tinctions will become blurred the more closely we examine social change in a particular setting and in the shorter run. This di5culty can be minimized, even if it c m o t be eliminated, by placing the an- alysis of shorn-run changes within the frameworlc of the long-run distinctions, for without the latter we are Wre sailors without stars or compass. Premodern Structure 2 . ; and Transformations ASPECTS OF AUTHORITY IN MEDIEVAL socIEn Medieval Political Life In turning now to the premo4ern structures of Western societies, I begin with Max Weber's use of the two concepts of patdmonialism and feudalism. The characterdation of medieval political life by means of these concepts schemLtically presents the approach of a I ldng and then the approach of the landed nobility. The real issues of medieval politics can be dderstood as conflicts and compro- mises resulting from these, logically incompatible approaches. Pahi7~~07zialin~,refers,&st of h,to the manag_e,zes.of the royal-- household and the royal domain$. This management is in the hands of the icing's personal servants, b h o are maintained as part of the royal household and rewarded for their services at the lcing's dis- cretion. On this basis patrimonihm develops as a structure of au- thority with the expansion of royal jurisdiction over territories outside the royal domains, though these day be expanding as well. Expansion I in this context always implies dcreased delegation of authority, or i Iconversely an increased indepeudknce of the icing's deputies or agents. s The men who previously attendeh the person of the icing are charged '', with increased responsibility, redeived greater and more permanent rewards for their service, rise ih the world, and thus become less personally dependentupon their rhyal master. I From the standpoint of patrimonialism, the fundamental issue of medieval politics is the secular ank-r&giousqosition.... ~ of the.~ Icing, As the patriarchal master of his household, the lord of his domains, and 1 the ruler of the territories under his jurisdiction, the ling possesses absolute secular authority. At thk same time he exercises his mjhoriq-~ ~ 33 of Western European Societies Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 34 N2tion-Building and CieeGhip under God a .condition of rule symdolizedb y the consecration of-~_ ... ... ~.,.. his sucessian to the throne. The ldng performs, therefore, a twofold represenntive function. As parriarch he has absolute authority over his subjects, but in principle he has also the responsibility to protect his subjects and see to their welfare.' As the consecrated ruler under God, the Iring's authority is lilcewise absolute, but because of that consecration he is also bound by the divine law which he dare not transgress lest he endanger his immortal soul. Toward his people the ruler is, therefore, the secular representative of God and before ,God he is the secular representative of his people. This position as :an intermediary means that in principle the ldng cannot deny the moral and religious limitation of his authority without undermining its legitimacy, but that the consecration of that legitimacy also justifies the absolutearbitrarinessof his will. Considered comparatively, these attributes of patrimonial ldngship are not at all confined to Western Europe. The combmation of the Icing's arbitrary wiU and his submission to a ILhigherlaw'' if a general attribute of "traditional domination," as Max Weher uses that tern. In China, for example, the Son of Heaven is responsible for the peace and welfare of his people. In case of natural calamities a public cere- mony is held, in which the Emperor aclrnowledges that responsibility and blames himself for the deficiencies through which the tranquillity of Hewen has been disturbed. Analogous ideas are found in other civilizations. The attempt to limit the arbitrary will of the supreme ruler by an appeal to the absolute sanctity of a transcendant power is, therefore, a general phenomenon. On the other hand, one can dis- tinguish types of patrimonial lcingship on the basis of the religious ideas and institutions through which the attempt is made to limit the Iring's arbitrariness. Western European lcingship is distinguished from other types of patrimonial rule by a universal church which pits its organizational power against the absolute claims of secular rulers and, in the name of its transcendant mission, subjects these claims to the juridical conceptions of canon law. This is indeed, as Otto Hintze points out, one world-historical pecnliarity of langship in the Occi- dentaltradition. From this perspective it is a basic assumption of medieval political 1In his concept of "tnditional domination," Max Weber emphasizes this double function when he stresses that the king is bound by sacred madition but that this mdidon also legitimizes his absolute arbitrariness. Tocquede's concept of the aristocratic ruler is rather similar, but perhaps with too little emphah upon the element of arbitrary authority. Premodern S$mcmes of Western Europe 35 life that the personal ruler of a tekritory is a leader who exercises his authority in the name of God ahd with the consent of the "peo- ~le."' Because he is the consecratdd ruler and represents the whole Icommunity, the "people" are obliged to obey his commands; but in t u n he is also responsible to the combunity. This idea of a reciprocal obligation between ruler and ruled +as part of an accepted tradition; it can be traced back to ancient Roman and Germanic practices, was greatly strengthened by ~luidtianbeliefs, but became formal law only very g~adually.~ These characteristics of medievd lcingship are closely related to the political conditions of royal a d h t r a t i o n . On the basis of the economic resources derived from kis domain and, in principle, on the basis of his consecrated claim tb legidmate authority, each ruler faces as his major political task the kxtension of his authority over a territory beyond his domain. In thdi efforts to solve this taslc, secu- lar rulers necessarily rely upon thoselelements of the population which by virme of their possessions and local authority are in a position to aid the ruler financially and mi$tarily, both in the extension of lus territory and the exercise of his rule over its inhabitants. But such aid from local notables can endance their own power as well as that of the ruler. As a result, secular rulers typically seek to offset the drive toward local autonomy by hwhole series of devices designed to increase the personal and material! dependence of such notables on the ruler and his immediate entourhge.& This typical antinomy of ?The quotation rnmlts refer to the inadcable ambiguity of this term in medi- eval society. The "people" were objects of government who took no p m in political life. Yet ltings and esrates frequenrly couched their rivalries in terms of some reference to the "people" they chimed to represent. In fncg "consent e people" referred to the secular Ad clerical notables whose voice was 3rd in tbe councils of government. S+ tbe discussion of this issue in Otto erlre. Politicnl Tl~eoriesof the ,Middle Ages (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958). pp. -61. It may bc added that this ambiguih is not confined to the Middle Ages, ' ce all government is based in same degiec on popular consent and since even tho most democratic form of governmeht the "people" are excluded from po- cal life in greater or lesser degree. ~ h e k ediiferences of degree, ns well ns the lities of consent and participation are ~II-impomant,once the typologies we din specificanalyses. See Max Weber, Law in Econo71zy md Society (Cambridge: Hanrmd Univcr- Press, 1954). Chap. V and Passir~z. xis andysis of traditional dominntioq iVax Weber distinguishes pasimonial feudal adminisrmdon, that is, the effort of rulers to extend their authority ctain control by the use of "hawehol~officials" or by their "fe~ltyrelntion- up" witb odstocndc notables of independent means. These two devices are by o means mutually exclusive, since "hou~eholdo5dalsV x e nsudly of noble Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 36 Nation-Building and Citizenship the premodern political community in Western Europe becomes manifest with every demand b y secular rulers for increased revenue and military service. Local notables typically respond to .such de- mands by exacting further guarantees of their rights, or increases of their existing privileges, by way of compensaMg for the greater services demanded of them. The ling in turn will resist such ten- dencies. H e may attempt to divide the nobility and thereby weaken their resistance. H e may seek allies with whose assistance he can expand the territories under his control and thus buttress his au- thority. H e may seelc to expand his administrative and political con- trols through greater reliance on royal servants. The vicissitudes of such struggles are many; they cannot be considered here. The point to note is that under medieval conditions the ling's power is limited where he finds it necessary or expedient to rely on the landed aristocracy. H e may have conquered such nobles in battle and then reinstated them in their possessions provided they pledge their loyalty and service to him. Or territorial lords may have made that pledge of their own accord in return for which they receive what they already possess as grants with the attendant rights and perquisites. Such relations of reciprocal obligation are the basic institution of feudalisnz,which in medieval Europe complement the institution of pntlimonialin7z. Writing in the early sixteen century, Machiavelli already noted the major characteristics of these two com- peting structures of authority: Kingdoms known to history have been governed in two ways: either by a prince and his servants, who, as ministers by his grace and permission, assist in governing the realm; or by a prince and by barons, who hold positions not by favour of the ruler but by antiquity of blood. Such barons have states and subjects of their own who recognize them as their lords, and are naturally attached to them. In those states which are gov- erned by a prince and his servants, the prince possesses more authority, because there is no one in the stare regarded as a superior other than himself, and if others are obeyed it is merely as ministers and officials of the prince, and no one regards them with any special aiTection.6 birth and in territories of any size demand autonomy, while "feudnl" nocables despite their independence frequendy depend upon the ruler for services of vai- ous liinds. Courracmal obligations as well as el~borateideologies butmess the various methods of rule under these complemenrq systems. For an exposition of Weber's approach see Reinhard Bendi Mnx Weber, An InteNectunl Portrait (GardenCity: Doubleday and Co., 1960),pp. 33+379. nNicc010 Machizvdi, The Prince and the Discour~es(New Yorlu The Modem Library, 1940).p. 15. remmodem! Smctues of Western Europe 1 Elements of feudal insdtutions hade been traced back to the Germanic tribes and the conditions of ~ u r b ~ e a nagriculture following the de- cline of the Roman Empire. ~dlevantfor the present discussion is 1only that eventually individual, self-equipped warriors come to con- trol more or less extensive agsi+tural holdings of their own. A basic issue of medieval politics is how these separate domains can be combined-one might almost Lay, federated-into a more or less stable political structure. From the standpoint of feud'@lin~zsome degree of stability is achieved by means of the recipiocal ties between a ruler and.-~~.his- ~ vassals. The vassal swears an o th of fealty to his ruler and thus--aclmoiuledges his obligation to s e r e him. In return, the ruler grants hi5 vassal a fief, or confirms him bn his existing possessions as a fief. Where the feudal element predo&ates, these grants include a guar- anteed "immunity" such that w i t h the territory held in "fief" the vassal is entitled to exercise certdn judicial and administrative pow- ers. (When the patrimonial elemebt predominates, such powers either remain part of the royal jurisdiction or separate grants are made of them so that the king divides the bowers he h d s it necessary or ex- pedient to delegate.) Considered lcomparatively, this type of author- ity is, again, a very general phenomenon. Under primitive conditions of communications the ruler who seelis to control a large territory is I.obliged to delegate the direct exenclse of authority to others. These may be former household officials or feudal vassals Typically, such 1 . . ..notables are small territorial rulers m thelr own nght and as such exempt from those obligations whlich are specifically excluded under Ithe reciprocal understandings of fe$ty. However, Western European eudalism is characterized in ad+tion by special juridical features an ideology of "rights." relations between a ruler and vassals is comecrated aflirmation of rights and duties der oath and before which presupposes the con- eption of a Thus, just as the 1"ng's is circumscribed in prinhple by appeals to a higher moral by the political and le$al powers of the church, so the y of feudal jurisdictions ks reinforced b y the vassal's con- ~~~1In his malysis of the feud as a co~ponentof medieval political life, Orro runner bas shown that lords who defend tbeir rights by force of arms do so the belief that they are upholding thd established order. Indeed, d i n limits, uds are conceived in the medieval worlld as m integral p a of politics. See Orro runner, Lnnd und HerrscbaJt (Vienna: Robrer Verlag, 1959). p p 17-41, Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 38 Nation-Building and Cidzenship sciouqess pf.l$s "right" and by the way which the church can ~mployher secul&powers and her canonical authority to protect that right. The contentions between the patrimonial and the feudal principle of authority result in a system of divided and overlapping jurisdictions (or "immunities"). Each jurisdiction accords positive, public rights which entitle particularly privileged persons and corporate groups to exercise a specific authority and to levy fees or tolls for that exer- cise. As an aggregate such jurisdictions constitute the political com- munity which may be held together M y or precariously depending on the momentum of past events, external circumstances, the personal capacity of the participants, and the vicissitudes of the political strug- gle.' Under the ruler's strong or nominal authority the vassals and corporate bodies which owe allegiance to him fight or bargain with him and with each other over the distribution of fiscal and adminis- trative preserves. In this setdng politics consists of jurisdictional disputes and their settlement, by force of arms if necessary. Excep- tionally strong, personal rulers may succeed in asserting the royal prerogatives and welding the several jurisdictions together, though in the absence of such strength at the center government adrninistra- tion may be little more than a sum total of the component jurisdic- tions. But even when the political unity of a whole realm is pre- carious, there is likely to be considerable unity in these jurisdictions. In principle at least, each man belongs to such a jurisdiction. De- pending on his rank he has some choice in the matter; but once he is a vassal to a lord or the member of a guild, his rights and duties are determined for him. H e is bound to abide by the rules pertaining to his status lest he impair the privileges of his fellows. Classes in the modem sense do not exist, for the coalescence of interests among the individuals in an estate is based on a collective liability. That is, joint action results from the rights and duties shared b y virtue of the laws or edicts pertaining to a group, rather than only from a shared experience of similar economic pressures and social demands. Under these conditions a man can mo* the personal or corporate rule to which he is subject only by an appeal to the established rights of his rank or to the personal and, therefore, arbitrary benevolence 7From time to time these snuggles among panimonial and feudal powers hwe a dedsive outcome thar establishes the pattern of subsequent developments. See rhe brief slThis "populist legidmism" should not be idealized. Descriptive accounts of the pcJsanr rebellions in Tsxrist Russia maim clear the sel6sh cunning which is i n v d ~ b l ya part of 'legicimLm," though the appeal to "andent rights" is not the less imponant for that reason. See, for esmple, A. Briiclmer. "Zur Nmu- geschichte der PrHtendenteq" in Beitriige mr Kuln~rgercbichteRvrrlnnds inr 17. Inbrbundert (Leipzig: B. Elischer, 1887). p. 30. This type of w e s t was nor confined to peasants, however. Prior to industrialization many meuopoliran centers witnessed the sporadic risings of n "city mob" which aims at immediate concessions by the rich and displays a "municipal pauiodrm" agmst foreigners. In irnpomnt princely residences, espeddly of Southern Europe, this phenomenon frequently involved n parasitic relationship in which the mob would riot if the ruler did not provide the expected panonage, while it would repay the ruler's largesse with loyalty to king and church. For an illuminating account of rhis special phenomenon, see Hobshawm, op. cit., pp. 108-125. ,remodern J m c t u r e s of w e s t e m Europe 47 peasants of the eighteenth century are an example of a subordinate group which has a stake in the poli,tical community, despite the fact that itis excluded from the exercise of public rights. Of the three types of popular dnrest which recurred in Europe prior to the "age of democratic revolution," popular legitimism may be considered a transitional phenomdnon. After the sixteenth century the legitimist appeal to ancient righL assumes a new character. For with the rise of absolute monarchied paternalism is transformed from a justification of domestic relations t an ideology of national govern- ment. The Icing becomes less an o erlord of a feudal nobility andemore the supreme ruler of the nahon. Under these conditions a Ipopular appeal to ancient rights suggests on occasion that the anto- : clatic ruler ~ . .who acts the "father" of his people can rely on their i loyalty in. his struggle- against the estates. In this sense populist j terp& to the id ology and practices of "enlight- iI ! pulist legitimism and the claim of enlightened ers of their pebplen and "iirst servants of the Istate" are harbingers of eqnalitarianb and the nation-state in societies marked by hereditmy privilege and $reat Werences in rank. Where3 all people have rights, where all are t+ subjects of one Icing, where the lting in turn exercises supreme authority over everyone-we get a j first intimation of "national~ citizens/?ii9'~ .... . and one supreme antl~orityI 'over all public affairs which eventually emerge as the distinguishing ,, characteristics of modem Western sbcieties. In the seventeenth a n d l eighteenth centuries this whole dev lo ment though not discernible ' i p !as such, was given special m o m e n q by malor economic changes as well as by a revolution of intellectual life which are outside the limits ion. Instead, I ,hsh to focus attention on those at transformation" which are of special relevance , ,., authority, that is, t ~ e s t r u c t i o n . o f _ ~ emedieval tical structure on the one hand, and the crisis in human relations :I. 1 - ~ - -. - ~ ~ ...~ . . - .. ~ - - *In I& The Iden of Nationalimz (New Yorlc: Macmillnn, 1951), Chnp. 5 and especially pp. 199-220, H m Kohn has shah that in Western Europe autocratic rule and mercantilist economic policies prLceded the rise of nationdism which broughr with it the idea of the rights of thb people. Tbis sequence sugg- that the idea of a political community involving the people as citizens emer~edd & ~ the eighteenth century not only in opposirion to the mcien rigiize but &o to some extent as a pan: of the ideology of abtocratic paternalism. See Kurt Von burner, "Ahsoluter Stnag Korporntivc Libertiit, PersSnlichc Frciheit," Histor- ircbe Zeitrcbrift, 183 (1957), 55-96, and t$e case study by Prim Valjavec, Die Entnehung der Polin'rchen Swd?~zz~ngenin Dez~tscI~Imd(Muaich: R. Oldcnbourg, Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 48 Nation-Building and Citizenship resultingforrg, the spread of equalitarian ideas on the other. Both./-- ..- aspects are the central concern of Tocqueville's life work. ASPECTS OF AUTHORIAr IN THE "GREAT TRANSFORMATION" The Political Snz~cn11-e In his famous study of the French Revolution, T o c q u e d e shows how the nncievz 1-igiwze has destroyed the century-old pattern of me- dieval political life by concentrating power in the hands of the ling and his oficials and by depriving the various autonomous jurisdictions :of their judicial and administrative f u n ~ t i o n s . ~ ~In pointed contrast to Burlre's great polemic against the French Revolution, Tocqueville dem- onstrates that in France the centralization of royal power and the con- comitant decline of corporate jurisdictions have developed too far to malre the restoration of these jurisdictions a feasible alternative. The nob,iq-no-@nger enjoys the rights it had possessed at one time, but its acquiescence 5 r o y a l - ~ ~ ~ o l ~ t i s m h a sbeen "bought" b y iretention of financial privileges like =exemption, a fact which greatly intenszes antiaristocratic sentiment. Tlit'iigh the royal administrative system of the intendavzts the rights. of municipal corporations and the inde- pendence of the judiciary ha% heen curtailed in the interest~ofgving the government a free hand in the field of taxation-with the result that the urban bourgeoisie is divested of local governmental responsi- b i t y and the equitable administration of justice is destroyed. Nohle- men thus preserve their pride of place in the absence of commensurate , responsibilities, urban merchants ape aristocratic ways while seeldng preferential treatment for themselves, and both combine social arro- gance with an unmitigated exploitation of the peasants. In lieu of the balancing of group interests in the feudal assemblies of an earlier day, each class is now divided from the others and within itself with the result that "nothing had been left that could obstruct the central government, hut, b y the same tolren, nothing could shore it up." 24 TocqueviUe's analysis is concerned explicitly with the prohlem of the political community under the conditions created b y the French Revolution. H e maintains that in the medieval societies of Western =a Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regnze nnd the Reuolz~tion (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1955). pp. 22-77. For a modern appraisal of the survival of corporate and libernrim elements under the absolutist regimes of the eight- eenth century,see Kurtvon kumer, op. Cit. 94Tocqueville, The OldRegime ...,p. 137. Premodern b m c t u r r of Western ~ v o p e B Iope, the inequality of ranks is a universally accepted condition ocial life. In that early politikal structure the individual enjoys the rights and fulfills the ohligaqns appropriate to his rank; and although the distribution of such rights and duties is greatly affected by the use of force, it is establisheh connactually and consecrated as ~ u c h . ~ V h eOld Regime and thk French Revolution destroy this system by creating among all dtizehs a condition of abstract equality, but without providing guarantees for the presemation of freedom. Hence, T o c q u e d e appeals to his contemporaries that a new com- munity-a new reciprocity of rights and obligations-must be estah- Ilished, and that this can be done only if men combine tl~eirlove of I equality and liberty with their love of order and religion. This ad- monition arises from his concern +th the weakness and isolation of the individual in relanon t o government. Because he sees the trend tiward equality as inevitable, Toc ueville is deeply troubled by the 9possibility that men who are equal would he able to agree on nothing but the demand that the central lgovemment assist each of them personally. As a consequence thd-government would subject ever new aspects of the society to its cedtral regulation. I cite one version i of this argument: IIAs in periods of equality no man is compelled to lend his assistance to his fellow men, and none has any righi to expect much support from them, everyone is at once independent and powerless. These two conditions, 1which must never be either separately considered or confounded together, 1inspire the &%en of a democratic country with very contrary propensides. Hi independence 6lls him with self- eliance and pride among hi equals; 4 .his debility malces him feel from time to m e the want of some ourward assistance, which he cannot expect from any of them, because they are all impotent and unsympathizing. In thd predicament he naturally turns his Ieyes to that imposing power [of the central government]. . ..Of that power his wants and especially his dksires continually remind him, until Ihe uldmately views it as the sole and necessary support of his own weak- ness.=O I 26 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 111, U, p. 311. In innovative activities Such men engage in to their fellows," they oppose concerns, and yet "by in his private en- deavor when it suits his that the power of gov- of mutually independ- ent men proceed Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 50 . Nation-Building and Citizenship. . Here is Tocqueville7sfamous oiequality and freedom. Men display ah extraordinary independence when they rise in opposition to aristocratic privileges. "But in .proportion as equality was ... established by the aid of freedom, freedom itself was thereby rendered more m c u l t of attai~rnent."?~ In grappling with this problem, Tocquedle uses as his base point of comparison an earlier society in which men had been compelled to lend assistance to their fellows, because law and custom h e s their common and reciprocal rights and obligations. As this society is destroyed, the danger arises that individualism and central power grow apace. T o counteract this threat men must cultivate the "art of associating together" in propor- tion as the equality of conditions advances, lest their failure to com- bine for private ends encourage the government to intrude-at the separate request of each-into every phase of social life.z8 W e can learn much from these insights. Tocqueville is surely right in his view that the established system of inequality in medieval society had been characterized by an accepted reciprocity of rights and obligations, and that this system had been destroyed as the afzcien itgime had centralized $he fnnctions of government. The French Revolution and its condnuing repercussions level old differences in social rank, and the resulting equalitarianism poses critical issues for the maintenance of freedom and political stability. Again, he discerns an important mechanism of centralization when he observes that each man would make his separate request for governmental assistance. In contrast to this tendency as he observes it in France, Tocquedle com- mends the Americans for their pursuit of private ends by voluntary association, which would help to curtail the centralization of govern- mental power. It is necessary, of course, to qu- these insights in view of Tocqueville's tendency to read into modem conditions the patterns of medieval political life. A t an earlier time, when landed aristocrats protect their liberties or privileges by resisting the encroachments of royal power, the centralization of that power appears as an unequivo- cal curtailment of such liberties. Today, however, centralization is an j important bulwarlc of all civil liberties, though by the same token ' government can infringe upon these liberties more effectively than before, as Tocqueville repeatedly emphasizes. The collective pursuit of private ends, on the other hand, is not necessarily incompatible with :'7 Ibid., p. 333. [bid.,pp. 114-132. Premodern S uceures of Western Europe 51 Ian increase of central government, because today v o l u n t q ~associa- tions frequently demand more rather than less government action in contrast to the medieval estates whose effort to extend their jurisdic- I dons was often synonymous with resistance to administrative inter- 1 ference from the outside. Dudcheim clearly perceives this positive I aspect of modern government and, correspondingly, the dangers im- plicit in group control over the indididual. It is the State that has rescued the child from patriarchal domination and from family tyranny; it is the State that! has freed the citizen from feudal groups and later from communal group/;; it is the State that has liberated the craftsman and groups of family, trade and regional areas and so on .. . of their members. It must do this, in order to prevent this free these individuals, and so as to remind these partial are not alone and that there is a right that stands Important as these qualifications are they should not make us over- look the reason why Tocqueville'/ interpretation of the "great transformation" is ill~minating.~~B$ contrasting an earlier condi- tion of political life, the transformatidn brought about by the ancien rtginre, the new condition of ushered in by the French Revolution, and the possibility tyranny in the future- Tocqueville is concerned with truths" as he calls them. This simplification of m e r e n t social structures enables him to bring out the major contrasts among them, and these are not invalidated by the short-run and more deductive hnalyses that went astray. As I I see it, TocqneviUe's worlc becomes intellectually most useful, if we attempt to develop within his over-ad frameworlc a set of categories that may enable us to handle the trahsition to the modern political 1community and some of the outstanding problems, which he discerns, in closer relation to the evidence as d e lcnow it today. Fortunately, a systematization of Tocqueville's 04analysis of "domestic govern- ment" in its transition to the "age of equality" can provide us with a firststep in this direction. ZnEEmi D~urltheim,Profes&mal Ethicr and Civic hIora1s (Glcncoe: The Free Press, 1958). pp. 6-5. rn0A fuller critical appraisal of Tocqueville's facts and interpretations is con- tained in the essay by George W. Pienon, Tocqzreville in America (GardenCity: Anchor Boolcs, Doubleday a d Ca., 19591.1 pp. 430477. though Pierson slights Tocqueville's theoreticalcontributionwhich is emphasizedabove. Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 51 .Nation-Building and Citizenship. . C~isirin the Relation of hfasters i v u ~Servants In ~ociueville'sview the facts and the ideals of the traditional relation-between aristocratic masters and their servants are destroyed by the spread of equalitarian ideas. As the social distance between masters and servants decreases, the points of personal disagreement between them sharply increase. In the "secret persuasion of his mind" the master continues to think of himself as superior, though he no longer dares to say so, and his authority over the servant is consequently timid. But the master's authority is also harsh, because he has abandoned the responsibilities of paternalism while retaining its privileges. The servant, on the other hand, rebels in his heart against a subordination to which he has subjected himself and from which he derives actual profit. "An imperfect phantom of equality" haunts his mind and he does not at once perceive "whether the equality to which he is entitled is to be found within or without the pale of domestic service." Obedience is no longer a divine obligation and is not yetperceived as a contractual obligation. The servant consents ti serve because this is to .hisadvantage; however, he blushes to obey because where all men are equal subordination is degrading. Under these circumstances the servants, .. . are not sure that they ought not themselves to be masters, and they are indined to consider him who orders them as an unjust usurper of their own rights. Then it is that the dwelling of every citizen offersa spectacle somewhat analogous to the gloomy aspect of politicd society. A secret and intemd warfare is going on there between powers ever rivals and suspicious of each other: the maxer is ill-named and wealc, the Senant ill-named and in- tractable; the one constantly attempts to evade by unfair remictions his obligation to protect and to remunerate, the other his obligation to obey. The reins of domestic government dangle between them, to be snatched at by one or the other. The lines thar divide authority from oppression, liberty from license, and right from might are to their eyes so jumbled together and confused thar no one lmows exactly what he is or what he may be or what he ought to be. Such a condition is not democracy, bur revolution.n1 Tocqueville analyzes this revolution in "domestic government" in the context of his contrast between revolutionary France and demo- alTocquevillc. Dmzocrncy in America, II, 195. In the preceding paragraph I have reordered Toocqueville's unexcelled phrasing in order to bring out his central thesis. Premodern Structures of Western Europe 53 cratic A m e r i ~ a . ~ ~The reactions o an hypothetical servant to the idea of equality symbolize for him unsettled conditions of French -societyin the nineteenth century. In his view France would have to approximate the conditions of sealed equality in the United States, if she is to overcome her revolu~onaryfever and combine liberty with order. In America, servants their masters as equals despite the manifest difierences in status; in lieu of personal loyalty the servants obligations of contract. In France, on the other neither loyalty nor a sense of contractual rather than an unalterably I inferior status forces them to be subordinates?' But in the absence Iof a sense of contractual obligations servants regard their continued subordination as a blemish on their character (at least initially), while the availability of other oppormni es makes them careless of pleasingaand impatient of control. Thus the d o m a n t concern of Tocquede's I .:servant is the consciousness of a posluon with claims and rights that are not aclmowledged by the powks that be. Legally, the servant is the equal of his master, economic$y the servant is a subordinate-a discrepancy which creates a "confused and imperfect phantom of equality." The question arises whb there should be any difference between the equality which the as a citizen and the inequality to which he is in his economic capacity. The distinction of the law and the private character of econo ic ursnits is easily blurred when T Psuch amhignity serves the inrerest of the servant. Hence, the protest against economic subordination quihly assumes a political character, Ias the servants "consider him who orders them an unjust usurper of their own rights." "4 It may be noted that Tocquevill attributes the crisis of "domestic government" to the spread of ideas b y men of letters. e maintains that in this diasion was tated by a gradual increase of economic prosperity rather than p~verty.~"ut although the diasipn of equalitarian ideas and their I82SeeTocqueville's letter to M. de Kergorlay, dated October 19, 1843, in Alexis de Tocqueville, Menzoirs, Letters A d Aenzainr (Boston: Tichor & Fields, 1862). L DO. 341-342. Tocqueville,Democ~ncyin America, 11,440-195. Ibid.,D. 195. IO6 This, it seems to me, is the issue in the dchate concerning the proper interpre- Intion of the indusmd revolution in ~nbland. T. S. Ashton has shown that there was a slow secular improvement in pving standards. See the conuiburionr; Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 54 .Nation-Building and Citizenship inherent revolutionary potential appear inevitable to him, the actual development depends on a nation's "moral and intellectual qualities given by nature and education." In contrast to Marx, Tocqueville does not attempt to predict the final outcome of the tendencies he discerns or to explain away ideas by reference to some ultimate de- terminant lilce the organization of production. H e see& to account for the frame of mind in which servants reject the "rules of the game" on which the established society is founded. T o do t h i s he formulates a theory-of crisis in the relations of masters and servants: (1) in an earlier condition the socially inferior person possesses a recognized status, which is reflected in the sense of "borrowed greamess" among the servants of aristocratic masters; (2) in the crisis of transition the masters retain their privileges but no longer perform their functions, while the servants retain their obligations but perceive new oppor- tunities; (3) in consequence the servants consider that the traditional claims of their status have been abrogated unilaterally and/or that they are now entitled to an equality of rights with all other social ranks since in his capacity as a citizen every man is the equal of every other. Tocqueville's theory of crisis in "domestic government" refers to the master's evasion of "his obligation to protect and to remunerate," but then gives special attention to the ideas of equality which elicit and shape the lower-class protest that initiates the "age of democratic revolution." Both perspectives will be examined in Chapter 3 together with an analysis of the extension of citizenship. by Ashton and Hun in F. A. Hayelt, ed, Capitnlinn and the Hidorim (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). Although the level of living standards in the early nineteenth century is st3l a subject for scholnrly debate, the point here is that a slow improvement dter long deprivations is precisely the condidon singled out by Tocqueville as a major cause of revolution. This possibility is neglected in the famous studies of the Hammonds which tend to equate dl deprivationwith increasing misery, although they &a show much sympathetic understanding of the of social unrest. Other observers agree with Tocqucville on this pint. See the telling statement by Fredericlt Douglazs, the early spolccsmm of American Negro slaves: "Beat and cut7 your dwe, keep him hungry and spiritless, and he mill follow the chain af his master Eke a dog; hut feed and clothe him well,-work him moderately-nuround him with physical comfort-and dreams of freedom innude. Give him a bad master, and he aspires to a good master, give him a good master, and he wishes to become his own master," Quoted in Kenneth Snmpp, The Peculinr Inm'tution (New Yorl;: A. A. Ifnopf, 1956). p. 89. See &o Eric Hoffer, The Tnle Believer (New Yorlt: Haper, 1951),p p 25-29. However, this view was relatively rarc compared with that of the theory of revolution as a result of increasing misery, which was a commoupl~cein Europe from the seventeenth century on. See the smdy by Robert Michels, Die Verelendzm~dl~eon'e(Leipug: Alfred Uraner, 1928). 4 i Transformations of Wes i Societies Since the Eigh TOCQUEVILLE carries his analysir; "age of equality." H e characterizes t the relations between masters and se crisis in human relations. Writing i the future, especially in his brilliant nditions of equality in America ance. Today, we can look npo those of Karl Marx, from the vantagl the effort of these men to discern the lack guidelines for a critical analysis. W e saw that medieval political li hereditary or spiritnal rank in society pal economic resource, and the exerci whose rank or status excludes them i thereby excluded from any dire1 hts and libemes are extended to g an to individual subjects; represen dies is channeled through traditio~ s framework no immediate rights tions of economic dependence such : servants: at best they are class5 er and represented through him n up by the twin revolutions o. trial-which lead to the evenm nship for all adult.;, including :ern European :eenth Century forward to the beginning of the e impact of equalitarian ideas on vants and analyzes the resulting the 18301s,he speculates about comparison between the settled nd the unsettled conditions in these speculations, as well as point of a later time. Without ~utlinesof the future we would : depends on the link between control over land as the princi- :of public authority. All those om access to control over land : participation in public affairs. )ups, corporations, estates rather ition in judicial and legislative ~llyprivileged estates. Within re accorded to subjects in posi- tenants, journeymen, workers, d under the household of their and his estate. This system is the West-the political and the 1 recognition of the rights of hose in positions of economic the crisis in "domestic govern- m that crisis a new pattern of Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 56 Nation-Building and Citizenship class relations emerges, replacing the earlier traditional one by an individualistic authority relationship. New forms of w e s t arise from this new pattern of class relations, involving the idea of equal rights for all citizens. An attempt is made to reinterpret the radicalization of the lower classes in the course of English industrialization. Against this hacliground the process of nation-building is examined in terms of a comparative analysis of the rights of citizenship. In the emerging nation-states of Western Europe the critical political problem was whether and to what extent social protest would be accommodated through the extension of citizenshipto the lower classes. CLASS RELATIONS IN AN AGE OF CONTRACT Z~adividz~alilrl'cAz~tbol-ityRelatio7zsbips The reciprocity of social relations falls into patterns because men orient themselves toward the expectation of others and every action of "the other" limits the range of possible responses. Authority means that the few in command have a wide choice of options. Cou- versely, subordination means that the many who follow orders have their range of choice curtailed. But the options of the few are limited, even when the power at their command is overwhelming. One of these limits is that even the most drastic subordination leaves some choices to those who obey. Tacit noncooperation can he varied, subtle, and more important than overt protest. Subordinates malie judgments, leading to degrees of cooperation or noncooperationthat are important variables in every established pattern of authority. The traditional ideology which defends the privileges of the aris- tocracy in the name of its responsibilities must be seen in this light. Tocqueville emphasizes the positive aspects of the social relations which correspond to this world view. However willful and evasive individual lords were, it is reasonable to assume that for a time the sense and practice of aristocratic responsibility for their inferiors were relatively high, just as the loyalty and ohedience of subordinates were genuine. Indeed, without some responsibil* on one side and \spme loyalty on the other, it would be meaningless to say that tradi- jnonal authority relations were disrupted. It is best to consider the traditional pattern as partly a behavior pattern and partly an ideal in view of the violent codicts which also characterize medieval society. Ideals are essential in this connection because they affect the orienta- tion even of those who fail to live up to them. Traditional authority Trans prmations of Western Societies 57f relations remain intact as long as the actions and beliefs which deviate from this pattern as well as those whch sustain it do not undermine 1 .the basic reciprocity of expectations. say that a crisis of trausi 'on sets in when men consciously on previously accepted agr ements and conventions, does not7help us to distinguish this questioding from the continual adjustments Iof rights and obligations which occur while traditional authority rela- tions remain "intact? Such adjlstments involve mod5cations of Idetail which turn into a questioning of basic assumptions only if they should cumulate. Usually, the codtemporary observer is barred from recognizing this distinction. He Jan see a crisis (no age is without its Cassandras), hut he cannot tell whether it is the crisis and where it will lead. In his analysis of tradi 'onal authority relations in decline,bTocquevilleobserves that the mastks increasingly evade their responsi- Ibility "to protect and to remunerate" but retain their customary privi- I leges as an inalienable right. This rocess extends over centuries, dur- P . ..ing which the actual rejection of r s ons~bd~tyis thoroughly obscured q pby the traditional ideology. TVheqd~ssthisth;.disisep.qcy between the rights and responsibilities of the masFersbecome manifest? 'Ideas concerning the position of the poor do not provide the best clue in this respect. Throughout the centuries the poor are taught the duty to labor and the virtue o being satisfied with the station to Iwhich God has called them. Condemnation of their indolence and that the rich and powerful treat the laboring poor as their children. Throughout much of the nineteenth retains its appeal; a deeply ingrained view is not is all the more miking, therefore, that in the industrialization the re-' hazards of life is re- malies this rejection Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 58 Nation-Building and Citizenship call for new interpretations of the cause of poveay. Three of these interpretations are cited here. Though closely linlced one with the other, they represent more or less separable themes of English social thought when, toward the end of the eighteenth century, traditional charity and the old poor-law legislation as a means of helping the indi- gent become controversialissues.l One approach sees the cause of poverty in the very effort to relieve distress. The poor are not inclined to exert themselves; they laclc the pride, honor, and ambition of their betters. Previously this observa- tion supported the view that the poor must be guided; now it sup- ports the view that charity only destroys incentive and hence intensi- fies poverty. Indolence increases where provision is made to snccour the poor; dire necessity is the most natural motive of labor, for it exerts unremitting pressure on the poor. "The slave must be com- pelled to worlc; but the freeman should he left to his own judgment and discretion." Here the accent is on the supposition that the rich cannot help the poor, even if they would, and further that the lower orders must depend upon themselves. Rejection of upper-class re- sponsibility goes hand in hand with the demand that the poor should be self-dependent. In the second approach the pernicious efforts of charity are linlted with the marlcet theory of labor. Hunger must be permitted to do its worlc so that laborers are compelled to exert themselves. Otherwise they will reduce their effortsand destroy their only safeguard against starvation. Here labor is viewed as a commodity like any other, its wage being determined by the demand for this commodity rather than the need of the laborer or his ability to snrvive. The only rele- vant question is what the labor is worth to the employer. For the employer is subject to the same necessities of supply and demand as the laborer. This means in the long run that he cannot pay him more than he offers without jeopardizing his enterprise, and hence that the interests of capital and labor are identical. The marlcet theory means that the employer cannot act irresponsibly without damaging his own interest and that the laborer has no safeguard but exertion and no guarantee against starvation. The third approach, s p e d c d y identified with the work of Malthus, relates this marlcet theory of labor to the theory of population. In- stead of assertinga harmony of interest between rich and poor, Malthus IThe detnils need nor concern us here. For Fuller discussion and dtadons see my smdy Work and Azttl~orityin indzutry (New York: John W l e y & Sons, 19561,pp. 73 ff. 3 Srntement of Rev. To-end quoted in ibid., p. 74. ranssforhations of Wesckn Societies 59 aclcnowledges the inevitability of . ' enohc and acute distress. He attributes this phenomenon to the tendency of population to increase^ faster than the means of subsistence, a law of nature which the upper classes are powerless to alter. Malthus states that poverty is inescap- able and a necessary stimulus to labor, that charity and poor relief only increase indolence and improvihence, that the higher classes are not and cannot be responsible for tie lot of the poor. But in terms of the present context he also adds a+ important idea. If it is a law of nature for the poor to increase thelr numbers beyond the available food supply, it is the responsibility o the higher classes to understand this law and instruct the lower or ers accordingly. ImprovidenceImay be a natural tendency, from ignorance and lack of moral restraint, and these can be combated through education. Education, then, is the keynote sinceimployers no longer personal au- thority of the aristocratic master. jMuch reliance is placed on such impersonal forces as economic necessity and the pressure of population Ion resources-much more reliance than was the case when the master difKcult, especially on the old, paternalistic basis. equalitarian ideas the emphasis on social rank the classes GdGns, as Tocqueville ers declines. and demand, of the struggle for snrvi)al, forces the workers to-do the Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 60 Nation-Building and Citizenship . . bidding of their employers; A d (3) the educational element, modeled after the classroom, the psychological laboratory, or the ther~peutic session in which instruction, incentives and penalties, or indirect, mo- tivational inducements are used to discipline the worlcers and prompt them to intensifytheir efforts. For the course of Western European industrialization we can posit a sequenceleading first to a decline of the paternalistic and a rise of the impersonal element and subsequently a declining reliance _on G&lcet forces and an increasing reliance on educational devices. The sequence applies most closely to the English and American develop- ment, though even here it is a rough approximation. For paternalism always includes an educational element, reliance on marltet forces has often been adumbrated in a paternalistic manner, and the educational dimension is compatible with an impersonal as well as a personal ap- proach. DZerent cultural antecedents as well as the changing organi- zational structure of economic enterprises have much to do with varying emphases among managerial ideologies such as those of the United States,Germany, and J a ~ a n . ~ The political dimension of these ideologies is of special moment, however. In an emerging nation-state which has destroyed the earlier fragmentation of public authority, agencies of the national government fiord employers of labor legal protection for their rights of property. These rights are part of a broad egalitarian trend which also finds expression in the praise of frugal habits and hard worlc, qualides that enable every man to acquire property and statns. At the impersonal level of ideological appeals this approach produces certain typical paradoxes that are of political sigmiicance. Individualistic interpretations of the authority relationship do not remain confined to the enterprise. The idea of an impersonal marltet which will induce worlters to offer their services and worlt diligently calls for policies that wiU facilitatethe operation of that marlcet. More- over, recourse to ideological appeals and educational methods suggest that impersonal incentives are insdcient Entrepreneurs also seelt to inculcate the desired habits and motives. But by encouraging the :self-dependence of the workers, they run the rislc that such individ- ualism will eventuatein social and political protest rather than coopera- ition and compliance. 4Ibid, Chap. 5; Heinz Hnmnann, Authority and Organisation in Gennnn Mnnogement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). pmsinr; m d James G.Abegglelen,The Japanese Factory (Glencoe: T h e Free Press, 1958). Western Societies 61 For the praise of good lends itself to invidious judgments of a very provocative b e . The good and honest worlcer is a model to be followed as disdgnished from the lazy and improvi- dent one, whose bene6t of all who will listen and as a waming that contempt and condemnation. The public manner in which attributes" are discussed malces them into a political division of the lower classes into diligent and complacency of who remain position of the lower orders into national political issue. The indi- vidualist interpretation of authori4 relations in industry appears from this standpoint as an effort to derqk the r i g h ~of citizenship to those who are unsuccessful economicallyI an approach that can.'arousea new. sense of right on the part of thellower classes and lead to groping efforts to define the position of t$ese classes in the national political community. Just as Tocqueville focuses attention on atransition in domestic relations, marked by a ch ge in the terms of commands and b .obedience, so the following discussion wdl focus attenfiou on a transi- tion in group relations on the nhtional level, rnarlcedbr changing ideas concerningthe rights and oblikations of the lowkr'cl&ses. . .. Lower-Class Unrest Becomes liticnl: England . , When political developments attributed to economic detenni- nants, the changing position of lower classes and the emergence I of national citizenship appear as by-products of industrialization. This line of interpretation develops at ihe end of the eighteenth century. It appearsplausible in the sense nbat the revolutions in the United/- States and France "reflect the rise df the bourgeoisie," while the indus- trial revolution in England leads 40 the political mobilization of an emerging industrial work force. Greatly simplified as these state- Iments are, they refer to historical phenomena rather than general principles. Yet it is in the light of these historical phenomena that nll political events were &st construeaas more or less direct by-products of social and economic pr~cesses.~Today we lmow that elsewhere 6 T o some extenr modern social and ecqnomic theories still reflecr the historical situation in which they were fist developed, but n century m d z'half later ic should he possible to y a r d against: chis Liar;. See Chap. 5 Secr. c, 4 above. Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 62 Nation-Building and Citizenship- political revolutions have occurred in the absence of an economically strong and politically articulate middle class, or perhaps because of that absence, as in Russia or Japan. Again, the political mobilization of the lower classes has occurred as a prelude to industrialization, rather than as a result of it, as, for example, in the United States. Thus, dthougl~changes in the economic and political spheres are closely related, their iduences work in both directions. Hence we get little guidance if we tacitly accept Western Europe and especially England as our model. It is true that there democratic ideas originated under circumstances in which socio-economic changes had a massive impact upon the political structure, but these ideas have spread around the world ever since in the absence of similar circumstances. Na- tional citizenship and modem industrialism have been combined with a variety of social structures; hence we should recognize democratiza- tii4nnandindustrializationq.yo,firoce~ser;each distinct from the other,- --__ _- however intunatery they have been related on occasion. The two processes have been closely linked in England. For a long time the English development has served as a model for an under- standing of economic gro~vthin relation to political modernization- perhaps simply because England was the fist country to develop a modem indusny. Just for these reasons it may be well to show that even in ~ n ~ l a n dit is possible to distinguish the political element in the midst of economic change. We saw that prior to the eighteenth century the lower classes might try to wring concessions from the ruling powers by a "legi&t" posture mixed with violence; or that they might compensate for their exclusion from the exercise of public rights by rnillenarianfantasies and banditry. Ditferent forms of lower- class protest became possible, however, after enlightened despotism and the philosophers of the Enlightenment had formulated the-prin- ciple of equal rights for all men. The spread of this idea was certainly facilitated byindustrialization, a fact tvhich was recognized early: Of the worldng men, at least in the more advanced countries of Europe, it may be pronounced certain that the patriarchal or paternal system of governmem is one to which they will not again be subject. That question was decided, when they were taught to read, and allowed access to news- papers and political tracts; when dissenting preachers were sufferedto go among them, and appeal to their faculties and feelings in opposition to the creeds professed and countenanced by their superiors; when they were brought together in numbers, to work socially under the same roof; when railways enabled them to shift from place to place, and change their Transfo ations of Western Societies 63 TIpatrons and employers as easily as the' coats, when they were encouraged to seek a share in the government, byTeans'of the electoral franchise.0 In this statement Mill describes a ~-. and his references to dissendng point to conditions that are more time. But he also notes several erally associated with the recrnitmeni of an industrialworlc force: the I literacy of workers, the spread of printed matter among them, physical concentration of work, increased gkographic mobility, and the de- personalization of the employment relanonshlp. Mill's descriptive 1 . .account may be considered equivalent to Mannheim's statement that "modern industrial society"-by phykcally and intellectnally mobiliz- ing the people-"stirs into action thbse classes which formerly only played a passivepart in political life." 1 . . . .Under the iduence of ideas of equahty tlus mobhation of lower- I class protest comes to be oriented, broadly speaking, toward realizing . ~ fullparticipation in the e&ing poli&calcommunity or establishing a I iiifiOni- political^ community in whch such participation would be possible. This consideration may bd applied initially to some of the popular disturbances in early nineteehth-century England. For Marx these disturbances are similar to the sporadic rebellions in which for several centuries peasants and artisans have destroyed machines as the most immediate instruments of their oppression.^ Later writers have shown that thisviolence was directed against bdcers or money-lend- ers as much as against machines, and that despite their obvious agita- tion the workers of early nineteenth-century England show a most surprising respect for property not directly connected with their dis- I 0 John Stum Mill, statement is cited here as an endy a common topic of conversation. illurninacing survey of the grow- "The Language of 'Class' in and John Saville, eds., Erragr Macmillan, 1960), Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 64 Nadon-Building and Citizenship. . tress. By dis&pguishing in practice between looting and a "jnsdfied" destruction of property, the worlrers may be said to have engaged in "collect+ bargaining b y riot" at a time when combinations were pr6&bited by law.0 Such evidence is compatible with the idea that the workers who engage in violence desire at the same time to demon- strate their respectability. They are face to face with a manifest legal inequity; they are prevented from combining for peaceful collective bargaining, while combinations of employers are tolerated or even encouraged. Hence, LLcollectivebargaining b y riot" easily accom- panies the demand for civil rights which has been denied despite ac- ceptance of formal equality before the law.lo Although very inatticdate at &st, the appeal against legal inequities involves a new dimension of social unrest. T o get at the relative novelty of this experience we have to rely on the circumstantial evi- dence of the period. In the late eighteenth and through the nineteenth centuries the civic position of the common people became a subject of national debate in Europe. For decades elementary education and the franchise are debated in terns of whether an increase in literacy or of voting rights among the people would worlr as an antidote to revolutionary propaganda or as a dangerous incentive to insubordina- tion?= It is dif3icult to l n o w what sentiments such debates arouse 'JThe phrzse has been coined by E. J. Hobsba\vm, "The Machine Brealrers," Pmt nnd Prerent, I (1952). 57-70. Evidence concerning the distincdon between looting and such dimbances as the famous Luddite riots is analyzed in Fradc 0.Darvd, Populnr Disturbancer and Public Order in Regency Englond (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1934).pp. 314-315 and pmn'nz. laNote in rbis respect Mads emphasis upon the way in which combinations of worlters and employers sdmulated each other and the reference in the ten below to the awareness of this inequity among English rnagkates. A study of indw mal and a,prian disputes in Japan suggests that much the same mechanism operates in a very dXerent cultural setdug. See h e comment dut "an inctear ing number of renant farmers became convinced of the need for poliucal action, when they learned how often corn verdicts, which were based on existing laws, went against them," in George 0. Toaen, "Labor and Agrarian Disputes in Japan Following World War I," Econo77zic Dmelopnzent and Culturnl Cbnnge, IX (October1960). p t 11, 194. 11Similar questions were &ed with regard to universal conscription, since arms in the hands of the common people were considered a revolutionary threat. A case study of the conscription issue and its signi6cance for the development :of class reladons in Germany is Gerhnrd Rirrer, Staatrkum und IHans Rosenberg, Buremrcrncy, Arirtocrncy and Azrtocrncy (Cambridge: Harvard Universi~Press, 19581,p. 142. ??This brief resume is based on Otto Hinae, Geirt tmd Epocben der prezrsri- rcben Ger~bichte (Leipzig: Koeller & Arnelang, 1943). especially pp. 25-33, 537ff.,566ff. 'aFmenld, op. cit., pp. 87-89. Talchg togctller d delegates mho are con- sidered public o t l i c i ~in Germany, a m e y shows thar from one-fifth to more tban one-half of the representatives in successive lcgislntive assemblies have heen Admiuisuative in the Nation-State 123 been significant instances prior to o5cials voiced their independent judgment at the And in the absence of representative such independence as an absolutiststate. Tbese are the and activities of political freedom of public o5cials apbeared desirable to liberal spolces- men, as long as these officials opposed arbitrary, monarchical rule and contributed to the growth of parlihentary institutions-tendencies which naturally aroused apprehensiln among conservatives. These positions were reversed in the years ollowmg the revolution of 1848, 4 :whenever high o5cials of liberal persuasion found themselves con- fronted by staunchly conservative who opposed consti- tutional government. The result Previous legis- lation had legitimized the cases of moral turpitude. In 1852 a new disciplin& regulation was added according to which ministers have the power 40 place officials in a position of temporary retirement (einrtweiligen at half-pay, but with- out any further abridgment of rights. This litical o5cials" in the from time to time, ever since. It among Reichsmg represemauves has been 47% in 1871, 38% in 1887, 25% in 1912, and 21% in 1930. This includes univemy professors, teachers and servants. For f d e r de& see Karl gercbicbte, Vol. 39 (1952),p. 13 War Ll the proportion of civil servants in tbe Republic rose once again,initially because of a lack of suitablecandidares for electiveo5cc. =&SeeFritz H m g , "Smdien Vermdmg," in Stnntrbildende Kriifte der Nevceit & Humblot, 1961),,pp. account of pohues Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 124 Nation-Building and Citizenship. . the nineteenth century ~ e r & a ngover&ents~'would employ public officials in electhal campaigns as well as call upon them for an active defense of in and elsewhere. Before 1914 these attempts were by no means always successful, since higher civil serv- ants-among them those designated as "political 05cials"--aften defended the rule of law against what they considered political expe- diency. In retrospect we can see that such independence was facili- tated by the conservative outloolc of the o5cials; their quarrels with a conservative government were codicts among like-minded men, rather than between opposed, ideological camps. After 1918 the situa- tion changed when ministers of the Weimar Republic found themselves confronted by staunchly conservative public o5cials who opposed a constitutional regime. Accordingly, the device of "temporary retire- ment" was used to replace recalcitrant o5cials by others more accept- able to the party in power, thus undermining the independence of the civil service and furthering its partisanship rather than its neutrality. After 1933 political endorsement of the regime was made a positive requirement of public empl~yrnent.~~These vicissitudes have not afFectedthe prevailing outlook, however. T o this day public officials are allowed to double as legislators and party spolcesmen, although many arguments favoring a prohibition of this practice have been brought forward in the course of the German debates on this issue.28 However, the policy which allows of%& to serve in parliament remains associated not only with the belief in political liberties for all citizens irrespective of their status, but more specifically with the idea that the legally protected independence of civil servants must not be impaired since it is a buttress of the rule of law. Similarly, maintenance of the legal order remains idendfied with a civil service, whose members are appointed for life, protected against changes of positions which do not represent the exact career equiva- lent of the previous ogce, protected against arbitrary dismissal or removal from the service (except in cases of "temporary retirement"), and entitled to an adequate subsistence for themselves and their 2sEvidehce for the political independence of civil servants prior to 1914 is cited by Harrung, op. cit, who seems however to nnderesdmate (on pp. 273- 275) the degree to which high puhlic officials were obliged to "toe the line" polidcdy during the Weimar Republic. For a survey of this latter problem see Theodor Eschcnhurg, Der Bemtzte in Ponei und Pnrlmnent (Franldum Alfred Meaner Vedag, 1952). Chaps. 2-3. 'Wee Werner Weher, "Parlmenurische Unvereinbarlreiteu:' Archiu der 6fent- lichen Rechts, Vol. 58 (1930), pp. 208s. for a comprehensive comparative analysis of the argumenrs advanced and the relevant legislation. Administrative Authority in the Nation-State 125 fa mi lie^.'^ In the American settin these conditions have hardly evenbbeen approximated, and further status of the American civil servant bas not Uce the prestige, security, and supporting The implications of of World W a r I1the the precepts of the civil service. In the motivated by 27 See Klaus Kroeger, " MeinungsZusserungen' der Beamteq" Arcbiv der 6ffentlicben (June 19631, p. 134 for the relevant legal citations. This pp. 121-147 a faif turgid. restate- ment of the views characterized above There are mdicaaons that t& view is shared widely by the germ^ publi% See Brian. Chapman," ' The Proferrion of Golrernvzent (London: GeorgeAllen $LTnY$. 1959),, pp. 308-310.. 28Emn:Kern, "Berufsheamtenmmm d oLnli, Archlv des offentlzchen Recbts, Vol. 77 (1951/52), p. 108. I follow here the argument advanced ibid., pp. 109-110. The same volumeLof the drcbiv contains a rebuttal by OPI(UI(Uest~r(of,pp. 364-3661 in which the author a r y e s against the special leg ponuon of uvd swants us no longer juded todzy, but no reference is ma e to the special problem of political octivitiesby civil servants. Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 126 Nation-Building and Citizenship . . This conventional defense of the Gdrman civil service has been challenged by&ose who favor that special restrictions be placed on the political activities of public ~fficials.~~,When civil servants serve as delegates, they help enact and supervise the execu- tion of laws, thus leading to a bureaucratization of parliament. It is just as much of an abuse if political parties put their top functionaries in civil-service positions. Both the legislative and the executive branch of government are harmed if either is made into a mere exten- sion of the other. One writer states that political neutralization of the civil service can only enhance the integrity of the state. But in thus favoring the clear separation between politics and administration, he also adds a consideration which reveals the basic difference between the German and the American institutional structure. Political nen- tralization will presumably strengthen the inner homogeneity of the [German] civil service. But then the quesdon arises whether this is really in accord with the intentions of the [Amedcan] military government. For they are con- cerned in the &st place to elimiuate the "caste-Nce segregation" of the privileged civil service (Benmtennnnd). The political neutralization of the officialdom could prove to be a genuine privilege, however, even though the denial of elective office to the civil servant consti~tesa diminution of his righrs as a citizen. For this neutralization also precludes the possi- bility that the officialdom is pervaded by forces ouside is own province ("benlfrfi-enzde" Kriifte).nL When a traditional position of special privilege exists, political neutral- ization may only intensify the social and psychological distance be- tween o5cials and the public which the reforms are supposed to re- duce. This is in contrast with the American case, where similar measuces reinforce the "second-class citizenship" of public officials. The German context thus tends to transform the meaning of political neutrality, as Emst Fraenltel points out.'? For the prohibition t o engage in partisan activities may mean in effect that the German no A survey of opinions a d of several proposh for rerncdial legidation are contained in Eschenhurg, op. cit., pp. 59-77. The author e x d e s the implica- tions of politicnl activides by civil servm with numerous examples from the Gaman contest in Chapter4 of this work. al"Bemte ds Abgeordnete," Archiv der 6fientlicben Rechts, Vol. 75 (1949), pp. 108-109. There me other opinions, of course. See, for esamplc, Escbenbq, op. cit, p. 67 whcre neutrdkation is considered n potenrial danger, because in the absence of political participation civil servanrs would he ipormt or uncertain and might again fall victim to "wrong tendencies." 83 SeeFrncnlrel, op. cit.,p. SO. IAdminisnative Authority in the Nation-State 127 civil servant is enjoined to display a emphasis on the neutrality of his position and the special from its legal privi- leges. Accordingly, public officials often claim a special trust and eyes the prohibition of pardsan activities can be to an authoritative depreciation of politics as such and the idea of executive immunity from the reflect partisanship. of the public officials is, faithful service, recallkg personal servants of the this idea was cago Press, 1964). Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 128 Nation-Building and Cirizenship sive partisanship" is, however, only one side of the problem delineated earlier. Even when politics and administration are distinguished clearly, it remains an open question how much the administrative proc- ess can be insulated from intluences or pressures decting the imple- mentation of policies. Ad77zinist7-ato~snnd the Public TEE PLEBISCITARUN SETTING. Modem, Western societies are charac- terized by national political communities. They exemplify the modem duality between government and society: a nationwidejurisdiction with administrative authority in the hands of a functionally defined group of 05cials on the one hand, and formally equal participation in public &airs by all citizens on the other.84 As stated earlier, politics under these circumstances ceases to be a struggle over the distribution of sov- ereign powers and becomes instead a struggle over the distribution of the national product and over the principles guiding governmental ad- ministration. With the universalization of citizenship, demands on the government and hence governmental activities expand greatly. This growth of plebiscitarianism is reflected in the development of political parties into mass organizations. Parliaments become transformed from a body of deliberating notables who represent or claim to represent the public at large, to a hody of professional politicians who are identified with a political party and represent its constituency. In the field of public employment earlier restrictions based on family baclc- ground and social standing are gradually replaced by reliance on training and educational qualZcations as the sole criterion of selection. With these changes goes a major transformation of public life arising from the development of the mass media and the gradual but pervasive encroachment of publicity on spheres previously considered confiden- tial and privileged.n6 D'Polides orgmized on the federal principle present special problems, of course, but they do not invalidate this general charncterizntion. Ususlly, constitudonal provisions see ro the division of powers hcnveen the federal center and mre or provincial and local authorities, with cerrain nntion-wide authorities remain- ing with the center. Although complex disputes occur with reference to this division, any major alteration requires constiturional mendmenrs and these we relatively infrequent. na A brief sumrnq can do no more than point to the complex urnsformation from s politics of notahles with its emphasis on functional represenradon to a politics of plehiscitarian pardes. See the analysis of this trmformation on a comparative basis in Gerhard Leibholz, Smktur~roblemeder. nzodernen Denzo- krntie (ICarkruhe: Verlag C. I.'. Mueller, 1958). pp. 78 ff. See also the brilliant in the Nation-State 129 The use of the with regard to public o5cials is an context the t e r n to vote and to . . duties of civil servants. increasing importance, however. As rights are universalized and governmental activities proliferate, it is less problematic that the un- educated citizen is barred from employment because he cannot qualify, than that he may the aptitudes and attitudes needed to obtain reasoned of his case by the public authorities. Such in their dealings with the governmentwhen W e should not gloss over the human concerns and administrative between indi- With regard to rhe American developdent this transformation occuned much ezrlier thpn on the Condnent or in Eng and, and as the author notes American political p d e s do not exercise a discip ine over elected representatives that ir; at dl comparable to that exercised by European parries. Thus, although the politician as nomble disappeared earlier in the United States than in Europe, some aspects of n polidcs of notables linger on here, because some individual politicians succeed in building safe co ktuencies of their own which enahle them to defy the leadership of their o& patty, a phenomenon that is familiar where it has P more general,rcgionnl basis as m the South. Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 130 Nation-Building and Citizenship viduals and officials characterizes only a fraction of the relations between administrators and the public. The latter is composed of discrete individuals only when the citizen requires public assistance, acts in his capacity as a voter, and so on. When citizens desire to iduence policy at any level, as they have a right to do, they often combine their demands with those of others, whether the object is to have a party win an election, intercede with individual representatives, or modify the implementation of policy through contact with an administrative agency. Interest groups have proliferated along with the increase and diversi- fication of povemmental activities. In dealing wid1 large-scale govern--merit, there is safety as well as advantage in numbers and collective action. It is useful to summarize these developments of the "public" in a series of propositions. With reference to the citizen as an individ- ual possessing the freedom to conclude contracts and the right to vote, we can adopt SirH e m y Maine's famous formulation: It is Contract which replaces by degrees those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the Family. Stardng, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all these rela- tions arise from the free agreement of Indi~iduals.~~ This formulation must he altered if we refer to the citizen as an individual in need who is entitled to public assistance. In that case public authority recognizes his social right to a minimum subsistence. W e may adapt Maine's formulation accordingly: S t a r ~ gas from one terminus of history, from a condition of society in which d the relations of persons h e from the free agreement of individ- uals, we seem to have sceadily moved towards a phase of social order in which social, political and economic inequalides that affect the legal ca- pacity of individuals have become of d c i e n t public concern so as to lead to a corrective redistribution of the rights and duties of citizenship by means of legislation and adminimatinn. Such "corrective redistribution" through government exemplifies the increase of governmental activities generally, since these effect a re- distribution of rights and duties, even if this is not their explicit purpose. Interest groups or political parties are formed and become active both as causes and consequences of this proliferation of govern- noHenry Maine, Ancient Lnw (Everyman's Library; New Yorlt: E. P. Dutton. 1931), p. 99. Admiisrrative ~ u t h o r i t ~in the Nation-State 131 1ment. W e can, therefore, rephrase the preceding proposition as fol- lows: persons arising in order to modify to their affected by actions of public Thus, governmental demands, in turn based on the rather than "in- intellectual uncertainty with organized interests are re- garded. In the present to comment briefly on two over-all significance of organized interests and for the socio- political theory of W e saw earlier assumed the existence of trative problems-a tendency which Lomplicated the already difEcult task of effective supervision by parl!iamentary bodies. In Germany this problem was especially acute because of the strength of the bureaucracy and the great wealmess bf political parties and of parlia- ment. Weber's political preoccupakon with these questions over- n ' l h i s phrase is taken from the tide o'f Joseph Kaiser, Die ReprZrentntion orgonidelter Intererren (Berlin: Dunclter k Humblor, 1956). Despite a rather corporatist interpretation this is the most1 comprehensive, comparative analysis Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 132 Nation-Building and Citizenship shadowed his own concern with their generic signhcance. The fact is that with the proliferation of governmental functions "secrecy" of the administrative process is a by-product of complexiq- more often than it is the result of a strong-willed and entrenched o5cialdom. Also, parliamentary supervision of administrative acts declines in coverage if not in slcill and vigor, even when political parries and parliamentary institutions are strong and widely accepted. Under these circumstances administrators become concerned with policy and exercise discretionaryjudgments, more so than formerly, because the "chain of command" has lengthened and responsible public officials in the best sense can no longer meet their responsibilities without such concern and such j~dgments.~~ Policies often allow administrators to decide among alternative courses of action, and they do not wish to act arbitrarily. "Adminis- trative responsibility" may talce the form of C O I I S U ~ M ~ with the organized interests most directly concerned. Here responsibility comes to mean responsiveness to the "public." This may mean no more than the administrator's sense of what the public wants or needs, but such estimates shade off into ideas of what public wants ought to be. This is treacherous ground which many administrators will avoid or would avoid if they lmew they were treading on it. There is the rislc of adverse repercussions from the public and the legislature, if the official's estimate is drastically wrong. Accordingly, administrators loolc for support of the discretionary judgments which broadly drawn policy directives and the organizational complexity of government obligethem to malce. They find such support in the opinions and expert advice which organized interests are only too willing to provide. At this point there is a noteworthy interaction between "state" and "society." In a comprehensive study of Gouernnzent by Conmzittee, I<. C. Wheare stateswith reference to English practices: It is sometimes the case that it is only after hearing the interested pames and bringing them together to hear each other and perhaps to negotiate a neIncidenul but telling evidence for this point is the discrepancy of the case load handled by the court system as compared with administrative adjudication. "In any one year the [American1 Veterans Administtarion adjudicates in its formal procedural realm (the Board of Veterans Appeals) almost half the number of cases adjudicated by the endre federal court sysrcm. But informal adjudication handled by the VA in a year amounts to more than thirty times the number of cases adjudicated by the federal court system!' See Peter WoU, Ad7ninimntive Lnw (Berlceley:Universiy of CaliforniaPress, 1963). p. 7. in the Nation-State 133 the guidance it needs. of economic life, by Government In a parallel leam that advisory committees are rarely of detached counsel- ing alone. Persons serving on remain in contact with the for support, the author aclmowled!ges the conciliating function of the interests themselves. In a revealing plained that the formal ministries to consult only with groups (the so- called peak associations) originated after 1918, when every citizen or local association addressed their dkrnands or wishes personally or in The purpose of the federations, Thus, entirely had the effect Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 134 Nation-Building and ~idzenship . . Consultation with organized interesls becomes itself an amcle of policy. In the'words of the Haldane Committee on the Machinery of Government: The of the full responsibility of Ministers for executive action will nor, in our opinion, ensure that the course of administration which they adopt will secure and retain public confidence, unless it is recognized as an obligation upon departments to avail themselves of the advice and assistance of advisory bodies so constituted as to make available the knowledge and experience of all sections of the community affected by the activities of rhe According to I<. C. Wheare, consultation between public o5cials and organized interests is considered a recognized part of the British Constitution. T h e recent PEP (Political and Economic Planning) report states explicitly that "the object of having committees with advisory status but great independent authority is to detach administra- tive worlr from the main Government machine."" This statement is not considered incongruous because in theory ultimate control re- mains with the minister. And in England public o5cials and func- tionaries of organized interests have a similar social background and apparently a tacit understanding of the proprieties of their relation- ship, which helps them to distinguish issues of policy from issues of ad&~tration.~~ Elsewhere the same tendencies appear in m e r e n t form. T h e Con- stitution of the Federal Republic of Germany does not recognize the existence of organized inteiests. However, ihe manuals of procedure (Gescl1iiftso~d7zz~nge7z)of the principal ministries formally provide for the consultation of major associations in the initial preparation of legislative proposals b y the federal government. Advisory committees Quoted in Political and Economic Planning (PEP), Advisory Conm~iiteesim Bdtish Governnzent (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960). p. 6. 44% Wheare, 09. cit., p. 32 and PEP Report, op. cit., p. 16. Advisory com- mirrees are, of course, only one of many contacrs benveen public oaicials and organized interests. An accounr of the range and variety of contact; between officialsand individual citizens as well as organized groups is contained in Report of the Committee on Intermediaries, Cmd. 7904 (London: H.M.S.0, 1950). In a country of 53 million people the agencies reviewed hnndle in excess of 19 million applicationsannually ((ibid.,p. 8). rsSee, for example, Sir Raymond Street, "Government Consultation with In- dusery: Public Ad77tinimdion, Vol. 37 (1959), p. 7 and S. E. Finer, "The Individual Responsibility of Mbizers," Pz~blicAdrninis~ntio~Vol. 34 (1456). pp. 3778. See also Henry Ehrmann's and Norman Chester's remarlrs in Henry Ehrmann, ed., lnteren Groups on Four Continents (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958).pp. 6-7.285, and pnrsi77z. thority in the Nation-State 135 are another the reciprocal influences Chancellor Adenauer organized interests, federal government. against minis- ences which would interfere with thdir implementation of policy diiec- tives. Several principles appear to hav guided this r e g ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~The basic rule against bribery is with cases in which private persons through payment to an official seek to influence an official act, and in which in return the offidal pennits himself to he so influ- enced. Under the "conflict-of-intkrest" laws additional principles pates in public interests. In addition, it is to have private sources trans- "See the excellent discussion by Wilhelm Ilennis, op. cit., (Chicago: University of thc very useful survey by pp. 314338. in Frim Morstein-Mq Inc, 1946), Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 136 Nation-Building and Citizenship fer economic values to public officials, even when such transfers do not constitute bribery. Here the principle is that public officials should not accept any transfer of economic values from a private source, which is at the discretion of the latter. Such transfers are acceptable only if they are pursuant to an enforceable contract or propeq right of the official. In other words, the conduct of public business is to be insulated against the danger that a public official becomes sub- servient to private interests. Other principles relate to officials acting in their private capacity. Officials should not appear in a government f o r m in their private capacity or have dealings in matters in which the government is a party. As a matter of principle officials are not to step out of their official positions in order to assist private interests in their transactions with the government. The same prohibition applies also in the case of former officials, although here it tends to be confined to a limited period of time following the termination of public employment as well as by the degree of connection between the matter in hand and the past responsibilities of the former official. Finally, there is the principle that public officials should not be allowed to use for personal gain confidential information acquired in their official capacities; in this area only piecemeal regulation has been attempted so far because it is diEcult to distingnish in a general way between the legitimate and illegitimate use of acquired experience. The foregoing principles in "conflict-of-interest" legislation are so many efforts, then, to guard the impersonal criteria of public employ- ment against the new forms of iduence arising from the proliferation of organized interests. m o m n w IMPLICAnoNs. Having briefly an*ed the sigmiicance of organized interests for the "neutral administrator," we must bring the discussion back to the strnctusal changes of Western societies considered in the preceding chapters. The simultaneous development of a nationwide authority, a corps of public officials formally insulated from ''extraneous" influences, and the plebiscitarian tendencies in the political realm are accompanied by the development of functionally defined, organized interests. The efforts of public officials to obtain support, information and guidance from the relevant "publics" are matched point for point by the efforts of organized interests to influ- ence government actions so as to benefit their members or clients." 40To my lmowlcdge we have no comprehensive comparative study of the degree to which these "publics" are organized. By way of illustration it is useful, however, to cite S. E. Finer's estimates for Englmd. According to Finer in the Nation-State 137 It may be authority, on one hand, and the proliferation of idterests organized to influence that authority, on the other, that in ist tern nation-states consensus is high at d G national level. In these communities no one questions L seriousl~~that functions lilce conscription, law enforcemen5 the conduct of foreign others belong to (or must be delegated by) the central even though the specific imple- mentation of most of these National or lmow a government of this type, because adjudication and adminimation were and are deceutr&zed. uersonal inlermirrenr and subiect to a fee for each Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 138 Nation-Building and Citizenship individual. The state can have this effect, because it is "an organ distinct from the rest of society." 62 Presumably the people accept the over-all jurisdiction of the state, because they believe in the orderly achievement and revision of an over-all reciprocity of rights and duties. We can say that t l k belief is expressed in the claims which individuals and organized interests malce upon the state. But if it be true that consensus is high with regard to the institutions which can satisfy these claims, it is also true that the multitude and diversity of claims may malce any consistent policy impossible. Indeed even the interest in formulating such policies may weaken when any identifica- tion of "public welfare" is bound to work to the detriment of some interests. A high degree of consensus at the national level may, therefore, be quite compatible with a decreasing ability to reach agreement on questions of national policies. Except in emergencies consensus at the national level possesses, therefore, an impersonal quality which does not satisfy the persistent craving for fraternity or fellow feeling. Nor is that craving satisfied at other levels of group formation. Indeed, the development of a nationwide consensus hns been accom- panied by a decline of social solidarity. Classes, status groups, and formal associations arise from the coalescence of "ideal and material interests." Yet none of them involves a consensus comparable to the acceptance by all citizens of the idea that the national government possesses sovereign authority. This is not a new issue. Social and political theorists have deplored and criticized the loss of social soli- darity from the very beginning of the modern political community. When writers Ute Tocqueville and Durlcheim stress the importance of 'Isecondary groups," they do so in the belief that such groups can counteract both the isolation of each man from his fellows and the centralization of government. Yet much of this analysis remains at a level where considerations of policy and an element of nostalgia merge with considerations of facr, especially in the ever-recurring, invidious contrasts between hadition and modernity.6n Despite the eminent names associated with it, we should discard this intellectuallegacy. The "great transformation" leading to the modem political community malies the decline of social solidarity inevitable. No association based on a coalescence of interests or on ethnic and "Emile Durlcheim, Profersionnl Etbicr nnd Civic ~Mornlr (Glcncoe: The Free Press, 19jS), pp. 64, 82. snFor a m e y of this line of thoughg see Robert A. Nisbec, The Qecert for Co7mn1zz:nity(NewYork: OxFord University Press, 1953). the Nation-State 139 religious &ation of rights and duties that was exacted a heavy price in personal dbordination. Above all it was a counterpart to the very loose integrdtion of a multiplicity of jurisdic- tions at the "national" ~evk~. this respect the absolutist regimes achieved a greater integratio through centralized royal admin- istration and the people's loyalty the liing, although the privileges appropriated by Church and also subjected the ordinary man to the autocratic ruIe of Where such privileges I replaced the "law communities" of an earlier day, the privileged groups achieved considerable socia cohesion, but the people were 'Ideprived of what legal and customary protection they had enjoyed, and hence excluded even from the& former, passive participation in the reciprocity of rights and ~bli&tions.~~Modern political com- munities have achieved a greater ckntralization of government than either the medieval or the absolutist bolitical systems, and this achieve- ment has been preceded, accompanibd, or followed by the participa- tion of all adult citizens in politica life (on the basis of the formal equality of the franchise). But one rice of these achievements is the d i s h e d solidarityof all "second groups."4This "price" is a by-product of the separation between society and government in the modem political community. Whereas solidarity bad been based on the individual's pkticipation in a "law community" or on his membership in a privilegdd status group possessing certain governmental prerogatives, it must &ise now from the social and eco- nomic stratiEcatiou of society aided By the equality of all adult citizens before the law and in the electoral process. In the legal systems of the older typ law appeared as the privilege of particular individuals or objects or of constellations of individuals or objects. Such a point of view to be opposed by that in which the state appears as the dl institution. . . . The revolutionaryperiod of the 18th of legislationwhich sought to estirpate every form and legal particu- o~TocqueviUetends to obscure this reciprocity in the earlier esrme societies of mcdievaj Europe with the Inter symbiosis of absolutist rule and aristocratic privilege, hough he IS quiclc to point out how $ . . . ' ,absolutismtended to undermine the nrisroc nuc posluon Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 140 Nation-Building and Citizenship larisrn. . . . This was effected by two arrangements: the first is the formal, universally accessible,closely limited,and legallyregdared autonomy of asso- ciation which may be created by anyone wishing to do so; the other consists in the grant to everyone of the power to create law of his own by means of engaging in privare legal transactions of certain i~hds.~' On this basis joint actions and exchange relations can exclude govern- mental control without thereby encroaching upon the sovereign au- thority of government. Though the governmental performance of administrativetaslcs may be affected in detail, individual and collective actions need not detract from the continuous functioning of the na- tional political community. In the societies of Western civilizationwe should accept, therefore, the existence of a hiatus between the forces malting for social solidarity or codict independently of government and forces accounting for the continuous exercise of authority in the nationalpolitical community. What has been said concerning the political community of the modem Western nation-state is true in terms of a then-and-now con- trast. Compared with the multiplicity of largely autonomous jurisdic- tions, more or less loosely held together by the sacrosanct authority of the Icing and the fealty owed to him by his vassals, the modem nation- state represents a structure of authority possessing sovereign functions that can no longer be appropriated and inherited as attributes of the rights of ownership. Then-and-now comparisons benveen medieval and modem political life will bring the enduring features of the nation-state into the foreground, but by highlighting the contrasts they win also diminish the relevance of the resulting concepts for an understanding of behavior. Though the characteristics of the nation- state have remained, they have been combined with changes of struc- ture and behavior such as those analyzed above with reference to bureaucratic culture patterns and the relations between administrators and the public. SUMMARY This chapter has analyzed the transformations of Western European societies from the side of public authority, supplementing the earlier analysis of social relations in the context of changing political struc- tures. The fist part of the chapter exemplifies the use of concepts of 6Veber,Lnw in Econonzy nnd Society, pp. 145-146. Authoriy in theNation-State 141 limited applicability. change we usually d e h e social structures by a list distinguish one from another. Such definitions are which enable us to state from patrimonial to bureaucratic each structnre pos- of its distinctive can be ana- Emphasis on this distinction is in the second pprr of, ' . the chapter by analyseswhich and its bureaucracy as given rather than both is the destruc- -. tion of inherited ministration of whose work. ' . will be unrestricted except for edJcationd qualifications. Similarly, the growth of plebiscitarian politics will give rise to a proliferation of I.attempts to iduence the administrapon and to a regularization of con- tacts between administrators and the "public." These developments reveal the conditions under which national allegiance grows at the Určeno pouze pro studijní účely 142 Nation-Building and Citizenship expense of group solidarity. In Western societies "orgmized interests" have formed in great numhers on the impersonal basis of common interests. They have been encouraged by the right to form associa- tions, by the administrative use of group representation, by the great resources available at the national level, and by the degree to which politics has become a struggle over the distribution of the national product. Accordingly, attention is focused at the governmental and national level, while group feeling or fraternity are on the wane despite the growth of "organized interests." These developments of Western societies provide a useful vantage- point for the comparative studies to follow. It will he seen that each of them deals with the problem of puhlic authority in relation to the group-formingtendenciesarisingin the socialstructure. I Part Two T&?transformation of gives one meaning to the tern counmes outside the Western meaningsof the same term. are Russia, Japan, and India, the blend of tradition and modernity is achievedin the development of a conntry. Finally,consideration to India's community developmentmovement as a clue to t of her emerging,polit- ical community. Here the purpose the relations between central, governmentalauthority and with Western Europe shows these out; hut they are especially acute in India which is only beginning the process of nation building. Určeno pouze pro studijní účely