Union was not at the forefront of efforts to foster democracy and good governance; its policies developed after many member states had already adopted these objectives. Internal pressure to adopt the objectives came from the member states and, to a limited extent, from the EP. And the EU's promotion of democracy and good governance cannot be said to be the export of values and principles practised at the EU level. Generally speaking, then, the EU's adoption of these objectives has been reactive rather than proactive. Furthermore, the lack of international standards and the democratic deficit within the EU do not give the EU much solid ground on which to push other countries to implement democratic and good governance reforms.

The way in which the EU promotes democracy and good governance is not strikingly different from that of other actors, as it reflects an apparent consensus that both top-down and bottom-up measures must be used to promote democracy in particular, and that negative conditionality is not necessarily the best way to engender democratization. In contrast, both the inclusion of democratic principles in the human-rights clause and the emphasis on dialogue are more innovative and unusual, again reflecting the EU's preference for basing relations on legal agreements and persuasion. The inconsistent use of negative measures is, however, a relatively common practice across donors.

Of course, the extent to which the EU is committed to the objectives of democracy and good governance can be questioned. A very modest amount of aid is provided for encouraging both objectives, and there is a lack of policy coherence (particularly between the encouragement of economic liberalization and the promotion of democracy). Negative measures are applied inconsistently, especially where considerations of stability and security are paramount. But, as the concern over the EU's visibility in election observation missions shows, the promotion of democracy and, to a lesser extent, good governance is seen to be an important part of the EU's international identity.

7

Conflict Prevention

Preventing violent conflict became a concern for the European Union once it was clear that peace and security would not replace the balance of terror of the Cold War. The conflict in Yugoslavia in mid-1991 illustrated this most starkly, but by the end of 1992 violent conflicts had also erupted in the former Soviet Union (Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and so on) and northern Africa (Algeria), and there were tensions elsewhere (between Hungary and Romania, for example). These conflicts were either internal, though often with significant external consequences, or attributable largely to the spillover of internal tensions, especially over minority rights.

Defence against a Soviet threat may no longer have been a concern, but the security of the EU and its member states was far from assured, though it was not actually militarily threatened by the spread of conflicts. Instead, such conflicts were costly for the EU in other ways (see section 7.2). But dealing with (or 'managing', in current parlance) violent conflicts through military intervention has not been a practical option for the EU, due to both institutional shortcomings and a lack of political will. Trying to prevent conflicts from breaking out in the first place has been a much more promising area for EU activity, which fits more comfortably with its civilian power image and capabilities.

The EU's approach to conflict prevention can be characterized as primarily a long-term one, which tries to create the conditions for peace, for the most part within states (and on the assumption that this contributes to inter-state peace). The member states have agreed on basic causes of conflict (economic hardship; lack of respect for human and minority rights; political, economic and social inequality;

and lack of democracy) and on appropriate measures to address them (democratization, respect for human and minority rights, sustainable economic development, and regional cooperation). These assumptions shape the EU's policies in various regions, but they do not add up to a coherent, overall strategy for preventing violent conflict.

An overall strategy is necessary because the EU's preferred measures – promotion of democracy, human rights, sustainable development and regional integration – may contribute to conflict prevention, but they also may not. Firstly, democratization may permit the peaceful conciliation of group interests, but it can also unleash extreme nationalism and political instability, especially if new political parties reflect ethnic divisions. Hence, if the promotion of democracy is to prevent conflicts, programmes must be specifically designed to minimize the conditions that breed extremist political movements. Secondly, development or economic assistance, or trade concessions, must be used carefully to ensure that they do not create or exacerbate inequalities among different identity groups, a source of conflict. Thirdly, regional cooperation could have disintegrative effects: Reinhardt Rummel has pointed out that Slovenia's expectation of integration into the EU arguably 'produced a domino effect of disintegration in Yugoslavia in 1990/91', and that there is a risk that new EU member states could take a hardline attitude towards outsiders.[1] The prospect of enlargement to the Republic of Cyprus, for example, increased tension in the eastern Mediterranean. Easing the insider–outsider distinction is one way to try to avoid such conflicts, but this is easier said than done. To some extent, these considerations have been incorporated into EU policies, but a coherent strategy is still more of an objective than a reality.

In addition to the long-term, peace-building approach, the EU is trying to develop the capacity to prevent conflicts that are perceived as being imminent, as well as to prevent the escalation of existing conflicts. In part, the security and defence policy is supposed to allow the EU to back up its civilian instruments with the threat or use of force, and thus prevent conflicts from breaking out or escalating (or then intervening if conflict prevention does not work). The June 2001 Göteberg European Council noted, 'the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has, since the outset, also been intended to strengthen the EU's capacity for action in the crucial field of conflict prevention.'[2]

The Union's approach to conflict prevention is broadly shared by other actors, such as Canada or Norway, and international organizations, most notably the OSCE. However, in contrast to these actors, the EU possesses a considerable toolbox of policy instruments

and, crucially, its own unique legacy as an exercise in conflict prevention.

This chapter first discusses the experience of preventing conflict within the EU. Section 7.2 analyses how and why the EU adopted conflict prevention as a foreign policy objective. The following two sections discuss how the EU defines conflict prevention and what instruments it uses to try to prevent conflicts. The EU's policies are evaluated in section 7.5.

7.1 Conflict prevention within the EU

Until the 1990s, the European Union was better known for preventing conflicts between its own member states than among or within third countries. A key reason, after all, for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community was to prevent future conflicts in Western Europe, and specifically between France and Germany. For Joseph Weiler, peace was the most explicit of the Community's foundational ideals.[3] The EU's High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, asserted that the EU

> came into existence as an exercise in conflict prevention. A half a century ago, we began the process of recovery from a global conflict of unprecedented dimensions. Today's European Union was borne [*sic*] from the determination of all our peoples that such a conflict should never happen again. . . . Building stability and preventing conflict is at the heart of our endeavours.[4]

Similarly, the Commission maintained: 'The EU is in itself a peace project, and a supremely successful one. It has underpinned the reconciliation and peaceful development of Western Europe over the last half century, helping to consolidate democracy and to assure prosperity.'[5]

The route to peace via integration has been successful. While there is continuing violence in some parts of the EU (Northern Ireland, the Basque region, Corsica), these are contained conflicts, and violent conflict among EU member states is simply inconceivable. The EU is a 'security community': there are long-term, dependable expectations that members of the community will resolve their problems by a process of peaceful change.[6] This is an extraordinary achievement. As Maurice Keens-Soper argues:

> What is noteworthy from the standpoint of the present is how the assumption of peace, above all between France and Germany, has become so securely grounded as to be unworthy of comment. When

> expectations have taken such hold that their fulfilment goes unnoticed, it suggests that relations based upon them depend on more reliable material than the official undertakings of treaties. Habit has sealed what contract began.[7]

This does not mean the end of disputes among the member states; it does mean that expressing and resolving those disputes become the stuff of politics, comparable to what takes place in the domestic political process.

The success of the integration project bestows legitimacy and authority on the EU's pursuit of the conflict-prevention objective.[8] The EU can also act with more legitimacy than the member states could separately when this involves intervention in third countries (as is often the case with conflict prevention), especially former colonies. Of course, EU intervention may still be resented as neo-imperialist, but, with respect to the perceptions of third countries, there is still more to be gained from acting collectively than unilaterally.

But while integration is undoubtedly an important factor in producing stable expectations of peace among West European states, it is not the only factor. Traditional liberal theories of international relations also seem to fit here: democratic states do not fight one another, and EU member states are all democracies; violent conflict is incompatible with free trade and economic interdependence, and the EU member states are all (rich) 'trading states'.[9] In practice, it is the combination of all these factors that the EU promotes externally to prevent violent conflict, between *and* within states.

Realists, however, would argue that peace in Europe during the Cold War was the result of bipolarity and mutual deterrence. Western Europe benefited, and still benefits, from the American security guarantee, which guarantees peace.[10] This is not widely acknowledged within the EU: the two declarations cited above, by the CFSP High Representative and the Commission, do not discuss the wider context of peace in Europe, merely how the EU has contributed to peace among its member states. Furthermore, the provision of security guarantees is one instrument that the EU cannot wield; only the US and NATO can do so. EU enlargement cannot provide a similar level of protection.[11] The EU's use of softer measures directly reflects the means available to it and its own 'home-grown' experiences, but realists would question whether it really can wield the full range of conflict-prevention instruments, as it persistently claims.

The EU's history and experience have clearly shaped its approach to conflict prevention. But, as the next section illustrates, the EU adopted this objective in the wake of events external to it, and concurrently with major international actors (not least the UN and the OSCE).

7.2 Conflict prevention as an EU foreign policy objective

During the Cold War, 'conflict prevention' meant preventing nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union by a strategy of nuclear deterrence. The Cold War did not, of course, inhibit all violent conflict – intra-state or inter-state – but frequently conflicts became theatres of US–Soviet competition: Afghanistan, Angola, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Vietnam, to name but a few. The UN tried to defuse crises and resolve conflicts, and thus prevent or limit superpower involvement, through the 'quiet diplomacy' of the Secretary-General and peace-keeping, but these efforts were not touted as conflict prevention or preventive diplomacy.[12]

To an extent, the EC member states used the EPC framework to try to reduce Cold War tensions in Europe – as in their collective diplomacy in the CSCE – or to propose solutions to conflicts that could threaten international stability. EPC put forward proposals to end the conflict in Afghanistan and the Middle East, and it supported regional efforts to end the conflicts in Central America. This was activity aimed not at preventing imminent violent conflict, but rather at alleviating or resolving it, or at creating the conditions for peace in the long term. While EPC was largely unsuccessful in this, it manifested a different and unique approach to violent conflict than that of the superpowers, in that it emphasized the local economic and political causes of conflict and non-military solutions to it.

With the end of the Cold War, several conflicts ended (Cambodia, Central America, Mozambique), but new ones broke out, often within states. A revitalized UN tried to resolve many conflicts, as did regional organizations. Dealing with these conflicts was expensive. For example, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia cost over $1 billion a year from 1993 to 1995, and the lives of 120 soldiers; EU member states paid a large part of this cost. The estimated cost in 1996 of the NATO Implementation Force, which enforced the Dayton peace agreement, was $5 billion. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees spent $1 billion between 1991 and 1996 on emergency assistance.[13] And this of course leaves out the costs of the conflict for the people of the former Yugoslavia and neighbouring states, of housing Yugoslav refugees in host countries, of lost trade and of reconstruction.

The costs of conflicts naturally sparked considerations of how to prevent them from breaking out in the first place. Within Europe, even before the Yugoslav war, some attention was paid to conflict prevention, mainly to ensure that the Cold War ended peacefully. A CSCE summit in November 1990 agreed to create a Conflict Prevention Centre, to try to prevent inter-state conflicts. In 1992, in the wake of the Yugoslav war, the CSCE established a High Commissioner on National Minorities, who could intervene at an early stage to try to prevent tensions over national minority issues from erupting into internal and/or inter-state conflict. In June 1992, acting on a request from the UN Security Council six months earlier, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published *An Agenda for Peace*, which contained recommendations for strengthening the UN's capacity to prevent violent conflict. EU member states have been active in supporting OSCE and UN conflict-prevention activities,[14] indicating a widespread consensus that conflicts can and should be prevented, and that many international organizations can be useful in this respect.

Given that the EU was increasingly expected to deliver humanitarian aid to, and help reconstruct, conflict-ridden zones (particularly in its periphery, notably the former Yugoslavia), there was considerable support within the EU for attempting to prevent conflicts from arising. Conflict prevention is also an area in which the EU could make a distinct contribution, and it has an armoury of appropriate tools. Commission President Jacques Delors asserted, 'as many conflicts and tensions are rooted in political, social and economic instabilities, the Union is much better equipped than any other international organisation to address related problems.'[15]

In the June 1992 report on CFSP joint actions, preventing (and settling) violent conflict was declared an objective for EU foreign policy. Initially, the EU's neighbourhood attracted the most attention. The importance of preventing conflict in Central and Eastern Europe was obvious, as conflict there would seriously affect the EU's security, economic interests and political objectives. Enlargement is considered the primary way to spread security and stability eastwards. But the prospect of enlargement also made it imperative that disputes among the CEECs be resolved *before* enlargement, lest the Union import instability and insecurity or generate tensions between an enlarged EU and outsiders. Across Central and Eastern Europe there were inter-state disputes over minority rights and boundaries, as well as domestic tensions stemming from minorities' grievances, economic hardship and nationalism. Early on, the Union addressed these problems in ways that reflect the underlying assumptions about the

sources of conflict. It tried to foster democratization and respect for human and minority rights using conditionality (including, most powerfully, membership conditionality), aid and diplomatic instruments, and it encouraged regional cooperation. It also engaged directly in mediation, not least in the Pact for Stability.

Since the end of the Bosnian war, South-Eastern Europe has become a significant – perhaps the most significant – area for EU foreign policy. The EU has been concerned to prevent the recurrence of conflict and the outbreak of new conflicts there. It drew up a strategy for reconstruction and peace in the region, based on the offer of association agreements, provided countries meet conditions including respect for democratic principles and human rights, good-neighbourliness, and compliance with the peace agreements. The EU engaged in intensive diplomacy to try to prevent conflict in Kosovo and FYROM.

From the mid-1990s, the Union also devoted more attention southwards. As southern member states argued, there were risks to European security from religious fundamentalism and underdevelopment – whose direct impact on the EU would be via increased illegal immigration – as well as the spread of chemical and biological weapons. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership, based on political dialogue, economic and financial cooperation, and cultural exchange, is to 'contribute to the overall aim of preventing conflict and promoting stability'.[16] The Euro-Mediterranean partnership tries to make up for the EU's marginal influence in the Middle East peace process (due partly to the efforts of Israel and the US to curtail its role) with a longer-term, wider-ranging approach to peace and stability in the region.

Beyond its periphery, conflict prevention in Africa became an EU concern, in the wake of conflicts in Liberia (1989–), Somalia (1992–) and Rwanda (1994). In none of them did the EU intervene (even with coercive civilian measures), although member states were active in the UN mission to Somalia and France intervened (eventually and controversially) in response to the Rwandan genocide. One lesson learned was that outsiders would not intervene to resolve conflicts in Africa, so African capacities to prevent and resolve conflicts should be developed. In December 1994 the Essen European Council advocated 'an intensive political dialogue' between the EU and OAU, focusing on conflict prevention.[17] A year later the Council declared that the EU would support African efforts in preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping.[18] In March 1996 the Commission issued a communication on the EU and conflicts in Africa.[19] In June 1997 a CFSP common position stated that the EU 'shall actively support efforts in

favour of the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa.'[20] The replacement common position, of May 2001, lists several measures that the EU will take to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa.[21] Conflict prevention was a significant chapter at the Africa–Europe summit in April 2000 and was included in the Cotonou Convention.

But for all of these activities, at the end of the 1990s the Union still lacked an overall strategy for preventing conflicts. From 1999, however, more effort was devoted to articulating a coherent framework. Several member states (Sweden and Finland, for example) and the Commission were pushing to ensure that the development of the EU's capacity to intervene militarily was balanced by a strengthening of its capacity to use civilian means to try to prevent and resolve conflicts. Hence the conclusions of European Councils since 1999 have usually contained reports on strengthening the EU's capabilities for crisis management with civilian and military means.

There was considerable cooperation between the first and second pillars. Javier Solana and Chris Patten issued a report to the Nice European Council in December 2000 on 'Improving the coherence and effectiveness of European Union action in the field of conflict prevention'. This led to an open (televised) debate on conflict prevention at the January 2001 meeting of the General Affairs Council, under the Swedish presidency. In May 2001 the Commission issued a communication on conflict prevention. And in June 2001 the Göteberg European Council agreed an 'EU programme for the prevention of violent conflicts'.

The High Representative for CFSP and the Commission asserted that 'preserving peace, promoting stability and strengthening international security worldwide is a fundamental objective for the Union, and preventing violent conflict constitutes one of its most important external policy challenges.'[22] They made a number of recommendations for more effective and coherent policies. The Commission's communication also listed a large number of recommendations for improving the Union's capacity to prevent conflicts in the short and long term.

The General Affairs Council's open debate revealed a convergence of views among the member states. They agreed

> on both the principles on which conflict prevention should be based – such as democracy, the rule of law, respect of human rights and human dignity, in particular expressed in the fight against poverty and in favour of economic development – as well as the means to be employed for concrete action, with priority in the civil area – trade, development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, etc – but also in the last resort, the readiness to use military force for conflict solution.[23]

The foreign ministers further agreed that the EU needed to improve its internal tools, as well as the coherence and consistency of its conflict-prevention policies.

The Göteberg programme was a significant step towards a coherent EU strategy, and declared:

> In line with the fundamental values of the EU, the highest political priority will be given to improving the effectiveness and coherence of its external action in the field of conflict prevention, thereby also enhancing the preventive capabilities of the international community at large.[24]

The EU will set clear political priorities for preventive actions; improve its early warning and policy coherence; enhance its instruments for long- and short-term prevention; and build effective partnerships for prevention. The Council is to review potential conflict issues at the outset of each presidency.[25]

Thus the EU has come quite a way towards articulating the objective of preventing conflict and formulating a strategy to achieve that objective, though it remains to be seen how coherently it will implement that strategy. Why has it done so?

Firstly, and obviously, violent conflict is costly for the EU. The CFSP High Representative and the Commission argued: 'Conflict bears a human cost in suffering and undermines economic development. It also affects EU interests by creating instability, by reducing trade and putting investments at risk, by imposing a heavy financial burden in reconstruction and ultimately by threatening the security of its citizens. The financial costs of preventing conflict are small compared to the cost of addressing its consequences.'[26] And violent conflict makes it virtually impossible to pursue the EU's other foreign policy objectives, such as the promotion of democracy or the encouragement of regional cooperation. As the Commission noted, 'For the European Union, the existence of violent conflicts in Africa is increasingly challenging the achievement of its declared policy goals. Fostering peace, stability, democracy and human rights under the conditions of conflicts is a nearly impossible task.'[27]

There are also less tangible costs, as Reinhardt Rummel points out. Ignoring the human suffering would exact a moral cost, undermining the legitimacy of policies designed to further the EU's shared values, such as respect for human rights. And the EU's failure to resolve con-

flicts can discredit the CFSP (as in the case of Bosnia) and cause tensions with other states.[28]

The politics of scale clearly favour collective action to prevent conflicts. The EU can wield appropriate and quite powerful policy instruments, such as development assistance or the conditional offer of EU membership. The member states can have more influence acting together than separately. Not doing so could even be dangerous, as individual national policies might undermine each other. Rummel warns that, 'in a situation of developing tensions, an uncoordinated approach from individual Member States could exacerbate the situation rather than mitigate the tensions.'[29]

Conflict prevention is also one area which plays to the EU's strengths, given the range of instruments that it can wield and its history as an exercise in conflict prevention. This is clearly a key reason why the member states chose to develop the conflict-prevention capacity of the EU: the EU could add value. However, failure to prevent conflicts could have considerable negative effects on the EU's credibility and image. And claiming success is well-nigh impossible, as it is hard to determine whether the EU has been responsible for helping to prevent conflicts or whether conflicts would not have erupted regardless of outside intervention.

Several actors have actively pushed to strengthen the EU's capacity to prevent conflicts. The neutrals, Denmark and the Netherlands have been keen to develop civilian instruments alongside new military ones, and to consider how these should best be used to prevent conflicts. Strengthening the EU's civilian instruments for conflict prevention could, after all, potentially reduce the need for military force. During its 1999 presidency, Finland actively promoted consideration of the non-military management of crises. Sweden used its 2001 presidency to develop the EU's civilian instruments, reflecting the strong emphasis on conflict prevention in Swedish foreign policy, as well as its preference for civilian over military means.[30] The Netherlands has actively pushed for an EU conflict-prevention role, especially during its 1997 presidency, which resulted in October 1997 in the common position on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa.[31] The larger member states have also pushed for EU conflict-prevention activities: France proposed the Pact for Stability in Central and Eastern Europe; Germany pushed for a similar Stability Pact in South-Eastern Europe; France and the UK advocate EU support for building African conflict-prevention capabilities; and Spain and Italy promoted the Euro–Mediterranean partnership. But the most active promoters of conflict prevention as an EU objective, and the development of civilian instruments, have been the smaller states. The Commission has

also long seen conflict prevention as an area where the Community's civilian instruments are of particular use, which requires a strong Commission voice in the foreign policy-making process.

The European Parliament has repeatedly called on the EU to strengthen its capabilities to prevent conflicts.[32] In 1994, MEPs created the Forum of the European Parliament for the Active Prevention of Conflicts. In June 1995, on the initiative of Michel Rocard MEP, the European Parliament urged the Commission to set up a unit for analysing and proposing solutions to conflicts; in 1996 the Commission responded by creating the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN). NGOs (such as International Alert, Saferworld and International Crisis Group) and think tanks (such as the WEU – now EU – Institute for Security Studies) have made numerous recommendations for improving and strengthening the EU's conflict-prevention capacities.[33]

There is clearly considerable support within the EU for pursuing the objective. Why then has it taken so long to adopt a more coherent approach? Partly this is because the EU, along with other international actors, is still learning about how to prevent conflicts. And partly it reflects weaknesses of the EU's foreign policy system. Conflict prevention requires minimizing the pillar division, further development of CFSP's instruments, and incorporation of political considerations into the use of economic instruments. A strengthened capacity to prevent conflicts must go hand in hand with a strengthened capacity to formulate and implement foreign policy. This is a slow process.

Although the EU was active in conflict prevention quite early, it was following in the footsteps of other international actors, not least the UN and the OSCE. The development of its strategy was also at the behest of several member states who were already quite involved in conflict prevention (such as Sweden). The adoption of this foreign policy objective thus followed international trends. But it clearly fits well with the EU's own origins and experiences, which contribute to the uniqueness of EU activity in this field.

7.3 What does the EU mean by conflict prevention?

In the last decade there has been a proliferation of terms regarding the prevention and settlement of violent conflicts: preventive diplomacy, preventive action, crisis prevention, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-building, conflict

management and crisis management. Some definitions of these terms overlap with each other; the same term can mean different activities. Initially the EU's preferred term was preventive diplomacy,[34] but the Commission has since used the terms conflict prevention, peace-building, conflict resolution and conflict management (see box 7.1).

The Commission's terminology has evolved: in 2001 it grouped both long-term (which it called the projection of stability) and short-term (quick reaction to nascent conflicts) efforts under the general rubric of conflict prevention.[35] The Council too has used slightly different terms and definitions:

Box 7.1 The European Commission's definition of conflict prevention and related terms

Peace-building: 'Actions undertaken over the medium and longer-term to address root-causes of violent conflicts *in a targeted manner*.' Root causes are:

- imbalance of political, socio-economic or cultural opportunities among different identity groups (ethnic, religious, regional, social, and so on);
- lack of democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of governance;
- absence of effective mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group interests (including democratic structures) and for bridging dividing lines between different interest groups; and
- lack of a vibrant civil society.

Conflict prevention: 'Actions undertaken over the *short term* to reduce manifest tensions and/or to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict.'
Conflict management: 'Actions undertaken with the main objective to prevent the vertical (intensification of violence) or horizontal (territorial spread) escalation of existing violent conflicts.'
Conflict resolution: 'Actions undertaken over the *short term* to end violent conflict.'

Source: European Commission, Development Directorate-General, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/definition.htm> (accessed 27 July 2001).

- conflict prevention targets the trigger factors and root causes of violent conflict;
- crisis management addresses acute phases of conflicts, supporting efforts to end violence; and
- peace-building supports initiatives to contain violent conflict and prepare for and sustain peaceful solutions.[36]

The Council's definition of conflict prevention encompasses both short-term and long-term efforts, so that there now seems to be some consensus on this.

The definitional confusion is one sign that a coherent strategy for conflict prevention is still under construction. It also generates a further problem. The EU wants to work together with other international organizations, especially the UN.[37] Yet the UN and the EU use different terminology and definitions. 'Peace enforcement' for the UN means 'peace-making' for the EU (military action to maintain or restore international peace), while 'peace-making' for the UN means non-military measures to resolve conflict.[38]

7.4 How does the EU pursue the objective?

One of the EU's strengths in the field of conflict prevention is the wide range of instruments that it could wield in an effort to prevent violent conflicts. The Commission listed some of these with respect to preventing conflict in developing countries (see box 7.2). But if these instruments are to be effective, they must be used in pursuit of a clear, coherent policy. The Council has repeatedly stated that the Union's approach should be comprehensive and integrated.[39] But overcoming the limitations of the pillar structure has been problematic, as the CFSP High Representative and the Commission admitted:

> The challenges which face the Union as it sets about improving its coherence and effectiveness for conflict prevention are similar to those which it faces throughout its external action: to establish and sustain priorities for action; to ensure the coherent use of what is now a very broad range of resources in pursuit of those priorities; to deploy those resources in a pro-active, flexible and integrated way; and to build and sustain partnerships with those who share our values and priorities at global, regional, national and local level.[40]

The under-development of the CFSP pillar is a problem: 'EU conflict prevention thinking [has] a disproportionately heavy focus on

Box 7.2 EU measures to try to break the cycle of conflict

Peace-building (in situations without obvious tension):

- assistance for training, education, social and economic cohesion, strengthening human and social development, democracy-building, good governance and civil society, institution-building;
- political dialogue;
- watching changes;
- voicing concerns.

Conflict prevention (in situations of tension):

- political dialogue with the parties concerned;
- advocacy of specific measures (including preventive deployment of troops) and/or of specific solutions to the problems;
- (threat of) sanctions;
- deployment of observers;
- humanitarian/emergency aid;
- intensification of measures listed under peace-building above.

Peace-building (in post-conflict situations):

- demobilization and disarmament;
- repatriation and reintegration;
- mine clearance;
- post-conflict relief and humanitarian aid rehabilitation;
- peace-building measures listed above;
- advocacy of specific solutions;
- confidence-building measures;
- (support for) conflict-resolution initiatives;
- rebuilding of government structures.

Source: European Commission, COM (96) 153, pp. 18–19.

economics, human rights and democratisation, to the neglect of diplomatic conflict prevention measures that seek to significantly alter the political dynamics of an emerging conflict.'[41] The Göteberg programme declared that 'the Council will develop proposals on the

further improvement of its diplomatic instruments.' But resources for the CFSP pillar remain limited: the CFSP budget is small, especially compared to the EU's external relations budget (see table 3.3); only twenty-four people staff the Policy Unit; and member states do not have to share relevant information that might help the Policy Unit produce solid analyses and policy recommendations. The inadequacy of the CFSP's resources is especially apparent when compared to those for the CESDP: for example, 135 people work for the Military Staff, which is to provide early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg task operations. In comparison, the Policy Unit, which might help determine that a Petersberg task operation is necessary in the first place, is vastly understaffed.

There is still inter-pillar rivalry; the Commission has been anxious to prevent its marginalization from conflict-prevention efforts. In February 2001, Development Commissioner Poul Nielson declared, 'I consider development co-operation as the most important contribution Europe can make to preventing conflicts in developing countries.'[42] The Commission's April 2001 communication on conflict prevention concentrates on the Community's long-term measures, such as promoting regional cooperation, and on the need for better short-term measures in the first pillar.

The rest of this section analyses several EU policy instruments for conflict prevention: financial assistance; conditionality; sanctions; limits on arms exports; early warning; political dialogue and mediation; support for regional cooperation; civilian crisis management capabilities; and military instruments.

Financial assistance

From the mid-1990s there was a growing recognition (internationally and within the Union) that assistance alone will not prevent conflict; it must be specifically directed towards alleviating the root causes of conflicts. At the UN level, the Secretary-General emphasized the role of development aid in conflict prevention in his 1994 report *An Agenda for Development*.[43] By summer 1994, donor countries, international organizations and NGOs were evaluating the negative impact of humanitarian and emergency aid on prospects for peace-building, primarily because of the experience of the refugee camps just outside Rwanda, but also as a result of the earlier experience of relief provision in Somalia.[44]

The EU absorbed and even contributed to these discussions. The Commission proposed changing the focus in EU development and humanitarian assistance programmes to take account of the socio-political impact of assistance. Programmes must address the root

causes of violent conflicts. The ultimate policy goal is 'structural stability', which is 'a situation involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures, and healthy social and environmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resort to violent conflict.'[45] Importantly, this approach became the basis for the OECD Development Assistance Committee's guidelines on conflict, peace and development cooperation.[46]

The Council agreed that development aid could contribute to the prevention of violent conflicts if it addresses the causes of conflicts and ensures balanced opportunities among different identity groups, strengthens democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of governance, and builds effective mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group interests.[47] In November 2000 the Community's development policy was revised to emphasize poverty reduction as the primary objective, and 'poverty, and the exclusion which it creates, is one of the root causes of conflict.'[48]

The EU is also to 'mainstream' the goal of conflict prevention. The Commission's regional and country strategy papers are to assess potential conflict situations, and, where there is possible conflict, 'conflict prevention measures will be made an integral part of the overall programmes of the Community.'[49] In the strategy papers, the Commission now regularly refers to a 'check-list' of root causes of conflicts, and tries to focus aid on relevant conflict-prevention activities (such as strengthening the rule of law, or demobilization programmes).[50] But it has not been able to make conflict prevention an issue in all the Community's sectoral policies (particularly trade policy) or traditional development programmes.[51]

There is specific funding for conflict-prevention measures under the EIDHR, but the percentage of funding for such measures has dropped since 1996 (see appendix 2). Support for the prosecution of violations of humanitarian law has not declined so precipitously, and is one of the four thematic priorities for EIDHR funding from 2002.[52] The level of EU funding on conflict prevention, though, compares favourably to that of other actors when peace-keeping costs are not included (see appendix 3). The Commission also considers that the EIDHR as a whole addresses the root causes of conflicts, such as a lack of democracy and respect for human rights, and alienation of vulnerable groups.[53] The countries that have been targeted for EIDHR funding from 2002 are in fact countries either at high risk of suffering violent conflict or already affected by it (see section 5.4).

Post-conflict peace-building is also a major area of EU assistance, and is supposed to be designed to help prevent conflicts from erupting again. The EU has taken responsibility for reconstruction and rehabilitation (including demobilization) in South-Eastern Europe, for example, promising euro 5.5 billion in aid for 2000–6. The Cotonou agreement provides for EU support for demobilization and reintegration of former combatants into society.

Conditionality

The EU has used conditionality, including membership conditionality, to try to prevent conflicts, particularly with respect to other European countries. It has quite assertively exploited its 'power of attraction' to exert leverage over European countries.[54] Two EU membership conditions are relevant here: respect for minority rights (see section 5.3) and 'good-neighbourliness'. Good-neighbourliness implies a willingness to cooperate with neighbours, but also – more concretely – to resolve disputes peacefully, if necessary by referring them to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Good-neighbourliness has been stressed on a number of occasions. In 1992 the Czech Republic and Slovakia were carefully watched to ensure that their break-up was peaceful. In 1993, Hungary and Slovakia were successfully pressed to refer the Gabcikovo dam dispute to the ICJ. A key objective of the 1994–5 Pact for Stability was to encourage the applicant countries to reach bilateral agreements among themselves on borders and the treatment of minorities. In 'Agenda 2000', the Commission stated that, 'before accession, applicants should make every effort to resolve any outstanding border dispute among themselves or involving third countries. Failing this they should agree that the dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice.'[55] The Helsinki European Council reiterated this condition: applicants had to resolve outstanding border disputes before accession, or refer them to the ICJ.[56]

The South-East European countries have been subject to even more stringent conditions tied to the offer of trade relations, assistance, and stabilization and association agreements: countries must protect minority rights, be ready to engage in cross-border cooperation, provide opportunities for displaced persons and refugees to return to their places of origin, and comply with obligations under the peace agreements (including cooperation with the International Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia).

The use of conditionality is a long-term strategy. Where there are relatively low levels of tension it has worked well, as in the peaceful break-up of Czechoslovakia or the Gabcikovo dam dispute. On its own and in situations of instability, it works less well. For example,

the signing of an SAA in March 2001 with FYROM was a deliberate, though premature, signal from the EU that the government should try to reach a peaceful resolution of the problem, but it still had to be combined with intensive international diplomacy (see below) and limited NATO intervention.

Sanctions

The EU has usually imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions after a violent conflict has already erupted, rather than as a prevention measure. Aid to several ACP countries has been suspended because they were involved in violent conflicts, so as to avoid the misuse of funds for military purposes and to underscore the EU's appeal for a settlement of conflicts.[57]

Sanctions tend to be threatened once a situation has deteriorated, by which time they cannot often influence events on the ground. Sanctions threatened and imposed against Serbia in 1998 could not prevent the war in Kosovo, as the Commission admitted: 'For the financial sanctions taken against the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1998–2000 to have been truly effective in preventing FRY interference in Kosovo, for instance, measures should have been targeted swiftly and unambiguously on individual decision-makers.'[58]

While the utility of sanctions in preventing conflict is questionable, their role in fuelling instability is difficult to ignore: they foster illegal transactions, smuggling, civilian suffering, and trade losses for neighbouring countries. This was particularly evident in the experiences of sanctions on Serbia.[59] It is difficult to compensate fully for the disruption, even where the will to do so exists. In line with an international debate on the utility of sanctions, the Commission pledged in April 2001 to initiate a debate on devising and implementing 'smart' sanctions, which target the top officials of a country.[60]

The EU has also been active in trying to build an international control regime to prevent the sale of diamonds from conflict zones (the Kimberley process). It has already blocked the importation of diamonds from Liberia and Sierra Leone (in conformity with UN Security Council resolutions).[61]

Limits on arms exports

Any serious attempt to prevent conflicts must address the supply of arms to areas at risk of conflict. But arms industries are powerful lobbies, and states find it difficult to limit the exports on which many jobs can depend. They are also unwilling to limit exports if competitors will simply supply substitutes, so the need for cooperation is evident.

In 1991 the member states moved towards harmonization of their arms export policies. The June 1991 Luxembourg European Council noted that member state policies on arms exports were based on common criteria, which could form the basis for a common approach. Seven criteria were listed; an eighth was added a year later by the Lisbon European Council.[62] The eight criteria were later incorporated into the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, which was signed on 8 June 1998, following a UK presidency initiative. It fit in with the new Labour government's 'foreign policy with an ethical dimension', but would also help prevent the British arms industry from being undercut by EU competitors with fewer scruples. The code is a list of eight criteria stipulating the conditions under which export licences should be denied (see box 7.3). Member states are to tell each other about licences they have denied; a member state that approves a licence that has been denied by another member state must state the reasons for so doing. There is little enthusiasm for strengthening the code, either by making it binding or by publishing annual reports on its implementation.

The code is not often invoked. In June 1999 the EU indicated that, with respect to the Great Lakes region of Africa, member states would rigorously apply the criteria of the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports until peace is re-established.[63] But although some member states imposed a *de facto* arms embargo on Israel in April 2002, the EU did not formally declare that the code would be applied.[64] In the case of India and Pakistan in spring 2002, the member states did not even apply a *de facto* arms embargo.

The EU has taken a strong stance on anti-personnel land mines. In a series of joint actions in 1996 and 1997, the Union supported the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction. It also established a moratorium on their production and transfer. This stand clearly distinguishes the Union from the US, which refused to sign the Ottawa Convention.

Combating the spread of small-arms and light weapons has been another area where the EU has taken the initiative. The EU is supposed to include small-arms issues in political dialogue with developing countries, provide aid to eliminate surplus small arms, promote regional cooperation to combat illicit trafficking, and fund public awareness programmes.[65] It has tried to build international consensus on several principles, including: states should import and hold small arms only for legitimate security needs; they should supply small arms only to governments; and they should combat illicit traf-

Box 7.3 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports

1. Export licences should be refused approval if they are inconsistent with international obligations such as arms embargoes or international arms treaties.
2. Export licences should be refused if there is a risk that the equipment could be used for internal repression.
3. Member states will not allow exports which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.
4. Member states will not issue licences if there is a risk that the recipient would use the equipment aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.
5. Member states will not issue licences if there is a risk that equipment could be used against them, their allies and friends, or other member states.
6. Member states should take into consideration the recipient country's attitude towards terrorism, the nature of its alliances, and its respect for international law.
7. Member states should not issue licences if there is a risk that equipment will be diverted to internal repression or re-exported.
8. Member states should evaluate the compatibility of arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.

Source: General Affairs Council, 'Conclusions, 25 May 1998'.

ficking by implementing border and customs controls.[66] The EU supported the July 2001 UN conference on controlling small arms and light weapons, which, however, reached only an anodyne final agreement, due in large part to US opposition to stronger measures – another area where EU and US positions have diverged.

The EU member states, however, continue to sell arms abroad. Five member states are currently among the ten largest suppliers of major conventional weapons: France (third), the UK (fourth), Germany (fifth), the Netherlands (seventh) and Italy (eighth). But

their exports are, for the most part, declining, and all EU transfers to non-European countries accounted for only 23 per cent of global arms transfers in 1997–2001.[67]

Early warning

One lesson that the Union learned from the wars in the former Yugoslavia is that it needed a better capacity for early warning. An effective preventive policy relies on spotting crises before they erupt and formulating possible responses. The Policy Unit was set up for this specific purpose. The Commission also strengthened its analysis capacity, first through CPN, then by creating a Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit within the External Relations DG.[68] In South-Eastern Europe, the EU Monitoring Mission monitors political and security developments, borders, inter-ethnic issues and refugee returns.[69] The EU also helps strengthen the early warning and analysis capabilities of African organizations, by exchanging information on areas at risk, training analysts, organizing seminars and providing material assistance.[70]

Information and analysis must be integrated into the policy-making process if it is to be translated into action. The Council is to draw up a yearly survey to identify and monitor potential violent conflicts and present policy options for preventing their outbreak.[71] Under the Göteberg programme, the Council is to discuss potential conflict issues at the outset of each presidency, and identify priority areas and regions for preventive actions. At its meeting on 28 January 2002, for example, the General Affairs Council announced that it had reviewed potential conflicts so as to set priorities for preventive actions, but the conclusions do not actually mention what the priorities are.[72]

Political dialogue and mediation

Political dialogue is a long-term conflict-prevention measure, while mediation is a more short-term one. In April 2001 the Commission argued that dialogue on political issues can have an early warning role and help bring disputes to an early resolution. But if this is to occur, 'the political dialogue clearly needs to be more focused, time-flexible and robust than is often the case at present.'[73] The Göteberg programme stated that the 'EU's political dialogue will be used in a systematic and targeted way to address potential conflicts and promote conflict prevention.' Given that dialogues are also supposed to cover human rights and democracy, trade, migration issues, and so

on, their agendas could become quite overloaded, further stretching the EU's diplomatic resources.

A considerable proportion of the EU's diplomacy has revolved around trying to resolve conflicts, as in the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East and the African Great Lakes region. But the EU's diplomacy has increasingly been aimed at preventing conflict. The presidency and troika have visited countries and regions at risk of violent conflict, or where it has already broken out, in an attempt to prevent its outbreak or escalation. In 1998 and 1999, special representatives were sent to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Kosovo to try to prevent and then resolve the conflict in Kosovo. From February 2001 the EU took the lead in trying to halt inter-ethnic violence in FYROM. Solana (joined often by the NATO Secretary-General) spent a considerable amount of time trying to work for a peaceful solution to the escalating conflict.[74]

Even the Commission has been involved in mediation. From October 1992 it mediated a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over a hydroelectric project on the Danube (the Gabcikovo dam). In April 1993, Commission officials successfully secured agreement from both sides to submit the dispute to the ICJ. Undoubtedly, the prospect of being excluded from eventual EU enlargement helped to convince the two sides to compromise.[75]

The EU has sponsored multilateral diplomatic initiatives to try to prevent conflicts, such as the Pact for Stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. It supports African efforts to develop preventive diplomacy, prompted particularly by British and French pressure.[76] It has organized seminars to strengthen local negotiation and mediation skills in Africa.

Support for regional cooperation

In accordance with the EU's own experience, regional cooperation is seen as a way to spread peace. EU enlargement reflects this, but it is also obvious in the emphasis on good-neighbourliness in Europe and the support for building conflict-prevention capacities of African organizations. The EU's encouragement of regional groupings in Africa, Central America, Latin America and Asia feeds into this long-term approach to building peace. But there are snags, as discussed in chapter 4, notably the willingness of states to cooperate with each other. The Euro–Mediterranean partnership was based on the assumption that peace and stability will flow from regional cooperation. But the lack of progress in the Middle East peace process has stymied progress and the EU now openly declares that the Barcelona process is 'laying the foundations for after peace [in the Middle East] has been achieved.'[77]

Civilian crisis management

In its report to the Helsinki European Council, the Finnish presidency argued that the EU needed to develop a non-military rapid response capability. In May 2000 the Council set up a committee for the civilian aspects of crisis management. Work since then has proceeded along two paths (see chapter 3): the Community's rapid reaction mechanism and the launching of civil police missions. There are some precedents for the use of such civilian instruments, such as the WEU police mission to Mostar, WEU training of police officers in Albania, and the WEU demining operation in Croatia.[78] The EU took over the UN police mission in Bosnia in January 2003. As is the case with, for example, election observation and human-rights activities, numerous other organizations are involved in civilian crisis management, particularly the OSCE (within Europe). Cooperation with others is necessary to avoid the costly inefficiency of duplication and uncoordinated efforts on the ground. This, again, could place limits on the EU's attempts to maximize its visibility and autonomy in this field.

Military instruments

The EU has only recently considered launching missions to try to end conflicts, although EU member states have actively participated in UN and NATO missions. The EU's rapid reaction force is supposed to enable it to 'play its role fully on the international stage' and carry out the 'full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in EU treaty, the Petersberg tasks.'[79] The EU replaced NATO's peace-keeping mission in FYROM in early 2003, provided a stabilization force for the Democratic Republic of Congo in mid-2003, and is poised to take over the operation of SFOR in Bosnia by the end of 2003. But exactly how the force might be used to try to break the cycle of conflict is still unclear, particularly at the early stages of a conflict. The Göteberg European Council stated that the Council will 'examine how to use the crisis management capabilities more effectively for preventive purposes.'

7.5 Evaluation

The extent to which the EU has both developed a coherent strategy on conflict prevention and crisis management and created new

instruments is impressive; considerable efforts have been made to overcome the limitations of the pillar structure, though weaknesses remain. The EU is well positioned to foster the long-term conditions for peace, by targeting the underlying causes of conflict and contributing to stability. But the goal of conflict prevention is still not fully integrated into policy-making in sectors such as trade or development assistance.

The EU is also developing capabilities to take measures to prevent violent conflict in the short term and, in future, to manage violent conflict. But this is where the weaknesses inherent in the EU's foreign relations system are most evident. Where conflict appears imminent, speed and decisiveness are often of the essence. Yet it can take time to build an EU consensus to act at all, much less with effective instruments. If disputes appear dangerous, the EU and the member states must agree that a crisis exists and requires EU action. Based on previous experience, this is a large hurdle. As Christopher Hill noted in a survey of EPC responses to crises, 'EPC has tended to try to define crises out of existence by ignoring them' and 'to play down their significance'.[80] But even if there is recognition of a crisis, the EU has to unite behind a strong and decisive message. As the CFSP High Representative and the Commission noted, in situations with a high conflict potential in the short term, conflict-prevention efforts 'must be underpinned by vigorous and continuous diplomatic engagement, involving the transmission of clear messages to countries and regions in a situation of political deterioration.'[81] The EU's capacity to engage so clearly and forcefully must be questioned.

The EU's long-term approach can be quite out of place in situations requiring more decisive and quick action. In May 2002, at a time when conflict – possibly nuclear – between India and Pakistan seemed highly likely, the Commission published a country strategy paper on Pakistan. Although it acknowledged Pakistan's internal volatility and the general instability of its neighbourhood, the main thrust of the Commission's strategy was to help reduce poverty and encourage economic reform.[82] Granted, these are important long-term objectives, but the approach was out of step with events. This was compounded by the fact that the EU issued only one anodyne CFSP declaration on the situation, hoping for a reduction in tensions between India and Pakistan (on 22 May).

In addition to the well-known problems of consensus-building, the EU faces other challenges in pursuing the conflict-prevention objective, such as reconciling competing objectives and setting priorities. Conflict prevention is not the EU's only foreign policy goal, but even the goals central to its conflict-prevention strategy – integration, democracy and economic interdependence – are not necessarily compatible with conflict prevention. Priorities must be set, but the EU does not do this particularly well. Short-term considerations can thus easily take precedence over the EU's longer-term strategy. For example, maintaining good relations with Russia is prioritized over taking action to end the conflict in Chechnya and prevent its recurrence or spread.

An additional problem is that, although the EU has implicitly established broad geographical priorities, in that the periphery seems to be of greater importance, it has not indicated the extent of its commitment to prevent conflict. The CFSP High Representative and the Commission acknowledged that regions close to the EU's own borders would be a high priority, but they insisted that 'the Union must be ready to engage elsewhere when confronted with a clear risk of conflict.'[83] Yet, for Christopher Hill, the EU's resources can only stretch so far; beyond the periphery of the EU, even in the ACP countries (where there are many conflicts and potential conflicts), the EU simply doesn't have the means to be able to do what it says it wants to do.[84] The development of an EU military dimension could further fuel expectations that the EU will act, thus exacerbating this capabilities–expectations gap.

7.6 Conclusion

Conflict prevention is a significant objective for EU foreign policy, and considerable effort has been devoted both to developing a coherent strategy and to strengthening the EU's instruments. This is an important facet of its international identity, which builds on its own history and experience, but its adoption of the conflict-prevention objective followed the examples set by other international actors.

In many ways, the EU's conflict prevention efforts are unique. As the International Crisis Group noted, 'The EU has shown considerable commitment to the principles and purposes of conflict prevention – arguably more than many traditional great powers – due in no small part to its origins as an economic community that disposed of exclusively "civilian" power.'[85] But the analysis of the causes of violent conflicts and how best to address them is also shared by other actors. Where the EU is unique is that it can muster a large conflict-prevention 'toolbox', much more so than any other international organization and, arguably, more so than the individual member states (consider, for example, the influence of the conditional offer of EU membership).

The extent of the EU's toolbox distinguishes it from other international organizations which have a clearer mandate to prevent conflicts: the UN and, within Europe, OSCE and NATO. The OSCE cannot coerce parties to a dispute or conflict but must depend on their goodwill, and its large membership (fifty-five states) and consensual decision-making process lead inevitably to watered-down decisions (a problem also for the UN). 'The OSCE mechanisms are effective only when accompanied by substantial political and/or military power projection by actors such as the European Union or NATO.'[86] For all the military power that NATO can bring to bear in favour of conflict prevention or resolution, the range of instruments that the EU can employ is still much larger. As Solana and Patten argued, in a report on the Western Balkans: 'The Union also is the only institution capable of comprehensive action, ranging from trade, economic reform and infrastructure, humanitarian assistance, human rights and democratisation, justice and police to crisis management and military security.'[87]

Several of the specific contents of the EU's toolbox are also unique, particularly the emphasis on multilateralism and regional cooperation, precisely because it is the export of the EU's own model of conflict prevention. Other aspects of the EU's toolbox are not so unusual, such as the mainstreaming of conflict prevention in development aid. And, in many respects, the EU has been acquiring new instruments in response to international trends. Certainly the move to acquire military instruments seems influenced by a new consensus on the utility of military force for purposes other than territorial defence, including conflict prevention and crisis management.

The EU's civilian method of preventing conflict had been unique, but, with the development of CESDP, it seems to be abandoning civilian power in favour of the view that force is needed to back up diplomatic initiatives for successful conflict prevention. But there is a cost of abandoning civilian power: the EU's legitimacy and authority in the area of conflict prevention stems in large part from its role as a model for other regions. The strength of the civilian power image lies in its challenge to the traditional reliance on military instruments and in its attempt to 'domesticate' relations between states, both within and outside the Union.[88] In this sense, the development of an EU military dimension might diminish the civilian power image and thus the unique contribution that the EU could make to conflict prevention.

8

The Fight against International Crime

The objective of fighting international crime was proclaimed as early as 1975, as the motivation for setting up the Trevi group, yet little of substance resulted from the Trevi discussions. The ramifications of the completion of the single European market and the end of the Cold War then prompted the member states to do more together to tackle international crime, but the issue has risen up the EU's agenda largely since the October 1999 Tampere European Council, which was devoted to discussing justice and home affairs (JHA). Furthermore, until the Council set priorities for external relations in the JHA field in 2000,[1] the external dimension of JHA was even more limited than the internal one. JHA issues now figure more highly in the EU's relations with third countries.

Among the foreign policy objectives discussed in this book, the fight against international crime stands out because of the extent of its internal–external nexus: criminal activity takes place, and criminals cooperate, across national frontiers within the EU and across the EU's external borders. Steps taken to try to increase 'internal' security are interconnected with steps taken to address 'external' criminal threats.[2] Foreign policy and internal EU policy are intertwined. This can be seen vividly in the EU's response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US: it consisted of agreements on an EU-wide arrest warrant and common penalties for terrorist crimes, as well as the use of more traditional diplomatic and economic foreign policy instruments. But the EU's policy-making framework, divided into three pillars, is ill-suited to cope with the external dimension of the fight against international crime.

Some 'cross-pillarization' is in progress. Member states' diplomatic missions and Commission delegations in third countries are supposed