

their aid, and the Serbs' ability to survive, as they had historically, by standing, if necessary alone, against overwhelming odds.

To make the multinational reality of Yugoslavia conform to what both nationalist leaders and Europe said was fact, a truly brutal process had to unfold within the former country. The EC could not find a resolution to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia; they became more virulent and intractable, and political negotiators weaker. Although most called it a civil war, armed contest did not aim to decide which party should control a state or whether a secessionist region would succeed against the parent state. It was a competition to create wholly new nation-states—citizens and loyalties, strategic assets, and borders defined by the perceived right to national self-determination within the territory of a former state. Defined by the economic and political conditions of the collapse of a state and its ability to provide security and civil order, the contests were a series of wars—sometimes localized, sometimes rolling and interconnected—in which the projects of radical nationalists willing to use force to claim territorial sovereignty and the spontaneous behaviors of people facing this collapse interacted.

Chapter 8

War: Building States from Nations

As a political force, nationalism is an empty vessel to be filled by all those who see their interests in political independence and states' rights. Its key characteristic is its definition of a political community—its principles of membership, its cultural and territorial boundaries, and also, therefore, its enemies. In contrast to communism, nationalism has no intrinsic substantive goals beyond affirmation of a particular collective bond among people and the creation of an independent state around that identity. Exclusion is as important as inclusion. Nationalist expression may be a positive assertion of commonality in culture, political history, and obligations of social reciprocity. But it is at the same time necessarily a negative assertion of who does *not* belong, of mistrust, fear, even hatred of persons seen as “other,” as “foreigner,” and of the characteristics of persons who should be excluded.

Nationalism's virulent capacity is not so apparent when it manifests itself as cultural or religious revival and in intellectuals' demands for rights to personal expression, as if to open debate, rather than to draw cultural borders between people. As a vehicle for resolving distributive conflicts by claiming ethnic rights or national ownership over incomes, jobs, economic assets, and tax revenues, it is so familiar to the workings of most societies that it is easily accepted. What society does not seek to defend privilege or wealth as a national right or to organize social roles and patterns of discrimination (positive and negative) in part along cultural lines? When aspiring politicians in countries formerly ruled by communist parties used nationalist symbols and loyalties to maximize votes and popular support, to coopt opposition intellectuals, or to neutralize competitors with charges of being unpatriotic, they did not appear threatening to Western governments that heard the anticommunist language in which it was often cloaked. The ease with which aroused passions could substitute in the short run for ideology and organization and avoid representing individual interests also caused little alarm because it was seen as part of a democratic revolution.

Despite the Jekyll and Hyde potential of nationalism, people tend to distinguish among separate nationalisms, calling some "good" and others "bad" according to the goal sought or the methods used.¹ But this evaluation is always subjective, and it depends on the institutional context within which it appears. In an atmosphere of tolerance and institutionalized pluralism, nationalism can remain a positive expression of cultural or religious identity—ethnic differences—that does not deny the same freedom to others. Even politicized ethnicity, while discriminating against those who do not belong to or identify with officially recognized groups, can exist peacefully under favorable economic conditions if it provides the same rights to members of different groups and ensures institutionalized channels of appeal. But political nationalism defines rights of membership itself: black and white, in or out; on this one defining trait it cannot compromise.² Because the goal of nationalist politicians is to use the coercive instruments of the state to enforce that principle, what one thinks about a particular nationalism depends most on whether one is being included or excluded.

Nationalism is often compared with communism as a collectivist ideology, but in fact it defines the membership characteristics of individuals, not the quality of their social interaction. In contrast to communist parties, moreover, its membership is ascriptive and exclusive rather than open to people regardless of racial, religious, and cultural background. And that membership is not only in a party, with its obligations and privileges, but in society itself—as citizen, and with no recourse against others' decision to exclude. But nationalism is compatible with communist rule, either together or as its successor, because both deny (for very different reasons) the need to provide institutional mechanisms to regulate and protect differences (such as permitting an opposition, critical thought, conflicts of interest, or minority rights).

The label of nationalism is not sufficient to describe a situation or predict behavior, however, because of its empty-vessel character—its absence of program outside the insistence on political power for some imagined community. It can therefore ally easily with others, including dispossessed communists who believe in a strong state against international exploitation or who hold bureaucratic positions. Such allies may be ideologically contradictory groups from far left to far right joined only by political expediency. Nationalist parties most often attract individuals when political organizations representing their specific interests are absent or have not sought their support, when individuals—out of a growing rootlessness or anomie—seek a restored sense of community.³ Because it is a principle of exclusion, however, it tends to surface in conditions that are not conducive to its more benign expression alone. Its potential for violence is ever more manifest as it moves from intellectual expression and economic discrimination to criteria for citizenship and claims for territorial sover-

eignty. In multinational states such as Yugoslavia, it must destroy while it builds.


This process can be understood not by the labels of historical ethnic hatred or Balkan culture, but by the clash between nationalist goals and Yugoslav reality and by the consequence of translating socioeconomic and political divisions into contests over territory. The wars to create new national states out of Yugoslavia contained many elements: psychological warfare against multiethnic identities and loyalties; the culture surrounding the defense of rights to land; class warfare; the dissolution of the governmental and economic functions of the former state; and the construction of borders, foreign relations, economic infrastructure, and armed forces of defensible, viable, new states.

Psychological Warfare: *Honi Soit Qui Mal y Pense*

Despite the claims made by nationalist leaders, the reality of multinational Yugoslavia still existed in the lives of individual citizens in 1990–91—in their ethnically mixed neighborhoods, villages, towns, and cities; in their mixed marriages, family ties across republic boundaries, and second homes in another republic; in their conceptions of ethnic and national coexistence and the compatibility of multiple identities for each citizen; and in the idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina (see figure 8-1). Because people had not expressed their differences politically under one-party socialism, their loyalties were scattered among many associations. These tended to be highly localized and personal—to one's village or town, to school friends, to neighbors, to the town or region of one's origin and parents, to Yugoslavia as an idea and a stature abroad, to workplace colleagues, or to an occupation or profession. A one-time, multiparty election thus was not sufficient to develop partisan identities. The exception to undeveloped political identities was communists—not individuals who had simply been members of a party that had folded, but those who identified broadly with its ideals, traditions, or wartime struggle. But as it was common to say, "I come from a communist family," this had become for most a private identity, however strong it remained.

To legitimize new states on the basis of political loyalty to a nation, nationalist politicians had to draw out the ethnic element in all these social bonds and identities, nationalize it, and win the loyalty of citizens whose allegiances were in doubt. A vote in 1990 for a political party that emphasized ethnonational identity was not the same thing as a vote for a national state, and even a vote for the sovereignty of one's republic was not necessarily a vote for independence, let alone commitment to war, should that be necessary. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where votes were cast most over-

FIGURE 8-1. National Composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by District



whelmingly for ethnonational parties, public opinion polls in May and June 1990, and again in November 1991, also showed overwhelming majorities (in the range of 70 to 90 percent) against separation from Yugoslavia and against an ethnically divided republic.⁴

To win against public opinion, nationalist leaders had to engage in psychological warfare. They sought to persuade audiences both at home and abroad that the alternative to national states was no longer viable: in other words, to destroy forever the Yugoslav idea that they could live together. The first stage in the wars of 1991–95, therefore, occurred earlier in the mass media and on the political stump.⁵ The domestic objective of various nationalists was to persuade citizens of one nationality that they were under threat from other nations. Accusations of being cheated economically by other nations (in federal taxation or in jobs) or being overcome biologically (by the higher Muslim and Albanian birth rates) and warnings of plots by other groups to create states that would expel citizens from their homes played on a local inclination to conspiracy theories and on growing economic insecurity and rapidly shifting, uncertain political conditions. In a country where everyone was a minority in ethnonational terms, politicians willing to raise consciousness about national survival and the danger of being in a minority had the potential to create a collective paranoia that was self-perpetuating. It was then only a short step to persuade those who accepted this argument that the security of their identity, way of living, and perhaps even person lay with their national group.⁶ As terrorists reason, elemental fears were to force people to take sides.

In view of this tactic, the political rhetoric of the 1980s found in debates over the federal budget and constitution from Slovenia to Serbia and in nationalist themes from anticommunist intellectuals therefore became, whether intended or not, a long, psychological preparation for war.⁷ In Slovenia nationalists claimed that Slovene standards of living were threatened by federal taxes and that their democracy and pluralism were endangered by Serbia. In Serbia nationalists linked the Albanian demand for a republic in Kosovo with Serbia's 500 years of subjugation to Turkish rule after its defeat in 1389; the nationalist programs of Slovenes, Croats, Muslims, Albanians, and Macedonians in the 1980s, with the progressive splintering of Serbs and Serbia after 1945 and 1974 into ever more separate political units; and the anti-Serb coalition, with a similar alliance of the Vatican, the Comintern, and Germany during World War II.⁸

It was true that in the decade-long struggle over Kosovo between Serbian state power and Albanian demographic power, Albanians had made Serbs and Montenegrins feel unwelcome, persuading them to leave. It was also true that church leaders and intellectuals had given these Serbs and Montenegrins aid in their political campaign with Belgrade to take back political power and property. But the political problem was the

hypercharged emotional atmosphere of mutual suspicions within Kosovo, in which rumors of Serbs poisoning drinking water and of Albanians raping Serb women suggested the beginnings of mass hysteria.⁹ The Serbian political campaign referred to “genocide” against Serbs and used a “discourse of violence, rape particularly, aiming to spread the fear of communication over ethnic boundaries.”¹⁰ It was in this context that Serbian president Slobodan Milošević first gave the war cries, which he repeated often, “No one will be permitted to beat you” and “They will never humiliate the Serbian people again.” In some villages, local authorities began to issue permits to citizens to draw arms from the local TDF arsenal “just in case.” Croatian leader Franjo Tuđman’s revisionist history about the genocide against Serbs, Jews, and Romany under the Croatian independent state in 1941–45 became politically threatening when Tuđman’s election as Croatian president was bankrolled largely by right-wing émigrés from that period and brought back its state symbols and a special tax on Serbs from Serbia who had second homes in Croatia (but not on such persons from any other republic).

By 1991 many who might have been expected to fight these developments also had begun to succumb emotionally. Pro-Yugoslav Slovenes began to “recall” unpleasant encounters in Belgrade or in the army. Non-nationalist Croatian intellectuals, who had opposed Tuđman’s attempt to deny centuries of communal coexistence and intermarriage between Serbs and Croats or the history of competition between Serbs in Habsburg territories and Serbs in Serbia, began to reassess their own contacts with Serb friends and the stereotypes of ordinary people. Once dismissed by such intellectuals as religious and cultural prejudice, their way of talking about the “other” ethnic group now seemed to reveal a deeper truth—that there was, after all, an ineradicable cultural difference between the two peoples. The cultural revival initiated by Serb nationalist intellectuals from Belgrade in the 1980s in minority areas of Croatia began to appear to non-Serbs as part of a plot to create a Greater Serbia. The discovery in Croatia and Herzegovina of caves and mass graves revealing victims of World War II massacres heightened fears of impending danger and obligations of revenge.¹¹

Operating within stable democratic systems, this emotional momentum might have encountered limits even late in the crisis. Instead, those willing to use the extremist language for political ends sought to increase or consolidate their local power in the republics by gaining control over the mass media. The democratic elections in 1990 provided this opportunity, by giving nationalist politicians access to state resources in a system that was constitutionally still the socialist one-party system, and the incentive, because most of them won office with less than a majority and because more than one party claimed to represent each nation’s interests.

Censorship of the press and total control of television were essential to the power and wartime tactics, for example, of both Milošević in Serbia and Tujman in Croatia.¹² As early as December 1990, Tujman justified such censorship by a “state of war,” decree—as was most other governmental business—by an extraconstitutional security council with emergency powers. When pro-Marković reformers attempted to counteract censorship within the republics with a new all-Yugoslav and antinationalist television channel, YUTEL, Tujman’s government (and the government in Slovenia) gave it an unfavorable slot after midnight. Milošević’s strength lay, in particular, in his near total manipulation of television. Without that, it would have been difficult to maintain his portrayal without qualifications of the threats to Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and therefore his role as protector and defender of Serb lives and interests, on which so many of his supporters and his leverage with international negotiators came to depend once war had begun.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina the fact that three national parties shared power after the November 1990 election did not prevent all three from collaborating in an attempt to impose state control over the media through legislation whereby each would appoint one-third of the governing boards and editors in TV and newspapers. Although struck down as unconstitutional on appeal, the intention here was the same as in Croatia and Serbia—to hinder rival political parties within the same national community in their access to public opinion and to appropriate for one political party the right to speak and interpret for its particular nation. This was not a case of interethnic conflict, but of intraethnic competition: of consolidating one-party rule within a nation by eliminating competition for the single constituency each was trying to develop and claim to represent. The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) sought to eliminate the Serbian Movement for Renewal (SPO), the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) to squeeze out the Muslim Bosniak Organization (MBO), and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) to undermine pro-Bosnian or anti-Zagreb Croats. Yet the voices in danger from these attempts to divide up turf among the three ruling parties were the nonethnic, multinational alternatives and—because the three parties appealed to national identities and crossed republican borders in their search for supporters and organizing activities—also the Bosnian.¹³

Just as in the conflict within the SDS in Croatia, between moderate parliamentarians oriented to Zagreb and radical militants oriented to Serbia, the links with Zagreb of the Bosnian branch of the HDZ and with Belgrade of the SDS meant that the propaganda of partisan struggle within Bosnia-Herzegovina was not confined to the republic. The most active wing of Tujman’s HDZ, including campaign contributions, was the western Herzegovina branch from Bosnia. By the fall of 1991, this area of

Bosnia (which would be proclaimed the state of Herzeg-Bosnia on July 3, 1992) was well integrated into the Croatian state; its Croat citizens had been granted dual citizenship in Croatia in 1990, with the right to vote in Croatian elections, and its local authorities used Croatian educational curricula, currency, state symbols (such as the flag and crest), police uniforms, and car registration plates. As early as 1989–90, Bosnian Serbs in Belgrade (including right-wing radical Vojislav Šešelj, leader of the Radical party) were active participants in the campaign to reshape opinion in Serbia. Given refuge and encouraged by Belgrade publishing houses, they claimed to be in exile from Bosnia after being forced to leave Sarajevo, which they portrayed as a “world of perpetual darkness” (*tamni vilajet*) where Serbs were endangered.¹⁴ A daily feature section, “Echoes and Reactions,” running two pages in the main Belgrade newspaper, *Politika* (by then under control of the Serbian Socialist party of Milošević), published carefully selected letters that targeted people who were “anti-Serb,” including many members of the Bosnian political and cultural elite.¹⁵

The struggles for independence in 1991–92 added another audience to this media war—world opinion—and intensified the need to secure loyalties on ethnonational criteria. As the main architect of Tujman’s foreign propaganda policy explained in mid-July 1991, “The West can do a lot for us by seeing the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ that we are democrats and they are not.” He then specified how the West could help: by “giving Croatia economic aid and technical help” and “intervening firmly to give them the time necessary” to wait for the army and federal idea to fall apart.¹⁶ With war, however, the democratic freedom to present an alternative reality and to oppose the nationalization of all identities had itself become an enemy—its very expression both an act of war and an obstacle to the war effort. In Croatia, the president’s office issued a series of state directives, such as forbidding the media from using the terms “Chetniks” and “extremists,” requiring them to refer to Serbs exclusively as “Serb terrorists” and to the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) only as the “Serbo-Communist occupation army.”¹⁷ Urban intellectuals whose political identities were not ethnic but philosophical, such as liberal or social democratic, were publicly told instead that their identity was Serb or Croat.

Because the cease-fire in January 1992 did not end Croatia’s war for territorial control and a secure independence, but rather shifted the battle back to the domestic political front, Tujman actually intensified the campaign against independent newspapers and weeklies and harassment of journalists and intellectuals suspected of independent views. The process of property privatization through nationalization and state licensing provided a means and a cover for dismissing editorial boards, closing journals and newspapers, and imposing state control, as well as a way—especially after the middle of 1992—to squelch opposition, ensure Tujman’s reelec-

tion, and prevent discussion of policies toward minorities and the UN protected areas (UNPAs) in Croatia.¹⁸ HDZ-nominated administrators at the University of Zagreb began a purge of “suspicious Croats” from its faculty in the fall of 1992, and Croats who showed any sympathy for multiethnic and pluralistic thinking were labeled *Jugonostalgicar* (Yugo-nostalgic) and *Jugozombi*, “for dar[ing] to remember what the country used to be.”¹⁹

Milošević’s control over the print media was always less complete than Tujman’s.²⁰ This control declined when the war in Croatia temporarily energized the opposition in Serbia to try to overthrow him. But the imposition of economic sanctions against Serbia, beginning with the EC and the United States in November 1991 and then the UN (Security Council Resolution 757) on May 30, 1992, worked to restore his control by cutting alternative sources of information and communication with the outside world and making subscriptions to print media prohibitively expensive. The sanctions also prevented his opposition from obtaining the foreign financial support and imported equipment (such as a transmitter with enough power to beam the one truly independent television station, Studio B, beyond Belgrade) that were necessary to compete with Milošević’s domestic control through police and customs officials. Thus when Serbia was isolated, it was far easier for Milošević to control information given to the Serbian population about the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and about world opinion. By late 1994, he was even copying Tujman, applying the tactics used on *Danas* and *Slobodna Dalmacija* to silence the independent and increasingly critical daily *Borba*.

Nationalists in five of the Yugoslav republics needed only to persuade the majority of their populations and the outside world of the inevitability or desirability of separate national states. The violence of this propaganda war to persuade of the impossibility of nations living together was visible largely where conditions for an alternative view and political opposition existed—in ethnically mixed or ethnic minority areas. But in a sixth republic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, this argument met very different conditions. As a political fact and a cultural ideal, Bosnia-Herzegovina was multiethnic and multinational. The entire territory was ethnically mixed, blatantly defying the argument that national states were inevitable or that people of different national identities could not coexist. Not one of its three constituent nations (Muslims, Serbs, Croats) was a majority, so no one of their separate national projects could dominate the others. In fact, any alliance to create a majority could only be tactical and short-lived, as demonstrated by the SDA-HDZ alliance over sovereignty and national security in the fall of 1991, which placed the Serbs in a minority, or by the many instances of military cooperation between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs during 1992–94, which squeezed the Muslim party and Bosnian government

forces. All the evidence suggested that there was majority support for a Bosnian identity and survival, from public opinion polls on the constitutional debates up to 1990, the civic initiatives, editorial policy in leading mass media, intellectuals’ projects for a Bosnia based on individual citizenship and rights, and antiwar rallies in the fall of 1991 and March–April 1992. Because the Yugoslav constitution did not recognize Bosnia as a political nation and because the three ruling political parties represented constituent nations, however, there was no official record of people identifying with Bosnia-Herzegovina, no official desire to gather such data, and few political representatives of such a (potential) majority.

Whatever these trends in public opinion and loyalty during 1990–91 were likely to produce in the long run, therefore, they were preempted by the EC decisions on Slovene and Croatian sovereignty as nations and the breakup of Yugoslavia at the end of 1991 (including U.S. insistence on recognizing Bosnian independence in early 1992). Power-sharing arrangements over voters and state offices would not suffice for *territorial* sovereignty. Slovene, Croatian, and Serbian republican leaders had mobilized domestic sentiment along nationalist lines in order to bargain more effectively over reform and national rights at the federal level, and then parlayed their official position as representatives of the so-called national interests of their republics in talks with international bodies—beginning in the spring of 1991—into national leadership (“fatherhood”) of their republics.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, this same process now played out between its party leaders and international negotiators. These leaders, to retain their position as representatives of their nation, not just in electoral terms but in terms of territorial rights to self-determination, had to go beyond holding a monopoly over an ethnic voting constituency within Bosnia-Herzegovina to destroying the constitutional alternative for an independent Bosnia—the idea of a civic state where ethnic difference was not politically defining and citizens were loyal to ethnic tolerance and multicultural civilization. To secure their monopoly within their national community and also maximize their bargaining position in the EC-sponsored negotiations over a political settlement, they also had to persuade Western negotiators and world opinion that this alternative was no longer viable—that their own citizens believed it was not possible to live together and preferred to live under nationally identified governments. But in contrast to the other republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina had no political force to represent the republic as a whole against outsiders or its idea of multinational identity and civilization, any more than Yugoslavia itself had had. The EC negotiators confirmed this when they began talks in February 1992 with the representatives of the three national parties.

In this new propaganda effort, the HDZ-BH under the Croatian nationalist leadership of Mate Boban (once Tujman removed the pro-

Bosnian Stjepan Kljuić) had an advantage, because the Croat stronghold of western Herzegovina was relatively homogeneous ethnically, with the important exception of the regional capital, Mostar. Moreover, its only political rival was another party in Croatia (the right-wing Croatian Party of Right [HSP]). The SDA had an initial advantage because the majority of Bosnian citizens who were against ethnic division did not have to be persuaded of its goal to protect an integral Bosnia and because EC and U.S. support for republican boundaries seemed to give it (through its president, Alija Izetbegović) the upper hand with international negotiators and opinion.²¹ It did, nonetheless, mount a substantial propaganda campaign at home and abroad, including the creation of new state symbols to demonstrate the venerable historical identity of Bosnia.²² The SDS had the most difficult task, and was accordingly the most active in its propaganda war, because it was the most actively opposed to Bosnian independence from Yugoslavia and because Serbs lived in communities that were particularly heterogeneous in ethnic composition.

SDS leader Radovan Karadžić was at the forefront of the campaign to persuade all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina that it was impossible for Bosnian nations to live together. But it was only when the Bosnian Serbs left the government and prepared for war, setting up headquarters in Pale—a mountain-resort suburb of Sarajevo—that the SDS also created a separate television station, Channel S, and a Bosnian Serb News Agency (SRNA). The difficulty of its task can be measured in the intensity and crudeness of its message. A barrage of commissioned television commercials caricatured Serbian battles against the Ottomans, beginning with Kosovo in 1389, to revive Serbian national myths of heroism and to persuade Bosnian Serbs that it was impossible for them and Muslims to live together. Muslims were frequently referred to as Turks. In an effort to create new national heroes, Channel S televised ceremonies in 1992 in which soldiers were given awards for the number of Muslims they had killed.

The towns and cities of Bosnia-Herzegovina presented a formidable obstacle to the nationalist propaganda aimed at making national states appear the natural condition. With their mixed populations, which were living proof of multiethnic coexistence and multicultural civilization, they could not be taken psychologically. They would also, as a result, put up stronger resistance to military takeover by armies loyal to ethnic parties.²³ Moreover, the rapid urbanization of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the postwar period (from 15 to 36 percent during 1953–81) had loosened ethnic and agrarian identities. Of people choosing Yugoslav nationality in the 1981 census, 83 percent lived in cities, and the majority of them were educated, nonbelieving, often party-member Serbs.²⁴ As a result, the cities were filled with people who had something to defend, and they were ready to resist an attack on even the idea of mixed communities. Although more

villages and towns were ethnically mixed than in Croatia, urban spaces and mixed apartment buildings are far more difficult to identify and separate ethnically than are farmsteads and single-family homes.

The siege of the capital, Sarajevo, drawn out over more than seventeen months—from April 5, 1992, to August 1993, and revived with a vengeance in November 1993 until a cease-fire was negotiated in February 1994—was the most dramatic example, along with Mostar in Herzegovina, of the campaign to destroy the symbol of Bosnian identity and to weaken the physical resistance of citizens still committed to living together. Far more than a military target, Sarajevo stood as a mockery to national exclusiveness. Serb and Croat self-determination, by cantonizing Bosnia-Herzegovina into three ethnic parts, would at best make Sarajevo into a capital of a Muslim canton. Karadžić's map at Lisbon identified "Serbian quarters." By the end of 1993, the Bosnian Serbs' plan for Sarajevo was "twin cities," one Muslim, one Serb. To transform it into separate national cities, they could not destroy it but tried instead to force the Bosnian government to negotiate by progressive strangulation, while its symbolic status served the Bosnian Muslims' strategy so well that it had to be kept a hostage with periodic reminders to the world television audience, if necessary by provoking Serb attacks and preventing the restoration of utilities. Bosnian Croat military forces collaborated with Bosnian Serbs by standing aside when the Serbs took suburbs to the north and northwest of Sarajevo, in exchange for territories such as Stup elsewhere (and reciprocal arrangements for Bosnian Croats when they were fighting Bosnian Muslims in Mostar and elsewhere).²⁵ Natives of Sarajevo, dwindling from half a million to less than 350,000 during the siege, responded to the essence of the assault by building ever greater resistance on cultural terms and a worldwide campaign to save the "spirit of Sarajevo." At the same time, the lack of world attention to the nearly incessant bombardment of Mostar, which suffered far greater human and physical damage than Sarajevo and had at least as venerable a multicultural tradition, demonstrates the effect of such a campaign and the capacity to manage the media.

The military siege of the cities also reflected the nature of the war as the work of politicians against public opinion, for their bombardment reflected the fact that the balance of resources lay with equipment and not with infantry sufficient to overcome civilian or guerrilla resistance and the cost in human lives of urban warfare. Military tactics were aimed to isolate rather than to defeat: artillery and mortar shelling, the cutoff of food and fuel, and an early attempt to destroy means of communication both within the city and with the outside. Deliberate sabotage of the telephone lines included disconnecting neighborhoods selected by ethnicity.²⁶ Very early targets were pro-Bosnian media—the television and radio stations, aerial transmitters, and offices of the Sarajevo newspaper, *Oslobodjenje*, which

was conspicuously multiethnic and pro-Bosnian. When Bosnian Serb army troops agreed with UN forces to withdraw from their murderous perch on Mount Igman above Sarajevo in mid-August 1993, their parting shot was to blow up the television tower on the highest peak, Bjelašnica. Yet because artillery barrages are far more visible and countable than infantry attacks, parties disadvantaged in heavy weapons but not in infantry could turn that disadvantage into a propaganda victory by provoking firepower and keeping cities vulnerable.

The psychological warfare to justify the creation of national states would be to no avail if diplomatic recognition did not follow. Military engagements aimed not merely at physical control of territory but at foreign support. Military strategists and political leaders chose targets and managed media coverage so as to shape international opinion and local sympathies. The Croatian government, for example, placed sharpshooters on the walls of Dubrovnik to draw fire from the federal armed forces, attracting world attention to that internationally protected city that even the total destruction of Vukovar could not obtain. The Croatian and Bosnian governments placed mortars and artillery batteries within the walls of hospitals (such as at Osijek, Sarajevo, and Goražde) for the same purpose, drawing fire from Serb gunners to gain international reaction. To generate war hysteria, both Serbian and Croatian television stations showed footage of war atrocities by the other side that was as likely to have been taken from their own side, or even from World War II films. All sides used attacks (and mutual recriminations of blame) on cultural monuments, on civilians in breadlines, on wedding and funeral parties, on busloads of orphans, and on international troops to mobilize sympathies and hostility at home and abroad.

The Right to Land

The source of the conflict raised by the European actions on recognition was the issue of territory. In contrast to ethnic conflict or civil war, national conflict is over rights to land. "Nationalism always involves a struggle for land, or an assertion about rights to land; and the nation, almost by definition, requires a territorial base in which to take root."²⁷ In the multinational environment of the Yugoslav space, the multiple and incompatible claims on territory of its many nations had been accommodated through constitutional rights. The exclusivity of nationalism, once war over territory and borders began, jettisoned that accommodation. Once leaders justified their goals of national states on the claim, "we can't live together," they had to open a process of defining *which persons* had a right to live on that land. The nationalist argument led to the *physicalizing* of citizenship rights and democracy. The expulsion of persons according

to ethnic background, which came to be labeled *ethnic cleansing*, had nothing to do with ethnicity, but rather with securing national rights to land. And because the resulting war is waged to define who can belong to a particular state and its territory, it makes no distinction between soldiers and civilians, between military and civil targets.

Outsiders explained the character of the fighting in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the ethnic cleansing and brutal violations of humanitarian law, by citing ethnic conflict, historical enmities, and—in the actions of Serbs—genocide. But, in fact, these were the results of the wars and their particular characteristics, not the causes. The conditions of breakdown of a state and civil order, on the one hand, and the ideologies and goals of nationalist politicians, on the other, came together in alliance only with war to decide national sovereignty over land.

The advent of war also initiated an element of ethnic conflict. The final collapse of all formal institutions for providing security left individuals and households to provide for their own through informal networks and relations they could trust. In defending land, particularly in villages where the fighting first raged and in a war characterized by *local* battles, there was a natural tendency to rely on older (pre-state) mechanisms of solidarity and insurance adapted to survival—family, kinship, ethnicity.²⁸ Individuals' resort to family and ethnic bonds and the patriarchal culture of social obligations attached to land created a predisposition to support the distinctions—such as the idea that safety and freedom were only secure in a national state—being made by politicians. The localized, predominantly rural character of the war in border areas, where nationalists could compete because populations were ethnically mixed—regardless of the particular ethnic or national identity of those involved—also tended to revive historical memories of earlier wars for land and who could live there and gave some credibility to the fears of genocide raised by nationalist propaganda.

The essential association between national rights and territorial control was already apparent in the political language of cultural nationalism in the 1980s and the electoral campaigns of 1990, in which the most commonly used word politically, from Slovenia to Serbia, was *hearth* (*ognište/ognjište*). The focal point of a home or homestead, hearth became a metaphor for property, community, citizenship, and patriotism, all in one. But using the symbols of land, even for those who had been urban dwellers for generations, was quite different from fighting for it and for the physical borders of a national community. Once war began, behavior was increasingly governed by the mores associated with land ownership and the social organization built to protect it.

What had been an urban movement shifted its cultural fulcrum to the countryside and its traditions of self-defense. The rural population, less in

touch with the pluralist conditions of urban culture, more likely to rely on state-controlled television or radio for information, and having less formal education, had voted in large numbers for ethnonational parties in the 1990 elections. Where people might have been more receptive to the political language of paranoia and threat from the outside, war brought a very real possibility of loss.

The culture of the village contrasts sharply with that of the city, with its moderating forces of cross-cutting associations built on schooling and occupation, psychological and physical mobility, and tendency toward greater religious and political liberalism as a result of the higher education levels of its population and exposure to foreign ideas. The culture surrounding smallholding villagers remained patriarchal, a culture of the Mediterranean type, not necessarily inclined toward ethnic prejudices or nationalist views.²⁹ Men defended property through soldiering and household unity, maintained through a family's honor and the sexual shame of women. This rural culture is based on obligations to kin, intergenerational transfer of knowledge, the perpetuation of communal rituals and myths focused on the life cycle (especially death), and the social influence retained by clerics in the villages.³⁰ It did not help that churches remained more influential in villages, despite high levels of reported atheism in society as a whole (with the exception of Croats), because of the strong, shared patriarchal elements in the dogma of all three. Moreover, the strategy for industrialization in socialist Yugoslavia had reinforced the cultural divide between rural and urban residents. Those who sought economic improvement and social mobility left the villages for cities and towns, leaving the countryside disproportionately populated by the elderly or people with little schooling. Although rural in origin, this patriarchal culture was also largely characteristic of the urban underclass of unskilled workers, day laborers, the unemployed, and criminals who were recruited to do much of the fighting when conscripted young people resisted mobilization or deserted.

The character of the wars, particularly as they began, drew out this particular culture. Sites were local, for control of particular settlements. Armies were not yet fully organized or reorganized, and multiple armies, militia, and armed gangs *within* one national camp extended the political party competition to control over turf and citizens' loyalties (voluntary or forced). Where armies at this time pursued a strategy of territorial gain, they nonetheless relied on untrained irregulars, such as criminals released from jails and the urban unemployed who were free or needed pay, and on the "shock troops" of radical paramilitaries and volunteers organized by political parties who did the dirty work of creating interethnic suspicions through terrorizing villagers. As outsiders to the villages and towns where

they fought and undisciplined by professional army structure, these two groups had no particular obligation to neighbors, an important social bond in the region.³¹ Nor did they have any professional honor to limit the inclination to rape, mutilation, burning, looting, and revenge. Individual motivations differed. To the extent that the fighting involved more than individual aggrandizement, and did aim to identify people as outsiders and exclude them from land, women became particularly vulnerable, regardless of age, because the culture of patriarchy viewed their sexual purity and shame as essential to the honor and unity of the family—to violate women is to destroy the family's ability to resist.

The spontaneous role of patriarchal culture in the fighting was reinforced by political rhetoric. To the extent that nationalist leaders played on religious differences in defining the threat to each national community, they were able to tap a reservoir in rural communities of negative memories or stories of historical conflict between churches, intolerance, and even genocide once that population was exposed to war. The reinforcement was particularly evocative on the Serbian side because the rhetoric of Serb nationalism in the 1980s was based on the same patriarchal themes—the obligation to protect family and community against an external threat, and the reassertion of manhood wounded by perceived victimization, genocide, and the rape of their women.³² The apparent callousness and insensitivity of Serbian leaders to international accusations—that began in the summer of 1992 in hopes of putting a stop to the violence through publicity and threats of criminal prosecution—of genocide and blatant violation of Geneva conventions in the war in eastern and northern Bosnia can be explained in part by this psychology. While it may well have contributed to more systematic violations of international humanitarian law by Serbs than by other groups, it was simultaneously possible for individuals committing such acts to perceive themselves innocent of genocide and for leaders to insist that they had no such policy.

Alongside the culture surrounding the protection of land and family, the transition from constitutional and partisan conflict to military fights over land introduced elements of historical conflict. The political rhetoric of national assertion by intellectuals and politicians during the 1980s, on all sides, had engaged in historical reinterpretation and a culture of revenge for past wrongs. The politics of the democratic elections and sovereignty declarations had revived symbols and alliances of World War II (the Croatian wartime state and its symbols, the Chetnik regalia of Serbian paramilitaries, the Croat-Muslim alliance in Bosnia-Herzegovina). But once fighting began, the memory of World War II became relevant to ordinary citizens. Even where individuals had come to terms with that war trauma, the revival of such memories in the 1970s and 1980s by writers, historians,

clerics, and political leaders could reawaken sensitivities and mutual suspicions, and predispose many to expect the worst or to reinterpret behavior in the light of physical danger.³³

The historical analyses of intellectuals are a far cry from the moral obligations to avenge the deaths of kin and the tradition of blood revenge (*krvna osveta*) still practiced in some regions of the peninsula. It is war over territory that links the two. The previous instance of such life-and-death choices of political loyalty and the rights to land and settlement for villagers occurred during World War II and its aftermath. Whole villages had latent political identities associated with that conflict. Regions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia were splintered into Partisan (led by the Communist party) and Chetnik (Serbian royal army forces) villages; in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina among Partisan, Chetnik, and Ustasha (Croatian fascists) villages; in Macedonia among Partisan, Chetnik, and pro-Bulgarian villages; and in Kosovo between Partisan and the more common pro-Italian villages. Ethnically mixed villages experienced mass atrocities, particularly at the hands of the German army and of fascist collaborators.³⁴ A mechanism of revenge also played out in the subsequent revolutionary upheaval of 1945–47 and civil war of 1948–49. The population resettlement programs of the Yugoslav government during 1945–48 attempted to place Partisan soldiers from poor, food-deficient regions in the Dalmatian hinterland in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in homesteads in the rich farmlands of Slavonia and Vojvodina of expelled collaborators (Volksdeutsche and Hungarian, Austrian, and Catholic Church landlords) as a reward for soldiering, and a solution to their lack of self-sufficiency in food. This settled a loyal class of veterans in vulnerable borderlands. Such policies created the mixed populations in the border area contested in 1991–93 between Serbia and Croatia.

Thus, for example, the fears on which Serbian nationalist policy toward Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina fed had a very real grounding in a recent memory of genocidal atrocities against ordinary Serbs during World War II. Many argue that President Tadjman could have undercut the strength of Milošević's appeal to Serbs in Croatia if he had been willing to dissociate his regime from that period in history with a public apology, instead of reviving fears by questioning, as he did, the actual number of Serb victims.³⁵ Many Serbs felt a moral obligation, at two levels, to prevent a recurrence; the collective obligation of all Serbs to say "never again," and the individual, cultural imperative to avenge the deaths of kin. Both of these obligations required loyalty to other Serbs (even among those who vehemently opposed Milošević, nationalists, and war). For some it also obliged rejection of the idea of peaceful coexistence with Croats and Muslims. But such challenges between national groups aroused defensive loyalties on all sides; there were more than enough his-

torical memories or myths to be used as justification, to create fears, and to reshape perceptions by politicians aimed at gaining nationally defined support.

One important factor was not national at all, but the economic and cultural divide already present between city and country, for during World War II cities tended to collaborate with the occupying armies. Urban dwellers who joined the resistance did so by escaping to the forests and mountains, whereas villagers had little choice but to take active sides in the civil war that ran parallel to the anti-Axis war of liberation.³⁶ The pattern of fighting in Croatia in 1991 and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 could be seen to repeat this past, beginning in towns infamous for World War II atrocities, and distinguishing house-by-house in Slavonian villages between post-World War II migrants and old residents.³⁷

Nonetheless, social change had occurred, and people had lived together for more than forty years in spite of their war experiences. The major political trace during the 1945–90 period was the oft-spoken fear that multiparty democracy would bring back ethnically based political competition. Thus the attempt by nationalists to control the mass media and the ability during wartime in 1991–95 to legitimize such control and censorship, were unusually important. Control of the media gave full reign, without opposing views, to the nationalists' myth of "we cannot live together." It made it possible for politicians to connect their message to the world of ordinary people. And it limited the audience of alternative voices—which reminded people that the world had changed, that their history was far more one of coexistence and nonethnic bonds, that their fears were unjustified, and that the moral obligation was not revenge but tolerance—to those who could buy and did read newspapers and journals.

Regardless of the multiple predispositions of culture and memory, the fight to create states out of nations in territories that are ethnically mixed eventually becomes a fight over persons and their rights to live on particular tracts of land. This became known to outsiders during the Serbian onslaught in eastern Bosnia in the spring and summer of 1992 as a policy of "ethnic cleansing." Based on racial beliefs (in the physicalizing of ethnic identity and prerogatives), this policy has had many parallels, such as apartheid in South Africa or the massive population exchanges between Greece and Turkey in 1922, or after the division of India and Pakistan in 1947.³⁸ Its immediate prelude in Yugoslavia was the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo—the result of a mixture of reciprocal fears and political tactics during the 1980s in which both the Serbian government and Albanian residents played their part.³⁹ Nationalist Serb extremists referred loosely to Serb victims of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

The next phase, in 1989, used legal instruments. Republican constitutions redefined citizenship in terms that distinguished between the

majority nation and others, and effectively created semi-disenfranchised minorities (in relation to previous rights) most explicitly in Croatia and Macedonia.⁴⁰ When war came to ethnically mixed areas in Croatia, mutual fears and local harassment, often provoked by outsiders (paramilitary gangs from central Croatia and from Serbia proper; returned Croat émigrés and mercenaries of Serbian origin), turned the language of endangerment and politics of revenge into invitations to expel unwanted persons.⁴¹

As a war strategy pursued by Croats and Serbs alike in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, the association between persons and rights to land became a deliberate policy to clear a territory of all those who were considered not to belong in their national territory and who might be suspected of disloyalty. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, "random and selective killing," detention camps as way stations with "inadequate shelter, food, and sanitation," and even massacres were reportedly used as "tools" to remove populations.⁴²

The basis of this policy of ethnic cleansing lay not with primordial hatreds or local jealousies, but with political goals. According to the German criterion on which the Badinter Commission and the EC decisions were made, international recognition of national sovereignty required a referendum of residents in a territory on their choice of a state; where that choice had been ignored, nationalist leaders found their political prejudices vindicated. Military control of territory was not sufficient to recognition; it had to be supplemented eventually by a vote. Thus cease-fires only led to a change in the methods of ethnic cleansing. After the cease-fire in Croatia and in towns of Bosnia-Herzegovina where fighting had ceased, local authorities continued this process by negotiating population exchanges on an ethnic basis between towns. These exchanges were hardly more voluntary because they were peaceable, but their objective—to consolidate ethnically pure territories that would vote correctly in a referendum on sovereignty and in future elections and to justify government administration by their national group—had not been fully obtained by warfare.⁴³

Their methods of population transfers varied. In places like the wealthy village of Kozarac in northeastern Bosnia, members of the local Muslim elite who might organize such opposition were first murdered or brutally expelled. Serbs in the Croatian *krajina*, such as the village of Pod Lapača, appealed to the UN forces sent to protect them to help them leave the area instead out of fear after a Croatian army scorch-and-burn attack on three neighboring villages just outside the UNPA in September 1993. Elsewhere, local rivalries were encouraged to play out, perhaps given a boost by the terrorizing tactics of outside extremists and then fed by a cycle of revenge between neighboring villages. One measure of the level of resistance by many local leaders and citizens to such cleansing and of

the strength of commitment to mixed environments and nonnationalist political preferences is the fact that the process gained momentum in later stages of the war. Official exchanges of minorities between villages of different majority ethnicity to create overwhelming national majorities and justify government administration by their national group became systematic after the Washington agreement for federation of March 1, 1994, was signed by Bosnian Croats and Muslims. Local radicalization, as those who opposed ethnic partition of the republic became ever weaker or had left, brought renewed expulsions in the spring and summer of 1994, such as the forced expulsions by Serbs of Muslims from Banja Luka and Bijeljina areas or the voluntary exodus of Croats and Serbs from Tuzla the same year. Whatever the method, however, ethnic cleansing was a particularly extreme reminder of the conflict between the goal of national states and Yugoslav reality.

The victimization of Muslims through ethnic cleansing was also a result of the political contest behind the wars, not ethnic or religious hatreds. Claiming a unified Bosnia as its base instead of a separate national enclave, the SDA could not win with a policy of ethnic cleansing. Its political difficulty in settling on a consistent strategy for national sovereignty (see chapter 9)—against the two other parties, the SDS and the HDZ—extended to this tactic. A referendum confirming the national sovereignty of Bosnia had to be supported by more voters than those who identified politically with the SDA as Muslims, and depended, therefore, on maintaining mixed communities. When relief agencies of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) chose to help evacuate Muslims from towns in eastern Bosnia, such as Srebrenica and Konjević Polje, in order to save lives in April 1993, they were not only accused of being accomplices to Serbian ethnic cleansing, but were in many towns blocked by local Muslim (SDA) officials and Bosnian government army commanders who knew that once people left, they had lost political control over that territory (whatever military objectives they might accomplish).⁴⁴ Similarly, in withholding support from the peace plan drawn up by the Geneva international conference on former Yugoslavia in October 1992–January 1993 based on creating mixed communities and provinces and an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina (the Vance-Owen plan), on the grounds that it did not guarantee enough land to Muslims and rewarded the "aggression of Serbs," the Clinton administration in January–February 1993 doomed the Muslims as well to a policy of ethnic cleansing.

Whether the failure of a political agreement on the Vance-Owen plan was a result of military gains and ethnic cleansing on the ground that were impossible to reverse, as some claimed, or a result of U.S. encouragement of Izetbegović to bargain for more Muslim territory, as those seeing the

parallels with the failed Lisbon Accord the previous March claimed, the appearance of ethnically based massacres and fighting between Croat and Muslim forces in central Bosnia was not an attempt to realize the Vance-Owen plan. Many observers argued that the plan legitimized the assignment of territories ethnically and that armies were fighting between December 1992 and May 1993 to take those territories militarily, but it in fact only acknowledged national rights to form governments and territorial administrations over provinces that would remain ethnically mixed and a part of a sovereign Bosnia. It was the failure of international support for the plan—in the same manner as the EC decision in December 1991 on recognition was made without first obtaining agreements on borders and principles of national self-determination—that led politicians and armies to settle the question of territorial rights on the ground. In the face of territorial losses and without a political settlement, the Bosnian government in December 1992 had begun a temporarily successful campaign to take back areas of eastern Bosnia and to control central Bosnia. As Bosnian Croats, through ethnic cleansing, extended their territory in the fall of 1992 beyond western Herzegovina into mixed towns in central Bosnia, such as Prozor at the end of October, Muslim militias (not Bosnian government forces) also began to expel Croats.

The move from nationalist psychological warfare to nationalist warfare over land on territory that was multinational had predictable outcomes in the character of that warfare. The political goal of creating national states made little distinction between military and civilians, either as fighters or as targets.⁴⁵ What would seem only to be a matter of military doctrine, in which the YPA held preponderant power with artillery designed to delay an attacker and then to hit invaders' supply routes with ambushes, land slides, and artillery, and the TDF in rural villages would swing into guerrilla warfare in a long war of attrition, if necessary, was reinforced by the sharp urban-rural divide within the country's social and political structure. Heavy artillery shelled population settlements and had to make up for the refusal of urban young people to fight. Cities were encircled by artillery, using supply depots intended for repelling invaders. Guerrilla warfare in urban settings comprised snipers from all political sides and commando raids by small groups of disciplined soldiers in the early mornings to demoralize soldiers of the other side. The objective of such tactics and the threat of death by starvation, disease, and cold, however, was to persuade civilians of a different ethnicity to leave without putting up a fight. Psychological and economic pressure to force capitulation of cities to ethnic definition and loyalties included destruction of the physical infrastructure on which urban life depends—electricity, heating plants, kiosks selling newspapers, TV and radio transmitters, the com-

munal bakery—but one of the first objects of attack in cities as well as towns and villages was also the church or mosque of the “other” group.

The goal of national control of land meant that male civilians of any age but of the “wrong” nationality were sent to detention camps on the assumption that they were potential soldiers for the enemy or were forcibly conscripted to the front line to dig trenches or initiate assaults on armies of their own ethnicity. Bosnian Serbs in Banja Luka and Bijeljina were accused by the ICRC and UNHCR of forcibly separating non-Serb men from their families during waves of ethnic expulsions to do “work detail” on the front.⁴⁶ Even the Croatian government—in violation of the Geneva conventions—forcibly returned Bosnian men of all ages who had taken refuge from the Bosnian war in camps across the border in Croatia.⁴⁷ Women of any age were victims of rape, in part for reasons always associated with warfare and in part to demoralize armies composed not of professionals but of fathers, sons, and brothers from the region. Because the purpose of the warfare was largely defense of village and land, even if a particular military engagement were classified as offensive, the armies were largely composed of people from the region. Except for small elite units, army units were not mobile, were locally recruited among farmers and villages of all ages, tended to be led by commanders from the area, and were known to be fiercely loyal to that local commander, even if doing so meant that they disobeyed orders given higher up the normal chain of command.

Even if political leaders wish to reverse course and sign cease-fire agreements in good faith and citizens desperately want an end to the fighting, the momentum of such wars becomes increasingly difficult to stop. The limit on ethnic expulsions begun with local quarrels or as a result of political rivalry between radicals and moderates within a political party is only reached when there are no more people of that particular category to be expelled. The political rhetoric that prepared the way for war by emphasizing group danger tended to perpetuate the practice in conditions of anarchy and ever further unraveling of legal and moral standards and stable social organization. Localized fighting for the territory and soul of a village, and then between villages as refugees fled or as fighting fanned out, eventually drew in villagers who had tried to stay out of politics but found they had to fight or be killed or expelled. Those who did not flee sought to ensure their own security by turning on those from the threatening group and torching their homes, cultural monuments, and places of worship to discourage their return.

Among soldiers, the horrors alone and the fact that “many of them didn’t understand what they were fighting for, or didn’t approve of a war in which people from two nations with the same language and origin were

killing each other” led to the emergence of what was called the “Vukovar syndrome,” in which psychological breakdown turned them not away from war but into “uncontrolled killers.” The explanation offered by a clinical psychologist for the “Bijeljina (Bosnia) case”—a twenty-three-year-old reservist mobilized by the army who “gunned down three other soldiers from the Bijeljina barracks and then his girlfriend’s family” on February 1, 1992—was the psychological pressure of this particular type of war: “it’s neither war nor peace, they’ve been living for months in trenches, their position as well as their mission is unclear, they lose their nerves and they drink heavily.”⁴⁸

On all sides of the war, the expulsion or execution of rival local elites and the exodus as refugees of moderates repelled by the war meant that, as the war went on, an ever larger proportion of those who remained or reappeared ready to fight in other towns were militant radicals most committed or bound to that land. By committing atrocities to clear that land, engendering the likely revenge of the ethnic group of its victims, these radicals had even more reason to continue fighting for fear of retribution and no honorable exit. This was particularly the case for Serbs in eastern Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who aroused global condemnation and outrage because they were accused, as a result of reports by human rights organizations and by UN inquiries, of a systematic policy of genocide and mass rape and blamed for the overwhelming portion of the war’s atrocities. In other cases, such as the fratricidal fighting in central Bosnia in the summer of 1993 between Croatian and Muslim forces that had remained at peace or fought side by side during the previous eighteen months, the continuation of war created its own momentum in the rising numbers of displaced persons who had lost everything (often including families) and who had little left to do but to fight for some other land or take revenge.

Civil War

In the course of the constitutional struggle of the 1980s, nationalist politicians at the republic level had channeled social unrest and economic grievances into demands for national rights. This did not, however, remove those grievances. As the above discussion of urban-rural differences implies, the characteristics of these wars for new states owed as much or more to the social and economic divisions that existed within Yugoslav society before the war as to the ethnic conflict proclaimed by nationalist elites and outside powers.

In interrupting the process of democratization begun with the elections in 1990, the Slovene and Croatian declarations of sovereignty and the European response in 1991 taking these declarations at face value prolonged representation throughout the region in terms of national self-determination and ethnic political rights. Instead of a change in the organization of economic life and interests in the socialist period toward organizations like class-based political parties and interest groups more suited to parliamentary democracy and market economics, the political organization of elections by republic and by ethnonational parties therefore reinforced the territorial, vertical, and state-based organization of the socialist regime. The regionalized specializations, relative immobility of labor and capital, and geopolitically influenced economic policy characteristic of all socialist countries created a pattern of economic advantage and disadvantage that was defined by territorial (including urban-rural) lines. Thus national movements were subject to few if any checks and balances that might dampen political escalation once they mobilized grievances and interests in the political and economic transition.

When the European Community and the United States ignored the difference between Slovenia and the rest of the country and the likelihood of conflicts over borders and land, they exposed to territorial dispute those very areas most threatened by the policies of the liberal economic reformers and less privileged in economic development. In the Croatian *krajina*, central Bosnia, the “Serbian corridor” of northern Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, deindustrialization and declining demand since the mid-1970s had led to severe economic decline largely as a result of economic policy or global change outside the immediate control of these areas.⁴⁹ Dominated by extractive industries (minerals, timber, transport) or military production with uncertain demand in foreign markets and in government contracts, these areas had been hard hit by the reform policies favoring export-oriented manufactures to convertible currency countries. They also tended to have declining per capita income in the 1970s and 1980s, so that local budgets for services and welfare were increasingly dependent on federal subsidies; they were therefore also hurt more by the drastic cuts in government budgets under policies of stabilization and liberalization. Local industries were more dependent on sources of investment capital that were being sharply curtailed—the development funds of their republican budgets and the investment and services of the army and military industries financed by the federal budget. Unemployment in these areas was rising and income falling far faster than in the rest of the country.⁵⁰

These were areas that traded more with the markets that collapsed in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Middle East. In the line being drawn through the country’s center between Europe

and the Balkans, moreover, there was increasing uncertainty over the fate of the areas of the former military border between Habsburg and Ottoman empires, the Danubian region, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Were they West or East?⁵¹

Individual prospects also had a pronounced territorial dimension. Upward social mobility in the socialist period through education eventually required a move to the cities, leaving poorer interior areas with people of lesser prospects, lower status, and a sense of cultural inferiority. Although poverty and open unemployment were increasingly urban phenomena in the 1970s and 1980s, urban areas retained their association with the privileges of public sector employment, social welfare, and opportunities not dependent on the land. Rural communities retained a secondary status, where those who had no opportunities to leave (whether through lack of education, urban relatives, or cash incomes) remained tied to the rural or semirural community of their birth. Decentralizing reforms to reduce federal expenditures and favor the TDF in national defense had also had the effect of concentrating security forces and retired soldiers in localities in these areas, for reasons of World War II experience and poverty.

Patterns of migration, because they followed routes laid by family and by schooling, also had an ethnic dimension, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Overall, studies for the 1960s–80s show that emigration occurred in economically declining villages and regions, and was greatest in ethnically mixed communes.⁵² This pattern created more ethnically homogeneous villages within districts (*opštine/općine*) that remained heterogeneous (a pattern more common in Croatia). In particular, Serbs left for other republics and cities (primarily in Serbia) and Croats most frequently went abroad. Both poor and elite Muslims, on the other hand, tended to stay “at home” in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Migration and the relative differences in birth rates between these groups had reversed the numerical preponderance of Serbs over Muslims.⁵³ Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats were thus more likely to be those left behind by their own ethnic group.

This situation may have made these people receptive to politicians who, in the 1990–93 period, encouraged resentment against new elites of a different ethnicity, particularly Muslims, who were at earlier, more assertive stages of national consciousness. The 1990 elections had not yet replaced at the local level the single-party system of the previous forty years, except for takeover by the ethnonational party corresponding to the local political elite. Politicians often used the excuse of an anticommunist purge to expel members of other political parties, but because the main electoral victors were identified with the nation, this process had left interethnic emotions occasionally raw.⁵⁴

The actual characteristics of the fighting on the ground, however, reflected the socioeconomic basis of these politics far more than the ethnic

coloration and historical revenge that characterized politicians’ rhetoric. For many, war became a rare opportunity for enrichment, through theft or smuggling, in a period of serious economic decline. Early pictures in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina show soldiers looting VCRs and stereos, urban furniture and appliances, and foreign automobiles such as BMWs—most originally bought with the enviable foreign hard currency. Illiteracy and mobilized resentments over who were the “rightful owners” of land help to explain the destruction of cultural monuments, razing of prosperous farms, and crowds of village women who prevented aid convoys from reaching their destinations.

Although soldiers were frequently paid two to three times more than they were earning in civilian jobs, the actual pay was still meager and was often given in alcohol and cigarettes instead of cash. The incentive for class-based revenge was high. The recruitment of soldiers when the state collapsed also reinforced this class division, because more urban and better educated youth could escape the draft, often by leaving the country. The unemployed, poorer village youth, and industrial workers, unpaid for months, were more vulnerable to the draft and promises of pay and veterans’ benefits. In the first stages of the war in Croatia, the promise in Serbia of significant discounts on the price of electricity and fuel for households was sufficient for many heads of households to enlist.

War closed schools and factories in many areas, either because of the fighting or because of the interruption of transport and supplies in other areas, compounding the number of people left idle. Paramilitary forces, in particular, were filled with teenagers faced with the choice either to leave the country or to join a military organization, but under little organized command or adult standards of behavior. Evidence also suggests that those who felt excluded in the socialist period, such as unskilled workers or troubled young people, tended to volunteer to fight; war presented an opportunity for them to achieve a certain status and honor unavailable in peace or to get revenge for their previous impotence and discrimination. They were also more inclined to the culture of patriarchy and protection than to the norms defining the Geneva conventions on war.⁵⁵ At the same time, like the right-wing teenagers rampaging against foreigners in west European countries, the war attracted “weekend Chetniks” from a lost generation of educated youth with meager prospects in Serbia. These unemployed high school or university graduates, living on the outskirts of big cities, went on shooting sprees with Kalashnikov rifles from Friday night to Sunday in villages of little consequence to them over the border in Croatia or Bosnia.⁵⁶

As in the events leading up to war, independent forces became mutually reinforcing in ways that accelerated violence. Class-based resentment and revenge legitimized as national liberation and anticommunism were a

potent force. Those who took up arms to defend their land and communities were also incited and led by people who saw themselves as outsiders—dissidents against communism (from Franjo Tuđman to Alija Izetbegović to Vojislav Šešelj), urban migrants from poor regions (such as Radovan Karadžić), in many cases actual criminals (the most infamous was Željko Ražnatović, or Arkan). This self-perception was reinforced by the language of combat, such as the labeling of all Serbs as barbarians and the urban professionals' derision of Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić for his "village" speech. Given the Western judgment that Slovenes and Croats were democratic and peace-loving whereas Serbs were aggressors in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, potentially, Kosovo and Macedonia, it was doubly unfortunate that the Slovenes had captured the liberal space in the Yugoslav political spectrum and that Serbian nationalism under Milošević had come, accurately or not, to represent the fears or reaction of the less privileged and the political forces under attack.

Dissolution of a State

In recognizing Slovene and Croatian independence, the European Community was not only creating new states but dissolving an existing one—Yugoslavia. It approached this problem ad hoc, with the result that the primary mechanism became an arbitration commission of jurists with advisory authority only, set up at the request of the Slovene government in August—almost two months before the end of the moratorium on moves toward independence—for an independent, European body to deal with the economic questions of succession. Skeptical about their ability to resolve such questions without outside arbitration, the Slovenes also argued that they could not participate in the setting up of some new "Yugoslav" institutional forum, however temporary it first appeared. The Badinter Commission soon found its effective mandate expanded, under the auspices of the EC peace conference at The Hague, from arbitrating disputes over the allocation of federal economic assets and obligations among the republics to advising on border disputes and the criteria for recognition.

Even this minimal regulation of the process of dissolution fell victim to the diplomatic recognitions in December, January, and April, however, and the deadly pause of ten months before the second peace conference was set up at Geneva in September. The work on economic issues of succession was handed to one of the conference's six standing commissions, which remained in Brussels for continuity. Its authority depended on that of the Geneva conference and its cochairmen, who rapidly became preoccupied by the work of another of its standing commissions, that on Bosnia-Herzegovina, in its efforts to negotiate a political agreement that

would end the Bosnian war. Like the European decision that the republican borders were legitimate international borders, moreover, the issues of dissolution were also colored by their assumptions regarding economic accounts—that the assets and debts of the former state belonged to the republics and that the only issue was what proportions would govern their distribution among the six.

The question of state succession was, in fact, decided in May 1992 by Western policy aimed at ending the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As part of its strategy to hold Serbia and the YPA responsible for the war and to exert pressure on the Serbian leadership to end its military aid and political support to the Bosnian Serbs, the UN Security Council denied successor status to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (created between Serbia and Montenegro on April 27, 1992). Declaring that it could not continue "automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations," the UN rejected the argument of the new Yugoslav leadership that it bore the right of successor, in the way that Russia had since been accredited the UN seat of the Soviet Union, because the other republics had seceded. Thus the Security Council let the question of state succession die on September 19, 1992 (SCR 777), in a way similar to the EC's de facto usurpation of the federal presidency and cabinet during the summer and fall of 1991 by its mediating intercession.

But the reality was that this had been a country, not only a confederation of states—however autonomous the republics had been. There were not only psychological interdependencies that needed to be broken, but also economic interdependencies and an entire structure of security—local police, internal security police, territorial defense forces, federal army, and all-Yugoslav laws and standards—protecting civil order and external defense. In line with its incorrect assumption that there was no conflict between the independence of the republics and the right to national self-determination, the EC in particular paid no attention to the disposition of the armed forces and security apparatus or to the consequences for the security of citizens if it removed the last vestiges of authority from the common procedures and guarantees of the entire structure of civil order.

The Disintegration of Internal Security and Civil Order

The country's system of territorial defense and security could not be rearranged neatly in accordance with the republics, as if they were already states in which the loyalties and authority of police, TDFs, intelligence agencies, and army were not in doubt and the only issue was to expel aggressors from other states. The federal army was a significant political actor in its own right, which could not succumb to the lack of quorum and simply disperse among republics, as the federal parliament chose to

do after months of debate. It was not simply a body representing the republics, but an independent, coequal partner representing Yugoslavia as a whole and its multinational ideal and antifascist origins. In contrast to other federal institutions, such as the central bank, its fate and the distribution of its assets could not wait for decades of diplomatic wrangling. As an integral part of the constitutional and then the political-military contest, the YPA would have to undergo a process of reorientation: from its defense of Yugoslavia, through disorientation as an army without a state, to a state-building project of its own. Moreover, military districts had not coincided with republican borders since the reorganization of the mid-1980s. Just as troops in Croatia were part of the Slovene operation, troops from the Banja Luka (5th) Corps in Bosnia participated in the Croatian conflict over the border in Slavonia and in the Dalmatian hinterland.⁵⁷ The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina reflected, in part, the YPA's division between eastern Herzegovina—which fell under the command of the fourth military district headquartered in Podgorica (Montenegro)—and areas of central and eastern Bosnia, which were in the first military district headquartered in Belgrade and encompassing parts of Serbia proper and Vojvodina.⁵⁸

There was no reason, moreover, for the territorial defense forces to become automatically national armies of the separate republics. Although nominally under republican authority in the previous order, the TDFs were simultaneously integrated into the central command and control structure of the federal armed forces and under the administrative jurisdiction of the local governments. Local politics were most decisive, therefore, in the role and loyalties of TDF units. Whereas Slovenia had constructed its national army on the basis of the TDF in the course of its conflict with the federal army over several years, the Croatian army evolved only after the elections held in the spring of 1990 as a result of two conflicts—one with the army over federal or republican rights to TDF assets and the other with local Serbs over “national” (Croat) control of local police and TDF units. In part because the YPA was quicker than the Croatian government to take control of some TDF assets and in part because Serbs had sought to defend themselves in Baranja-Slavonia and in the Dalmatian hinterland and around Knin with civil defense units (and later paramilitary groups) using local TDF weapons and facilities, Croatia built its national army instead on the basis of internal republic-level security forces called MUP and their counterinsurgency activities during 1990–91. President Tudjman held the first public parade of this National Guard Corps (ZNG), which would later become the core of a standing Croatian army (HV), in March 1991, and it had active and reserve motorized brigades poised in the field against Serb militia by May.⁵⁹

The disposition of the TDF in Bosnia-Herzegovina followed the same, though more complex, political evolution: from interrupted democratiza-

tion through national self-determination to armed conflict. When power changed hands with the elections of December 1990, most local TDF units became instruments of local political elites, their political ambitions, and the consolidation of power behind their political party. Along these political party (and therefore ethnic) lines, these units began to combine into militia beyond the local level. TDF units in western Herzegovina were active, through HDZ politicians, in helping form the HV, and the HV then sent troops and equipment to organize Croat units in Bosnia (eventually the HVO), for example. Local officials and SDS party leaders in the Bosnian *krajina* lent logistical and economic support to Serbs in the Croatian *krajina* and were aided later in turn. The war in Croatia thus sped up the preparation for war in Bosnia-Herzegovina through these reciprocal networks among political parties in forming armies and also through refugees who poured over the border (both Croats and Serbs) for sanctuary and who kindled tensions along partisan, ethnic, and military lines.⁶⁰ This earlier formation of military and partisan paramilitary links between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, among Croats and among Serbs, meant that the Bosnian government army would be built largely on the basis of internal resources in Bosnia-Herzegovina among local SDA (Muslim party) elites. President Izetbegović created a National Defense Council on June 10, 1991, as an arm of his party, and was illegally purchasing weapons from Slovenia during the fall.⁶¹ Despite the political alliance between Croatian and Muslim parties, in fact, a defense alliance appeared necessary between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in June 1992 to gain access to arms through HVO-controlled supply routes and Croatian ports on the Adriatic. The Bosnian army was eventually built on the basis of TDF units—in addition to a separate militia called the Patriotic League—largely from areas outside Croatian and Serbian strongholds where the SDA governed or the town was indisputably ethnically mixed. The continuing predominance of the local character of military formations meant that, while armies were primarily organized by ethnonational parties, their soldiers were often of a different ethnicity, such as the thousands of Bosnian Muslims fighting in the HVO, for example, or the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs who fought in the Bosnian army.⁶²

Local leaders who commandeered the Bosnian TDF with its stockpiles of weapons and civil defense units of all-citizen training, were called warlords after war came officially to the republic in April 1992, but they remained preoccupied largely with local power. The system of civil order at the local level had already begun to disintegrate as a result of the 1990 elections. The shift from Communist party oversight of judgeships and police to that of a nonpartisan, independent branch of government had also been interrupted—no longer communist but still controlled by the local party or preoccupied with an intense battle between types of judicial

systems. Police forces tended to take partisan sides, form their own paramilitary groups with criminals released from jails, and often exploit "business opportunities" in league with mafia trafficking in lucrative contraband in drugs and illegal arms.

At the time of the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence, the primary source of rising tensions and armed confrontations was not the armies based in the TDF or the YPA but the paramilitary groups formed by political parties. In Serbia the powerful internal security police supported Milošević and the Socialist party.⁶³ All the major parties and renegades created their own armies: the Chetniks of Serbian Radical party leader Vojislav Šešelj; the Serbian Guard of Vuk Drašković's Serbian Movement for Renewal; and the White Eagles, Dušan Silni, and the Serbian Volunteer Guard (also known as Arkanovci or Tigers) organized by Željko Ražnatović-Arkan, a criminal wanted in Europe for political assassinations and drug trafficking. In Croatia the interior police (now National Guard) were similarly attached to Tudjman's party, while Ustasha units of the Black Legion, the Zebras, and the 5,000-strong Croatian Defense League (HOS) of the Croatian Party of Right of Dobroslav Paraga all operated in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶⁴ The SDA organized its Green Berets. Five separate militia were operating in the *krajina* region of Croatia alone by June 1991, and there were twenty such paramilitary groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶⁵

The military wings and activities of political parties were no more confined within republican borders than were their electoral activities. With the internationalization of the political contest, however, the purpose of these military wings changed as the determinants of interparty competition shifted from the size of voting constituencies and ability to form local alliances to the willingness to use armed force to control persons and territories. It also gave rise to a new struggle within political parties and between political parties claiming to represent the same nation: that between moderates who believed in or counted on international support and peaceful negotiations for their national goals and radicals who believed in the inevitability of an armed contest and prepared for military confrontation—the diplomatic versus the war option. Citizens reoriented their loyalties from political identities and preferences to physical survival and therefore to those parties, leaders, and identities they thought most likely to win in the end. The conditions of anarchy and territorial contest favored the armed radicals.

Thus by the fall of 1991, paramilitary gangs, foreign mercenaries, and convicted criminals roamed the territory under ever less civil control.⁶⁶ Shady deals between the police and black marketeers confirmed that the line between what was legal and what was not had evaporated. Republican intelligence agencies were offering their services to political parties. En-

gaged in their own fight for political control locally, civil authorities were not inclined to restore order if it required collaboration with political enemies. Rising criminality, local shoot-outs and armed provocations in contested areas, as well as politically aroused fears about the neutrality of the law and police and the untrustworthiness of other national groups, left many citizens with the impression that the only true security was ownership of a firearm. Locals also raided army barracks. In some areas local police and army units have been charged with distributing weapons from official stocks to villagers and militia of the same ethnic group.⁶⁷

The Federal Army

The federal army was simultaneously engaged in this local process, since its actual command structure was substantially decentralized, and in the high politics of state formation taking place. While the assets of the TDFs and arms purchases from abroad (despite the embargo) were falling into various hands, a complex internal struggle over the YPA's political identity, goals, and appropriate strategy was taking place, paralleling the path of European mediation of the Yugoslav dissolution.

The army's evolution began, as described in chapters 4 and 5, in the contest with Slovenia. The growing antagonism between the YPA and Slovenia in the 1980s culminated in March 1991, when Slovenia withheld its conscripts and confirmed the impossibility of reconciliation. The Croatian government paraded its new army (still based legally on the rights of the TDF and the MUP) that month as well and, like the Slovenes, rejected any suggestion of negotiation with the YPA. (Some generals, such as Generals Martin Špegelj and later Anton Tus in Croatia, had defected early from the YPA to command national security in their republics.) In the view of the Croatian government's top strategists, the sovereignty of the republics was not achievable until the army, as the last remaining Yugoslav institution and the one most committed to the Yugoslav idea, succumbed to internal disintegration from the contest between what they called Titoist elements still committed to Yugoslavia and Serbian elements which, like the Slovenes and Croats, were nationalists committed to an independent state. The nationalist momentum was such, in their view, that Serb nationalists had to win and the Titoists had to concede defeat. The events of March 1991, when the Serbian bloc in the presidency and the minister of defense pushed for emergency rule and when one section of the army general staff agreed to assist Milošević by sending tanks into the streets of Belgrade against opposition demonstrators, seemed to fit their scenario. The fight between the army and Prime Minister Ante Marković came to a head in July, when Marković turned on Defense Minister Kadjević, accusing the army of illegal action in Slovenia.⁶⁸ Then, in early July, with

the collective presidency, the prime minister, and the president of Croatia gathered in the presidential palace in Zagreb to attempt negotiation of Croatian independence, someone faked an air attack on the palace and blamed it on Kadijević.⁶⁹ The intention apparently was to end any possibility of reconciliation between the military and civilian authorities of the federal government. Moreover, monitoring of the cease-fire negotiated by the federal presidency in Croatia during July and August was assigned not to the army but to representatives of the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs (although by August 30, the republican governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, which had agreed to share this task with federal authorities, decided not to participate, and they withdrew their representatives from the monitoring groups on September 4).⁷⁰

Nonetheless, the army did not dissipate on demand. While the republican declarations of independence in June 1991 forced Slovene and Croatian recruits and officers to choose between competing loyalties, their cohorts from other republics continued to be conscripted and to fight into 1992. The senior officer corps, the composition of which had followed the strict application of the rule of national parity (the *ključ*), did not reflect Croatian propaganda. One of the three generals in the supreme staff at the time of the Slovene war was a Slovene (Admiral Stane Brovet). The army was led by the representative of Croatia on the supreme staff, Veljko Kadijević, a Yugoslav born in Croatia of mixed Croat-Serb parentage, minister of defense, and commander of the army. He resigned in January 1992 when he accepted full responsibility for the air force attack on an EC helicopter monitoring the cease-fire in Croatia that killed its five crewmen (and which appeared to be another stage in the rivalries internal to the armed forces). General Zvonko Jurjević, the chief of the air force, obliged to resign because of the same attack, was also Croatian. At the time of the Bosnian declaration of sovereignty, in October 1991, Kadijević promised President Izetbegović to do everything possible to prevent war from spreading to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This promise was honored until April 1992, when those working throughout the fall and early winter to keep the peace (such as Generals Nikola Uzelac in Banja Luka and Milutin Kukanjac in Sarajevo—both Serbs) lost to those seeking to escalate fighting (officers of Serbian ethnicity—Ratko Mladić and Momčilo Perišić—and of Muslim ethnicity—Colonel Vehbija Kadić, who then left to command the Bosnian territorial forces).⁷¹ The purge of the Titoists, or Partisan faction, of the YPA began only after Kadijević's resignation: twenty generals in February 1992, thirty-eight in March. It continued over the next eighteen months, even after the army's small residual officer corps and employees originating from Serbia and Montenegro had been renamed the Yugoslav Army and the internal struggle (favoring the air force) interacted with the political struggle in Serbia.⁷²

The stages of the YPA's transformation and its reassessment of political goals were driven, however, by international decisions. The army's apparent military strategy in Slovenia, to combine surprise and overwhelming force in a blitzkrieg assault, on the assumption that there would be little local resistance, had no political objective other than its constitutional duty to defend Yugoslav integrity. According to James Gow, a British specialist on the YPA, the YPA's backup strategy to begin a slow, calculated escalation was foiled by the unexpected intervention of EC mediators; "confused and constrained," it hesitated.⁷³ The Brioni Agreement of July 7, 1991, obliging the army to return to barracks and leveling accusations from both the EC and Prime Minister Marković of illegitimate and aggressive use of force, was the first step of a process by which the army was forced to retreat, step by step, from each republic that had declared independence. As the violence increased in Croatia, but long before the army had adjusted politically to events, the EC and the United States began to call it a Serbian army and to view the fight as some old Croat-Serb conflict played out between the Croatian government and the army. The policy question in July and early August 1991 was whether to interpose forces (whether Western European Union [WEU], Eurocorps, or UN) between them or to enable Croatia to build up its army and air force legally by recognizing its sovereignty. In fact, the army had been attempting for some months already, and continuing into September 1991, to provide such a neutral buffer between Serbs and Croats, particularly in eastern Croatia, so as to dampen the fighting and create cease-fires. Like Slovenia and Croatia, the EC monitors (ECMM) refused to speak to the army and by early fall of 1991 had joined Croatia in labeling the YPA an occupation force. Still, UN envoy Cyrus Vance began to have greater negotiating success during November 1991 than his EC counterpart, Lord Carrington, in part because he included the Yugoslav minister of defense. When Kadijević resigned, Vance considered it a serious blow to his efforts.

By the second month of the Croatian war, however, this Western response forced the army leadership to reassess totally its political and strategic position. Critical to this reassessment, according to Gow, was the Persian Gulf war, which YPA analysts saw as a "true paradigm for the use of modern technology and a credible model for the use of force in a hypothetical war in similar military-political circumstances, something which (with reference to our crisis and its possible internationalisation) cannot leave us indifferent."⁷⁴ That war demonstrated the "instrumentalisation of the UN, as a system of global security, serving to realise the global strategic interests of the greatest world powers," and thus the necessity of U.S. leadership and international consensus for any armed intervention in cases such as Yugoslavia. The United States at the time was preoccupied with Iraq and thus unlikely to back the EC militarily. Con-

sensus in the UN Security Council was also unlikely, particularly if the fear of another Vietnam could be sown. Intervention seemed improbable if the army accepted that Yugoslavia was no longer salvageable and moved to secure the strategic quadrants of a new state—what was being called, by August–September 1991, a rump Yugoslavia (*krnja Jugoslavija*)—without Slovenia and without most (but not all) of Croatia. In Gow's estimation, the consequences of this reassessment could be seen in Croatia by October in the army's participation in the siege taking place for Vukovar, on the Danube, and the campaign in Konavli, south of Dubrovnik, in the Montenegrin military district, to ensure control of the Prevlaka peninsula and therefore its naval base on the Adriatic and the most strategic point on the entire coastline. But Miloš Vasić, the military expert of the independent Belgrade weekly, *Vreme*, saw the army floundering, without "any proper political aim" and a "resulting strategic confusion," into the end of December (and long after the "Pyrrhic victory" of the fall of Vukovar).⁷⁵

Whether a YPA strategy existed at the time, the political path of dissolution continued. The UN-negotiated cease-fire in Croatia required the YPA to withdraw, which it did beginning November 29, and to be replaced by UN troops. The Macedonian government accompanied a request for recognition of its sovereignty to the EC in December 1991 with negotiations for the army to leave (redeployed to Kosovo). UN troops would remain in Croatia, at the behest of the Secretary General and Security Council, until the rebel Serbs disarmed and political negotiations resolved the contest between the two in a political settlement for the country as a whole.⁷⁶ This agreement not only met with opposition from the Serbian leader in the *krajina*, Milan Babić—against the public reprimand of his former patron Milošević—but also meant a loss of territories in Slavonia for the faction within the army fighting to create a new, smaller Yugoslavia.⁷⁷ Although it still did not include the army in its negotiations, now over Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EC began to demand on April 11, 1992—only five days after Bosnian sovereignty was recognized—that the army withdraw from the republic. In "alarm over the rapid deterioration of the situation" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN Security Council declared in its resolution of April 10 that it would demand on April 24 that "all interference from outside cease." UNSCR 752 (May 15, 1992) demanded that "JNA [YPA] or Croatian Army units in Bosnia-Herzegovina be withdrawn or subject to Bosnia-Herzegovina government authority or disarmed and disbanded with weapons under international supervision." While repeating the same demand in Resolution 757 on May 30, the Security Council also imposed "wide-ranging sanctions" against the new federal republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) because of the "failure of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA [YPA] authorities to meet Resolution 752."⁷⁸

Despite this foreign view that the army was an external aggressor on Bosnian sovereignty, a primary reason for concern if war erupted in Bosnia was the intimate bond between the Yugoslav People's Army and that republic. The fate of the army would not be determined before the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the relationship between the two was of a different order altogether than the question of political loyalties or of obtaining diplomatic recognition of sovereignty. For geopolitical, geological, and historical reasons, Bosnia-Herzegovina had been the heart of the country's defense. Located in the interior of Yugoslavia with the natural resources of mountainous terrain, Bosnia-Herzegovina was ideal for the location of military production—coal, iron, timber, metallurgy, steel, hydroelectric power, armaments, and industrial crops. The industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Habsburgs after 1878, the removal of strategic industries from borderlands into the interior after 1938 (before World War II) and again in the quarrel with the Cominform in 1948–49 (leading the army to call Bosnia its "Dinaric Fortress"), and the massive federal investment in Bosnian industry in 1948–52 were all consequences of Bosnia-Herzegovina's military significance. Even in the 1980s, when the army was being substantially downsized, 40 to 55 percent of the Bosnian economy was tied to military industries; 50 to 55 percent of its industry was federally mandated investment for that reason; and 40,000 people were employed directly in military production. Sixty to 80 percent of the army's physical assets (armaments factories, supply routes, airfields, mines and basic raw materials, stockpiles, training schools, oil depots) were located in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the eve of the war, 68 percent of the federal army's 140,000 troops were stationed in the republic.⁷⁹ To the extent that the Yugoslav army was fighting a war for its own integrity and state, it could not easily be a neutral party in Bosnia-Herzegovina or abandon its own economic foundations.

Even if the army's identity is equated with its permanent personnel alone, it was inextricable from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because the primary site of Partisan fighting against Axis powers in World War II was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, an estimated 80 percent of the officer corps originated there. Early accusations of Serbian aggression in Croatia and Bosnia were commonly supported with the allegation that the army was 70 percent Serbian. It is not fully clear how these data were compiled, since a large portion of the officer corps identified their nationality as Yugoslav, and reliable statistics on the ethnic composition of the army were not publicly available. Moreover, the army experienced substantial turnover for political and natural reasons. To obtain such an estimate, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Yugoslavs would have to be equated as Serbs; the data would have to represent only the professional corps of officers and its civilian employees and not the entire army or armed forces; and the differences

between ethnic Serbs from Serbia proper and from outside Serbia would have to be ignored. The full active component, including conscripts, reservists, and reserve officers, was far more representative of the ethnic composition of the population. This was even more true if one assessed the total armed forces, which included the TDFs of each republic. The senior officer corps and assignment of commands strictly followed the legal requirement—the key (*ključ*)—of national proportionality.

More important, the labeling of the YPA as a Serbian army, with all its implications, accepted the nationalist argument that ethnic origin was equivalent to political loyalty and partisanship. In the hands of outsiders who were insisting on borders and sovereignty as defined by the former republics, the label was also confusing, if not hypocritical, for like the nationalists, it seemed to deny the difference between ethnic origin and republic of origin or residence. But the army was ideologically a communist institution, dogmatically antinationalist.⁸⁰ To the extent it had a Serbian “character” in terms of ethnicity, these Serbs came largely from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia as a result of the army’s origins during World War II, when ethnic Serbs in the areas of the former military border between Austria and Turkey took sanctuary with Partisan units against the fascist Ustasha campaign of genocide against them. Along with many officers of the royal army from Serbia proper, they chose to join the Partisans under Tito rather than the Serbian Chetniks.⁸¹

Relations between the army and the Bosnian government nonetheless deteriorated as the country dissolved. At the time of the Slovene and Croatian independence declarations, the Bosnian government and Parliament had made no particular effort to communicate with the army, in part because of internal divisions among the parties. From the beginning, the Croatian party took the position of its Zagreb superiors that the YPA was an army of occupation. Bosnian Serb party leaders issued calls to the YPA as early as mid-July to protect the Serb minority, just as its other SDS branch had done in Croatia. While preparing actively for armed conflict like the others, the SDA leadership under Izetbegović began to talk as a state-building party about transforming the army within Bosnia-Herzegovina into the republic’s national army in a future Yugoslav confederation. The declaration of Bosnian sovereignty by the Croat-Muslim alliance on October 15, 1991, however, was a direct reaction to the army decision to mobilize troops in the Bosnian *krajina*, as part of the intensified fighting in Croatia during September. Although President Izetbegović ordered draft boards to ignore the order for mobilization, he was sensitive enough to the Slovene and Croatian precedents and to the YPA’s commitment to some form of a Yugoslavia that included Bosnia to issue a warning to all sides not to do anything against the army. Minister of Defense Kadijević promised to do everything necessary to prevent the war’s spread to Bosnia.

Such a commitment in the midst of a rapidly deteriorating and shifting political scene depended, however, on the ability of these two men to maintain a consistent position and keep control over their own forces. Izetbegović’s mandate as president expired in November 1991 and the means used to extend it a second twelve months were not universally considered legitimate. Kadijević felt obliged to resign in January 1992. Officers loyal to both the YPA and Bosnia who tried to play a neutral and pacifying role faced a rise in incidents requiring damage control during the fall. In September 1991, within days after the Belgrade Initiative issued its proposal for a new Yugoslavia, reservists from Serbia went on a shooting spree in Tuzla, the truly multiethnic city in northern Bosnia, and cross-border raids began to terrorize citizens in eastern Bosnia into ethnic factions. Refugees from the war in Croatia brought with them the polarizing epithets of Chetniks (for all Serbs) and Ustasha (for all Croats) and provoked clashes with local army units. Officers unsure of which way the political wind would blow maneuvered their own local alliances and provocations to test the waters, which had the effect of exacerbating tensions.⁸²

Also during the fall, while the YPA was preparing to leave Croatia, Izetbegović sought to negotiate a political accommodation and partial demobilization, promising that officers and their families could keep their apartments and receive their pensions, and that the government would assist their transition to employment in the civilian sector. Yet it was not at all clear where he would find the funds necessary to make the promise credible. The economy had already begun to collapse as a result of the country’s dissolution and of an economic embargo imposed on Bosnia-Herzegovina during the fall by Croatia (on transportation routes) and Serbia (on most trade in food and fuel).

Izetbegović appealed to German foreign minister Genscher in early December to wait to recognize Croatia until Bosnia’s political relations were more settled, but he also showed his hand by requesting UN peacekeeping troops to guard the border on December 6. The EC decisions on recognition in December and the decision of the Croat-Muslim faction within the Bosnian government to request recognition and of the Serb party to declare in response that it would create its own republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina appeared to force YPA units and officers toward an alliance with Serbs wishing to remain within Yugoslavia and TDF units in Serb majority localities. All other territorial defense forces began to mobilize on the side of the Croat-Muslim alliance. Yet the period between Kadijević’s resignation in January 1992 and the EC demand of April 11, 1992, that the YPA leave Bosnia-Herzegovina still presented opportunities for reversing the polarization and for preventing open war. The confrontation mounted only after April 4, when the Bosnian government, assured that recognition was coming on April 6, called up the national guard to

fight Serb insurrection and declared the YPA untrustworthy and on the side of the Bosnian Serbs. Following the tactics chosen earlier by Slovenia and then Croatia, it blockaded YPA barracks and insisted on the army's retreat under UN supervision.⁸³

Although President Milošević had been resisting for over a year calls from the Serbian parliament and nationalists for the formation of a Serbian national army, he acknowledged the fait accompli on May 8 when the new Yugoslav army (VJ) retired thirty senior officers known as Titoists. Života Panić, who had been commanding officer at Vukovar, was appointed the new state's minister of defense. Only a week after Panić claimed that the YPA would remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina at least five years, he ordered its withdrawal from the republic.⁸⁴

The YPA project for a rump Yugoslavia disappeared with the YPA. But the retreat of the YPA from Bosnia-Herzegovina May 4–10 meant in fact the departure of the 20 percent of its personnel who originated from Serbia and Montenegro, the two remaining republics of the former federation that joined into a new Yugoslavia on April 27. Left in Bosnia were two-thirds of the YPA's ammunition, much heavy artillery and equipment, and 80,000 troops who were Bosnian citizens. These were largely transferred to the territorial defense forces of the "Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina," the core of a new Bosnian Serb army formed on May 13.⁸⁵ Bosnian loyalist Milutin Kukanjac was replaced by General Ratko Mladić, the openly pro-Serb militant from Bosnia who had been commander of the Knin corps of the YPA.⁸⁶ Mladić's military campaign to keep eastern and northern Bosnia within Yugoslavia so as to create a corridor between Serbia and the areas claimed by Serbs in the Croatian *krajina* and a strategic buffer along the Drina River had become explicitly Serb nationalist in its motivations, attached to the Bosnian Serb party (SDS) leadership and its political aims. At the same time, the forced retreat of YPA officers from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had been to Belgrade; the senior ranks of the new Yugoslav army were former colleagues of Mladić, veterans of the campaigns in Croatia and Bosnia, and in many cases, exiles from their origins in these republics. In contrast to the moderate Panić, for example, was General Nikola Uzelac, responsible for arming Serb irregulars in the Banja Luka region, who was appointed to the general staff and commander of the third army (of three) with jurisdiction over Kosovo.⁸⁷ Moreover, on June 16, Bosnian president Izetbegović announced that he had signed a formal military alliance with Croatian president Tuđman.

The Proliferation of Weapons

In addition to the influence of EC and UN diplomatic negotiations to recognize republican sovereignty and obtain a cease-fire, the UN arms

embargo imposed in September 1991 in response to the war in Croatia contributed to further chaos in the system of defense. It gave impetus to political groups throughout the country to seize local stockpiles of weapons and ammunition (such as the move by Croat forces in Herzegovina to secure TDF assets and keep them from the YPA) and to plan the relocation of assets in preparation for war (as appeared to be the motivation of YPA troop movements out of Bosnian cities during the fall of 1991). It made control over Bosnia and sites of domestic defense plants and installations more critical and led governments (especially Croatia and Serbia) to begin war production from the substantial domestic arms industry.⁸⁸ Such production, however, did not interrupt cooperation between Croatian and Serbian tank and arms producers even while Croats and ethnic Serbs were at war in Croatia.

The embargo gave an initial advantage to those who had built up armies during 1990–91, those who had taken the early initiative over TDF assets, and those aided by the army from existing stocks. Slovene territorial defense forces used Armbrust rocket launchers and antitank weapons from Germany in the ten-day war; in Croatia and Bosnia, Serb irregulars used new German submachine guns and sniper rifles sold to an arms buyer in Belgrade; and the Croatian government had little difficulty purchasing west European antitank weapons, east German AK-47 and Argentine self-loading rifles, Stinger missiles, and west German light arms and, apparently, even Leopard tanks.⁸⁹ The initial disproportions in access to domestic stocks and the uncertainty and higher risks and cost attached to foreign supplies encouraged a local arms race. Croatia captured arms in September 1991 by blockading YPA barracks and by seizing about thirty ships and all bases of the former Yugoslav navy.⁹⁰ The YPA supported some Serb groups in Croatia. Slovene war booty was transferred to Croatians, and YPA equipment, including heavy artillery and planes, to Bosnian Serbs. This led to the development of new arms industries, such as Croatia's construction of a fully equipped army, navy, and air force of 110,000 troops by November 1992 from its own plants—the Djuro Djaković tank factory, Zmaj aircraft center, and shipyards.

The primary source of continuing disadvantage, in fact, was physical location and the dependence of some areas—above all, central Bosnia—on others within the former country for access to supply routes and transport. The UN embargo thus reproduced the effects of economic reform and westernization and the EC decisions on recognition and aid. In its early stages the embargo largely affected the Bosnian army, Muslim paramilitaries, and special forces created by Albanians in Kosovo. Able to purchase or receive from foreign patrons, émigrés, and arms markets abroad substantial imports of light arms and ammunition, they could not overcome their disadvantage in access to heavy weapons (artillery, tanks) and aircraft

of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, because supply routes were controlled by their potential or real enemy. Thus President Izetbegović's military alliance with Croatia aimed to gain access to the sea for arms, fuel, and supplies. When Croatian war aims extended beyond their political stronghold in western Herzegovina, during the fall of 1992, Croatian forces that controlled those routes began to insist on a 50 to 70 percent cut of all weapons traffic, if they let any through at all (which they did less and less after September 1992).

The Bosnian government's dependence on Croatian cooperation to allow arms and refugees to flow prevented President Izetbegović, in fact, from calling for international sanctions on Croatia, even when it was clear that the alliance meant little to the fighting on the ground and that the Croatian army (HV) was an active participant against Bosnian forces. Indeed, it led Izetbegović to protect Tudjman by muting international criticism on numerous occasions. At the same time, the borders between Serbia and Montenegro and areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed by Bosnian Serbs were so permeable and its legitimacy as an international border so rejected by locals that Serbian assistance of weapons, fuel, supplies, and "weekend warriors" were easily provided and difficult to interdict. Landlocked Bosnian forces and Albanians in Serbia thus had to rely more than the others on attracting international sympathy to obtain the foreign military assistance, such as air cover for their ground troops or actual attacks on enemy heavy artillery, that the embargo was designed to make unnecessary.

Economic Disintegration and the Collapse of Trade

Inseparable from the collapse of civil order and the protracted process of transformation from a single Yugoslav to many separate armies and paramilitary groups that characterized the fighting was the dissolution of their common economy. Also not obedient to republican borders, economic relations and the flow of goods and transport necessarily were casualties of the political conflict—in part, a spontaneous breakdown and, in part, deliberate destruction of the economic interdependencies of the former state. But the fact of these interdependencies also provided weapons of war. Thus the Serbian attempt to boycott Slovene goods after December 1990 had little effect on the Slovene economy. But when Serbia and Croatia both imposed an embargo on goods going into Bosnia-Herzegovina during the fall of 1991, in order to sabotage the Bosnian economy and facilitate their respective war aims, the effect was devastating.⁹¹ The economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina not only was fully integrated into the Yugoslav economy, but also particularly depended on the import of food. While Bosnians reeled from the inflationary effects, the areas claimed by militant Bosnian

Croats (their state of Herzeg-Bosnia) had an important buffer of stability from their early economic incorporation into Croatia proper, Croatian currency, and Dalmatian trade routes. This also helped to facilitate the payment and therefore loyalty of soldiers and local administrations that were critical to the Bosnian Croats' war aims.

The persistent efforts during 1991 and again in mid-1992 by the leadership in Montenegro to distance itself from Serbian policies and be more independent were also futile without international support, because Montenegro's transportation routes, energy grids, and similar lifelines were connected to Serbia and because the republic's dependence on federal budgetary subsidies had been transferred to Serbia after the collapse of Yugoslavia. The Croatian decision on September 11, 1991, to shut off the Adria oil pipeline feeding Serbia (and central Europe) and the war's disruption of links with Croatia and Slavonia meant that Serbia could not easily afford to lose its access to the sea through Montenegro. Each Montenegrin move, therefore, was met by some form of economic pressure, such as an overnight rise in the cost of electricity or a blockade of fuel oil, from Serbia. Unable to gain even international acknowledgment of its separate interests, the Montenegrin liberals had nowhere to turn, and the Montenegrin government had to find accommodation with Milošević (particularly after December 1992, when its support for the campaign of Yugoslav prime minister Panić to end the war was defeated along with Panić in the Serbian presidential election). The UN economic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro after May 30, 1992, imposed to stop the war in Bosnia, not only made Serbia's alternative routes in the east more risky, but also caused serious hardship for Macedonia. Macedonia was landlocked and nearly all of its road, railway, energy, power, and telecommunications links went through Serbia. Macedonia sold about two-thirds of its agricultural and manufactured goods to Serbia.⁹²

The actual path of the dissolution of the state had a direct consequence on the character of those wars. The first stage of fighting (seen in both the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, when the world was least attentive or prepared to react) was not a calculated military strategy between contending armies or between the Yugoslav army and republican militias. The situation was, instead, chaotic. Competing militias and gangs marauded, only loosely linked to centers of command and control or fully freewheeling, and paramilitary extremists escalated small confrontations to force political leaders to greater militancy. The declining number of regular troops and difficulty finding conscripts willing to fight led to supplementation with militant extremist volunteers and criminals released from jails, who were more often motivated by the invitation to loot and plunder than nationalist fervor. The worst excesses of reported massacres, rape, and mutilations emerged because of such conditions.

Local interests and alliances predominated, giving a very different character to warfare in different regions and municipalities. To the extent that battles had a strategic character, each commanding officer also faced a choice among competing loyalties (based on a calculation of the probable fate of the army itself as well as personal sentiments and bonds of obligation).

The political conflict within national and military organizations over political goals and strategy, the absence of appropriate equipment for communication among local units, and the continuing dominance of local loyalties interfered throughout the period with efforts to impose central control or enforce negotiated agreements. Events such as the shelling of Dubrovnik at the end of October 1991 and the attack on an EC monitoring helicopter that killed five airmen in January 1992 appear to have been the result of policy disagreements within the YPA senior command and the branches of the armed forces. It remains unclear whether there would have been a three-month siege (August 24–November 17, 1991) and destruction of Vukovar, the worst battle of the Croatian war, had renegade forces from the Croatian National Guard (called the Wolves of Vukovar) and neofascist Ustasha bands such as the Zebras, who were loyal to local politicians (particularly the right-wing radical in the HDZ, Tomislav Merčep), not chosen to ignore Zagreb authority and put up a stiff resistance—in order to draw the government into a more aggressive strategy.⁹³ They succeeded in escalating the war because they were matched on the Serb side by right-wing radicals from Serbia, such as Šešelj, who had attempted to make eastern Slavonia a Chetnik base through radicalizing campaigns during the spring. In similar fashion, these irregulars were also outside much control but had allies within the army among officers who were attempting to drag Belgrade into the war.⁹⁴ The army, for its part, faced increasing problems of recruitment and desertion. Two units of the TDF refused to fight; morale was declining and there were insufficient soldiers in a location of major geopolitical significance. The commanding general, Života Panić, assessed that there would be no YPA left within two months unless he turned to artillery. Each fighting their own battles as much as each other, they continued until there was nothing left to destroy.⁹⁵

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, lack of communication affected the command and control of both the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian government armies and emphasized the dominance of local territorial forces in their origins and the psychology of defending home territory. The Bosnian government tended to fight many battles with small units of 1,000 to 2,000. Even after December 1992, by which time the organization of a new army made it possible to launch serious campaigns, they continued to have difficulty concentrating forces and creating mobility. Local alliances and local commanders held sway for the Croatian HVO and even the Bosnian Serb army,

despite the Serbs' mobile elite units and slightly higher proportion of former YPA officers.

Moreover, the dissolution of the country erased the security guarantees for most individuals and families. The bases of self-restraint and mutual trust that make civil order possible without massive coercion were already fragile after a decade of economic depression and social disintegration. The tactics of outside terrorists, the mass media propaganda, and the political interests of ethnically pure local administrations or police were additional assaults. The many recorded examples of heroic neighborliness across ethnic lines and in village solidarity against outside radicals could only provide for many a temporary protection against displacement or voluntary exile once the last vestiges of trust were destroyed by the unexpected hostility of other neighbors.⁹⁶

State-Building

Perhaps the most negligent element of the European policy to recognize the republics of the Yugoslav federation as separate nation-states was its disregard for the characteristics of states, as opposed to nations. States are more than communities of political identity. In addition to legitimacy and citizens, they require strategically defensible borders, economic assets sufficient to survive against external threats, and a monopoly on the use of force over territory claimed. The borders of the republics had never had to satisfy the needs of independent states. Once nationalists turned to state-building, there was an additional reason on many sides for contesting existing republican borders. While political rhetoric and propaganda continued to emphasize ethnic criteria, the actual goals of military activity would be driven by strategic objectives.

Therefore, although Europeans had argued that recognition of Slovene and Croatian sovereignty—and the invitation to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia—would stop the use of force, its consequence was to up the ante instead. Once it was clear that Yugoslavia was no longer salvageable and that separate states would ensue, the strategic requirements of statehood fueled war.

In this aspect of the Yugoslav conflict, too, the Slovene case deceived those who thought that the creation of new states, state powers, and foreign relations would be unproblematic and peaceful. Its economy had long been more integrated internationally (especially with Western markets) than domestically. Slovene firms adjusted rapidly to war and international sanctions, maintaining their contracts and markets in Serbia by redirecting routes, through friendly Hungary where necessary, in spite of the UN embargo.⁹⁷ The availability of Austrian capital and the central

European trade and tourist organizations such as Alpe-Adria provided Slovenia with a buffer, in the short run, against the collapse of the Yugoslav market. Because Slovenia had the highest proportion of export producers, it could reassure international financial organizations and credit markets that it could reliably assume its portion of the Yugoslav foreign debt and guarantee new loans. Membership in the United Nations for Slovenia came easily and quickly, in May 1992. By December 1992, long before there was any hope of discussion over the economic questions of the Yugoslav succession, Slovenia had been admitted to the IMF and to the Council of Europe.

Slovenia's Alpine terrain provided a natural line of defense as long as the policy it chose during the 1980s to repopulate the uplands could be maintained. It had succeeded in taking control over most of the military assets of the Yugoslav army, establishing a national monopoly over the use of force, and gaining foreign assistance in purchasing supplementary arms even before its declaration of independence. Reconstruction of war damage was minor, in contrast to the effects of the war on its border. With borders and international relations stable, a parliamentary vote of no confidence over failing economic policies brought down the center-right government that had waged the war, and an election six months later resumed the prewar trend back to the liberals.

In contrast to Slovenia, war in the other republics reflected, in part, the process of creating the coercive instruments and borders of states. Armed clashes began when police forces moved in to challenge local control by national minorities, as in Glina, Plitvice, and Borovo Selo in Croatia in 1990–91. A critical moment in the consolidation of control over Herzeg-Bosnia, the state within Bosnia-Herzegovina being created by the Bosnian Croat branch of the HDZ, occurred when its armed forces succeeded in assassinating Blaž Kraljević, the regional commander of rival Croatian forces, the right-wing HOS, in Trebinje in August 1992. Although the military alliance between the Croatian and Bosnian governments had broken down after September 1992, it did not lead to open warfare between Bosnian Croats and Muslims until the end of January 1993, when Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban began to disarm Bosnian government police and army personnel in areas of central Bosnia that he claimed for Herzeg-Bosnia. Brutal massacres carried out by both forces in mixed Croat-Muslim towns of central Bosnia beginning with Vitez in April 1993 were triggered when Croatian defense minister Gojko Šušak visited Bosnia and ordered the Croatian state flag raised over these towns.

War in the other republics also concerned strategic assets, in contrast to Slovenia's natural, and largely uncontested, borders and its linkup with European transportation and communication routes. Ethnically defined territories are not by and large defined by natural borders, and the fact of war between ethnically defined armies heightened sensitivity to the need

for defensible borders between national states that might be hostile.⁹⁸ Access to the sea, ports, and international transportation routes became necessities for landlocked areas which aimed to become independent states. One aspect of the fight for Vukovar was geopolitical, made more immediate by the increasing importance of the Danube River as an international waterway for commerce and defense in the continental expansion of European trade with the end of the cold war.⁹⁹ Although Croatia claimed western Herzegovina on both historicist and ethnodemocratic principles, its importance was strategic: as an essential cordon protecting the Dalmatian coast tourist trade and its thin, long, vulnerable line of north-south communications of an independent state of Croatia.¹⁰⁰

Montenegro (and therefore Serbia, with which it was allied in one state) could not defend itself without control over the Prevlaka peninsula, and the fishing industry that was critical to its economy could not afford the Croatian claim of territorial waters that it extended from the Prevlaka it controlled. Regardless of international recognition for the former republican borders, the strategic significance of the Prevlaka peninsula for Montenegro, of the Drina and Danube rivers for Serbia, and of the Dalmatian hinterland for Croatia required subsequent negotiation.

Perhaps the greatest confusion for foreign observers was the debate over maps that seemed to derail all political negotiations over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The more war continued in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the more armies fought for routes, defensible corridors, and contiguous territories. Outsiders continued to talk of *percentages* of territory in ethnic terms and of what they considered to be a just solution, including their aim of not "rewarding aggression." Neither had much resonance in the behavior of military forces, whose leaders were thinking in strategic terms of independent survival and natural lines of defense and stable borders. Although leaders continued to lay claim to territory on national grounds, including the criterion of the majority ethnic identity of residents in the 1991 census, claims to territory on grounds of national rights did not mean they would be limited to ethnic-majority or historically national territories.

When international mediators, for example, ignored Karadžić's insistence on the cantonization of Bosnia, with his claim of Serbian rights to 65 percent of Bosnian territory on the grounds that Serbs held legal title to this much land in Bosnia even if their percentage in the population was lower, the Bosnian Serb army under General Mladić pushed instead to fill in the patchwork quilt of these landholdings to make contiguous, statelike territory and to build a land corridor between Serbia proper and the Serbian-claimed areas in the Croatian *krajina* that was intended to ensure the survival of Serbs as a nation in this area.¹⁰¹ Even cities that were considered clearly Muslim territory by population and historical tradition became military targets because of their military assets (airfields, oil depots, hydro-

electric power plants, armaments factories, communication lines for supplies).¹⁰² Similarly, when Bosnian government forces took the offensive at the end of 1992, some of the most vicious fighting of the war (in terms of atrocities and ethnic cleansing) occurred in central Bosnia. Whereas journalists argued that this fight between predominantly Muslim forces and their former Croatian allies occurred because the Bosnian government could not penetrate Serbian-held territory, the fact was that Bosnian Muslim goals were strategic: the industrial heartland and above all the armaments factories in towns such as Vitez.

The importance of economic assets to new states, moreover, was behind the prolonged refusal of Bosnian Serbs to sign on to the map part of the Vance-Owen plan. Whereas the international community accused the plan of appeasing aggression (for assigning the Bosnian Serbs majority control over 43 percent of the territory—a rollback from the 70 percent they held militarily at the time of the negotiations but more than their approximately 33 percent of the population), the Bosnian Serbs were calculating not only the percentage of territory given each constituent nation in relation to its percentage of the population, but also the proportional value of industrial and mining sources, energy sources (thermal, coal, hydroelectric power), and railways per province and “per ethnic group.” In this calculation, the Vance-Owen map was leading to the economic destruction of their territory “with the stroke of the pen” because it “deprive[d] them of energy sources and industrial plants” and made them “dependent in energy and therefore economically submitted [sic]” to Muslim and Croat provinces and “condemned to permanent economic inferiority and dependence.”¹⁰³ The same calculation of economic values by nationality became a key bargaining document of the Bosnian Muslim leadership in the summer of 1994 when the map at issue was one formulated by the Contact Group. A stumbling block in the one in between, the Invincible plan, was the Bosnian government and Bosnian Muslim demand for access to the sea and to the Sava River.

Conclusion

Had the Western view that Yugoslavia was an artificial creation of separate nation-states been correct, there would have been no reason for war. Moreover, the characteristics of the ensuing wars were defined by its causes rather than by some historical predilection to war and to the particular form of brutality witnessed in Yugoslavia. Because the EC left it up to partisans in Yugoslavia to decide which justifications for territory would prevail in defining new states and borders, the constitutional methods of combat during 1989–90 (national claims through constitutional

preamble, citizenship rights, and loyalty oaths) were replaced by the methods, social organization, culture, and weapons associated with land and its defense.¹⁰⁴

Regardless of ethnic differences, the process of justifying a nation's sovereignty over territory became embodied in persons and their rights to live on that land. It was this association, of this link between particular persons and land with past wars, that made historical memories relevant to the conflict and opened thoughts of revenge that had been laid aside. And the EC's insistence on referendums to legitimize these rights, while accepting the validity of only some, provided the impetus—whatever the spontaneous reasons (envy, hatred, competition)—to expel people from their homes and jobs on the basis of their ethnicity and to create ethnically pure areas through population transfers and expulsions as a prelude to a vote. The goal was not territorial acquisition but statehood. For that, only international recognition would complete the task.

Contrary to the distinction made by the international community between humanitarian and political objectives, there can be no distinction between soldier and civilian in such wars. The goal is to claim territories for a particular people and to resolve questions of membership and political loyalties through war. As in a referendum, the size of the turnout is as important as the size of the vote—but neutrality is even less of an option. Whatever the methods used, the fight to establish national rights to land has a genocidal aspect. According to the myth of right-wing nationalism, ethnicity is pure and a *natural* basis for state rights. Those who refuse to accept an ethnically defined political loyalty are reclassified as enemies of their people. The conflict is not ethnic, in other words, but national: ethnic Croats who protested exclusive Croatian nationalism or President Tudjman's policies, ethnic Serbs who opposed Slobodan Milošević or argued for intellectual dissent, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina who identified themselves as Bosnians rather than side with Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Croat nationalists were all classified with the enemy and vulnerable to treatment as traitors.

Moreover, contrary to those who argue that these wars represent a clash of civilizations—between civilized and barbarian, Western and Balkan, Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox, Christian and Muslim—the real clash is social and economic. Territorial war for new states does not put an end to the political, economic, and social conflicts raised by the policies of global integration but that lost out to the nationalist juggernaut; they are simply played out under the guise of ethnic conflict. The war became an opportunity for a revolt of the disadvantaged, for individual enrichment, for political aspirations, and for revenge against the communist regime. The character of the fighting itself is best explained by the socioeconomic background of those leading the fight and doing the sol-

diering. Thus the element of revenge is far more social and generational than historical, although the two can come together. Right-wing nationalists in Serbia and Croatia did revive the names, symbols, and even uniforms of right-wing nationalists from World War II—the monarchist Chetniks and fascist Ustasha—for their paramilitary forces.

The description of the Yugoslav wars as ethnic conflict is most misleading, however, as a predictor of military activity. Military strategy in this case was not driven by ethnic hatred, class conflict, or historical aspirations for territory, but by the geopolitical and institutional preconditions of sovereignty: obtaining the strategic and economic assets and borders of a secure future state, destroying those of one's enemies, and building (in the course of war) the armies and foreign alliances of a new defense. Strategically defensible territories may have little relation to the borders defined by medieval states (as proclaimed by the historicist principle of a nation), by the patterns of migration and settlement of individuals and households (leading to the claim of the democratic principle), or by the administrative units of a former state (and the Helsinki principles); but short of such security, a state is incomplete. Like the social conflicts defining loyalties and fighting, this strategic objective is part of the longer process of the disintegration of one state and transformation of its assets and institutions to new states in the process of formation. The local organization of territorial defense in the previous Yugoslav system, the massive stockpiles of weapons, the armaments factories, and the organization of the federal army contributed substantially to the pattern of fighting. And as an actor in its own right in the constitutional battle, the army also had a political project: first, to hold a Yugoslavia together and to protect its particular assets and people, and then, as the political reality shifted, to create a state (a different state, depending on which officers and conscripts) to serve. Because the multiple elements and conflicts creating the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were part of a prewar and postwar political continuum encompassing all of former Yugoslavia, however, they also characterized politics and calculation in areas that were not yet at war.

Chapter 9

Stopping the Bosnian War

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina posed a severe test for the international community. It did not fit any of the categories for which international and regional organizations were designed. Two sets of problems were overriding in revealing this lack of fit and preparation and in thwarting a more adequate response.

The first was the dilemma posed by the decision of the major powers on the one hand that Bosnia-Herzegovina had no strategic significance and the ability of the republic and its people on the other hand to mobilize nearly continuous pressure on the major powers from the global mass media and international public opinion to act. The absence of vital interest for major powers meant that they would not become engaged militarily in the war, but the pressure from the media and the public acted as a moral campaign, reminding the world that international conventions and moral law were being violated and demanding that the major powers take decisive military action. This dilemma made concrete the proverbial identification of Yugoslavia—and particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina—as a “crossroads.” It was, but it also was not, a part of Europe. The compromise was to send UN peacekeeping forces to deliver humanitarian assistance to civilians in the midst of a multisided war. The predictable effect of such a policy was to satisfy no one, to build in constant pressure for more assertive action, and to endanger seriously the credibility of the United Nations and peacekeeping in general.

The second set of problems, arising from the issue of national sovereignty, plagued the multiple rounds of political negotiations aimed at bringing an end to the war. The European Community's willingness to break up multinational Yugoslavia on the principle of national sovereignty showed little regard for the consequences for multinational Bosnia-Herzegovina. This mistake was compounded by U.S. insistence on recognizing Bosnia's sovereignty before its ties with other parts of the former country (particularly Croatia and Serbia) were clarified and before some negotiated arrangement had been reached among the three ethno-“national” political parties (each claiming the status and rights of “con-