I return, finally, to one of the questions that began this article, Who will want to rear the children? If we continue to allocate this activity on a strictly sexual basis, if we continue to generally denigrate its significance, and to make it necessary for those who do it to sacrifice their self-esteem and independence and to reduce their potential for other kinds of contributions to their culture, then the answer, I believe, is that those who want to rear the children will be those who are fearful of autonomy and distrustful of their own capacities to function in the larger community. If, however, we come to view children as desirable rather than necessary, and to view child rearing as not incompatible with other creative activities, then such a question will not need to be asked. Many will still decide, for all sorts of personally valid reasons, that parenthood is not for them, but others, remembering their own joyful childhoods, will be eager to participate in such an experience again, as parent now instead of child. REFERENCES Atkinson, T. G. The institution of sexual intercourse. In S. Firestone & A. Koedt (Eds.), Notes from the second year: Women's liberation. New York: Radical Feminism, 1970. Besdine, M. Mrs. Oedipus has daughters, too. Psychology Today, 1971, 4, 62. Firestone, S. The dialectic of sex. New York: Bantam, 1970. Gaylin, W. We have the awful knowledge to make exact copies of human beings. New York Times Magazine, March 5, 1972, pp. 12-13, 41-49. Geeer, G. The female eunuch. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970. Hartley, R. E. American core culture: Changes and continuities. In G. H. Seward & R. C. Williamson (Eds.), Sex roles in changing society. New York: Random House, 1970. Jones, B. The dynamics of marriage and motherhood. In R. Morgan (Ed.), Sisterhood is powerful. New York: Vintage, 1970. Koedt, A. The myth of the vaginal orgasm. In S. 11 stone & A. Koedt (Eds.), Notes from the second y Women's liberation. New York: Radical Feminism, 1 Limpus, L. The liberation of women: Sexual repres and the family. In H. Gadlin & B. E. Garskof (Ei The uptight society. Belmont, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1 Lott, A. J., Lott, B. E., Reed, T., & Crow, T. Person: i trait descriptions of differentially liked persons. Jow of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16, 284-Maccoby, E. E., & Jackxin, C. N. Sex differences their implications for sex role. Unpublished manusc i Stanford University, 1971. Mailer, N. The prisoner of sex. Harper's, March 1 pp. 41-91. Mead, M. Male and female. New York: Dell, 1949. Mead, M., & Hyman, K. Family. New York: Macmill 1965. Millett, K. Sexual politics. New York: Doubleday, 1 Money, J. Sexual dimorphism and homosexual ge identity. Psychological Bulletin, 1970, 74, 425-440. Rollin, B. Motherhood, who needs it? Look, Septer ib 22, 1970, pp. 15-17. Romer, K. T., & Secor, C. The time is here for womu liberation. Annals of the American Academy of Polt'ic and Social Science, 1971, 397, 129-139. Rossi, A. S. Changing sex roles and family developn i r Unpublished manuscript, (Voucher College, 1971. Sedler, R. A. The legal dimension of women's Hberatio In L. Worell (Chm.), Women's liberation: Equalit legality, and personality. Symposium presented i' tl annual meeting of the American Psychological A-, ci tion, Washington, D.C., September 1971. Shaw, M. E., & Wright, J. M. Scales for the m t it ment of attitudes. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1! 7 Shaw, R. Artists today: A conversation. Worn Journal of Liberation, 1970, Fall, 38^12. Sherfey, M. J. A theory on female sexuality, li I Morgan (Ed.), Sisterhood is powerful. New \orl Vintage, 1970. Stannard, u. The mask of beauty. In V. Gornick & 1 Y Moran (Eds.), Women in sexist society. New \ >rl» Basic Books, 1971. Walker, H. M., & Lev, J. Statistical inference. vei York: Holt, 1953. Women on Words and Images. Dick and Jane as t n:tt, Princeton, N.J.: Author, P.O. Box 2163, 1972. Worell, J., & Worell, L. Supporters and oppoíir G women's liberation: Some personality correlates. Ill -Worrell (Chm.), Women's liberation: Equality, 1 ? W» and personality. Symposium presented at the innua meeting of the American Psychological Assoi latioii Washington, D,C, September 1971. 582 • July 1973 • American Psychologist Ecology: Let's Hear from the People In Objective Scale for the Measurement of Ecological Attitudes and Knowledge MICHAEL P. MALONEY University of Southern California School of Medicine MICHAEL P. WARD University of Southern California School of Medicine 1 ■ Mih 'logy, like many other sciences, has recently nil 'rasping (some would say "gasping") for i\ ji e. For many sciences, a mere glance from \\ »■ mdovvs of their ivory towers brought an end ■■ i« 2arch for relevancy. Their eyes burned and u ision was limited by the hazylike condition m atmosphere; they were overwhelmed with i numbers of people, the noises they made, the uii I they consumed, their trappings and their The landscape was changing rapidly, and 'i N from the tower was no longer pleasant . tlu tower itself no longer isolated. The issue ■ i"bgy demanded relevance. Indeed, it de- i« it 1 preeminence. With the problem apparent, ntisls began to look for a solution in their ■1.-.1 fashion. Technological solutions were ■l.i ftii i\hat were defined as technological prob- Ihui, the rush is now on to develop new 'Ii ii s, tu w engines, nonpolluting detergents and ouires, biodegradable products of all kinds, i ''H' sjMems and recycling systems, etc. Society 1 lit to aave made the assumption that such *«i«s will, indeed, solve the problem. f Lhnology has won battles in the past, in the " ■> of medicine, transportation, and automation, •' liaj not provide the answer to the current al ci isis. First, the mushrooming nature of diliile is based on a paper presented at the annual ol tin Western Psychological Association, Portland, April (972. ■sis [ there is a paucity of data available to help in the understanding, prediction, and modification of these behaviors. At this point, we must reemphasize the urgency of this problem: the so-called "crunch" is predicted to occur within the next 30 years. Given this urgency, the most feasible solution lies in the immediate changing of critical behaviors on a population-wide basis. Furthermore, we must note that this is not simply an issue of numbers (cf. population control movements) but, more importantly, of what those numbers do. Even if population size remained static, present consumption-pollution behaviors pose limited viability. Clearly, our task is the immediate one of assessment, understanding, and modification of critical population behaviors. We must "go to the people" in an attempt to understand these behaviors. We must determine what the population "knows" regarding ecology, the environment, and pollution; how they feel about it; what commitments they are willing to make; and what commitments they do make. These are necessary antecedent steps that must be made before an attempt can be made to modify critically relevant behaviors. In an attempt to provide such data, the present authors have developed an ecology scale which is currently used primarily as a research device. While preliminary results are quite positive, our method is modest. The direction, however, is essential. The present scale and data are thus presented as a model, albeit crude, in the hope that further research will be stimulated. Method The ecology scale is comprised of four subscales with a total of 130 item's. The verbal commitment (VC) subscale, containing 36 items, measures what a person states he is willing to do in reference to environment-pollution issues. This subscale includes such items as "I'd be willing to ride a bicycle or take the bus to work in order to reduce air pollution" and "I would probably never join a group or club which is concerned solely with ecological problems." In contrast to this subscale, the actual commitment (AC) subscale, containing 36 items, measures what a person actually does in relation to pollution-environment issues. It includes such items as "I have switched products for ecological reasons" and "I save some waste materials for recycling." The affect (A) subscale, consisting of 34 items, measures the degree of an individual's emotionality related to ecological issues. Item examples are "I become incensed when I think about the harm being done to plant and animal life by pollution" and "I get depressed on smoggy days." Finally, the knowledge (K) subscale, containing 24 items, measures specific factual knowledge related to ecological issues. It includes such items as "Which of the following materials usually takes longest to decompose? A) Tin, B) Iron, C) Aluminum, D) Copper, E) Steel" and "Mercury has been found in unacceptable levels in A) Fruit, B) Vegetables, C) Seafood, D) Beef, E) Soft Drinks." Items for the verbal commitment, actual commitment, and affect subscales are presented in a true-false format. To control for acquiescence and negative sets, approximately 50% of the items are worded in a positive manner and 50% in a negative manner. Items for these three subscales are randomly mixed in the survey booklet. Knowledge items, which incorporate a multiple-choice format, are presented at the end of the booklet. Items in the present scale were selected from a pool of approximately 500 items. During initial item selection, an attempt was made to use items that reflected different degrees of commitment, affect, and knowledge. For example, the item "I would donate a day's pay to a foundation to help improve the environment" measures a high degree of verbal commitment, while the item "I'm willing to purchase beverages only in returnable bottles" measures a lower degree of such a commitment. After initial item selection was performed by several groups of psychology graduate students, the scale was presented to three independent judges (PhD psychologists) who assessed the appropriateness of each item in its subscale. Interjudge disagreement led to the exclusion of six items. The contrasted-groups approach to criterion validity was employed by administering the scale to Conservation Committee members of two chapters of the Sierra Club (Los Angeles area). Data analysis revealed that these persons scored significantly higher on all subscales (see Tables 1 and 2) than do groups of college and noncollege adults. The Sierra Club members thus functioned to anchor the high end of the scale, but because of the social desirability 584 • July 1973 • American Psychologist related to the ecology issue, no suitable low-anchor group has yet been found. The scale was administered to two additional groups of subjects. A college group was obtained by testing all students in three lower division psychology courses at California 'State University at Los Angeles. A noncollege adult group was obtained by testing any adult who was a resident of the Los Angeles area and who had less than 13 years of formal education. No additional criteria for subject selections were used. Subjects in all three groups were tested anonymously. Reliability was estimated separately for each subscale by use of the split-half technique with a randomly selected N of 12 from the college group. The following Pearson reliabiUty coefficients (corrected with the Spearman-Brown formula) were obtained: for VC, .91; AC, .93; A, .92; and K, .89. Results Table 1 presents means and standard deviations on the various subscales for the Sierra Club, college, and noncollege groups. A two-factor (Groups X Subscales) analysis of variance showed a significant interaction (F = 21.2, df= 2/125, p < .001). A series of t tests (presented in Table 2) reveals that the Sierra Club group scored significantly higher than the college and noncollege groups on all subscales. College subjects, in turn, scored significantly higher than noncollege subjects on all subscales. Intercorrelations among the subscales revealed that Subscale K did not correlate significantly with any of the other scales for any of the groups. Sub-scale A correlated moderately high with Subscale VC (.59, .75, .72) for the college, noncollege, and Sierra Club groups, respectively. Intergroup differences in correlation were not significant. Similarly, Subscale VC correlated moderately high with Sub-scale AC (.40, .39, .45) for the three groups, respectively. Again, intergroup differences among correlation were not significant. The degree of relationship between Subscales A table 1 Means and Standard Deviations for the Various Groups on Ecology Subscales Group N VC AC A K M SD M SD M SD M SD Sierra College Noncollege 32 56 40 24.75 19.43 16.15 3.87 5.75 6.35 24.28 15.04 10.50 S.03 6.89 5.29 31.D6 26.14 21.25 4.17 5.95 8.14 16.88 13.00 10.45 3.44 3.51 3.45 Note. VC = verbal commitment; AC —actual commitment; A = affect; K = knowledge. TABLE 2 Test Comparisons of the Various Groups on Ecology Subscales Group VC AC A K Sierra Club and college (df = 86) Sierra Club and noncollege (df = 70) College and noncollege (df - 94) 4.67*** 6.72*** 2.62* 6.65*** 11.20*** 3.49*** 6.21*** 3.40** 5.04*** 7.84*** 3.54*** Note. VC = verbal commitment; AC = actual commitment; A = affect; K = knowledge. * ŕ < .02. **ŕ <.oi. ***£ < .001. and AC for the college and noncollege groups was .40 and .39, respectively. The same relationship was significantly higher (.83) for the Sierra Club group. Discussion Due to the preliminary nature of the present data, ^conclusions must be tenuous. However, several interesting trends are noted. First, it appears that most persons have a relatively high degree of verbal commitment and affect, with lower levels of actual commitment and knowledge. In colloquial terms, most people say they are willing to do a great deal to help curb pollution problems and are fairly emotional about it, but, in fact, they actually do fairly little and know even less. This conclusion is suggested by mean differences on the various subscales as well as correlational data which suggest a relatively higher relationship between Subscales A and VC and a lower correlation between these subscales and Subscales AC and K. Knowledge presents a manifold problem. First, the very nature of ecology with its complex interactions between organisms and environment serves to make its subject matter difficult to understand and assimilate. Consequently, despite its current 1 popularity, the average person appears to know j very little about ecology. Thus, it becomes difficult i to develop an ecological knowledge scale with many \ high-probability, or "easy," items. Such difficulties may serve to explain low Subscale K correlations with other subscales. From the psychologist's point of view, high levels j of concern (Subscale A) over ecological issues and high verbal commitment to these issues should make fertile soil for the modification of ecologically I American Psychologist • July 1973 • 585 relevant behaviors (Subscale AC). The task, however, is an enormous one since, to be effective, such behaviors must be altered on a population-wide basis. A related problem confronting us is one of education, that is, developing in the population more knowledge about ecology, the environment, and pollution. Again, the task is enormous, but the outcome is critical. REFERENCES Lachenmayer, C. W. Experimentation—A misunderstood methodology in psychological and social-psychological research. American Psychologist, 1970, 25, 617-624. Meadows, D. H.( Meadows, D. L., Randers, J., & Behrens, W. W. The limits to growth. New York: Universe Books, 1972. Wohlwill, J. F. The emerging discipline of environmental psychology. American Psychologist, 1970, 25, 303-312. Special Issue: New Approaches to Behavioral Research on Smoking In April 1973, the Journal o j Abnormal Psychology published a monograph issue "New Approaches to Behavioral Research on Smoking." The material in this special issue was an outcome of a conference held in Tucson, Arizona, on March 30-31, 1972. The research, the conference, and the publication of the material were sponsored by the American Cancer Society. Because of the special nature of this issue, individual copies may be obtained through the Subscription Office of the APA at the cost of $5 per copy. 586 • July 1973 • American Psychologist Subject—Experimenter Perceptions of Ethical Issues in Human Research DAVID S. SULLIVAN Central State Hospital Pineville, Louisiana1 THOMAS E. DEIKER Central State Hospital Pineville, Louisiana2 Psychology has laid claim to being the first proti -sion to use empirical methods in developing a tode of ethics (APA, 1953). Beginning with the ') i sic data of commonsense judgments by responsible psychologists, the original code and its revision {M'A, 1963) were drafted from modal issues and flicisions. Despite these pioneer efforts and the pioduclion of wide-scale collaborative response f i«m the membership, there is little evidence in ill«» literature of continued experimental interest in 11ns area. Hamsher and Reznikoff (1967), in fact, In ŕe reported an inverse relationship between a ii earcher's experience and his interest in ethical pioblems. It seems that our efforts at self-regula-lii m have been, in large part, reactions to perceived public pressures concerned in one way or another iMlh individual rights, whether expressed through |(n irnali stic exposes and congressional hearings t \mrine, 1965), policies of the larger scientific minmunity (Panel on Privacy and Behavioral Re-si irch, 1967), or new research support require-nunts (USDHEW, 1971). The only focus in the psychological literature on i Ihical topics has been on the use of deception in jxisonality and social-psychological research. Conti iiversy has centered on the effectiveness of this •li ign in eliminating experimental artifact. Beginning with Rosenthal's (1966) unnerving disclosure of experimenter bias effects, a growing concern has been evidenced about the impact of the experimenter-subject relationship on research out- 1 Now at Northern Illinois University. 2 Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas E. Deiker, Central State Hospital, Research Department, Pineville, Louisiana 71360. comes. Strieker (1967), Seeman (196' Carlson (1971) have traced the growth o tion studies in the area of personality am psychological research over the last two Such designs now characterize over half studies published in this area and are co "as much de rigueur as significance at the [Kelman, 1967, p. 3]." Orne (1962), (1968), and Schultz (1969) have attempt retical explanations of this trend. Diff emphasis, they have agreed on the result: perimenter is fast becoming the only one c They have agreed also about the need means of enlisting the cooperation and c< tion of the subject rather than artificially ing to elicit "pure" responses. Stuart Cook and his colleagues (Comn Ethical Standards, 1971, 1972) have rec< opened this area to discussion through th prehensive codification of ethical issues h research. The Committee has broadenet decision strategies in their proposed s! They have suggested collegial review a studies of subject reactions as additional j ethical decision making. Compatible with the Committee's suggf proach of balancing benefits against ris! assumed disparity between ethical viewj the experimenter and his subject. The s frequently seen as ethically sensitive to pi involving his own welfare, but scientific trained to evaluate the merit of the study tion. The researcher, on the other han sumed to be in a position to know his gation's potential value, but less concen his subject's comfort or personal rights. 1 American Psychologist • July 19'.