* Professor, University of Heidelberg, Friedrich-Ebert-Anlage 6­10, D-69117, Heidelberg, Germany. This
is the English summary of a study to be published in German under the title, Die Aufnahme neuer Staaten in
die Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (1998).
..............................................................................................................................................................
European Journal of International Law 9 (1998), 491­509
.............................................................................................
The Admission of New States to
the International Community
Christian Hillgruber*
There are only very few branches of international law
which are of greater, or more persistent, interest and
significance for the law of nations than the question
of Recognition of States . . . Yet there is probably no
other subject in the field of international relations in
which law and politics appear to be more closely
interwoven.
Hersch Lauterpacht
Abstract
While the political relevance of the recognition of new states is beyond all doubt, the rules of
law which apply to this aspect of public international law remain uncertain. The new practice
of recognition of the recently established states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union since 1991 is said to have overridden the traditional principles of public international
law regarding recognition. Indeed, the predominant declarative theory cannot explain this
new practice convincingly. The integration of a new state in the international community
does not take place automatically, but through co-optation; that is, by individual and
collective recognition on the part of the already existing states. By the procedure of
recognition, these states exercise their prerogative to determine in advance whether the
newcomer, in their judgment, is able and willing to carry out all its obligations as a subject of
international law, whether it will be a reliable member of the international community.
Therefore, the ability and willingness of the new state to respect international law constitute
the central criteria of statehood in terms of international law. They are decisive for the
conferment of legal capacity under international law.
492 EJIL 9 (1998), 491­509
1
See Ruiz Fabri, `État (Création, Succession, Compétences). Gense et Disparition de l'État  l'Époque
Contemporaine', 38 AFDI (1992) 153, at 163 et seq.
2
On the `caractre cooptatif de l'accession  la communauté internationale' cf. Ruiz Fabri, supra note 1, at
169, 176.
3
31 ILM (1992), at 1486­1487.
4
Ibid.
5
Cf. Weller, `The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia',
86 AJIL (1992) 569, at 588, 604; Hummer, `Probleme der Staatennachfolge am Beispiel Jugoslawien', 3
SZIER (1993) 425, at 440; Charpentier, `Les Déclarations des Douzes Sur la Reconnaissance des
Nouveaux Etats', 96 RGDIP (1992) 343, at 351 et seq. See also Talmon, `Recognition of Governments:
An Analysis of the New British Policy and Practice', 63 BYbIL (1992) 231, at 250 et seq.
1 The Significance of Recognition in International Law and
the Contemporary Practice of Non-recognition
A The Legal Effect of Recognition
Recognition of a new state is an act that confers a status; as a result of recognition, the
recognized entity acquires the legal status of a state under international law. In this
sense, a (new) state is not born, but chosen as a subject of international law. Only
when the new state has been recognized does it become a subject of international law,
and this initially only with respect to the existing states recognizing it.1
On admission
as a member of the United Nations, the new state then becomes part of the globally
organized community of states by way of co-optation.2
After the decision has been
taken to admit a state to the United Nations, its statehood cannot be called into
question with the effect of contesting the validity of mutual rights and obligations
arising from co-membership. This is true even if the decision to admit the state
constituted, under substantive law, a contravention of the prohibition of intervention
enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter to the disadvantage of a (Member) State.
The European practice of recognizing new states in Eastern Europe and in the
former Soviet Union in 1991­1992, which was based on the guidelines adopted by
the EC Member States on 16 December 1991,3
is very informative as to the legal effects
of recognition. The list of criteria lay down the conditions that had to be fulfilled before
the Community was prepared to recognize the new states, and thus to agree to their
admission to the community of states and to the international community: `The
commitment to these principles opens the way to recognition by the Community and
its Member States and to the establishment of diplomatic relations.'4
In the literature, it has been claimed that the conditions listed in the guidelines are
merely the criteria for the establishment of diplomatic relations -- something which is
in the political discretion of the states in any case -- and not requirements for
statehood in the sense of international law.5
This opinion is not convincing for several
reasons.
Although the EC Member States' intent was to implement recognition by
establishing diplomatic relations, this was not the only legal effect. The criteria are not
related in any way to the rules of international law and standard international
practice in diplomatic intercourse, but rather are designed to evaluate the candidates
The Admission of New States to the International Community 493
6
In the literature, the mere political character of the principles of the CSCE has been disregarded
frequently.
7
Cf. Judge ad hoc Kreca, Dissenting Opinion, ICJ, Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary
Objections, 11 July 1996, ICJ Reports (1996) 596. Kreca, Dissenting Opinion, ibid, § 26, at 686: `legally,
the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its administrative bounderies represented the
recognition of a non-existent State'.
applying for admission to the international community -- and more specifically to the
European community of states closely connected with one another by their consensus
on political values as formulated in the principles of the CSCE -- in terms of the
reliability of these candidates as partners in international relations and the extent to
which they are able and willing to be politically integrated. Only after the candidates
had assumed these international obligations and political duties as cumulative
criteria and had subsequently been recognized were they to be integrated into the
community of states and the international community. This can be seen both from the
events leading up to the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the EC Member States
and from the guidelines themselves.
From the time of their declarations of independence up until their recognition, the
`states' of Slovenia and Croatia were still regarded and treated as constituent republics
of Yugoslavia, i.e., as integral parts of the Yugoslav Federal State, and were not
protected by the prohibition of intervention and the use of force laid down by
international law. In the civil war that had broken out, their `nationals' enjoyed
protection solely from the protective character of humanitarian international law.
The republics themselves or rather their `rebel forces' merely acquired the legal status
under international law of non-recognized parties engaged in civil war. Both the EC
Member States and the CSCE participating countries started out from this assumption,
even if they did go beyond these rules of international law and also postulated the
requirement for intra-state disputes to be settled by peaceful means as well as a
corresponding `general' prohibition of the use of force as the product of the political
principles of the CSCE.6
For the very reason that the Hague Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, in which these
political principles were taken as the basis for negotiation, did not arrive at a solution
to the crisis and was unable to put an end to the bloodshed, the German government
called for the conflict to be `internationalized' and propagated recognition as the way
to achieve this; as the legal consequence of recognition, the prohibition under
international law of the use of force was to become applicable.
The constitutive, legally operative effect of the recognition of new states is clearly
illustrated by state practice with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina. In view of the fact that
right from the beginning Bosnia-Herzegovina did not constitute a functioning
national body and its recognized government only controlled a very small part of the
national territory, international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina conferred on it the
status of a state under international law by way of a legal fiction.7
Recognition did not
function merely as a refutable assumption that the criteria of statehood were met; it
actually served as a substitute for these features, which were obviously missing. There
494 EJIL 9 (1998), 491­509
can be no doubt that, despite its defects, in particular its lack of effective power to rule
throughout its territory, Bosnia-Herzegovina thus came into existence as a state in the
sense of international law. Numerous Security Council resolutions emphasizing the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina
and calling for their universal acceptance bear witness to the fact that, after it had
been admitted as a member of the United Nations, Bosnia-Herzegovina was regarded
by the international community as a state protected by the prohibition of intervention
and the use of force enshrined in international law.
B Non-recognition as the Withholding of a Legal Status
Non-recognition of an entity that is factually emerging as a state continues to be an
exception in state practice. This is because internationally ostracizing a regime as an
outlaw not only means that the entity is deprived of rights under international law,
but it also has the undesirable consequence that it cannot be called on to fulfil
international obligations and responsibilities, although the international community
would have an elementary interest in doing so in order to guarantee the universality
of international law. Thus, non-recognition is only considered as an option if the
unreliability of the new state as a partner in international relations appears to be so
serious that the community of states, on account of its self-image as a legal
community, refrains from integrating the new state and keeps it away from the
international community, despite the problems pertaining to international law that
arise from the new state's position as an outsider in legal terms.
Nevertheless, there is no better illustration of the legal conviction held by the states
that recognition of a new state under international law is significant as an act
conferring a status than the practice of non-recognition.
It is only by recognition that the new state acquires the status of a sovereign state
under international law in its relations with the third states recognizing it as such. If it
were to acquire this legal status before and independently of recognition by the
existing states, solely on the basis of the three so-called traditional criteria of statehood
(state population, state territory, effective government) -- criteria which Rhodesia
and the Serbian Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, like every de facto independent
entity with a state-like organization, fulfill(ed) -- this legal consequence under
international law would occur automatically and could no longer be prevented by
withholding recognition of the entity as a state. It would not be possible to bring about
the `negative' legal consequence intended by non-recognition, i.e. denial of the legal
status of a state under international law. Legal personality under international law,
which non-recognition was intended to prevent, would already have been acquired,
and non-recognition would then in a sense be futile and would merely be an
expression of political censure of the way in which the state came into existence,
without this flaw having any significant legal consequences under international law.
The Admission of New States to the International Community 495
8
For Rhodesia cf. Green, `Southern Rhodesian Independence', 14 AVR (1969­70) 155, at 160, 162 et seq.
See also Klein, `Die Nichtanerkennungspolitik der Vereinten Nationen gegenüber den in die
Unabhängigkeit entlassenen südafrikanischen homelands', 39 ZaöRV (1979) 469, at 486.
9
Cf. SC Res. 541 (1983); SC Res 550 (1984).
10
Cf. only Epping, in K. Ipsen (ed.), Völkerrecht (3rd ed., 1990), at § 8 II 1, 87 margin 13; C. N. Okeke,
Controversial Subjects in Contemporary International Law (1974), at 104.
Such an assumption is not consistent with state practice (Rhodesia,8
the South
African homelands and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus9
).
C The Alleged Deficit in Protection under International Law for Non-
recognized New States
The argument put forward to justify the application of the prohibition of the use of
force to stabilized de facto regimes that have come into existence as a result of factual
developments, in particular by secession, but have not been recognized as states under
international law is based on the alleged legal consequence that the territory
concerned would otherwise be open to seizure by third states;10
however, this scenario
does not as a rule occur.
Although the former sovereign loses its territorial jurisdiction as a result of its
factual displacement, it does not lose territorial sovereignty. For a third state that does
not recognize the de facto regime as a state under international law, but treats it as a
legal nullity, the `mother country' retains territorial sovereignty. Thus, the third state
does not regard the territory controlled by the de facto regime as terra derelicta.
The community of states did not recognize Rhodesia as an independent state and
continued to regard the United Kingdom as internationally responsible and account-
able. By regarding and treating the independence of the homelands Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei as invalid under international law, the United
Nations continued to consider these entities as integral parts of the state territory of
the Republic of South Africa, to which the prohibition of intervention and the use of
force applied. Accordingly, elementary deficits in the protection of the law did not
arise.
This was not so in the case of Palestine because of the unusual situation: when the
United Kingdom ended its mandate, the League of Nations had already been dissolved
and the mandate failed to be transferred to the United Nations' trusteeship system.
Thus there was no territorial sovereign responsible for the territory under inter-
national law after the mandate had come to an end.
At the time, the prohibition of the use of force was extended to cover this territory
without granting Israel, the third party beneficiary, its own status under international
law. However, more recently, standard practice has tended to grant such entities their
own legal position in order to avoid a vacuum in which international law does not
apply.
This was the situation in the case of Macedonia after the foundation of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia on 27 April 1996. After the community of states had
acknowledged the dissolution of Yugoslavia, a vacuum arose which was only partially
filled by the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. If Macedonia
496 EJIL 9 (1998), 491­509
had not been treated as a state and placed under the protection of general
international law, an area would have remained in which international law did not
apply, a situation that would have run counter to the claim of universality made for
international law and that would have had unacceptable consequences. Since the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not lay claim to territorial sovereignty over this
former Yugoslav constituent republic, Macedonia would have been terra derelicta and
would thus have been open to (military) intervention by third states. The EC Member
States were of the opinion that this could not be permitted and thus conferred on
Macedonia the status of a state under international law.
D The Significance of the Procedure under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter for Extending the Protection Provided by the Prohibition of
the Use of Force to Cover New States Not Universally Recognized
The problem of whether and, if so, to what extent a state or state-like entity enjoys the
protection of the prohibition of intervention and the use of force is only relevant in
practical terms during the interim stage between its coming into existence and its
admission as a member of the world organization of the United Nations. After its
admission, all obligations contained in the Charter, in particular the principle of the
sovereign equality of all the Organization's members, which prohibits intervention
(Article 2(1) UN Charter), and the prohibition of threat or use of force in the members'
international relations (Article 2(4) UN Charter), are applicable in the relations
between the new member and all the other members without prejudice to their
mutual recognition as states under international law.
Admission as a member of the United Nations presupposes that the candidate is a
state (Article 4(1) UN Charter). Thus, after the General Assembly's decision to admit
a candidate -- a decision that is binding also for those states that are outvoted
(Article 4(2) UN Charter) -- the validity of intergovernmental obligations contained
in the Charter can no longer be operatively contested by any member in their relations
with the member that has been admitted. Co-membership in the United Nations of
states that have not recognized one another therefore leads to the validity, according
to the Charter, of the major international obligations in intergovernmental relations.
Should a military conflict occur between a newly emerged or emerging state (in
statu nascendi) and a member of the United Nations before the nascent state has been
admitted, the question arises as to whether the member has violated the obligation
contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, an obligation whose protective character
is also valid in relations with non-members. Whether an international conflict
constituting a threat to international peace and security exists is a matter to be
determined finally -- and by a decision that is binding on the member -- by the
Security Council in the procedure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Within the
framework of this procedure, the Security Council has to determine as a preliminary
question whether or not the non-member affected by the member's use of force fulfils
the criteria of statehood. In answering this question, the members represented on the
Security Council are regularly guided by their own position in the question of whether
The Admission of New States to the International Community 497
11
J. A. Frowein, Das de facto-Régime im Völkerrecht (1968), at 35­37 and 51­54; Brownlie, `Recognition in
Theory and Practice', in R. St. MacDonald and D. M. Johnston (eds), The Structure and Process of
International Law (1983) 627, at 638.
the de facto regime should be recognized as a state. The member exercising force and
not recognizing the attacked non-member as a state will not necessarily be able to
assert its own position unless it is a permanent member of the Security Council with a
right of veto or a member under the patronage of a permanent Security Council
member with a right of veto.
Only by way of the procedure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter can a member be
urged with binding force and, if necessary, obliged to respect the prohibition of the use
of force in its relations with a non-member not recognized as a state. It is only in this
way and to this extent that the definition of aggression agreed on by the General
Assembly on 14 December 1974 (Res. 3314 [XXIX]) -- which, after an explanatory
comment, declares that every state enjoys protection `without prejudice to questions
of recognition or to whether a State is a member of the United Nations' -- can assume
practical effect and the Security Council can ensure effective protection for
non-members as well.
The procedure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter thus partially fills a lacuna in
legal protection under international law, a lacuna that arises for the very reason and
to the extent that, because of the lack of recognition or of co-membership in the United
Nations, the legal consequences associated with recognition as a state or with
admission to the world organization have not (yet) come about and a status
guaranteed under international law without prejudice to recognition or co-
membership in the United Nations does not exist.
The problem of protection for the non-recognized de facto regime against the use of
military force can only be solved by way of procedural, and not substantive, law. A
state that does not recognize another as a state, i.e. as a subject of international law,
will not respect its territorial integrity, sovereignty or political independence if a
conflict should arise. A rule under substantive law that the prohibition of the use of
force should also apply in the relations between states that do not (mutually)
recognize one another would, alone, merely defer the problem because the aggressor
state would contest the statehood of the entity it has attacked (which it does not itself
recognize as a state) in order to evade the applicability of the prohibition of the use of
force.
The binding decision-making process under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which
all the members of the United Nations have agreed to be bound by, is the only way in
which to effectively counter the legal point of view of the non-recognizing state and
the consequences it draws from this non-recognition.
Apart from this particular procedure under international law and contrary to the
doctrine of the de facto regime,11
which is thus misleading on this point, the validity
and operative effect of rules of international law in international relations always
depend on the recognition (in whatever form) of the new state by the existing ones.
This recognition can occur not only by the establishment of relations under a treaty,
498 EJIL 9 (1998), 491­509
12
Frowein, supra note 11, at 69­166.
13
In the last case, recognition is necessarily (by implication) retroactive, which means with effect from the
time that the international crime took place. Otherwise, there could be no liability of the new state
towards the old one for what happened prior to recognition.
14
But see Frowein, supra note 11, at 224.
15
But see ibid, at 51.
but also by acknowledging the tortious liability of the new state under international
law. Thus, contrary to what is claimed by Frowein,12
these elements do not constitute
evidence of the de facto regime being a subject of international law independent of its
recognition as a state. Rather, they are the expression of recognition of at least limited
international personality of the so-called de facto regime that has been accepted as a
party to a treaty or called on to fulfil its duty to make reparation as a party to an
international obligation capable of liability for an international crime and responsible
under international law.13
So-called de facto regimes do not enjoy the protection of the prohibition of the use of
force solely because they exist for a certain length of time in a pacified situation with a
factual international status,14
but because, and to the extent that, by acts that are
legally relevant under international law, they are granted a particular international
status that is guaranteed by the prohibition of the use of force. Thus, it is not true that
a de facto regime assumes a certain legal position on account of its existence, without
any particular recognition being required.15
On the contrary, if and to the extent that
a state entity is granted an inviolable international status, however limited, by
another state that does not recognize it as a state under international law or by the
organized community of states with binding effect for the non-recognizing state, i.e. in
this sense at least partial `recognition' as a subject of international law, the prohibition
of the use of force and, depending on the international status of the entity in each
particular case, possibly also other general rules of international law apply. Thus, in
order for it to enjoy the protection of the prohibition of the use of force applicable in
international relations, integration to a greater or lesser extent into the international
community is always necessary by way of (collective) recognition and, depending on
its scope, conferring on the entity full or merely partial international personality and
hence its own status under international law. It is not the factual, but the legal
stabilization and pacification of the de facto regime that is important. If the de facto
regime is not recognized in this sense, it does not enjoy protection under international
law. Here, too, as is generally the case in international law, a factual situation does not
have normative force.
In the year between its factual independence and its admission as a member of the
United Nations (April 1992 to April 1993), the former Yugoslav republic of
Macedonia was not merely a de facto regime. Analysis of the practice of the EC
Member States and the Security Council of the United Nations shows that, regardless
of the dispute with Greece over its name and its flag, which had the effect of deferring
its `formal recognition', Macedonia had already been granted the status of a state in
the sense of international law and was therefore protected under international law by
the prohibition of intervention and the use of force. Hence, in this crucial sense, it had
The Admission of New States to the International Community 499
already been recognized as a subject of international law with only the establishment
of diplomatic relations (`diplomatic recognition') still to take place.
The same is true of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the period between its
`foundation' (27 April 1992) and its `recognition' by the EC Member States (April
1996), as the EC Member States and the United States only disputed the claim made by
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as to its identity, and not its status as a state under
international law. They treated the Federal Republic as a legal personality capable of
acting under international law with all the rights conferred and obligations
incumbent on states under general international law. As diplomatic relations were
continued, albeit on a lower level, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was granted the
active and passive right of legation and was also certified as having the competence to
conclude treaties, at the latest by the Dayton Agreements. It is in this sense that it was
recognized as a subject of international law right from the beginning or in stages by
implied conduct by those states that rejected its claims as to its identity. In contrast,
the significance of the mutual sending of ambassadors after the declarations made in
April 1996 was merely that of full `diplomatic recognition' of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia by the EC Member States.
2 The Ability and Willingness To Act in Accordance with
International Law as an Overriding Criteria for the
Recognition of New States and for Membership of a State in
the United Nations According to Article 4(1) of the UN
Charter
A The Nature of this Criterion as a Standard
The reliability of the new entity as a partner in international relations is the decisive
criterion of statehood in the sense of international law. The existing states base their
decision on whether to recognize the entity under international law on their
assessment in this respect. Article 4(1) of the UN Charter explicitly mentions the
ability and willingness `in the judgment of the Organization' to carry out international
obligations as a criterion for admission of new members to the United Nations, and by
doing so merely stipulates what constitutes statehood in accordance with inter-
national law, i.e. the essentiality inherent to the state as a subject of international law.
All other requirements for statehood according to international law, in particular the
existence of effective power of control over a territory and its inhabitants, are derived
from this one decisive criterion of the necessary ability and readiness to act in
accordance with international law and, as such, take on the character of inter-
national standards. Thus, by recognizing the principle of de facto effectiveness,
500 EJIL 9 (1998), 491­509
16
Cf. Doehring, `Effectiveness', in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encylopedia of Public International Law, Vol. II (1995)
43, 46; H. Schiedermair, Herrschaftsgewalt und Rechtsfähigkeit im Völkerrecht, Juristische
Ausbildungsblätter (1984) 638, at 640.
17
ICJ Reports (1949), at 178.
international law is not acknowledging the alleged normative force of factual
situations, but rather guaranteeing that its own claim to validity is enforced.16
On the one hand, the phrase `able and willing to carry out these obligations'
(Article 4(1) UN Charter) reinforces international law's claim to being a legal system.
In addition, it is orientated towards the requirements of international practice, in
which legal personality is conferred according to the states' practical interests in
international relations.17
Admission of new states as members of the international
community takes place by an act of individual or collective recognition by the existing
states, and these states base their decision on whether, in their opinion, the candidate
is able and willing to act in accordance with international law. Insofar as it
corresponds to the requirements of international practice, the existing states confer
limited legal personality under international law on newly emerging states as
`candidates for statehood' even before their process of development is complete and
before all the elements of statehood are fully present, as the case of Indonesia
(1947­1949) clearly demonstrates; this limited legal personality later becomes full
legal capacity.
The guidelines on recognition adopted by the EC Member States on 16 December
1991 also concentrate on the commitment of new states to the fundamental
international obligations of states. In order to be able to be recognized, new states
must `have accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed
themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations'. This implies the
need for a credible undertaking to respect the prohibition of the use of force as
applicable in international law and to recognize the obligation to settle disputes by
peaceful means. It is expressed in more concrete terms in the `commitment to settle by
agreement, including where appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all questions
concerning state succession and regional disputes'. In addition, a general `respect for
the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations' is required. This lays down the
minimum standard required under international law as outlined by the criteria for
admission as a member of the United Nations (Article 4(1) UN Charter), criteria
which a state must fulfil if it wishes to join the international community: it must be
able and willing to carry out the international obligations incumbent upon it as a
state.
Focusing on the ability and willingness of new states to carry out the international
obligations incumbent upon them as subjects of international law, this phrase has
proved to be sufficiently flexible to be able to take into account new developments in
international law by adapting the international requirements made of new states for
their admission to the international community. In this context, it is clear that, with
the growth of international obligations incumbent on a state in areas that are
traditionally regarded as domestic affairs, the requirements made by international law
The Admission of New States to the International Community 501
18
Supra note 3.
19
For example, the practice of the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin (1878) and the practice of the
`Principal Allied and Associated Powers', united in the `Supreme Council' at the Paris Peace Conference
(1919­1920).
concerning the inner organization and constitutional structure of a state are also
increasing; while only a state with exclusive jurisdiction over its territory can
guarantee that the law concerning aliens, as applicable according to customary
international law, will be respected, in principle only a constitutional state in which
there is a separation of powers and which guarantees basic rights can fulfil the
requirements concerning the protection of minorities and human rights under
international law.
The smaller European community of states organized in the EC is not content with
the universally valid minimum requirements of statehood laid down by international
law. It regards itself as being committed to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act
(1975) and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990). These documents form the
core of the new community with shared values comprising Europe, the United States
and the former Soviet Union. If a state wishes to join this community, it has to meet
more stringent criteria. It additionally has to recognize the CSCE obligations
concerning the rule of law, democracy and human rights as `valid', i.e. as politically
binding, and has to guarantee the `rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities
in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE'.18
The requirements made of new states in this context exceed by far the minimum
standard required by international law insofar as such a standard has ever existed
with respect to the protection of minorities. The fact that such preconditions exist has
been and is still regarded as discrimination by new states that are waiting at the door
to be let in. What for existing states already integrated into the community of states
would be regarded as a violation of the prohibition of intervention -- and, in
contemporary international law, presumably also of the right of self-determination in
domestic affairs of peoples and nations organized as states -- appears to be legitimate
in the case of new states still to be admitted to the community of states and to the
international community.
The European community of states has in the past19
and continues to consider itself
justified in laying down such requirements for admission. Unless this is to be regarded
as a violation of international law on the part of the existing states laying down these
conditions -- which in view of the duration and consistency of this state practice does
not seem to be a convincing approach -- this `unequal treatment' can only be
explained in terms of international law if it is assumed that, before their admission as
members of the community of states, the new state entities are not yet subjects of
international law, i.e. do not have external sovereignty with respect to third states,
and that they only become subjects of international law by the legal act of recognition.
Thus, as far as the preconditions of their international recognition are concerned, they
cannot rely on the prohibition of intervention under international law. New states
primarily have to prove themselves to be reliable partners in international relations in
502 EJIL 9 (1998), 491­509
20
Cf. Ruiz Fabri, supra note 1, at 172.
21
Cf. ibid, at 165.
22
`Reconnaissance fictive et fiction étatique', see J. Verhoeven, La reconnaissance internationale dans la
pratique contemporaine (1975), at 52­54.
23
UN Doc. S/1995/999/Annex, see 35 ILM (1996), at 75.
the eyes of the existing states and, in addition, as able to be integrated into the political
process of the CSCE in the eyes of the CSCE participating countries in order to be
recognized on the basis of a positive judgment in this respect and thus to be integrated
into both the international and, more specifically, the European community of states.
New terms that do not yet form part of customary international law are laid down for
new states in order to develop international law in a particular direction.20
In this
respect, the practice of recognition serves as a `testing ground' to promote the
international `legal culture'; the recognition procedure is a suitable means for this
because acceptance by the existing states is necessary in order for the new states to
acquire international legal personality.
B The Influence of this Standard on the Classical `Elements' of
Statehood According to International Law and on the Decision-Making
Process
The traditional requirement of de facto effectiveness is not an end in itself, but rather a
means to enforce the validity of international law. The conditions laid down with
respect to the de facto effectiveness required of a new state's power of control are
intended to ensure that international law is respected in the territory concerned.21
It is
a matter of ensuring that the new state is viable and is hence in a position to guarantee
permanently, reliably and responsibly the validity of international law in the territory
it effectively controls. For the very reason that the requirement of de facto effectiveness
satisfies elementary requirements of the international community, it cannot so easily
be waived, and certainly not on a permanent basis. If the international community
resorts to recognizing a fictive statehood,22
this fiction of international law will have
legal consequences and consequential burdens, as documented by the case of
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The community of states does not wish to endorse the de facto dual statehood of
Bosnia-Herzegovina by conferring the status of states under international law on both
entities (the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of `Srpska') and
instead continues to hold to the unity of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina that it
has recognized as a state, although the latter basically has no more than the power of
representation in external affairs that it has been granted under international law.
Thus, the community of states has to reduce the international obligations that usually
apply in terms of guarantees obtained from new states and to a great extent assume
these itself by establishing an international regime, as occurred on the basis of the
Dayton Agreement.23
The lack of a clearly defined territory over which the new state claims the right to
exercise sovereignty only detracts from its ability to be recognized if this flaw calls into
The Admission of New States to the International Community 503
24
Allgemeine Staatslehre (3rd ed., 1914), at 394­434.
25
Cf. Ruiz Fabri, supra note 1, at 172; Rich, `Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union', 4 EJIL (1993) 36, at 36.
question its effective existence as a whole, i.e. its ability to carry out its international
obligations, and thus the security of international relations. The `doctrine of the three
elements' developed by Georg Jellinek as part of his general theory of the state24
can
therefore -- even with respect to the element of `state territory' -- only constitute a
criterion of the legal personality of new state entities to the extent that these formal
criteria are borne out for international law by the requirements of international
practice and the principle of the certainty of the law derived from them.
Even the necessary precondition of the external sovereignty of the new state, i.e. its
legal independence with respect to its mother country and to third states, only takes
shape in connection with the criterion of legal personality. In order to be recognized as
an independent subject of international law, the new state must itself be in a position
to carry out the international obligations incumbent upon it without being dependent
on the will of another state.
C The Ability and Willingness to Respect International Law as a
`Normative Constituent Fact'
Direct consequences for the way in which new states are admitted as members of the
community of states and the international community arise from the fact that the
ability and willingness of the new state to respect international law constitute the
central criteria of statehood in terms of international law; that is, they are decisive for
the conferment of legal capacity under international law. The test of whether this
`normative' constituent fact is present in the `person' of the new state cannot be
carried out by simple subsumption, but requires a `value judgment', which the
existing states deliver in conjunction with their decision on whether or not to
recognize the new state and which cannot be replaced by `objective' declarations by
third parties. The power of the existing sovereign states to decide whether to recognize
the new state, by which they evaluate its reliability as a partner in international
relations, means that the existing states continue to be the `masters' of the procedure:
by exercising their prerogative to evaluate the newcomer, they form their own final
judgment concerning its ability and willingness to be integrated into the international
community and to accept and adhere to its rules. For this reason, according to the
legal conviction of the community of states as expressed in the practice of recognition
as constantly exercised, new states do not have an enforceable right under
international law to be recognized, even if they fulfil the so-called classical criteria of
statehood according to international law.25
D The Decision-making Process Concerning the Admission of New
Members (Article 4(2) UN Charter)
In accordance with Article 4(2) of the UN Charter, the final decision as to whether an
504 EJIL 9 (1998), 491­509
26
Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Basdevant, Winiarski, Sir Arnold McNair and Read, ICJ Reports
(1947/48) 57, at 84 et seq.
27
Cf. H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (1950), at 71.
28
ICJ Reports (1996) 596, at 611, § 19.
29
Cf. J. Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (1987), at 64 et seq.
applicant fulfils the substantive requirements for admission, as laid down in
Article 4(1) of the UN Charter -- i.e. whether it is a state that is peace-loving, that
accepts the obligations contained in the Charter and is able and willing to carry out
these obligations -- is made by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the
United Nations. From a procedural point of view, as set out in the Charter, the United
Nations consciously decided against a system of accession by which all states can join
the world organization by way of a unilateral declaration. The admission procedure
enshrined in the Charter ensures that the relevant organs of the United Nations retain
absolute authority in the procedure.26
Notwithstanding the substantive criteria for admission set out in Article 4(1) of the
UN Charter, the organs of the United Nations that have the power to take such a
decision, and indirectly the members represented in these organs, are therefore the
`masters' of the admission procedure according to Article 4(2) of the UN Charter.
Thus, a claim to membership in the United Nations that can be enforced under
procedural law against the will of the decision-making institutions -- or at least
against the will of a permanent member of the Security Council -- does not exist; a
new state cannot even enforce a claim to a decision being taken concerning its
application for admission.27
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognizes the power of final judgment of the
Security Council and the General Assembly. Thus, the interlocutory judgment of the
ICJ in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia) of 11 July 199628
is based on the assumption that a decision to admit a
new state is binding on all members and cannot be contested under procedural law.
3 The Significance of the Right of Self-determination of
Nations and Peoples in the Contemporary Practice of the
Recognition of New States
A The Practice of Decolonization
In recognizing the statehood of nations emerging as independent entities after colonial
rule from the beginning of the 1960s, the classical criteria of statehood according to
international law, in particular the existence of effective power to rule by the new
state, have no longer been carefully examined by the community of states. Instead, the
new states thus constituted have been recognized and admitted as members of the
United Nations without hesitation.29
In this state practice, the main argument has
The Admission of New States to the International Community 505
30
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Res. 1514 (XV), UNYB
(1960) 44, at 49 et seq.
31
J. Crawford, The Creation of New States (1979), at 78.
presumably not been an acknowledgement that the right of self-determination takes
priority, so much as the following considerations. After the mother country has
relinquished its claim to sovereignty, third states that recognize the former colony as
an independent state no longer run the risk of violating international law by
intervention. When the General Assembly adopted a resolution on decolonization in
1960,30
the colonial powers abstained, but subsequently bowed to their fate and
voluntarily gave up colonial rule by granting their colonial territories and peoples
independence (with the exception of Spain and Portugal, who retained their colonial
possessions until the end of the 1960s and the mid-1970s, respectively). Thus the
question of whether the right of self-determination of peoples could be asserted in the
practice of the recognition of new states even against the will of the mother country,
i.e. whether it limits the prohibition of intervention, did not need to be settled.
Incidentally, after the mother country had exempted itself from liability for the
former colony under international law by renouncing its claim to sovereignty, the
community of states had no choice but to make the newly independent state
internationally responsible by recognizing it as a subject of international law in order
to prevent the creation of an area in which international law did not apply, something
which would have been detrimental to international law's claim to universality.
This aspect -- the need for the new states to be integrated into the international
community immediately -- was presumably a decisive factor in the state practice of
immediately recognizing the new, often unstable state entities that had emerged as a
result of decolonization and of admitting them as members of the United Nations
directly after they had gained independence, without a lengthy `trial period'. Respect
for the right of self-determination of the colonial peoples now constituting themselves
as states presumably merely complemented the decisive practical considerations.
B Non-recognition of a New State on Account of Its Violation of the
Right of Self-determination of Peoples
In the case of Rhodesia, the community of states soon adopted a strict policy of
non-recognition of the proclaimed independence of Rhodesia, as had first been
practised from 1932 onwards as a reaction to the state of Manchukuo being
established.
This was a fundamental decision that was not based on any doubts about the de
facto effectiveness of the white minority regime.31
The community of states refused to
recognize this state under international law because the independence of Rhodesia as
a state under white minority rule violated and frustrated the right of the people of
Zimbabwe formerly under British colonial rule, i.e. the majority of the African
population, to national self-determination; in other words, it refused recognition
because the emergence of the new state under the conditions of rule by the white
settlers created a situation that contravened international law from the point of view
506 EJIL 9 (1998), 491­509
32
Cf. R. Zacklin, The United Nations and Rhodesia (1974), at 45 et seq; Dugard, supra note 29, at 98.
33
Dore, `Recognition of Rhodesia and Traditional International Law: Some Conceptual Problems', Vand. J
Transnat'l. Law 13 (1980) 25, at 25; Kato, `Recognition in International Law: Some Thoughts on
Traditional Theory, Attitudes of and Practice of the African States', 10 IJIL (1970) 299, at 309.
34
For the relation between non-recognition and ius cogens cf. Dugard, supra note 29, at 123­127,
152­154, 156­163.
of the right of self-determination of peoples recognized as a legal title under
international law by General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December
1960.32
Rhodesia remained ostracized and excluded from the community of states
and the international community as an `outlaw'.33
In the eyes of the international
community, the state founded by Ian Smith's regime suffered from an incurable
`congenital defect' on account of its violation of the right of self-determination, a defect
that made it illegal under international law. Thus Security Council Resolution 217
(1965) of 20 November 1965 denied Rhodesia's declaration of independence any
legal validity, and under the white minority regime Rhodesia was in no way able to be
recognized and had no legal personality.
After the General Assembly had adopted Resolution 1514 (XV) on 14 December
1960, the attitude of a new state towards the right of self-determination that the
colonial peoples had been promised became a test case for its allegiance to
international law. By linking the decision concerning recognition to the principles
contained in this resolution, it became clear that, in the opinion of the community of
states, these principles had become positive international law and therefore contained
fundamental international obligations that were applicable to every state. Thus, if it
seemed probable that an entity would not carry out these obligations or had even
declared its intention not to do so, this amounted to a denial of its being willing to
respect at least the fundamental international rights, something that was required for
it to be recognized as a new state.
In this minimum international standard -- a standard whose content has varied in
different periods of international law and which has to be satisified by a new state in
order for it to be recognized as a subject of international law -- we can see what is
known as peremptory international law (ius cogens) taking shape, i.e. rules of
international law regarded by the community of states as so essential for the system of
international law as a whole that the willingness to respect these rules has become
absolutely indispensable in the sense of an international ordre public in order for a new
state to be admitted to the international community and such that the community of
states is even prepared to accept difficulties in international relations as a result.34
Observance of the right of self-determination of peoples by the new state, a
requirement that it has to meet before it can be recognized as a subject of international
law, is not strictly speaking a new criterion of statehood in terms of international law,
but rather simply the practical implementation in the more recent practice of
recognition of the traditionally accepted standard of the ability and willingness on the
part of the new state to carry out at least the major international obligations. The
existing states have always regarded the ability and willingness of a new state to act in
accordance with international law as a precondition of its being recognized and have
The Admission of New States to the International Community 507
35
Cf. ibid, at 134.
36
But see Crawford, supra note 31, at 106.
37
The Baltic states represent a special case because their annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940, contrary
to international law, was not recognized by several states, especially not by the United States. Therefore,
although they have regained independence, they have not been recognized as new states; only
diplomatic relations with them have been re-established.
assessed this ability and willingness in various ways. Thus, in the issue of whether the
former Spanish colonies emerging as new states in Central and South America were to
be recognized, the United Kingdom based its decision on a commitment on the part of
these states to helping to put an end to the black slave trade; similarly, the League of
Nations laid down the same condition for the admission of Ethiopia to the organized
community of states. Thus, the prohibition of the slave trade can retrospectively be
regarded as one of the first peremptory norms of international law.35
However, in terms of the significance of the right of self-determination of peoples in
the practice of the recognition of new states, we should avoid drawing far-reaching,
overly generalized conclusions from the case of Rhodesia.36
On the basis of state
practice towards Rhodesia and the homelands created in South Africa, it is only in the
colonial context, if at all, that a violation of the right of self-determination of (native)
peoples by the establishment of a racist white minority regime necessarily means that,
as a legal consequence, a new state set up by this regime by way of secession is not able
to be recognized.
C The Significance of the Right of Self-determination of Peoples for
the Legal Institution of Recognition in State Practice since 1990
The significance of the right of self-determination of peoples for the recent practice of
recognition after the end of the Cold War in 1989­1990 is generally overestimated.
The dissolution by mutual agreement of the USSR and of Czechoslovakia did not
pose any problems with regard to the right of self-determination; the integration into
the international community of the new states that emerged as a result of these
dissolution processes was trouble-free. Recognition of the former Soviet republics
therefore gives no reason to assume that the community of states has recognized a
right of secession derived from the right of self-determination of peoples in any context
other than the colonial one.37
In the conflict in Yugoslavia, the right of self-determination was only relevant to
some extent at the beginning and only in discussions in Europe.
Consultations in the Security Council before the adoption of Resolution 713 (1991)
on 25 September 1991 show that the community of states organized worldwide
within the United Nations continues not to recognize the right of self-determination of
peoples as a legal title under international law that justifies secession outside the
colonial context.
In order to ensure the validity of the prohibition of the use of force in international
relations as applicable under international law, the civil war in Yugoslavia (which is
all it was to start with from the point of view of international law) had to be
internationalized by recognizing the constituent republics Slovenia and Croatia as
508 EJIL 9 (1998), 491­509
38
Opinion No. 1, 31 ILM (1992), at 1494­1497.
independent states under international law. As the course of events initially suggested
a process of secession, albeit one that had not yet been completed and that was still
resisted by the mother country, recognition of the seceders as autonomous states at a
time that would be judged premature according to the traditional rules of
international law required a particular justification in terms of international law in
order to avoid the charge of having violated the internationally applicable prohibition
of intervention. As far as the situation in Yugoslavia was concerned, such a
justification can only be seen in the violation or denial of the right of self-
determination of the peoples seeking to acquire independence as states.
The Federal Republic of Germany deliberated the possibility of recognizing Slovenia
and Croatia very early on and thus attempted to persuade its partners in the European
Community that the right of self-determination should be interpreted as limiting the
guarantee for the respect of territorial integrity and the unity of states in the sense of a
right of secession enabling such entities to be recognized as the last resort in the event
of no solution being reached by negotiations.
The first opinion delivered on 29 November 1991 by the Arbitration Commission
convened within the framework of the Peace Conference38
then altered the
perspective of the European Community in this central question of international law.
The Arbitration Commission judged the events in Yugoslavia to be symptomatic of a
process of dissolution. The significance in terms of international law of the
interpretation of the signs of disintegration in the Yugoslav federal state as a process of
dismemberment lay in the fact that it facilitated the recognition of the constituent
republics claiming independence, particularly Croatia, as autonomous states under
international law. In the opinion of the Arbitration Commission, the process of
disintegration was already so far advanced that the federal organs were no longer able
to form an internationally significant will for the state as a whole which would have
had to have been overcome when recognizing the constituent republics as indepen-
dent states without violating the prohibition of intervention.
It was not until then, on this basis, that the EC Member States were able to agree on
a common position in the question of recognition and to resolve existing reservations
and legal doubts concerning the immediate recognition of Croatia. As the EC Member
States proceeded to recognize Slovenia and Croatia on the basis of what they regarded
to be the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, this did not create a precedent in favour of a
right of secession that would play a decisive role in the practice of recognition in the
European context. Although the process of dissolution in Yugoslavia -- which the
European community of states had confirmed on the basis of the first report delivered
by the Badinter Commission -- had not been completed by the time it recognized as
independent states the first two Yugoslav constituent republics to declare their
independence, the process already appeared to be irreversible. The fact that it waited
until this point was sharply criticized from a political point of view, but from the point
of view of international law this position was logically correct.
Even the EC Member States did not acknowledge a real right of succession, i.e. the
The Admission of New States to the International Community 509
39
Cf. J. Marko, Der Minderheitenschutz in den jugoslawischen Nachfolgestaaten (1996) 205, at 214 et seq.
40
Cf. only Doehring, `Self-Determination', in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary
(1994) 35, 40.
right of a nation that had not even begun to constitute itself as a state to break away
unilaterally from an existing federation and to create an independent state of its own;
this was documented by the position they took vis--vis the desire for self-
determination expressed by the Albanians in Kosovo, who in September 1990
declared this autonomous territorial entity an independent, sovereign state and
claimed international recognition but who, on account of the Serbian policy of
oppression, were not able to establish even a rudimentary organization.39
In contrast
to the situation in Slovenia and Croatia at the beginning of the conflict in Yugoslavia,
the strict criteria of a right of succession -- as acknowledged in the literature40
in the
case of systematic discrimination and persecution of an ethnic group by the state
authority on account of its belonging to a particular group -- were most likely to be
fulfilled in this case; however, the European community of states passed over this fact
in silence. It did not even consider the possibility of `premature' recognition of this
`state' for the sake of its right of self-determination. In the present Kosovo crisis, the
international community has again refused to recognize an independent state of the
Albanians and is only willing to grant an autonomous status which shall be
internationally guaranteed.
The significance of the right of self-determination in the recent practice of
recognition of the independence of new states is limited to the fact that, in addition to
the usual requirements, recognition depends on an authentic declaration by the
nation concerned of its will to be recognized as an independent state. Thus, in the case
of the Yugoslav republics seeking to gain independence, the plebiscites held on this
matter were regarded as the undeniable expression of this will on the part of the
nation; where there were doubts (i.e. in Bosnia-Herzegovina), a referendum was
called for prior to recognition.
Comments on this article are invited on the EJIL's web site: www.ejil.org .