

succumb to the demands of different political and economic pressure groups and to develop its activities and distort its own rules accordingly.

As already indicated, in concrete cases some overlapping between the tendencies to bureaucratization and debureaucratization may occur. Thus, for instance, when a politically monopolistic group gains control over a bureaucratic organization, it may distort the rules of this organization in order to give special benefits to the holders of political power or to maintain its hold over different segments of the population. On the other hand, when a process of debureaucratization sets in because of the growing pressure of different groups on a bureaucracy, there may also develop within the bureaucratic organization, as a sort of defense against these pressures, a tendency toward formalization and bureaucratization. This shows that the distinctive characteristics of a specific bureaucratic organization and role have been impinged upon in different directions, and one may usually discern which of these tendencies is predominant in different spheres of activity of the bureaucracy. It is the task of further research to analyze these different constellations in greater detail.

S. F. Leke

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TOTAL INSTITUTIONS

Erving Goffman

Social establishments—institutions in the everyday sense of that term—are buildings or plants in which activity of a particular kind regularly goes on. . . . Each captures something of the time and interest of its members and provides something of a world for them; in brief, every institution has encompassing tendencies. When we review the different institutions in our

Reprinted in part from Erving Goffman, "The Characteristics of Total Institutions," in *Symposium on Preventive and Social Psychiatry*, 15-17, April 1957, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Washington, D.C., by permission of the author and publisher.

Western society we find a class of them which seems to be encompassing to a degree discontinuously greater than the ones next in line. Their encompassing or total character is symbolized by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside that is often built right into the physical plant: locked doors, high walls, barbed wire, cliffs and water, open terrain, and so forth. These I am calling total institutions, and it is their general characteristics I want to explore.¹ This exploration will be phrased as if securely based on findings but will in fact be speculative.

The total institutions of our society can be listed for convenience in five rough groupings. *First*, there are institutions established to care for persons thought to be both incapable and harmless; these are the homes for the blind, the aged, the orphaned, and the indigent. *Second*, there are places established to care for persons thought to be at once incapable of looking after themselves and a threat to the community, albeit an unintended one: TB sanitariums, mental hospitals, and leprosoria. *Third*, another type of total institution is organized to protect the community against what are thought to be intentional dangers to it; here the welfare of the persons thus sequestered is not the immediate issue. Examples are: Jails, penitentiaries, POW camps, and concentration camps. *Fourth*, we find institutions purportedly established the better to pursue some technical task and justifying themselves only on these instrumental grounds: Army barracks, ships, boarding schools, work camps, colonial compounds, large mansions from the point of view of those who live in the servants' quarters, and so forth. *Finally*, there are those establishments designed as retreats from the world or as training stations for the religious: Abbeys, monasteries, convents, and other cloisters. This sublisting of total institutions is neither neat nor exhaustive, but the listing itself provides an empirical starting point for a purely denotative definition of the category. By anchoring the initial definition of total institutions in this way, I hope to be able to discuss the general characteristics of the type without becoming tautological.

Before attempting to extract a general profile from this list of establishments, one conceptual peculiarity must be mentioned. None of the elements I will extract seems entirely exclusive to total institutions, and none seems shared by every one of them. What is shared and unique about

¹The category of total institutions has been pointed out from time to time in the sociological literature under a variety of names, and some of the characteristics of the class have been suggested, most notably perhaps in Howard Roland's neglected paper, "Segregated Communities and Mental Health," in *Mental Health Publication of the American Association for the Advancement of Science*, No. 9, edited by F. R. Moulton, 1939. A preliminary statement of the present paper is reported in the *Third Group Processes Proceedings*, Josiah Macy Foundation, edited by Bertram Schaffner, 1957.

total institutions is that each exhibits many items in this family of attributes to an intense degree. In speaking of "common characteristics," then, I will be using this phrase in a weakened, but I think logically defensible, way.

TOTALISTIC FEATURES

A basic social arrangement in modern society is that we tend to sleep, play and work in different places, in each case with a different set of coparticipants, under a different authority, and without an over-all rational plan. The central feature of total institutions can be described as a breakdown of the kinds of barriers ordinarily separating these three spheres of life. *First*, all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority. *Second*,² each phase of the member's daily activity will be carried out in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together. *Third*, all phases of the day's activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity leading at a prearranged time into the next, the whole circle of activities being imposed from above through a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials. *Finally*, the contents of the various enforced activities are brought together as parts of a single over-all rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution.

Individually, these totalistic features are found, of course, in places other than total institutions. Increasingly, for example, our large commercial, industrial and educational establishments provide cafeterias, minor services and off-hour recreation for their members. But while this is a tendency in the direction of total institutions, these extended facilities remain voluntary in many particulars of their use, and special care is taken to see that the ordinary line of authority does not extend to these situations. Similarly, housewives or farm families can find all their major spheres of life within the same fenced-in area, but these persons are not collectively regimented and do not march through the day's steps in the immediate company of a batch of similar others.

The handling of many human needs by the bureaucratic organization of whole blocks of people—whether or not this is a necessary or effective means of social organization in the circumstances—can be taken then, as the key fact of total institutions. From this, certain important implications can be drawn.

Given the fact that blocks of people are caused to move in time, it becomes possible to use a relatively small number of supervisory personnel where the central relationship is not guidance or periodic checking, as in many employer-employee relations, but rather surveillance—a seeing to it that everyone does what he has been clearly told is required of him

and this under conditions where one person's infraction is likely to stand out in relief against the visible, constantly examined, compliance of the others. Which comes first, the large block of managed people or the small supervisory staff, is not here at issue; the point is that each is made for the other.

In total institutions, as we would then suspect, there is a basic split between a large class of individuals who live in and who have restricted contact with the world outside the walls, conveniently called *inmates*, and the small class that supervises them, conveniently called *staff*, who often operate on an 8-hour day and are socially integrated into the outside world.² Each grouping tends to conceive of members of the other in terms of narrow hostile stereotypes, staff often seeing inmates as bitter, secretive and untrustworthy, while inmates often see staff as condescending, high-handed and mean. Staff tends to feel superior and righteous; inmates tend, in some ways at least, to feel inferior, weak, blameworthy and guilty.³ Social mobility between the two strata is grossly restricted; social distance is typically great and often formally prescribed; even talk across the boundaries may be conducted in a special tone of voice. These restrictions on contact presumably help to maintain the antagonistic stereotypes.⁴ In any case, two different social and cultural worlds develop, tending to jog along beside each other, with points of official contact but little mutual penetration. It is important to add that the institutional plant and name comes to be identified by both staff and inmates as somehow belonging to staff, so that when either grouping refers to the views or interests of "the institution," by implication they are referring (as I shall also) to the views and concerns of the staff.

The staff-inmate split is one major implication of the central features of total institutions; a second one pertains to work. In the ordinary arrangements of living in our society, the authority of the workplace stops with the worker's receipt of a money payment; the spending of this in a domestic and recreational setting is at the discretion of the worker and is the mechanism through which the authority of the workplace is kept within strict bounds. However, to say that inmates in total institutions have their

²The binary character of total institutions was pointed out to me by Gregory Bateson, and proves to be noted in the literature. See, for example, Lloyd E. Ohlin, *Sociology and the Field of Corrections*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1956, pp. 14, 20. In those special situations where staff too is required to live in, we may expect staff members to feel they are suffering from special hardships and to have brought home to them a status-dependency on life on the inside which they did not expect. See Jane Cassels Record, "The Marine Radioman's Struggle for Status," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LXII, 1957, p. 359.

³For the prison version, see S. Kirson Weinburg, "Aspects of the Prison's Social Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 47, 1942, pp. 717-726.

⁴Suggested in Ohlin, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

full day scheduled for them is to say that some version of all basic needs will have to be planned for, too. In other words, total institutions take over "responsibility" for the inmate and must guarantee to have everything that is defined as essential "laid on." It follows, then, that whatever incentive is given for work, this will not have the structural significance it has on the outside. Different attitudes and incentives regarding this central feature of our life will have to prevail.

Here, then, is one basic adjustment required of those who work in total institutions and of those who must induce these people to work. In some cases, no work or little is required, and inmates, untrained often in leisurely ways of life, suffer extremes of boredom. In other cases, some work is required but is carried on at an extremely slow pace, being geared into a system of minor, often ceremonial payments, as in the case of weekly tobacco ration and annual Christmas presents, which cause some mental patients to stay on their job. In some total institutions, such as logging camps and merchant ships, something of the usual relation to the world that money can buy is obtained through the practice of "forced saving"; all needs are organized by the institution, and payment is given only after a work season is over and the men leave the premises. And in some total institutions, of course, more than a full day's work is required and is induced not by reward, but by threat of dire punishment. In all such cases, the work-oriented individual may tend to become somewhat demoralized by the system.

In addition to the fact that total institutions are incompatible with the basic work-payment structure of our society, it must be seen that these establishments are also incompatible with another crucial element of our society, the family. The family is sometimes contrasted to solitary living, but in fact the more pertinent contrast to family life might be with batch living. For it seems that those who eat and sleep at work, with a group of fellow workers, can hardly sustain a meaningful domestic existence. Correspondingly, the extent to which a staff retains its integration in the outside community and escapes the encompassing tendencies of total institutions is often linked up with the maintenance of a family off the grounds. . . .

Total institutions, then, are social hybrids, part residential community, part formal organization, and therein lies their special sociological interest. There are other reasons, alas, for being interested in them, too. These establishments are the forcing houses for changing persons in our society. Each is a natural experiment, typically harsh, on what can be done to the self.

Having suggested some of the key features of total institutions, we can move on now to consider them from the special perspectives of the inmate world and the staff world.

THE INMATE WORLD

Mortification Processes

It is characteristic of inmates that they come to the institution as members, already full-fledged, of a *home world*, that is, a way of life and a round of activities taken for granted up to the point of admission to the institution.⁵ It is useful to look at this culture that the recruit brings with him to the institution's door—his *presenting culture*, to modify a psychiatric phrase—in terms especially designed to highlight what it is the total institution will do to him. Whatever the stability of his personal organization, we can assume it was part of a wider supporting framework lodged in his current social environment, a round of experience that somewhat confirms a conception of self that is somewhat acceptable to him and a set of defensive maneuvers exercisable at his own discretion as a means of coping with conflicts, discrediting and failures.

Now it appears that total institutions do not substitute their own unique culture for something already formed. We do not deal with acculturation or assimilation but with something more restricted than these. In a sense, total institutions do not look for cultural victory. They effectively create and sustain a particular kind of tension between the home world and the institutional world and use this persistent tension as strategic leverage in the management of men. The full meaning for the inmate of being "in" or "on the inside" does not exist apart from the special meaning to him of "getting out" or "getting on the outside."

The recruit comes into the institution with a self and with attachments to supports which had allowed this self to survive. Upon entrance, he is immediately stripped of his wonted supports, and his self is systematically, if often unintentionally, mortified. In the accurate language of some of our oldest total institutions, he is led into a series of abasements, degradations, humiliations, and profanations of self. He begins, in other words, some radical shifts in his *moral career*, a career laying out the progressive changes that occur in the beliefs that he has concerning himself and significant others.

The *stripping processes* through which *mortification of the self* occurs are fairly standard in our total institutions. Personal identity equipment is removed, as well as other possessions with which the inmate may have

⁵ There is reason then to exclude orphanages and foundling homes from the list of total institutions, except insofar as the orphan comes to be socialized into the outside world by some process of cultural osmosis, even while this world is being systematically denied him.

identified himself, there typically being a system of nonaccessible storage from which the inmate can only reobtain his effects should he leave the institution. As a substitute for what has been taken away, institutional issue is provided, but this will be the same for large categories of inmates and will be regularly repossessed by the institution. In brief, standardized defacement will occur. In addition, ego-invested separateness from fellow inmates is significantly diminished in many areas of activity, and tasks are prescribed that are *infra dignitatem*. Family, occupational, and educational career lines are chopped off, and a stigmatized status is submitted. Sources of fantasy materials which had meant momentary releases from stress in the home world are denied. Areas of autonomous decision are eliminated through the process of collective scheduling of daily activity. Many channels of communication with the outside are restricted or closed off completely. Verbal discrediting occurs in many forms as a matter of course. Expressive signs of respect for the staff are coercively and continuously demanded. And the effect of each of these conditions is multiplied by having to witness the mortification of one's fellow inmates.

We must expect to find different official reasons given for these assaults upon the self. In mental hospitals there is the matter of protecting the patient from himself and from other patients. In jails there is the issue of "security" and frank punishment. In religious institutions we may find sociologically sophisticated theories about the soul's need for purification and penance through disciplining of the flesh. What all of these rationales share is the extent to which they are merely rationalizations, for the underlying force in many cases is unwittingly generated by efforts to manage the daily activity of a large number of persons in a small space with a small expenditure of resources.

In the background of the sociological stripping process, we find a characteristic authority system with three distinctive elements, each basic to total institutions.

First, to a degree, authority is of the *echelon* kind. Any member of the staff class has certain rights to discipline any member of the inmate class. This arrangement, it may be noted, is similar to the one which gives any adult in some small American towns certain rights to correct and demand small services from any child not in the immediate presence of his parents. In our society, the adult himself, however, is typically under the authority of a *single* immediate superior in connection with his work or under authority of one spouse in connection with domestic duties. The only echelon authority he must face—the police—typically are neither constantly nor relevantly present, except perhaps in the case of traffic-law enforcement.

Second, the authority of corrective sanctions is directed to a great multitude of items of conduct of the kind that are constantly occurring and constantly coming up for judgment;⁶ in brief, authority is directed to matters of dress, deportment, social intercourse, manners and the like. In prisons these regulations regarding situational proprieties may even extend to a point where silence during mealtime is enforced, while in some convents explicit demands may be made concerning the custody of the eyes during prayer.

The third feature of authority in total institutions is that misbehaviors in one sphere of life are held against one's standing in other spheres. Thus, an individual who fails to participate with proper enthusiasm in sports may be brought to the attention of the person who determines where he will sleep and what kind of work task will be accorded to him.

When we combine these three aspects of authority in total institutions, we see that the inmate cannot easily escape from the press of judgmental officials and from the enveloping tissue of constraint. The system of authority undermines the basis for control that adults in our society expect to exert over their interpersonal environment and may produce the terror of feeling that one is being radically demoted in the age-grading system. On the outside, rules are sufficiently lax and the individual sufficiently agreeable to required self-discipline to insure that others will rarely have cause for pouncing on him. He need not constantly look over his shoulder to see if criticism and other sanctions are coming. On the inside, however, rulings are abundant, novel, and closely enforced so that, quite characteristically, inmates live with chronic anxiety about breaking the rules and chronic worry about the consequences of breaking them. The desire to "stay out of trouble" in a total institution is likely to require persistent conscious effort and may lead the inmate to abjure certain levels of sociability with his fellows in order to avoid the incidents that may occur in these circumstances.⁷

It should be noted finally that the mortifications to be suffered by the inmate may be purposely brought home to him in an exaggerated way during the first few days after entrance, in a form of initiation that has

⁶The span of time over which an employee works at his own discretion without supervision can in fact be taken as a measure of his pay and status in an organization. See Elliot Jacques, *The Measurement of Responsibility: A Study of Work, Payment, and Individual Capacity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1956. And just as "time-span of responsibility" is an index of position, so a long span of freedom from inspection is a reward of position.

⁷Staff sometimes encourages this tendency for inmates to stand clear of one another, perhaps in order to limit the dangers of organized inmate resistance to institutional rule. Through an interesting phrase, inmates may be officially encouraged to "do their own time."

been called *the welcome*. Both staff and fellow inmates may go out of their way to give the neophyte a clear notion of where he stands.⁸ As part of this *rite de passage*, he may find himself called by a term such as "fish," "swab," etc., through which older inmates tell him that he is not only merely an inmate but that even within this lowly group he has a low status.

Privilege System

While the process of mortification is in progress, the inmate begins to receive formal and informal instruction in what will here be called the *privilege system*. Insofar as the inmate's self has been unsettled a little by the stripping action of the institution, it is largely around this framework that pressures are exerted, making for a reorganization of self. Three basic elements of the system may be mentioned.

First, there are the *house rules*, a relatively explicit and formal set of prescriptions and proscriptions which lay out the main requirements of inmate conduct. These regulations spell out the austere round of life in which the inmate will operate. Thus, the admission procedures through which the recruit is initially stripped of his self-supporting context can be seen as the institution's way of getting him in the position to start living by the house rules.

Second, against the stark background, a small number of clearly defined *rewards or privileges* are held out in exchange for obedience to staff in action and spirit. It is important to see that these potential gratifications are not unique to the institution but rather are ones carved out of the flow of support that the inmate previously had quite taken for granted. On the outside, for example, the inmate was likely to be able to unthinkingly exercise autonomy by deciding how much sugar and milk he wanted in his coffee, if any, or when to light up a cigarette; on the inside, this right may become quite problematic and a matter of a great deal of conscious concern. Held up to the inmate as possibilities, these few recapturings seem to have a reintegrative effect, re-establishing relationships with the whole lost world and assuaging withdrawal symptoms from it and from one's lost self.

The inmate's run of attention, then, especially at first, comes to be fixated on these supplies and obsessed with them. In the most fanatic way, he can spend the day in devoted thoughts concerning the possibility of

⁸ For the version of this process in concentration camps, see Elie A. Cohen, *Human Behaviour in the Concentration Camp*, Jonathan Cape, n.p., 1954, p. 120. For a fictionalized treatment of the welcome in a girls' reformatory, see Sara Norris, *The Wayward Ones*, Signet Pocket Books, New York, 1952, pp. 31-34.

acquiring these gratifications or the approach of the hour at which they are scheduled to be granted. The building of a world around these minor privileges is perhaps the most important feature of inmate culture and yet is something that cannot easily be appreciated by an outsider, even one who has lived through the experience himself. This situation sometimes leads to generous sharing and almost always to a willingness to beg for things such as cigarettes, candy and newspapers. It will be understandable, then, that a constant feature of inmate discussion is the *release binge fantasy*, namely, recitals of what one will do during leave or upon release from the institution.

House rules and privileges provide the functional requirements of the third element in the privilege system: *punishments*. These are designated as the consequence of breaking the rules. One set of these punishments consists of the temporary or permanent withdrawal of privileges or abrogation of the right to try to earn them. In general, the punishments meted out in total institutions are of an order more severe than anything encountered by the inmate in his home world. An institutional arrangement which causes a small number of easily controlled privileges to have a massive significance is the same arrangement which lends a terrible significance to their withdrawal.

There are some special features of the privilege system which should be noted.

First, punishments and privileges are themselves modes of organization peculiar to total institutions. Whatever their severity, punishments are largely known in the inmate's home world as something applied to animals and children. For adults this conditioning, behavioristic model is actually not widely applied, since failure to maintain required standards typically leads to indirect disadvantageous consequences and not to specific immediate punishment at all. And privileges, it should be emphasized, are not the same as prerequisites, indulgences or values, but merely the absence of deprivations one ordinarily expects one would not have to sustain. The very notions, then, of punishments and privileges are not ones that are cut from civilian cloth.

Second, it is important to see that the question of release from the total institution is elaborated into the privilege system. Some acts will become known as ones that mean an increase or no decrease in length of stay, while others become known as means for lessening the sentence.

Third, we should also note that punishments and privileges come to be geared into a residential work system. Places to work and places to sleep become clearly defined as places where certain kinds and levels of privilege obtain, and inmates are shifted very rapidly and visibly from one

place to another as the mechanisms for giving them the punishment or privilege their cooperativeness has warranted. The inmates are moved, the system is not.

This, then, is the privilege system: a relatively few components put together with some rational intent and clearly proclaimed to the participants. The overall consequence is that cooperativeness is obtained from persons who often have cause to be uncooperative.⁹

Immediately associated with the privilege system we find some standard social processes important in the life of total institutions.

We find that an *institutional lingo* develops through which inmates express the events that are crucial in their particular world. Staff too, especially its lower levels, will know this language, using it when talking to inmates, while reverting to more standardized speech when talking to superiors and outsiders. Related to this special argot, inmates will possess knowledge of the various ranks and officials, an accumulation of lore about the establishment, and some comparative information about life in other similar total institutions.

Also found among staff and inmates will be a clear awareness of the phenomenon of *messing up*, so called in mental hospitals, prisons, and barracks. This involves a complex process of engaging in forbidden activity, getting caught doing so, and receiving something like the full punishment accorded this. An alteration in privilege status is usually implied and is categorized by a phrase such as "getting busted." Typical infractions which can eventuate in messing up are: fights, drunkenness, attempted suicide, failure at examinations, gambling, insubordination, homosexuality, improper taking of leave, and participation in collective riots. While these punished infractions are typically ascribed to the offender's cussedness, villainy, or "sickness," they do in fact constitute a vocabulary of institutionalized actions, limited in such a way that the same messing up may occur for quite different reasons. Informally, inmates and staff may understand, for example, that a given messing up is a way for inmates to show resentment against a current situation felt to be unjust in terms of the informal agreements between staff and inmates,¹⁰ or a way of postponing release without having to admit to one's fellow inmates that one really does not want to go.¹¹

⁹ An excellent description of this model universe as found in a state mental hospital may be found in Ivan Belknap, *Human Problems of a State Mental Hospital*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1956, p. 164.

¹⁰ For example, see Morris G. Caldwell, "Group Dynamics in the Prison Community," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, Vol. 46, 1956, p. 656.

¹¹ There are some interesting incidental social functions of messings up. First, they tend to limit rigidities which might occur were seniority the only means of mobility

In total institutions there will also be a system of what might be called *secondary adjustments*, namely, technics which do not directly challenge staff management but which allow inmates to obtain disallowed satisfactions or allowed ones by disallowed means. These practices are variously referred to as: the angles, knowing the ropes, conniving, gimmicks, deals, ins, etc. Such adaptations apparently reach their finest flower in prisons, but of course other total institutions are overrun with them too.¹² It seems apparent that an important aspect of secondary adjustments is that they provide the inmate with some evidence that he is still, as it were, his own man and still has some protective distance, under his own control, between himself and the institution. In some cases, then, a secondary adjustment becomes almost a kind of lodgment for the self, a *churinga* in which the soul is felt to reside.¹³

The occurrence of secondary adjustments correctly allows us to assume that the inmate group will have some kind of a *code* and some means of informal social control evolved to prevent one inmate from informing staff about the secondary adjustments of another. On the same grounds we can expect that one dimension of social typing among inmates will turn upon this question of security, leading to persons defined as "squealers," "finks," or "stoolies" on one hand, and persons defined as "right guys" on the other.¹⁴ It should be added that where new inmates can play a role in the system of secondary adjustments, as in providing new faction members or new sexual objects, then their "welcome" may indeed be a sequence of initial indulgences and enticements, instead of exaggerated deprivations.¹⁵ Because of secondary adjustments we also find *kitchen strata*, namely, a kind of rudimentary, largely informal, stratification of inmates on the basis of each one's differential access to disposable illicit commodities; so also we find social typing to designate the powerful persons in the informal market system.¹⁶

in the privilege system. Secondly, demotion through messing up brings old-time inmates in contact with new inmates in unprivileged positions, assuring a flow of information about the system and the people in it.

¹² See, for example, Norma S. Hayner and Ellis Ash, "The Prisoner Community as a Social Group," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 4, 1939, pp. 364 ff. under "Conniving Processes"; also, Caldwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 650-651.

¹³ See, for example, Melville's extended description of the fight his fellow seamen put up to prevent the clipping of their beards in full accordance with Navy regulations. Melville, *White Jacket* (New York: Grove Press, n.d.), pp. 333-347.

¹⁴ See, for example, Donald Clemmer, "Leadership Phenomenon in a Prison Community," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, Vol. 28, 1938, p. 868.

¹⁵ See, for example, Ida Ann Harper, "The Role of the 'Fringer' in a State Prison for Women," *Social Forces*, Vol. 31, 1952, pp. 53-60.

¹⁶ For concentration camps, see the discussion of "Prominents" throughout Cohen, *op. cit.*; for mental hospitals, see Belknap, *op. cit.*, p. 189. For prisons, see the discus-

While the privilege system provides the chief framework within which reassembly of the self takes place, other factors characteristically lead by different routes in the same general direction. Relief from economic and social responsibilities—much touted as part of the therapy in mental hospitals—is one, although in many cases it would seem that the disorganizing effect of this moratorium is more significant than its organizing effect. More important as a reorganizing influence is the *fraternization process*, namely, the process through which socially distant persons find themselves developing mutual support and common *counter-mores* in opposition to a system that has forced them into intimacy and into a single, equalitarian community of fate.¹⁷ It seems that the new recruit frequently starts out with something like the staff's popular misconceptions of the character of the inmates and then comes to find that most of his fellows have all the properties of ordinary decent human beings and that the stereotypes associated with their condition or offense are not a reasonable ground for judgment of inmates.¹⁸

If the inmates are persons who are accused by staff and society of having committed some kind of a crime against society, then the new inmate, even though sometimes in fact quite guiltless, may come to share the guilty feelings of his fellows and, thereafter, their well-elaborated defenses against these feelings. A sense of common injustice and a sense of bitterness against the outside world tends to develop, marking an important movement in the inmate's moral career.

Adaptation Alignments

The mortifying processes that have been discussed and the privilege system represent the conditions that the inmate must adapt to in some way, but however pressing, these conditions allow for different ways of meeting them. We find, in fact, that the same inmate will employ different lines of adaptation or tacks at different phases in his moral career and may even fluctuate between different tacks at the same time.

sion of "Politics" in Donald Clemmer, *The Prison Community*, Christopher Publishing House, Boston, 1940, pp. 277-279, 298-309; also Hayner, *op. cit.*, p. 367; and Caldwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 651-653.

¹⁷ For the version of this inmate solidarity to be found in military academies, see Sanford M. Dornbusch, "The Military Academy as an Assimilating Institution," *Social Forces*, Vol. 33, 1955, p. 318.

¹⁸ An interesting example of this re-evaluation may be found in a conscientious objector's experience with nonpolitical prisoners, see Alfred Hassler, *Diary of a Self-Made Convict*, Regnery, Chicago, 1954, pp. 74, 117. In mental hospitals, of course, the patient's antagonism to staff obtains one of its supports from the discovery that, like himself, many other patients are more like ordinary persons than like anything else.

First, there is the process of *situational withdrawal*. The inmate withdraws apparent attention from everything except events immediately around his body and sees these in a perspective not employed by others present. This drastic curtailment of involvement in interactional events is best known, of course, in mental hospitals, under the title of "regression." Aspects of "prison psychosis" or "stir simpleness" represent the same adjustment, as do some forms of "acute depersonalization" described in concentration camps. I do not think it is known whether this line of adaptation forms a single continuum of varying degrees of withdrawal or whether there are standard discontinuous plateaus of disinvolvement. It does seem to be the case, however, that, given the pressures apparently required to dislodge an inmate from this status, as well as the currently limited facilities for doing so, we frequently find here, effectively speaking, an irreversible line of adaptation.

Second, there is the *rebellious line*. The inmate intentionally challenges the institution by flagrantly refusing to cooperate with staff in almost any way.¹⁹ The result is a constantly communicated intransigency and sometimes high rebel-morale. Most large mental hospitals, for example, seem to have wards where this spirit strongly prevails. Interestingly enough, there are many circumstances in which sustained rejection of a total institution requires sustained orientation to its formal organization and hence, paradoxically, a deep kind of commitment to the establishment. Similarly, when total institutions take the line (as they sometimes do in the case of mental hospitals prescribing lobotomy²⁰ or army barracks prescribing the stockade) that the recalcitrant inmate must be broken, then, in their way, they must show as much special devotion to the rebel as he has shown to them. It should be added, finally, that while prisoners of war have been known staunchly to take a rebellious stance throughout their incarceration, this stance is typically a temporary and initial phase of reaction, emerging from this to situational withdrawal or some other line of adaptation.

Third, another standard alignment in the institutional world takes the form of a kind of *colonization*. The sampling of the outside world provided by the establishment is taken by the inmate as the whole, and a stable, relatively contented existence is built up out of the maximum satisfactions procurable within the institution.²¹ Experience of the outside world is used as a point of reference to demonstrate the desirability of life on the inside; and the usual tension between the two worlds collapses, thwarting the

¹⁹ See, for example, the discussion of "The Resisters," in Edgar H. Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program for Prisoners of War," *Psychiatry*, Vol. 19 (1956), pp. 160-161.

²⁰ See, for example, Belknap, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

²¹ In the case of mental hospitals, those who take this line are sometimes called "institutional cures" or are said to suffer from "hospitalitis."

social arrangements based upon this felt discrepancy. Characteristically, the individual who too obviously takes this line may be accused by his fellow inmates of "having found a home" or of "never having had it so good." Staff itself may become vaguely embarrassed by this use that is being made of the institution, sensing that the benign possibilities in the situation are somehow being misused. Colonizers themselves may feel obliged to deny their satisfaction with the institution, if only in the interest of sustaining the counter-mores supporting inmate solidarity. They may find it necessary to mess up just prior to their slated discharge, thereby allowing themselves to present involuntary reasons for continued incarceration. It should be incidentally noted that any humanistic effort to make life in total institutions more bearable must face the possibility that doing so may increase the attractiveness and likelihood of colonization.

Fourth, one mode of adaptation to the setting of a total institution is that of *conversion*. The inmate appears to take over completely the official or staff view of himself and tries to act out the role of the perfect inmate. While the colonized inmate builds as much of a free community as possible for himself by using the limited facilities available, the convert takes a more disciplined, moralistic, monochromatic line, presenting himself as someone whose institutional enthusiasm is always at the disposal of the staff. In Chinese POW camps, we find Americans who became "pros" and fully espoused the Communist view of the world.²² In army barracks there are enlisted men who give the impression that they are always "sucking around" and always "bucking for promotion." In prisons there are "square Johns." In German concentration camps, longtime prisoners sometimes came to adopt the vocabulary, recreation, posture, expressions of aggression, and clothing style of the Gestapo, executing their role of straw-boss with military strictness.²³ Some mental hospitals have the distinction of providing two quite different conversion possibilities—one for the new admission who can see the light after an appropriate struggle and adapt the psychiatric view of himself, and another for the chronic ward patient who adopts the manner and dress of attendants while helping them to manage the other ward patients with a stringency excelling that of the attendants themselves.

Here, it should be noted, is a significant way in which total institutions differ. Many, like progressive mental hospitals, merchant ships, TB sanitariums and brain-washing camps, offer the inmate an opportunity to live

²² Schein, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-169.

²³ See Bruno Bettelheim, "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 38, 1943, pp. 447-451. It should be added that in concentration camps, colonization and conversion often seemed to go together. See Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-203, where the role of the "Kapo" is discussed.

up to a model of conduct that is at once ideal and staff-sponsored—a model felt by its advocates to be in the supreme interests of the very persons to whom it is applied. Other total institutions, like some concentration camps and some prisons, do not officially sponsor an ideal that the inmate is expected to incorporate as a means of judging himself.

While the alignments that have been mentioned represent coherent courses to pursue, few inmates, it seems, carry these pursuits very far. In most total institutions, what we seem to find is that most inmates take the tack of what they call *playing it cool*. This involves a somewhat opportunistic combination of secondary adjustments, conversion, colonization and loyalty to the inmate group, so that in the particular circumstances the inmate will have a maximum chance of eventually getting out physically and psychically undamaged.²⁴ Typically, the inmate will support the counter-mores when with fellow inmates and be silent to them on how tractably he acts when alone in the presence of staff.²⁵ Inmates taking this line tend to subordinate contacts with their fellows to the higher claim of "keeping out of trouble." They tend to volunteer for nothing, and they may even learn to cut their ties to the outside world sufficiently to give cultural reality to the world inside but not enough to lead to colonization.

I have suggested some of the lines of adaptation that inmates can take to the pressures that play in total institutions. Each represents a way of managing the tension between the home world and the institutional world. However, there are circumstances in which the home world of the inmate was such, in fact, as to *immunize* him against the bleak world on the inside, and for such persons no particular scheme of adaptation need be carried very far. Thus, some lower-class mental hospital patients who have lived all their previous life in orphanages, reformatories and jails, tend to see the hospital as just another total institution to which it is possible to apply the adaptive technics learned and perfected in other total institutions. "Playing it cool" represents for such persons, not a shift in their moral career, but an alignment that is already second nature.

²⁴ See the discussion in Schein, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-166 of the "Get-Alongers," and Robert J. Lifton, "Home by Ship: Reaction Patterns of American Prisoners of War Repatriated from North Korea," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, Vol. 110, 1954, p. 734.

²⁵ This two-facedness, of course, is very commonly found in total institutions. In the state-type mental hospital studied by the writer, even the few elite patients selected for individual psychotherapy, and hence in the best position for espousal of the psychiatric approach to self, tended to present their favorable view of psychotherapy only to the members of their intimate cliques. For a report on the way in which army prisoners concealed from fellow offenders their interest in "restoration" to the army, see the comments by Richard Cloward in Session 4 of *New Perspectives for Research on Juvenile Delinquency*, ed. by Helen L. Witmer and Ruth Kotinsky, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Children's Bureau Bulletin, 1955, especially p. 90.

The professional criminal element in the early periods of German concentration camps displayed something of the same immunity to their surroundings or even found new satisfactions through fraternization with middle-class political prisoners.²⁶ Similarly, Shetland youths recruited into the British merchant marine are not apparently threatened much by the cramped arduous life on board, because island life is even more stunted; they make uncomplaining sailors because from their point of view they have nothing much to complain about. Strong religious and political convictions may also serve perhaps to immunize the true believer against the assaults of a total institution, and even a failure to speak the language of the staff may cause the staff to give up its efforts at reformation, allowing the non-speaker immunity to certain pressures. . . .²⁷

Consequences

Total institutions frequently claim to be concerned with rehabilitation, that is, with resetting the inmate's self-regulatory mechanisms so that he will maintain the standards of the establishment of his own accord after he leaves the setting.²⁸ In fact, it seems this claim is seldom realized and even when permanent alteration occurs, these changes are often not of the kind intended by the staff. With the possible exception presented by the great resocialization efficiency of religious institutions, neither the stripping processes nor the reorganizing ones seem to have a lasting effect.²⁹ No doubt the availability of secondary adjustments helps to account for this, as do the presence of counter-mores and the tendency for inmates to combine all strategies and "play it cool." In any case, it seems that shortly after release, the ex-inmate will have forgotten a great deal of what life was like on the inside and will have once again begun to take for granted the privileges around which life in the institution was organized. The sense of injustice, bitterness and alienation, so typically engendered by the inmate's experience and so definitely marking a stage in his moral career, seems to weaken upon graduation, even in those cases where a permanent stigma has resulted.

²⁶ Bettelheim, *op. cit.*, p. 425.

²⁷ Thus, Schein, *op. cit.*, p. 165 fn., suggests that Puerto Ricans and other non-English-speaking prisoners of war in China were given up on and allowed to work out a viable routine of menial chores.

²⁸ Interestingly enough, staff is expected to be properly self-regulating upon first coming to the total institution, sharing with members of other kinds of establishments the ideal of needing merely to learn procedure.

²⁹ The strongest evidence for this, perhaps, comes from our knowledge of the readjustment of repatriated brain-washed prisoners of war. See, for example, Lawrence E. Hinkle, Jr., and Harold G. Wolff, "Communist Interrogation and Indoctrination of 'Enemies of the State,'" *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, Vol. 76, 1956, p. 174.

But what the ex-inmate does retain of his institutional experience tells us important things about total institutions. Often entrance will mean for the recruit that he has taken on what might be called a *proactive status*. Not only is his relative social position within the walls radically different from what it was on the outside, but, as he comes to learn, if and when he gets out, his social position on the outside will never again be quite what it was prior to entrance. Where the proactive status is a relatively favorable one, as it is for those who graduate from officers' training schools, elite boarding schools, ranking monasteries, etc., then the permanent alteration will be favorable, and jubilant official reunions announcing pride in one's "school" can be expected. When, as seems usually the case, the proactive status is unfavorable, as it is for those in prisons or mental hospitals, we popularly employ the term "stigmatization" and expect that the ex-inmate may make an effort to conceal his past and try to "pass."³⁰

THE STAFF WORLD

Humane Standards

Most total institutions, most of the time, seem to function merely as storage dumps for inmates, but as previously suggested, they usually present themselves to the public as rational organizations designed consciously, through and through, as effective machines for producing a few officially avowed and officially approved ends. It was also suggested that one frequent official objective is the reformation of inmates in the direction of some ideal standard. This contradiction, then, between what the institution does and what its officials must say that it does, forms the central context of the staff's daily activity.

Within this context, perhaps the first thing to say about staff is that their work, and hence their world, has uniquely to do with people. This people-work is not quite like personnel work nor the work of those involved in service relationships. Staffs, after all, have objects and products to work upon, not relationships, but these objects and products are people.

As material upon which to work, people involve some of the considerations characteristic of inanimate objects. Just as an article being

³⁰ As Cloward, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-83, implies, one important kind of leverage staff has in regard to inmates and one factor leading inmates to act convertible in presence of staff is that staff can give the kind of discharge that may appear to reduce stigmatization. Prison barracks officials can hold up the possibility of the inmate's "restoration" to active duty and, potentially, an honorable discharge; mental hospital administrators can hold up the possibility of a "clean bill of health" (discharged as cured) and personal recommendations.

processed through an industrial plant must be followed by a paper shadow showing what has been done by whom, what is to be done, and who last had responsibility for it, so human objects moving, say, through a mental hospital system must be followed by a chain of informative receipts detailing what has been done to and by the patient and who had most recent responsibility for him. In his career from admission suite to burial plot, many different kinds of staff will add their official note to his case file as he temporarily passes under their jurisdiction, and long after he has died physically his marked remains will survive as an actionable entity in the hospital's bureaucratic system. Even the presence or absence of a particular patient at a given meal or for a given night may have to be recorded so that cost-accounting can be maintained and appropriate adjustments rendered in billing.

Other similarities between people-work and object-work are obvious. Just as tin mines or paint factories or chemical plants may involve special work hazards for employees, so (staffs believe at least) there are special dangers to some kinds of people-work. In mental hospitals, staffs believe that patients may strike out "for no reason" and injure an official. In army prisons, staff "is ever haunted by the spectre of riot, revolt or mutiny. . . ."³¹ In TB sanitariums and in leprosoria, staff feel they are being specially exposed to dangerous diseases.

While these similarities between people- and object-work exist, it is, I think, the unique aspects of people as material to work upon that we must look to for the crucial determinants of the work-world of staff.

Given the physiological characteristics of the human organism, it is obvious that certain requirements must be met if any continued use is to be made of people. But this, of course, is the case with inanimate objects, too; the temperature of any storehouse must be regulated, regardless of whether people or things are stored. However, persons are almost always considered to be ends in themselves, as reflected in the broad moral principles of a total institution's environing society. Almost always, then, we find that some technically unnecessary standards of handling must be maintained with human materials. This maintenance of what we can call humane standards comes to be defined as one part of the "responsibility" of the institution and presumably is one of the things the institution guarantees the inmate in exchange for his liberty. Thus, prison officials are obliged to thwart suicidal efforts of the prisoner and to give him full medical attention even though in some cases this may require postponement of his date of execution. Something similar has been reported in German

³¹ Cloward, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

concentration camps, where inmates were sometimes given medical attention to tidy them up into a healthier shape for the gas chamber.

A second special contingency in the work-world of staff is the fact that inmates typically have statuses and relationships in the outside world that must be taken into consideration. (This consideration, of course, is related to the previously mentioned fact that the institution must respect some of the rights of inmates *qua* persons.) Even in the case of the committed mental patient whose civil rights are largely taken from him, a tremendous amount of mere paper-work will be involved. Of course, the rights that are denied a mental patient are usually transferred to a relation, to a committee, or to the superintendent of the hospital itself, who then becomes the legal person whose authorization must be obtained for many matters. Many issues originating outside the institution will arise: Social Security benefits, income taxes, upkeep of properties, insurance payments, old age pension, stock dividends, dental bills, legal obligations incurred prior to commitment, permission to release psychiatric case records to insurance companies or attorneys, permission for special visits from persons other than next of kin, etc. All of these issues have to be dealt with by the institution, even if only to pass the decisions on to those legally empowered to make them.

It should be noted that staff is reminded of its obligations in these matters of standards and rights, not only by its own internal superordinates, by various watchdog agencies in the wider society, and by the material itself, but also by persons on the outside who have kin ties to inmates. The latter group present a special problem because, while inmates can be educated about the price they will pay for making demands on their own behalf, relations receive less tutoring in this regard and rush in with requests for inmates that inmates would blush to make for themselves.

The multiplicity of ways in which inmates must be considered ends in themselves and the multiplicity of inmates themselves forces upon staff some of the classic dilemmas that must be faced by those who govern men. Since a total institution functions somewhat as a State, its staff must suffer somewhat from the tribulations that beset governors.

In the case of any single inmate, the assurance that certain standards will be maintained in his own interests may require sacrifice of other standards, and implied in this is a difficult weighing of ends. For example, if a suicidal inmate is to be kept alive, staff may feel it necessary to keep him under constant deprivatizing surveillance or even tied to a chair in a small locked room. If a mental patient is to be kept from tearing at grossly irritated sores and repeating time and again a cycle of curing and disorder,

staff may feel it necessary to curtail the freedom of his hands. Another patient who refuses to eat may have to be humiliated by forced feeding. If inmates of TB sanitariums are to be given an opportunity to recover, it will be necessary to curtail freedom of recreation.³²

The standards of treatment that one inmate has a right to expect may conflict, of course, with the standards desired by another, giving rise to another set of governmental problems. Thus, in mental hospitals, if the grounds gate is to be kept open out of respect for those with town parole, then some other patients who otherwise could have been trusted on the grounds may have to be kept on locked wards. And if a canteen and mailbox are to be freely available to those on the grounds, then patients on a strict diet or those who write threatening and obscene letters will have to be denied liberty on the grounds.

The obligation of staff to maintain certain humane standards of treatment for inmates represents problems in itself, as suggested above, but a further set of characteristic problems is found in the constant conflict between humane standards on one hand and institutional efficiency on the other. I will cite only one main example. The personal possessions of an individual are an important part of the materials out of which he builds a self, but as an inmate, the ease with which he can be managed by staff is likely to increase with the degree to which he is dispossessed. Thus, the remarkable efficiency with which a mental hospital ward can adjust to a daily shift in number of resident patients is related to the fact that the comers and leavers do not come or leave with any properties but themselves and do not have any right to choose where they will be located. Further, the efficiency with which the clothes of these patients can be kept clean and fresh is related to the fact that everyone's soiled clothing can be indiscriminately placed in one bundle, and laundered clothing can be redistributed not according to ownership but according to rough size. Similarly, the quickest assurance that patients going on the grounds will be warmly dressed is to march them in file past a pile of the ward's allotment of coats, requiring them for the same purposes of health to throw off these collectivized garments on returning to the ward.

Just as personal possessions may interfere with the smooth running of an institutional operation and be removed for this reason, so parts of the body itself may conflict with efficient management and the conflict

³² Extremely useful material on TB sanitariums as total institutions will be available in the forthcoming work by Julius A. Roth, Committee on Human Development, University of Chicago. Preliminary statements may be found in his articles "What Is an Activity?" *Etc.*, Vol. XIV, Autumn 1956, pp. 54-56, and "Ritual and Magic in the Control of Contagion," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 22, June 1957, pp. 310-314.

resolved in favor of efficiency. If the heads of inmates are to be kept clean and the possessor easily identified, then a complete head shave is efficacious, regardless of the damage this does to appearance. On similar grounds, some mental hospitals have found it useful to extract the teeth of "biters," give hysterectomies to promiscuous female patients, and perform lobotomies on chronic fighters. Flogging on men-of-war as a form of punishment expressed the same conflict between organizational and humane interests.³³

One of the arguments advanced by officers of the Navy in favor of corporal punishment is this: it can be inflicted in a moment; it consumes no valuable time; and when the prisoner's shirt is put on, *that* is the last of it. Whereas, if another punishment were substituted, it would probably occasion a great waste of time and trouble, besides thereby begetting in the sailor an undue idea of his importance.

I have suggested that people-work differs from other kinds because of the tangle of statuses and relationships which each inmate brings with him to the institution and because of the humane standards that must be maintained with respect to him. Another difference occurs in cases where inmates have some rights to visit off the grounds, for then the mischief they may do in civil society becomes something for which the institution has some responsibility. Given this responsibility, it is understandable that total institutions tend not to view off-grounds leave favorably. Still another type of difference between people-work and other kinds, and perhaps the most important difference of all, is that by the exercise of threat, reward or persuasion human objects can be given instructions and relied upon to carry them out on their own. The span of time during which these objects can be trusted to carry out planned actions without supervision will vary of course a great deal, but, as the social organization of back wards in mental hospitals teaches us, even in the limiting case of catatonic schizophrenics, a considerable amount of such reliance is possible. Only the most complicated electronic equipment shares this capacity.

While human materials can never be as refractory as inanimate ones, their very capacity to perceive and to follow out the plans of staff insures that they can hinder the staff more effectively than inanimate objects can. Inanimate objects cannot purposely and intelligently thwart our plans, regardless of the fact that we may momentarily react to them as if they had this capacity. Hence, in prison and on "better" wards of mental hospitals, guards have to be ready for organized efforts at escape and must constantly deal with attempts to bait them, "frame" them, and otherwise get them into trouble. This leads to a state of anxiety in the guard that is not

³³ Melville, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

of men, and about the difference between mental sickness and malingering. In prisons, we find currently an interesting conflict between the psychiatric and the moral-weakness theory of crime. In convents, we find theories about the way in which the spirit can be weak and strong, and the ways its defects can be combatted. Mental hospitals, it should be noted, are especially interesting in this connection because staff members pointedly establish themselves as specialists in the knowledge of human nature who must diagnose and prescribe on the basis of this philosophy. Hence, in the standard psychiatric textbooks there are chapters on "psychodynamics" and "psychopathology" which provide charmingly explicit formulations of the "nature" of human nature.

Given the fact that the management of inmates is typically rationalized in terms of the ideal aims or functions of the establishment and that certain humane standards will form part of this ideal, we can expect that professionals ostensibly hired to service these functions will likely become dissatisfied, feeling that they are being used as "captives" to add professional sanction to the privilege system and that they cannot here properly practice their calling. And this seems to be a classic cry. At the same time, the category of staff that must keep the institution going through continuous contact with inmates may feel that they too are being set a contradictory task, having to coerce inmates into obedience while at the same time giving the impression that humane standards are being maintained and that the rational goals of the institution are being realized. . . .

INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES

One important difference among total institutions is found in the spirit in which recruits enter the establishment. At one extreme we find the quite involuntary entrance of those who are sentenced to prison, committed to a mental hospital, or impressed into the crew of a ship. It is perhaps in such cases that staff's version of the ideal inmate has least chance of taking hold among the inmates. At the other extreme, we find religious institutions which deal only with those who feel they have gotten the call and, of these volunteers, take only those who seem to be the most suitable and the most serious in their intentions. In such cases, conversion seems already to have taken place, and it only remains to show the neophyte along what lines he can best discipline himself. Midway between these two extremes we find institutions like the army barracks whose inmates are required to serve, but who are given much opportunity to feel that this service is a justifiable one required in their own ultimate interests. Obviously, significant differences in tone will appear in total institutions, depending on whether recruitment is voluntary, semivoluntary or involuntary.

Another dimension of variation among total institutions is found in what might be called their *permeability*, that is, the degree to which the social standards maintained within the institution and the social standards maintained in the environing society have influenced each other sufficiently to minimize differences.³⁶ This issue, incidentally, gives us an opportunity to consider some of the dynamic relations between a total institution and the wider society that supports it or tolerates it.

When we examine the admission procedures of total institutions, we tend to be struck with the impermeable aspects of the establishment, since the stripping and leveling processes which occur at this time directly cut across the various social distinctions with which the recruit entered. St. Benedict's advice³⁷ to the abbot tends to be followed:

Let him make no distinction of persons in the monastery. Let not one be loved more than another, unless he be found to excel in good works or in obedience. Let not one of noble birth be raised above him who was formerly a slave, unless some other reasonable cause intervene.

Thus, the new cadet in a military school finds that discussions "of wealth and family background are taboo," and that "Although the pay of the cadet is very low, he is not permitted to receive money from home."³⁸

Even the age-grading system of the wider society may be stopped at the gates, as nicely suggested in a recent memoir³⁹ of an ex-nun:

Gabrielle moved to the place that would ever be hers, third in line of forty postulants. She was third oldest in the group because she had been third to register on that day less than a week ago when the Order had opened its doors to new entrants. From that moment, her chronological age had ceased and the only age she would henceforth have, her age in the religious life, had started.

It is, of course, by suppressing outside distinctions that a total institution can build up an orientation to its own system of honor. There is a sense then in which the harshest total institution is the most democratic, and in fact the inmate's assurance of being treated no worse than any other of his fellows can be a source of support as well as a deprivation.

But regardless of how radical a total institution appears to be, there will always be some limits to its reshuffling tendencies and some use made

³⁶ If the analogy were to be carried out strictly, we would have to say of course that every total institution had a semipermeable membrane about it, since there will always be some standard equally maintained on the inside and outside, the impermeable effects being restricted to certain specific values and practices.

³⁷ St. Benedict, *Holy Rule*, Ch. 2.

³⁸ Dornbusch, *op. cit.*, p. 317. The classic case of this kind of echelon leveling is found perhaps in the fagging system in British public schools.

³⁹ Kathryn C. Hulme, *The Nun's Story*, Little, Brown, Boston, 1956, pp. 22-23.

of social distinctions already established in the environing society, if only so it can conduct necessary affairs with this society and be tolerated by it. Thus, there does not seem to be a total institution in Western society which provides batch living completely independent of sex; and ones like convents that appear to be impervious to socioeconomic gradings, in fact tend to apportion domestic roles to converts of rural peasant background, just as the patient garbage crews in our prize integrated mental hospitals tend to be wholly Negro.⁴⁰ More important, perhaps, than the fact that total institutions differ in overall permeability to outside standards, we find that each is permeable with respect to different social standards.

One of the most interesting differences among total institutions is to be found in the social fate of their graduates. Typically, these become geographically dispersed; the difference is found in the degree to which structural ties are maintained in spite of this distance. At one end of the scale we find the year's graduates of a particular Benedictine abbey, who not only keep in touch informally but find that for the rest of their life their occupation and location have been determined by their original membership. At the same end of the scale, we find ex-convicts whose stay in prison orients them to the calling and to the nationwide underworld community that will comprise their life thereafter. At the other end of the scale, we find enlisted men from the same barracks who melt into private life immediately upon demobilization and even refrain from congregating for regimental reunions. Here, too, are ex-mental patients who studiously avoid all persons and events that might connect them with the hospital. Midway between these extremes, we find "old-boy" systems in private schools and graduate universities, which function as optional communities for the distribution of life-chances among sets of fellow graduates.

⁴⁰ It seems to be true that within any given establishment the topmost and bottom-most roles tend to be relatively permeable to wider community standards, while the impermeable tendencies seem to be focused in the middle ranges of the institution's hierarchy.

INTERORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS: A HYPOTHESIS ON CO-ORDINATING AGENCIES¹

Eugene Litwak
and Lydia F. Hylton

One major lacuna in current sociological study is research on interorganizational relations—studies which use organizations as their unit of analysis. There are some investigations, which bear tangentially on this problem, such as studies on community disasters and community power,² and the study of Gross and others on the school superintendency.³ There are some explicit formulations of general rules of interorganizational analysis among some of the sociological classics of the past, such as Durkheim's discussion of organic society and, in a tangential way, Marx's analysis of class.⁴ But little has been done in current sociological work to follow up the general problems of interorganizational analysis as compared to the problems of intraorganizational analysis, that is studies in bureaucracy.⁵

Reprinted from *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol. 6 (1962), pp. 395-415, with omission.

¹ We are indebted to Henry J. Meyer for helpful comments on this paper.

² William H. Form and Sigmund Nosow, *Community in Disaster* (New York, 1958), pp. 243-244; Floyd Hunter, *Community and Power Structure* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1953).

³ Neal Gross, W. S. Mason, and A. W. McEachern, *Exploration in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role* (New York, 1958).

⁴ Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York, 1947). If the concept of organization is used very broadly, it could be argued that Marx provided in his theory of class conflict a view of interorganizational analysis which, according to him, explains all social behavior.

⁵ The systematic study of intraorganizational analysis has proceeded at a rapid pace since the 1940's as indicated by the many studies in bureaucracy as well as the development of industrial sociology. For a review of some of this literature, see Peter M. Blau, *Bureaucracy in Modern Society* (New York, 1956). Interorganizational analysis has received no such systematic attention. This contrasts somewhat with related social sciences, where interorganizational analysis has been a major

Závěr

Kontingenční přístup k teorii řízení koresponduje s novými pohledy na povahu organizací, jak jsou v zatím nejuplněnější podobě syntetizovány v díle Michela Croziera. Sociální aktér i formální organizace v tomto pohledu ztrácejí ty pevné obrysy, které jim přidělil Taylorismus, ale také ty, které jim propůjčil směr "human relations". Základním východiskem tohoto přístupu je uznání faktu, že relativně jednoduché a všeobjímající formule nejsou v oblasti organizačních studií nadále obhajitelné, ať již jsou inspirovány jakkoliv vyspělým paradigmatem.

Základní situací organizačního života je nejednoznačnost, kontextová vázanost a proměnlivost situací. V tomto nepevném terénu platí téměř všechny poznatky, k nimž dospěla ve svém dosavadním vývoji teorie organizace, všechny však platí pouze podmíněně. Namísto jednoznačných formulí tak nastupují relativně členité typologie a mnohost modelů, jejichž úspěšná aplikace předpokládá bedlivé zkoumání terénu té které konkrétní organizace. Jestliže se ve fázi komparativních studií teorie organizace snažila nalézat obecné v rozrůzněné mnohosti, nyní je postup spíše opačný. Žádná formulace a žádné pravidlo není shledáno natolik příležitým, aby se pod něj dalo zahrnout bez četných výhrad a výjimek větší množství podobných případů.

V praxi to znamená, že debata o tom, nakolik je teorie řízení skutečně vědou v přísném slova smyslu, je dnes tak aktuální jako málokdy předtím. Na rozdíl od sociologické teorie organizace, která si klade za cíl "pouze" porozumět předmětu svého bádání, má manažerská věda velké praktické ambice. Jejich naplnění předpokládá ovšem nejen značné generalizující a predikční schopnosti, ale také (a zde se manažerská disciplína stává opět krajně zajímavou pro sociologii) to předpokládá více či méně manipulativní přístup k "lidským zdrojům" organizace. Věda o řízení se tak dostává do blízkosti zóny, která sociologii zajímá především jako oblast experimentování s lidským faktorem, jeho tváření a upravování. V podobě až do krajnosti vystupňované je tento povážlivý motiv obsažen v případě tzv. totálních institucí.

Keller, J. - S. Lelece
Kapitola 8 S. 125-134
7.

Totální instituce

Byrokraticky řízené formální organizace ovlivňují v moderní společnosti značnou část života všech občanů. Existuje ovšem zvláštní typ organizací, pro které je charakteristické, že ovlivňují prakticky veškerý život jisté části občanů. Do této kategorie náleží mimo jiné kasárna jako institucionalizace vojenské organizace, vězení jako institucionalizace korektivní organizace a léčebny, především léčebny pro mentálně postižené jako institucionalizace zdravotní organizace. Všem těmto specifickým typům byrokraticky řízené organizace věnuje sociologie stoupající pozornost přibližně od počátku čtyřicátých let. Až do té doby zkoumala prakticky jen organizace výrobního typu s jejich specifickými manažerskými problémy. Rozšíření záběru na organizace povahy sice nevýrobní, přesto však neméně nezbytné pro zajištění reprodukce společnosti, umožnilo sociologii šířeji tematizovat problém formativního působení organizací, který byl v případě studia výrobních jednotek poněkud zatlačen do pozadí a podřízen studiu organizační účinnosti.

8.1. Nápravné instituce

Klasickou prací v této oblasti je Clemmerova analýza vězeňské komunity (Clemmer 1940). Autor identifikuje tři statusové skupiny, které vytvářejí sociální stratifikaci vězeňského prostředí: vězeňskou elitu, masu běžných vězňů, opovrhované outsidersy. Popisuje normativní kódy, které určují chování příslušníků těchto vrstev, a kanály mobility mezi nimi.

Dále zkoumá neformální vůdce, kteří ovlivňují názory a chování ostatních spoluvězňů. Popisuje rovněž mechanismy, pomocí nichž se vězňové snaží čelit monotónii depersonalizované existence uvnitř vězení, a dále popisuje vzorce solidarity mezi vězni ve vztahu k personálu dozorců. Rozebírá různé aspekty vězeňské disciplíny a způsoby adaptace na její požadavky u jednotlivých typů vězňů. Všimá si odlišností v postavení i způsobu uvažování mezi vězeňskými nováčky a zkušenými delikventy.

Další vývoj analýzy nápravných institucí pokračuje dvojím směrem. Na straně jedné vzniká množství detailnějších studií věnovaných jednotlivým aspektům vězeňské problematiky, které analyticky rozlišil

již Clemmer. Řada studií se zaměřuje na klíčový problém účinnosti trestu a převýchovy, jiné se zabývají možnostmi alternativního uspořádání života ve vězení ve směru zlidšťování tamějších podmínek. Druhá linie úvah reprezentovaná především Ervingem Goffmanem namísto těchto problémů technické povahy tematizuje problematiku života v uzavřených ústavech obecně, sleduje psychické a osobnostní dopady tohoto společensky nepřirozeného prostředí na chovance i na personál, zkoumá mechanismy dohledu a disciplinace i obranné reakce chovanců vůči nim. Také tato linie úvah může čerpat řadu motivů již z klasické Clemmerovy práce.

8.2. Vojenské instituce

Rovněž studium vojenských institucí se rozvíjí dvojím směrem. Na jedné straně nalézáme klasické studie analyzující stálou armádu jako specifickou instituci moderní společnosti. Tento směr empirického bádání je systematicky rozvíjen od dob druhé světové války a navazuje na rozsáhlou kolektivní práci amerických sociologů (Stouffer 1949) i na podobně široce koncipované práce pozdější (Janowitz 1960). Postupný vývoj zásad manažerského myšlení se odrazil i v této oblasti důrazem na potřebu rozvinutí nových stylů vedení, jež by snižovaly napětí a zvyšovaly míru identifikace podřízených s úkoly (Selvin 1960). Zároveň právě ve vojenském prostředí v poválečné době prudce nabývá na významu konflikt, který je přítomen latentně ve všech typech formálních organizací, a sice konflikt mezi vertikálními linií organizační autority (line) a horizontálními linií autority expertní (staff). Moderní zbraňové systémy, vyžadující ke svému ovládnutí i v porovnání s civilními sektory neobvyklou míru odborné zdatnosti, zvyšují riziko kompetenčních konfliktů mezi podřízenými špičkovými odborníky a vysoce postavenými laiky.

Druhá, z hlediska teorie organizace neméně zajímavá myšlenková linie zkoumá dopad existence vlivných vojenských institucí na okolní společnost. Armáda jako zosobnění státního monopolu na násilí se podstatně liší od většiny organizací, v nichž násilí vystupuje pouze jako náhodný a v principu nelegitimní prvek. Vzestup významu armády zejména v době permanentního rizika atomového konfliktu se nutně odráží i v celkovém charakteru života moderní společnosti. Podle Lasswella větší destruktivní moc moderních zbraní vede k "socializaci nebezpečí", riziko války je ve společnosti distribuováno celoplošně (Lasswell 1941). I v době míru dochází ke srůstání vojenského a civilního aparátu, vojenská expertiza je vyžadována u všech významnějších politických rozhodnutí. Na druhé straně závislost

armády na civilních technologiích a průmyslovém potenciálu země činí z problému obranyschopnosti celospolečenskou záležitost. Zároveň profesionalizace armády reprodukuje zvláštní sociální třídu (či spíše stav) schopnou prosazovat své parciální zájmy na různých úrovních společensky významného rozhodování.

Goffmanovská linie uvažování čerpá především z prvního z obou uvedených zdrojů. Zvláštnosti života v kasárnách vykazují některé společné rysy s režimem věznic a léčeben pro mentálně postižené. Oddělení vojáků od jejich rodin, zvláštní uspořádání života v nich i omezené možnosti toto prostředí opustit ostře kontrastují s parametry běžného civilního života. Goffman se nechává inspirovat studiem různých typů odpovědí na tuto stresovou situaci.

8.3. Léčebné instituce

Podobně jako instituce nápravné a vojenské, také nemocnice a zvláště ústavy pro duševně nemocné představují v mnoha ohledech důsledku dovedené organizační principy, které ve výrobních a správních kontextech vystupují méně zřetelně a pouze parciálně.

Zvláštní pozornost z hlediska teorie organizace zasluhují právě ústavy pro duševně choré, neboť v nich bývá v plnosti realizována latentní tendence všech byrokracií, snaha pohlížet na klienty jako na ne zcela plnoprávné, ne zcela vyzpytatelné a zdravý odstup vyžadující objekty. Již první velká studie léčeben tohoto typu (pocházející z poloviny čtyřicátých let, publikována až o 15 let později) poukazuje na jev označovaný Mertonem jako "přemístění cílů". V ústavech pro choromyslné jsou léčebné cíle velmi často zaměňovány za cíl jiný, slouží především ostraze (Dunham 1960). K podobným závěrům dospívá i jedna z prvních případových studií v této oblasti studující jedno státní zařízení pro choromyslné na území Texasu (Belknap 1956).

Existují výrazné paralely ve vývoji pohledu sociologie na zaměstnání úřadů a továren a na pacienty léčebných zařízení všeho druhu. Ještě v první polovině padesátých let se studie věnují zcela taylorovsky testování míry výkonnosti organizací při léčbě pacientů. V této souvislosti sledují i fluktuaci ošetřujícího personálu a jeho pracovní morálku. Zjišťuje se, že zvláště velké léčebny pro mentálně postižené vykazují výraznou neúčinnost při sledování svých manifestních cílů. Dochází v nich k procesu, který Merton již dříve nazval "přemístěním cílů". Jejich hlavním úkolem se stává dohled, kontrola a poskytování pouze minimální péče. Vesměs se jedná o aktivity, které mají nízký sociální status. Tato okolnost, ve spojení s chronic-

kým nedostatkem financí obvyklým u zařízení ekonomicky neproduktivních, vede k tomu, že podobné ústavy přitahují zpravidla níže motivovaný a méně kvalitní personál. To zpětně negativně ovlivňuje charakter poskytované péče, která se mění v pouhý symbol legitimizující fakticky odlišné aktivity zařízení.

Proces "přemístění cílů" vyvolal zájem o studium problematiky kontraproduktivity organizací. Americká sociální psychologie (mezi jinými G. Devereux) od konce čtyřicátých let upozorňuje na skutečnost, že mentálně choří pacienti jsou umisťováni do prostředí, které stále znovu generuje příznaky jejich choroby. Léčebny jsou tak samy zčásti zodpovědné za rozvoj chorob, na což upozorňoval ostatně již před sto lety jeden z klasiků psychiatrie Pinel. V nenormálním prostředí lze stěží očekávat rozvoj normálního jednání.

Sociologové doporučují nechat se inspirovat Hawthorským experimentem: Již pouhé projevení zájmu o pacienty a zvýšení komunikace s nimi může mít blahodárný dopad. Pronikání trendu "human relations" má v oblasti léčebných zařízení analogický dopad jako v oblasti nápravných zařízení či vojenských institucí. Smyslem zavádných opatření je zmírňování napětí mezi chovanci a personálem, rozšiřování jejich participace na chodu celé organizace.

Vznikají studie pojednávající o léčebnách pro mentálně choré, které mezi prvními zavedly humánnější zacházení s pacienty (Stanton 1954, Caudill 1958). Na ně pak navazuje známý sociální psycholog R. N. Rapoport svou studií o komunitě v roli lékaře (Rapoport 1960). Navrhuje organizovat nemocniční zařízení jako pospolitost, jejíž každý člen bude moci přinést určitý vklad pro vytvoření prostředí, které bude mít již samo určité léčivé účinky.

K tomu je, podle Rapoporty, zapotřebí demokratizovat léčebné instituce, tak aby v nich i pacienti měli jistá práva a mohli přebírat jistou zodpovědnost ohledně sebe i druhých. Zdůrazňuje zároveň požadavek Kurta Levina na větší míru permisivity, tedy nahrazení striktní disciplíny liberálnější přístupem a připuštěním diskuse. Kromě požadavku komunismu, který úžeji spojí každodenní svět pacientů a personálu, trvá na principu konfrontace s realitou, tedy propojení dění uvnitř léčebné komunity se sledováním dění ve vnějším světě, jež již nemá být ignorován.

8.4. Přínos Ervinga Goffmana

Termínem "totální instituce" označuje Goffman ty organizace, které vytvářejí pro své členy prostředí, jež se v zásadním ohledu liší od ži-

votního světa, tak jak je znám běžným občanům moderní společnosti. Goffman definuje totální instituci jako místo, které slouží současně jako bydliště i pracoviště a v němž větší počet podobně situovaných jedinců oddílných na delší dobu od vnější společnosti vede společně navenek uzavřený a formálně spravovaný způsob života (Goffman 1961).

Jestliže každá organizace si pro sebe nárokuje určitou část kapacit a času svých členů, totální instituce se vyznačují tím, že jejich nároky v tomto ohledu jsou maximální. Goffmana přitom především zajímá formování struktury osobnosti v těchto extrémních organizačních podmínkách.

8.4.1. Typologie totálních institucí

Goffman rozlišuje pět skupin totálních institucí:

1. Instituce ustavené za účelem péče o ty, o nichž se soudí, že o sebe sami pečovat nedokáží (lidé přestárlí, sirotci, osoby silně tělesně či mentálně postižené atd.).

2. Zařízení pro osoby, které o sebe pečovat nedokáží, a navíc mohou být z různých důvodů pro společnost nebezpečné (např. lidé trpící nakažlivými chorobami, nebezpeční šílenci apod.).

3. Instituce zřízené kvůli ochraně společnosti před nebezpečnými osobami. Zde nejde o blaho chovanců, nýbrž o ochranu druhých (vězení, ústavy pro převýchovu nezletilých, sběrné tábory).

4. Zařízení pro realizaci určitých technických záležitostí souvisejících s provozem společnosti (kasárna, námořní lodě, internátní školy apod.).

5. Zařízení, jež mají umožnit svým obyvatelům stáhnout se ze světa (kláštery a azyly nejrůznějšího druhu). *Kromě toho*

Hlavním společným rysem všech těchto zařízení je, že spojují pod jednou střechou aktivity, jež jsou v podmínkách moderní společnosti provozovány odděleně a na různých místech – spánek, práce, volný čas. V totálních institucích jsou všechny činnosti provozovány nejen v tomtéž prostoru, ale i pod dozorem téže autority, což je právě v podmínkách moderní společnosti další silně neobvyklý rys. Všechny tyto aktivity jsou provozovány za přítomnosti druhých osob, přičemž na všechny tyto osoby je pohlíženo v principu stejně. Všechny aktivity jsou provozovány podle přesného a pro všechny přísně závazného rozpisu. Všechny mají svým způsobem přispívat k naplnění oficiálního cíle organizace, ať již je jím trest a náprava delikventů, zvyšování bojovnosti armády či léčba tělesně nebo mentálně strádajících.

Právě organizované naplňování mnoha odlišných potřeb velkého počtu lidí v rámci a pomocí prostředků byrokratické organizace považuje Goffman za klíčový znak totálních institucí. Tyto instituce jsou jakýmsi sociálním hybridem, částečně jsou formálními organizacemi, částečně sídelními komunitami. Jsou to zařízení specializovaná na změnu osobností. Každé z nich představuje určitý sociální experiment ukazující, co lze učinit s individuální psychikou.

Z tohoto vymezení a uspořádání plynou další závažné důsledky: Proti sobě stojí chovanci ústavu a personál, dvě zcela zřetelně oddělené skupiny, které na sebe pohlížejí skrze hostilní stereotypy. Vládne mezi nimi velká sociální distance, neexistuje prakticky žádná mobilita, jejich vzájemné chování je přísně reglementováno, což jen dále posiluje antagonistické stereotypy na obou stranách.

Totální instituce přejímají veškerou zodpovědnost nad svými chovanci po celý čas jejich pobytu. Jejich dohled se neomezuje na oblast pracovních aktivit, jak je to běžné v moderních společnostech. Život v nich je neslučitelný se dvěma podstatnými rysy moderní společnosti:

1. Neexistuje zde svobodný smluvně uzavřený kontrakt vymezující vztah mezi odvedenou prací a získanou odměnou. Všechny aktivity, včetně pracovních, mohou být v různé míře vynucovány.

2. Neexistuje zde instituce rodinného života a domácnosti.

Pracovní kontakt i vedení vlastní domácnosti je umožněno pouze personálu, což dále zvyrazňuje rozdíly mezi oběma skupinami a nesusměřitelnost jejich statusu. Goffman zkoumá svět chovanců a svět zaměstnanců totálních institucí odděleně.

8.4.2. Svět chovanců

Všechny totální instituce vytvářejí a udržují zvláštní druh napětí mezi domovským světem, z něhož chovanci přicházejí, a světem instituce a užívají tohoto trvalého napětí jako významné strategie při zvládnutí a tvarování svých obyvatel. Nepřekročitelná bariéra, kterou tyto instituce kladou mezi chovance a vnější svět, je mimo jiné zbavuje možnosti měnit role v průběhu všedního dne. Tím ochuzuje jejich Já a oklešťuje jejich sociální status. Zároveň jim odebírá vše (včetně osobních věcí), co by jim mohlo připomenout jejich bývalou identitu.

Goffman popisuje, jakými způsoby totální instituce potlačují v nově přichozích, ať již záměrně, či nezáměrně, jejich koncepci sebe sama, kterou si vyvinuli ve svém domovském světě. V této souvislosti ana-

lyzuje především mechanismy procesu mortifikace, jemuž jsou nově přichozí podrobováni.

Šok ze ztráty dřívějších rolí je doprovázen systematickým zbavováním vlastní tváře. Vnějšíkově se tato standardizace projevuje mimo jiné ostříháním, přidělením čísla, vážením, dezinfikováním a přidělením povinného ústavního stejnokroje. Účelem všech těchto procedur je navodit "civilní smrt" nově přichozích. Ti jsou tvarováni do podoby objektů, které mohou být snadno vloženy do již připravené administrativní mašinerie, kde budou opracováni podle rutinních předpisů. Často jsou nově přichozí zbaveni svého plného občanského jména, tedy vlastnictví, které je mimořádně důležité pro udržení vlastní identity. Na dobu pobytu přechází do majetku instituce i jejich vlastní vizáž.

Jsou přervány rodinné, profesní i občanské svazky a namísto nich dosazen stigmatizovaný status. Skrze kolektivní načasování všech denních aktivit jsou eliminovány možné oblasti osobního rozhodování. Jsou přetrženy či alespoň narušeny kanály komunikace s vnějším světem. Je vyžadován naprostý respekt vůči personálu, nejednou doprovázený vnučenými vzorci úcty. Nutnost žádat o povolení každé drobnosti uvádí chovance do permissivní pozice nepřírozené pro dospělé jedince.

Všechny tyto a mnohé další umrtvovací praktiky, jež jsou koordinovaným útokem na civilní Já chovance, bývají zdůvodňovány čistě pragmaticky. V léčebnách pro mentálně nemocné jsou zdůvodněny ochranou pacienta před druhými i před sebou samým, ve vězení jsou vydávány za součást trestu a nástroj převýchovy, v prostředí náboženských organizací jsou zdůvodněny potřebou duchovní očisty, již má být dosaženo skrze disciplinaci těla. Často se jedná pouze o zpětné racionalizace snahy seřadit denní aktivity velkého počtu osob na malém prostoru při použití minima organizačních zdrojů.

Tím je do chodu uveden další z mechanismů umrtvování osobnosti. Člověku je zabráněno, aby své tělo, jednání, a dokonce i myšlení mohl držet stranou kontaktu s cizími osobami a věcmi. Nikdy není zcela sám, vždy je buď přímo vystaven pohledům druhých, anebo nemůže tuto možnost alespoň vyloučit. V tomto směru působí i rutinní kontroly a inspekce. Soukromí chovanců je zcela eliminováno. Výměnou za své vlastnictví získávají uniformní věci instituce. Je na nich vyznačeno, že náleží instituci a pravidelně jsou měněny, jako kdyby měly být dezinfikovány od nabyté identifikace.

Navíc dochází i k dalším formám profanace. Je narušena informační ochrana ve všech věcech týkajících se osobnosti chovance. Jsou propracovány metody zjišťování údajů o něm, včetně těch kompromitujících. Za tímto účelem bývají institucionalizovány i různé formy zpovědi. Chovanec naopak nemá možnost získávat žádné informace týkající se rozhodování o jeho vlastních osudech.

Systematicky jsou atakovány a penalizovány všechny pokusy bránit zbytky dřívější osobnosti a často i vlastní důstojnosti. Tyto projevy se stávají předním cílem útoků, v chovanci je živěn pocit, že každý odpor je již předem marný, nesmyslný a bezvýhodný. Teprve v tomto bodě vzniká pravá bezmocnost, proces umrtvování osobnosti je ukončen.

8.4.3. Systém autority, systém privilegií a způsoby adaptace

Vztahy moci uvnitř totálních institucí vykazují několik zvláštností. Především zde existuje právo každého příslušníka aparátu organizace disciplinovat každého chovance. V moderní společnosti vně totálních ústavů existuje podobný vztah jedině mezi policií a občany, kteří se dopustili určitého přestupku. Dále zde platí, že sankce lze udělovat za velmi široké spektrum projevů až po nepředpisové oblečení, stravovací způsoby a podobně. A konečně, nevhodné chování v jedné oblasti může být penalizováno v jakékoliv jiné oblasti. Výsledkem je maximalizace příležitostí pro udílení trestů a hustá síť zákazů a příkazů, která obepíná veškerý život chovanců a přibližuje pozici těchto dospělých situací dítěte. Radikálně omezuje míru jejich kontroly nad každodenním prostředím ve srovnání s běžným standardem, jenž je samozřejmostí mimo zdi ústavů. Nadměrný počet všudypřítomných pravidel způsobuje, že chovanci, zvláště nově přichozí, žijí v chronické úzkosti z důsledků jejich možného překročení.

Podobně jako v případě systematického umrtvování vněústavní osobnosti, také v případě systému zákazů a pravidel narušují totální instituce především to jednání, které v běžné společnosti slouží individuům k tomu, aby si sama před sebou i před druhými potvrdila, že mají jistou kontrolu nad svým prostředím, že jsou zároveň autonomními a zodpovědnými bytostmi. V podmínkách totálních institucí se naopak zpravidla potlačují i marginální projevy autonomního chování až po rovinu projevů nezájmu o málo odměňující vztahy a okolnosti. V mnoha totálních institucích existuje snaha přimět chovance k aktivní účasti na destrukci jejich dřívější osobnosti (nováčci v kasárnách, novici v kláštrech apod.).

Zatímco proces mortifikace osobnosti pokračuje, chovanci začínají přijímat formální i neformální instrukce o existenci systému ústavních privilegií. Kolem tohoto systému mohou začít krystalizovat prvky nové osobní reorganizace v podmínkách ústavu. Goffman rozlišuje tři základní prvky systému privilegií:

1. Znalost pravidel, jež budou v novém prostředí vyžadována. Tato znalost zvýhodňuje chovance, kteří si ji dokáží pružně osvojit, neboť redukuje oblasti nejistoty, ve kterých lze očekávat tresty za nevhodné chování. Nová pravidla jsou novicům postupně sdělována již od přijímací procedury.

2. Malý počet odměn za příkladnou poslušnost vůči personálu. Tyto drobné odměny často mají vztah k samozřejmostem života za zdmi ústavů (cigareta, drobné přilepšení, možnost kontaktu se světem apod.). Vytváření přijatelného světa uvnitř instituce je soustředěno právě kolem těchto drobných privilegií, připomínajících venkovní svět.

3. Znalost forem trestu, například i v podobě odmítnutí odměn a privilegií, je rovněž součástí systému privilegií, neboť tato znalost opět umožňuje zlepšit orientaci uvnitř organizace a tím i své šance na uspokojivé přežití.

V konfrontaci s mechanismy umrtvujícími osobnost a s využitím určitých prvků systému privilegií mohou chovanci individuálně volit několik strategií adaptace na existující podmínky. Goffman rozeznává následující hlavní způsoby adaptace:

Regrese. Spočívá ve stažení se do sebe, což je vnitřní, subjektivní formou útěku z nepřijatelné reality. Tato strategie se vyznačuje minimální komunikací s druhými, je pokusem uchránit si svůj vnitřní svět jako realitu primárního významu a bagatelizovat realitu skutečnou.

Rebelie. Znamená odmítnutí spolupráce s personálem, vzpouru proti zákonům a ignorování pravidel totální instituce. Bývá zpravidla první reakcí na nové poměry, často po prvních sankcích přechází ve formu regrese.

Kolonizace. Chovanec se snaží zařídit si v podmínkách totální instituce relativně spokojenou existenci s maximem dosažitelných uspokojení. Z dosažitelných zdrojů a dosažitelnými prostředky pro sebe buduje co největší pohodlí. Každá snaha o humanizaci prostředí totálních institucí podporuje tento postoj.

Konverze. Chovanec přejímá optiku personálu jak v pohledu na druhé, tak také sám na sebe. Spolupracuje iniciativně s personálem, třeba i na úkor svých kolegů.

Chovanci zpravidla kombinují popsané postoje takovým způsobem, aby z prostředí totální instituce vyšli co nejméně fyzicky a psychicky poškození. Všechny tyto strategie i jejich kombinace jim mají napomoci zvládat napětí mezi domovským světem a světem totální instituce.

Goffman konstatuje, že platnost popisovaných mechanismů mortifikace, systému privilegií i způsobů adaptace se liší podle typu instituce a podle způsobu rekrutace chovanců. Způsob rekrutace variuje od nedobrovolného vstupu (vězení, pracovní tábory, léčebny pro mentálně postižené) až po vstup zcela dobrovolný (kláštery). Někam doprostřed pak situuje Goffman kasárna jakožto instituci, která nucený pobyt prezentuje jako čestnou službu, nikoli jako trest.

Goffman klade důraz na nezamýšlené vedlejší účinky převýchovy provozované v podmínkách totálních institucí. Tyto ústavy ve své ideologii často prohlašují za svůj cíl výbudování či posílení seberegulačních schopností u svých chovanců. Způsob, jakým jsou provozovány, jakým pohlížejí na své chovance a jakým přeformovávají jejich osobnosti, je však právě tomuto cíli naprosto vzdálen. Nezanedbatelná část totálních institucí slouží jako pouhé odkládiště problémových lidí, veřejnosti je však prezentována jako zcela racionální organizace efektivně naplňující své oficiálně schválené cíle. Jestliže přesto nějakým způsobem osobnost svých chovanců tvarují, není to tím směrem, o němž se hovoří jako o žádoucím.

Byrokracie

Prvým, kdo použil termínu "byrokracie", byl francouzský ekonom fyziokrat Vincent de Gournay. Měl tak učinit roku 1745. Od té doby sdílí "byrokracie" osud snad všech pojmů užívaných ve společenských vědách. Různí autoři mu přidělují významy často značně odlišné, žurnalistická praxe a intuice politiků přispívají k dalšímu zamlžení již tak nejasného pojmu. Nejčastěji bývá termín "byrokracie" spojován se třemi značně odlišnými okruhy významů:

1. Politologie rozumí pod "byrokracií" vládu uskutečňovanou skrze úřady, skrze státní aparát složený ze jmenovaných, a nikoli volených činitelů, organizovaný hierarchicky a závislý na legitimní autoritě. Jedná se o vládu regulovanou sice zákony, avšak připouštějící jen minimální účast občanů na řízení veřejných záležitostí. Alternativní uspořádání předpokládá jistou decentralizaci státní správy a doprovodné zvýšení úlohy volených zástupců občanů, především na úrovni lokální a regionální samosprávy.

2. V sociologii a v historických vědách se, do značné míry pod vlivem díla Maxe Webera, rozumí byrokratizací snaha o racionalizaci kolektivních aktivit spočívající ve vytváření velkých výrobních i nevyrobních organizací a právních systémů, které jsou řízeny pomocí neosobních pravidel. Alternativou moderní byrokracie v tomto slova smyslu by byl návrat k historicky ranějším formám organizace správních i produkčních aktivit, tedy v terminologii Maxe Webera návrat k patrimoniálním či dokonce patriarchálním formám organizace. Byrokracie v tomto čistě technickém smyslu může být nahrazena jediné vládou neodborných diletantů, neprofesionálů.

3. V běžném užívání označuje "byrokracie" nestrožumitelný způsob vyřizování poměrně jednoduchých záležitostí, který komplikuje a znepříjemňuje život občanů. Patří sem například neúměrně dlouhé vyřizování záležitostí, rutinní nezáměr, s nímž úředníci přistupují k vyřizování jednotlivých případů, komplikovanost procedur, ignorování účelů, jimiž je organizace explicitně pověřena, a podobně. Alternativou by bylo co nejmenší a co nejpružnější používání výkazů, statistik a dotazníků, co nejkratší fronty přede dvěma úřady a co nejkratší lhůty vyřizování žádostí.

Různost pojetí je dále komplikována skutečností, že samotný výraz "byrokrat" není stvořen příliš šťastně. Toto označení budí dojem, že