Whar Urilirarianism Is include cheir I do nor, indeed, consider
The creed which accepts as the foundadon ofmorals,
Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds
that actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce
the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended
pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness,
pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear
view of the moralstandard set up by the theory, much
more requires to be said; in particular, what things
it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to
what extent this is felt an open question. But these
supplementaryexplanations do not affect the theory
of life on which this theory of morality is groundednamely,
that and freedom from pain, are
the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable
things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian
as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the
pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the
promotion of and the prevention of pain.
Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds,
and among them in some of the most estimable in
feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose
that life has (as they express it) no higher end than
pleasure-no better and nobler object of desire and
pursuit-they designate as utterly mean and grovelling:
as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom
the followers of Epicuruswere, at a very early period,
contemptuouslylikened; and modem holders of the
doctrineare occasionally made the subject of equally
polite comparisons by its Geman, French, and
English assailants.
When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always
answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who
represent human nature in a degrading light; since
the accusation supposeshuman beings to be capable
of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable.
lf this supposition were true, the charge could
not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation:
for if the sources of pleasure were precisely
the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of
lifewhich is good enough for the one would be good
enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean
life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely
because a beasťs pleasures do not satisfy a
human being's conceptions of happiness. Human
beings have faculties more elevated than the animal
appetites, and when once made conscious of them,
do not regard anything as happiness which does not
Source:JohnStuart Mill, Social Benefit.
[he Epicureans to have been by any means faultless
in drawing out cheir scheme of consequences from
the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient
manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements
require to be included. But there is no known Epicurean
theory of life which does not assign to the
pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination,
and of the moral sentiments, a much higher
value as ~leasuresthan to those of mere sensation.
It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers
in general have placed the superiorityof mental over
bodily ~leasureschiefly in the greater permanency,
safety, uncostliness, kc., of the former-that is, in
their circumstantial advantages rather than in their
intrinsic nature. And on all these points utilitarians
have fully proved their case; but they might have
taken the other, and, as it may be ci~lled,highe~
ground, with entire consistency. It is quitc compiltible
with the principle of utility to recognise the fact,
that some kinds of pltasure are more desirahlc and
more valuable than others. It would be absurd that
while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered
as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures
should be supposed to depend on quantity
alone.
If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality
in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable
than another, merely as a pleasure, except its
being greater in amount, there is but one possible
answer. Of two pleasures, if there be onc to which
all or almost all who have experience of both give a
decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of
moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable
pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are
competently acquainted with both, placed so far
above the other that they prefer it, even though
knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of
discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity
of the other pleasure which their nature is capable
of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment
a superiority in quality, so far outweighing
quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small ac-
count.
Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who
are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of
appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most
marked preference to the manner of existence which
employstheir higher faculties. Few human creatures
would consent to be changed into any of the lower
animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a
beasťs pleasures; no intelligent human being would
consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be
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l ' . \ l ' - I ' I l l , N111111~~I S \ lillll,,
an ignor;~m~~s,no pcrsun t r f fcc.ling i~ndconscience
\vcl~~lJI~c'si.lfis11 i111dha~il,C\~CII though they should
hc pcrsu;~~lcdth;~tihc fool, the dunce, or the rascal
is better satisfied with his lot than they are with
theirs. They would not resign what they possess more
than he, for the most complete satisfaction of all the
desires which they have in common with him. If they
ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of unhappiness
so extreme, that to escape from it they would
exchange their lot for almost any other, however undesirable
in their own eyes. A being of higher faculties
requires more to make him happy, is capable
probably of more acute suffering, and is certainly accessible
to it at more points, than one of an inferior
type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never
really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower
grade of existence. We may give what explanation
we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it
to pridc, a llame which is given indiscriminately to
some oľthe most and to some of the least estimable
feelings of which mankind are capable; we may refer
it to the love of liberty and personal independence,
an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the
most effective means for the inculcation of it; to the
love of power, or to the love of excitemcnt, both of
which do really enter into and contribute to it: but
its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity,
which all hulnan beings possess in one for111 or another,
and in some, though by no mearis in exact,
proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so
essential a part of the happiness of those in whom
it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could
he, othcrwise,than momentarily, an object of desire
to them. Whoever supposes that this takes
at a sacrifice of happiness-that the superior
being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not
happier than the inferior-confounds the two very
different ideas, of happiness, and content. It is indisputable
that the being whose capacities of enjoyment
are low, has the greatest chance of having them
fullysatisfied; and a highly-endowed being will always
feel that ~ n yhappiness which he can look for, as the
world is constituted, is imperfect. Rut he can learn
to bear its imperfections, if they are at all bearable;
and they will not make him envy the being who is
indeed unconscious of the imperfections, hut only
because he feels not at a11 the good wh~chthose imperfections
qualify. It is better to be a human being
dissntistied than a pig satisficcl; hetter tu bc Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool satisticd. And if the fool, or
the pig, is of a different opinion, it is becausc thev
only know their ou.n side of the question. The other
parry ro the con~parisunknows both sides.
It may be objected, that many who are capable of
the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influence
of temptation, postpone them to the lower. But
this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of
the intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often,
from infirmity of character, make their election for
the nearer good, though they know it to be the less
valuable; and this no less when the choice is between
two bodily pleasures, than when it is between
bodily and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences
to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that
health is the greater good. It may be further objected,
that many who begin with youthful enthusiasm
for everything noble, as they advance in years
sink into indolence and selfishness. But I do not believe
that those who undergo this very common
change, voluntarily choose the lower description of
pleasures in to the higher. I believe that
before they devote themselves exclusively to the one,
they have already become incapable of the other.
Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a
very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile
influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in
the majority of young persons it speedily dies away
if the occupations to which their position in life has
devoted them, and the society into which it has
thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that
higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations
as they lose their intellectual tastes, because
they have not time or opportunity for indulging
them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasu~its,nut
because they deliberately prefer them, but
because they are either the only ones to which they
have access, or the only ones which they are any
longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned
whether any one who has remained equally susceptible
to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and
caltnly preferred the lower; though many, in all ages,
have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine
both.
From this verdict of the only competent judges, I
apprehend there can be no appeal. O n a question
which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or
which of two modes of existence is the most grateful
to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and
from its consequences, the judgment of those who
are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ,
that of the majority among them, must be admitted
as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to
accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures,
since there is no other tribunal to be referred
to even on the question of quantity. What means are
therc of determining which is the acutest of two
piiins, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations,
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,..~cpt the general suffrageof those who are familiar
both? Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous,
and pain is always heterogeneous with
pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particular
is worth purchasingat the cost ofa particularpain,
except the feelings and judgment of the
experienced?When, therefore, those feelings and
jLlJsnlent declare the pleasures derived from the
higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from
the cluestion of intensity, to those of which the
animalnature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is
susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the
same regard.
I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary
part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or Happiness,
considered as the directive rule of human
But it is by no means an indispensable
condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard;forthat
standard is not the agenťs own greatest
happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether;
and if it may possibly be doubted whether
a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness,
there can be no doubt that it makes other
peuPle happier, and that the world in general is imlnensely
a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore,
could only attain its end by the general cultivation
of nobleness of character, even if each individual
were only benefitted by the nobleness of others, and
his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a
sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare
enunciation of such an absurdityas this last, renders
refutation superfluous.
According to the Greatest Happiness Principle,
ils above explained,the ultimate end, with reference
to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable
(whetherwe are considering our own good or
that of other people), is an existence exempt as far
as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments,
both in point of quantity and quality; the
test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against
quantity, being the reference felt by those who, in
their opportunities of experience, to which must be
added their habits of self-consciousness and selfobservation,
are best furnished with the means of
comparison. This, being, according to the utilitarian
opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also
the standard of morality; which may accordingly be
defined,the rules and precepts for human conduct,
by the observance of which an existence such as has
been described might be, to the greatest extent possible~secured
to all mankind, and not to them only,
so faras the nature of things admits, to the whole
Sentientcreation.
Against the doctrine, hnwcvcr, riscs another class
of objectors, who say that happiness, in any form,
cannot be the rational purpose of human life and
action; because, in the first place, it is unattainable:
and they contemptuously ask, What right hast thou
to be happy? a question which Mr. Carlyle clenches
by the addition, What right, a short time ago, hadst
thou even to be? Next, they say, that men can do
witl~outhappiness; that all noble human beings have
felt this, and could not have become noble but by
learning the lesson of Entsagen, or renunciation;
which lesson, thoroughly learnt and submitted to,
they affirm to be the heginning and necessary condition
of all virtue.
The first of these objections would go to the root
of the matter were it well founded; for if no happiness
is to be had at all by human beings, the attainment
of it cannot be the end of morality, or of any
rational conduct. Though, even in that case, something
might still be said for the utilitarian theory;
since utility includes not solely the pursuit of happiness,
but the prevention or mitigation of unhappiness;
and if the former aim be chimerical, there
will be all the greater scope and more imperativeneed
for the latter, so long at least as mankind think fit
to live, and do not take refuge in the simultaneous
act of suicide recommended under certain conditions
by Novalis. When, however, it is thus positively
asserted to be impossible that human life
should be happy, the assertion, if not something like
verbal quibble, is at least an exaggeration. If by happiness
be meant a continuity of highly pleasurable
excitement, it is evident enough that this is impossible.
A state of exalted last only moments,
or in some cases; and with some intermissions, hours
or days, and is the occasional brilliant flash of enjoyment,
not its permanent and steady flame. Of this
the philosophers who have taught that happiness is
the end of life were as fully aware as those who taunt
them. The happiness which they meant was not a
life of rapture; but moments of such, in an existence
made up of few and transitory pains, many and various
pleasures, with a decided predominance of the
active over the passive, and having as the foundation
of the whole, not to expect more from life than
it is capable of bestowing. A life thus composed, to
those who have been fortunate enough to obtain it,
has always appeared worthy of the name of happiness.
And such an existence is even now the lot of
many, during some considerable portion of their
lives. The present wretched education, and wretched
social arrangements, are the only real hindrance to
its being attainable by almost all.
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The objectors perhaps may doubt whether human
beings, if taught to consider happiness as the end of
life, would be satisfied with such a moderate share
of it. But great numbers of mankind have been satisfied
with much less. The main constituents of a
satisfied life appear to be two, either of which by itself
is often found sufficient for the purpose: tranquillity,
and excitement. With much tranquillity, many find
that they can be content with very little pleasure: with
much excitement, many can reconcile themselves to
a considerable quantity of pain. There is assuredly
no inherent impossibility in enabling even the mass
of mankind to unite both; since the two are so far
from being incompatible that they are in natural alliance,
the prolongation of either being a preparation
for, and exciting a wish for, the other. It is only
those in whom indolence amounts to a vice, that do
not desire excitement after a n interval of repose; it
is only those in whom the need of excitement is a
disease, that feel the tranquillity which follows excitement
dull and insipid, instead of pleasurable in
direct proportion to the excitement which preceded
it. When people who are tolerably fortunate in their
outward lot do not find in life sufficient enjoyment
to make it valuable to them, the cause generally is,
caring for nobody but themselves. To those who have
neither public nor private affections, the excitements
of life are much curtailed, and in any case
dwindle in value as the time approaches when all
selfish interests must be terminated by death: while
those who leave after them objects of personal affection,
and especially those who have also cultivated
a fellow-feeling with the collective interests of
mankind, retain as lively an interest in life o n the
eve of death as in the vigour of youth and health.
Next to selfishness, the principal cause which makes
life unsatisfactory, is want of mental cultivation. A
cultivated mind-I do not mean that of a philosopher,
but any mind to which the foundations of
knowledge have been opened, and which has been
taught, in any tolerable degree, to exercise its faculties-finds
sources of inexhaustible interest in all
that surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the
achievements of art, the imaginarions of poetry, the
incidents of history, the ways of mankind past and
present, and their prospects in the future. It is possible,
indeed, to become indifferent to all this, and
that too without having exhausted a thousandth part
of it; hut only when one has had from the beginning
no moral or human interest in these things and has
sought in them only the gratification of curiosity.
Now there is absolutely no reason in the nature
of things why an amount of mental culture sufficient
to gi\,can intclligcnt intvrcst in tlicsc ul?jccts of contemplation,
. s h ~ ) u l ~ inot bc ~ h cinheritance of
everyune born in a civilisect country. As littlc is there
an inherent necessity that any human being should
be .a selfish egotist, devoid of evcry fecling or care
but those which centre in this own miscrilble individuality.
Something far superior to this is sufficiently
common even now, to give ample earnest of
what the human species may be made. Genuine private
affections, and a sincere interest in the public
good, are possible, though in unequal degrees, to
every rightly brought up hurlian being. In a world in
which there is so much to interest, so much to enjoy,
and so much also to correct and improve, everyone
who has this moderate amount of moral and intellectual
requisires is capable of an exisrence which
may be called enviable, and unless such a person,
through bad laws, or subjection to the will of others,
is denied the liberty to use the sources of happiness
within his reach, he will not fail to find this enviable
existence, if he escape the positive evils of life, the
great sources of physical and mental suffering-such
as indigence, disease, and the unkindness, worthlessness,
or premature loss of objects of affection. The
main stress of the problem lies, therefore, in the
contest with these calamities, from which it is a rare
good fortune entirely to escape; which, as things now
are cannot be obviated, and often cannot be in any
material degree mitigated. Yet no one whose opinion
descrvcs a ll-romenťs consideration can doubt that
~uostof the great positive evils of the worlcl are in
themselves removable, and will, if human affairs
continue to improve, be in the end reduced within
narrow limits. Poverty, in any sense implying suffering,
may be completely extinguished by the
wisdom of society, combined with the good sense and
providence of individuals. Evcn that most intractable
of enemies, disease, may be indefinitely reduced
in dinlensions by good physical and morn1 education,
and proper control of noxiclus influences; while
the progress of science holds out a promise for the
future of still more direct conquests over this derestable
fc>e.And every ad:':,nce in that dircction relieves
us from some, not only of the chances which
cut short our own lives, but, what conurns us still
more, which deprive us of those in whonl our happiness
is wrapt up. As for vicissitc~dcsof fo~tune,and
other disappointments connected with worldly circumstances,
these are principally the effect either of
gross imprudence, of ill-regulated desires, or of bad
or imperfect social instirutions. All the grand sources,
in shalt, of human suffering are in a great degree,
Illany of them almost entirely, conquerable by human
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,-ilce and effort; and though their removal is grie\--
,usly slow-though a long succession of generations
will perish in the breach before the conquest
is completed, and this world becomes all that, if will
and knowledge were not wanting, it might easily be
rnade-yet every mind sufficiently intelligent and
gellerous to bear a part, however small and inconspicuous,in
the endeavour, will draw a noble enjoyment
from the contest itself, which he would not for
any bribe in the form of selfish indulgence consent
to be without.
And this leads to the true estimation of what is
said by the objectors concerning the possibility and
the obligation, of learning to do without happiness.
unquestionably it is possible to do without happiness.
It is done involuntarily by nineteen-twentieths
of mankind, even in those parts of our present world
which are least deep in barbarism; and it often has
to be done voluntarily by the hero or the martyr, for
the sake of something which he prizes more than his
individual happiness. But this something, what is it,
unless the happiness of others, or some of the requisites
of happiness? It is noble to be capable of resigning
entirely one's own portion of happiness or
chances of it, but after all, this self-sacrificemust be
forsomeend. It is not its own end; and if we are told
that its end is not happiness but virtue, which is
better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be
made if the hero or martyr did not believe that it
would earn for others immunity from similar sacrifices?Would
it be made if he thought that his renunciation
of happiness for himself would produce
no fruit for any of his fellow creatures, but to make
their lot like his, and place them also in the condition
of persons who have renounced happiness? All
honor to those who can abnegate for themselves the
personal enjoyment of life, when by such renunciation
they contribute worthily to increase the amount
of happiness in the world; but he who does it, or
professes to do it, for any other purpose is no more
deserving of admiration than the ascetic mounted
on his pillar. He may be an inspiriting proof of what
men can do, but assuredly not an example of what
they should.
Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the
worlďs arrangements that anyone can best serve the
happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his
own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect
state, I fully acknowledge that the readiness to make
such a sacrifice is the highest virtue which can be
found in man. I will add that in this condition of
the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the
cQnsciousability to do without happiness gives the
best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable.
For nothing except that consciousness can
raise a person above the chances of life, by making
hinl feel that, let fate and fortune do their worst, they
have no power to subdue him, which, once felt, frees
him from excess of anxiety concerning the evils of
life and enables him, like many a Stoic in the worst
times of the Roman Empire, to cultivate in tranquillity
the sources of satisfaction accessible to him
without concerning himself about the uncertainty of
their duration any more than about their inevitable
end.
Meanwhile, let us utilitarians never cease to claim
the morality of self devotion as a possession which
belongs by as good a right to them as either to the
Stoic or to the Transcendentalist. The utilitarian
morality does recognize in human beings the power
of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good
of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice
is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase,
or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it
considers as wasted. The only self-renunciation
which it applauds is devotion to the happiness, or
to some of the means of happiness,of others-either
of mankind collectively or of individuals within the
limits imposed by the collective interests of man-
kind.
I must again repeat what the assailants of utilitarianism
seldom have the justice to acknowledge,
that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard
of what is right in conduct is not the agenťs
own happiness but that of all concerned. As between
his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism
requires him to be as strictly impartial as
a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the
golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete
spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would
be done by and to love your neighbour as yourself
constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.
As the means of first making the nearest approach
to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that
laws and social arrangements should place the happiness
or (as speaking practically it may be called)
the interest of every individual as nearly as possible
in harmony with the interest of the whole and, secondly,
that education and opinion, which have so
vast a power over human character, should so use
that power as to establish in the mind of every individual
an indissoluble associationbetween his own
happiness and the good of the whole-especially between
his own happiness and the practice of such
modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard
for the universal happiness prescribes-so that not
only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of
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happiness to hirnsclf cons is^ c111:Iy\vitl) CLIIIJULI.017posed
to the gcnor:11good, h t ~ t;~lsnthat a dircct ilnpulse
to promote the gcncral gc~oclm;iy be in ellcry
individual one of the habitui~lsnotivcs uf acrion i~nd
the sentiments connected herewith may fill a largc
and prominent place in every human being's sentient
existence. If the impugners of the utilitarian
morality represented it to their own minds in this its
true character, I know not what recommendation
possessed by any other morality they could possihly
affirm to be wanting to it, what more beautiful or
more exalted developments of human nature any
other ethical system can be supposed to foster, or
what springs of action, not accessible to the utilitarian,
such systems rely on for giving effect to their
mandates.
The objectors to utilitarianism cannot always be
charged with representing it in a discreditable light.
O n the contrary, those among them who entertain
anythinglike a just idea of its disinterested character
sometimes find fault with its standard as being too
high for humanity.They say it is exacting too much
to require that people shall always act from the inducement
of promoting the general interests of society.
But this is to mistake the very meaning of a
standard of morals and confound the rule of action
with the motive of it. It is the business of ethics to
tell us what are our duties or by what tests we may
know them, but no system of cthics requires that the
sole motive of all we do shall he a feeling of duty; on
the contrary, ninety-ninc hundredths of all our actions
are done from other motives, and rightly so
done, if thc rule of duty does not condemn them. It
is the more unjust to utilitarianisrn that this particular
rnisapprehcnsion should be made a ground of
objection to it, inasnluch as utilitarian moralists have
gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the
motive has nothing to do with the morality of the
action, though much with the worth of the agent.
He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does
what is morally right, whethcr his motive be duty or
the hope of being paid for his trouble; he who betrays
the friend that trusts him i s guilty of a crimp,
even if his object be to serve another friend to whom
he is under greater obligations. But to speak only of
actions done from the motive of duty and in direct
obedience to principle, it is a misapprehension of the
utilitarian mode of thought to conceive it as implying
that people should 6s their minds upon so
wide a generality as the world, or society at large.
The great majority of good actions are intended not
for the benefit of the world hut tor that of individuals,
of which the good of the \vorld is made up; and
the thoughts of rhr most virtuo~~sman nced not on
thcsc occasions travcl beyond ~ h cparticular persons
concerned, cxcept so far as is necessary to assure
himself that in benefiting them he is not violating
the rights, that is, thc lcgitimate and authorized expectations,
of anyone clse. The multiplication of
happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the
object of virtue. The occasion on which any person
(except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do
this on an extended scale-in other words, to be a
publicbenefactor-are but exceptional, and on these
occasions alone is he called on to consider public
utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest
or happiness of some few persons, is all he has
to attend to. Those alone the influence of whose actions
extends to society in general need concern
themselves habitually about so large an object. In
the case of abstinences indeed-of things which
people forbear to do from moral considerations,
though the consequencesin the particular case might
be beneficial-it would be unworthy of an intelligent
agent not to be consciously aware that the
action is of a classwhich, ifpractised generally,would
be generallyinjurious and that this is the ground of
the obligation to abstain from it. The amount of
regard for the public interest implied in this recognition
is no grcaterthan is demanded by every system
of morals, for they all enjoin to abstain from whatever
is manifestly pernicious to society.
The same considerations dispose of another reproach
against the doctrine of utility, founded on a
still grosser misconception of the purpose of a standard
of morality and of the very meaning of the words
right and wrong. It is often affirmed that utilitarianism
renders men cold and unsympathizing; that
it chills their moral feelingstowards individuals; that
it makes them regard only the dry and hard consideration
of the consequences of actions, not taking
into their moral estimate the qualities from which
those actions emanate. If the assertion means that
they do not allow their judgment respecting the
rightness or wrongness of an action to be influenced
by their opinion of the qualities of the person who
does it, this is a csrnplaint not against utilitarianism
but against having any standard of morality at all;
for certainly no known ethical standard decides an
action to be good or bad because it is done by a good
or had man, still less because done by an amiable, a
brave, or a benevolent man, or the contrary. These
considerations are relevant not to the estimation of
actions but of persons; and there is nothing in the
utilitarian theory inconsistent with the fact that there
are other things which interest us in persons besides
the rightness and wrongness of their actions. The
Stoics, indeed, with the paradoxical misuse of langcnge
{yhichv::~ pait of thcir system and by which
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rhcy srrrwc tu raiw thcnisclvcs above all concern world by utilitarianism, while that doctrine docs
; I \ ~ O L I ~ilnyrllirlg but \,irtuc, \\.ere fond of saying that supply, if not always an easy, at all events a tangible
hc who has hat has cvcryrhing, that he, and only and intelligible mode of deciding such differences.
hc, is rich, is bcautihl, is u king. But no claim ofthis
clcscription is made for the virtuous man by the utilirilrian
cloctrins. Utilitarians arc quite aware that
tl~creilrc othcr Jcsirahlc possessions and qualities
besides virtue and are perfectlywilling to allow to all
them their full worth. They are also aware that a
right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous
character and that actions which are blamable often
pl(lceeJ, frum qualities cn&d to praise. When this
is apparent in any particular case, it modifies their
estimation, not certainly of the act but of the agent.
I grant that they are, notwithstanding, of the opinion
that in the long run the hest proof of a good charxccer
is good actions and resolutely refuse to consider
any mental disposition as good of which the
predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct.
This makes them unpopular with many people; but
it is an unpopularity which they must share with
cvcryone who regards the distinction between right
and wrong in a serious light, and the reproach is not
onc which a conscientious utilitarian need be anxious
to repel.
If no more be meant by the objection than that
many utilitarians look on the morality of actions, as
measured by the utilitarian standards, with too exclusive
a regard and do not lay sufficient stress upon
the other beauties of character which go towards
making a human being lovable or admirable, this may
be admitted. Utilitarians who have cultivated their
moral feelings but not their sympathies nor their artistic
perceptions do fall into this mistake; and so do
all other moralists under the same conditions. What
can be said in excuse for other moralists is equally
available for them-namely, that, if there is to be
any error, it is better that it should be on that side.
As a matter of fact, we may affirm among utilitarians,
as among adherents of other systems, there is
every imaginable degree of rigidity and of laxity in
the application of their standard: some are even puritanically
rigorous, while others are as indulgent as
can possibly be desired by sinner or by sentimentalist.
But on the whole, a doctrine which brings
prominently forward the interest that mankind have
in the repression and prevention of conduct which
violates the moral law, is likely to be inferior to no
other in Kurning the sanctions of opinion against
such violations. It is true, the question, What does
violate the moral law? is one on which those who
recognize different standards of morality are likely
now and then to differ. But differenceof opinion on
moral questions was not first introduced into the
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