A DANGEROUS OBSESSION
A RESEARCH REPORT
THE EVIDENCE AGAINST CARBON TRADING AND
FOR REAL SOLUTIONS TO AVOID A CLIMATE CRUNCH
FOREWORD
Cover image: Amelia Collins
The authors of this report have
done a masterful job of drawing
together a highly dispersed literature
representing more than a decade
of critical perspectives on carbon
trading. This critique is based on
the inability of carbon markets to
achieve greenhouse gas reductions
on the scale required to avert highly
disruptive temperature increases by
mid-century.
The report catalogues the repeated
failure of global and regional carbon
trading to deliver in its own terms
as expressed in the promises of its
advocates. The authors decisively
reject the argument that the
disappointing record of attempts to
construct carbon markets is due to
"teething problems" or because we
have not tried hard enough. Rather,
they demonstrate that the carbon
trading architecture is fundamentally
unfit for purpose and cannot possibly
deliver the stabilisation of atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations that
the scientific community is calling for
in the time frame that matters.
ABOUT THIS REPORT
This report has been prepared by
Friends of the Earth England, Wales
and Northern Ireland for its Demand
Climate Change campaign. The report
is being distributed to decision makers,
media and campaigners ahead of the
UN climate talks in Copenhagen in
December 2009. The report evaluates
whether carbon trading can deliver
the necessary emissions reductions
to avoid dangerous climate change
quickly, strategically, and in a just
and equitable way. It also looks at
what alternative tools are available to
governments.
This report is available online at:
www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/
dangerous_obsession.pdf
Author
Sarah-Jayne Clifton
Editorial team
Editor: Martin Cullen
Design: Foundation Graphic Design
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to everyone who gave help and advice in the writing of this report,
in particular:
Professor Steve Rayner, Oxford University
Larry Lohmann, The Corner House
Professor Gwyn Prins, London School of Economics
Dr Yacob Mulugetta, University of Surrey
Oscar Reyes, Transnational Institute
Mike Childs, Asad Rehman, Tom Picken, Andy Atkins, Adam Bradbury,
Joe Zacune, Tim Jenkins, Richard Dyer, Helen Wolfson,
Henry Rummins, Dave Timms, Helen Bird, Antje von Broock, Sebastian Valdomir,
Tom Wright, Amelia Collins, Deborah Thompson, Zoe Cook, Stephanie Greig
Far from proving to be an
economically efficient instrument,
carbon trading and offsetting have
been beset by inefficiency and, in
places, corruption and are set to
become the next subprime crisis.
While various voices in academia
and the environmental movement
have been expressing these views
over the past decade, they have
largely been ignored, or even actively
muffled, by those who have sunk their
political capital into the carbon trading
architecture. Indeed, support for
carbon trading seems to have become
a litmus test of "climate correctness."
Against this background, publication
of this report is an act of genuine
courage on the part of Friends of the
Earth. It is earnestly to be hoped that
its voice will be heard loud and clear
at Copenhagen and beyond.
Professor Steve Rayner
Director, Institute for Science,
Innovation & Society, Sad Business
School, University of Oxford
3A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 8
SECTION 2: CARBON TRADING ­ THE BASICS 12
SECTION 3: ARE CARBON MARKETS WORKING? 20
PART A: COMPARING CARBON MARKETS AGAINST THEIR OWN CRITERIA 20
1. REDUCTIONS IN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS THROUGH CARBON TRADING ­ THE REAL PICTURE 20
2. THE PRICE SIGNAL ­ DRIVING INNOVATION OR LOCKING IN HIGH-CARBON INFRASTRUCTURE? 22
PART B: THE OTHER FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS 25
3. OFFSETTING IN GLOBAL CARBON TRADING ­ AN ESCAPE HATCH FOR EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS 25
4. CLIMATE SPECULATION ­ THE RISK OF CARBON SUBPRIME 32
5. CLIMATE FINANCE ­ A SMOKESCREEN FOR LACK OF ACTION 35
SECTION 4: CAN THE PROBLEMS WITH CARBON TRADING BE OVERCOME? 38
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO CARBON TRADING 38
PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING THESE SOLUTIONS 38
SECTION 5: ALTERNATIVES TO CARBON TRADING 43
PART A: OVERALL APPROACH TO BRINGING DOWN EMISSIONS ­ FOCUS ON SIMPLE,
DIRECT AND PROVEN POLICIES 43
PART B: BEYOND DIRECT DECARBONISATION ­ ADDRESSING GLOBAL INEQUITY AND
UNSUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION 49
PART C: HOW TO PAY FOR IT ­ FUNDING SOURCES FOR DECARBONISATION IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH 52
SECTION 6: THE WAY FORWARD ­ CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 54
RECOMMENDED READING / LISTENING 59
LIST OF FIGURES 59
REFERENCES 60
BOXES
EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME (EU ETS) 15
PROPOSALS FOR SECTORAL TRADING AND SECTORAL CREDITING MECHANISMS 18
REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION (REDD) 31
THE ROLE OF THE UK IN THE GLOBAL CARBON MARKET 41
SUMMARY OF KEY FLAWS WITH CARBON TRADING 54
4 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Section 1: Introduction
Tackling greenhouse gas emissions to
prevent dangerous climate change is
one of the most pressing challenges
facing humanity. The chance of
keeping global average temperature
increase below the critical threshold
is fast slipping away. It requires a
peak and decline in global emissions
by 2015. Rich developed countries
are responsible for three quarters
of emissions historically despite
representing only 15 per cent of the
world's population. They have a legal
and moral obligation to make the
biggest reductions and provide finance
and technology to developing countries
to compensate for climate impacts
and support clean development. But
developed countries have largely failed
to take sufficient action to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions or provide
this much-needed finance to the
developing world.
In this context carbon trading is
increasingly being put forward as
a tool for tackling climate change.
Proponents of carbon trading argue
that it helps to reduce emissions, and
that it does this at the lowest cost,
stimulates investment in low-carbon
infrastructure and can help generate
finance for developing countries to
tackle climate change.
This report evaluates whether
carbon trading can deliver these
emissions reductions quickly,
strategically, and in a just and
equitable way. It also looks at what
alternative tools are available to
governments.
Section 2: Carbon trading
­ the basics
About carbon trading
* Carbontradingisthebuyingand
selling of an artificial commodity the
right to emit carbon dioxide.
* Itisamarket-basedmechanism
and is an indirect tool for tackling
emissions, in contrast to more direct
tools available to governments such
as investment and regulation.
* Emissionstradingschemes(ETSs)
are created by government action in
the following steps:
 ˇAnupperlimit­orcap­isseton
emissions from a sector or sectors
of the economy.
 ˇBusinessesinthosesectorsare
given or auctioned permits for a
proportion of those emissions.
 ˇBusinessesthatdon'tuseallof
their allowances can sell their
surplus to others that exceed their
allowance.
* AllexistingandplannedETSsallow
for the inclusion of offsetting.
* Awidevarietyofactorsincluding
banks and investment funds are
active in the carbon markets and
there is increasing use of complex
financial instruments known as
derivatives.
The global carbon market
* ETSsarealreadyoperatingor
planned in 35 countries around the
world.
* TheEuropeanUnionEmissions
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the
world's largest carbon trading
market.
* Theglobalcarbonmarkethas
roughly doubled in size every year
since 2005 and was worth US$126
billion in 2008.
* Ithasbeenpredictedtogrowtoa
market value of US$3.1 trillion per
year by 2020.
* UKbusinessesarethebiggest
investors in carbon offset projects
globally.
* TheUKGovernmentandthe
European Union are major
proponents of carbon trading.
They are pushing for the extension
of the schemes to developing
countries and the inclusion of
new international carbon trading
mechanisms in international climate
negotiations.
5A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
Section 3: Are carbon
markets working?
Problems with carbon trading
The report identifies six central
problems with carbon trading, namely
that it:
* Isineffectiveatdrivingemissions
reductions.
* Failstodrivetechnological
innovation.
* Leadstolock-inofhigh-carbon
infrastructure.
* Allowsfor,andrelieson,offsetting.
* Createsariskofsubprimecarbon.
* Providesasmokescreenforlack
of action on climate finance by the
developed world.
The report finds that:
* Carbontradingfailstodeliver
necessary carbon cuts or
technological innovation
Carbon trading is not achieving the
emissions reductions promised, nor
is it driving the major technological
innovations that are needed to shift our
economies to low-carbon pathways.
The first phase of the EU ETS (2005-
2007) has failed and Phase II (2008-
2012) looks on course for a similarly
dismal outcome. The perverse
incentives created by the trading
mechanism itself ­ particularly the
focus on low-cost solutions ­ is further
locking us in to high-carbon pathways.
The UK's respected Committee on
Climate Change recently confirmed
this: "We cannot therefore be
confident that the EU ETS will deliver
the required low-carbon investments
for decarbonisation of the traded
sector through the 2020s. Given this
risk, the Committee recommends that
a range of options such as regulation
and taxes for intervention in carbon
and electricity markets should be
seriously considered."
* Carbontradingrelieson
offsetting ­ a dangerous distraction
All existing and planned emissions
trading schemes allow for the
inclusion of offsetting and, to a great
extent, rely on the ability of firms to
purchase offset credits to escape
their emissions cap by paying for
reductions to take place elsewhere.
Offsetting is profoundly unjust,
fundamentally flawed and cannot be
reformed. We need emissions cuts
in both developed and developing
countries in order to avoid catastrophic
climate change. Offsetting projects
frequently do not deliver emissions
reductions at all, and are sometimes
worse than doing nothing.
* Carbontradingriskscarbon
subprime
The complexity of the carbon
markets, and the involvement of
financial speculators and complex
financial products, carries a risk that
carbon trading will develop into a
speculative commodity bubble that
could provoke a global financial failure
similar in scale and nature to that
brought about by the recent subprime
mortgage crisis. Such a crisis risks
further undermining the effectiveness
of trading as a tool for delivering cuts
in emissions, and would increase the
risk of dangerous climate change.
* Carbonmarketfinanceisa
smokescreen for lack of action
Carbon markets are failing to
generate the much-needed finance
for developing-country mitigation and
adaptation. What's more, developed
countries are using the prospect of
increased carbon market finance to
hide from their commitments under the
United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to
provide new and additional sources
of finance to developing countries.
Carbon market finance comes
from offsetting developed-country
emissions cuts which should be
additional. Counting it towards the
financial commitments of developed
countries is double counting.
"WE CANNOT THEREFORE BE
CONFIDENT THAT THE EU ETS
WILL DELIVER THE REQUIRED
LOW-CARBON INVESTMENTS
FOR DECARBONISATION OF THE
TRADED SECTOR THROUGH THE
2020s. GIVEN THIS RISK, THE
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS THAT
A RANGE OF OPTIONS SUCH AS
REGULATION AND TAXES FOR
INTERVENTION IN CARBON AND
ELECTRICITY MARKETS SHOULD
BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED."
UK COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE
CHANGE
6 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
Section 4: Can the
problems with carbon
trading be overcome?
The report finds that:
* Proposals to reform and extend
carbon trading are unrealistic
Powerful vested interests from
industry and finance have exerted a
significant influence over emissions
trading schemes. Given these
interests' historical impact and
continued influence it is likely that
the sweeping changes needed to
emissions trading schemes would
meet powerful resistance. Wholesale
reform of carbon trading in the time
available looks unrealistic.
* Proposals to extend carbon
trading are dangerous
It is implausible that a global cap
and trade system could be established
within the time frames necessary to
avoid dangerous climate change, even
if it could be agreed and made just,
equitable and operationally effective.
Pursuing carbon trading as a key
tool for tackling climate change at
the expense of more effective policy
instruments is therefore a highly
dangerous obsession.
* The real driver behind the
UK and EU agenda is economic
interest
The UK and EU have invested
significant time and resources
developing their carbon trading
scheme and therefore have a strong
financial self interest to make it work
and see it expanded elsewhere.
Industry and finance are key driving
forces behind the push to see carbon
trading expanded globally.
Section 5: Alternatives to
carbon trading
* Focus on simple, direct and
proven policies
There is growing support for
more direct government intervention
in response to the global climate
crisis. This report argues that this
intervention should focus on delivering
the structural transformation of national
economies and their global linkages
in order to reduce dependency on
fossil fuels, ie direct intervention to
decarbonise the economy. The policies
which could be mobilised are already
in use ­ taxation, regulation and direct
public investment are employed by
governments in a wide range of areas
and are proven to be effective.
* Beyond direct decarbonisation
­ addressing global inequity and
unsustainable consumption
Tackling climate emissions globally
also necessitates policies that address
the unequal distribution of the means to
tackle climate change, ie efforts to stem
the flow of resources from South to
North and ensure developing countries
have adequate resources to tackle
climate change, and pursue low-carbon
development and poverty reduction.
* Funding sources for
decarbonisation
The scale of the climate change
threat requires a response of a similar
scale to the response to the global
economic crisis. Carbon taxes have the
potential to generate significant revenue
to fund climate mitigation and lowcarbon
development whilst also driving
emissions reductions. Reprioritisation
of government finances is also
necessary, including an end to perverse
subsidies like those for fossil fuels.
This report supports a new
approach to tackling climate
change which relies on policy tools
that are simple, direct, and proven
to be effective. As highlighted
by Lord Nicholas Stern, climate
change is the greatest market
failure the world has ever seen.
Relying on indirect, untested and
unproven mechanisms such as
carbon trading to address this
fundamental threat to humanity
and the environment is high-risk,
irresponsible and dangerous.
The report makes three sets
of recommendations covering
emissions trading schemes,
alternative tools for tackling
emissions, and wider changes
needed to address climate change
in a just and equitable way:
1. Emissions trading
* Haltexpansionofemissionstrading
schemes globally.
* Nolinkingofemissionstrading
schemes.
* Fundamentalreformstoexisting
schemes such as the EU ETS
to close loopholes, including the
removal of all forms of offsets,
and ensure they are not subject to
abuse and profiteering by industry
and finance.
* Focusgovernmentpolicy-making
and spending on the rapid
deployment of the proposals set
out below.
2. Developed-country emissions
cuts ­ rapid deployment of direct,
tried and tested policy tools
Developed-country governments
must agree to emissions cuts of at
least 40 per cent on 1990 levels by
2020, excluding offsetting, and adopt
a huge transformational agenda to
ensure that these cuts are delivered.
7A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
This programme should comprise:
* Taxation: Increased use of
hypothecated and escalating carbon
taxes to drive behavioural change and
provide government revenue for lowcarbon
investment.
* Standard setting and direct
regulation: A return to the use of
proven, direct regulatory approaches
to drive emissions reductions by
heavily polluting industry, incorporating
key lessons from the successes of the
EU's Integrated Pollution Prevention
and Control directive.
* Public finance: A major increase
in public investment to address
the climate crisis, prioritised in
the research, development and
deployment of renewable energy,
improvements to energy efficiency,
and low-carbon public infrastructure,
including sustainable transport. New
carbon taxes and other innovative
instruments such as a Tobin tax
could provide new sources of funding
for these investments, but it will
also necessitate a reprioritisation of
government spending and an end to
perverse subsidies such as those to
fossil fuels.
All policies should be underpinned
by greater transparency and scrutiny
in formulation and decision-making.
All policies should also ensure a
just transition for workers in affected
industries and include actions to
mitigate against any regressive
impacts on low-income and other
vulnerable groups.
3. Addressing global inequality
and supporting low-carbon
development in developing
countries
Urgent action should be
undertaken by developed countries
to support climate mitigation and
adaptation in developing countries and
to address historic patterns of uneven
and inappropriate development.
* New and additional climate
finance: Developed countries
must deliver on their commitment
through the UNFCCC to pay the full
incremental costs of climate mitigation
and adaptation in developing
countries. This requires the urgent
commitment and delivery of significant
public funds of at least f200 billion
per year by 2012 from developed
countries overall. This finance must
be delivered under the authority of
the UNFCCC and ensure respect for
human rights and a focus on social
and environmental outcomes.
* Technology transfer /
intellectual property rights:
Supporting developing countries in
making emissions cuts necessitates
large-scale technology transfer of
environmental goods and services.
Current intellectual property rights
stand in the way of this and must be
tackled.
* Stopping unfair trade and
investment policies: International
trade and investment agreements
are a driving force behind the growth
of energy-intensive industries
and also undermine development
prospects in developing countries. A
major refocusing of global trade and
investment rules is needed.
* Unconditional cancellation of
illegitimate foreign debt: Developing
countries cannot be expected to pay
for emissions reductions while paying
US$100 million per day in debt to the
developed world. There must be 100
per cent cancellation of all unpayable
and unjust debts, and US$400 billion in
immediate debt relief.
* A new development paradigm:
Developed countries must stop
promoting export-led development
that contributes to climate change
and instead prioritise support for
sustainable livelihoods and poverty
reduction.
* Addressing unsustainable
consumption: Rich countries
use far more than their fair share
of the world's resources. This is
unsustainable and unjust, and rich
countries must set targets to reduce
their resource use and put in place
plans to achieve them.
8 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
Climate change: the science
and the scale of the threat
The need to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions urgently is one of
the foremost and most pressing
challenges facing humanity. It is
now accepted that an average
global temperature increase of more
than 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial
levels would have potentially
devastating impacts on the world's
population and the ecological systems
that sustain us. According to the
United Nations' Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
the leading scientific body for the
study of climate change and its
impacts, failing to keep within the 2
degree threshold will lead to mass
extinctions of species, and put millions
of people globally at risk from crop
failures, water shortages, flooding
and homelessness.1
Even a rise of
1.5 degrees is regarded as highly
dangerous. An increase to this level
would threaten the very existence
of low-lying small island states and
the Alliance of Small Island States
(AOSIS) is calling for the global
community to aim for a 1.5 degree
target.2
According to a report by the
Global Humanitarian Forum, by the
year 2030, the lives of 660 million
people are expected to be seriously
affected, either by natural disasters
caused by climate change or through
gradual environmental degradation.3
Furthermore, the report estimates
that the number of deaths from
weather-related disasters and gradual
environmental degradation due to
climate change is expected to jump
to about 500,000 people per year
over the next twenty years. Even if
we manage to stay within the critical
threshold, significant impacts for
humanity and the environment are
likely. Indeed the impacts of climate
change are already being felt with
the increased incidence of drought,
flooding and a greater frequency of
high-impact weather events taking
place globally.4
Several hundred
million people are already seriously
affected by climate change today,
with several hundred thousand annual
deaths directly attributable.5
Uneven historical responsibility
Developed countries, while
representing only around 15 per
cent of the world's population, are
responsible for almost three quarters
of greenhouse gas emissions
historically. This stark inequality in
terms of responsibility for climate
change persists today, with emissions
per person currently around 6-7 times
greater in developed countries than
in developing countries.6
Although
they are not responsible for creating
the problem, the poorest people in
developing countries are likely to be
hardest hit by climate change. Indeed
poor communities in the global South
are already feeling the impacts of
climate change disproportionately7
and
there are already growing numbers of
people displaced by climate change,
including communities displaced by
sea-level rise in the Pacific.8
The backdrop: global (in)action
In Rio de Janeiro in 1992 the
international community agreed a
new environmental treaty setting out
a framework for intergovernmental
efforts to tackle climate change. The
United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has
now been ratified by 192 countries
and Article 2 of the treaty commits
all signatories, including the United
States, to stabilise greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at
a level that would prevent dangerous
climate change.
A synthesis of climate models
published in 2006 suggests that
keeping the concentration of carbon
dioxide equivalent (CO2
e) in the
atmosphere below 450 parts per
million by volume (ppmv) gives us a
50 per cent chance of not exceeding
2 degrees.9
A 50 per cent chance is
still not the most comfortable of odds
when millions of lives are potentially
at risk. What's more, research by
the UK's Tyndall Centre for Climate
Change Research suggests that even
to achieve this requires global CO2
e
emissions to peak in 2015, ie in less
than six years from now, and to fall by
four per cent per year after that.
The UNFCCC is based on the
principle of equity, and common but
differentiated responsibilities. In the
Convention, developed countries
recognise their greater responsibility
for damage done to the environment
and contributing to climate change,
and for actions needed to address
this. The Convention also recognises
the priorities of developing countries
to use their own limited capacity to
pursue sustainable development and
9A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
poverty reduction goals in order to
address the deep inequalities that
exist between standards of living in
developed and developing countries.
With these issues in mind, developed
countries have committed under the
UNFCCC to:
* Taketheleadonreducingtheir
own greenhouse gas emissions
* Providefinancialandtechnological
assistance to developing countries
to support and enable those
countries to mitigate their own
greenhouse gas emissions
* Supportdevelopingcountriesas
they adapt to the impacts of climate
change and pay for damage done
by providing adaptation finance.
Despite these international
commitments, however, woefully little
progress has been made in any of the
above three areas since the signing
of the UNFCCC in 1992. Massive
support is needed by developing
countries to switch to low-carbon
development pathways in order to
meet the dual challenges of climate
change and poverty reduction.
According to the 2009 United Nations
Social and Economic Survey: "Such
a switch would entail unprecedented
and potentially very costly socioeconomic
adjustments in developing
countries ­ adjustments, moreover,
that will have to be made in a world
more rife with inequalities than at
any time in human history. If it is
to happen, the switch will require
a level of international support and
solidarity rarely mustered outside
a wartime setting."10
Yet developed
countries' financial and technical
support for developing countries has
been pitiful. According to the Survey:
"Most developing countries do not
currently have the financial resources,
technological know-how and
institutional capacity to deploy such
strategies at a speed commensurate
with the urgency of the climate
challenge. Failure to honour longstanding
commitments of international
support in those three areas remains
the single biggest obstacle to meeting
the challenge."11
Developed countries have also
largely avoided taking substantial
action to reduce global greenhouse
gas emissions. Emissions have
continued to increase, and have even
accelerated since 2000.12
Although a
few developed countries are on track
to meet their emissions reduction
targets under the Kyoto Protocol,
based on current trajectories Annex
I (developed country) signatories to
the Protocol as a whole look likely
to fail their targets under the first
commitment period (2008-2012).
Furthermore, a large proportion of
the limited cuts that have been made
have been delivered through offsetting
rather than real action in developed
countries themselves.
The commitments made by
developed countries so far also fall
far short of what is necessary. At the
UNFCCC talks in Copenhagen in
December 2009, signatory countries
are tasked with agreeing new emissions
reduction targets for Annex I countries
for the next commitment period of the
Kyoto Protocol starting in 2013. The
IPCC suggests that to have at least
a 50 per cent chance of avoiding a 2
degree rise, we need to see a 25-40
per cent reduction in emissions from
developed (Annex I) countries by 2020
and a 15-30 per cent reduction below
`business-as-usual' baseline emissions
levels for developing (non-Annex I)
countries by 2020.13
A 50 per cent chance is quite high
risk, and furthermore a 2 degree
rise would still mean significant
climate impacts and threaten
the existence of low-lying island
states.14
As a result, reductions of
at least 40 per cent by 2020 are
needed from Annex I countries.
However, nothing approaching these
commitments is being put forward by
developed countries in the UNFCCC
negotiations. The European Union
has so far committed to the highest
targets for the second commitment
period, but even it has offered
reductions of only 20 per cent by 2020,
or 30 per cent conditional on other
developed countries making similar
commitments. Furthermore, it plans
to deliver half of these reductions
through offsetting, not through direct
reductions to EU emissions.
"MOST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DO NOT CURRENTLY HAVE
THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES,
TECHNOLOGICAL KNOW-HOW
AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
TO DEPLOY SUCH STRATEGIES
AT A SPEED COMMENSURATE
WITH THE URGENCY OF
THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE.
FAILURE TO HONOUR LONGSTANDING
COMMITMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IN
THOSE THREE AREAS REMAINS
THE SINGLE BIGGEST OBSTACLE
TO MEETING THE CHALLENGE."
UN SOCIAL & ECONOMIC SURVEY,
2009
10 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
Carbon trading ­ solution or
Trojan horse?
It is in this context ­ of a lamentable
failure by developed countries to
take real action either in reducing
their own greenhouse gas emissions
or supporting developing countries
to make their own reductions ­ that
discussions about carbon trading are
moving rapidly up the global agenda.
Carbon trading is purportedly a tool
to help countries reduce emissions,
stimulate investment in low-carbon
infrastructure, and generate
government revenue that could
be used towards further mitigating
against climate change or adapting
to its consequences. It is being
energetically advanced by certain
developed country governments,
predominantly by the UK, the United
States, and the European Union, as
well as by interest groups linked to
emissions trading systems.
Proponents of emissions trading
argue that this mechanism can deliver
guaranteed levels of emissions cuts at
the lowest cost. Even though carbon
markets are created by government
regulation, emissions trading is
generally categorised as a `marketbased'
mechanism. Its proponents
argue that this type of government
intervention works better than
more traditional direct government
interventions such as standard setting
and taxation.
The European Union's Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU ETS),
established in January 2005, is the
largest multi-country, multi-sector
greenhouse gas emissions trading
system in the world.15
National carbon
trading schemes are planned in 35
countries worldwide, with the EU ETS
likely to be dwarfed by the nationwide
trading scheme currently being
planned and legislated for in the
United States.
However, despite this powerful
drive for the expansion of emissions
trading schemes, concerns about
carbon trading are growing. These
concerns range from doubts over
the ability of emissions trading to
deliver cuts in greenhouse emissions,
to wider impacts and potential risks
associated with it. Such risks include
the potential for the global carbon
market to duplicate the problems
with speculation and asset valuation
which led to the subprime mortgage
crisis and in turn triggered the current
global financial and economic crisis
across the world. This would further
undermine the effectiveness of carbon
trading as a mechanism for delivering
emissions reductions.
11A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
This report
The purpose of this report is to explore
these concerns with carbon trading
as a tool for tackling greenhouse gas
emissions. Our criteria for evaluation
are simple: we judge the mechanism
on the basis of whether it will deliver
the emissions reductions we need to
avoid dangerous climate change in a
just and equitable way. We also look at
the alternative mechanisms and policy
tools that are available for bringing
down greenhouse gas emissions.
Based on this analysis we recommend
the most suitable policy tools for
governments to deploy in the face of
the immense task that is responding to
the challenge of climate change.
Our analysis applies primarily to
the experience of developed countries
as the location for the majority of
current and proposed emissions
trading systems. We also look at
proposals for the expansion of trading
to developing countries. Finally,
we consider how policies adopted
by developed countries must also
address global inequalities between
the global North and the global South,
and the economic relationships and
processes that serve to perpetuate
those inequalities and undermine the
ability of developing countries to take
action on climate change and adapt to
its impacts.
iStock
12 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
SECTION 2
CARBON TRADING ­ THE BASICS
What is carbon trading?
Carbon trading is the buying and
selling of a new, artificially-created
commodity ­ the right to emit carbon
dioxide. Unlike trading in other
commodities like crude oil or bananas,
carbon trading is not a voluntary
exchange between producers and
those who want to consume or sell
on the goods. Instead, it results from
action by governments to create
this new commodity ­ the right to
emit carbon ­ and then to limit the
availability of this right in order to
create scarcity and therefore a market
for it.
What is the purpose of carbon
trading?
Carbon trading is one of a number
of different approaches that have
been developed and adopted by
governments as a means of controlling
the amount of carbon dioxide that
is emitted into the atmosphere and
reducing this amount over time. It
is based on the broader approach,
purportedly to control the emission of
pollutants, known as `cap and trade'.
What type of tool is cap and
trade?
Cap and trade is often referred to
as a market-based mechanism and
contrasted with a different set of tools
available to governments to influence
behaviours, those which come under
the umbrella of direct regulation
or standard setting. However, this
contrasting of market-based and
non-market-based approaches is
sometimes unhelpful. It ignores the
fact that market mechanisms do not
operate in a vacuum. Instead, they
always take place in a social and
economic environment underpinned
by various government laws and
regulations and often require these
laws in order to be effective. Carbon
trading is a case in point. Carbon
markets are directly created by
government regulation.
Perhaps a more useful distinction
for the purposes of this report is
that between direct and indirect
mechanisms. Carbon trading can
be classed as an indirect tool as it
is supposed to achieve its purpose
of reducing emissions indirectly
by affecting the price of those
emissions. This in turn affects the
behaviour of `actors' in the market, ie
those responsible for producing the
emissions, by creating an incentive for
them to save money by reducing their
emissions and hence change their
behaviour. In contrast, government
regulation and standard setting
are direct interventions to change
behaviour, not reliant on intermediate
mechanisms such as prices. Taxation
is an indirect mechanism as it aims to
change behaviour through affecting
the price of a good, service or activity.
However, it is arguably less indirect
than trading as governments fix the
price with a tax whereas with trading
the price is determined by the market.
How does carbon trading work?
The basic model of an emissions
trading scheme (ETS) works as
follows:
1. Setting a cap: The government
sets a mandatory cap on the overall
quantity of CO2
emissions that is
allowed for a portion of the economy,
eg the power sector. As the purpose
of carbon trading is to reduce
emissions, the quantity of emissions
under the cap should be lower than
historical emissions for that sector of
the economy.
2. Allocating allowances: The
overall quantity of emissions under
the cap is then divided up between
the emitters (eg the different power
stations), and each of these emitters
receives a permit for an allocated
allowance of emissions which they are
not allowed to exceed. The permits
are distributed to the emitters covered
by the scheme either at a cost through
auctioning ­ or for free.
3. Trading allowances: Some of the
emitters will find it easier than others
to reduce their emissions. A cap and
trade system allows for some flexibility
about where the reductions are made
by allowing permits to be tradable.
As a result emitters who can make
reductions more easily and cheaply
and who therefore don't need to use
up their entire allowance can sell what
remains of it to other emitters who find
it harder and more expensive to bring
down their emissions.
In reality, although it has been
around for less than twenty years,
carbon trading is far more complex
than the simple buying and selling of
permits under an emissions trading
scheme. The three other notable
features central to carbon trading as it
now occurs are the use of offsetting;
the use of financial instruments or
derivatives; and the actors in the
carbon markets, ie the people and
institutions who participate in them.
Offsetting
In all existing national and international
carbon trading schemes, emitters are
allowed not only to trade in permits
CARBON TRADING IS THE
BUYING AND SELLING OF A
NEW, ARTIFICIALLY-CREATED
COMMODITY ­ THE RIGHT TO
EMIT CARBON DIOXIDE.
13A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
amongst themselves, they are also
allowed to comply with their emissions
reduction obligations by `offsetting'
some of their emissions, ie by paying
for emissions reductions to take place
elsewhere, outside of the sector of
the economy covered by the cap, and
usually outside of the country.
Most offset projects are located
in developing countries, and they
include a wide variety of activities
ostensibly aimed at reducing, avoiding
or sequestering greenhouse gas
emissions. They include renewable
energy projects ranging from smallscale
wind and solar projects to megadams,
energy efficiency projects,
clean-up projects which are supposed
to deliver reductions in emissions from
highly-polluting industries, and forestry
projects.
Under emissions trading schemes
which allow offsetting, companies
which produce carbon emissions
can purchase credits generated from
offset projects in amounts supposedly
equivalent to the emissions that they
wish to offset. These emissions then
don't count towards their overall
allowance. The inclusion of offsetting
in emissions trading schemes
therefore means that the cap on
emissions set by the scheme is of little
consequence. Emitters can produce
more emissions than their permits
allow by purchasing offset credits.
There are also a great many
problems associated with offsetting,
including social and environmental
problems linked with individual
projects such as the displacement of
communities, and the undermining
of efforts to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions globally. These are
explored in detail later in Section 3.
Financial derivatives
As with other commodities
markets, emissions markets are
also characterised by a variety of
transactions more complex than the
straightforward buying and selling
of emissions permits and credits.
Carbon trading involves a range of
financial instruments or derivatives.
The immediate buying and selling
of carbon allowances and credits
between companies and in return for
cash is known as `spot trading'. This
is accompanied in carbon markets
by other types of more complex
transactions, including futures, forward
contracts and options contracts.16
These are derivatives, ie financial
instruments whose value is derived
from the value of another, underlying
asset.17
In the carbon markets, such
instruments are essentially promises
to deliver a certain quantity of carbon
permits or credits at a certain price at
a certain date and time. The purpose
of these hedging instruments is to
allow companies to reduce their
exposure to risks associated with their
need to purchase carbon permits
THE INCLUSION OF OFFSETTING
IN EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES
MEANS THAT THE CAP ON
EMISSIONS SET BY THE SCHEME
IS OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE.
EMITTERS CAN PRODUCE MORE
EMISSIONS THAN THEIR PERMITS
ALLOW BY PURCHASING OFFSET
CREDITS.
OFFSET CREDITS
COMPANIES
RUNNING
OFFSET
PROJECTS
SPECULATORS
COMMODITIESPARTICIPANTS
HEDGE FUND
OPERATORS
COMPLIANCE
TRADERS
CARBON PERMITS
FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES
PRODUCTS
EMISSIONS
TRADING
SCHEME
FIGURE 1: HOW AN EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME WORKS
14 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
and credits, for example the risk of
significant price increases at the time
when they need to make a purchase.
Who are the actors in the
carbon market?
A wide range of companies and
business are required to participate
in the carbon markets because
their emissions are covered under
emissions trading schemes. These
include utility companies and the
owners of heavily-polluting industries.
In the markets they are known as
`compliance traders'. However,
trading for compliance purposes is
actually only a small proportion of
the overall volume of permits and
credits traded. Most carbon permits
and credits are held by people and
organisations whose participation in
the markets is solely for the purpose
of making money via buying and
selling, ie speculation. These include
large financial institutions, investment
funds and brokers, as well as trading
desks set up by compliance traders
with the objective of making money
from additional trading activity. For
example, there are at present 80
carbon investment funds in existence
worldwide. They manage funds in
excess of $13 billion, finance offset
projects and buy carbon credits and
permits. Carbon exchanges operate
both in Europe and the US and
transact millions of dollars-worth of
business each day.18
Where does carbon trading take
place?
Emissions trading schemes are
already operating or planned in 35
countries around the world.19
The
European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU ETS) is the world's
largest carbon market. It includes
more than 80 per cent of the world's
carbon credits and accounted for
approximately three quarters of the
value of carbon traded globally in
2008.20
See below for a more detailed
explanation of the evolution and
operation of the EU ETS.
In the United States, a small trading
scheme is currently in operation. The
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) covers a group of ten states
in the northeast of the country.
However, a far bigger nation-wide
carbon trading scheme is envisaged
in legislation under consideration. The
Waxman-Markey American Clean
Energy and Security Act, passed by
the US House of Representatives
in June 2009, mandates a gradual
phase-in of a cap and trade scheme
which would eventually cover
84.5 per cent of the United States'
total greenhouse gas emissions.21
Emissions trading schemes are also
under consideration or in the process
of being established in Switzerland,
Mexico, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, China and Japan.
The global framework for
carbon trading
Emissions trading schemes such
as the EU ETS and others under
development are underpinned by
provisions in the Kyoto Protocol,
the international treaty signed in
1997 which supplements the United
Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC). The
Kyoto Protocol ­ which came into
effect in 2005 ­ established legally
binding measures for the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions for most22
developed countries. The Protocol
includes three flexible mechanisms,
the supposed purpose of which is
to provide flexibility for countries in
how they comply with their emissions
reduction commitments under the
treaty. As is explored later in the
report, the effect of these mechanisms
is to provide an escape hatch for
developed or Annex I countries from
their compliance obligations under the
Treaty.
* International Emissions Trading
(IET) is a gigantic cap and trade
scheme covering all of the Annex I
countries bound by the Kyoto Protocol
but with a great many loopholes.
Under the Protocol, countries are
allocated a certain quantity of carbon
emissions which they cannot exceed.
For each tonne of CO2
that a country
is allowed to emit, it is allocated
a permit known as an Assigned
Amount Unit. Under the International
Emissions Trading provision in the
Kyoto Protocol, countries are allowed
to trade Assigned Amount Units
between themselves. This means that
countries that are more successful in
bringing down their carbon emissions
and therefore don't use up their
full allowance of Assigned Amount
Units can sell what remains to other
countries that are less successful at
reducing their emissions and would
otherwise exceed their allowance. If
a country does exceed its allowance,
then under the Kyoto Protocol it is
supposed to make up the difference in
the next compliance period, and pay
an additional penalty of 30 per cent.
We are in the first commitment period
of the Kyoto Protocol covering 2008-
2012. Targets for the next commitment
period are due to be agreed at the
UNFCCC Fifteenth Conference of the
Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen in
December 2009.
The other two flexible mechanisms
under the Kyoto Protocol allow for
countries with binding emissions
15A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
The European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the
world's largest carbon trading market
and the first mandatory international
carbon trading scheme. It covers over
11,500 energy-intensive installations
across the European Union,
including combustion plants, oil
refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel
plants and factories making cement,
glass, lime, brick, ceramics, pulp and
paper.23
Together these installations
represent approximately 42 per cent
of EU emissions.24
In total, the EU
generates around 4 billion tonnes
of CO2
a year, of which sectors
participating in the EU ETS are
responsible for 2.15 billion tonnes.
The stated aim of the EU ETS is
to help EU member states achieve
compliance with their commitments
under the Kyoto Protocol. The EU
signed the treaty as a single body
and agreed an overall eight per cent
reduction on 1990 level emissions
over the first commitment period of
the Protocol covering 2008-2012.
Responsibility for achieving this
target is divided unequally between
European member states under the
Burden Sharing Agreement. Under
this agreement, each EU member
state has an allocated number of
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs),
each of which represent the right
to emit one tonne of CO2
e (CO2
or
equivalent).
The EU ETS was introduced in
January 2005. Under the system,
each member state converts a
proportion of its AAUs to permits
tradable under the scheme, known
as EU allowances (EUAs) and
allocates these to energy-intensive
businesses through a National
Allocation Plan agreed with the
European Commission.
Every year, at the end of March,
installations covered by the EU ETS
must have their emissions verified
and then surrender a number
of EUAs or Certified Emissions
Reductions (CERs) and JI credits
(offset credits created under the UN
flexible mechanisms known as the
Clean Development Mechanism and
Joint Implementation, respectively)
considered to be equivalent to their
actual emissions over the course
of the year. In practice there are
big problems in verifying whether
CERs equate to actual emissions
reductions as explored later in this
report.
If an installation has emitted less
than its allocation it can sell excess
EUAs or bank them for future use.
Similarly, installations which emit
more than their allocated number
of emissions must purchase EUAs
or CERS equivalent to their excess
emissions on the carbon market.
The EU ETS is overseen by a
competent authority in each EU
member state, who has responsibility
for verifying the emissions produced
by each installation covered by
the scheme within their territory.
This is done using independent
auditors referred to as Independent
Accredited Verifiers (IAVs), who
review and verify the emissions
records for each installation and
confirm the amount of CO2
emitted.25
The EU ETS operates in phases:
Phase I covered the period 2005-
2007; we are currently in Phase
II which runs from 2008-2012;
and Phase III is planned for 2013
onwards. The top seven per cent of
installations covered by the EU ETS
account for 60 per cent of emissions
covered26
and it is estimated that
55 per cent of allowances are held
by the heat and power sector.27
According to the UK Financial
Services Authority, the average
daily volume in Carbon Financial
Instrument (CFI) futures and options
contracts traded on the European
Climate Exchange was 7.6 million
tonnes in January 2008, an increase
of 190 per cent compared to January
2007 ­ evidence of strong market
growth in the EU ETS. Record days
of trading volumes were experienced
that month with volumes reaching
14,934 contracts, representing nearly
15 million tonnes of underlying
CO2
e.28
Overall a total of 3.1 billon
EUAs were bought and sold on the
EU ETS in 2008.29
The total value of
the EU ETS for 2008 was estimated
at h67 billion (US$90 billion).30
EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME (EU ETS)
16 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
reductions targets under the treaty to
meet part of these targets by paying
for projects which reduce emissions
outside of their territories, ie to offset
their emissions reductions.
* TheClean Development
Mechanism (CDM) allows developed
countries with binding targets under
the Kyoto Protocol to buy credits from
developing countries which do not
have binding emissions reduction
targets but which are implementing
projects which supposedly reduce,
avoid or sequester CO2
emissions.
For every one tonne of CO2
abated
through a CDM project, a developing
country is awarded a Certified
Emissions Reduction (CER) credit.
CERs are interchangeable with AAUs,
so Annex I countries can purchase
them to comply with their emissions
reduction targets. As described above,
CERs are also tradable in emissions
trading schemes such as the EU ETS
and RGGI. Companies can meet
their own obligations for reducing
emissions under these schemes
by purchasing CERs. The CDM is
currently the main mechanism which
links developing countries to carbon
markets.
* Finally,Joint Implementation (JI)
is the other scheme which allows for
the offsetting of countries' emissions
reduction commitments. Unlike CDM,
JI covers offsetting projects between
developed countries whose emissions
are capped under the Kyoto Protocol.
Hence countries with a binding cap
can purchase credits from projects to
reduce emissions in other countries
with a binding cap. Unlike the CDM,
which is the second biggest carbon
market after the EU ETS, use of the JI
scheme is so far very limited.31
The Kyoto Protocol sets no upper
limits on the proportion of their
emissions reductions obligations
that developed countries can offset.
While the Protocol does refer to
this question in a supplementary
principle, this is not likely to have
legal enforceability and no specific
limit is given. As a result it is up to
countries themselves to decide what
proportion of their emissions cuts
are shifted to offsetting, and most
developed countries have chosen to
make this proportion a large one. As
is explored in more detail later, the
EU is planning to offset around half
of its emissions reductions. In other
developed countries this proportion is
even higher, with Australia proposing
to meet almost all of its reduction
obligations through offsetting. The
US Waxman-Markey American Clean
Energy and Security Act of 2009
allows for up to 1 billion tonnes of
domestic offsets in the proposed cap
and trade scheme, and an additional
1 billion tonnes of international
offsets.32
Early analysis of the
legislation suggests that these offset
provisions could allow emissions in US
economic sectors supposedly capped
under the cap and trade scheme to
rise by nine per cent up to 2030.33
The global carbon market
The global carbon market has roughly
doubled in size every year since 2005.
By 2008 it had reached US$126
billion, of which approximately US$92
billion consisted of transactions of
allowances and derivatives under the
EU ETS.34
While this is still relatively
small compared to other commodity
and financial markets ­ the global
financial derivatives market reached
a nominal value in excess of five
hundred trillion dollars in 200735
­ it
is expected that the global carbon
market will continue to expand rapidly,
especially if the United States adopts
a nation-wide carbon trading scheme
as envisaged in the Waxman-Markey
Act. US Commodities Future Trading
Commissioner Bart Chilton has stated
that if the United States adopts the
emissions trading scheme proposed
in the new legislation, then carbon
derivatives are likely to become "the
biggest of any derivatives product in
the next four to five years."36
Similarly,
global financial services firm Merrill
Lynch has predicted that the global
carbon market could be "one of
the fasting-growing markets ever,
with volumes comparable to credit
derivatives inside of a decade."37
Some predictions put the global
market value at US$3.1 trillion per
year by 2020.38
This predicted growth of the global
carbon market is linked to, and to a
large extent reliant on, the increased
use of offsetting by developed
countries to meet their emissions
reduction targets. The adoption of the
Waxman-Markey Act in the United
States will create an offset market
approximately 10 times larger than
that under the Clean Development
Mechanism. Similarly, proposals
on the table in the UNFCCC for
sectoral crediting and sectoral trading,
explored later in this report (see box
explaining these mechanisms below),
will dwarf current volumes of offset
reductions.
THE GLOBAL CARBON MARKET
HAS ROUGHLY DOUBLED IN
SIZE EVERY YEAR SINCE 2005.
BY 2008 IT HAD REACHED
US$126 BILLION, OF WHICH
APPROXIMATELY US$92 BILLION
CONSISTED OF TRANSACTIONS
OF ALLOWANCES AND
DERIVATIVES UNDER THE EU ETS.
17A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
The EU vision: a global
emissions trading system
A number of countries are voluntarily
exploring and developing national
emissions trading schemes, and
this growth in individual schemes
is likely to be one of the key drivers
behind the expansion of the carbon
market overall. Meanwhile, the
European Union is playing an active
role in promoting the expansion of
emissions trading schemes globally,
not only amongst developed countries
whose emissions are capped
under the Kyoto Protocol, but also
amongst developing countries. The
European Commission's January
2009 Communication setting out
its vision and aspirations for a new
global climate deal in Copenhagen
in December 2009 states that:
"The EU should help interested
developing countries gain experience
in emissions trading, in particular to
set up sound governance structures
and strong domestic institutions and
to boost their capacity to monitor and
report emissions."39
It also asserts
that the EU should "propose to
enter into bilateral partnerships with
the US and with other developed
countries to share experience on
designing domestic emissions trading
systems and to facilitate the creation
of a robust carbon market covering
the countries in the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and
Development by 2015. This market
should be further extended to
economically more advanced
developing countries by
2020."48
The EU's vision is to establish
and link emissions trading schemes
to create a global emissions trading
system covering not only developed
countries but also advanced
developing countries. It has been
heavily promoting the extension of
carbon market mechanisms in the
negotiations running up to the critical
global climate talks in Copenhagen
in December 2009. For example,
the European Union submission to
the UNFCCC negotiations in April
200949
pushed for the inclusion in the
negotiating text of the concepts of
sectoral crediting and sectoral trading
(see box below).
Among EU member states, the
United Kingdom is one of the lead
proponents of this approach. The
British Government is actively pushing
other EU member states and other
governments which are party to the
UNFCCC negotiations to accept this
vision. The UK Government is also
filling in the gaps in analysis and
understanding of how this vision could
work in practice.
Britain's commitment to the
expansion of the global carbon
market as a means of bringing down
emissions globally was first outlined
in 2007 in a keynote speech by then
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon
Brown:
"I believe there is much more we can
do, not after 2012 but now, building
on initiatives on which the UK has
already led, and using many levers
for change. First, by creating new
markets... My ambition is to build a
global carbon market, founded on the
EU Emissions Trading Scheme and
centred in London. Today worth just $9
billion, emissions trading could grow to
between $50 and $100 billion."50
In July 2009, the British
Government held a conference to
promote this vision. It was attended
by over 100 participants representing
governments, investment houses,
traders, energy companies, major
industries, international institutions
and non-governmental organisations.
The conference focused on the
future development of the global
carbon market and launched a report
by the Prime Minister's Special
Representative on Carbon Trading,
Mark Lazarowicz MP.
The Lazarowicz report43
was
commissioned by the Prime Minister
to examine the role of cap and trade
systems internationally and the main
challenges as they develop. The
report asserts that global carbon
trading should play a central role in
delivering emissions reductions. It
advocates the linking of emissions
trading schemes to form a global
network of carbon trading. The report
sets out a roadmap for the creation
of a dual-level system comprising
the same national emissions targets
for governments as under the Kyoto
Protocol but expanded to cover
advanced developing countries,
combined with emitter-level emissions
trading schemes covering businesses
and other major sources of emissions
THE EU'S VISION IS TO
ESTABLISH AND LINK EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEMES TO CREATE
A GLOBAL EMISSIONS TRADING
SYSTEM COVERING NOT ONLY
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES BUT
ALSO ADVANCED DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES.
"MY AMBITION IS TO BUILD A
GLOBAL CARBON MARKET,
FOUNDED ON THE EU EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEME AND CENTRED
IN LONDON. TODAY WORTH JUST
$9 BILLION, EMISSIONS TRADING
COULD GROW TO BETWEEN $50
AND $100 BILLION."
GORDON BROWN, 2007
18 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
in individual countries. These emitterlevel
schemes are then linked up and
expanded to form a global network:
"Effectively a global carbon market,
this network would allow emitters in
one country to trade allowances with
emitters in other countries without
loss of sovereignty."44
This duallevel
system is deemed preferable
to a single global emissions trading
system with centralised governance,
which Lazarowicz argues would
reduce the sovereignty of participating
governments over their domestic
policies and would also be difficult
to negotiate and agree on between
governments.
Key milestones on this roadmap
include:
* The establishment of caps
on emissions from all developed
countries by 2013
* The linking of the EU ETS with the
newly established US trading scheme
by 2015
* Capacity building for developing
countries combined with the expansion
of sectoral crediting mechanisms
and their eventual replacement of the
Clean Development Mechanism
* The establishment of sectoral
trading in more advanced developing
countries by 2020.
The Lazarowicz report is highly
significant, not only because of
Sectoral trading
Proposals for sectoral trading would
see the extension of nationallevel
emissions reduction targets
to particular economic sectors in
developing countries.
Under a sectoral trading scheme,
a target would be set lower than
the `business as usual' emissions
trajectory for the economic sector
in question, for example the power
sector.
Emissions allowances would then
be allocated to the government of
the country up to the level of the
target.
At the end of a given period of
time, if the government had reduced
emissions in the economic sector
more than the set target, it would be
able to sell any surplus allowances
on the carbon market.
Failure to achieve a target would
require the government to purchase
additional allowances from the
market.
It would be up to the government
itself to decide how to implement
the target domestically, ie whether
to achieve the emissions reductions
in the sector in question through
emissions trading, taxation,
subsidies or regulation.
Sectoral crediting
Under sectoral crediting proposals,
a `baseline' level of emissions for a
particular sector in a country would
be set below the `business as usual'
emissions trajectory for that sector.
Reductions of emissions below
the business-as-usual level but
above the baseline would be
referred to as `own action' and
the government would not receive
anything for this.
However, reductions achieved
below the baseline would be
rewarded with credits which could
then be traded on the carbon
market. These credits would be
issued at the end of a defined
period.
There would be no obligation for
governments to purchase carbon
credits from elsewhere if they didn't
achieve their target. For this reason
this mechanism is sometimes
referred to as `sector no lose
targets'.
PROPOSALS FOR SECTORAL TRADING AND SECTORAL CREDITING
MECHANISMS
Emissions
Time
BAU
Sectoral
target
Emissions
Time
BAU
Baseline
Own action
Credits
Actual
emissions
Source: Global Carbon Trading: A framework for reducing emissions, Mark Lazarowicz, 2009
Figure 2 Figure 3
THE LAZAROWICZ REPORT WAS
COMMISSIONED BY THE PRIME
MINISTER TO EXAMINE THE ROLE
OF CAP AND TRADE SYSTEMS
INTERNATIONALLY AND THE
MAIN CHALLENGES AS THEY
DEVELOP. THE REPORT ASSERTS
THAT GLOBAL CARBON TRADING
SHOULD PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE
IN DELIVERING EMISSIONS
REDUCTIONS.
19A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
its ardent promotion of emissions
trading as a mechanism of choice for
reducing emissions of greenhouse
gases globally but also because
it argues for the participation of
developing countries in carbon
trading. Whilst it recognises some
limitations of emissions trading and
states that individual countries should
use a range of policy tools that
are most appropriate for their own
circumstances, the report concludes
that emissions trading schemes
should play a central role in developed
countries and, in future, in advanced
developing countries.
Why carbon trading and not
something else?
Why are the UK and the EU placing
such emphasis on emissions
trading mechanisms relative to
other approaches available to help
governments bring down emissions?
Four rationales form the core of
the case for carbon trading made
by key proponents, including the
UK Government and the European
Commission. They are as follows:
* Argument one: Carbon trading
delivers a guaranteed level of
emissions reductions
Proponents of carbon trading argue
that by setting an absolute cap on
emissions, trading provides guaranteed
levels of emissions reductions, and
hence is a superior instrument in
the struggle to keep global average
temperature increases below the
critical threshold. While other
instruments such as carbon taxes
can also deliver emissions reductions,
advocates of carbon trading assert
that it is the only instrument that can
guarantee emissions reductions at a
defined level.
* Argument two: Carbon trading
delivers emissions reductions at
the lowest cost, and therefore more
cuts overall
Proponents argue that carbon trading
allows emissions cuts to be made in
the most cost-effective way because
the flexibility provided by the trading
allows for the emissions reductions
to be made where it is cheapest to
do so, ie emitters that find it easy
and therefore cheaper to reduce their
emissions will do so, and then sell their
excess allowances to emitters that find
it harder and thus more expensive. It
is argued that the overall effect is a
lower aggregate cost for emissions
reductions across the emitters covered
by the scheme. This supposed
advantage of lower abatement costs
is also argued to work when different
emissions trading schemes are joined
together. The Lazarowicz report
argues that linking of emissions
trading schemes can further reduce
the costs of emissions reductions
through international carbon trading.
It points to modelling to back up the
assertion that: "Global carbon trading
could reduce global abatement costs
by up to 70 per cent in 2020 compared
with countries and emitters meeting all
their targets domestically."45
* Argument three: Carbon trading
drives investment in low-carbon
technologies
Linked to argument two, supporters
of carbon trading maintain that, by
providing a carbon price signal, it
harnesses the market to reward
low-carbon businesses and provide
incentives for other emitters to invest
in low-carbon technologies in order
to reduce the carbon footprint of
their operations. It is argued that
carbon trading makes low-carbon
technologies cost competitive
compared to more fossil fuel-intensive
ones, because it incentivises emitters
to invest in the former and gradually
shift away from the latter.
* Argument four: Carbon trading
provides finance for mitigation in
developing countries
Finally, carbon trading is increasingly
held up as having major potential as
a tool for delivering finance to support
emissions reductions in developing
countries. Very high expectations are
being placed on offsetting through
the carbon markets to deliver finance
flows for climate mitigation from the
private sector in developed countries
to governments in developing
countries. The UNFCCC estimates
that by 2020 offsetting could yield
up to US$40.8 billion in finance for
developing-country mitigation.46
In
addition, it is argued that auctioning of
permits to firms covered by emissions
trading schemes rather than giving
them out for free could provide a key
revenue stream for governments to
use towards mitigation finance for
developing countries. EU member
states have expressed a willingness
to use part of their auction revenues
to support mitigation and adaption in
developing countries.47
The following sections in this report
examine whether carbon trading is
tackling carbon emissions globally. We
start with whether those arguments in
favour of carbon trading as a priority
mechanism are grounded in evidence.
20 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
SECTION 3
ARE CARBON MARKETS WORKING?
PART A: Comparing
carbon markets against
their own criteria
1. Reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions through carbon trading the
real picture
There is a huge gap between the
claims made for carbon trading and
the reality: emissions cuts delivered
through carbon trading are simply not
as high as its proponents claim. The
argument that trading is a good way of
guaranteeing cuts is simply not borne
out by the facts.
The EU ETS
The European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme is the largest
active scheme in the world. It is a
key indicator of the likely success
of emissions trading mechanisms in
delivering guaranteed emissions cuts.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the original
15 EU member states are expected
to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions by eight per cent compared
to 1990 levels by 2012. In reality, if
the UK and Germany are excluded,
emissions in the EU15 increased by
12 per cent between 1990 and 2005,48
and have not fared much better since.
This is despite the creation of the
EU ETS with the explicit objective
of helping member states comply
with their Kyoto commitments. In
fact EU performance over the first
Kyoto commitment period (2008-
2012) has been no different from US
performance so far, despite the EU
having an emissions trading scheme
when the United States does not.49
Over the period 2005-2007
(covering Phase I of the EU ETS),
emissions in the sectors covered
by the scheme rose by about one
per cent per year when the caps
were supposed to have resulted
in an overall decline in emissions
from sources covered by the
scheme.50
There was a decline
in emissions under the EU ETS
in 2008.51
However, while the
European Commission claims that
measures taken by installations in
response to the increased price of
carbon played a significant role in
delivering this decrease, the economic
contraction in Europe resulting from
the global economic downturn is
also acknowledged to have been a
significant factor in bringing about the
decline.
The failure of the EU ETS to deliver
emissions reductions in the industrial
sectors covered by the scheme is
largely attributed to the overall cap
on emissions being set too high,
resulting in the over-allocation of
permits to industrial sectors covered
by the scheme. Phase I of the scheme
is widely deemed to have been a
complete failure with over-allocation
leading to a collapse in the price of
EUAs ­ the permits traded under
the scheme. With price being the
main driver for emissions reductions
under a trading scheme, a collapse
in the price of permits eliminates all
incentives for firms covered by the
scheme to reduce their emissions.
Despite a lowering of the cap in
Phase II, permits have still been overallocated.
Combined with the recent
contraction of European industry, this
resulted in the price of EU allowances
falling to record lows for Phase II,
down to 8 on 12 February 2009 ­ a
fall of more than 70 per cent from the
peak on 1 July 2008.52
Analysis by the campaigning
organisation Sandbag has revealed
that European industry covered by
the EU ETS is likely to have nearly
400 million tonnes worth of surplus
permits in Phase II.53
There may also
be an estimated surplus of more
than 300 million permits in the New
Entrants Reserve which could be
added to the market. As a result, a
total of 700 million surplus permits
could be available in Phase II of the
scheme which can be rolled over in
Phase III. Sandbag describes these
surplus permits as "hot air" in the
system because firms can buy and
use them without making any effort
to cut their emissions. Combined with
the additional safety valve provided to
companies by way of the inclusion of
offset credits in the EU ETS, the net
effect of the over-allocation of permits
could be to "allow EU companies
to stand still on cutting domestic
emissions for the next seven years,"54
hence providing zero incentive for
emissions reductions between now
and 2015.
The EU ETS scheme has clearly
failed to provide adequate incentives
for European firms to reduce their
emissions in Phase I; Phase II is
performing poorly and is likely to
fail. Yet many proponents of carbon
trading still hold up the scheme as
justification for the expansion of
emissions trading schemes, and a
model for the construction of such
schemes elsewhere. The Lazarowicz
report significantly underplays the
implications of the EU ETS failures,
stating only that a key lesson from
current carbon market instruments is
that weak targets reduce and delay
environmental effectiveness. In reality,
the EU ETS has demonstrated that
weak targets completely eliminate
environmental effectiveness.
However, in spite of the major failings
demonstrated in Phases I and II of the
scheme, the report concludes that:
21A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
"The EU Emissions Trading System
and the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative in US states have provided
blueprints for how governments
can effectively devolve emissions
reduction effort to businesses and
other emitters."55
The only evidence the report can
muster in support of this assertion
is a survey of industry undertaken
by the National Audit Office (NAO)
in which approximately 64 per cent
of companies reported that the EU
ETS had led to emissions reductions
in their operations, and 34 per cent
of respondents said that reducing
emissions was now taken more
seriously as a boardroom issue.56
However, the same NAO survey
also revealed that, according to the
companies surveyed, falling output
was the most common cause of
emissions being lower than allocations
under the scheme. Furthermore,
the NAO report itself provides data
indicating that Phase I of the EU
ETS may not have resulted in any
reductions in emissions from UK
installations participating in the EU
ETS,57
and furthermore that Phase II
of the EU ETS may also not result in
significant emissions reductions.
The clear failings of the EU
ETS scheme and the significant
prospects of continuing failures raise
the question of why it continues to
be considered as a useful tool for
delivering emissions reductions by
European policy-makers. This issue
will be addressed in Section 4.
Sulphur dioxide trading ­ the
US Acid Rain Programme
The other piece of evidence frequently
cited in support of emissions trading
is the experience of the United States
trading scheme in sulphur dioxide (one
of the gases responsible for acid rain).
The scheme was established in the
US under its Acid Rain Programme in
the early 1990s as a result of the US
Clean Air Act Amendments in 1990.
Its purpose was to make it cheaper
for industry to reduce SO2
emissions.
According to a progress report by
the US environmental regulator the
Environmental Protection Agency,
the scheme succeeded in bringing
down SO2
emissions by more than 5
million tons from 1990 levels in the
first 10 years of its operation (1994-
2004), or approximately 34 per cent
of total emissions from the power
sector. It also resulted in nearly 100
per cent compliance through "rigorous
emissions monitoring, allowance
tracking, and an automatic, easily
understood penalty system for
noncompliance."58
However, a key point often
excluded from this version of the story
is the fact that the US scheme was
much less successful at reducing SO2
pollution than equivalent regulations
elsewhere: "SO2
emissions in the US
had been reduced by 43.1 per cent
by the end of 2007, but over the same
period 25 members of the European
Union saw a decrease in emissions
of 71 per cent. These reductions were
achieved through regulation, rather
than a cap-and-trade scheme."59
Furthermore, additional analysis
suggests that the reductions in SO2
cannot be attributed to the trading
scheme alone. According to the
United Nations: "The low cost made
itself apparent quite early, at a time
when the volume of emissions trading
was quite small. Several other events
also played important parts in driving
down the costs. Just before trading
began, a sharp reduction in railroad
freight rates made it affordable to
bring low-sulphur coal from Wyoming,
replacing high-sulphur coal from the
closer Appalachian coalfields, to
Midwestern power plants. Some State
regulations required even greater
sulphur reduction than that stipulated
by the national law, so it took no
extra effort for power plants in those
States to comply with the new national
standard. At the same time, prices
were declining for scrubbers, the
pollution control devices that remove
sulphur emissions. In this context, the
emissions trading system may have
made some contribution to lowering
costs, but it operated on a field tilted
in its favour. Without all the helpful
coincidences, sulphur emissions
trading would have looked much less
successful."60
Critics of carbon trading also point
to the major differences between
the scale and scope of the US SO2
scheme, and the types of emissions
trading now being advanced as a
means of bringing down greenhouse
gas emissions globally. First and
foremost, the SO2
scheme covered
only one set of sources ­ power plants
­ and all sources were bound by a
single legislative framework. Further,
the scheme did not cover sinks of
SO2
outside of the system, ie it did not
allow for the use of offsets.
22 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
2. The price signal ­ driving
innovation or locking in highcarbon
infrastructure?
It is clear from the above that,
based on the record of carbon
markets, the arguments in support
of carbon trading as a mechanism
for delivering a guaranteed level
of emissions reductions do not
stand up under close scrutiny. The
largest emissions trading scheme in
existence, the EU ETS, has largely
failed in this regard. And while the US
SO2
scheme saw some successes,
these were not fully attributable to
the trading scheme alone. Nor is
that model easily translatable to the
task now envisaged by proponents
of carbon trading as a mechanism
for driving down greenhouse gas
emissions globally.
Claims that carbon trading is
effective in creating incentives
for firms to invest in low-carbon
technologies are also increasingly
being challenged. As set out in
Section 2, there are two further
arguments put forward in support of
carbon trading over other abatement
mechanisms: that it reduces
emissions in the most cost-effective
way for the economy as a whole;
and that in doing so it harnesses
the market to reward low-carbon
businesses and provide incentives for
other emitters to invest in low-carbon
technologies in order to reduce their
carbon footprints.
In practice it is increasingly argued
that the price signals needed to
stimulate investment in low-carbon
technologies are not being provided
by carbon trading schemes and nor
are they likely to in the future.61
But
there's a bigger problem. Carbon
trading, and specifically its emphasis
on low-cost options, is likely to put off
the major economic adjustments that
need to be made urgently. It is likely to
lock participating economies in both
the developed and developing world
into high-carbon infrastructure.
Achieving a high enough price
Cheap available alternatives to
fossil fuels don't currently exist. The
carbon price needed to stimulate
investment in low-carbon technology
or make current available alternatives
such as wind and solar energy truly
competitive has been estimated to
be much higher than those currently
being delivered by the EU ETS. At
the time of writing the going rate for
a permit to emit one tonne of carbon
under the EU ETS (the price of one
EU Allowance) was approximately
13.62
This is not much better than
the 8 that the permits were fetching
when the recession first hit in early
2009. The highest price that EUAs
have reached so far was around
30 in July 2008.63
In contrast,
while onshore renewable energy
becomes competitive with dirty coal
at around US$50 per tonne,64
some
estimates put the level of carbon
price necessary to make low-carbon
technology competitive as high as
500 per tonne. Similarly, it has been
argued that a carbon price of 100-
300 per tonne would have insufficient
impact on reducing levels of emissions
growth in the aviation sector.65
Only very big increases in the
price of carbon are likely to induce
the kind of changes in behaviour that
proponents of carbon trading suggest
will result from the use of this kind of
mechanism. A higher carbon price
in the EU ETS could be achieved
by significantly lowering the cap on
emissions, and this kind of reform is
advocated by a number of pressure
groups as a means of improving
the effectiveness of the scheme in
bringing down emissions.
However, it is highly questionable
whether the kind of major price
increases needed to stimulate
investment by companies in lowcarbon
technology would be politically
acceptable without prior government
intervention to bring down the price of
the alternatives.
On the other hand, the politically
acceptable alternative under a carbon
trading scheme, of bringing down the
cap more slowly, is likely to fail on the
criterion of bringing down emissions fast
enough. It is also unlikely to produce
a price signal high enough to drive
major advances in technology needed
to ensure a peak and decline of global
greenhouse gas emissions by 2015.
Saving the worst till last
Even if alternative technologies were
more cheaply available, there are
additional problems with the incentive
structure provided by carbon trading:
even with a high enough carbon price
firms won't necessarily switch to using
these alternative technologies. On the
contrary, critics of carbon trading argued
that by incentivising firms to focus on
the lowest cost adjustments, carbon
trading is actually locking economies
into high-carbon infrastructure.
"MANY ECONOMISTS,
LEGAL SCHOLARS, AND
PRACTICING LAWYERS
REPEAT THIS OBVIOUSLY
INCOMPLETE ARGUMENT [THAT
CARBON TRADING DRIVES
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION]
OVER AND OVER AGAIN AS
GOSPEL."
PROFESSOR OF LAW DAVID
DRIESEN
23A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
The failure to understand this
dynamic has been attributed to a
major error in the economic theory
underlying the assumption that carbon
trading drives technological innovation.
According to American Professor of
Law David Driesen, "Many economists,
legal scholars, and practicing lawyers
repeat this obviously incomplete
argument [that carbon trading drives
technological innovation] over and over
again as gospel."66
Driesen highlights
that this theory, like many neoclassical
economic theories, is simplistic and
takes into account only the sellers of
credits, not the buyers: "Polluters have
an incentive to make extra emission
reductions under emissions trading so
that they can sell credits, therefore,
emissions trading stimulates innovation.
This model accurately explains the
situation of sellers of credits. But it is
also obviously incomplete. It leaves the
buyers of credits out of the picture."67
For Driesen, the situation is directly
opposite for the buyers of credits ­ the
highly polluting firms whose emissions
exceed their allowances and for whom
the adjustments to less carbon-intensive
modes of production are expensive.
Carbon trading makes lower-cost credits
available to these firms as an alternative
to the higher-cost investments that they
would otherwise have to make. Hence
trading removes any incentive that
they have for technological innovation.
Driesen concludes that there are solid
reasons to suspect that an emissions
trading programme does a poorer job
of stimulating technological innovation
than comparably designed traditional
regulation.
In conclusion, carbon trading
can actually prevent the types of
innovation that are urgently needed
in order to support decarbonisation
in developed countries. Although
trading provides limited incentives for
firms for whom emissions reductions
are low cost to invest to make those
reductions, it removes incentives
for firms who have to make heavy
adjustments to do so by allowing them
to purchase additional permits on the
carbon market. It is an opt-out.
The overall effect of this is to put off
the very difficult, expensive adjustments
to our economic and industrial
infrastructure to the very last moment.
This significantly increases the risk
of failure to keep global temperature
increases below the critical threshold.
In order to maximise our chance of
keeping within this threshold, developed
countries must embark immediately on
the structural transformation of their
economies, investing in fundamental
adjustments to energy production and
use. Relying on carbon trading has the
opposite effect ­ focusing action on the
cheapest adjustments first and leaving
the hardest transitions for capitalintensive
industries until last.68
A similar conclusion about the
weaknesses of carbon trading in
stimulating investments in low-carbon
innovation was reached by the UK
Climate Committee in their recent
report on meeting carbon budgets.
The Committee argues that
"a policy of relying too much on
purchased credits in the initial
years could make a stretching 2050
domestic target unachievable". By
way of example, it points out that
an 80 per cent reduction by 2050
requires electricity generation to
be almost entirely decarbonised by
2030.69
Electricity generation is one of
a number of industrial sectors where
a major step change is needed if
adequate adjustments in infrastructure
are going to be made in time to deliver
emissions cuts. However, the ability to
buy cheap credits from other industries
significantly reduces incentives on
power providers to do so.
The Committee asserts that "the
only situation where investments
in low-carbon technology would
then proceed is if investors attach
significant weight to scenarios with a
significantly increasing carbon price
over the next decade and through the
2020s. We believe that this is currently
unlikely for two reasons:
* There is a great deal of uncertainty
over what the arrangements will be
for determining the carbon price in the
2020s.
* It is difficult to make an investment
business case around a price that
is currently low but that is projected
to increase significantly in 20 years
time, particularly where the increase is
subject to significant political risk."70
On the basis of these risks
and uncertainties, the Committee
concludes "we cannot therefore be
confident that the EU ETS will deliver
the required low-carbon investments
for decarbonisation of the traded
sector through the 2020s."71
It then
goes on to recommend that alternative
options for intervention in the UK
carbon and electricity markets be
seriously considered.
This failure of carbon trading
mechanisms to stimulate the
THE OVERALL EFFECT OF
THE OPT-OUT PROVIDED BY
CARBON TRADING IS TO PUT
OFF THE VERY DIFFICULT,
EXPENSIVE ADJUSTMENTS TO
OUR ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL
INFRASTRUCTURE TO THE
VERY LAST MOMENT. THIS
SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASES
THE RISK OF FAILURE TO
KEEP GLOBAL TEMPERATURE
INCREASES BELOW THE
CRITICAL THRESHOLD.
24 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
shift that is needed to low-carbon
economic infrastructure in developed
countries is increasingly widely
recognised, including by industry
representatives themselves. At the
European Commission's European
Business Summit in March 2009, Joan
MacNaughton, Senior Vice President
of the power company Alstom said
that emissions trading and other
market-based mechanisms could
not achieve the shift to a low-carbon
economy on their own, asserting
the need for public investment in
the development of technologies to
help bring down carbon emissions.72
Others acknowledge the weaknesses
of carbon markets in delivering
incentives but assert this could be
addressed through reforms to the EU
ETS, an argument examined later in
this report.
Other unintended consequences
Research has revealed several
other ways in which carbon trading
is actually disincentivising efforts to
shift to low-carbon infrastructure.
One of the consequences of the
over-allocation of permits to polluters
covered by the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme has been the
creation of huge windfall profits for
polluters. A study of five EU countries
commissioned by WWF from Point
Carbon in 2008 estimated that
investors and other holders of permits
under the EU ETS were likely to
make between 23 billion and 63
billion over the course of Phase II of
the scheme (covering 2008-2012)
on the basis that the price of carbon
would be between 21 and 32.73
Amongst the businesses likely to reap
significant profits is the world's largest
steel company ArcelorMittal, already
estimated to have made approximately
2 billion in profits from the EU ETS
between 2005 and 2008.74
Through setting too low a cap on
emissions, and thus over-allocating
emissions permits to polluting
industry, the EU ETS is providing
minimal incentives for emissions
reductions. It is also subsidising highly
polluting industries at the expense of
their low-carbon competitors.
As well as creating this direct
disincentive, carbon trading has
also been recognised to block other
mechanisms designed to promote
a more rapid switch to low-carbon
infrastructure. For example, in its
2008 Renewable Energy Strategy
consultation paper the UK Government
openly admits that, because large-scale
energy producers are covered by the
EU ETS, the Government's renewables
strategy has no provisions for setting
large-scale energy production on a
different technology path.75
Similarly, the desire to align EU
legislation on pollution from heavy
industry with the EU ETS resulted
in the European Commission taking
steps to undermine the power of
national authorities in EU member
states to place limits on greenhouse
gas emissions when determining
environmental permits for industries.
In August 2009 the Commission
introduced a new provision under
the Integrated Pollution Prevention
and Control (IPPC) directive which
would prevent national governments
from setting more stringent limits
on emissions from industrial plants
covered by the IPPC directive than
those determined by the EU ETS.76
ONE OF THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THE OVER-ALLOCATION
OF PERMITS TO POLLUTERS
COVERED BY THE EU EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEME HAS BEEN THE
CREATION OF HUGE WINDFALL
PROFITS FOR POLLUTERS.
iStock
25A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
PART B: The other
fundamental flaws
It is clear from the above that
carbon trading is failing against the
criteria set for it by its proponents ­ it
is not achieving the guaranteed levels
of emissions cuts promised, nor is
it driving the major technological
innovations that are needed to shift
our economies onto more lowcarbon
paths. In fact its focus on
low cost solutions is further locking
us in to high-carbon pathways. The
perverse incentives it creates are
further hampering efforts to reduce
emissions.
However, these issues are far
from the whole story about carbon
trading. As a mechanism for bringing
down emissions globally it suffers
from other fundamental flaws. To call
these merely additional issues would
be to downplay their significance.
They are fundamental to the chances
of humanity's success in avoiding
catastrophic climate change. Yet
they are rarely addressed or even
recognised by the proponents of
carbon trading. Some of these issues
are explored below. They include
the reliance of carbon trading on
offsetting, the difficulty of regulating
it, and the risk that it could become
another speculative bubble which
eventually bursts ­ much like the
subprime mortgage crisis, but this
time with implications for global
climate mitigation as well as the
economy.
3. Offsetting in global carbon
trading ­ an escape hatch for
emissions reductions
As set out in Section 2, all existing
carbon trading schemes allow emitters
to purchase emissions reductions
credits from outside of the scheme to
comply with their targets, ie to offset
some of their emissions-reduction
obligations. Through this reliance on
carbon trading and the active role that
emissions trading schemes play in
generating increased demand for offset
credits through mechanisms such as
the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), carbon trading is not only
failing to deliver on its cited goals
of guaranteed emissions cuts and
technological innovation, it is actually
actively undermining global efforts to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions
and bringing further negative social
and environmental impacts.
Offsetting in emissions trading
schemes
The EU ETS has been a key driver of
the growth and development of the
offsets market. Under the EU's 2008
Climate and Energy Package, 50 per
cent of the total reduction in emissions
envisaged under Phases II and III of
the EU ETS can be realised through
the use of offset credits through
the flexible mechanisms provided
under the Kyoto Protocol: the Clean
Development Mechanism and Joint
Implementation.77
Unused permits and
credits are also bankable from Phase
II through to Phase III of the scheme,
meaning that offsets unused during
Phase II, for example because of the
economic downturn, can be carried
over for use in Phase III (2013-2020).
The vast majority of the offset
credits available through the EU ETS
come from the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), the mechanism
under the Kyoto Protocol which allows
developed countries with binding
emissions reduction targets to buy
credits from developing countries
that are implementing projects which
reduce, avoid or sequester CO2
emissions.
In total 1.6 billion Certified
Emissions Reductions (CERs) ­ the
carbon credits generated under the
Clean Development Mechanism ­ will
be available for use by EU companies
under the EU ETS between 2008 and
2020. As CERs are generally cheaper
than EU ETS credits ­ know as EU
Allowances (EUAs) ­ it is highly likely
that all of these offset credits will
be used. Global demand for offset
credits is also likely to dramatically
increase as a result of the plans
by the United States to introduce a
national emissions trading scheme.
The Waxman-Markey American
Clean Energy and Security Act would
allow up to two billion tons of offsets
each year.
There are however extensive,
insoluble problems with offsetting,
which are generally ignored by
proponents of its use as a central
component of emissions trading
schemes. Not only does offsetting
fail to cut emissions, it delays
essential structural change in
developed country economies. It
also institutionalises the idea that
cuts can be made in the developing
world in place of cuts in the developed
world when the science demands
reductions in both. It is therefore
not only unworkable but grounded
in a profoundly unjust approach
which allows developed countries to
continue polluting while delivering
minimal benefits for developing
countries and even bringing additional
26 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
social and environmental problems in
its wake. These fundamental problems
with offsetting are explored in more
detail below.
The problems with offsetting
* Offsetting won't deliver fair and
adequate global emissions cuts
fast enough
Offsetting allows developed countries
to count emissions reductions
in developing countries toward
their own targets for emissions
reductions under the Kyoto Protocol.
Yet the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), the
leading international body for the
assessment of climate change, has
stated unequivocally that we need
reductions in emissions in developed
countries as well as deviation
from business-as-usual emissions
pathways in developing countries in
order to guarantee a decent chance of
avoiding catastrophic climate change.
The IPCC estimates that
meaningful progress would mean a
25-40 per cent cut on 1990 levels
of greenhouse gas emissions
for developed countries by 2020
combined with a reduction of 15-
30 per cent on business-as-usual
baselines for developing countries.78
These reductions are not being
delivered. The EU, for example,
has the most ambitious emissions
reductions commitments of any of the
Annex I countries and the region is
still only committed to a reduction of
20 per cent on 1990 levels by 2020.79
The IPCC estimates are also now
regarded by members of the scientific
community as too low.80
Even more significant for the
debate on offsetting is the fact that
the IPCC recommendations do not
represent a fair allocation of emissions
reductions once the question of
responsibility for historical emissions
is taken into account. Developed
countries, while representing only 15
per cent of the world's population,
have emitted almost three quarters of
historic emissions.81
As set out in the
introduction to this research, there is
an upper limit on the overall amount
of emissions that humanity can safely
put into the atmosphere if we are to
avoid catastrophic climate change.
If historic responsibility is taken
into account, developed countries
have already consumed more than
three times their fair share of this
atmospheric space, representing
a disproportionate contribution to
climate change. In contrast, the
poorest 10 per cent of the world's
population have contributed less than
one per cent of these emissions.
There is today a massive gap
between the per capita carbon
footprint of people in developed
countries and those who live in the
developing world. Emissions produced
per person in the UK are roughly
twice those of a person in China and
more than 10 times those of someone
in India. Per capita emissions in the
United States are even higher: the
average person in the United States
is responsible for nearly four times
as many emissions as the average
person in China, and 20 times as
much as someone in India.82
Taking into account current and
projected emissions on a per capita
basis, an 80 per cent reduction in
developed country emissions by
2050 with no offsetting would still not
ensure the levelling-off of per capita
emissions by 2050. If offsetting is
added into the equation, then global
inequalities in the production of
carbon emissions increase further.
According to Friends of the Earth's
analysis of offsetting:
"Whereas the current per capita
consumption in developed countries is
at least three times that of developingcountry
per capita emissions, the
offsetting scenario presented here
[with offsetting by developed countries
at the current level of 50 per cent
in the EU ETS] would increase this
inequality by a factor of more than
eight. Such scenarios are morally
unjustifiable, conflict with agreements
under the UNFCCC, and would
probably undermine other international
treaties including the UN Declaration
on the Right to Development."83
Offsetting is an instrument
whose essential role is to transfer
responsibility for emissions reductions
from developed to developing
countries. As such, it will mean
we fail to ensure adequate cuts in
emissions reductions globally. It
also further entrenches a deeply
inequitable development framework
where inhabitants of developing
countries are locked in to a low and
decreasing share of global carbon
emissions. Under global emissions
scenarios which allow offsetting from
the developed to the developing
world, even with greater availability
of cleaner technology, people in
developing countries will not be able
to make the necessary increases
in their emissions associated with
improvements in standards of living
OFFSETTING IS AN INSTRUMENT
WHOSE ESSENTIAL ROLE IS TO
TRANSFER RESPONSIBILITY FOR
EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS FROM
DEVELOPED TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES. AS SUCH, IT WILL
MEAN WE FAIL TO ENSURE
ADEQUATE CUTS IN EMISSIONS
REDUCTIONS GLOBALLY.
27A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
FIGURE 4: HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR GLOBAL EMISSIONS AND DISTRIBUTION OF FUTURE
EMISSIONS (PER CAPITA)
Actual historical
emissions
Annex I: Rich industrialised countries
Non-annex I: Developing countries
GtC = billion tonnes of carbon
Proposed future
emissions
Fair share distribution
of historical emissions
Fair share distribution
of future emissions
Source: Statistics from Third World Network, Climate Debt: A Primer, June 2009.
Picture credits ­ green: Simon Rawles/Friends of the Earth; grey: iStock
NON-ANNEX I
91 GtC
NON-ANNEX I
111 GtC NON-ANNEX I
160 GtC
NON-ANNEX I
251 GtC
ANNEX I
241 GtC
ANNEX I
81 GtC
ANNEX I
33 GtC
ANNEX I
82 GtC
28 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
and essential services such as
housing, food, fuel, health, education
and transport. Offsetting denies poor
people in developing countries the
right to development.
A truly equitable approach to
climate change would see developed
countries producing negative
emissions, ie they would have
reduced their carbon emissions to
zero whilst making sizeable additional
contributions by way of finance and
technology to developing countries to
help them reduce their emissions.84
This fact is recognised by leading
climate economist Lord Nicholas Stern
who, in his 2009 book The Global
Deal states: "If the allocation of rights
to emit in any given year took greater
account both of history and of equity
in stocks rather than in flows, then rich
countries would have rights to emit
which were lower than 2 tonnes per
capita (possibly even negative)."85
* Offsetting frequently doesn't
deliver emissions cuts at all and
can be worse than doing nothing
One of the key criteria for offset
projects under the Clean Development
Mechanism is that they are additional.
This means they should contribute to
reducing, avoiding or sequestering
emissions in developing countries
beyond those activities that would
have happened anyway. Otherwise,
the net effect would be an actual
increase in carbon emissions globally.
Although developing countries
submitting projects for crediting under
the CDM are required to prove that
their projects are additional, in practice
there are major difficulties in actually
testing and proving additionality.
First and foremost, the CDM
Executive Board ­ which is
responsible for approving offset
projects for CDM crediting ­ is
massively under-staffed and relies
on third party verifiers to check the
claims made by project proponents.
In practice the verifiers are paid by
the project developers themselves,
leading to significant conflicts of
interest and strong pressure on
the verifiers to approve projects
which may not necessarily be
additional. There is very little
oversight of the verification process,
and there is significant pressure
from CDM investors to speed up
the assessments so as to limit the
transactions costs and gain project
approval as quickly as possible.
Beyond these practical difficulties
associated with proving additionality,
there are much more fundamental
problems with the CDM, including
the perverse incentives that it
creates, and how to determine what
is and is not additional. There are big
incentives for developing countries to
claim that projects are additional when
they are not. There are even reports
that the CDM is actually encouraging
the building of refrigeration plants
in the developing world so that the
companies can then benefit from the
sale of the credits. According to a
Joint Committee of the UK Parliament
"the economic incentives offered
by the CDM appear actually to be
encouraging the building of refrigerant
plants in the developing world, simply
in order that the HFC by-products
from the plant can be incinerated, and
the credits generated from this sold at
a large profit."86
The problem of proving
additionality is easily demonstrated by
looking at CDM crediting of hydroelectric
power plants in China. In total,
more than 200 large-scale Chinese
hydro plants are progressing through
CDM validation.87
The Government
claims that the projects would not
have gone ahead without CDM
revenues ­ for example, because a
coal-fired station would have been
cheaper to build. However, this
ignores the fact that the Chinese
Government is a strong supporter
of hydro-electric development, that
hydro-electric power is a major
component in its five-year plans,
and that the Chinese hydro-electric
industry is expected to grow from
132-154 gigawatts (GW) of capacity in
2010 to 191-240 GW in 2020 ­ growth
equivalent to around 20 large coalfired
power stations.88
This growth is
continuing at the same rate as it has
previously, and there is no evidence
that removing the CDM would stop
China continuing its strategy of
building more dams.
Given the significant finances
available through the CDM for the
development of such projects, it
would be unreasonable to expect
countries not to factor it into their
economic planning. Hence it becomes
impossible to know when a project is
additional, and to prove it. In the words
of carbon trading specialist Larry
Lohmann: "This makes impossible any
distinction between fraud and nonfraud,
rendering any attempt at offset
regulation ultimately pointless."89
Or,
as is aptly put by UK journalist Dan
Welch: "Offsets are an imaginary
"IF THE ALLOCATION OF RIGHTS
TO EMIT IN ANY GIVEN YEAR
TOOK GREATER ACCOUNT BOTH
OF HISTORY AND OF EQUITY IN
STOCKS RATHER THAN IN FLOWS,
THEN RICH COUNTRIES WOULD
HAVE RIGHTS TO EMIT WHICH
WERE LOWER THAN 2 TONNES
PER CAPITA (POSSIBLY EVEN
NEGATIVE)."
LORD NICHOLAS STERN
29A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
commodity created by deducting what
you hope happens from what you
guess would have happened".90
These problems with verifying
that offset credit represents a real,
measurable, and long-term reduction
in emissions have already lead to
a lack of market confidence in the
carbon markets, with credits from
the Clean Development Mechanism
(CERs) currently trading on carbon
markets at an approximate 10 per cent
discount compared to permits from
emissions trading schemes like the
EU ETS.
* Offsetting locks developing
countries into high-carbon
development pathways
The development of projects under
the CDM is driven largely by market
forces and hence by the search by
investors for the greatest returns. This
in turn means that projects which gain
support under the scheme are often
the lowest cost options, which are the
least beneficial from the perspective
of climate mitigation and setting
developing countries onto low-carbon
development pathways. The largest
source of credits from the CDM comes
from projects which are cheapest to
implement and easiest to calculate
the benefits of, for example projects
applying widely-available technologies
to clean up greenhouse gases like
HFCs, N2
O, coal mine methane and
landfill gas.91
Not only are these projects doing
nothing to help the developing
countries hosting them to move
away from existing carbon-intensive
infrastructure, many are providing
significant profits, and these profits
are often going to companies who are
investing in building more greenhouse
gas-emitting plant. For example, Wara
and Victor estimate that HFC projects
in the CDM in 2006 would generate
4.7 billion of credits for refrigerant
manufacturers, but destroying the
gases costs less than 100 million.
A similar situation occurs for N2
O
projects, where the price of CERs is
tens of times more than the cost of
introducing the technology.92
In fact, fossil fuel-intensive
projects such as new coal-fired power
stations qualify for CDM credits
as long as they can demonstrate
marginal improvements in emissions
compared to similar projects nearby.
For example, the Tanjavur natural gas
combined-cycle power plant in Tamil
Nadu, India, claims to reduce carbon
emissions by 180,000 tonnes by being
cleaner than existing power plants in
the region, and so displacing dirtier
power from the grid. Although it is
cleaner, it is still a new fossil fuel power
station, average by western standards.
In this case the CDM is helping India
to copy and lock in to a high-fossil fuel,
Western development path, rather than
take a low-carbon path.93
Finally, there are major concerns
that the CDM can lead to what is
known as `regulatory chill', by further
undermining countries from making
progress on sustainable development
through enacting national laws and
regulations to increase environmental
protection and reduce emissions.
CDM projects can claim to be
additional and therefore receive
credits if it can be shown that there
are no laws requiring the introduction
of new technology which would
produce the same effect. This has the
perverse effect of creating significant
incentives for companies planning
offset projects under the CDM to lobby
against the introduction of new laws,
and further incentives for governments
hosting such projects not to introduce
new laws.
The future of offsetting
The problems with offsetting set out
above are largely insurmountable and
could not be addressed by altering
or reforming the CDM. As set out in
Section 2, the central mechanism
in any offsetting project ­ the
displacement of emissions reductions
from developed to developing
countries ­ is not viable given the
level of cuts that need to be made
over very short timescales if we are
to avoid catastrophic climate change.
Offsetting merely swaps action in
developed countries for action in
developing countries when we actually
need to tackle carbon emissions in
both the global North and the global
South, with the greatest action being
taken by developed countries because
of their historic responsibility for the
majority of greenhouse gas emissions.
Furthermore, such a displacement
of cuts from developed countries to
the developing world is fundamentally
unjust given that developed countries
have been responsible for the vast
majority of emissions historically
and also that significant inequalities
continue to exist between levels of
emissions produced per capita in
developed and developing countries.
Offset projects also don't guarantee
the same level of carbon savings in
developing countries as should have
been made in developed countries
ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEANER, IT IS
STILL A NEW FOSSIL FUEL POWER
STATION, AVERAGE BY WESTERN
STANDARDS. IN THIS CASE THE
CDM IS HELPING INDIA TO COPY
AND LOCK IN TO A HIGH-FOSSIL
FUEL, WESTERN DEVELOPMENT
PATH, RATHER THAN TAKE A
LOW-CARBON PATH.
30 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
as it is impossible to say whether a
project is additional, ie that it would
not have happened without CDM
support. Furthermore, they often bring
very limited social and environmental
benefits and often create problems
for local people instead, for example
plantations displacing communities
from their land. They also serve to
lock developing countries into highcarbon
development pathways,
creating additional expensive hurdles
for countries to jump on later.
Some of the issues around social
and environmental impacts and
high-carbon lock-in might be tackled
through changes to the criteria which
determine what types of projects
receive CDM funding, and through
much tighter oversight and scrutiny
of project proposals and delivery. Yet
the UNFCCC is deliberating proposed
changes to the CDM, likely to be
agreed at the talks in Copenhagen in
December 2009, that do not focus on
the fundamental concerns with the
scheme or offsetting more generally
as set out above, but on how to
reduce regulation and increase the
supply of credits available.
However, the two most
significant problems with offsetting displacement
of cuts when we need
cuts in both developed and developing
countries, and proving additionality
­ are impossible to address as
illustrated above.
Although these fundamental
problems with offsetting are widely
known and understood, its expansion
is being driven forward by some
parties in the UNFCCC negotiations.
The EU is one of the leading
proponents of its expansion. The
European Commission (EC) strategy
paper for the Copenhagen climate
talks states that "the EU should see
common ground with the US and other
countries in implementing cap-andtrade
systems and generating demand
for offset credits in a coordinated
manner."94
As highlighted earlier, the
EU has also been active in proposing
new types of offsetting mechanisms in
the UNFCCC negotiations, including
sectoral trading and sectoral crediting.
There are proposals under
consideration in the negotiations
for the extension of offsetting
mechanisms to include forest carbon
trading through Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation or REDD. The same
central problems with offsetting apply
to REDD but the scheme also has
major implications in terms of impacts
on the rights and livelihoods of forestdwelling
communities and Indigenous
Peoples (see box below).
In conclusion, it looks highly likely
that the use of damaging offsetting
projects as part of carbon trading
schemes, purportedly to tackle global
climate emissions, will expand in spite
of there being conclusive evidence
that offsetting is hindering the task of
bringing down global greenhouse gas
emissions in a just and effective way.
Furthermore, the damaging impacts
of offsetting projects are likely to be
amplified further if proposals for the
creation of a global carbon market
are taken forward. The linking of
emissions trading schemes is likely
to lead to further deterioration in
the quality of offset credits and the
undermining of controls on them
unless common rules are put in
place. For example, the proposed
emissions trading scheme in the
United States envisages the use of
offset credits not regulated under the
Kyoto Protocol, ie unlike the EU ETS
it will not limit offset credits tradable
in the scheme to those from the
Clean Development Mechanism and
Joint Implementation. As a result, a
linking of the EU and US schemes
as envisaged under EU proposals
would mean non-UN regulated offsets
trading in the US scheme would also
enter the EU scheme, undermining the
rules of the EU scheme. The overall
effect would be a deterioration in the
environmental integrity of offsets to
the lowest common denominator,
unless countries participating in the
linked global carbon market agreed to
common rules on which offset credits
were tradable. However, the most
detailed vision of a global emissions
trading scheme so far ­ that set
out in the Lazarowicz report ­ sees
no role for internationally-agreed
common regulation of the linked global
emissions trading scheme.
Lazarowicz's report states that:
"at the emitter level, the national
authority should remain responsible
for the effective regulation and
implementation of its own ETS,
even after linking to other ETSs.
Cooperation between countries to
link their domestic ETSs bilaterally
should also take place outside
the intergovernmental negotiation
processes and institutions. A lighttouch
joint committee consisting of
representatives of national authorities
could coordinate between linked ETSs
and negotiate with new entrants."97
31A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
Certain proposals being put forward
as part of the REDD initiative would
reward the protection of forests in
developing countries by linking them
to the global carbon market, allowing
companies and governments to count
the carbon benefit of replanted or
protected forests against their carbon
emissions.
These proposals would hence turn
REDD into an offsetting mechanism
and, as with other forms of offsetting,
it will mean that countries with
emissions reduction obligations avoid
necessary economic transformation.
We need to reduce deforestation and
emissions from fossil fuel use, not
trade between them.
There are also additional risks
and problems with the scheme.
* Plantations: Proposals within
the REDD discussions would
define plantations as forests, and
as a result REDD funding could
be used to replace forests with
large monoculture plantations.
Not only do plantations store on
average only 20 per cent of the
carbon of intact forests, replacing
forests with plantations can have
devastating social and economic
impacts on those that live in
forests and rely on them for food,
shelter and medicine. According
to the Food and Agricultural
Organisation (FAO) 1.6 billion
people globally rely on forests,
including 60 million indigenous
people who are entirely dependent
upon forests for their livelihoods,
food, medicines and building
materials.95
* Governanceandindigenous
peoples' rights: The inclusion of
forests in carbon markets will also
undermine public governance,
weakening governments' ability
to protect and manage natural
resources. Furthermore, by
increasing the financial value of
forests, carbon market proposals
in REDD would be likely to trigger
a land grab, and risk the prospect
of social dislocation and violent
evictions of Indigenous Peoples
and forest-dwelling communities
without formal land title.
Source: REDD Myths, Friends of the Earth
International96
REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION (REDD)
SimonRawles/FriendsoftheEarth
Jerry Benjamin, 19, a local Makushi and guide
at Turtle Mountain, in the Iwokrama Forest, Guyana.
32 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
4. Climate speculation ­ the risk of
carbon subprime
The carbon trading system is
already far more complex than a
simple trading of permits and credits
between firms covered by emissions
trading schemes and those running
offset projects. The development of
secondary markets involving financial
speculators and complex financial
products based on the financial
derivatives model brings with it a risk
that carbon trading will develop into a
speculative commodity bubble. This in
turn would risk another global financial
failure similar to that brought on by
the subprime mortgage crisis with
fundamental implications for the ability
of the system to deliver emissions
reductions.
Involvement of financial
speculators
As highlighted in the introduction, at any
one time the vast majority of permits
and credits available in the carbon
markets are not held by compliance
traders such as utilities and other
companies which must own them in
order to comply with their emissions
reduction obligations. They are
owned by other actors ­ traders and
speculators whose participation in the
markets is for the purpose of making
money from the buying and selling of
credits and permits, ie speculation.
Carbon trading specialist Larry
Lohmann has written: "As a new `asset
class', carbon has proved a magnet
for hedge funds, energy traders,
private equity funds and large global
investment banks such as Barclays,
Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Credit
Suisse, BNP Paribas and Merrill
Lynch as well as index providers
and European exchange-traded
commodity sponsors."98
Many of these
FIGURE 5: TOP 20 KYOTO MARKET CARBON CREDIT BUYERS
(NUMBER OF PROJECTS)
Buyers (sector) No. of projects
EcoSecurities (carbon finance, brokerage and consulting) 296
Carbon Asset Management Sweden (carbon finance) 132
AgCert (carbon finance) 97
EDF Trading (carbon finance) 87
IBRD (banking) 84
RWE (utilities) 80
Cargill International (agribusiness) 78
Mitsubishi (technology) 72
Trading Emissions (carbon finance) 68
ENEL (utilities) 63
Vitol (oil trading) 60
MGM Carbon Portfolio (carbon finance) 59
Agrinergy (carbon finance) 58
Carbon Resource Management (carbon finance) 57
CAMCO (carbon finance) 56
Marubeni (carbon finance) 53
Kommunalkredit (banking) 53
Essent Energy Trading (carbon finance) 51
Climate Change Capital (carbon finance) 44
Energy Systems International (carbon finance) 43
Source: The Corner House submission to the UK Environmental Audit Committee Inquiry,
2009; original data from United Nations Environment Programme Risoe Centre:
www.cdmpipeline.org
33A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
financial institutions have set up desks
to speculate in carbon permits and, as
with the financial derivatives markets,
many new institutions have also been
set up to deal with the new commodity
of carbon. According to Lohmann,
by 2008 there were about 80 carbon
investment funds set up to finance
offset projects or buy carbon credits,
managing nearly US$13 billion, and
most of these are oriented towards
speculation rather than helping
companies to comply with the carbon
caps.99
In addition to these major financial
actors and new specialist institutions
set up to speculate on the carbon
markets, many trading companies
active in the energy markets are
also active in carbon trading.
Similarly a significant number of
industrial companies like steel-maker
ArcelorMittal have also developed
new arms aimed at profiting from the
carbon trade.90
Why is this involvement of
speculators in global carbon trading
of concern? Primarily because the
involvement of actors whose sole
purpose is to profit from the trading
of carbon credits and permits
significantly increases the potential for
a speculative bubble. As described
in Friends of the Earth US's analysis
of the subprime risks of the carbon
markets, as more investors become
involved, especially hedge funds,
they can increase market volatility
and create a potential asset bubble:
"A market dominated by speculators
may push up prices, create a bubble
and spur the development of subprime
assets."101
A speculative bubble is where
trading in a commodity takes place in
increasingly high volumes at prices
which are increasingly unrelated to the
underlying value of the commodity,
eventually leading to a stock market
crash where the tradable value of the
commodity suddenly aligns itself with
the underlying value. Or, to put it more
bluntly, where: "Too much money
chases too few viable investments,
which can spur the development of
toxic assets."102
From the crash in the market
for black tulips in the Netherlands
in the seventeenth century to the
dot com bubble of 1990s and the
subprime mortgage crisis we are
now facing, speculative bubbles
are a consequence of the failure
of governments adequately to
regulate markets, often combined
with the inability of market actors to
calculate and take proper account of
uncertainty. They have far-reaching
consequences, often including knockon
economic impacts which can
cause widespread job losses, as the
current global economic downturn is
now demonstrating.
In the carbon markets, the
risk is twofold. The first is that the
involvement of speculators will drive
the development of what has been
described as subprime carbon, ie
contracts to deliver carbon that carry a
relatively high risk of not being fulfilled.
The second is that we become
increasing reliant on carbon trading as
a mechanism for reducing emissions
as proposed by key global actors
like the European Union, and then
the increasing prevalence of these
subprime carbon contracts leads to
a market crash which fundamentally
undermines an already weak and
ineffective mechanism for avoiding
catastrophic climate change.
Some of the developments that
led to the subprime mortgage crisis
in the United States and sparked
the global economic downturn are
already recognisable in the carbon
trading markets. These include
the use of increasingly complex
financial instruments, for example the
bundling together of carbon credits
for buyers. In the subprime crisis,
banks developed increasingly more
exotic, complex and opaque financial
products to absorb the demand from
speculators for mortgage-backed
securities and similar products.
The complexity of the products
meant that credit rating agencies
which were meant to be providing
rigorous assessments of mortgagebacked
securities failed to analyse
the thousands of mortgages which
comprised these securities.
Similarly complex instruments
are already being used in the
carbon markets. For example, offset
aggregators are bundling small offset
projects for buyers,103
increasingly
the likelihood of similar challenges to
accurate valuation of assets as the
carbon markets grow.
Complex financial derivatives
instruments have been described
by US businessman and investor
Warren Buffet as "financial weapons
of mass destruction."104
According
to Larry Lohmann: "Carbon options
have been used since 2005 and
there are now swaps between Clean
Development Mechanism credits and
EU allowances, allowing more liquidity
and larger positions. Proposals to
securitize carbon credits (as a new
`asset class') have been made at
least since 2007, and EcoSecurities
invented a CDO [collateralised debt
obligation]-type instrument for carbon
in 2008. The Chicago Climate Futures
Exchange, a subsidiary of the Chicago
Climate Exchange, already offers a
futures contract based on emissions
allowances under an anticipated US
federal cap and trade scheme."105
The risk of the development of
34 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
subprime carbon assets has already
been recognised by participants in the
markets themselves, as highlighted by
the UK Financial Services Authority
(FSA), the UK financial services
regulator which has some limited
responsibilities for regulating the
derivatives trading associated with
the carbon markets. In its research
on the risks and challenges of carbon
trading, the FSA found:
"Some market participants have
expressed concern about the
impact the fixed supply of emission
allowances might have on the
derivatives market if the number of
outstanding derivative contracts grows
at such a rapid pace that the number
of financial contracts exceeds the
pool of underlying assets that can be
delivered at expiry."106
Subprime carbon assets are most
likely to be credits from offset projects
because of the fundamental problems
in offsetting examined earlier, and
because sellers can make promises
through the carbon markets to deliver
carbon credits before the credits have
actually been issued for a project.107
Such offset credits are comparable to
subprime loans or junk bonds, ie debts
that carry a relatively high risk of not
getting paid.
Many of the problems with
offsetting examined earlier ­ the
prevalence of perverse offset projects
where companies create powerful
greenhouse gases just to destroy
them so as to claim offset credits, the
problems with proving additionality,
and the problems with verifying
greenhouse gas savings from more
legitimate offset projects ­ are likely to
lead to the creation of more and more
subprime offset credits, eventually
undermining the confidence of the
markets in the value of the assets
being traded.
Lack of regulation of carbon
trading
In theory adequate regulation of
carbon trading could contribute to
mitigating the risk of a speculative
bubble and eventual crash of the
carbon market. However, current
regulation is limited, complex and
uncoordinated. There are also major
barriers to the development of more
effective regulation of the carbon
markets. The United Nations is the
main governing body for emissions
reduction projects and regulation of
the two flexible mechanisms ­ the
Clean Development Mechanism and
Joint Implementation ­ is conducted
by bodies accountable to the United
Nations: the CDM Executive Board
and the JI Supervisory Committee. Yet
responsibility for assessing emissions
reductions projects under each of
these mechanisms lies with each
signatory country to the UNFCCC, and
responsibility for regulating emissions
trading systems lies with the national
and regional governments. The EU
ETS is regulated by the European
Commission, but the individual
EU member states have certain
competencies and responsibilities
for implementing and regulating the
scheme.
In the UK the Department for
Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
is the competent authority for the EU
ETS, ie for the underlying emissions
markets, whereas the Financial
Services Authority (FSA) has
responsibilities for market participants
conducting activities in relation to
derivative instruments based on the
underlying emissions allowances. As
if this is not complex enough, the FSA
points out that: "Emissions derivatives
traded by certain firms may not be
caught by MiFID ­ the EU's Markets
in Financial Instruments Directive,
which guides the FSA's regulatory
role in relation to the carbon markets
­ because of exemptions to the
directive."108
This complex web of international,
regional, national and multi-agency
competencies and responsibilities
significantly increases the risk of poor
regulatory oversight and breaches
in existing rules being missed or
overlooked. Furthermore, the lack
of regulation in the global financial
markets ­ now widely acknowledged
as having contributed to the current
credit crisis ­ brings significant
additional risks for carbon trading.
Recognition of subprime risks
The parallels between carbon trading
and the subprime mortgage market
and the likelihood of a subprime
carbon crisis are becoming widely
recognised and have been remarked
on even by private sector leaders
and actors within the carbon markets
themselves. Vincent de Rivaz, the
chief executive of the UK arm of the
French gas and electricity group EDF
Energy has called on politicians to
look at the working of the EU ETS and
"WE LIKE CERTAINTY ABOUT
A CARBON PRICE... [BUT] THE
CARBON PRICE HAS TO BECOME
SIMPLE AND NOT BECOME A
NEW TYPE OF SUBPRIME TOOL
WHICH WILL BE DIVERTED FROM
WHAT IS ITS INITIAL PURPOSE: TO
ENCOURAGE REAL INVESTMENT
IN REAL LOW-CARBON
TECHNOLOGY."
VINCENT DE RIVAZ, CHIEF
EXECUTIVE EDF ENERGY,
JANUARY 2009
35A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
whether it is delivering the results it is
intended to: "We like certainty about
a carbon price... [but] the carbon
price has to become simple and not
become a new type of subprime
tool which will be diverted from what
is its initial purpose: to encourage
real investment in real low-carbon
technology."109
Rivaz also questioned more
broadly the reliance being placed
on carbon markets for delivering the
changes we need to tackle climate
change and pointed to a similar overreliance
on markets without tougher
safeguards being responsible for
the financial turmoil that instigated
the financial crisis and subsequent
global recession. According to the
energy boss: "We are at the tipping
point where we... should wonder if
we have in place the right balance
between government policy, regulator
responsibility and the market
mechanism which will deliver the
carbon price."110
Similarly, Marc Stuart of the carbon
trading firm EcoSecurities confessed
to The Wall Street Journal in the wake
of his firm's first stock crash: "I guess
in many ways it's akin to subprime....
You keep layering on crap until you
say, `We can't do this anymore.'"111
5. Climate finance ­ a smokescreen
for lack of action
A major argument put in favour
of carbon markets is that they will
generate much-needed finance to
fund adaptation to climate change,
and a transition to a low-carbon
economy in developing countries.
There is no doubt that large sums
of money are needed to finance
adaptation and mitigation in
developing countries. However, the
evidence to date that the carbon
markets will provide them is not
good. Far more concerning is the
fact that developed countries are
pointing to the expansion of funding
through the carbon market as a way
of fulfilling their commitments under
the UNFCCC to provide finance
for mitigation and adaptation in
developing countries when this is
not the case. The UNFCCC commits
developed countries to providing
new and additional finance to pay the
full incremental costs of developingcountry
mitigation and adaptation.
Counting financial transfers through
the carbon market is double
counting. This finance is not new and
additional as it is generated through
the offsetting of developed-country
emissions reductions.
Amount of finance needed
The Stern Review estimated that
mitigation to stabilise the level of
greenhouse gas emissions in the
atmosphere at even 500 ppmv CO2
e,
a level which would still carry a
significant risk of dangerous climate
change, would cost around two
per cent of global GDP annually more
that US$1 trillion. Stern said
adaptation costs are likely to rise to
hundreds of billions of dollars a year.
As highlighted at the beginning of this
report, action to stabilise and reduce
greenhouse gas emissions whilst
adapting to the impacts of climate
change will be particularly difficult for
developing countries, whose levels
of socio-economic development
necessitate that such action is taken
concurrently with ongoing efforts
to alleviate poverty and promote
sustainable development. The
African Group of Nations in the UN
climate negotiations argues that
developing nations will need at least
US$200 billion a year for mitigation.112
In addition, the United Nations
Development Report 2007/2008
estimates that US$86 billion a year
­ 0.2 per cent of developed country
GDP or around one tenth of their
current military spending ­ is needed
by 2015 by developing countries to
adapt to climate change.113
This is
in the context of global patterns of
uneven development in which 2.4
billion people lack fuel and 1.6 billion
are without electricity,114
and in which
many developed countries are still
failing to live up to the commitment
made at the Monterrey Financing for
Development Conference in 2002 to
provide 0.7 per cent of their GNP in
international aid to support sustainable
development for the world's poorest.115
Not enough
Looking purely at volumes of
finance provided by carbon trading,
predicted flows up to 2020 are
CARBON MARKETS, BY VIRTUE
OF THE VERY INCENTIVE
SYSTEMS THAT THEY SET UP,
ARE FAILING TO CHANNEL FUNDS
TO THE POOREST COUNTRIES
AND COMMUNITIES.
"I GUESS IN MANY WAYS IT'S
AKIN TO SUBPRIME....YOU KEEP
LAYERING ON CRAP UNTIL
YOU SAY, `WE CAN'T DO THIS
ANYMORE.'"
MARC STUART, ECOSECURITIES
36 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
grossly insufficient compared to what
is needed to support developing
countries in bringing down their
carbon emissions, and adapt to the
impacts of climate change whilst
also advancing poverty alleviation
and sustainable development. For
example, CDM revenues from the
EU ETS ­ the world's largest carbon
trading scheme ­ are likely to be less
than US$5 billion a year to 2020.
This is around one tenth of a fair
EU contribution towards the global
mitigation costs estimated by the UN.
Other failings of carbon market
finance
As well as being far too small in
volume, funding from carbon trading is
highly limited in other ways. Because
of the attraction of carbon trading
to low cost options, the majority of
CDM projects are located in more
industrialised advanced developing
countries. Less than one per cent of
projects under the CDM are located
in the Least Developed Countries
(LDCs), countries which according
to the United Nations exhibit the
lowest indicators of socioeconomic
development.116
This situation does not
look set to change much in the near
future: the four countries predicted to
be generating the most CDM credits
in 2012 are the more advanced
developing countries of China, India,
Brazil and South Korea.117
It is these more advanced
developing countries, with already
higher levels of high-carbon dirty
industry, which will need the most
significant financial support in
decarbonising their economies.
However, the poorer Least Developed
Countries also need major financial
transfers in order to support lowcarbon
clean development and
adaptation to the impacts of climate
change. Carbon markets, by virtue
of the very incentive systems that
they set up, are failing to channel
funds to the poorest countries
and communities. Furthermore,
as demonstrated in the offsetting
section above, offset finance is
attracted to the lowest cost projects
as this yields the highest returns for
investors. As a result, finance from
the carbon markets is not supporting
the major structural changes needed
in advanced developing countries like
India, China and Brazil. Instead, offset
finance is further locking developing
countries into the failed high-carbon
development pathways of the
industrialised North.
Even if these major failings in the
volume and nature of finance from
carbon markets could be addressed,
carbon trading will never provide
the reliable and predictable flows of
finance to developing countries that
are necessary to truly support wellplanned
sustainable development.
This is because the flows are by their
very nature unpredictable, depending
as they do on the price of carbon at
any given time. Price volatility in the
carbon markets is also aggravated
by the involvement of speculators.
According to the United Nations World
Economic and Social Survey 2009,
"the trading of emission certificates
as financial assets and speculative
instruments can generate a high
volatility in the price of carbon."118
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ARE
HIDING BEHIND THE CARBON
MARKET TO COVER FOR NOT
DELIVERING ON THEIR LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS TO PROVIDE NEW
AND ADDITIONAL FINANCE
TO SUPPORT DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN TACKLING CLIMATE
CHANGE. THIS IS TOTALLY
UNACCEPTABLE.
37A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
Double counting
Even the analysis above of the major
shortcomings of carbon trading fails
to take into account one fundamental
factor which alone determines
that the carbon market cannot
be relied upon to provide finance
for developing country mitigation
and adaptation. That is the issue
of double counting. Because they
have done most to cause climate
change, developed countries have
committed under the UNFCCC to
providing new and additional finance
to pay the full incremental costs of
developing-country adjustments to
mitigate and adapt to climate change.
This is covered by Articles 4.1, 4.3,
4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 of the Convention
amongst others. Funding from the
carbon market, resulting as it does
from the offsetting of developedcountry
emissions reductions, does
not constitute new and additional
finance. Counting finance from the
carbon market towards the fulfilment
of the legal obligations of developed
countries to provide finance to
developing countries is essentially
double counting.
This fundamental flaw is being
ignored by developed countries who
­ rather than accepting their legal
obligations under the Convention and
committing to the necessary financial
transfers ­ are increasingly saying
that developing countries should
put forward the finance themselves
and get the rest through the carbon
market. The European Commission's
"global finance blueprint" was put
forward in September 2009. This
proposed that of the 100 billion a
year by 2020 it estimated was needed
by developing countries to mitigate
their emissions and adapt to climate
change, domestic public and private
finance from developing countries
themselves could cover 20-40 per
cent, the international carbon market
around 40 per cent, and only the
remainder ­ as little as 20 per cent
­ should come from international
public finance, including from financial
transfers from developed countries.119
Developed countries are hiding
behind the carbon market to cover for
not delivering on their legal obligations
to provide new and additional finance
to support developing countries in
tackling climate change. This is totally
unacceptable.
38 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
SECTION 4
CAN THE PROBLEMS WITH CARBON
TRADING BE OVERCOME?
There are a variety of views on
whether or not the problems with
carbon trading can be overcome.
Some more optimistic critics believe
that it is within the realms of possibility
that the fundamental problems with
carbon trading could be addressed.
In taking a position on whether the
problems with carbon trading could be
overcome, it is important that we look
at this possibility, ie at what it would
take to prevent the damaging impacts
of carbon trading and turn it into an
effective mechanism for tackling
global greenhouse gas emissions. A
list of what these changes might look
like is set out below.
Potential solutions to
carbon trading
* Set a low enough cap: Setting
a cap on emitters covered by carbon
trading schemes that is low enough to
ensure that reductions in emissions in
developed countries take place in line
with climate science and an equitable
reduction of emissions globally based
on historic responsibility.
* Removal of all forms of
offsetting: Stopping the inclusion of
all forms of offset credits in emissions
trading schemes, including the CDM,
REDD, sectoral approaches and nonUN
mandated offset schemes.
* Prohibit speculative trading
activity: Prohibit the involvement
of all non-compliance actors in the
carbon markets in order to end
speculation and reduce the likelihood
of a subprime carbon bubble and
subsequent market crash.
* 100 per cent auctioning of all
carbon permits: In order to prevent
windfall profits and raise revenue
to finance climate mitigation in
developing countries.
* Agree global regulation of
emissions trading: Agreement
on global rules and standards for
emissions trading.
* Drive real innovation: Address
the perverse incentives created by
carbon trading for lock-in to highcarbon
infrastructure by the industries
for which emissions cuts are hardest
and most expensive to make.
Prospects for achieving
these solutions
What changes are possible in
theory?
Some of the above reforms to
emissions trading schemes could
notionally be achieved. Taking the
EU ETS as a hypothetical example,
governments could agree to set a low
enough cap to deliver reductions in
emissions, not only in line with the
targets suggested by the latest science
to be necessary for avoiding an
increase in average global temperature
above the critical threshold, but also
which address the responsibility
of developed countries for the
overwhelming majority of historic
emissions. It would have to be a very
low cap in order to deliver a reduction
in EU emissions by at least 40 per
cent by 2020, with no offsetting.
European member states could also
agree to remove all forms of offsetting
from the scheme, so that participating
companies could only trade in EU
allowances and not in offset credits.
Finally, EU member states could,
theoretically, agree to prohibit the
involvement of all other actors except
for compliance traders in the EU ETS,
to outlaw all forms of speculative
trading and to auction 100 per cent
of allowances. These changes would
address some of the fundamental
problems with existing emissions
trading schemes in the EU ETS.
It is also possible that countries
planning new emissions trading
schemes could design and implement
schemes where these issues are
addressed, and that collectively
countries could agree common
regulations and standards for their
schemes.
39A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
However, addressing the other
fundamental problem identified, that
of the trading element of emissions
trading schemes serving to lock in
high-carbon infrastructure, would be
much more difficult. Incentivising highlypolluting
heavy industries, for which
emissions cuts are expensive, to shift to
cleaner technologies rather than simply
opting out through the purchasing of
credits would require either the removal
of their trading option altogether,
or the setting of clean technology
standards alongside the emissions
trading mechanisms. Addressing this
problem effectively necessitates either
supplementing the emissions trading
scheme with significant government
intervention, or reforming the scheme
so that it is in effect no longer a trading
scheme, at least for a significant
proportion of the participants.
What changes are possible in
practice?
In assessing whether carbon trading
could deliver the emissions reductions
we need in order to avoid catastrophic
climate change in a just and equitable
way, it is necessary however, to take
a view not only on whether effective
and non-damaging emissions trading
schemes could be achieved in theory,
but also what the likelihood of this is
in practice. The probability that the
above shopping list of changes could
ever be achieved and the hypothetical
`perfect carbon market' put in place,
depends to a significant extent on
the political forces and interests that
have grown up around the emissions
trading industry and the implications
that follow from this.
An artificial market constructed
by governments
As pointed out by regulators and
commentators alike, the global
carbon market is unique as
commodity markets go, in that it is
artificially constructed by politicians.
According to the UK Financial
Services Authority: "The key
differences in the emissions market,
compared with other commodities
markets, are that it is a politicallygenerated
and managed market
and that the underlying [commodity]
is a dematerialised allowance
certificate, as opposed to a physical
commodity."120
Similarly, Sophie Grene
in the Financial Times has argued: "As
an asset class, carbon is too young for
any precise conclusions to be drawn
about it... However, since its very
existence depends on the political will
to limit greenhouse gases, and both
supply and demand depend largely
on government policy, its risk profile is
uniquely related to politics."121
Susceptibility to lobbying and
political pressure
As its existence depends entirely
on political will and action by
governments, we can confidently
assume that emissions trading is,
like all other government policies
and interventions, highly susceptible
to pressure from powerful interest
groups. In fact, it is widely argued
that the adoption of emissions trading
schemes and the establishment of the
carbon market were themselves partly
the result of pressure from interest
groups. For example, according to
Oxford economist and adviser to the
UK Government on climate policy
Dieter Helm, the fact that the EU ETS
was established at all was partly as a
result of strong lobbying from polluters
for a permits scheme rather than a
tax on carbon emissions because of
the income effect, ie who gets the
money.122
Revenues from taxation
accrue to governments whereas
initially under the EU ETS permits
were given away rather than auctioned
and so companies themselves were
the financial beneficiaries.
Impacts of lobbying on
development of emissions
trading schemes
Experience from the EU ETS has
further shown that carbon trading as a
system is highly vulnerable to lobbying
and influence by vested corporate
and industrial interests. According
to Dieter Helm: "Having got the EU
ETS up and running, there are now
very powerful vested interests in not
only perpetuating it, but also weighing
on its evolution."123
The impact of
lobbying by these vested interests
has been significant, and responsible
for the some of the key failures of the
scheme, including the lack of political
will to set a low enough cap and
generate a high enough carbon price
to stimulate emissions reductions.
The severe weaknesses of the
EU ETS that have resulted from this
lobbying and political pressure are
articulated by Helm as follows: "The
EU ETS now looks a very shaky
foundation on which to base the policy
of decarbonisation of the EU economy.
The carbon price may even collapse,
and very considerable volatility
is already apparent. The EU has
therefore landed itself with a complex
and relatively inefficient tradable
permits system which maximises the
scope for vested interests to pursue
the resulting economic rents. It
provides no long-term price of carbon,
and the short-term price that emerges
40 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
is likely to remain highly volatile."124
Furthermore, very few of these
issues have been addressed in the
negotiations for Phase III of the EU
ETS. European member states,
driven by the desire to promote
the competitive advantage of their
domestic firms in the face of growing
competition from rapidly industrialising
advanced developing countries like
India and China and prevent the
relocation of those firms abroad,
lobbied heavily for exemptions in
negotiations for Phase III of the EU
ETS. In their influential paper, `How
to get climate policy back on course',
Gwyn Prins of the London School of
Economics and his colleagues assert:
"In the case of the European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS),
the policy process was effectively
voided before formal agreement in
December 2008 by the provision of
exclusions for coal-dependent eastern
European economies, for industrial
producers subject to international
competition and by the requirement
imposed by Italy that the whole
process should be reviewed root and
branch after the forthcoming UNFCCC
Copenhagen conference."125
Polluting industries covered by
the EU ETS were highly successful
in lobbying for the distribution by
governments of permits for free
rather than by auction. 90 per cent of
sectors deemed to be at significant
risk of impacts on their international
trade competitiveness as a result
of emissions trading rules, often
referred to as `carbon leakage', will
be excluded from any auctioning of
permits in Phase III of the EU ETS
because of trade exposure, and
this includes the majority of the EU
manufacturing sector.126
In the United States carbon
trading has shown itself to be equally
vulnerable to lobbying and regulatory
capture. Companies have lobbied on
various carbon trading bills for `safety
valves' or `off ramps' that would raise
the carbon cap in certain situations,
fundamentally undermining the
already limited environmental integrity
of the system.127
Complexity and civil society
scrutiny
All government policy-making and lawmaking
is vulnerable to influence from
powerful interest groups. However, the
complexity of carbon trading is without
doubt a factor in allowing the EU ETS
to have been manipulated and watered
down to the extent that it has. Similarly,
the complexity of forthcoming
schemes is unquestionably part of the
reason why those schemes are being
developed with similar fundamental
flaws and shortcomings.
Excessive influence over
government decision-making by
powerful economic interest groups
can be balanced to a limited extent
by influence from other interest
groups in civil society, for example
those primarily concerned with
environmental and social outcomes.
However, the exercise of this counterbalancing
force depends to a large
extent on the ability of civil society
groups to access, process and
scrutinise information about the
policies in question.
As this report itself demonstrates,
carbon trading is without doubt an
immensely complex policy area,
covering as it does multiple industry
sectors and with structures, processes
and terminology that are verging on
the impenetrable for those who do not
work in carbon trading on a day-today
basis. The exercise of civil-society
scrutiny and influence is therefore
significantly more difficult than over
simpler government policy mechanisms
such as taxes, or standards covering
single industry sectors.
The future of emissions trading:
the growing role of interest
groups
Given the history of corporate lobbying
over emissions trading schemes,
the chances of achieving the basic
changes to emissions trading
mechanisms set out above look bleak.
The establishment of emissions
trading schemes has already created
a whole new constituency whose
vested interests lie not in climate
mitigation but in the perpetuation of
the schemes and further changes to
increase their extraction of profits from
the system. Again, according to Helm:
"A tradable permits regime creates
new markets which in turn create
rents for participants. There is now a
rapidly growing set of vested financial
interests with every incentive to lobby
for the retention and development
of the EU ETS."128
Similarly, leading
NASA scientist and climate specialist
James Hansen has argued: "Carbon
trading does not solve the emission
problem at all... In fact it gives
industries a way to avoid reducing
their emissions. The rules are too
complex and it creates an entirely new
class of lobbyists and fat cats."129
It is highly unlikely that these
interest groups will be supportive of
changes to emissions trading which
GIVEN THE HISTORY OF
CORPORATE LOBBYING OVER
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES,
THE CHANCES OF ACHIEVING THE
BASIC CHANGES TO EMISSIONS
TRADING MECHANISMS SET OUT
ABOVE LOOK BLEAK.
41A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
undermine the rents that they are
able to gain from it. Helm asserts
that the situation with the EU ETS is
already very similar to that of Europe's
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
The EU's main project of the 1960s,
while the aim of the CAP was to
stabilise agricultural markets, over
time it metamorphosed into a grossly
distorting and expensive policy with
agricultural lobbyists capturing the
rents from the scheme: "The danger
is that climate policy will go the same
way ­ as interested parties battle for
the very considerable rents attached
to the various components."130
Furthermore, the outlook for
improvements is further diminished
by the growing involvement of noncompliance
actors, ie financiers and
speculators, in the carbon markets another
powerful group with a vested
interest in maintaining the system
as it is. Regulators predict that the
already dominant position of these
actors in the carbon markets is likely
to increase even further. According to
the UK Financial Services Authority:
"As the market grows it is expected
that there will be a change from the
current estimated 50-50 split between
trade and financial participants, with
financial participants increasing their
participation significantly to a similar
level to other commodities markets,
where financial, ie non-physical,
participants can typically make up 90
per cent of market transactions."131
Given the historical impacts of
lobbying by interest groups on the
establishment and development of
emissions trading schemes, and
the growing involvement of powerful
industrial and financial actors with
a strong interest in the perpetuation
and growth of carbon markets in a
form that delivers sizeable profits, it is
clear that any attempts to implement
The role of the UK as a leading
global financial centre hosting a
great many banks, financiers and
investment houses goes a long way
towards explaining the highly active
role the UK Government is playing in
promoting the expansion and linking
of emissions trading schemes
globally.
UK businesses play a significant
role in the global carbon market. UK
companies are by far the biggest
investors in credits from CDM
projects, accounting for 644 projects
or 28.9 per cent of the total at the
time of writing.132
The next biggest
developed country investor in CDM
projects is another big global financial
centre, Switzerland, with 462 or
20.7 per cent of the total at the time
of writing. These projects are not
necessarily offsetting emissions
from the UK. Rather the UK is just
the host country for purchase of the
credit from the CDM project. The
credit may then be sold on to emitters
or purchasers in other countries.
In fact, according to the UK
Financial Services Authority, the vast
majority of UK firms participating in
the carbon market are doing so for
reasons other than to comply with
emissions reductions obligations:
"Many FSA-authorised firms are
involved in the emissions markets,
including brokers, funds, institutional
investors including pension funds,
commodity trading advisors,
electricity generators, and other
physically-exposed hedgers. As a
proportion of the total, only very few
of these FSA-authorised emissions
market participants actually have a
UK-imposed emissions reduction
requirement but are active in the
market to offer services to clients,
products to investors or purely to
generate revenue. For example,
investment banks have in general,
played a significant role in providing
funding to the emissions market
and, as such, have a significant
impact in the market."133
THE ROLE OF THE UK IN THE GLOBAL CARBON MARKET
iStock
42 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
the fundamental reforms to existing
emissions trading schemes identified
above would likely be met with major
resistance and would have only very
limited chances of success in practice.
Similarly, it can be argued that
suggesting that new emissions trading
schemes could be put forward which
avoid the most damaging aspects
of existing schemes and have a
better chance of effectively reducing
emissions is a somewhat academic
exercise. The fact is that most of the
new schemes being proposed look
likely to be as damaging if not more
damaging than existing schemes,
indicating that the same political
forces and interest groups are at
work influencing the development of
schemes in the pipeline.
The future of emissions trading:
the question of timing
A final factor which needs to be
considered when assessing the
ability of carbon trading to deliver
emissions reductions needed to
avoid catastrophic climate change
in a just and equitable way is the
question of the time available. As we
have highlighted at the beginning of
this report, global greenhouse gas
emissions must peak and start to
decline within the next six years if we
are to have a reasonable chance of
avoiding catastrophic climate change,
Time is therefore of the essence
and the history of emissions trading
schemes suggests that they are likely
to fail on this front as well. The EU
ETS has been operational since 2005,
and although it is now in its second
phase, the framework for Phase III
has been put in place and, despite
awareness of the major shortcomings
of Phases I and II, these have still
not been addressed in Phase III. It
therefore looks highly unlikely that
there is time to get the system right
and working effectively in the time that
we have available. Similarly, based
on the experience of the EU ETS, the
likelihood of establishing new national
emissions trading schemes elsewhere
in time to deliver the urgent emissions
reductions needed looks very small.
This issue of a fundamental lack
of time applies equally to proposals
for the establishment of a global
emissions trading system as put
forward by the European Union and
the UK Government. The roadmap
for the development of such a system
as set out in the report by Mark
Lazarowicz134
envisages the first
step in the establishment of a global
scheme ­ the linking of the EU and
US emissions trading schemes ­ as
taking place in 2015, the year that
global emissions need to peak.
This raises questions as to the core
purpose of the proposed scheme,
as it clearly cannot be to deliver the
necessary emissions cuts to avoid
catastrophic climate change.
It can therefore be concluded
that the chances of achieving the
fundamental reforms to existing and
new emissions trading schemes
to make carbon trading work
effectively in delivering the necessary
emissions reductions in a fair and
effective way look slim at best,
and more realistically, likely to fail
totally. Furthermore, in the highly
unlikely event that such reforms
were theoretically possible, the
time it would take to make these
reforms and expand the carbon
trading system globally is simply too
long for trading to be relied upon as
the core mechanism to deliver the
necessary emissions cuts. On all
counts the factors above suggest
that carbon trading as it currently
exists is damaging, ineffective and
fundamentally flawed and that seeking
to reform it is a waste of precious time
and energy in the face of the urgent
threat of climate change.
ON ALL COUNTS THE
FACTORS ABOVE SUGGEST
THAT CARBON TRADING AS
IT CURRENTLY EXISTS IS
DAMAGING, INEFFECTIVE AND
FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED AND
THAT SEEKING TO REFORM IT IS
A WASTE OF PRECIOUS TIME AND
ENERGY IN THE FACE OF THE
URGENT THREAT OF CLIMATE
CHANGE.
43A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
SECTION 5
ALTERNATIVES TO CARBON TRADING
Part A: Overall approach
to bringing down
emissions ­ focus on
simple, direct and proven
policies
A growing body of experts from
diverse backgrounds now believes we
need much more direct interventions
in response to the global climate
crisis.135
The scale of the challenge
and limited time in which we have
to achieve it mean that we cannot
rely on high risk, indirect methods
for reducing emissions. Policy
specialists including climate scientists
and economists are calling for
significant and direct government
intervention at the national, regional
and international level to bring
about the changes needed to avoid
catastrophic climate change. It is
argued that this intervention should
focus on delivering the structural
transformation of national economies
and their global linkages in order to
reduce dependency on fossil fuels, ie
direct intervention to decarbonise the
economy.
This preference for direct
intervention over indirect policies
such as the use of carbon trading is
highlighted in the critical paper `How
to get climate policy back on course'
by Professor Gwyn Prins of the LSE
and 13 UK academics, published in
July 2009 under the auspices of the
Institute for Science, Innovation and
Society at the University of Oxford
and the MacKinder Programme for
the Study of Longwave Events at the
London School of Economics. The
paper recommends focusing on the
causes instead of the consequences
of excessive reliance on fossil fuels,
and asserts: "If countries really aspire
to cut emissions, we suggest that the
motor of an effective mechanism is a
direct approach to the decarbonization
of the global energy system, rather
than an indirect approach via
manipulation of the economy."136
The paper also asserts that, in
contrast to relying on new, elaborate
and untested approaches such as the
establishment of a carbon market,
we need to focus on tried and tested
policies that we know have worked
in the past: "We should switch
decisively to a radically different but
also very familiar approach to policy
which focuses upon actions that have
worked in the past and which we know
to be politically feasible."137
Historical evidence, past
experience
As highlighted by the influential US
think tank the Breakthrough Institute,
all of the big historic successes in
decarbonising economies have
focused on such tried and tested
direct mechanisms to deploy sources
of energy needed, as opposed to
indirect incentives to shift from one
energy source to another. They have
also all had a big focus on direct
public investment in those policies.138
The Breakthrough Institute's Michael
Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus
argue that that there is no precedent
for switching energy sources by
making incumbent sources more
expensive, ie through the use of
a price mechanism. Rather, all of
the historic examples of big energy
switches by national economies have
involved the combination of big public
investment with direct deployment of
new technologies as set out above.
Examples include France ­ the
economy which has decarbonised
the most rapidly over the last 30
years ­ where the government has
designed, built and operates nuclear
power stations; Sweden, where there
has been a big government-driven
expansion of publicly-funded nuclear
and hydro-electric power; and Japan,
Iceland and Denmark where there has
been significant government support
for nuclear and solar, geothermal
and hydro-electric, and offshore
wind power respectively.139
While a
life-cycle assessment raises major
questions as to whether nuclear
energy can be considered low
carbon, the main point is that direct
government intervention successfully
delivered big switches in national
energy sources.
The policies which could be
mobilised in a more direct approach
to decarbonisation are already in
use ­ taxation, regulation and direct
public investment are all tools that are
employed by governments in a wide
range of areas. There are hundreds of
historic examples of their successful
application to environmental
questions, and it is this set of tools,
not indirect mechanisms, which most
Western governments have employed
in response to the banking crisis,
directly intervening with public funds
to bail out banks in trouble combined
with proposals for new regulations
with the intention of warding of a
repeat of the crisis in future. The
United States alone has committed
US$700 billion in public funds to
stabilise its banking system since the
beginning of the banking crisis.140
This
and similar efforts by other developed
nations have demonstrated their ability
to mobilise significant funds when the
political will exists to do so.
44 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
A global Green New Deal
Many proposals for the specific
application of these tools to facilitate
climate mitigation and the switching of
industrialised economies onto more
low-carbon pathways have already
been developed, including in much
of the recent literature calling for a
climate-conscious response to the
global economic crisis. The proposal
for a Green New Deal, for example,
"entails reregulating finance and
taxation plus a huge transformational
programme aimed at substantially
reducing the use of fossil fuels and in
the process tackling unemployment and
decline in demand caused by the credit
crunch."141
Its key recommendations
include structural transformation of the
regulation of national and international
financial systems, major changes to
taxation systems, and a sustained
programme of investment and
deployment of energy conservation
and renewable energies.
Alternative tools
How each of these tools might now
be employed by governments with the
aim of reducing carbon emissions,
and some of the advantages and
disadvantages of each are explored
briefly below.
Taxation
Taxation is often cited as an
alternative to carbon trading. As an
indirect mechanism which relies on
changing behaviours by altering the
price of carbon, it can be argued that
some of the problems associated
with carbon trading also apply to a
carbon tax. Taking into account the
current stage of development of lowcarbon
alternative technologies and
the very high price of carbon needed
in order to make them competitive,
it is unlikely that taxation alone will
deliver the major structural changes
that are needed in industrialised
economies in the time available to us.
The introduction of a carbon tax high
enough to have major and immediate
impacts on carbon emissions without
additional public support for research,
development and deployment of
alternative low-carbon technologies
would be likely to provoke major
discontent as businesses pass price
rises onto consumers, leading to
major hikes in the cost of goods and
services.
However, while taxation alone
is unlikely to deliver emissions
reductions, there is growing support
for a role for it in climate mitigation.
Furthermore, experience from the
application of tax instruments to
deal with other environmental issues
such as landfill, as well as directly
to tackle climate emissions, shows
that if well targeted and with an
escalator, taxation can help to shift
behaviour. One such example of the
successful application of a carbon tax
to incentivise energy efficiency and
drive emissions reductions is the UK
Climate Change Levy (CCL), a tax
on energy delivered to non-domestic
users, including those in industry,
agriculture and public administration.
Introduced in 2001 through the
Finance Act 2000, despite significant
watering down through negotiated
agreements with businesses, the CCL
has generated emissions reductions
in the sectors covered. According to a
report by the UK National Audit Office
(NAO), the Levy has driven energy
efficiencies and emissions reductions
relative to business as usual in both
energy-intensive and less intensive
industries. Although, according to the
NAO, the cumulative carbon savings
achieved by the Levy across the
economy cannot be measured, only
estimated, "the balance of qualitative
evidence broadly supports the major
assumption which underlies the most
recent estimate of annual savings of
3.5 MtC [million tonnes of carbon] in
2010."142
Taxation has two main advantages
over trading as a means of delivering
reductions in carbon emissions.
First, it provides a more predictable
price impact than do carbon trading
systems. As explored above, the
latter tend to aggravate price volatility
because of the predominance of
speculative transactions in the carbon
market. The price stability offered
by carbon taxes is argued to offer
more encouragement to longer-term
investment decisions in low-carbon
infrastructure than does emissions
trading. According to the UN 2009
Social and Economic Survey: "By
increasing the cost of emissions to
private parties in a more predictable
manner than cap and trade, carbon
taxes provide the opportunity to both
raise public revenues and mitigate
climate damage by increasing the cost
of emissions to private parties."143
The second major advantage
of taxation over trading is that
taxation instruments are simpler
and therefore easier to design and
implement. This is a very significant
benefit given the extremely limited
timescales in which we must achieve
real reductions in carbon emissions
to avoid catastrophic climate
change. It is argued by some that
the relative simplicity of taxation
instruments compared to trading,
and the transparency and ease of
understanding that this facilitates,
means that taxation provides less
opportunity for manipulation and
watering down by special interests.
45A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
Any government intervention is subject
to lobbying and influence by powerful
interest groups, and the experience
of the UK Climate Change Levy
shows that taxation is no exception.144
However, there is no doubt that,
because of its relative simplicity and
therefore transparency, the CCL and
its strengths and weaknesses are far
more open to scrutiny by civil society
than the workings of the EU ETS.
Whilst many countries have fuel
taxes in place to provide revenue
for central government budgets, the
only countries which currently have a
carbon tax in place with the specific
objective of delivering reductions in
carbon emissions are in Scandinavia.
Sweden has had such a tax in place
since 1991 and the country's Ministry
of Finance predicts that emissions
in Sweden would be 20 per cent
higher without the tax.145
However, a
number of other countries in Europe
are considering the introduction of a
carbon tax. France is likely to be the
first big European country to introduce
such an instrument after proposals
were announced by President Sarkozy
in September 2009.146
The two main disadvantages of
carbon taxes are, first, their potential
to generate political resistance as
highlighted above, and second, their
potentially disproportionate impact
on poor households and therefore
the possibility of a regressive
impact on income levels across an
economy overall. The issue of political
resistance has been successfully
addressed through the use of an
escalator ­ which gradually increases
the tax over time. The significant
impacts of Sweden's carbon tax are
no doubt the result of the relatively
high level at which it is set ­ currently
128 per tonne of CO2
. When
introduced in 1991 the tax was at the
far lower rate of 28 per tonne of
CO2
.147
The issue of potentially regressive
impacts on incomes are set out by
the 2009 UN Social and Economic
Survey: "Carbon pricing will affect
the level and distribution of real
household income, both directly
through a household's use of fossil
fuels and directly through the prices
of other commodities. A carbon
tax has been found to place a
disproportionately heavy burden on
low-income groups in some contexts,
by raising not only the direct cost of
energy but all final prices for goods
in which energy has been used. In
such cases lower-income households
would pay disproportionately more in
environmental compliance costs."148
However, there are a number
of ways to mitigate these impacts,
including through differentiated
taxation, ie increasing prices
commensurate with levels of income
or the amount of energy used, or by
compensating low-income groups.
France's proposed carbon tax for
example, due to be introduced in
January 2010, will be levied at a rate
of 17 per tonne of CO2
. However, its
aim is not to generate revenue but to
incentivise reductions in emissions,
and as a result the tax is planned
to be fiscally neutral. The French
Government plans to compensate
households through an incometax
deduction worth 112 per year
for a family with two children living
in a town. There will be additional
compensation for farmers, fisherfolk
and people who live in the countryside
with less access to public transport.149
Overall therefore, it can be argued
that carbon taxes have limited but
significant potential as a tool for
national governments to bring down
emissions. Furthermore, carbon
taxes can provide an important
revenue stream for governments
to invest in the transformation of
public and energy infrastructure (see
part C below). Certain people and
institutions, including the International
Monetary Fund, have advocated in the
past the implementation of a global
carbon tax. However, the United
Nations warns that such proposals
should be treated with caution
because of, amongst other things,
the potentially regressive impacts on
developing countries. The possibility
of negotiating and implementing a
global tax regime and for that tax
regime to take effect within the times
we have to achieve a peak and
decline in emissions is highly unlikely.
Any such undertaking would therefore
likely be another highly dangerous
distraction from the real task of
reducing global emissions. Rather,
the effort to explore and deliver
taxation instruments should come
primarily from national governments
and regional institutions such as the
European Union.
CARBON TAXES HAVE LIMITED
BUT SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL
AS A TOOL FOR NATIONAL
GOVERNMENTS TO BRING DOWN
EMISSIONS. FURTHERMORE,
CARBON TAXES CAN PROVIDE AN
IMPORTANT REVENUE STREAM
FOR GOVERNMENTS TO INVEST
IN THE TRANSFORMATION
OF PUBLIC AND ENERGY
INFRASTRUCTURE.
46 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
Regulation
There is a major and as yet
significantly under-employed role
for the use of more traditional types
of regulation based on models
we know work, such as standard
setting for dirty industries, to drive
reductions in carbon emissions
in industrialised economies. The
crucial role for regulation in climate
mitigation is highlighted by Stern in
his critical review on the economics
of climate change, where he argues
that "carbon pricing alone will not
be sufficient to reduce emissions on
the scale and pace required"150
and
points to the critical role for regulation
such as "forward-looking standards
to stimulate innovation by reducing
uncertainty for innovators; encourage
investment by increasing the costs
and commercial risks of inaction for
firms; and reduce technology costs by
facilitating scale economies."151
The term `command and control'
is often used to describe direct
regulatory approaches such as
standard setting, generally by those
with a vested interested in a more
free-market approach in an attempt
to delegitimise direct government
intervention in the economy in the
public interest. However the term
command and control illustrates
the key attributes that traditional
regulatory approaches have in the
context of the urgent need to avoid
catastrophic climate change ­ they
involve the direct deployment of
government power to control harmful
activities and change behaviours.
There are many examples of the
successful use of standard setting
to drive behaviour change, including
the EU's Large Combustion Plant
Directive (LCPD). This involves a
non-tradable, plant-level approach to
phase out dirty industry, starting with
a non-tradable cap on emissions,
and an option for plants to opt-out if
they cannot achieve this which in turn
will lead to the closure of a number
of coal-fired power stations across
Europe.
Another EU law on industrial
emissions, the IPPC directive,
incorporates the principle of Best
Available Techniques (BAT). This
allows emissions limits set by
the directive to be determined
according to the best techniques and
technologies that are reasonably
achievable and available to the
polluting industries covered by the
regulation at a reasonable cost. The
BAT principle allows for standards
in the industry to be determined by
the most progressive firms from
an environmental perspective. It is
therefore highly progressive and
rewards best practice.
A similar principle underlies Japan's
Top Runner Programme, a regulatory
scheme designed to drive continuous
improvement in the energy efficiency
of products, including household
appliances and vehicles. The scheme
covers manufacturers and importers
of products, and it undergoes
continuous revisions, allowing for
the continuous introduction of new
product-specific energy performance
requirements dependent on the best
available technology at the time of the
revision.152
There are diverse options for
regulations to bring down emissions
and it is likely that a variety will need
to be developed and deployed. These
THNMLtd
THE TERM COMMAND AND
CONTROL ILLUSTRATES THE KEY
ATTRIBUTES THAT TRADITIONAL
REGULATORY APPROACHES
HAVE IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE URGENT NEED TO AVOID
CATASTROPHIC CLIMATE
CHANGE ­ THEY INVOLVE
THE DIRECT DEPLOYMENT
OF GOVERNMENT POWER TO
CONTROL HARMFUL ACTIVITIES
AND CHANGE BEHAVIOURS.
The Torrs hydro electric project in New Mills, Derbyshire
seen here during installation, uses an archimedian screw.
See www.torrs-hydro-new-mills.blogspot.com
47A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
should include higher standards for
heavily-polluting industries, setting
new fuel efficiency standards,
the introduction of feed-in tariffs
where they are not already used,
and restricting or banning the most
energy-inefficient products and
production processes.
Publicly-funded investment
The urgent need for dramatic
increases in public investment to
address the climate crisis is now
widely acknowledged, including by
Lord Nicholas Stern in his abovecited
review of climate change
economics, as well as the numerous
proponents of a green fiscal stimulus
package in response to the economic
crisis.153
Stern highlighted the major
difficulties in financing the structural
economic changes that need to
take place through the capital
markets and highlighted the role for
major increases in levels of public
spending on, for example, research,
development and deployment (RD&D)
incentives to overcome market failure.
The growing calls for a Green New
Deal are inspired by the wide-ranging
series of programmes launched by US
President Franklin D. Roosevelt during
the worldwide economic depression
triggered by the stock market crash
of October 1929 which lasted into the
Second World War. Roosevelt's New
Deal programme aimed to provide
employment and social security,
reform tax policies and business
practices and stimulate the American
economy out of the depression. It
involved a massive increase in public
investment in the construction of
homes, hospitals, schools and other
public buildings, as well as roads,
dams and electric grids. Proponents
of a Green New Deal argue that public
investment of a similar scale and
level of ambition is urgently needed
to address the climate crisis and
provide some of the heavy lifting in
industrial and public infrastructure that
is required.
In the UK, less that 0.2 per
cent of government spending is
directed to initiatives to support the
decarbonisation of the economy, less
than is spent annually on the running
of our National Lottery.154
The United
Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) has questioned whether what
emerges after the global recession will
be "a resurrected "brown economy"
with its traditional dependence on low
energy efficiency, non-sustainable
energy sources, high materials use,
unsustainable use of our ecological
commons and a high degree of
climate risk."155
According to UNEP
and others, avoiding this resurrection
of the brown economy will require
the deployment of a truly green
fiscal stimulus package involving
major public investment prioritised in
renewable energy; energy-efficient
buildings, public housing and truly
effective measures to tackle fuel
poverty; and public infrastructure,
including sustainable transportation.
While no one thinks that public finance
can deliver everything, campaigners
are increasingly in agreement that
public finance must be the lever that
delivers the shifts we need to see.
1. Technology
We cannot rely on technological fixes
to the climate crisis and unsustainable
consumption in the global North must
be addressed, for equity purposes
as much as tackling existing levels
of emissions. However, it is clear
that technology is still going to
have to do the heavy lifting in the
switch to low-carbon economies in
developed and developing countries
­ a second industrial revolution is
needed. As explored earlier in this
document, while significant numbers
of alternative low-carbon technologies
are available, few of these are
currently cost competitive with their
high-carbon equivalents or ready for
mass deployment. Experience shows
that carbon trading isn't delivering
adequate research, development
and deployment (RD&D). Rising to
the challenge of the climate crisis
therefore necessitates a step change
in levels of RD&D for low-carbon
technologies and public funding has a
crucial role to play in bringing forward
a portfolio of such technologies and
stimulating greater private sector
involvement. It is also critical that
patenting laws are reformed and
intellectual property rights reduced
so that when technological advances
are made these can be shared and
disseminated as rapidly as possible.
As highlighted by the Green New
Deal group, all big new technological
transitions have required significant
government support.156
The
development of nuclear power in
particular was financed through
significant public spending, and similarly
the internet was originally developed
and funded by the US military. However,
global spending on energy R&D has
fallen after the fuel price shocks of the
1970s, and the International Energy
Agency suggests that governments
IN THE UK, LESS THAT 0.2
PER CENT OF GOVERNMENT
SPENDING IS DIRECTED TO
INITIATIVES TO SUPPORT THE
DECARBONISATION OF THE
ECONOMY, LESS THAN IS SPENT
ANNUALLY ON THE RUNNING OF
OUR NATIONAL LOTTERY.
48 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
should double their spending. Lord
Stern calls this `an appropriate first step'
and advocates an increase in public
funding for low-carbon technology
RD&D of two to five times.157
A number of specialists advocate
focusing spending on the heaviest
energy-using sectors first,158
the
opposite approach to carbon trading.
This would mean a focus on electricity
generation, ie on the decarbonisation
of the energy supply and the expansion
of renewable energy, as well as other
heavy industrial-energy users such as
iron, steel and aluminium production,
focusing directly on improvements to
energy efficiency and carbon intensity.
Such direct government intervention
through generous subsidies for RD&D
is already yielding big benefits in a
number of developed countries, for
example a large increase in the use
of different renewable technologies
in Japan and California.159
China is
also investing heavily in low-carbon
RD&D and commentators predict that
it could soon be a world leader in the
manufacture of green technologies.
2. Domestic energy efficiency
Serious investment is also needed in
improving domestic energy efficiency
and helping to tackle fuel poverty. This
requires a mix of policies including
tough standards for the building trade,
combined with the injection of significant
finance to fund improvements to public
housing and other public buildings and
provide financial incentives for a similarly
wide take-up in private housing. In
the UK the domestic sector accounts
for 27 per cent of all emissions. Here,
Friends of the Earth has advocated
the creation of a one-off 5 billion fund
to kick-start a massive programme of
energy efficiency and to help tackle fuel
poverty, combined with further funding of
at least 1 billion a year subsequently.160
3. Transport
The transport sector is a third
priority for public investment in
decarbonisation, specifically in
advancing integrated land-use
planning to reduce the need to travel
and in improving alternatives to
motoring, including increasing the
quality, affordability and availability
of public transport and providing safe
walking and cycling conditions. All this
requires major capital investment, yet
transport spending in many countries
is still dominated by spending on
carbon-intensive road building.
4. Procurement policy
Finally, procurement policy is a
significant tool governments can use to
deploy public spending in the interests
of decarbonisation. Modernising
public procurement not only helps to
bring down emissions directly, it also
helps to further stimulate innovation
and bring down the prices of lowcarbon
technologies. Public sector
procurement can be re-orientated to
tackle climate change in numerous
ways, including improvements to
heating, electricity generation, building
construction and refurbishment,
transport vehicles and fuels.
Approaches to policy-making
New approaches to policy making are
also essential if the policies described
above are to be made effective in
delivering emissions reductions in
a just and equitable way. There is a
need for far greater openness and
transparency in decision making and
must greater involvement of a wider
range of interest groups in policy
formulation. Excessive access to and
influence over decision makers by
powerful economic interest groups
must be balanced by an increased
role for academics, policy specialists
and other interest groups, civil society
organisations, and the general public.
Increased openness and robust,
inclusive, public discussion is also
essential in the international arena,
where currently the negotiating space
is restricted to a few elite countries
and people. Policies to tackle climate
change must also look at small-scale
community-level initiatives which
are already taking place and seek to
support and scale these up.
Finally, efforts are also needed
to ensure a `just transition' to lowcarbon
economies. It is likely that
many of the policies examined
above, if implemented, would lead
to job creation. However, it is critical
that governments play a proactive
role in ensuring that job-creation
opportunities from these policies
are maximised, that any job losses
resulting from the transition are
minimised, and that change within
economic sectors does not occur
at the expense of decent work
and decent terms and conditions
for workers, as highlighted in the
UK Trade Union Congress (TUC)
paper on a Just Transition.161
It
is also essential that appropriate
measures are taken early to mitigate
or prevent any negative impacts on
low-income groups, and to ensure
that policies implemented to support
decarbonisation do not exacerbate
poverty or increase inequality.
49A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
Part B: Beyond direct
decarbonisation addressing
global inequity
and unsustainable
consumption
Although the tried and tested policies
explored above have a critical role to
play in delivering emissions reductions
and shifting economies in the global
North and the global South onto more
sustainable low-carbon pathways,
they fail to take into consideration
two other critical parts of the global
picture of climate change: questions
of global inequity and unsustainable
consumption.
Addressing global inequity
The first missing part of the picture
is the responsibility of developed
countries for the majority of global
emissions historically. This, combined
with the historic and ongoing net
transfer of resources from South to
North, locks developing countries
into underdevelopment and denies
developing-country governments
the means of adequately delivering
poverty reduction and real low-carbon
development.
Carbon trading would serve to
exacerbate this global inequity. Any
comprehensive and just approach to
bringing down emissions globally must
be grounded in the analysis above
and provide solutions that address
these structural injustices. The more
direct tools examined above provide a
preferred approach for governments
in delivering emissions cuts and
structural changes to their domestic
economies. Yet tackling climate
emissions globally also necessitates
policies that address the unequal
distribution of the means to tackle
climate change, ie efforts to stem the
flow of resources from South to North
and ensure developing countries have
adequate resources to pursue lowcarbon
development. As part of this,
developed countries must provide
reparations to developing countries
for their disproportionate historical
responsibility for creating climate
change ­ the `climate debt' owed by
the developed world to the developing
countries in the global South.162
Policies to address this unequal
distribution of resources and ensure
developing countries have the means
for low-carbon development which
also delivers on poverty reduction are
examined briefly below.
Direct financial transfers
The United Nations Development
Report 2007/2008 estimates that
US$86 billion a year by 2015 ­ 0.2
per cent of developed country GDP or
around a tenth of their current military
spending ­ is needed by developing
countries to adapt to climate
change.163
Additionally, hundreds
of billions of dollars in finance are
needed yearly to support developing
countries in reducing their emissions
and making a just transition towards
low-carbon economies.
Developed countries must
provide the bulk of the financing
needed because of their historical
responsibility for the majority of global
CO2
emissions. However, developed
countries are largely shirking their
responsibilities. They are offering
inadequate amounts of money; and
they are using illusory tactics ­ such
as double counting the use of Official
Development Assistance (ODA)
obligations and the use of offsetting
to meet their emissions reductions
obligations ­ as steps to meet their
commitments on providing finance to
developing countries.
Many developed countries are
pushing for funds to support mitigation
and adaptation by developing
countries to come from the global
carbon market and be managed by
the World Bank. This multilateral
lending institution has a terrible track
record in terms of the social and
environmental impacts of its lending
policies. It also has a major conflict
of interest as the largest multilateral
lender for fossil fuel projects in the
world (the World Bank Group's fossil
fuel financing totaled $2.275 billion
in 2008164
); and it is an inherently
undemocratic institutional structure
with a one dollar-one vote decisionmaking
process that marginalises
Southern countries. It is therefore
a wholly inappropriate institution
for administering the distribution
of climate funds. Critical issues
which are already apparent with its
proposals for Climate Investment
Funds (CIFs) include:
* They undermine the UNFCCC
process by setting up an unequal
aid framework of donor and recipient
rather than treating climate financing
as the binding obligation of Annex I
countries as it is regarded under the
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol
* They compete for funding with
already established UN adaptation
and technology funds
* They promote dirty industries like
coal as clean energy
* They force developing countries to
pay for the developed world's pollution
by providing loans for them to adapt
to the climate crisis, increasing their
overall debt burden ­ a process which
runs counter to efforts to reduce
poverty and vulnerability to climate
change.
50 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
It is critical that the international
community recognises the principle
responsibility of developed countries
of the global North to repay the climate
debt owed for their disproportionate
contribution to historic emissions
and the disproportionate suffering
faced by populations in developing
countries from the impacts of climate
change. Developed countries
must fulfill their commitment in the
UNFCCC to finance climate mitigation
and adaptation in the developing
world, and do this through funding
mechanisms that are designed and
implemented within a multilateral
framework that is genuinely
representative of both developed and
developing countries. As the UNFCCC
is the main international framework
and is guided by multilaterally
negotiated principles, financing for
meeting climate change commitments
must be located within this framework.
It is also essential that there is
strong and central involvement of
communities at all stages, particularly
in defining the activities for which
climate finance must be allocated.
Other key ethical and operational
criteria for international climate finance
include:
* Additionality: Climate finance
must be sufficient, new and additional
to existing Official Development
Assistance (ODA) obligations, without
generating a debt for Southern
countries.
* Respect for human rights:
The design and implementation of
mitigation, adaptation and resiliencebuilding
projects, programmes and
practices must ensure respect for
human rights and fundamental
freedoms. In particular the "free,
prior and informed consent" of
Indigenous Peoples and local
communities as enshrined by the
UNDRIP (UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous People) must be
implemented.
* Reliability: Finance sources
should be reliable and not subject to
volatility risks.
* Focus on social and
environmental outcomes: Economic
efficiency should be subordinated
to social and environmental
requirements, and only valid for
comparing different options that
have no relevant negative impacts.
Therefore it should only be applied as
a secondary criterion.
* Enforceability: Enforcement
mechanisms are needed both for
contributions from wealthy developed
countries and for the implementation
of funds by Southern countries to
ensure that obligations are honoured.
Technology transfer and
reducing intellectual property
rights
Historic uneven development combined
with the rigorous defending
by developed countries of intellectual
property rights in order to secure the
highest levels of return for companies
developing new technologies ­ has
meant that the vast majority of
new low-carbon technologies are
produced by firms located in the rich,
developed world and are unaffordable
for many developing countries.
Adequately addressing emissions
cuts globally necessitates large-scale
technology transfer in environmental
goods and services to developing
countries, including renewable energy
technologies; low-carbon vehicles;
public transport equipment; energyand
resource-efficient production
processes; construction materials and
designs; waste treatment facilities;
recycling technologies and `soft
technologies', for example knowledge,
systems and management processes.
This technology transfer in turn
requires a significant reduction in
the protection of intellectual property
rights through changes to global trade
rules and multilateral and bilateral
trade agreements. It is not enough to
let technology transfer depend upon
the will and generosity of corporations
which own patent rights to share
technology and know-how.
Stopping unfair trade and
investment policies
As highlighted in a recent report on
trade and climate change by the
global trade justice network Our
World Is Not For Sale (OWINFS), the
neoliberal economic development
model stands in the way of a swift and
effective response to climate change.
According to OWINFS: "International
trade and investment agreements
are a driving factor behind the
growth of energy-intensive industrial
sectors, the continued extraction and
processing of fossil fuels, and the
expansion of intensive agriculture.
These carbon-hungry activities also
contribute to the relentless destruction
of climate-regulating forests; and
international transport is responsible
for a significant chunk of annual
greenhouse gas emissions."165
A number of countries are pursuing
changes to trade rules in the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) which
would further liberalise energy
services and place constraints on the
ability of governments to use national
laws to shift to more sustainable
energy sources. A major refocusing
of trade and investment rules and
policies is needed globally to ensure
that climate mitigation and adaptation,
combined with poverty eradication
51A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
and sustainable development in
poor countries, is prioritised over
the simple expansion of global trade
and investment as an end in itself,
a process which has contributed
significantly to perpetuating levels
of underdevelopment in developing
countries as well as to climate change.
Unconditional cancellation of
unjust foreign debt
Although some limited progress has
been made on the cancellation of
unjust poor country debt, the world's
poorest countries still pay almost
US$100 million every day to the
rich world. The poorest 49 countries
have total debts of US$375 billion,
and for the poorest 144 countries,
it is over US$2.9 trillion.166
Much of
this debt is still left over from the
irresponsible lending by developed
countries to the developing world
in the 1970s. Repayment by
developing countries of these debts
to developed world governments and
international institutions soaks up
much-needed government revenue
which could otherwise be put towards
poverty reduction and sustainable
development goals. Developing
countries pay at least US$30billion
per year in debt interest repayments.167
There must be 100 per cent
cancellation of unpayable and unjust
debts ­ those that countries simply
cannot afford to pay whilst at the
same time meeting the most basic
needs of their populations, and those
that were given on unfair terms or
knowingly given to failed projects
or dictators. At least US$400 billion
in debt relief is needed immediately
to enable developing countries to
meet the United Nations Millennium
Development Goals.168
A new development paradigm
The current development paradigm
being promoted by international
institutions and developed country
governments continues to be one
of export-led growth, focusing on
the expansion of sectors producing
commodities for export like basic
raw materials, simple manufactured
goods and industrial agriculture.
This approach destroys sustainable
livelihoods, often contributes to
poverty rather than alleviating it, and
actively contributes to the problem of
climate change.
The expansion of industrial
agriculture is, for example, one of the
driving forces behind climate change.
High inputs of energy, fossils fuels and
fertilizer, industrial meat production
as well as large-scale deforestation
to grow agricultural commodities
mean industrial agriculture is now
responsible for at least 30 per cent of
global emissions. When taking into
account the global transportation and
processing of food, estimates suggest
that food could be responsible for
up to half of global greenhouse gas
emissions. At the same time, with
over a billion people ­ largely poor
farmers ­ hungry this year and half
a billion people globally facing an
obesity crisis while food corporations
report billions in profit, it's clear that
the current model is not providing
livelihoods or feeding those that need
it the most either. Climate change will
also have huge impacts on our ability
to grow food, most of which will be
felt in the developing world where
food production is set to drop by
more than a fifth. If we are to feed the
world and address climate change the
global food system needs to change
dramatically.
Yet many of the solutions being
proposed by developed country
governments and agribusiness
in the UN climate talks, such as
intensification of meat and dairy
production and genetic modification
mean more of the same. These false
solutions will entrench industrial
agriculture, as well as lock us into
ever-rising emissions and decreasing
control over food production systems.
Real solutions do exist. For
hundreds of years, small-scale
peasant agriculture has developed
incredibly sophisticated agroecological
methods of farming that
work along with nature rather than
against it. These methods have been
proven to increase yields by up to
90 per cent while raising incomes
with low-cost, locally available and
appropriate technologies. Small-scale
farming can also reduce emissions by
using practices that store CO2
, reduce
considerably the use of energy on
farms, prioritise local food production
and move to sustainable livestock
production and consumption. A four
year assessment of global agriculture
­ sponsored by the UN, World Bank,
World Health Organisation and
conducted in the name of 58 countries
­ recognised the damage caused by
industrial agriculture and last year
called for a move towards sustainable,
integrated production methods.
The scale of change needed
necessitates an alternative
development paradigm capable of
delivering real poverty reduction and
sustainable development in a carbonconstrained
world. It requires political
commitment from governments to
put power in the hands of small food
producers rather than corporations.
It also requires efforts to tackle
deforestation more widely, which
itself accounts for one quarter of
global carbon emissions according
to the UN's Food and Agriculture
52 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
Organisation. Tackling the drivers and
underlying causes of deforestation is
essential if we are to avoid dangerous
climate change whilst safeguarding
the rights of forest dwellers and
Indigenous Peoples. This necessitates
not only tackling the expansion
of unsustainable and destructive
plantation agriculture, including for
biofuels, soy and genetically-modified
trees, but also support for communitybased
forestry projects that protect
the customary land rights of forest
communities and Indigenous Peoples.
Addressing unsustainable
consumption
The people in the rich countries
of the world use far more of the
world's resources than those in
poorer countries, and this resource
use continues to increase, with
environmental, economic and social
impacts.169
This unsustainable and
inequitable resource use needs to be
addressed. As a first step countries
and regions (such as Europe) should
start to measure what resources they
use ­ in terms of materials, land,
water and carbon emissions, including
those generated in the production
of imported products. Developed
countries must then set targets to
reduce this resource use, and put in
place policies to achieve this.170
At the
moment even the most basic aspects
of resource wastage are not being
adequately addressed. For example,
Europe is landfilling and burning over
5 billions-worth of resources every
year,171
with only a few regions having
laws in place to prevent this.
Part C: How to pay for
it ­ funding sources for
decarbonisation in the
North and South
Taxation as a source of climate
finance
There is growing support for the use
of hypothecated carbon taxes, ie
the use of a carbon tax to generate
revenue specifically for public
investment in reducing carbon
emissions. The taxation revenue
is therefore ring-fenced for climate
mitigation purposes, for example
for RD&D of alternative low-carbon
technologies, or for direct investment
in energy efficiency measures and a
shift to low-carbon infrastructure and
services such as public transport. In
the UK a number of economists and
climate change specialists favour a
hypothecated carbon tax as a minimal
price to the EU ETS for investment
in primary research in low-carbon
technology and its development and
deployment.172
Internationally, the
United Nations asserts: "Carbon
taxes will not provide an unlimited
source of funding and will drop off
as greenhouse gas emissions are
effectively reduced to low levels, but
in the initial stages, they may play an
important role in sourcing a substantial
part of the investment costs of the big
push that needs to be accomplished in
coming decades."173
The United Nations Development
Programme estimates that a US$20
tax per tonne of CO2
in OECD
countries at current emissions levels
could generate US$265 billion
annually,174
whilst a US$7 levy per
passenger on international flights
alone could generate US$14 billion
per year. A more recent United
Nations report asserts that a tax of
US$50 per tonne would make many
renewables economically viable and
could mobilise US$500 billion in
resources annually.175
Proposals have been put forward
for other types of hypothecated
taxation to generate government
funding to support climate mitigation.
These include a windfall tax on
oil and gas companies,176
a Tobin
tax177
­ a tax on cross-border capital
transactions ­ and variants on these,
including controls on speculation
in energy markets.178
All of these
proposals would have the dual
benefits of discouraging harmful
behaviour while generating significant
revenues for climate mitigation.
Other sources of government
revenue
There is little doubt that the scale
of the threat of climate change
demands a major reprioritisation of
public-finance priorities in developedcountry
economies. The first and most
obvious step would be the reduction
of perverse subsidies ­ government
subsidies to fossil fuel-related
projects which actually contribute
to the damaging impacts of climate
change. According to the United
Nations Environment Programme,
the International Labour Organisation
and others, subsidies to fossil fuels
and nuclear power globally have been
estimated at US$300 billion per year.179
Removing these perverse
subsidies for environmentally
destructive activities is an obvious
first step. However, given the threat
posed by climate change to global
public health and security, there is a
very strong case for governments to
go much further than this initial step
53A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
and redirect not only subsidies away
from fossil fuel-intensive activities but
also government revenues currently
going to activities that are less of a
priority than tackling climate change.
The ability of governments to mobilise
large sums of money in response to
perceived threats to global stability
has been evidenced by the response
to the recent economic crisis and
the billions of dollars made available
to bail out the banks. Published in
February 2009, the United Nations
Environment Programme's Green
New Deal agenda estimated the total
planned global stimulus package
in response to the economic crisis
at around US$2.5 trillion. However,
very few of the stimulus packages
on the table will, according to UNEP,
deliver on the three Global Green
New Deal objectives of creating
employment opportunities and
protecting vulnerable groups, reducing
carbon dependency and furthering the
Millennium Development Goals.180
UNEP has called for around one
third of the planned global stimulus
package to be invested in greening
the world economy.181
However,
the scale of the climate threat and
its implications, including to public
health, security and the environment,
suggests that governments should go
further and redirect funding away from
less significant strategic threats. For
example, the UK Ministry of Defence
budget for research and development
of military equipment is 2.4 billion
for 2008-09.182
In light of the scale of
the climate threat there would appear
a very strong case for redirecting
a significant proportion of such
government budget lines to support
decarbonisation of the economy and
reducing emissions.
Finally, there are many innovative
proposals for additional methods of
raising government revenue to support
climate mitigation. These include
a new generation of climate bonds
raised by municipalities, national
governments and international
institutions, as proposed by the UK
Green New Deal Group.183
Whilst
such tools represent borrowing from
the future to pay for the present,
mitigating against climate change a
threat which if not addressed will
impact disproportionately on future
generations ­ is reason enough to
explore such mechanisms further.
Knock-on benefits: job creation
Furthermore, while governments
may be concerned about increasing
national debt levels in the current
economic climate, increased public
investment and other government
interventions to support transitions to
low-carbon economies are likely to
have significant knock-on economic
benefits, notably job creation. As
highlighted by Mathew Forstater,
there is now significant evidence
that environmental regulation very
often generates employment.184
This
is further supported by the United
Nations Environment Programme in
its work on a global Green New Deal
which points out that more than 3.8
million jobs could be created globally
through the increased production of
low-emission vehicles.185
According
to the UNEP research, similar job
creation opportunities are provided
by energy-efficiency measures
such as retro-fitting of houses, while
investment in urban public transport
systems contributes secondary
employment effects, with a multiplier
of 2.5-4.1 per job created.
THE ABILITY OF GOVERNMENTS
TO MOBILISE LARGE SUMS
OF MONEY IN RESPONSE TO
PERCEIVED THREATS TO GLOBAL
STABILITY HAS BEEN EVIDENCED
BY THE RESPONSE TO THE
RECENT ECONOMIC CRISIS AND
THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS MADE
AVAILABLE TO BAIL OUT THE
BANKS.
54 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
SECTION 6
THE WAY FORWARD ­ CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Carbon trading ­ fundamental
problems and fatal flaws
The experience of existing emissions
trading schemes, notably the EU
ETS, indicates that carbon trading is
failing according to the criteria set by
its proponents. But as a mechanism
for bringing down global greenhouse
gas emissions it also has a number of
other fundamental problems.
Against its own criteria, carbon
trading is not achieving the promised
emissions reductions, nor is it driving
the major technological innovations
that are needed to shift our economies
to low-carbon paths. The first phase
of the EU ETS failed and Phase II
looks on course for a similar outcome.
Furthermore, the perverse incentives
created by the trading mechanism
itself, ie the focus on low-cost
solutions, are further locking us in to
high-carbon pathways. In addition
to these failures, there are further
fundamental problems with relying on
carbon trading as a mechanism for
bringing down emissions globally.
Offsetting ­ a dangerous distraction
All existing and planned emissions
trading schemes allow for the
inclusion of offsetting, and to a great
extent rely on the ability of firms to
purchase offset credits to supplement
their emissions allowances.
Offsetting itself is profoundly unjust,
fundamentally flawed and cannot be
reformed. It will not deliver fair and
adequate global emissions cuts in the
time we have to make them because
it allows developed countries to count
cuts in developing countries towards
their own targets. We need reductions
in both developed and developing
countries in order to achieve the
necessary emissions reductions to
avoid catastrophic climate change.
Offsetting projects frequently do not
deliver emissions reductions at all, are
sometimes worse than doing nothing,
and lock developing countries into
high-carbon development pathways
with minimal social and environmental
benefits and, frequently, detrimental
local impacts.
Speculation ­ the risk of carbon
subprime
The complexity of the carbon markets
and the involvement of financial
speculators and complex financial
products brings with it a risk that
carbon trading will develop into a
speculative commodity bubble which
could provoke a global financial
failure similar in scale and nature
to that brought on by the recent
subprime mortgage crisis, with major
implications for the prospect of
avoiding dangerous climate change if
carbon trading is the primary means
of delivering emissions reductions.
Carbon market finance ­ a
smokescreen for inaction
Finally, carbon markets are failing
to generate much-needed funds
for mitigation and adaptation in
developing countries. The prospect
of increased carbon market finance
is being used by developed countries
to hide from their commitments
under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change to
provide new and additional sources
of finance to developing countries.
Carbon market finance is not new and
additional finance; counting it towards
the commitments of developed
countries is double counting.
SUMMARY OF KEY FLAWS
WITH CARBON TRADING
The report identifies six central
problems with carbon trading,
namely that it:
a. Is ineffective at driving
emissions reductions.
b. Fails to drive technological
innovation.
c. Leads to lock-in of high-carbon
infrastructure.
d. Allows for, and relies on,
offsetting.
e. Creates a risk of subprime
carbon.
f. Provides a smokescreen
for lack of action on climate
finance by the developed world.
55A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
Prospects for reform
It is possible to identify some changes
to emissions trading schemes which
would address some of the key flaws
and fundamental problems with
carbon trading and make it more
effective at reducing emissions.
However, in assessing the likelihood
of such reforms being achieved, it is
essential to consider the historical
impacts of lobbying by interest groups
on the establishment and development
of emissions trading schemes, and
the growing involvement of powerful
industrial and financial actors with a
strong interest in carbon markets.
Taking into account these historical
impacts and the power of vested
interests, it is clear that any attempts
to fundamentally reform emissions
trading schemes would probably
meet strong resistance. The chances
of achieving these reforms and
addressing the fundamental problems
with carbon trading look unrealistic.
Time and risk
The central role for carbon trading
put forward by the European Union
and the UK Government as a tool
for delivering emissions reductions
globally ­ already an impractical
proposition ­ is further undermined
once the time available to deliver
these reductions is taken into
consideration. Recent proposals from
the UK Government for the expansion
of global carbon trading envisage the
first major step in this process ­ the
linking of the EU and US emissions
trading schemes ­ commencing
in 2015, the year in which global
greenhouse gas emissions must peak
and start to decline if we are to avoid
catastrophic climate change. It is
therefore implausible that a global cap
and trade system could be established
within the time frames necessary,
even if it could be agreed and made
just, equitable and operationally
effective.
In whose interests?
At least some of this misplaced
enthusiasm for carbon trading can be
put down to costs already paid ­ the
UK and EU have invested significant
time and energy creating an emissions
trading system. They have a strong
incentive to make it work rather than
replace it, and to ensure that other
parts of the world adopt compatible
systems so that we don't have to start
again from scratch.
However, the constituency of
interest groups in industry and
finance which helped to drive the
establishment of the EU ETS and
influenced its development is a
significant driving force behind the
enthusiasm of the UK and Europe
for the expansion of carbon trading
globally. The benefits of getting a head
start were openly recognised by UK
business representatives themselves
in a recent evidence session for
an inquiry by the UK Parliament's
Environmental Audit Committee. Louis
Redshaw, Head of Environmental
Markets Trading at Barclays Capital,
the investment banking division of the
UK-based major financial services
provider Barclays, said:
"Like the UK led the way with the
UK Emissions Trading Scheme and
helped build capacity within the
systems ­ ...accountants, lawyers,
as well as trading companies and
financial intermediaries ­ the European
Emissions Trading Scheme has put
Europe, and London as a consequence,
at the centre of global emissions trading
as the trend picks up."186
There can be little doubt that
pressure from British and European
industry to perpetuate the EU ETS
and expand emissions trading
globally is also a key factor behind
the drive by the European Union and
the UK Government to promote the
establishment of a global emissions
trading system.
An objective evaluation of the
experience of emissions trading to
date indicates that carbon trading
as it currently exists is damaging,
ineffective and fundamentally flawed.
Seeking to reform and then extend
it as the primary means of delivering
emissions reductions globally is a
waste of precious time and energy
in the face of the urgent threat of
climate change. In summary, the focus
on carbon trading as the primary
mechanism for tackling emissions is a
highly dangerous obsession.
56 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
What now? Last throw of the dice
This report supports the central
conclusion of the recent landmark
policy paper `How to get climate policy
back on course' from the University
of Oxford and the London School
of Economics, that "one must not
let dogmatism and the argument
that there are sunk costs ­financial
and, even more importantly, political
and psychological ­ drive policy
to the exclusion of pragmatism...
We should switch decisively to a
radically different but also very familiar
approach to policy which focuses
upon actions that have worked in
the past and which we know to be
politically feasible."187
As highlighted by climate
economist Lord Stern, climate change
is the greatest market failure the world
has ever seen. Therefore relying
on indirect, untested and unproven
mechanisms such as carbon trading
to correct this major threat to human
health and security would appear
gravely mistaken.
The significant risks of this overreliance
on indirect approaches like
carbon trading are highlighted far
and wide. According to Timmons
Roberts and others at the Oxford
Institute for Energy Studies: "...such
market-based approaches remain
very uncertain tools to address a
problem of such magnitude as climate
change. It is unrealistic to expect
that a massive global `public good'
like avoiding climate change ­ where
everyone benefits from its being
addressed, but each have incentives
to shirk responsibility ­ could be
solved with market mechanisms
alone."188
Similarly, in a recent seminar
in London the US Breakthrough
Institute's Michael Shellenberger and
Ted Nordhaus likened this situation to
one where a government responds to
a war by proposing to put a market on
it.189
It is also critical to recognise
that there is no single solution to
reducing global greenhouse gas
emissions that should be adopted in
place of carbon trading as a priority
focus for government policy makers.
There are multiple tools available
and we need to employ a range of
them. The mix of direct and indirect,
market and non-market mechanisms
currently in use must be dramatically
altered. Whilst there may be a role
for market mechanisms at the right
levels and within the right regulatory
frameworks, the emphasis at this
stage in the climate crisis must be on
direct mechanisms, and ones which
are as simple as possible and proven
to work. Taxation, regulation and a
dramatic increase in publicly funded
investment must be deployed as a
matter of urgency in order to deliver
the emissions reductions needed.
Like all government interventions,
these policies will also be subject to
influence by actors with an interest in
perpetuating high-carbon economic
growth or false solutions such as
carbon trading. However, the relative
simplicity of these mechanisms
compared with carbon trading allows
for greater transparency and ease of
understanding and therefore better
scrutiny by the media and civil society.
This in turn is likely to balance at
least some of the excessive influence
of powerful private interest groups.
Carbon trading is inherently more
susceptible to manipulation and
watering down by vested interests
because of its complexity and
associated lack of transparency.
This need for more direct and
strategic government intervention to
tackle emissions has been identified
by the UK Climate Committee in
its recent report on how to meet
the UK's carbon budget. Focusing
on the decarbonisation of the
UK power sector, the Committee
has recommended increased
regulation and taxation to stimulate
transformation in the sector. Its
recommendations include measures
to strengthen the carbon price, for
example extending exemptions to
the UK's Climate Change Levy to all
low-carbon power generation or a
carbon tax to underpin the carbon
price; measures to provide certainty
over the price paid for low-carbon
generation, for example feed-in tariffs
for low-carbon power generation; and
finally measures to ensure investment
in low-carbon generation, for example
an emissions performance standard
and a low-carbon obligation.190
As regards existing carbon trading
schemes, while attempts at reform
are likely to be met with significant
resistance from those groups who
have an interest in perpetuating the
schemes, it is clear from this analysis
that existing schemes, notably the
EU ETS, are highly problematic and
cannot be left to continue as they are.
Fundamental reforms are needed,
at the very least to ensure that these
schemes do not constitute a barrier to
tackling climate change, for example
by driving the expansion of offsetting
and providing windfall profits which
give unfair competitive advantage to
highly polluting industries.
Finally, as well as implementing
far-reaching and proven policy tools
to ensure emissions cuts and to
shift economies in the developed
and developing world towards more
sustainable low-carbon pathways,
developed countries must fulfil their
obligations to provide adequate
finance to developing countries to
support low-carbon development.
57A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
Systemic problems of global
inequality, uneven development
and unsustainable consumption by
rich developed countries must be
addressed if developing countries are
themselves to tackle climate change
whilst also achieving sustainable,
low-carbon development and poverty
reduction.
The policy mix ­ key demands
1. Emissions trading
* Halt expansion of emissions trading
schemes globally.
* No linking of emissions trading
schemes.
* Fundamental reforms to existing
schemes such as the EU ETS to close
loopholes, including the removal of all
forms of offsets, and ensure they are
not subject to abuse and profiteering
by industry and finance.
* Focus government policy-making
and spending on the rapid deployment
of the proposals set out below.
2. Developed-country emissions
cuts ­ rapid deployment of
simple, direct and proven policy
tools
Developed-country governments must
agree to emissions cuts of at least
40 per cent on 1990 levels by 2020,
excluding offsetting, and adopt a huge
transformational agenda to ensure
that these cuts are delivered. This
programme should comprise taxation,
regulation and publicly-funded
investment as proposed by advocates
of a global Green New Deal191
in
order to deliver rapid structural
transformation of developed country
economies to lower carbon pathways.
A. Taxation: Increased use of
hypothecated and escalating carbon
taxes to drive behavioural change and
provide government revenue for lowcarbon
investment.
B. Standard setting and direct
regulation: A return to the use of
proven, direct regulatory approaches
to drive emissions reductions
by heavily polluting industry,
incorporating key lessons from the
successes of the EU's Integrated
Pollution Prevention and Control
directive.
C. Public finance: A major increase
in public investment to address
the climate crisis, prioritised in
the research, development and
deployment of renewable energy,
improvements to energy efficiency
in buildings, public housing and
effective measures to tackle fuel
poverty, and public infrastructure,
including sustainable transport. New
carbon taxes and other innovative
instruments such as a Tobin tax
could provide new sources of funding
for these investments, but it will
also necessitate a reprioritisation of
government spending and an end to
perverse subsidies such as those to
fossil fuels.
All policies should be underpinned
by greater transparency and scrutiny
in formulation and decision making.
All policies should also ensure a
just transition for workers in affected
industries and include actions to
mitigate against any regressive
impacts on low-income and other
vulnerable groups.
58 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
3. Addressing global inequality
and supporting low-carbon
development in developing
countries
Urgent action should be undertaken
by developed countries to support
climate mitigation and adaptation in
developing countries and to address
historic patterns of uneven and
inappropriate development which
prevent developing countries from
tackling climate change and making
progress on poverty reduction and
sustainable development.
A. New and additional climate
finance: Developed countries
must deliver on their commitment
through the UNFCCC to pay the full
incremental costs of climate mitigation
and adaptation in developing
countries. This requires the urgent
commitment and delivery of significant
public funds of at least 200 billion
per year192
by 2012 from developed
countries overall. This finance must
be delivered under the authority of
the UNFCCC and ensure respect for
human rights and a focus on social
and environmental outcomes.
B. Technology transfer and
intellectual property rights:
Supporting developing countries in
making emissions cuts necessitates
large-scale technology transfer of
environmental goods and services.
Current intellectual property rights stand
in the way of this and must be tackled.
C. Stopping unfair trade and
investment policies: International
trade and investment agreements
are a driving force behind the growth
of energy-intensive industries
and also undermine development
prospects in developing countries. A
major refocusing of global trade and
investment rules is needed.
D. Unconditional cancellation of
illegitimate foreign debt: Developing
countries cannot be expected to pay
for emissions reductions while paying
US$100 million per day in debt to the
developed world. There must be 100
per cent cancellation of all unpayable
and unjust debts, and US$400 billion
in immediate debt relief.
E. A new development paradigm:
Developed countries must stop
promoting export-led development
that contributes to climate change
and instead prioritise support for
sustainable livelihoods and poverty
reduction, including protecting
small-scale farmers and the rights
of Indigenous Peoples and forestdwelling
communities.
F. Addressing unsustainable
consumption: Rich countries use
far more than their fair share of the
world's resources. This excessive
consumption is unsustainable and
unjust and rich countries must set
targets to reduce their resource use
and put in place plans to achieve them.
59A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
RECOMMENDED READING /
LISTENING
A Dangerous Distraction ­ Why offsetting is failing the climate and people: the
evidence, Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland, 2009:
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/briefing_notes/dangerous_distraction.pdf.
Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatisation
and Power, Larry Lohmann (editor), 2006: http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/
summary.shtml?x=544225.
Prins et al., How to get climate policy back on course, 2009:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/ mackinderProgramme/pdf/
ClimatePolBackonCoursePRODUCTIONFINAL060709.pdf.
Subprime Carbon? Re-thinking the world's largest new derivatives market,
Friends of the Earth United States, February 2009: http://www.foe.org/pdf/
SubprimeCarbonReport.pdf.
Carbon Trading: How it works and why it fails, Tamra Gilbertson and Oscar
Reyes, (forthcoming 2009), Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala.
Shellenberger M & Nordhaus T, Beyond the pollution paradigm: the failure of
emissions trading and the need to make clean energy cheap, Breakthrough
Institute presentation, 29 July 2009, London, hosted by ippr / Policy Exchange:
http://www.ippr.org/events/?id=3651.
Ronnie Hall, REDD Myths, Friends of the Earth International, December 2008:
http://www.foei.org/en/publications/pdfs/forests-and-biodiversity/2008/redd-
myths/view.
A Beginners Guide to Carbon Trading, FERN (forthcoming 2009).
LIST OF
FIGURES
Figure 1: How an emissions trading
scheme works
Figure 2: Sectoral trading
Figure 3: Sectoral crediting
Figure 4: Historical responsibility for
global emissions and distribution of
future emissions (per capita)
Figure 5: Top 20 Kyoto market carbon
credit buyers (number of projects)
60 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
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3 Human Impact Report: Climate Change
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12 Anderson K & Bows A, Reframing
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14 Press TV, 22 Sep 2009, op. cit.
15 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/
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16 See A Beginners Guide to Carbon
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17 See a more extensive definition of
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18 Lohmann L, Memorandum submitted
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19 Mark Lazarowicz, Global Carbon
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20 Carbon emissions trading markets
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21 WRI Summary of H.R. 2454, the
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22 The United States is the only
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23 Questions & Answers on Emissions
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24 Lazarowicz, 2009, op. cit.
25 Hill et al., The emissions trading market:
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26 Lazarowicz, 2009, op. cit., Box 2.2, p17.
27 FSA Risks & Challenges, 2008, op. cit.,
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28 Ibid., p25.
29 4.9Gt CO2e traded in 2008 ­ up
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Point Carbon, 2009: http://www.
pointcarbon.com/aboutus/pressroom/
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30 Ibid.
31 Only 200 projects had been registered
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p15).
32 American Clean Energy and Security
Act of 2009 ­ Implications for an
International Climate Agreement, Friends
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33 Norris T, The Catch-22 of WaxmanMarkey:
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the-catch-22-of-waxman-markey-is-
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34 The State and Trends of the
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35 Lohmann L, 2009, op. cit.
36 Raphael Minder, Regulator forecasts
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Quoted in
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37 James Kanter, In London's Financial
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38 Carbon Market Transactions in 2020:
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39 Towards a comprehensive climate
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Communication from the Commission,
28 January 2009, p11: http://ec.europa.
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communication.pdf.
40 Ibid., p13.
41 A negotiation text for consideration at
AWG-LCA 6, European Community,
28 April 2009: http://unfccc.int/files/
kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/
czechonbehalfofec050509.pdf.
42 Climate change and the environment:
meeting the challenge, speech by
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Rt Hon
Gordon Brown MP to Green Alliance, 12
March 2007: http://www.green-alliance.
org.uk/grea1.aspx?id=1514.
43 Lazarowicz, 2009, op. cit.
44 Ibid., pix.
45 Ibid., p22.
46 Fairness in Global Climate Change
Finance, ippr, 2009, p4: http://www.
ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/
publication.asp?id=677.
47 Note of Council of European Union,
Brussels, (re:17215/08) clause 8, 12
December 2008: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st17215.
en08.pdf.
48 Annual European Community
greenhouse gas inventory 1990­2005
61A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
and inventory report, UNFCC, 2007,
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49 Both fell by around 3%. For EU, see:
EU emissions fell 3% in 2008,
EuropeanVoice.com, 18 May 2009: http://
www.europeanvoice.com/article/2009/05/
eu-emissions-fell-3-in-2008/64907.aspx.
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2.8% in 2008, mongabay.com, May 21,
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emissions.html.
50 Shellenberger M & Nordhaus T,
Beyond the pollution paradigm: the
failure of emissions trading and the
need to make clean energy cheap,
Breakthrough Institute presentation,
29 July 2009, London, hosted by ippr
/ Policy Exchange: http://www.ippr.org/
events/?id=3651.
51 Emissions trading: EU ETS emissions
fall 3 % in 2008, Europa press
release, 15 May 2009: http://europa.
eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=IP/09/794.
52 EU price collapse sparks calls for
intervention, Carbon Finance, 6 March,
2009: http://www.carbon-financeonline.
com/index.cfm?section=lead&action=vie
w&id=11903.
53 ETS SOS: Why the flagship `EU
Emissions Trading Policy' needs
rescuing, Sandbag, July 2009, p4: http://
sandbag.org.uk/files/sandbag.org.uk/
Sandbag_ETS_SOS_Report_0.pdf.
54 Ibid., p5.
55 Lazarowicz, 2009, op. cit., p15.
56 European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme: A Review by the National Audit
Office, March 2009, p8: http://www.nao.
org.uk/publications/0809/eu_emissions_
trading_scheme.aspx.
57 Ibid., p7.
58 Acid Rain Program 2004 Progress
Report, EPA, 2005: http://www.epa.gov/
airmarkt/progress/arp04.html.
59 Tamra Gilbertson and Oscar Reyes,
Carbon Trading: How it works and why
it fails, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation,
forthcoming 2009.
60 UN World Economic and Social Survey,
2009 , op. cit, Box VI.1, p162.
61 Prins et al., How to get climate policy
back on course, 2009, p3: http://www.lse.
ac.uk/collections/ mackinderProgramme/
pdf/ClimatePolBackonCourse
PRODUCTIONFINAL060709.pdf and
Helm, EU climate-change policy ­ a
critique, 2009: http://www.dieterhelm.
co.uk/publications/SS_EU_CC_Critique.
pdf.
62 European Climate Exchange: http://www.
ecx.eu/.
63 EU price collapse sparks calls for
intervention, 2009, op. cit.
64 Stern N, A Blueprint for a Safer Planet:
How to Manage Climate Change and
Create a New Era of Prosperity, The
Bodley Head Ltd, 2009.
65 Anderson K et al., Aviation in a lowcarbon
EU, a research report by the
Tyndall Centre, Friends of the Earth,
2007: http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/
reports/aviation_tyndall_07_main.pdf.
66 Driesen DM, Design, Trading &
Innovation, July 2003, p6: http://web.mit.
edu/ckolstad/www/Driesen.pdf.
67 Ibid., p6.
68 Lohmann L, 2009, op. cit.
69 Building a low-carbon economy The
UK's contribution to tackling
climate change, The First Report of
the Committee on Climate Change,
December 2008, p78: http://www.theccc.
org.uk/pdf/TSO-ClimateChange.pdf.
70 Meeting Carbon Budgets ­ the need for
a step change, Committee on Climate
Change, October 2009, p70: http://
hmccc.s3.amazonaws.com/21667%20
CCC%20Report%20AW%20WEB.pdf.
71 Ibid.
72 Dimas sends out positive signal before
Bonn talks, ENDS Europe, Friday 27
March 2009: http://www.endseurope.
com/21018.
73 EU ETS Phase II ­ The potential and
scale of windfall profits in the power
sector, a report for WWF by Point
Carbon Advisory Services, March 2008,
Table 2-5, p20: http://assets.panda.org/
downloads/point_carbon_wwf_windfall_
profits_mar08_final_report_1.pdf.
74 Oscar Reyes, Carbon Trading from
Kyoto to Copenhagen, 22 May 2009,
p48: http://www.carbontradewatch.
org/downloads/documents/BUKO_
KyotoToCopenhagen.pdf.
75 Lohmann L, 2009, op. cit.
76 Plan to prohibit CO2
limits under IPPC
`illegal', ENDS Europe, Wednesday 26
August 2009: http://www.endseurope.
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77 Reducing emissions or playing with
numbers? What the EU climate package
commits the EU-27 to in terms of
reduced emissions, FERN, March 2009:
http://www.fern.org/media/documents/
document_4362_4368.pdf.
78 Policies, instruments and co-operative
arrangements, IPCC 2007, Chapter 13,
p775. "...emissions from developing
countries need to deviate ­ as soon as
possible ­ from what we believe today
would be their baseline emissions, even
if developed countries make substantial
reductions": http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-
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79 Or 30% if other developed countries agree
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do?reference=MEMO/08/797.
80 Anderson, K & Bows, A, 2008, op. cit.
81 UN World Economic and Social Survey,
2009, Overview, op. cit., p3.
82 CO2
Emissions from Fuel Combustion Highlights,
International Energy Agency,
2009, pp89-91: http://www.iea.org/
co2highlights/CO2highlights.pdf.
83 A Dangerous Distraction ­ Why offsetting
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84 Ambassador Angelica Navarro, Bolivia,
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85 The Global Deal, Nicholas Stern, 2009,
p154
86 For example see: Final report, Joint
committee of parliament on the draft
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I, p32: http://www.parliament.thestationery-
office.com/pa/jt200607/
jtselect/.
87 Haya B & Stehr HJ, Letter to CDM
Executive Board On Non-Additional
Chinese Hydros, International
Rivers, October 12 2007: http://
internationalrivers.org/node/1892 .
88 A Dangerous Distraction, 2009, op. cit.
89 Lohmann L, 2009, op. cit.
90 Welch, D, 2007. A Buyer's Guide to
Offsets. Ethical Consumer 106, May/
June 2007.
91 A Dangerous Distraction, 2009, op. cit.,
p20 & Lohmann L, 2009, op. cit.
92 Wara and Victor, A realistic policy on
international carbon offsets, 2008,
Stanford University, p12: http://pesd.
stanford.edu/publications/a_realistic_
policy_on_international_carbon_offsets/.
93 A Dangerous Distraction, 2009, op. cit.,
p16.
94 Towards a Comprehensive Climate
Change Agreement in Copenhagen,
European Commission, January 2009,
p11: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
climat/pdf/future_action/communication.
pdf.
62 A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
95 Food and Agriculture Organization, 2007:
http://www.fao.org/forestry/28811/en/.
96 Ronnie Hall, REDD Myths, Friends of
the Earth International, December 2008:
http://www.foei.org/en/publications/pdfs/
forests-and-biodiversity/2008/redd-myths/
view.
97 Lazarowicz, 2009, op. cit., pxiii.
98 Lohmann L, 2009, op. cit.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Subprime Carbon?, 2009, op. cit., p4.
102 Ibid., p4.
103 Ibid., p6.
104 Annual Report, Berkshire Hathaway,
2002, p15: http://www.berkshirehathaway.
com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf, quoted in
Subprime Carbon?, 2009, op. cit., p9.
105 Lohmann L, 2009, op. cit.
106 FSA Risks & Challenges, 2008, op. cit.,
p17.
107 Subprime Carbon?, 2009, op. cit.
108 FSA Risks & Challenges, 2008, op. cit.,
p11.
109 Macalister, T, Carbon trading may be the
new sub-prime, says energy boss, The
Guardian, 30 January 2009: http://www.
guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jan/30/
eu-carbon-trading-scheme.
110 Ibid.
111 Jeffrey Ball, Up In Smoke: Two CarbonMarket
Millionaires Take a Hit as UN
Clamps Down ­ EcoSecurities Sees
Shares Slide 70 Per Cent, Wall Street
Journal, 14 April 2008, quoted in
Lohmann L, 2009, op. cit.
112 Africa says poor need $267 bln/yr in
climate fight, Reuters, 20 April 2009:
http://www.reuters.com/article/
latestCrisis/idUSLK631928.
113 Fighting climate change: human
solidarity in a divided world, Human
Development Report 2007/2008,
Executive summary, p26: http://hdr.undp.
org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/.
114 The Energy Challenge for Achieving
the Millennium Development Goals, UN
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energy/pdf/UN-ENRG%20paper.pdf.
115 UNDP Millennium Development Goals,
donor countries: http://www.undp.org/mdg/
tracking_donorcountryreports2.shtml.
116 Lazarowicz, 2009, op. cit., p92.
117 UNEP Risoe CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis
and Database, April 2009: http://
cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-region.
htm#1.
118 UN World Economic and Social Survey,
2009, op. cit., p161.
119 Climate change: Commission sets out
global finance blueprint for ambitious
action by developing nations, Europa
press release, 10 September 2009: http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=IP/09/1297.
120 FSA Risks & Challenges, 2008, op. cit.,
p15.
121 Sophia Grene, Carbon trading gets
rooted into the system, Financial Times,
9 November 2008: http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/b752341c-ad14-11dd-971e-
000077b07658.html.
122 Helm, 2009, op. cit.
123 Ibid., p11.
124 Ibid., p11.
125 Prins et al., 2009, op. cit., p8.
126 Emissions trading: member states
approve list of sectors deemed to be
exposed to carbon leakage, Europa
press release, 18 September 2009: http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=IP/09/1338.
127 Subprime Carbon?, 2009, op. cit., p9.
128 Helm, 2009, op. cit., p9.
129 James Hansen, quoted in The fool's gold
of carbon trading, Sunday Times, 30 Nov
2008: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
news/environment/article5257602.ece.
130 Helm, 2009, op. cit., p24.
131 FSA Risks & Challenges, 2008, op. cit.,
p33.
132 Registered projects by AI and NAI
investor parties, UNFCCC: http://
cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/
RegisteredProjAnnex1PartiesPieChart.
html.
133 FSA Risks & Challenges, 2008, op. cit.,
p14.
134 Lazarowicz, 2009, op. cit.
135 Helm, 2009, op. cit., Prins et al., 2009, op.
cit., Shellenberger & Nordhaus, Beyond
the pollution paradigm, 2009, op. cit.
136 Prins et al., 2009, op. cit., p3.
137 Ibid., p15.
138 Shellenberger & Nordhaus, Beyond the
pollution paradigm, 2009, op. cit.
139 Ibid.
140 Tracking the $700 Billion Bailout, New
York Times, accessed Oct 2009: http://
projects.nytimes.com/creditcrisis/
recipients/table.
141 A Green New Deal, Green New Deal
Group, new economics foundation, July
2008, p2: http://www.neweconomics.
org/gen/z_sys_publicationdetail.
aspx?pid=258.
142 National Audit Office: The Climate
Change Levy and Climate Change
Agreements, August 2007, p4: http://
www.nao.org.uk/publications/0607/
the_climate_change_levy.aspx.
143 UN World Economic and Social Survey,
2009, op. cit., p163.
144 McRae S, Hidden Voices ­ The CBI,
corporate lobbying and sustainability,
Friends of the Earth, 2005: http://www.
foe.co.uk/resource/reports/hidden_
voices.pdf.
145 More in Europe look to carbon tax to
curb emissions, New York Times, 9
September 2009: http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/09/10/business/energy-
environment/10carbon.html.
146 France's carbon tax: taming the
carbonivores, The Economist, 17
September 2009: http://www.economist.
com/world/europe/displaystory.
cfm?story_id=14460346.
147 See NYT article above (9 September
2009).
148 UN World Economic and Social Survey,
2009, op. cit., p165.
149 See Economist article above (17
September 2009).
150 Stern N, Stern Review: Report on the
Economics of Climate Change, HM
Treasury, 2006, p347: http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm.
151 Ibid., p378.
152 Nordqvist J, Evaluation of Japan's
Top Runner Programme, AID-EE,
July 2006: http://www.aid-ee.org/
documents/018TopRunner-Japan.PDF.
153 A Green New Deal, 2008, op. cit., A
Global Green New Deal Policy Brief,
2009, op. cit., A Budget for jobs and
green growth, TUC Budget Submission,
Executive summary, 2009: http://www.
tuc.org.uk/extras/2009budgetsubmission.
pdf.
154 Public Expenditure, Statistical Analyses
2007, HM Treasury doc, Tables 1.1
& 5.2: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
media/E/B/pesa07_complete.pdf, quoted
in Delivering the Climate Change Act,
Friends of the Earth, 2008: http://www.
foe.co.uk/resource/reports/climate_
change_manifesto.pdf.
155 A Global Green New Deal Policy Brief,
United Nations Environment Programme,
March 2009, p3: http://www.unep.org/
pdf/A_Global_Green_New_Deal_Policy_
Brief.pdf.
156 A Green New Deal, 2008, op. cit.
157 Stern Review, op. cit., p347.
158 Prins et al., 2009, op. cit., p11.
159 A Green New Deal, 2008, op. cit., p37.
160 Delivering the Climate Change Act: A
manifesto for a low-carbon economy,
Friends of the Earth, 2008, p19: http://
www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/climate_
change_manifesto.pdf.
161 For further information on key critiera
for a Just Transition see: A Green and
Fair Future, Trades Union Congress,
2008: http://www.tuc.org.uk/touchstone/
Justtransition/greenfuture.pdf.
162 Climate Debt: A Primer, Third World
Network, UN Climate Change Talks,
June 2009: http://www.twnside.org.sg/
title2/climate/briefings/Bonn03/TWN.
BPjune2009.bonn.02.doc.
63A dangerous obsession Friends of the Earth
163 Human Development Report 2007/2008,
op. cit., pp15, 18, 53, 79.
164 IFI Extractive and Energy Project
Spreadsheets, Bank Information Center,
updated July 2008: http://www.bicusa.
org/en/Article.3395.aspx.
165 OWINFS, Change Trade, Not our
Climate!, Executive Summary: http://
www.ourworldisnotforsale.org/en/report/
change-trade-not-our-climate.
166 Jubilee Debt Campaign: http://www.
jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/?lid=98 .
167 World Bank figures for 2008, cited in A
new debt crisis?, Jubilee Debt Campaign,
2009: http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.
org.uk/download.php?id=803.
168 Debt relief as if people mattered, new
economics foundation, 2008. p4: http://
www.neweconomics.org/gen/z_sys_
PublicationDetail.aspx?PID=223.
169 Overconsumption? Our use of the
world's natural resources, Friends
of the Earth Europe, September
2009, p3: http://www.foeeurope.org/
publications/2009/Overconsumption_
Sep09.pdf.
170 Giljum et al., How to measure Europe's
resource use, Sustainable Europe
Research Institute, 2009: http://www.
foeeurope.org/publications/2009/seri_
foee_measuring_eu_resource_use_final.
pdf.
171 Gone to waste, Friends of the Earth
Europe, October 2009, p2: http://www.
foeeurope.org/publications/2009/FoEE_
gone_to_waste_Oct09.pdf.
172 Helm, 2009, op. cit., Prins et al., 2009,
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173 UN World Economic and Social Survey,
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174 Human Development Report 2007/2008,
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175 UN World Economic and Social Survey,
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176 See, for example, the proposals from
the new economics foundation for an Oil
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org/gen/hookedonoil_231006.aspx.
177 Socialists, Greens renew calls for `Tobin
Tax', Euractiv.com, 2 September 2009:
http://www.euractiv.com/en/taxation/
socialists-greens-renew-calls-tobin-tax/
article-185026.
178 US Sen. Wyden Seeks To Curb
Excessive Speculation Via Taxes,
Nasdaq, 4 August 2009: http://www.
nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-news-
story.aspx?storyid=200908041604dowjo
nesdjonline000649.
179 Worldwatch Institute, Green Jobs:
Towards Decent Work in a Sustainable,
Low-Carbon World, United Nations
Environment Programme, International
Labour Organization, and others,
2008, p57: http://www.unep.org/labour_
environment/features/greenjobs-report.
asp.
180 A Global Green New Deal Policy Brief,
2009, op. cit., p5.
181 Realizing a "Green New Deal", United
Nations Environment Programme News
Centre, 2009: http://www.unep.org/
Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?Doc
umentID=562&ArticleID=6079.
182 UK Defence Statistics Factsheet
2009, Defence Analytical Services
and Advice: http://www.dasa.mod.
uk/applications/newWeb/www/
apps/publications/pubViewFile.
php?content=1600&date=2009-09-30&ty
pe=pdf&PublishTime=09:30:00.
183 A Green New Deal, 2008, op. cit., p38.
184 Mathew Forstater, New Roles for
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mesharpe.metapress.com/link.
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185 A Global Green New Deal Policy Brief,
2009, op. cit., p7.
186 The role of carbon markets in preventing
dangerous climate change, transcript
of oral evidence to Environmental Audit
Committee, 12 May 2009: http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/
cmselect/cmenvaud/uc393-iv/uc39302.
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187 Prins et al., 2009, op. cit., p15.
188 Timmons Roberts et al., The Reality
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for Energy Studies, November 2008,
p2: http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/
comment_1108-1.pdf.
189 Shellenberger & Nordhaus, Beyond the
pollution paradigm, 2009, op. cit.
190 Meeting Carbon Budgets, 2009, op. cit.,
p12.
191 A Global Green New Deal Policy Brief,
2009, op. cit., A Green New Deal, 2008,
op. cit.
192 Africa says poor need $267 bln/yr in
climate fight, 2009, op. cit., and Human
Development Report 2007/2008, op. cit.
This report evaluates whether carbon trading can deliver the necessary
emissions reductions to avoid dangerous climate change quickly,
strategically, and in a just and equitable way. It also looks at what
alternative tools are available to governments.
Friends of the Earth is calling on people to demand a strong and fair global
agreement to tackle climate change. Governments should:
1. Agree that developed countries must reduce their own emissions by at least
40 per cent by 2020, and reject all forms of offsetting, including proposals for
new and expanded offsetting schemes.
2. Negotiate a new financial mechanism under the authority of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to ensure adequate financial
flows of at least 200 billion by 2012 to developing countries to support their
transition to low carbon development and fulfil their adaptation needs.
3. Reject plans to introduce Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation (REDD) offsets, and instead negotiate effective and fair
mechanisms to protect the Earth's forests that do not involve offsetting.
This report is available online at:
www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/dangerous_obsession.pdf
A DANGEROUS OBSESSION
FriendsoftheEarthisthecollectivenameforFriendsoftheEarthTrust,registeredcharity281681,companynumber1533942,andFriendsoftheEarthLimited,companynumber1012357.Coverphoto:AmeliaCollins
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Friends of the Earth is:
* theUK'smostinfluentialnationalenvironmentalcampaigningorganisation
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* dependentonindividualsforover90percentofitsincome.
November 2009