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EJIL 2003
* George P. Shultz Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Professor of Law (by
Courtesy), Stanford Law School. All rights reserved.
1
See, e.g., Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (20 Sept. 2001) and Presidential
Address (7 Oct. 2001), available at www.whitehouse.gov.
..............................................................................................................................................................
EJIL (2003), Vol. 14 No. 2, 209­226
.............................................................................................
On the Necessity of Pre-emption
Abraham D. Sofaer*
Abstract
The attacks of September 11, 2001 led President Bush to declare a `war' on terrorism.
Terrorists are capable of inflicting grave damage, and are not susceptible to the deterrent
pressures felt by states. Pre-emption and prevention of attacks have become part of the US
national security strategy to deal with this danger. International lawyers claim that
pre-emption must be limited to actions in response to an attack that is imminent and
unavoidable by any other means. This paper examines the background of the requirement
that pre-emption is restricted to imminent attacks, and argues that the narrow standard
properly applies only when a potential victim state can rely on the police powers of the state
from which a prospective attack is anticipated. A more flexible standard for determining
necessity is appropriate for situations in which the state from which attacks are anticipated is
either unwilling or unable to prevent the attacks, or may even be responsible for them. The
situation posed by Al Qaeda, operating from Afghanistan, was one in which the Taliban
explicitly refused to prevent attacks on the US by that terrorist organization. The question of
the applicability of the rule regarding necessity to Saddam Hussein's Iraq is more
complicated, but a strong case can be made for the necessity of pre-emptive action.
President George W. Bush responded to the attacks of September 11, 2001 with
dramatic actions and even more dramatic rhetoric. He promised to stop known
terrorists from harming Americans. To this end, he declared `war' on terrorism,1
thereby refocusing the nation's strategic posture from one that targeted terrorists as
criminals to one that treats terrorists and supporting states capable of threatening the
US and its allies, as threats to national security.
This shift in perspective stems from important strategic realities. The civilized world
faces a grave threat from terrorism, especially from groups supported by states. The
current threat goes beyond conventional threats from terrorist groups. Globalization
has facilitated the capacities of terrorists to travel, move money, and communicate.
Technology has enhanced their ability to inflict damage with powerful explosives,
modern weapons, and potentially through the use of weapons of mass destruction.
210 EJIL 14 (2003), 209­226
2
The need to act pre-emptively was clearly set out by former Secretary of State George P. Shultz in several
speeches during the early 1980s. His advocacy of an `active defense' was strongly opposed at that time,
but it is now, once again, national policy. See generally the discussion in his Turmoil and Triumph (1993),
at 645­653. He specifically states: `We cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of Nations,
worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond. A great nation with global responsibilities cannot
afford to be hamstrung by confusion and indecisiveness. Fighting terrorism will not be a clean or pleasant
contest, but we have no choice . . . We must reach a consensus in this country that our responses should
go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation. Our goal
must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts . . . The public must understand before the fact that
occasions will come when their government must act before each and every fact is known -- and the
decisions cannot be tied to polls.' 648­649.
3
Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, West
Point, New York. This explanation echoed statements of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who said
on 31 January 2002 that when terrorists have weapons capable of inflicting grave damage, `we have no
choice':
[D]efending the U.S. requires prevention, self-defense and sometimes preemption. It is not possible to
defend against every conceivable kind of attack in every conceivable location at every minute of the
day or night. Defending against terrorism and other emerging 21st century threats may well require
that we take the war to the enemy. The best, and in some cases, the only defense is a good offense.
See `Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on "21st Century Transformation" of U.S. Armed Forces' (remarks
delivered at the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington D.C. on 31 Jan. 2002), available
at www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html.
Typical criminal law enforcement is insufficient to reach and stop terrorists located in
states that allow them to operate; prosecutions of low-level operatives, willing to die,
cannot be expected to deter attacks. Indeed, deterrence is far less effective in dealing
with modern terror (individuals or groups) than it has been with regard to
conventional threats from state conduct.
States can attempt to avoid responsibility for attacks by using terrorists to carry
them out. States can also enable terrorists to attack other states by refusing to prevent
such attacks, as the Taliban did. In either situation, establishing responsibility for
attacks is a formidable problem, greatly complicating national defence. Terrorist
groups avoid detection by dispersing their members in highly decentralized cells;
many are prepared to face death in pursuing their objectives. Success or victory for
such people has a meaning alien to rational thought. Finally, no amount of
preparation and technological sophistication will enable the US and other target
states to prevent all serious terrorist attacks, or even to limit such attacks to a tolerable
level. Technology should increasingly enhance security at key locations and for
critical infrastructures. But the US remains target rich, and extremely vulnerable,
because it is a large, thriving, open society unwilling to compromise its fundamental
freedoms for security.
For these reasons, the US has advanced, more forcefully than ever, the need for
pre-emptive actions.2
In a speech on 1 June 2002, at West Point, President Bush
explained that the `gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and
technology'.3
He promised to oppose `with all our power' efforts by terrorists and states
to use modern weapons to advance radical aims by attacking the US or its allies.
Where necessary, he would resort to pre-emptive actions, rather than permit the
On the Necessity of Pre-emption 211
4
National Security Strategy (USG 2002), Part I [hereinafter `Strategy'], available at
www.usinfo.state.gov.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid., at Part V.
devastating consequences that can flow from attacks such as occurred on September
11, 2001.
On 17 September 2002, this approach became part of the National Security
Strategy for the nation's defence. The Strategy states the general goal of preventing
`our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass
destruction . . . .'4
In Part V of the Strategy, this objective is explained as `proactive
counterproliferation' of weapons of mass destruction: `We must be prepared to stop
rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons
of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends.' The Strategy
states that the US `will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor
should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression'. But it asserts that the US
has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our
national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction -- and the more
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty
exists as to the time and place of the enemy's attack.5
US policy therefore appears at this point to reserve the option of pre-emption where
a grave threat is posed to it or its allies, especially by the threat or use of weapons of
mass destruction in the hands of states or terrorists, that cannot be stopped or deterred
through means short of the use of force.
The Strategy explicitly addresses the legality of pre-empting attacks. It notes that
international law has long recognized the right to defend against `imminent danger',
and it argues that the concept of what constitutes an imminent threat must be
adapted to reflect the capabilities and aims of terrorist groups and rogue states:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they
can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger
of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of
preemption on the existence of an imminent threat -- most often a visible mobilization of
armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's
adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means.
They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use
of weapons of mass destruction -- weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly,
and used without warning.6
Can the Administration's policy of pre-emption be justified under international law?
May the US properly cite current, unprecedented strategic necessities as a basis for
satisfying international legal requirements? If not, can and should the doctrine of
pre-emption be expanded to reflect new technological and strategic realities? Can the
concept of self-defence accommodate a role for pre-emption that satisfies the need of
leaders to protect their people, without providing a ready basis for states to use
pre-emption as an excuse for aggression?
212 EJIL 14 (2003), 209­226
7
`Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force,' 14 EJIL (2003) 227.
8
See, e.g., 2 TRANSLEX (Transnational Law Exchange) 5 (Special Supp. May 1999) (report of law
professors' opinions).
9
This appears to be the official view of the European Union, and of many scholars. E.g., Simma, `NATO, the
UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects: Kosovo: A Thin Red Line'
www.ejil.org/journal/Vol10/No1/ab1­2.html.
10
See, e.g., Bettina Clark, NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force -- Policy Roundtables
http://www.unausa.org/issues/sc/nyrapporteur.html
11
See Glennon, `The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law', Foreign Affairs
(May­June 1999) 2, at 4.
Answering these questions requires examination of the legal and political
precedents relevant to the use of pre-emptive force. These precedents establish that the
rigid and limited view of the propriety of pre-emptive action has no valid historical
basis, and is unsound, artificial and futile in attempting to restrict resort to the use of
force. The current and proper standard remains necessity, but what is necessary must
be determined on the basis of all the relevant circumstances, in light of the purposes of
the UN Charter.
1 The Use of Force in International Law and Practice
The United Nations Charter governs the legality of the use of force under international
law. Most international lawyers construe the Charter to limit the situations in which
force is permissible. Professor Michael Bothe's contribution to this Symposium is
representative of this approach.7
They read the Charter, Article 2(4), as prohibiting all
uses of force, regardless of purpose, except for two narrow categories: (1) specific
authorization by the Security Council under Chapter VII, Article 42, or (2) actions of
self defence under Article 51 in response to attacks on the territory of a member state.
They then apply each of these grounds independently, requiring -- with limited
exceptions for minor uses of force -- that at least one ground is satisfied. If not, the use
of force is considered illegal, however strong the moral and practical case for using
force might be under the circumstances.
This reasoning led most international lawyers to consider illegal NATO's action to
stop the mass deportations and murders of ethnic Kosovars by the Serbs, even though
virtually all conceded the action was both morally justified and politically necessary.8
Many international lawyers who considered the action illegal nonetheless supported
the use of force against the Serbs, declaring that it was a `special case' that should not
be regarded as a precedent.9
Some proposed that such uses of force could be justified as humanitarian
intervention, and called for a Charter amendment to make this clear.10
Some,
recognizing that the conventional categories for justifying the use of force are far too
limited, dramatically announced the proposition that international law is no longer
capable of governing use-of-force decisions in a world of terrorism and rogue leaders.11
These issues are hardly new. Myres McDougal and Florentino Feliciano addressed
them in 1961. They rejected as unwarranted and artificially narrow the mechanical
On the Necessity of Pre-emption 213
12
M. S. McDougal and F. P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International
Coercion (1961), at 238 note 263, criticizing the view that policy-makers must choose between the
standards of the UN Charter and protecting American security and preserving Western interests.
13
Article 2(4) provides that Members shall refrain `from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations'.
14
The Charter was adopted by states that had used force to defeat the Axis powers, which were able to gain
power in part because the League of Nations had failed to use force to stop their aggressions. President
Truman, who presided over the Charter's birth, was prepared to use force if necessary without Security
Council approval in assisting South Korea against the North's aggression.
15
The best treatment is McDougal, `The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense', 57 ASILJ (1963) 597.
It is clear that Art. 51 was intended to safeguard the right to collective self-defence, but the drive to limit
all uses of force led scholars, astonishingly, to claim that the language of Art. 51 so clearly limited the use
of force in self-defence to armed attacks against a member state that the purposes of its language and
legislative history should be disregarded. E.g. Kunz, `Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations', 41 ASILJ (1947) 872, at 873.
16
McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 12, at 217. In their book, McDougal and Feliciano develop a set of
criteria by which to evaluate the legitimacy of self-defence.
17
`A Common Lawyer Looks at International Law,' 78 Harvard Law Review (1965) 1396. Chayes later
changed his position on this and on other issues.
18
See generally Sofaer, `International Law and the Use of Force,' The National Interest (1988).
reading of the Charter's use-of-force provisions; and they condemned as dangerous
the notion -- already by then advanced by scholars and statesmen -- that
international law has no proper role in governing the use of force by states.12
They
rejected the proposition that the Charter is a value-free document that prohibits all
uses of force, regardless of purpose. The very language of Article 2(4) makes this
obvious,13
as do the history and purposes of the United Nations.14
They considered as
historically baseless, and logically unwarranted, the construction of Article 51
limiting the `inherent' right of self-defence.15
Most significantly, they rejected an
approach toward use-of-force issues that artificially limits the relevant categories and
considerations that may be weighed. They joined Julius Stone in rejecting this `push
button' approach to legal analysis, stating (over-optimistically): `There is, however,
increasing recognition that the requirements of necessity and proportionality . . . can
ultimately be subjected only to that most comprehensive and fundamental test of all
law, reasonableness in particular context.'16
While scholars in general have refused to accept this view, the US Government,
including every State Department Legal Adviser on record, has done so. Abram
Chayes, for example, specifically relied on McDougal and Feliciano in calling for a
`common lawyer' approach to use-of-force issues, that takes into account all relevant
factors, rather than applying narrow and rigidly separate categories.17
This view has
repeatedly and consistently been followed by the US, among other states, in
evaluating the propriety of using force under the Charter.18
Those committed to the narrow and mechanical construction of the Charter
invariably claim that applying a reasonableness standard is subjective and therefore
lawless. This argument, too, is old hat. Of course governments will strain to justify
their uses of force. But a reasonableness standard will not cause any greater abuse
than now occurs in the application of accepted categories. As McDougal and Feliciano
214 EJIL 14 (2003), 209­226
19
Ibid., at 218.
20
According to some commentators, moreover, the right to act only exists until the Security Council takes
action, even if the Council's action is insufficient to assure the state's safety from further attacks. See the
arguments raised by scholars at the symposium `The United States and International Law -- The Effects
of U.S. Predominance on the Foundations of International Law', Göttingen, Germany, 25­27 October
2001, and cogently rejected by Professor Thomas M. Franck in `Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense,'
95 AJIL (2001) 839.
wrote: `[R]easonableness in particular context does not mean arbitrariness in decision
but in fact its exact opposite, the disciplined ascription of policy import to varying
factors in appraising their operational and functional significance for community
goals in given instances of coercion.'19
The narrow, mechanical approach to use-of-force issues is perhaps nowhere
applied more strictly than in connection with the concept of pre-emption. Despite the
long acceptance as a legitimate aspect of self-defence in all legal systems, international
lawyers widely assert that, after the UN Charter, no use of pre-emptive force (also
called `anticipatory self-defence') is allowed until after an `attack' under Article 51,
which some claim must be on the territory of the state seeking to defend itself.20
The
only possible, very narrow exception to this rule, they contend, is Secretary of State
Daniel Webster's statement in 1842, arguing that the need to exercise self-defence
within the territory of another state must be `instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation'.
The standard articulated by Secretary Webster deals with pre-emptive attacks on
the territory of a state that is both willing and able to use its police powers to prevent
the attack sought to be pre-empted. It is inapposite to situations such as the threat
posed by Saddam Hussein's regime, which has refused to comply with Security
Council resolutions aimed at preventing a new chapter in its repeated history of
aggression, and in particular yet another violation of humanitarian law through the
use of weapons of mass destruction. Webster's words have been torn from their
context and applied to all uses of force. In any event, Webster's artificially narrow,
nineteenth-century standard has never been treated as restrictively in practice as
international lawyers generally claim.
It cannot rationally be claimed to apply in haec verba to the possibility of an attack
with modern technology and advanced weapons of mass destruction, launched by
terrorists acting secretly with state support.
2 The Caroline and International Law
The key facts in The Caroline incident are these. A rebellion by Canadians against their
government was underway in 1837; many Americans openly supported the rebels
with supplies and by enlisting as fighters for an invasion of Canada. Neither the US
Government nor the state governments that bordered Canada acted effectively to stop
Americans from supporting the rebels; the federal government claimed it lacked
legislative authority to enforce neutrality.
On 13 December 1837, a group of rebels, led by an American, took control of Navy
On the Necessity of Pre-emption 215
21
K. R. Stevens, Border Diplomacy (1989), at 12­13.
22
Ibid., at 24­25
Island, located in Canadian territory in the Niagara River, and began using it as a
place from which to attack Canadian boats and facilities. The rebel base on Navy
Island began to receive supplies from The Caroline, operating as a ferry from the US
shore. On 29 December, at night, a British force crossed the river in boats with the
specific objective of destroying The Caroline. The British commander found that the
American vessel had moved from Navy Island to Fort Schlossberg, in US territory.
Later that night, the British attacked the vessel, killed at least one American, dragged
the boat into the river's current, set it on fire; its remains were carried over Niagara
Falls.
The Van Buren Administration was aware that many Americans supported the
so-called Patriots who were attempting to foment rebellion in Canada. In December
1837, before the attack on The Caroline, both Secretary of State John Forsyth and
Treasury Secretary Levi Woodbury wrote letters to federal officials near the
US/Canadian border instructing them to prevent Americans from meddling in
Canadian disputes. Officials in the Buffalo area wrote, however, that `only an armed
force along the Niagara border could stop the supply of Patriots on Navy Island'.21
Not
until The Caroline incident did the federal government send General Winfield Scott to
the area, and even then without any forces. Americans continued to assist the rebels
in their cross-border activities.
The debate over the legality of the British action began with a note dated 5 January
1838, from Secretary Forsyth to the British Minister in Washington, D.C., Henry S.
Fox, calling the attack on The Caroline `an extraordinary outrage', requesting a full
explanation, predicting a future request for `redress', and calling for the aggressors to
be punished. Forsyth demanded redress on 19 January, enclosing affidavits. Fox
responded promptly. His affidavits and arguments were based squarely on the failure
of the US to enforce its own laws on the frontier, which he said forced the British
subjects involved to `consult their own security'. A `necessity of self defence and self
preservation', he argued, gave them the right to destroy the `piratical' vessel within US
territory. Forsyth responded on 13 February, challenging the assertion that the US
had failed to prevent American interference in the Canadian insurrection.22
When word of The Caroline incident reached London, the facts were submitted to the
law officers of the Crown, who concluded that the action was justified. The vessel had
acted as a belligerent, and was not therefore `entitled to the privileges of a neutral
territory'. British forces were justified as a matter of `self preservation' in attacking the
vessel wherever it was found. Stevenson sent a complaint to Foreign Secretary
Palmerston on 22 May, rejecting the notion that the vessel was `piratical' as lacking
support in international law. He agreed that Americans involved in the rebellion
could be punished in Canada, but argued that Britain had no right to enter another
`sovereign and independent state' to arrest them. He acknowledged that a nation
could justify entering another state's territory on grounds of necessity, but the
standard for allowing such action in international law required that `the necessity
216 EJIL 14 (2003), 209­226
23
Ibid., at 35.
24
Grotius regarded as the `first cause' of a just war `an injury not yet done which menaces body or goods'.
H. Grotius, De Jure Belli: et Pacis (1853), at 206. If a person is `menaced by present force with danger of life
not otherwise evitable, war is lawful, even to the slaying of the aggressor . . . as a matter of
"self-protection". This right of self-defence exists only when necessary; where the danger can be avoided,
delay is proper to allow recourse to other remedies.' Ibid., at 2101. It is lawful, Grotius opined, for those
whose duty is to protect others from force, to `kill him who is preparing to kill . . . ', even if it may be more
laudable to forbear and be killed. Other issues he examined reflect the importance he (and the authorities
he cites) gave to the particular facts of each situation, such as whether a robber enters a home at day or
night, and whether one may be killed who appears merely to be preparing to strike but not kill, as opposed
to one who has already struck a non-lethal blow. Grotius commented on whether a state is entitled to use
force to avoid the `possibility' of suffering an attack. He regarded as `an intolerable doctrine' the notion
that a state `may rightly take arms against a power which is increasing, and may increase, so as to be
dangerous'. Such a circumstance may be taken into account as a practical matter where the right to use
force properly exists, but it is otherwise `contrary to all notion of equity'. Ibid., at 224­225.
25
Pufendorf wrote that a `discerning judge' should have no problem determining the propriety of acts in
self-defence based on `the circumstances of each case'. S. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1688,
reprinted 1964), at 264­294. As a general rule, he concluded, a man may, without fear of punishment,
kill another in self-defence, once `the aggressor, showing clearly his desire to take my life, and equipped
with the capacity and the weapons for his purpose, has gotten into the position where he can in fact hurt
me, the space [within which self-defence is permitted] being also reckoned as that which is necessary, if I
wish to attack him rather than to be attacked by him'. Pufendorf, like Grotius, adds other observations
that reflect the need to weigh a variety of relevant circumstances, including whether the danger could be
avoided in any other way (which `should be interpreted not too strictly'); whether the defender is obliged
to attempt to escape when an attack is anticipated; or whether the defender may respond with lethal force
to attacks that are intended only to `mutilate' rather than kill.
26
Vattel comments directly on the power of states to act when threatened by other states, supporting in
general the right to defend against a threat of force, when its use is necessary. His comments on
pre-emptive (and preventive) uses of force are especially significant. An increase of power by one state, he
wrote, is not grounds for using force to avoid the possibility of a future attack. We must `have good
grounds to think ourselves threatened by him [a leader who is arming for war], before we can lawfully
have recourse to arms.' Monsieur de Vattel, The Law of Nations (1852) 308. Power alone does not
`threaten an injury', he concludes, but taken together with other evidence of improper intent or
inclination, power can justify demands by another state for reassurance and ultimately the use of force to
avoid injury:
When once a state has given proofs of injustice, rapacity, pride, ambition, or an imperious thirst of rule,
she becomes an object of suspicion to her neighbours, whose duty it is to stand on their guard against
her. . . . [O]n occasions where it is impossible or too dangerous to wait for an absolute certainty, we may
justly act on a reasonable presumption. If a stranger levels a musket at me in the middle of a forest, I am
not yet certain that he intends to kill me: but shall I, in order to be convinced of his design, allow him
time to fire? But presumption becomes nearly equivalent to certainty, if the prince who is on the point
of rising to an enormous power has already given proofs of imperious pride and insatiable ambition . . . .
[Would not requiring restraint in such situations deprive] mankind of the right to regulate their
conduct by the dictates of prudence, and to act on the ground of probability?
must be imminent, and extreme, and involving impending destruction'.23
These
arguments, later repeated by Webster, were based on the writings of Grotius,24
Pufendorf25
and Vattel,26
among others, all of whom supported a right to pre-empt
attacks, but only when the circumstances made such action necessary.
Both, in short, agreed on the existence of a right to pre-empt attacks, when
necessary in the circumstances. The principal difference between them was the claim
by the British that the US was either unable or unwilling to stop the rebels within its
On the Necessity of Pre-emption 217
On the other hand, he wrote, the mere fact that a neighbouring state prepares extensively for war is not
enough to justify defensive action. `The answer [in such situations] greatly depends on the manners and
character of that neighbour.' If that state's leader has given no evidence of baseness or perfidy, then his
word must be taken as sufficient, and the risk must be dealt with through preparations rather than action
in self-defence. Ibid., at 308­309.
27
Stevens, supra note 21, at 52.
28
Ibid., at 62.
territory from attacking Canada. The US, on the other hand, insisted that it was
adequately fulfilling its obligation to prevent the rebels from attacking Canada from
US territory.
The evidence established that US actions against the rebels were inadequate.
President Tyler openly complained that he lacked adequate authority to move against
the rebels. He asked Congress to increase his power by allowing the seizure of any
vessel violating neutrality, not just privateers and warships, and by permitting arrests
on `probable cause' even before any improper action occurred. Congress did so on 10
March 1838, two months after The Caroline incident. Furthermore, additional attacks
by rebels operating from within the US took place throughout 1838, undermining
Forsyth's claim that the US was preventing all significant rebel activities. Finally,
domestic politics began by 1839 to interfere with the US Government's incentive to
cooperate with Canada. Van Buren, faced with the need to secure re-election, ordered
a Canadian rebel released from US custody after being warned that he would lose
states if he failed to do so. The British concluded that the US could not be trusted to act
effectively, and specifically warned the US that it could not tolerate `ruffians and
brigands . . . again and again, to issue forth from within the jurisdiction of the United
States, for the ruin of Her Majesty's subjects'.27
Fox complained that the US refused to
extradite rebels for punishment in Canada, and at one point informed his government
that the US continued an `unreasonable, unjust and inadmissible position' by insisting
on the sanctity of its territory.28
Matters came to a head after November 1840, when New York officials arrested a
Canadian deputy sheriff from Niagara named Alexander McLeod, and charged him
with arson and murder in connection with The Caroline. The British protested, but
Secretary Forsyth responded that the federal government could not intervene in a
state criminal prosecution. The British insisted that McLeod was innocent, and that in
any event he could not be prosecuted as a private individual, since what he had done
was officially sanctioned. After William Harrison took office as President, Daniel
Webster became Secretary of State. In March 1841, he invited the British to avow The
Caroline incident and on that basis to request McLeod's release. The British Minister
Fox obliged immediately, and Webster set about securing McLeod's release, with the
approval of President Tyler, who assumed power upon Harrison's death.
It was at this point, 24 April 1841, that Webster wrote the letter to Fox containing
his famous words concerning self-defence. Webster began the letter by assuring the
British that, now that they had avowed the incident, McLeod would be released either
by habeas corpus, or by the courts in due course. Turning to self-defence, Webster
confirmed that it is available to states, not only to individuals, `and is equally
218 EJIL 14 (2003), 209­226
29
Webster, `Letter to Henry Stephen Fox', in K. E. Shewmaker (ed.), The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic
Papers, vol. I, 1841­1843 (1983) 62.
30
Webster's analysis of the issues related to establishing the necessity for sinking The Caroline is far more
relevant to today's issues than his sweeping generalities: Even supposing the need to enter the territory of
the US, he wrote, Britain must show it `did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by
the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it. It must be shown
that admonition or remonstrances to the persons on board the "Caroline" was impracticable, or would
have been unavailing; it must be shown that daylight could not be waited for; that there could be no
attempt at discrimination, between the innocent and the guilty; that it would not have been enough to
seize and detain the vessel; but that there was a necessity, present and inevitable, for attacking her, in the
darkness of the night, while moored to the shore, and while unarmed men were asleep on board, killing
some and wound[ing] others, and then drawing her into the current, above the cataract, setting her on
fire, and, careless to know whether there might not be in her the innocent with the guilty, or the living
with the dead, committing her to a fate, which fills the imagination with horror. A necessity for all this the
Government of the United States cannot believe to have existed.' Ibid., at 67­68.
necessary for the preservation of both'. But, he wrote, `the extent of this right is a
question to be judged of by the circumstances of each particular case; and when its
alleged exercise has led to the commission of hostile acts, within the territory of a
Power at peace, nothing less than a clear and absolute necessity can afford ground for
justification'.29
The circumstance upon which the British relied to justify destroying The Caroline, he
noted, was `defending the British Territory from the unprovoked attack of a bank of
British rebels and American pirates, who, have been "permitted" to arm and organize
themselves within the territory of the United States, [and] had actually invaded a
portion of the territory of Her Majesty'. Webster rejected this claim, stating that the
President would not assume that Britain meant by using the word `permitted' to
suggest that "those acts, violating the laws of the United States, and disturbing peace
of the British territories, were done under any degree of countenance from this
Government, or were regarded by it with indifference; or, that under the circum-
stances of the case, they could have been prevented, by the ordinary course of
proceeding.' He argued that the US had shown exemplary leadership by adopting
neutrality laws and enforcing them along a long border. Unlike other states, the US
was averse to maintaining a large, standing force, he wrote. `All that can be expected,
from either government, in these cases, is good faith, a sincere desire to preserve peace
and do justice, the use of all proper means of prevention, and, that if offences cannot,
nevertheless, be always prevented, the offenders shall still be justly punished. In all
these respects, this Government acknowledges no delinquency in the performance of
its duties.' It was Britain, not the US, that owed a justification, not just for attacking,
but for doing so in the manner, place, and time chosen, without exhausting other
potential avenues. He returned, in concluding, to the basic point of the dispute: the US
`cannot admit, that its Government has not both the will, and the power to preserve its
own neutrality, and to enforce the observance of its own laws upon its own citizens.' 30
The British rejected Webster's position, because they believed the actual circum-
stances differed from those claimed to exist by the US. They viewed the US as either
unable or unwilling to prevent the rebels and their American allies from attacking
On the Necessity of Pre-emption 219
31
Stevens, supra note 21, Webster, `Lord Palmerston to Andrew Stevenson, September 18, 1941 (enclosure
in Andrew Stevenson to Webster, August 27, 1841.)' in Shewmaker, supra note 30, at 133­134.
32
Stevens, supra note 21, at 165.
Canada. Palmerston recounted the many hostile acts that had taken place on
Canadian territory that originated in New York and included Americans. Either New
York `knowingly and intentionally permitted' the rebels and Americans to arm and
make war against British territory, or the State Government `had lost its authority
over the Border Districts' which were in open defiance. Either way, the British had the
right to enter US territory, since the area entered `had ceased at that time to preserve
that Neutral and Peaceful character, which every part of the United States was bound
to maintain . . . .'31
Webster and Secretary Ashburton settled The Caroline issue about a year later, in an
exchange of notes. Webster described the incident as an offence for which no apology
had been given. Ashburton replied that the attack had in fact been required by
`overwhelming necessity', and that the circumstances satisfied Webster's test. After
unexpectedly discovering The Caroline on the US side of the river, the British expedition
had `no moment for deliberation', and so went ahead with the attack. Ashburton
wished to bring the matter to a close, however, since McLeod had been released and
the US had dropped any claim for compensation. So, he regretted that `some
explanation and apology for this occurrence was not immediately made: this with a
frank explanation of the necessity of the case might and probably would have
prevented much of the exasperation and subsequent complaints and recriminations to
which it gave rise'. Webster replied that the issue was closed, without challenging
Ashburton's analysis.32
The historical setting of The Caroline incident makes clear that Webster's
formulation for determining the legality of self-defence was based on his assumption
that the attack was unnecessary, because the US was both willing and able to satisfy
its obligation to prevent and punish attacks from within its borders. On that
assumption, Webster reasonably claimed the British could use force within the US if
the need to act was `instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no
moment for deliberation'. The British, Webster in effect argued, should have relied on
the US to stop Americans and The Caroline in particular from violating its neutrality
laws. On the assumption that the US could and would act appropriately to prevent
attacks on Canada, the threat posed by a small supply vessel was not so imminent that
it required the British to violate US territory.
The British rejected Webster's premise, contending (with good cause) that they
could not rely on the US to neutralize the threat posed by the rebels and by The Caroline
in particular, so that a delay would have served no purpose. The British position was
therefore in principle consistent with prior US conduct in analogous situations, where
the US claimed it was entitled to use force to defend itself on the territory of a state that
failed to prevent attacks on US targets. Webster (like Forsyth before him) no doubt was
aware that the US regarded itself as justified in using force in foreign territory to
220 EJIL 14 (2003), 209­226
33
The US had, for example, relied on Spain's incapacity or unwillingness to protect US territory from
attacks emanating from islands in the West Indies during the very first years of the Republic, and from
Spanish Florida in 1818 and 1819 by Seminole Indians. Stevens, supra note 21, at 26; A. D. Sofaer, War,
Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power: The Origins (1976), at 276­278, 349­350, 370­373.
34
McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 12, at 217.
prevent attacks on US ships and nationals by pirates, Indians or others, where the
state involved was either unable or unwilling to prevent such attacks.33
A The Standard for Pre-emptive Self-defence
Given this background, by what standard is a pre-emptive attack justifiable? The
standard of necessity proposed by Webster is `so abstractly restrictive as almost, if read
literally, to impose paralysis'.34
In the context Webster intended -- where the state
from which attacks are anticipated is not responsible for the threat, and is both able
and willing to suppress them -- a strict standard is appropriate. For example, the US,
although attacked several times by Al Qaeda from its sanctuary in Afghanistan, at first
demanded that the Taliban Government arrest and extradite Al Qaeda leaders. Only
when the Taliban refused to fulfil their obligation to stop attacks by Al Qaeda, did the
US use force within Afghanistan to end Al Qaeda's sanctuary there.
Webster's language should not, however, be applied as a general rule for all
pre-emptive actions. The Caroline incident, in full context, makes clear that Webster's
stated rule was meant to apply to situations in which the state on whose territory
pre-emptive action is contemplated is not responsible for the threat involved, and is
both able and willing to act appropriately to prevent the threat from being realized.
The standard generally applicable to pre-emptive self-defence is, rather, the same
general rule applicable to all uses of force: necessity to act under the relevant
circumstances, together with the requirement that any action be proportionate to the
threat addressed. This was in fact explicitly recognized in the arguments made by both
Webster and his British interlocutors, as well as by the legal writers upon whom they
relied.
Under such an approach, necessity cannot properly be established through an
arbitrary assertion that a threat exists requiring pre-emption in the view of the party
being threatened. Nor is a state free to attack another merely because the latter
develops the capacity to inflict even grave damage in a military encounter. Rather,
necessity must be established on the basis of factors and circumstances related to
establishing the legitimacy of using force under international law principles and UN
Charter values, including: (1) the nature and magnitude of the threat involved; (2) the
likelihood that the threat will be realized unless pre-emptive action is taken; (3) the
availability and exhaustion of alternatives to using force; and (4) whether using
pre-emptive force is consistent with the terms and purposes of the UN Charter and
other applicable international agreements.
Applying these criteria to the current crisis concerning Iraq demonstrates their
utility in ensuring that those required to consider such matters have rigorously
addressed the relevant concerns.
On the Necessity of Pre-emption 221
35
See generally Govermment of Britain, `Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction', www.pm.gov.uk
1 The Threat
Threats vary according to their nature and magnitude. The types of weapons likely to
be used in an attack is an aspect of the nature of a threat, as well as whether the
weapons would be delivered by conventional forces or terrorist groups. Iraq has
developed chemical and biological weapons. They are difficult to detect and their use
could inflict massive casualties. Iraq also has a history of supporting terrorists,
particularly Abu Nidal and his organization, and it used terrorists in an attempt to
assassinate the first President Bush. The potential use of terrorists by Iraq makes it
especially difficult to know when and where an attack will occur.
Iraq also poses a continuing threat to use conventional forces or weapons of mass
destruction in light of its prior conduct and avowed motives. It has twice attacked
states in the Gulf area in pursuit of its avowed aim of `reestablishing' an `Arab Nation'
with its capital in Baghdad. If allowed to continue to develop weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear arms, Iraq could use or threaten to use those arms to
disrupt or disrail international efforts to prevent Iraq from achieving its geopolitical
objectives.
The magnitude of the threat posed by Iraq is potentially very great, both physically
and economically. Its forces and weapons programmes could inflict massive casualties
and cause grave disruption. The effects of a major attack on Iraq's most likely targets,
Kuwait and Israel, are potentially horrendous, given their vulnerability and relatively
limited, geographically concentrated populations. Iraq could also jeopardize the
world's energy supply, not only by withholding its own oil, but by attacking and
disrupting other sources of supply.35
2 Likelihood of Threat being Realized
A threat may be very great but unlikely to occur. While military preparations may be
probative of intent to use force aggressively, for example, it is an insufficient basis in
itself for inferring an intent to attack. A state may not attack a second state or a group
within it merely to prevent the possibility of a future attack. For example, the US could
not lawfully attack China merely because China is certain to become strong enough to
threaten the US or even to challenge the US for strategic superiority. Pre-emption
requires proof of an anticipated attack.
Any doctrine that allowed states to use force to prevent the potential development
of a threat would wreak havoc in international security. It would allow a state to
attempt to ensure its own security by attacking other states without proof that those
other states have planned or would even consider an attack. The stand-off between
the US and the Soviet Union for some 50 years was premised on the notion that
neither state should or could lawfully attack the other in the absence of satisfactory
proof that the attack was necessary to respond to an attack by the other state that was
underway and unavoidable through diplomacy or other means short of force.
On the other hand, a potential attack may be treated as very likely to occur, even
though it is not imminent. Israel's June 1981 attack on the Osirik nuclear reactor near
222 EJIL 14 (2003), 209­226
36
See UN SC Res. 487, 36 UN SCOR, 2288th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/487 (1981). An excellent description of
this issue, by a scholar who defended the attack from the start, is Anthony D'Amato, `Israel's Air Strike
against the Osiraq Reactor: A Retrospective', 10 Temple Int'l Comp. L.J. (1996) 259.
37
`How Saddam Thinks', San Jose Mercury News, 13 Oct. 2002, Sec. P, at 1. See generally US White House
Background Paper, `A Decade of Deception and Defiance', http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq.
Baghdad was condemned in a Security Council resolution as failing to meet the test of
necessity.36
Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick has since repudiated the arguments she
made in voting to condemn the attack. While Iraq's use of the plant to create material
for a nuclear device had not begun, and any attack was therefore not `imminent',
Israel believed that a nuclear attack on its population by Iraq was eventually highly
likely if Iraq were allowed to put the reactor into service and develop nuclear weapons.
Israel justified this conclusion on the grounds that Iraq had refused to accept a
disengagement with Israel at the end of the 1948 War; that Iraq had twice before
attacked Israel in other wars; that Iraq had repeatedly expressed the view (in violation
of the Charter) that Israel has no right to exist; that Iraq had no need for
nuclear-fuelled power plants; and that Iraq's high degree of animosity for Israel
created a real possibility of an attack with nuclear weapons that a small and
geographically concentrated population could not survive. Iraq's missile attacks on
Israel during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, in which Israel did not participate, and its
aggression against others, tends to justify Israel's unwillingness to face the high
degree of risk Iraq's prior conduct and positions created.
Considerable evidence supports the likelihood of another Iraqi aggression if it is
allowed to continue to develop weapons of mass destruction. Iraq's leader, Saddam
Hussein, has attacked both Iran and Kuwait with the aim of conquering them and
assuming control over their resources. His goals have long been known to include
consolidating under his control the vast areas parcelled out by the Western powers
after the First World War. Iraq should in principle be averse to confronting superior
forces, but Saddam's policies have not been based on rational calculation. Ambassa-
dor Joseph Wilson, for example, a former US diplomat who had extensive contact with
Saddam Hussein and Iraq, reports that he `learned firsthand . . . what the CIA
psychiatrists have said for years: Saddam is an egomaniacal sociopath whose
penchant for high-risk gambles is exceeded only by a propensity for miscalculation'.37
In recent statements, Saddam acknowledges that he cannot win a war with the US,
but he asserts that Iraq must nonetheless resist being forced to submit to US or UN
pressure. He equates his situation to that of a Muslim hero, being tested along with the
Iraqi people by God to demonstrate their willingness to confront evil. All this from one
of the most determined and demented aggressors in modern history.
The likelihood of the threat posed by Iraq someday becoming real is also based on
Saddam's perversity, as reflected in his willingness to inflict wanton destruction
having no rational purpose. His egregious violations of human rights are well known.
He used chemical weapons against Kurdish Iraqis, killing thousands of civilians, and
against Iranian troops. He deliberately spilled tens of millions of barrels of oil into the
Kuwaiti desert and into the Gulf, and set fire to 720 Kuwaiti oil wells, when he realized
On the Necessity of Pre-emption 223
he had been defeated in the Gulf War. It is true that he appears to have been deterred
from using unconventional weapons in that war. But he may simply have been
unable to use such weapons at that time, or been unprepared to do so directly rather
than through surrogates, or he may have refrained from attempting to do so because
he was left in power. President Bush has reasonably concluded on this record that the
future threat from Saddam is both grave and highly likely to be realized, even though
it is not imminent.
3 Exhaustion of Alternatives
To prove necessity requires exhaustion of all reasonable means of avoiding the threat
involved without recourse to the use of force. This is a continuing duty, based on the
realization that force is rarely unaccompanied by collateral damage to non-
combatants and property. The Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iraq
and other penalties for over ten years, in some 16 Resolutions. It gave Iraq a `last'
opportunity in Resolution 1441 to comply with outstanding Security Council
resolutions, including those related to the development of weapons of mass
destruction. It is difficult to claim the US failed to exhaust all reasonable, alternative
means for securing compliance short of force. Even if some states genuinely believed
that Iraq's disarmament could be achieved through inspections and pressure, this
view was based on very little evidence and on the impractical assumption that the US
and its allies could afford indefinitely to position their armed forces in preparation for
an attack.
4 Consistency with Charter Purposes
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter calls on Members to refrain from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or `in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations'. This principle
has generally been claimed to apply to all uses of force, whatever their purpose. But
that position has never made sense in light of the need to achieve the Charter's
purposes. Pressure has repeatedly arisen for treating as legitimate uses of force that
advance those purposes, without compromising the territorial integrity or political
independence of the states involved. The increasing recognition being given to the
legitimacy and need for humanitarian intervention is one reflection of the fact that
actions that advance the Charter's purposes are necessarily more justifiable than
those inconsistent with its purposes.
The use of force to disarm an established aggressor, without altering the territory of
that member state, or depriving it of its sovereign status, is an end that is consistent
with the `Purposes' of the United Nations.
Another factor that should be taken into account in evaluating the consistency
with the Charter of disarming Iraq by force is the many Security Council resolutions
adopted on the subject. International lawyers agree that force can lawfully be used
under the Charter if the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, explicitly
authorizes it. Many contend, moreover, that if authority is not clearly conferred by the
224 EJIL 14 (2003), 209­226
38
In dealing with the Taliban Government, the Council condemned its failure to arrest and punish or
extradite Al Qaeda members responsible for attacks on the US, and at the same time recognized that such
attacks triggered the right of self-defence. The international community has treated this formula as
conferring Council approval for the military action that destroyed Al Qaeda's sanctuary and removed the
Taliban from power.
39
See the discussion in Sofaer, `Kosovo and International Law', 36 Stanford Journal of International Law
(2000) 1, at 12­15.
40
See Shultz, `Act Now', Wash. Post, 6 Sept. 2002, at A25.
Council on Member States to use force, the Council's other actions, findings and
conclusions cannot be relied upon to justify or even support a use of force.
In fact, however, while explicit grants of authority to use force are always effective,
the Council can and has implicitly recognized the propriety of using force.38
Anyway,
it is unreasonable to refuse to give weight to Security Council actions in evaluating the
need (and hence the legality) for using force, merely because the Council may not
have granted explicit authority. In the case of Kosovo, for example, it was significant
that the Council had found Serbia to have acted illegally in several respects, in ways
that were a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII; that Serbia
had failed to comply with the Council's orders to stop such actions; that the Council
had imposed economic and other sanctions on Serbia for its violations of Council
resolutions and international law; and that it had set up a tribunal to try cases against
leaders who violated important humanitarian prohibitions. All these findings and
conclusions supported the propriety of NATO's resort to force.39
If the Council fails to grant Members explicit authority to use force against Iraq, the
findings, conclusions, and other actions of the Council should nevertheless be given
proper weight in evaluating the propriety of enforcement actions. Resolutions adopted
by the Council to end the Gulf War were explicitly conditioned on Iraq's agreeing to
give up its weapons programmes and to comply with other demands. Arguably, the
breach by Iraq of those resolutions restores in full force the original authorization by
the Council for the use of force in 1990.40
In addition, numerous findings in
resolutions, including Resolution 1441, condemn Iraq for violating Council resol-
utions and for egregious breaches of international law, including fundamental
principles of human rights. Iraq has also violated other international agreements,
including those prohibiting the development of chemical and biological weapons.
When these considerations are taken into account, the case for disarming Iraq
without further UN authorization is strong under the approach espoused by
McDougal and Feliciano, and widely supported by government lawyers and
statesmen.
5 Parchment Barriers and the Use of Force
The determined support of the international-law community for Webster's formu-
lation as the basis for using force in self-defence rests, ultimately, not on its historic
validity or cogency, but on the view that a very narrow, rigid rule is needed to prevent
states from using force too liberally. Their concern is that allowing states to rely on a
general rule that permits them to take into account the many relevant circumstances
On the Necessity of Pre-emption 225
41
See discussion in Stevens, supra note 21, at 166­168.
42
See generally the discussion in Sofaer, supra note 39, at 16­20.
and considerations that underlie uses of force will result in subjective, self-serving,
lawless decisions.
This concern is perfectly legitimate. States are hardly models of objectivity in
seeking to advance and protect their interests. It is illusory, though, to expect
Webster's formulation to achieve any greater objectivity in international legal
analysis than a more general but more coherent rule. States prepared to use force in
bad faith are undeterred by restrictive legal rules. Japan, for example, claimed its
occupation of Manchuria in 1931 satisfied the `standard principle laid down in the
Caroline case'. German leaders on trial at Nuremberg claimed their invasion of
Norway in 1940 was an act of self-defence.41
Conversely, an approach that requires a
thorough analysis of necessity and proportionality, on the basis of considerations
rationally and morally related to the reasonableness of using force, is unlikely to
encourage uses of force that would not otherwise occur. Statesmen acting in good
faith to protect their nations do not take artificial rules seriously; if anything, as
McDougal and Feliciano noted long ago, they are more likely to respect standards
rationally related to concerns they recognize as appropriate.
It is no less true today than it was when McDougal and Feliciano wrote, that
artificial rules cannot bear the burden of the real world pressures that underlie
use-of-force issues. Today, moreover, the need to enforce rules to advance human
rights and to limit the power of tyrants and terrorists is greater than ever. To deprive
the international community of a reasoned basis for using force threatens Charter
interests and values, rather than supporting and advancing them.42
3 Conclusion
The use of force to pre-empt threats is a matter of considerable complexity, and
requires a more nuanced evaluation than that implied by Webster's pronouncement
in The Caroline case. Properly applied, pre-emption is an aspect of a state's legitimate
self-defence authority. The power to act in self-defence after an attack is based on the
need to prevent further attacks, not on any right to exact revenge. Therefore, just as
pre-emption was to Grotius the first ground for the `just' war, it is the key justification
for using force in the post-Charter era.
Looking at the `war' on terrorism thus far, the concept of pre-emption is being
applied in a responsible manner, though some statements made by the current
Administration might have suggested a broader application. Osama bin Laden and Al
Qaeda had, prior to September 11, 2001, attacked the US and killed many Americans
several times. They had also announced their intention to attack US nationals and
targets until the US withdrew its forces from Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden issued a fatwa
purporting to authorize (or even to mandate) the killing of Americans. It was certainly
reasonable under the circumstances for the US to assume that further attacks were
being planned. President Bush attempted to convince the Taliban Government in
226 EJIL 14 (2003), 209­226
43
For instance, on 28 September 2001, Taliban leader Mohammed Omar strongly rejected the overtures of
Pakistani religious leaders seeking extradition of Bin Laden to the US. Omar `rebuffed . . . any negotiated
settlement . . . between the United States and Afghanistan over bin Laden', saying that `the Taliban was
willing to fight to the death to protect bin Laden from U.S. military forces', and remarking on the virtues of
going to war with the infidels because it was `imposed upon us. . . .' See Chandrasekaran and Khan,
`Taliban Denies Clerics' Call for Bin Laden; Pakistani Visitors Hear Vow to "Fight Until the End"', Wash.
Post, 29 Sept. 2001, at A01, available at 2001 WL 28360679.
44
For a summary case for the legality of enforcing Resolution 1441 by force see Sofaer, `Iraq and
International Law', Wall St. J., 31 Jan. 2003, at A10.
Afghanistan to turn over Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders, on the express
promise that force would in that event not be used in Afghan territory. This warning
was disregarded, and the Taliban made clear in numerous public statements that they
regarded Bin Laden as a hero and supported his objectives.43
It is, if anything,
astonishing that the US allowed such a record to develop before acting forcefully to
stop Al Qaeda from further implementing their destructive plans.
The President's `axis of evil' phrase in his January 2002 State of the Union speech
generated widespread comment, allegedly on the ground that he might be claiming
the right to attack North Korea, Iran and Iraq. The speech makes no such claim, and
President Bush has made clear that he has no plan based on present circumstances to
attack either North Korea or Iran. Iraq is another matter entirely.44
Pre-emption must be considered responsibly, on a case-by-case basis, but it remains
one aspect of every government's duty to protect its people. Weapons of mass
destruction (the very possession of which may be illegal) can now be fashioned by
many states, and delivered in many ways. When such weapons are likely to be used by
a state, and all reasonable means short of force have been exhausted, it is reasonable
to expect target states to consider pre-emption. Where such circumstances exist,
pre-emption is necessary, and should therefore properly be regarded as part of the
`inherent right' of self-defence.