3 Liberalism and foreign policy

Michael W. Doyle

Chapter contents

Introduction 50
Liberalism 50
Liberal foreign relations 51
Mitigating trade-offs 62
Conclusion 68

Reader's guide

For more than two centuries, liberal countries have tended to maintain peaceful relations with each other. Liberal democracies are each other's natural allies.[1] They tend to respect and accommodate other democratic countries and negotiate rather than escalate disputes. This provides a positive incentive to try to preserve and expand the liberal zone of peace. And that is the fundamental postulate of liberal foreign policy. But liberalism has also proved to be a dangerous guide to foreign policy, often exacerbating tensions with nonliberal states. Expanding liberalism can sometimes provoke danger and war. This chapter thus addresses a large and perplexing foreign policy question central to all democracies: can the liberal peace be effectively preserved and expanded without provoking unnecessary danger and inflicting unnecessary harm? The chapter also addresses how scholars have analysed liberalism's effects, distinguishing three key interpretations of liberal foreign policy: individualist, commercial, and republican.

Introduction

Liberalism contributes to the understanding of foreign policy by highlighting how individuals and the ideas and ideals they espouse (such as human rights, liberty, and democracy), social forces (capitalism, markets), and political institutions (democracy, representation) can have direct effects on foreign relations. It contrasts with the assumptions of structural realists regarding the determinative role of system structure (unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar) and the consequent assumption of state homogeneity (rational, material, and unitary actors). By opening the box of state action and allowing for the effects of varying ideas, interests, and institutions, liberalism complicates the study of international politics. But it also produces better predictions of foreign policy behaviour and incorporates modern conceptions of ethical foreign policy (Doyle, 1997). This chapter begins by defining what scholars have meant by liberalism, describes the major features of liberal foreign relations, and then shows how the three schools of liberal foreign policy analysis have connected liberal principles and institutions to foreign policy outcomes. It concludes with reflections on preserving and expanding the zone of liberal peace—while avoiding war with the wider nonliberal world.

Liberalism

Liberalism is identified with an essential principle—the importance of the freedom of the individual. Above all, this is a belief in the importance of moral freedom, of the right to be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects, and not as objects or means only. A concern for this principle generates rights and institutions.

The challenge within liberalism is how to reconcile the three sets of liberal rights. (See Box 3.1.) The right to private property, for example, can conflict with equality of opportunity and both rights can be violated by democratic legislation. The liberal tradition has evolved two high roads to individual freedom and social order; one is **laissez-faire** or 'conservative' liberalism and the other is **social welfare**, or social democratic, or (in US terms) 'liberal' liberalism. Both reconcile these conflicting rights (though in differing ways) by successfully organizing free individuals into a political order.

The political order *combining* laissez-faire and social welfare liberals is marked by a shared commitment to four institutions.[2] First, citizens possess juridical equality and other civic rights such as freedom of religion and the press. Second, the effective

BOX 3.1 The foundations of liberalism

A commitment to a threefold set of rights forms the foundation of liberalism. Liberalism calls for freedom from arbitrary authority, often called 'negative freedom', which includes freedom of conscience, a free press and free speech, equality under the law, and the right to hold, and therefore to exchange, property without fear of arbitrary seizure. Liberalism also calls for those rights necessary to protect and promote the capacity and opportunity for freedom, the 'positive freedoms'. Such social and economic rights as equality of opportunity in education and rights to health care and employment, necessary for effective self-expression and participation, are thus among liberal rights (Berlin, 1969). A third liberal right, democratic participation or representation, is necessary to guarantee the other two. To ensure that morally autonomous individuals remain free in those areas of social action where public authority is needed, public legislation has to express the will of the citizens making laws for their own community.

sovereigns of the state are representative legislatures deriving their authority from the consent of the electorate and exercising their authority free from all restraint apart from the requirement that basic civic rights be preserved.[3] Most pertinently for the impact of liberalism on foreign affairs, the state is subject to neither the external authority of other states nor to the internal authority of special prerogatives held, for example, by monarchs or military castes over foreign policy. Third, the economy rests on the recognition of the rights of private property, including the ownership of means of production. Property is justified as a stimulus to productivity and a limit on the monopoly of state authority. The institution of private property excludes state socialism or state capitalism, but it need not exclude market socialism or various forms of the mixed economy. Fourth, economic decisions are predominantly shaped by the forces of supply and demand, domestically and internationally, and are free from strict control by bureaucracies.

In order to protect the opportunity of the citizen to exercise freedom, laissez-faire liberalism has leaned toward a highly constrained role for the state and a much wider role for private property and the market. In pursuit of the same goal of freedom, welfare liberalism reverses its approach, and instead has expanded the role of the state and constricted the role of the market.[4] Both perspectives however accept the four institutional requirements and as a result contrast markedly with the monarchical regimes, military dictatorships, and single-party governments, including communist dictatorships with which they have shared the political governance of the modern world. Not even overwhelmingly liberal countries are purely liberal. Liberal principles and institutions sometimes vie with autocratic or racist rivals for the allegiance of the public (Skowronek, 2006). There are also domestic variations within liberal regimes. For example, Switzerland was liberal only in certain cantons; the United States was liberal only north of the Mason–Dixon Line until 1865, when it became liberal throughout. These lists also exclude ancient 'republics', since none appear to fit modern liberal criteria of individualism (Holmes, 1979).

The domestic successes of liberalism have never been more apparent. Never have so many people been included in, and accepted the domestic hegemony of, the liberal order; never have so many of the world's leading states been liberal, whether as republics or as constitutional monarchies. Indeed, the success of liberalism as an answer to the problem of masterless men in modern society is reflected in the growth in the number of liberal regimes from the three that existed at the beginning of the nineteenth century (i.e. Britain, France, and America) to the more than one hundred that exist today. But we should not be complacent about the domestic affairs of liberal states. Significant practical problems endure: enhancing citizen participation in large democracies, distributing 'positional goods' (for example, prestigious jobs), controlling bureaucracy, reducing unemployment, paying for a growing demand for social services, reducing inflation, and achieving large-scale restructuring of industries in response to growing foreign competition (Hirsch, 1977). While these domestic problems have been widely explored, they are by no means solved. Liberalism's foreign record is more obscure and warrants greater consideration.

Liberal foreign relations

The historical record of liberal international relations includes incentives for a separate zone of peace among liberal states, but also, unfortunately, for imprudent aggression against nonliberals and for complaisance in vital matters of security and economic cooperation.

The liberal zone of peace

The first and most important of the effects of liberalism on the foreign relations of liberal states is the establishment of a peace among them.[5] Medieval and early modern Europe served as the cockpit of

warring states, where France, England, and the Low Countries engaged in nearly constant strife. Then in the late eighteenth century there began to emerge liberal regimes. At first hesitant and confused, and later clear and confident as liberal regimes gained deeper domestic foundations and greater international experience, a zone of peace became established among the liberal states.

One key example of this peace was Anglo-American relations. During the nineteenth century, the United States and Great Britain engaged in nearly continual strife, including one war, the War of 1812. However, after the Reform Act of 1832 defined representation as the formal source of the sovereignty of the British parliament, Britain and the United States settled their disputes diplomatically despite, for example, British grievances against the North's blockade of the South, with which Britain had close economic ties. Nearly a century later, despite severe Anglo-French colonial rivalry, liberal France and liberal Britain formed an *entente* against illiberal Germany before the First World War. And in 1914–15, Italy, the liberal member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, chose not to fulfill its treaty obligations to support its allies. Instead, it joined in an alliance with Britain and France that prevented it from fighting other liberal states, and then subsequently declared war on Germany and Austria. And despite generations of Anglo-American tension and Britain's wartime restrictions on American trade with Germany, the United States leaned toward Britain and France from 1914 to 1917, before entering the war on their side. Nowhere was this special peace among liberal states more clearly proclaimed than in President Woodrow Wilson's War Message of 2 April 1917: 'Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed people of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles' (Wilson, 1924: 378).

Beginning in the eighteenth century, a zone of peace, which the liberal philosopher Immanuel Kant called the 'pacific federation' or 'pacific union' was slowly established among liberal societies. Today, approximately 103 liberal states with at least three years of consolidation make up this zone of peace.[6] Most are in Europe and North America, but they can be found on every continent. (See Map 3.1.)

Of course, the outbreak of war, in any given year, between any two given states, is a low-probability event. The occurrence of a war between any two adjacent states, considered over a long period of time, is more probable. The near absence of war between liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for almost 200 years thus may have significance. More significant perhaps, is that when states are forced to decide on which side of an impending world war they will fight, liberal states all wind up on the same side, despite the complexity of the paths that take them there. These characteristics neither proves that the peace among liberals is statistically significant nor that liberalism is the peace's sole valid explanation.[7] But they do suggest that we consider the possibility that liberals have indeed established a separate peace—but only among themselves.

This is a feature, moreover, that appears to be special to liberal societies. Neither specific regional attributes nor historic alliances or friendships describe the wide reach of the liberal peace. The peace extends as far as, and no further than, the relations among liberal states; not including nonliberal states in an otherwise liberal region (such as the north Atlantic in the 1930s) nor excluding liberal states in a less liberal region (such as Central America or Africa).

Foreign relations among any other group of states with similar social structures or with compatible values or pluralistic social structures are not similarly peaceful.[8] Feudal warfare was frequent and very much a sport of the monarchs and nobility. There have not been enough truly totalitarian, fascist powers (nor have they lasted long enough) to test fairly their pacific compatibility, but fascist powers in the wider sense of nationalist, military dictatorships clearly fought each other in the 1930s in Eastern Europe. Communist powers have engaged in wars more recently in East Asia, when China invaded Vietnam and Vietnam invaded Cambodia. Equally, we



Map 3.1 Liberal republics in 1900 and 2000

Note: Only countries with populations greater than 1 million.

have not had enough democratic socialist societies to consider the relevance of socialist pacification. The more abstract category of pluralism does not suffice. Certainly Germany was pluralist when it engaged in war with liberal states in 1914; Japan as well in 1941. But they were not liberal. Peace among liberals thus appears to be a special characteristic.

Here the predictions of liberal pacifists are borne out: liberal states do exercise peaceful restraint and a separate peace exists among them. This separate peace provides a solid foundation for the United States' crucial alliances with the liberal powers (NATO, the US–Japanese alliance, the alliance with Australia and New Zealand); and appears impervious to the quarrels with allies that have bedevilled many US administrations. It also offers the promise of a continuing peace among liberal states, and with increasing numbers of liberal states, it announces the possibility of a self-enforcing global peace without establishing a world state.

Imprudent aggressiveness

Aside from restraint in warring against other liberal states, liberalism carries with it a second effect—what David Hume called 'imprudent vehemence' or aggression against or enmity toward nonliberals (Hume, 1963: 346–347).[9] Peaceful restraint seems to work only in the liberals' relations with other liberals, liberal states have fought numerous wars with nonliberal states.

Many of these wars have been defensive, and thus prudent by necessity. Liberal states have been attacked and threatened by nonliberal states that do not exercise restraint in their dealings with liberal states. Authoritarian rulers both stimulate and respond to an international political environment in which conflicts of prestige, of interest, and of pure fear all lead states toward war. War and conquest have thus characterized the careers of many authoritarian rulers and ruling parties—from Louis XIV and Napoleon to Mussolini's fascists, Hitler's Nazis, and Stalin's communists.

But imprudent aggression by the liberal states—liberal imprudence—has also characterized many of these wars. Both liberal France and Britain fought costly expansionist colonial wars throughout the nineteenth century. The United States fought a similar war with Mexico in 1846–48, waged a war of annihilation against the American Indians, and intervened militarily against sovereign states many times before and after the Second World War. Liberal states invade weak nonliberal states and display exceptional degrees of distrust in their foreign policy relations with powerful nonliberal states.[10]

Nonetheless, establishing the statistical significance of Hume's assertion appears remarkably difficult. The best statistical evidence indicates that 'libertarian' or 'democratic' states appear to be more war-prone.[11] War-proneness is not, however, a measure of imprudent aggression since many wars are defensive. But that does not mean that we can simply blame warfare on the authoritarians or totalitarians, as many of our more enthusiastic politicians would have us do.[12] Liberal states acted as initiators in twenty-four out of the fifty-six interstate wars in which they participated between 1816 and 1980, while nonliberals were on the initiating side in ninety-one out of the 187 times in which they participated in interstate wars (Chan, 1984: 636). Liberal **metropoles** (imperial centres) were the overwhelming participators in **extrasystemic wars**, colonial wars, which we can assume to have been by and large initiated by the metropole (see below). Furthermore, the United States intervened in the Third World more than twice as often in the period 1946–1976 as the Soviet Union did in 1946–1979 (Clemens, 1982: 117–118). Further, the United States devoted one-quarter and the Soviet Union one-tenth of their respective defence budgets to forces designed for Third World interventions, where responding to perceived threats would presumably have a less than purely defensive character (Posen and Van Evera, 1980).

We should recall as well that authoritarian states have a record of imprudent aggression. It was not semi-liberal Britain that collapsed in 1815, but Napoleonic France. It was the Kaiser's Germany that dissolved in 1918, not republican France and liberal Britain and democratic America. It was imperial Japan and Nazi Germany that disappeared in 1945,

not the United States or the United Kingdom.[13] It is the contrast to ideal rational strategy and even more the comparison with liberal accommodation with fellow liberals that highlight the aggressive imprudence of liberal relations with nonliberals. Most wars, moreover, seem to arise out of calculations and miscalculations of interest, misunderstandings, and mutual suspicions, such as those that characterized the origins of the First World War. Yet we still find expressions of aggressive intent and apparently unnecessary vehemence by liberal states characterizing a large number of wars.[14]

In relations with powerful nonliberal states, liberal states have missed opportunities to pursue the negotiation of arms reduction and arms control when it has been in their mutual strategic interest, and they have failed to construct wider schemes of accommodation that are needed to supplement arms control. Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, this is the charge that Lord Sanderson levelled against Sir Eyre Crowe in Sanderson's response to Crowe's classic memorandum on the state of British relations with Germany.[15] (See Box 3.2.)

In the post-Second World War period, and particularly following the outbreak of the Korean War, US foreign policy equated the 'International Communist Movement' (all Communist states and parties) with 'Communist imperialism' and with a domestic tyranny in the USSR that required a Cold War contest and international subversion as means of legitimizing its own police state. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles most clearly expressed this conviction, together with his own commitment to a strategy of 'liberation', when he declared: '[W]e shall never have a secure peace or a happy world so long as Soviet communism dominates one-third of all the peoples that there are, and is in the process of trying at least to extend its rule to many others' (US Senate, 1953: 5–6).[16]

Imprudent vehemence is also associated with liberal foreign policy toward weak, nonliberal states, such as the many in the Third World. This problem affects both conservative liberals and welfare liberals, but the two can be distinguished by differing styles of interventions.

Protecting 'native rights' from 'native' oppressors, and protecting universal rights of property and settlement from local transgressions, introduced especially liberal motives for imperial aggression. Ending the slave trade and encouraging 'legitimate trade' (while protecting the property of European merchants) destabilized nineteenth-century West African oligarchies. Declaring the illegitimacy of *suttee* (self immolation as practised by widowed women in India) and domestic slavery also attacked local cultural traditions that had sustained the stability of indigenous political authority. Europeans settling in sparsely

BOX 3.2 Relations with powerful nonliberal states

In developing relations with powerful nonliberal states, evidence of deeply-held suspicion appears to characterize US diplomacy toward the Soviet Union. In a fascinating memorandum to President Wilson written in 1919, Herbert Hoover (then one of Wilson's advisers) recommended that the President speak out against the danger of 'world domination' which the 'Bolsheviki'—a 'tyranny that is the negation of democracy'—posed to free peoples. Rejecting military intervention as excessively costly and likely to 'make us a party in re-establishing the reactionary classes in their economic domination over the lower classes', Hoover proposed a 'relief programme' designed to undercut some of the popular appeal which the Bolsheviks were garnering in both the Soviet Union and abroad. Although acknowledging that the evidence was not yet clear, he concluded: 'If the militant features of Bolshevism were drawn in colours with their true parallel with Prussianism as an attempt at world domination that we do not stand for, it would check the fears that today haunt all men's minds.' (Herbert Hoover to President Wilson, 29 March 1919, Paterson 1978: 95).[i]

[i] The actual US intervention in the Soviet Union was limited to supporting anti-Bolshevik Czechoslovak soldiers in Siberia and to protecting military supplies in Murmansk from German seizure.

populated areas destroyed the livelihood of tribes that relied on hunting. When the locals retaliated defensively in force, the settlers called for imperial protection (De Tocqueville, 1945: 351). In practice, once the exigencies of ruling an empire came into play, liberal imperialism resulted in the oppression of 'native' liberals seeking self-determination in order to maintain imperial security, avoid local chaos and preclude international interference by another imperial power attempting to take advantage of local disaffection.

Thus 19th-century liberals, such as British Prime Minister William Gladstone, pondered whether Egypt's proto-nationalist rebellion (1881–82) was truly liberal-nationalist (they discovered it was not) before intervening to protect strategic lifelines to India, commerce, and investment.[17] These dilemmas of Liberal imperialism are also reflected in US imperialism in the Caribbean where, for example, following the Spanish–American War of 1898, Article III of the Platt Amendment gave the United States the 'right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty . . . ' (Paterson, 1978. I: 328). See also Box 3.3.

The record of liberalism in the nonliberal world is not solely a catalogue of oppression and imprudence. The North American West and the settlement colonies–Australia and New Zealand—represent a successful transplant of liberal institutions, albeit in a temperate, under-populated, and then depopulated environment and at the cost of Native American and Aboriginal rights. Similarly, the 20th-century expansion of liberalism into less powerful nonliberal areas has also had some striking successes. The forcible liberalization of Germany and Japan following the Second World War and the long, covert financing of liberal parties in Italy are the more significant instances of successful transplant. The covert financing of liberalism in Chile and occasional diplomatic demarches to nudge aside military threats to non-Communist democratic parties (as in Peru in

BOX 3.3 The 2003 invasion of Iraq: geo-strategic and liberal factors at work

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 illustrated another intervention, one widely regarded as imprudent. US and UK hostility stemmed from factors that any great power and any state committed to the international rule of law would have found provoking. These included Saddam Hussein's record of aggression against his neighbours (particularly Kuwait), the implicit threat he posed to security of oil supplies in the Persian Gulf, and his unwillingness to assure the international community that he had eliminated programmes to acquire weapons of mass destruction as he had been required to do as part of the settlement of the first Gulf War in 1991 (UN Security Council Resolution 687). Visibly liberal factors and goals were also at work. Saddam's genocidal campaigns against the Kurds and his record of flagrant abuses of the Iraqi population shaped his international reputation.

But the particular circumstances of the run-up to the 2003 invasion appeared more significant than either of the longer trends in hostility. The Bush administration, aware that the American public held it responsible for preventing another 9/11 attack and benefiting from a public that politically rewarded a 'war on terror presidency', read—and presented to the public—almost every piece of pre-invasion intelligence according to the most threatening interpretation.[i] The Bush administration attempted to justify the war by denouncing alleged Iraqi programmes to build WMD and alleged Iraqi ties to 9/11 ties and Al Qaeda (for which no support could be found afterwards) and it promised to induce a transformative spread of democracy in the region, beginning with Iraq.[ii]

Reacting to the insurgency that greeted the invasion, the poor planning that characterized the occupation and the mounting US and Iraqi casualties, a majority of the US public and publics of other democracies earlier had by 2005, turned against the war. The long-term results of the invasion and effort to democratize Iraq were far from clear. Iraq had experienced a referendum on a constitution and national elections, but splits among its three major communities (Shia, Sunni, and Kurd) threatened an escalating civil war. Even aggressive liberals who might have welcomed a democratic transformation of the region questioned the method, in light of the

BOX 3.3 Continued

disputed legality of the invasion and the long-run costs expected by some to amount to two trillion dollars[iii]

[i] One instance was the neglect of information widely available in the Bush administration that Niger was very unlikely to have sold uranium ore to Iraq. The charge that it did nonetheless wound up as the notorious sixteen words in the President's 2003 State of the Union Address justifying the march to war (Lichtblau, 2006).
[ii] For an informative collection of speeches by President Bush and Secretary Powell justifying the war and by Senator Byrd and others criticizing those rationales see 'Why Attack Iraq?' (Gutmann and Thompson, 2005: 45–60; 88–95). Goldsmith (2002) and Franck (2003) offer thoughtful pro and con legal analyses, while Pollack (2002, Chapters 5 and 11) and Kaufmann (2004) provide pro and con policy analyses.
[iii] Bilmes and Stiglitz (2006) estimate one trillion dollars as the low figure and two trillion the high, taking into account the long-term medical and other indirect costs associated with the war.

1962, South Korea in 1963, and the Dominican Republic in 1962[18] and again in 1978) illustrate policies that, though less successful, were directed toward liberal goals. These particular postwar liberal successes also are the product of special circumstances: the existence of a potential liberal majority, temporarily suppressed, which could be readily re-established by outside aid, or unusually weak oligarchic, military, or Communist opponents.[19]

Elsewhere in the postwar period, when the United States sought to protect liberals in the Third World from the 'Communist threat', the consequences of liberal foreign policy on the nonliberal society often became far removed from the promotion of individual rights or of national security. In Vietnam and elsewhere, intervening against 'armed minorities' and 'enemies of free enterprise' meant intervening for other 'armed minorities' some sustained by oligarchies and others resting on little more than US foreign aid and troops. Indigenous liberals simply had too narrow a base of domestic support. These interventions did not advance liberal rights, and to the extent that they were driven by ideological motives, they were not necessary for national security.

To the conservative liberals, the alternatives were starkly cast: Third World authoritarians with allegiance to the liberal, capitalist West, or 'Communists' subject to the totalitarian East (or leftist nationalists, who, even if elected, are but a slippery stepping stone to totalitarianism) (Kirkpatrick, 1979).[20] Conservative liberals are prepared to support the allied authoritarians. The Communists attack property in addition to liberty, thereby provoking conservative liberals to covert or overt intervention, or 'dollar-diplomacy' imperialism. The interventions against Mossadegh in Iran, Arbenz in Guatemala, Allende in Chile, and against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua appear to fall into this pattern (Barnet, 1968: Chapter 10). President Reagan's simultaneous support for the military in El Salvador and guerrilla 'freedom-fighters' in Nicaragua also tracks this pattern whose common thread is rhetorical commitment to freedom and operational support for conservative free enterprise.

To the social welfare liberals, the choice was never so clear. Aware of the need for state action to democratize the distribution of social power and resources, they tend to have more sympathy for social reform. This can produce, on the part of 'radical' welfare liberals, a more tolerant policy toward the attempts by reforming autocracies to redress inegalitarian distributions of property in the Third World. This more complicated welfare-liberal assessment can itself be a recipe for more extensive intervention. The large number of conservative oligarchs or military bureaucracies with whom the conservative liberal is well at home is not so congenial to the social welfare liberal, yet the Communists are still seen as enemies of liberty. In their foreign policy, left liberals justify extensive intervention first to encourage, then to sustain, Third

World social democracy in a political environment that is either barely participatory or highly polarized. Thus Arthur Schlesinger recalls President Kennedy musing shortly after the assassination of President Trujillo (former dictator of the Dominican Republic): 'There are three possibilities in descending order of preference, a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime [by his followers] or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we can't really renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third' (Schlesinger, 1965: 769; also quoted in Barnet, 1968: 158). Another instance of this approach was President Carter's support for the land reforms in El Salvador, which one US official explained in the following analogy: 'There is no one more conservative than a small farmer. We're going to be breeding capitalists like rabbits' (Simon and Stephen, 1981: 38). President Clinton's administration seems to have succumbed to a similar dose of optimistic interventionism in its conviction that friendly nations could be rebuilt democratically in both Somalia and Haiti, although democracy had never existed in the first and was led in the second by Jean Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic socialist and an eloquent critic of American imperialism.

Complaisance and isolationism

The third effect apparent in the international relations of liberal states is David Hume's second assertion, that of 'supine complaisance'. This takes two forms: one is the failure to support allies; the other is a failure to oppose enemies.

Liberal states have often been shortsighted in preserving their basic preconditions under changing international circumstances, particularly in supporting the liberal character of the constituent states. Self-indulgent isolationism or appeasement by democratic majorities, reluctant to bear the fiscal cost, has failed on occasion—as it did in regard to Germany in the 1920s—to provide the timely international economic support for liberal regimes whose market foundations were in crisis. Liberal democratic majorities failed in the 1930s to provide military aid or political mediation to Spain, which was challenged by an armed minority, or to Czechoslovakia, which was caught in a dilemma of preserving national security or acknowledging the claims (fostered by Hitler's Germany) of the Sudeten minority to self-determination. Farsighted and constitutive measures seem to have only been provided by the liberal international order when one liberal state stood pre-eminent among the rest, prepared and able to take measures, as did Britain before the First World War and the United States following The Second World War, to sustain economically and politically the foundations of liberal society beyond its borders. Then measures such as British antislavery and free trade and the US loan to Britain in 1947, the Marshall Plan, NATO, GATT, the IMF, and the liberalization of Germany and Japan helped construct buttresses for the international liberal order (Kindleberger, 1973; Gilpin, 1975; Krasner, 1976; Hirsch and Doyle, 1977).

Of course, ideologically-based policies can also be self-indulgent. Oligarchic or authoritarian allies in the Third World do not find consistent support in a liberal policy that stresses human rights. Conservative and realist critics claim that the security needs of these states are neglected, and that they fail to obtain military aid or more direct support when they need it (the Shah's Iran, Humberto Romero's El Salvador, Somoza's Nicaragua, and apartheid South Africa). Equally disturbing from those points of view, that Communist regimes are shunned even when a détente with them could further United States' strategic interests (China before 1976, Cuba). Welfare liberals particularly shun the first group, while laissez-faire liberals baulk at close dealings with the second. In both cases economic interests or strategic interests are allegedly slighted.[21]

A second manifestation of complaisance lies in a reaction to the excesses of interventionism. A mood of frustrated withdrawal affects policy toward strategically and economically important countries. Just as interventionism seems to be the typical failing of the liberal great power, so complaisance characterizes declined or 'not quite risen' liberal states.[22] Following the exhaustion of wars, representative legislature may become especially reluctant to undertake international commitments or to fund the military

establishment needed to play a geopolitical role. Purely domestic concerns seem to take priority, as they did in the US in the 1920s. Rational incentives for **free riding** on the extended defence commitments of the leader of the liberal alliance also induce this form of complaisance. During much of the nineteenth century the United States informally relied upon the British fleet for many of its security needs. During the Cold War, the Europeans and the Japanese, according to some American strategic analysts, failed to bear their 'fair' share of defence burdens.

Liberalism, if we take into account both Kant and Hume, thus carries with it three legacies: peace among liberals, imprudent vehemence toward nonliberals, and complaisance towards threats. The first legacy appears to be a special feature associated with liberalism and it can be demonstrated both statistically and through historical case studies (Owen, 1996; O'Neal and Russett, 1997; Rousseau, 2005). The latter two legacies cannot be shown to be special to liberalism, though their effects can be illustrated historically in liberal foreign policy and reflect laissez-faire, and social democratic, welfare variants. But the survival and growth in the number of liberal states suggests that imprudent vehemence and complaisance have not overwhelmed liberalism's efficacy as a form of governance.

Liberal foreign policy analysis

Liberalism has complicated implications for theories of foreign policy (Zacher and Matthew, 1995; Nincic, 1992; Doyle, 1997; Moravcsik, 1997). Defined by the centrality of individual rights, private property, and representative government, liberalism is a domestic theory. Transposed to the international plane, liberals share a common framework or zone of peace with fellow liberals, where they vary according to whether property or welfare should guide international preferences and whether the risks of isolation are greater or less than those of internationalism. Foreign policy analyses strive to account for these patterns by focusing on whether individual rights, domestic commercial interests, or a more complicated combination of both, together with republican institutions and international perceptions, shape policy.

Liberal theorists agree with the realists that states exist under anarchy, but they disagree as to the nature of anarchy. Rather than assuming a realist state of war in which all states are driven into relative contests of 'positional' zero-sum games (Grieco, 1988), the contest among liberals can be a positive- or negative-sum game within a separate zone of peace among fellow liberals. A failure to inform others may undermine coordination when liberals are seeking compatible goals. In more competitive situations, a failure to trust others may undermine cooperation when each would prefer at least one alternative to a failure to cooperate. But their inter-liberal security dilemma is generally solved by stable accommodation. They can come to appreciate that the existence of other liberal states constitutes no threat and instead constitutes an opportunity for mutually beneficial trade and (when needed) alliance against nonliberal states.

Liberals thus differ significantly from the realists. But liberal theorists also differ from each other, and they do so in systematic ways. Like realists, each of the liberal theorists must make assumptions about human nature, domestic society, and international structure as found in Kenneth Waltz's three images (Waltz, 1959). Liberals pay more attention to domestic structures and individual differences than do realists, and believe that the international system (or Third Image) has a less than overriding influence and so distinguish themselves from not only structural realists but also from almost all realists. For the present analysis, we can identify three types of liberals: **First Image Lockean** (human nature), **Second Image Commercial** (societal), and **Third Image Kantian** (republican internationalist). Each of these images can explain the three features of liberal foreign relations; and each highlights special aspects and reveals difficult choices within liberal foreign policy.

Locke's international system, like that of realists such as his fellow seventeenth-century philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, is anarchic. But the Lockean state is based on representation and ultimately on consent; while the Hobbesian state is indifferent to these matters as long as the state is sovereign. Locke's

citizens, like Hobbes's, are rational independent individuals. The difference then lies in the importance that Locke attributed to the duties to protect life, liberty, and property that Locke thought accompanied citizens' rights to the same. It is these duties that lead just commonwealths to maintain peace with each other, provided, that is, that their natural partiality and the poorly institutionalized character of world politics do not overcome their duties to try to resolve disputes peacefully.

But partiality and weak international institutions are difficult to overcome, and so imprudent aggression and complaisance often occur. Locke thus portrayed an international condition of troubled peace, only one step removed from the realist state of war and one fraught with 'Inconveniences' that could deteriorate into war through the combined effects of bias, partiality, and the absence of a regular and objective system of adjudication and enforcement. There is, for example, much of Hobbesian rational unitary egoism in the Lockean 'Federative Power', with its pursuit of 'national advantage'. Locke is prepared, unlike most liberals, to delegate foreign policy to the executive, trusting that no better institution can pursue the public interest. In troubled times, Lockean international 'Inconveniences' might well approach a nearly general state of war. But we also see one crucial difference. Locke's statespersons, like his citizens, are governed by the duties of natural law—life, liberty, and property. Lockean states are then distinguished by a commitment to mutual trust under the law. In the literature explaining the logic of negotiation, trust is crucial for stable agreements, and all rational egoistic bargainers will want to cultivate a reputation for it (Heymann, 1973; Dunn, 1984).

The commercial liberals—a second tradition of liberal scholarship focusing on Second Image domestic social forces—highlight the pacifying international effects of markets and commercial capitalism. The tradition that Albert Hirschman has called *doux commerce* (soothing commerce) originates in the eighteenth century attack on the realist doctrine of relative economic power then advocated by the Mercantilists (Hirschman, 1982). Although the commercial liberals such as Smith and Schumpeter argued that representative government contributed to peace—when the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their governments, wars become unattractive—for them, the deeper cause of the zone of liberal peace was commerce. After all democracies had been more than war-prone in history. Thucydides' story of democratic Athens was familiar to all with a classical education. Passions could wreak havoc among democrats, too. What was new was manufacturing and commerce—capitalism. Thomas Paine, the eighteenth-century radical American democrat, announced: 'If commerce were permitted to act to the universal extent it is capable, it would extirpate the system of war' (Paine, 1995: Chapter Five). Paine contributed to a growing recognition of a powerful insight systematically developed by Enlightenment philosophers: war does not benefit commercial manufacturing societies. This view was articulated most comprehensively by the great Scottish philosopher-economist Adam Smith. Joseph Schumpeter then extended into a general theory of capitalist pacification by Austrian economist.

Like the realists, Schumpeter regarded the international system as anarchic. Like many realists (including Hobbes), he regards citizens as individualistic, rational, and egoistic, and usually materialistic. But Schumpeter sees the combination of democracy and capitalism as opening up a revolutionary transformation of domestic state and social structure. These societies are as self-interestedly, deterministically pacific as the Hobbesian Leviathan is bellicose. Hobbesian Leviathans, after all, were merely Hobbesian individuals writ large, with all their individual competitiveness and egoism. Schumpeter's state is a structured whole, distinct from its parts, transformed as it were by an 'invisible hand' (to borrow the classic commercial metaphor from Adam Smith). According to Schumpeter (1955: 68) when the people's energies are daily absorbed in production, 'economic rationalism', or the instability of market competition, necessitates calculation. It also 'individualizes' as 'subjective opportunities' replace the 'immutable factors' of traditional, hierarchical society. Rational individuals then demand democratic governance. Market capitalism and democratic majoritarianism

make individual material egoism and competitiveness into pacifism. Democratic capitalism means free trade and a peaceful foreign policy simply because they are, he claimed, the first best solutions for rational majorities in capitalist societies. This is the heart of the contemporary enthusiasm, expressed by many liberal politicians, for global democratization and capitalism as the inevitable and pacific routes to peace at the 'end of history.'[23] It does well in accounting for the sometimes complaisant liberal attitude toward threats and provides another account of the liberal peace, but doesn't quite offer a convincing account of liberal aggression.

'First' and 'second' image liberals thus differ from each other. Schumpeter makes the peace, which is a duty of the Lockean liberal statesman, into the structured outcome of capitalist democracy. Both highlight for us powerful elements of liberal world politics. But if there is a long state of peace between liberal republics, Locke offers us a weak explanation for it. (How do they avoid partiality and bias so regularly in their relations?) He also misses the persistent state of war between liberals and nonliberals. (Why are the liberals so regularly more partial here?) Schumpeter misses the liberal sources of war with nonliberals, unless we should blame all these wars on the nonliberals.

Kant and the republican internationalists try to fill these gaps as they illustrate the larger potential of the liberal tradition. Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay 'Perpetual Peace' offers a coherent explanation of two important regularities in world politics—the tendencies of liberal states simultaneously to be peace-prone in their relations with each other and unusually war-prone in their relations with nonliberal states. Republican representation, liberal respect, and transnational interdependence (to rephrase Kant's three 'definitive articles' of the hypothetical peace treaty he asked states to sign) are three necessary and, together, sufficient causes of the two regularities taken in tandem.

Kant's theory held that a stable expectation of peace among states would be achieved once three conditions were met. He calls them the 'definitive articles' of the hypothetical peace treaty he wants states to sign. Together they constitute a liberal republic and explain the foundations of the **three features of liberal foreign relations**. We can rephrase them as:

- **Representative, republican government**, which includes an elected legislative, separation of powers, and the rule of law. Kant argued that together those institutional features lead to caution because the government is responsible to its citizens. This does not guarantee peace. It should select for popular wars.
- **A principled respect for the nondiscriminatory rights** all human beings can rightfully claim. This should produce a commitment to respect the rights of fellow liberal republics (because they represent free citizens, who as individuals have rights that deserve our respect) and a suspicion of nonrepublics (because if those governments cannot trust their own citizens, what should lead us to trust them).[24]
- **Social and economic interdependence.** Trade and social interaction generally engender a mix of conflict and cooperation. A foreign economic policy of free trade tends to produce material benefits superior to optimum tariffs if other states will retaliate against tariffs as they usually do. Liberalism produces special material incentives for cooperation because among fellow liberals economic interdependence should not be subject to security-motivated restrictions and, consequently, tends to be more varied, less dependent on single issues, and less subject to single conflicts.[25]

BOX 3.4 The liberal foreign policy process

Liberalism could shape foreign policy in democracies either because public opinion is liberal and demands it, or because the political elite has liberal values and implements them. But a more likely process is that neither the public nor the elite is united in a single set of values and that the elite typically manages policy but nonliberal members of the elite are deterred from choosing anti-liberal policies because they have good reason to doubt that anti-liberal policies would be sustained by a majority of the public at the next election.

Kant suggested that each was necessary and together they were sufficient to establish a secure expectation of peace. The first principle specifies representative government responsible to the majority; the second and third specify the majority's ends and interests. Together the three generate an expectation of peaceful accommodation among fellow liberals—the liberal zone of peace—and suspicion toward nonliberals. Liberal aggressive imprudence and complaisant indifference are the choices that elected legislatures and executives make, reflecting the preferences (ideas, ideals, and interests) of the governing coalitions elections produce. When galvanized by international threats or pushed by commercial interests, elected governments become aggressive toward nonliberals. When exhausted by war, they become complaisant. Governing coalitions also choose conservative, laissez-faire, or reformist social welfare variants of liberalism, which as discussed, lead to differing foreign policies.

Mitigating trade-offs

If a concern for protecting and expanding the range of international freedom is to shape liberal strategic aims, then foreign policy towards both liberal and nonliberal worlds should be guided by general liberal principles. At a minimum, this should mean rejecting the realist balance of power as a general strategy by refusing to balance against the capabilities of fellow democratic liberals, and trusting the **liberal community**. At its fullest, this also means going beyond the standard obligations of general international law. Membership in the liberal community should imply accepting a **positive duty** to defend other members of the liberal community, to discriminate in certain instances in their favour, and to override in some circumstances the domestic sovereignty of states in order to rescue fellow human beings from intolerable oppressions such as genocide and ethnic cleansing. Authentically liberal policies should in some circumstances call for attempts to secure personal and civil rights, to foster democratic government, and to expand the scope and effectiveness of the world market economy as well as to meet those basic human needs that make the exercise of human rights possible. (See Table 3.1.)

In order to avoid the extremist possibilities of its abstract universalism, liberal policy should be constrained both by a respect for consequences measured in terms of liberal values and by a geopolitical budget. Strategy involves matching what we are prepared to spend with what we want to achieve; it identifies aims, resources, threats, and allies. Balancing the first two, minimizing the third, and fostering the fourth are the core elements of a **liberal foreign policy** that seeks to preserve and expand the community of liberal democracies without violating liberal principles or bankrupting liberal states (Smith, 1994; Muravchik, 1991; Deudney and Ikenberry, 1991/2).[26]

Liberals should not embark upon **crusades for democracy** because in a world armed with nuclear weapons, crusading is suicidal. And in a world where changes in regional balances of power could be extremely destabilizing for ourselves and our allies, indiscriminate provocations of hostility (such as against the People's Republic of China) could create increased insecurity (for Japan and ourselves). Liberals—even liberal hyperpowers such as the United States—simply do not have the excess strength that free them from the need to economize on dangers (as the US is painfully discovering again in Iraq).

Instead, **liberal strategy** for expanding the international community of liberal states should lean toward the defensive. It should strive to protect the liberal community, foster the conditions that might allow the liberal community to grow, and save the use of force for clear emergencies that severely threaten the survival of the community or core liberal values. The strategy should first *preserve*—protecting the community and managing and mitigating the normal tensions among liberal market economies—and then *expand*. Ruling out an offensive state strategy, one

Table 3.1 The liberal community by date[i]

Historical period	Country	Total number
18th century	Swiss Cantons[ii]; French Republic 1790–1795; United States 1776–	3
1800–1850	Swiss Confederation, United States, France (1830–1849), Belgium (1830–), Great Britain (1832–), Netherlands (1848–), Piedmont (1848–), Denmark (1849–)	8
1850–1900	Switzerland, United States, Belgium, Great Britain, Netherlands, Piedmont (1861), Italy (1861–), Denmark (1866), Sweden (1864–) Greece (1864–), Canada[iii] (1867–), France (1871–), Argentina (1880–), Chile (1891–)	13
1900–1945	Switzerland, United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Canada, Greece (1911, 1928–1936), Italy (1922), Belgium (1940), Netherlands (1940), Argentina (1943), France (1940), Chile (1924, 1932), Australia (190l), Norway (1905–1940), New Zealand (1907), Colombia (1910–1949), Denmark (1914–1940), Poland (1917–1935), Latvia (1922–1934), Germany (1918–1932), Austria (1918–1934), Estonia (1919–1934), Finland (1919–), Uruguay (1919–), Costa Rica (1919–), Czechoslovakia (1920–1939), Ireland (1920–), Mexico (1928–), Lebanon (1944–)	29
1945	Switzerland, the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Finland, Ireland, Mexico, Uruguay (1973; 1985), Chile (1973; 1990–), Lebanon (1975), Costa Rica (1948, 1953–), Iceland (1944–), France (1945–), Denmark (1945–), Norway (1945–), Austria (1945–), Brazil (1945–1954, 1955–1964; 1985–), Belgium (1946–), Netherlands (1946–), Italy (1946–), Philippines (1946–1972; 1987–), India (1947–1975, 1977–), Sri Lanka (1948–196l, 1963–1971, 1978–1983, 1988–), Ecuador (1948–1963, 1979–), Israel (1949–), West Germany (1949–), Greece (1950–1967, 1975–), Peru (1950–1962, 1963–1968, 1980–), Turkey (1950–1960, 1966–1971; 1984–), Japan (1951–), Bolivia (1956–1969, 1982–), Colombia (1958–), Venezuela (1959–), Nigeria (1961–1964, 1979–1984), Jamaica (1962–), Trinidad and Tobago (1962–), Senegal (1963–), Malaysia (1963–), Botswana (1966–), Singapore (1965–), Portugal (1976–, Spain (1978–), Dominican Republic (1978–), Ecuador (1978–), Peru (1980–1990), Honduras (1981–), Papua New Guinea (1982–), El Salvador (1984–), Argentina (1983–), Uruguay (1985–), Mauritius (1987–), South Korea (1988–), Taiwan (1988–), Thailand (1988–), Pakistan (1988–), Panama (1989–), Paraguay (1989–), Madagascar (1990–), Mongolia (1990–), Namibia (1990–), Nepal (1990–), Nicaragua (1990–), Poland (1990–), Hungary (1990–), Czechoslovakia (1990–)	68

Table 3.1 *(continued)*

Historical period	Country	Total number
1990–	Switzerland, the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Finland, Ireland, Mexico, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Iceland, France, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Brazil, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Philippines, India, Sri Lanka, Ecuador, Israel, West Germany, Greece, Turkey, Japan, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Senegal, Malaysia, Botswana, Portugal, Spain, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Papua New Guinea, El Salvador, Argentina, Mauritius, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Panama, Paraguay, Madagascar, Mongolia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (1990),	103
	Singapore (1993), Pakistan (1998), Russia (1991–1999), Jordan (1991–2001), Nepal (2003), Bulgaria (1990–), Chile (1990–), Mongolia (1990–), Albania (1991–), Bangladesh (1991–), Benin (1991–), Cape Verde (1991–), Croatia (1991–), Estonia (1991–) Latvia (1991–), Lithuania (1991–), Ukraine (1991–), Slovenia (1991–), Zambia (1991–), Armenia (1992–), Indonesia (1992–), Macedonia (1992–), Mali (1992–), Romania (1992–), Burkina Faso (1993–), Guatemala (1993–), Lesotho (1993–), Yemen (1993–), Guinea-Bissau (1994–), Malawi (1994–), Mozambique (1994–), South Africa (1994–), Georgia (1995–), Ghana (1995–), Sierra Leone (1998–), Kuwait (1999–), Nigeria (1999–), Tanzania (1999–), Bosnia-Herzegovina (2000–), Djibouti (2000–), Niger (2000–), East Timor (2002–), Gambia (2002–), Kenya (2002–)	

[i]This is an *approximate* list of 'liberal regimes' (through 1994, thus including regimes that were liberal democratic as of 1990) drawn up according to the four 'Kantian' institutions described as essential: (1) market and private property economies; (2) polities that are externally sovereign; (3) citizens who possess juridical rights; (4) 'republican' (whether republican or parliamentary monarchy), representative, government. The latter includes the requirement that the legislative branch have an effective role in public policy and be formally and competitively (either inter- or intra-party) elected. Furthermore, I have taken into account whether male suffrage is wide (i.e. thirty per cent) or, as Kant would have had it, open to 'achievement' by inhabitants (for example, to poll-tax payers or householders) of the national or metropolitan territory (Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, in *Kant's Political Writings*, p. 139). This list of liberal regimes is thus more inclusive than a list of democratic regimes, or polyarchies (Powell, 1982: 5). Female suffrage is granted within a generation of its being demanded by an extensive female suffrage movement; and representative government is internally sovereign (including especially over military and foreign affairs) as well as stable (in existence for at least three years). (Banks and Overstreet, 1983; *The Europa Yearbook*, 1985; Gastil, 1985; McColm and Freedom House Survey Team, 1991; Finn et al., 1995.)

[ii]There are domestic variations within these liberal regimes. For example, Switzerland was liberal only in certain cantons; the US was liberal only north of the Mason–Dixon line until 1865, when it became liberal throughout. These lists also exclude ancient 'republics', since none appear to fit Kant's criteria (Holmes, 1979).

[iii]Canada, as a commonwealth within the British empire, did not have formal control of its foreign policy during this period.

should rely primarily on transnational civil society for expansion by three methods: it should begin with 'inspiration', focus on 'instigation', and, thereby, call upon 'intervention' only when necessary.

Preservation

Above all, liberal foreign policy should strive to preserve the pacific union of similarly liberal societies which is not only currently of immense strategic value

(being the political foundation of both NATO and the US–Japanese alliance); it is also the single best hope for the evolution of a peaceful world. Liberals should be prepared, therefore, to defend and formally ally with authentically liberal, democratic states that are subject to threats or actual instances of external attack or internal subversion. Liberals have taken for granted and underestimated the importance of the democratic alliance. Their alliances in NATO, with Japan, ANZUS, and alignments with other democratic states are not only crucial to their present security, but the best hopes for long-term peace and the realization of their ideals. Liberals should not treat them as once useful but now purposeless Cold War strategic alignments against the power of the USSR.

Much of the liberal success in alliance management has to be achieved on a **multilateral basis.**[27] The current need to redefine NATO and the increasing importance of the US relationship with Japan offer us an opportunity to broaden the organization of liberal security. Joining all the democratic states together in a single democratic security organization would secure an important forum for the definition and coordination of common interests that stretch beyond the regional concerns of Europe and the Far East. With the end of the Cold War, pressures toward regionalism are likely to become increasingly strong. In order to avoid the desperate reactions that might follow regional crises such as those of the 1920s and 1930s, a wider alliance of liberal democracies seems necessary. It could reduce pressures on Japan and Germany to arm themselves with nuclear weapons, mitigate the strategic vulnerabilities of isolated liberal states such as Israel, and allow for the complementary pooling of strategic resources (combining, for example, Japanese and German financial clout, with American nuclear deterrence, and American, British, and French expeditionary thrust). The expansion of NATO on the European continent is one part of this security umbrella. It should include all established democratic members and then establish a transitional category for all democratizing states that have yet to experience two democratic elections.

Much of the success of multilateral management will, however, rest on shoring up its economic supports. 'Above $600', Adam Przeworski and colleagues have noted, 'democracies are impregnable and can be expected to live forever' (Przeworski *et al.*, 1995: 297). Below that per capita income level, steady, low-inflation, economic growth is one key to protecting democratic government (ibid: 298). Unilateral solutions to national economic growth (exchange rate depreciation, increased taxation) may be necessary but they are not sufficient and some (long-term protectionism) are neither. To avoid a costly global economic recession calls for continued trade liberalization and expansion of international investment to match whatever contractions of governmental spending and private consumption are needed to contain national inflationary pressures.

Discovering ways to manage global interdependence will call for difficult economic adjustments at home and institutional innovations in the world economy. Under these circumstances, liberals will need to ensure that those suffering losses, such as from market disruption or restriction, do not suffer either a permanent loss of income or exclusion from world markets. Although intense economic interdependence generates conflicts, it also helps to sustain the material well-being underpinning liberal societies and to promise avenues of development to Third World states with markets that are currently limited by low income. To this should be added mutually beneficial measures designed to improve Third World economic performance. Export earnings insurance, international debt management assistance, export diversification assistance, and technical aid are among these. In the case of the truly desperate poor, such as is the condition of some of the populations of Africa, more direct measures of international aid and relief from famine are required, both as a matter of political prudence and of moral duty.

Furthermore, if measures of temporary economic protection are needed, liberal states should undertake these measures only by international negotiation and only when the resulting agreements are subject to a

regular review by all the parties. Otherwise, emergency measures could reverberate into a spiral of isolationism. The liberal community thus needs to create a diplomatic/international atmosphere conducive to multilateral problem solving. Foreign policies conveying a commitment to collective responsibility in United States diplomacy will go far in this direction (Bergsten *et al.*, 1978; Cooper *et al.*, 1978; Stiglitz, 2002: Chapter Nine).

Expansion

Preserving the community is important in part because there are few direct measures that the liberal world can take to foster the stability, development, and spread of liberal democratic regimes. Many direct efforts, including military intervention and overt or covert funding for democratic movements in other countries, discredit those movements as the foreign interference backfires through the force of local nationalism.

Much of the potential success of a policy designed to foster democracy therefore rests on an ability to shape an economic and political environment that indirectly supports or instigates democratic governance and creates pressures for the democratic reform of authoritarian rule.

Politically, there are few measures more valuable than an active human rights diplomacy, which enjoys global legitimacy and (if successful) can assure a political environment that tolerates the sort of dissent that can nourish an indigenous democratic movement. There is reason to pay special attention to those countries entering what Huntington (1981b) has called the **socioeconomic transition zone**—countries having the economic development typically associated with democracy (see also Przeworski, 1995). For them, more direct support in the form of electoral infrastructure (from voting machines to battalions of international observers) can provide the essential margin persuading contentious domestic groups to accept the fairness of the crucial first election.

Following the Second World War, the allied occupation and re-making of Germany and Japan and the Marshall Plan's successful coordination and funding of the revival of Europe's prewar industrial economies and democratic regimes offers a model of how much can be achieved with an extraordinary commitment of resources and the most favourable possible environment (Schwartz, 1991). Practically today, short of those very special circumstances, there are few direct means to stimulate democratic development from abroad apart from *inspiration* and *instigation*.

Inspiration

The simplest programme for liberal expansion is to be the 'City on a Hill'. The success of liberalism at home stands as an example for emulation and a refuge for beleaguered liberals in oppressive countries everywhere. Liberalism, moreover, taps into deep chords of common humanity that lend confidence that all may some day follow a similar path toward liberation, allowing for the appropriate national and cultural differences. Peoples will *liberate themselves* by *modernizing themselves*. One liberal 'strategy' is simply to live up to their own principles at home, and wait for others to modernize themselves.

Francis Fukuyama's striking argument about the 'End of History' presents a radical restatement of the liberal modernization theme, bringing together both its materialist and idealist strains. His study envisions the failure of all forms of autocracy, whether in Eastern Europe or elsewhere, and the triumph of consumer capitalism and democracy under the irresistible onslaught of modernization. Today however, we have mounting evidence that free market capitalism may not even be the quintessential capitalist answer to growth under the conditions of late-late capitalism. The most striking rates of growth of the postwar period appear to have been achieved by the semi-planned capitalist economies of East Asia—Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Japan and now China and India. Indicative planning, capital rationing by parastatal development banks and ministries of finance, managed trade, and incorporated unions—capitalist syndicalism, not capitalist libertarianism—seemed to describe the wave of the capitalist future.[28]

While China's current success (ten per cent annually) with 'market–Leninism' or 'national corporatism' seems to confirm the nonliberal path, the potential for liberalism need not be completely discounted. Economists have raised concerns about whether Asian capitalism can evolve from capital accumulation to 'total factor productivity', which may require a loosening of indicative planning. Thus in China market forces have stimulated the formation of thousands of business and professional groups and greater village level (democratic) self-management. Another route to democratization lies in the institutional routinization of authority, what Minxin Pei has called 'creeping democratization' in the Chinese context (Pei, 1995). Even when leaders are opposed to democratization and even when the forces of civil society lack the power or the interest in promoting a democratization of the state, democratization may 'creep' in. When leaders seek to defend their authority by recruiting allies, ceding to them competency embodied in institutional routines and government structures, then the beginnings of constitutional checks and balances are set in motion. Representing diverse and sometimes extensive interests, the new institutions limit arbitrary power and begin to delegate power in their turn, further institutionalizing a regime. Step by step, the foundations of the rule of law are laid, as they are now (albeit slowly) in China, where new clusters of authority in the National People's Congress—such as the court system and the legal profession, and village councils—are emerging.

Here the roles of global civil society and international civil politics are particularly important. Tourism, educational exchanges, scientific meetings spread tastes across borders; indeed, such transnational contacts with the liberal world seem to have had a liberalizing effect on the many Soviet and East European elites who visited the West during the Cold War, demonstrating both Western material successes (where they existed) and regimes that tolerated and even encouraged dissent and popular participation (when they did) (Deudney and Ikenberry; 1991/92). The international commitment to human rights, including the Helsinki Watch process, found a reflection in Gorbachev's 'universal human values'. The 'Goddess of Liberty' erected in Tiananmen Square represented another transnational expression of ideas shared on a global basis (see Chapter Seventeen).

Intervention

Liberal principles can also help us think about whether liberal states should attempt to rescue individuals oppressed by their own governments. Historically, liberals have divided on these issues.[29] Traditionally, and in accord with current international law, states have the right to defend themselves, come to the aid of other states aggressed against, and take forcible measures to protect where necessary their citizens from wrongful injury and release them from wrongful imprisonment (Cutler, 1985). Modern international law, however, condemns sanctions and force designed to redress the domestic oppression of states. The United Nations Charter is ambiguous on this issue, since it finds human rights to be international concerns and permits the Security Council to intervene to prevent 'threats' to 'international peace and security'.[30]

Choosing a foreign policy of nonintervention has important moral foundations. Nonintervention helps encourage order—stable expectations—in a confusing world without international government. It rests on a respect for the rights of individuals to establish their own way of life free from foreign interference. The basic moral presumption of liberal thought is that states should not be subject to foreign intervention, by military or other means. States should therefore be taken as representing the moral rights of individuals unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. Although liberals and democrats have often succumbed to the temptation to intervene to bring 'civilization', metropolitan standards of law and order, and democratic government to foreign peoples expressing no demand for them, these interventions find no justification in a conception of equal respect for individuals. This is simply because it is to their sense of their own self respect and not

our sense of what they should respect that we must accord equal consideration.

What it means to respect another's sense of self-determination is not always self-evident. Ascertaining what it might mean can best be considered as an attempt at both subjective and objective interpretation. One criterion is **subjective**. We should credit the voice of their majority. Obviously, this means not intervening against states with apparent majority support. In authoritarian states, however, determining what the wishes of the majority are is particularly difficult. Some states will have divided political communities with a considerable share but less than a majority of the population supporting the government, a large minority opposing, and many indifferent. Some will be able to suppress dissent completely. Others will not. Widespread armed resistance sustained by local resources and massive street demonstrations against the state (and not just against specific policies) therefore can provide evidence of a people standing against their own government. Still, one will want to find clear evidence that the dissenters actually want a foreign intervention to solve their oppression. The other criterion is **objective**. No group of individuals, even if apparently silent, can be expected to consent to having their basic rights to life, food, shelter, and freedom from torture systematically violated. These sorts of rights clearly cross-cut wide cultural differences.

Whenever either or both of these violations take place one has a *prima facie* consideration favouring foreign intervention.[31] But even rescuing majorities suffering severe oppression or individuals suffering massive and systematic violations of human rights are not sufficient grounds to justify military intervention. We must also have some reasonable expectation that the intervention will actually end the oppression. We need to expect that it will end the massacre or address starvation (as did India's intervention in East Pakistan and Tanzania's in Uganda). Or, if pro-democratic, that it has a reasonable chance of establishing authentic self-determination, rather than (as J. S. Mill warned) merely introducing foreign rulers who, dependent on outside support, soon begin to replicate the oppressive behaviour of the previous rulers. (The US invasion of Grenada and the covert push in the Philippines seems to qualify; the jury is still out on Haiti and Panama.)

Moreover, the intervention must be a proportional response to the suffering now endured and likely to be endured without an intervention. Countries cannot, any more than villages, be destroyed in order to be saved. We must consider whether means other than military intervention could achieve the liberation from oppression. And we must ensure that the intervention, if necessary, is conducted in a way that minimizes casualties, most particularly noncombatant casualties. In short, we must be able morally to account for the expected casualties of an invasion both to our own soldiers and to the noncombatant victims. Lastly, interventions should incorporate a normal sense of fallibility, together with a decent respect for the opinions of the entire community of nations. Meeting these standards requires a resort wherever feasible to multilateral organizations to guide and legally legitimate a decision to violate the sovereignty of another state.

Conclusion

Liberal foreign policy presents both a promise and a warning. Alliances founded on mutual strategic interest among liberal and nonliberal states have been broken, economic ties between liberal and nonliberal states have proven fragile, but the political bonds of liberal rights and interests have proven a remarkably firm foundation for mutual nonaggression. A separate peace exists among liberal states. But in their relations with nonliberal states, liberal states have not escaped from the insecurity caused by anarchy in the world political system considered as a whole. Moreover, the very constitutional restraint, international respect for individual rights, and shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among liberal states establish grounds for additional conflict irrespective of actual threats to national