Democracy Promotion and the U.S. National Security Strategy:
U.S. National Interest, U.S. Primacy, and Coercion
Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 3 (August 2009)
by Richard Nere
Strategic Insights is a quarterly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of
Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Introduction
As a consequence of anarchy and the insecurity in the international system, the United States
promotes, supports, and defends democracy. In an anarchic international system, the putative
assurance of security for any state is indeed power. The United States retains a salient position in
the international system as a formidable military power. To assure its security in the world the
United States relies on a preponderance of power, and promotes its own form of governance, for
it has proven competent--thus decreasing anarchy. Therefore, if democracy is promoted in this
world, then it is indeed a logical consequence of ubiquitous anarchy--a cause of war in many
cases, that is amongst power rivals. What is more, if in fact a state is coerced, then, to be sure, it
was a logical result of proving baleful. If, however, the state is in fact competent, then, there is
indeed no good reason for coercion. To be realistic, the logical contrapositive is, admittedly, not
the world we live in; instead, it is, in this case, a world where coercion was indeed necessary. A
negative corollary, incidentally, was engagement, and by this I mean, the conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq--a costly resolution for U.S. National security.
The U.S. National Interest
The U.S. national interest is, in fact, for the United States to conduct foreign policy in the interest
of its citizens, and the state relative to other states.[1] What is more, promoting its ideology, as
democracy's existence in the world is vital to the future of the ideology--as well as the United
States. There are three components of the national interest. First, is ensuring the security of the
United States by acquiring power, specifically military power. Second, is sustaining economic
prosperity, that is, of the United States and its allies, and moreover, facilitating the cooperation of
those states that serve this vital interest. Third, is indeed maintaining the stability of the world. In
aggregate, these three components serve as the interests of the most puissant state in the world,
the United States of America.
U.S. Primacy and Security
The history of peace among democratic states, and the restraint presented by this sort of
government indeed explains the decreased uncertainty amongst democratic states, whereby the
uncertainty of a states action can lead to strategic miscalculation, and subsequently war.[2] The
peace between democracies is unique to that type of state, for other types of like societies have
comprised the majority of the international system in the past;[3] however, this did not ensure a
peace. Indeed, democracies are perceived as dovish.[4]
The democratic peace is a noble avenue of research; however, the focus of the paper is the
merits of democracy promotion. A distinct domestic political structure produces a unique process,
and consequently a distinctive behavior.[5] As such, a domestic political structure that can be
compared to that of other states will have similar behavior as a result of this common structure,
though homogeneity shouldn't be expected.[6] As discussed before the system is unipolar, in fact,
the United States is the primus interes pares. As a direct consequence to the structure of the
system being unipolar, the United States determines successful and unsuccessful behavior[7].
The United States' actions have demonstrated that it rewards democratic states, and adhering to
liberal norms. States indeed have a survival motive, however, if a certain domestic political
structure labeled democracy is rewarded in a unipolar system, then a reward could come in the
form of security guarantees, thus, the democratic peace is the rational consequence of a powerful
state rewarding that form of governance, instead of a peace among similar domestic political
structures.[8]
Competent states perceiving the international system correctly conform to the structure of
domestic politics that the most puissant state rewards. As the direct result of this, liberalizing
occurs at the interstate level with the United States' influence. If the democratic peace is to follow
logically from rewarding a particular domestic political structure, then the domestic structure must
conform to the apotheosis of governance, a western-style democracy, for as Waltz posits,
"Anarchy is seen as one end of a continuum whose other end is marked by the presence of a
legitimate and competent government."[9] Therefore, just being a democratic state does not
ensure a democratic peace, since not all democratic states are equal. Instead, non-cartelized
democratic states as set forth by Snyder is the ideal.[10] For a non-cartelized democracy is
indeed rational; that is, in the international arena, as the military lobby rarely influences noncartelized
democracies.
Wilhelmine Germany[11] despite having all of the qualities of a model democracy, was highly
cartelized, and as the principal consequence of this the country went to war.[12] The ideal type of
domestic political structure would be non-cartelized, and thus not susceptible to logrolling.[13]
Democratic states have strategic interests all the same as other states[14]; however, upholding
liberal democracy appears as if it could be explained as a realist, or survival interest, for the
unipolar system rewards those states that conform to a conception of effective governance, with
security incentives. As a result of states conforming to appear more similar to this archetype of
domestic governance, there is indeed less anarchy, whereby the anarchy in the international
system is proportional to the number of incompetent states.
In international politics, there is indeed no state amongst states, thus states in the international
system divested of all attributes except for power capabilities, and differentiated by domestic
political structure, act in an anarchic world. However, the assertion is that the United States as a
salient military power acts as a leader of all states.[15] As a consequence, the United States
promotes democracy as the sole domestic political structure, for this type of domestic political
structure is competent. Therefore, states that--accurately perceiving the unipolar system, and the
rewards of conforming their domestic political structure to a Western model--do in fact
bandwagon rather than balance the United States[16] In the end, there are states with competent
governments in the international system, and as a result of this, there is indeed less anarchy.[17]
The United States, ever since Wilson, has promoted this particular domestic political structure on
its merits.[18] Still, another international relations scholar, Michael Doyle, who is discussed below,
provides evidence to substantiate democracy promotion as an integral part of the United States'
national security strategy.
The promotion of liberal ideas at the interstate level is indeed a means to achieve an end. Strictly
speaking, the end is less insecurity. Indeed, political institutions naturally form to sustain, and
foster, liberal ideas at the domestic level of states within the international system.[19] Thereby,
conforming those states to the archetype of competent governance, western democracy--that is,
when states accurately perceive the international system. Doyle posits a liberal international
theory, and in consequence to this theory, relations between states would indeed be pacified. In
fact, Doyle argues for two specific principles, which in conjunction and taken as principles that
states will respect, are relative to one another, thus providing a foundation for liberal international
theory:
The basic postulate of liberal international theory holds that states have the right to be free from
foreign intervention. Since morally autonomous citizens hold rights to liberty, the states that
democratically represent them have the right to exercise political independence. Mutual respect
for these rights then becomes the touchstone of international liberal theory. When states respect
each other's rights, individuals are free to establish private international ties without state
interference. Profitable exchanges between merchants and educational exchanges among
scholars then create a web of mutual advantages and commitments that bolsters sentiments of
public respect.[20]
As the net result, the merits of democracy promotion are not based on the United States' affinity
for democracy; instead, democracy promotion is substantiated by Doyle's liberal international
theory.
The international system becomes much simpler in a unipolar world, where a single superpower
has a vision for the international system. The United States is a puissant military power; and
moreover, democracy promotion has been an intrinsic component of U.S. foreign policy since it
attained this salient position relative to other states.[21] The United States is fortunate, for the
United States has been clearly perceived as a superpower since World War II; however,
maintaining U.S. primacy through the Cold War was a daunting task, as the world became
bipolar.[22] Yet, after the Soviet Union's fall the international system became unipolar once more.
Throughout this distinct epoch, from Wilson to the Bush Administration, each successive
presidential Administration has either promoted democracy, or supported this form of governance
as a means to an end. If the means is democracy, then the end is, strictly speaking, stability and
less anarchy.
Waltz argues that liberal international theory, an inside out theoroy, is a myth, and is, moreover,
an egregious myth. Inside out theory is, in fact, where the domestic political structure of a state
will determine its foreign policies, thus, if a state's domestic political structure were liberal, then as
a special result the state will pursue liberal foreign policies.[23] Regrettably, inside out theories
are indeed vitiated, when considering liberal states in an anarchic international structure, for there
is no governing authority; that is, there is no state amongst states to compel. But this article
asserts that in a unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar structure states that perceive the structure of the
international system may liberalize their domestic political structure, for the United States rewards
those states as this is considered successful behavior by the United States, a dominant military
power in the international system since WWII. Therefore, the democratic peace is achieved
through the power of a state capable enough to have others conform to an archetype that was set
forth, with the powerful state rewarding the behavior with support.
Doyle contends that U.S. power is insufficient, therefore, to have a democratic peace as a
corollary.[24] In the past, the United States may not have had the wherewithal to prevent
challenges to its interests; however, the United States has proved its ability to maintain security,
as it is has sedulously dealt with terrorism and rogue states after September 11th, and more
precisely, in Iraq where the United States acted unilaterally to ameliorate its security concerns.
Thus, the United States has demonstrated its ability to maintain security relying on a
preponderance of military power. According to Walt, it is indeed diaphanously clear the United
States is capable of maintaining security, for the United States has prevented armed conflict
between European states.[25]
Bush Doctrine
The Bush Doctrine was indeed the United States' national security strategy, under which, to
achieve security in an insecure world, the United States relied on three fundamental pillars:
preventive war, unilateralism, and regime change. It was, in fact, a more aggressive and
proactive foreign policy strategy relative to the national security strategies of previous
Administrations.[26] The Bush Doctrine aimed to achieve the United States' sensitive security
concerns in an insecure world, as rogue states and terrorism posed compelling security concerns.
The United States coerced states that did not adhere to international norms, sponsored terrorism,
and which were determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction.[27] The United States
coerced rogue states that failed to comply on security issues with the threat of war to change their
behavior; and, when diplomacy failed, the United States followed through on the threat.[28] And
to be sure, the United States did follow through on this threat, that is, when a minatory state fails
to comply, as instantiated by the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Bush Administration,
unlike preceding Administrations, no longer treated terrorists as if they were committing crimes;
instead, terrorists were dealt with as the irregular troops at war with the United States.[29]
The Bush Doctrine was based on three pillars. The first pillar was in fact a moral argument, where
the United States was now in a Manichean struggle between good and evil. The second pillar
reevaluated the United States' approach regarding terrorism; as a direct result, terrorism was no
longer perceived as byproduct of economic factors. As such, the United States determined that it
was because of political oppression rather than poverty and hunger that bred terrorism, thus,
regime change would be apposite, as it would give Islamic states the freedoms they want and
deserve, in addition to ameliorating U.S. security concerns regarding terrorism.[30] The third pillar
on which the Bush Doctrine was based was preventive war in those instances where it was the
United States' strategic imperative.[31] In the aggregate, the pillars of the Bush Doctrine
delineated the United States' strategy to promote peace and stability, especially in the Middle
East, as this part of the world is currently, and has historically been a cause of concern.
Balance of Threat
Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory would predict that states, including the United States, will
ally with or balance against the most threatening power rather than the greatest power in the
international system. Whether a state constitutes a threat is a determination made on the
following factors: aggregate power, proximate power, offensive capability, and offensive
intentions.[32] In short, rogue states, though lacking in aggregative powers and offensive
capability, have offensive intentions; in fact, offensive intentions is what gives these states an
aggressive perception rather than aggregate power. The United States reassessed what
constitutes a threat in the international system as a result of the September 11th attacks, and
formulated a national security strategy to ameliorate its security vis--vis these threats. Indeed, as
the direct result of this, the United States determined that rogue states require balancing, for
either these states have used their capabilities to harm the United States, or their offensive
intentions have the potential to pose future security concerns.
When Walt talks of aggregate power it is indeed a state's capability to potentially threaten a state;
in fact, aggregate power includes population, technology, and industrial and military
capability.[33] Proximate power is a states geographic location relative to other states, for a
state's power wanes over distance, hence a state that is in close proximity to another state, has
the ability to menace a particular state more than a state that is far away.[34] Offensive power is
indeed defined as a state's salient offensive capability, which provokes alliances. What is more, a
state that appears aggressive may provoke other states to balance against them based on
offensive intentions.[35] In the aggregate, these four components of Walt's theory indeed help
predict which states pose a threat.
Coercion
The Bush Administration has used blackmail to coerce threats, and consequently, change the
behavior of rogue states. Blackmail is indeed a coercive threat that uses intimidation, not the use
of force, to produce a desirable outcome.[36] The threat of U.S. force is not a commitment, for the
United States' action is conditional on the action or inaction of the threat. Subsequent to 9/11 the
desirable outcomes relative to three different states were for Afghanistan to turn over Bin laden
and shut down terrorist camps; for Iraq to halt its nuclear program; and, moreover, for North
Korea to stop proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To be clear, the threat of war is
favorable to the use of force, for there are indeed costs associated with conflict; however, in the
case of Afghanistan and Iraq, each state proved unreasonable, as both failed to comply with U.S.
demands. Therefore, Afghanistan and Iraq chose the mostly costly option by failing to comply
with U.S. demands. In the end, the United States' conditional threat of war became a
commitment, for the United States fought wars with both Afghanistan, and Iraq.
U.S. National Security
If the United States is indeed a puissant military power, and moreover, the structure of the
international system indicates that the world is unipolar, then the Bush Doctrine is appropriate for
the United States' power position, and in fact, the U.S. national security strategy is apposite for
this the current era. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were indeed applications of the Bush
Doctrine. What is more, these two wars were examples of U.S. power, thus demonstrating the
credibility of any threat the United States makes to another state. Preventive war, unilateralism,
and regime change are indeed principles to exercise the United States' military power.
Afghanistan supported the bin Laden-led terrorism efforts to attack the World Trade Center, and
as a rational consequence the terrorist attack threatened U.S. interests.[37] The United States is
indeed powerful; however, it is vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In short, Afghanistan's Taliban
government aided Al Qaeda, a terrorist organization that attacked the United States The Taliban
government when approached on the issue of terrorism, failed to comply with U.S. requests. The
United States asked for Osama bin Laden, and for the Taliban government to close terrorist
camps.[38] However, the Taliban government was irrational, and thus war was indeed politics
achieved by another means (see Figure 1).[39]
Figure 1
Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory would predict balancing against an irrational Afghanistan.
Afghanistan had limited offensive capabilities; however, the state had supported Al Qaeda
terrorists. Consequently, Afghanistan's offensive intentions, that is, aiding terrorists whose aim is
to attack the United States, was perceived as aggressive and threatening. After September 11th,
Afghanistan would prove the most threatening state for its support of Al Qaeda. Thus, Walt's
theory when applied to these circumstances predicts balancing behavior by the United States to
ameliorate its security concerns; that is, in addition to states allying or expressing support for the
United States, for the state was attacked by the most threatening power in the international
system.[40]
International support for the United States, in consequence to U.S. military action in Afghanistan,
is indeed easily demonstrated, for there were numerous offerings of solidarity from allies in
Europe, and moreover, on September 12, 2001, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1368
condemning the actions of "those responsible for aiding, supporting, or harbouring the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts." To be clear, the UN authorized action to
this threat; however, the authorized action was ambiguous. In any case, the United States
responded with U.S.-led coalition forces. Thus, the offensive intentions of Afghanistan were
threatening, for the Taliban government openly supported Al Qaeda.[41] As such, the
international community expressed support for action against the Taliban government.
If, then, Afghanistan were rational, Afghanistan would appease the United States by turning over
bin Laden and shutting down all terrorist camps. Alas, Afghanistan resisted, and moreover, the
U.S. threat of war became a commitment, for Afghanistan would continue to pose a security risk,
as the September 11th terrorists were linked to Al Qaeda. The Bush Doctrine's application in this
case appropriately dealt with the security risk using political influence, preventive war, and regime
change. Afghanistan was a rogue state that was not deterred by the threat of war; however,
regime change served U.S. security interests.
To be frank, Iraq also posed a security concern to the United States post-9/11, and to be sure,
the U.S. national security strategy was sufficient to deal with this threat.[42] The argument is
made by discussing the Saddam-led regime's history of aggressiveness in the context of a post-
9/11 world, where U.S. security concerns were sensitive. Iraq has had a history of aggressive
behavior, as it waged war against Iran throughout the 1980s in addition to invading Kuwait in
1990. What is more, the regime pursued WMD in the 1990s and early in the twentieth century to
gain power relative to other Middle Eastern states and eventually assert itself as a regional power
in the process. However, the process of Iraq asserting itself as a regional power would involve
war; thus, Saddam's ambitions threatened peace and security in the Middle East.
The United States since the Clinton Administration had determined that regime change in Iraq
was the panacea for the problems that Saddam's Administration posed. In 1998, the Iraq
Liberation Act documented Saddam's use of chemical weapons, and discussed Iraq's WMD
programs. Clinton had branded Iraq as a rogue regime that had ambitions that could not be
deterred. As a logical consequence, the Clinton Administration launched Operation Desert Fox,
which was a strategic military mission to destroy the Saddam-led regime's WMD capacity.
However, the extent to which Saddam had a WMD capacity was indeterminable as U.N.
inspectors were ejected in response to the attack, and were not allowed back until November
2002. What is more, U.S. intelligence and reports by UN inspectors from 1997-1999 had
concluded that information concerning Saddam's weapons program was inconclusive; therefore,
there was uncertainty as to Iraq's capabilities.
What made the Saddam-led regime a baleful rogue state was indeed its history of war with Iran,
and Kuwait, as well as its WMD program. Therefore, the history of Iraq's aggressive behavior,
and moreover, with Iraq having WMD capabilities, made Saddam what Clinton had declared:
"The greatest threat to our security in the 21st century." An adducer to Clinton's assertion is
Saddam's history of non-compliance, misleading UN inspectors, and Iraq's industrial capacity
through which biological weapons could be produced; all these factors in the aggregate
contributed to the state's aggressive perception.
The United States' and the UN Security Council's objective was to disarm Iraq, and in doing so
they provided many opportunities to avert war as a means to achieve this end. Security Council
Resolution 1441 was in fact a final attempt for the regime to cooperate, and disarm. Alas,
detractors would state that UN inspectors had inspected Iraq on numerous occasions with the
objective of finding evidence of WMD; however, these inspections were to no avail, as no WMD
was found. Yet, Richard Butler, UN arms inspector, stated in his reports to the UN that
inspections were premised on Saddam's cooperation. Regrettably, Saddam, a rational policy
maker, was a power maximizer, for he was positing foreign policy, therein, an anarchic system.
Indeed Iraq's national interest was to ensure their WMD capacity remained surreptitious, thus, if
WMD were not found, then it is perhaps a result of Saddam preserving the Iraqi national interest,
instead of Iraq not having WMD
The Saddam-led regime having access to WMD would lead to instability in the Middle East, as
WMD would increase Iraq's power relative to other Middle Eastern states. As such, the balance
power would shift in favor of Iraq, which would allow Iraq to coerce its neighbors. The United
States is influenced by its power position in the world and has an interest in maintaining stability
throughout the world. President George H.W. Bush, Sr., went to war with Iraq, more precisely,
when Iraq invaded Kuwait. To be clear, as a result of Iraq's actions the balance of power would
shift in Iraq's favor.[43] The Bush Administration has done the same with Operation Iraqi
Freedom, since Iraqi WMD would shift the balance of power, and the net result would be
instability.
Figure 2
To be honest, Iraq proved irrational, for Iraq had opportunities to comply with U.S. demands (see
Figure 2 above). Unfortunately, Saddam chose not to cooperate, and as a regrettable
consequence would upset the balance of power in the region. As such, Iraq posed a security
threat. Therefore, the United States sought regime change to restore security. Saddam should
have complied, especially after the United States had threatened Afghanistan with a commitment
of war in the event the state did not comply. As Figure 2 demonstrates when Iraq resists, and the
United States punishes, it is the most costly scenario. Iraq was a security concern, for it failed to
comply. What is more, the potential harm the regime posed to the United States was less than
the harm the United States posed to Saddam, in consequence, the scenario was indeed
asymmetrical. Figure 2 gives an accurate portrayal of the bargaining the two states were engaged
in regarding WMD.
Balance of Threat theory pontificated by Stephen Walt would predict balancing against Iraq, for
after Afghanistan the state was perceived as a threat to peace and stability in the Middle East.
Iraq's WMD ambition would lead to instability in the Middle East. Thus, the state's offensive
intentions, and its aggregate power, proved menacing, for a stronger Iraq would upset the
balance of power. Alas, the threat posed by Iraq was not perceived as an imminent one by the
international community, for the state's offensive intentions did not lead to action.[44] However,
the United States' national security strategy was formulated in a world where security is not
assured, therefore, preventive war, unilateral intervention, and regime change were called for to
ameliorate U.S. security.
Conclusion
In sum, the United States promotes democracy as a distinct domestic political structure, for it is
competent, and decreases anarchy in the international system. To be clear, peace and stability
are assured--that is, if the United States exerts its military power. What is more, as a result of the
U.S. presence abroad, there is indeed a peace among democratic states. The evaluation of the
Bush Doctrine substantiates the assertion that the United States acts in a manner to assure
international peace and stability. Above all, coercion was apposite, that is, as an expedient to
security. Thus in the end, it is indeed veritable that as a consequence of anarchy and insecurity,
the United States promotes, supports, and defends democracy.
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References
1. Karl Von Vorys defines the U.S. national interest in American National Interest: Virtue and
Power in Foreign Policy. (New York: Praeger, 1990), 19-32.
2. Wars are based on uncertainty which is a problem with states; each individual state has
security concerns, and makes strategic considerations based upon their status in the international
hierarchy. Based on the aforementioned considerations states make decisions rooted in chaos, or
uncertainty: "First outside the pacific union, liberal regimes, like all other states, are caught in the
international state of war Hobbes and realists describe. Conflict and wars are a natural outcome
of struggles for resources, prestige, and security among independent states; confusion is an
unsurprising accompaniment in a state of war without reliable law or organization." Michael W.
Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, No. 4
(Autumn 1983), 324.
3. That like societies won't fight is not true, since feudal and totalitarian states fight each other;
meaning that the peace amongst liberal states is unique to those states due to their distinct traits:
"Second, at the level of social determinants, some might argue that relations among any group of
state with social structures or with compatible values would be peaceful. But again, the evidence
for feudal societies, communist societies, fascist societies, or socialist societies does not support
this conclusion. Feudal warfare was frequent and very much a sport of the monarchs and nobility.
There have not been enough truly totalitarian, fascist powers to test fairly their pacific
compatibility; but fascist powers in the wider sense of nationalist, capitalist, military dictatorships
fought each other in the 1930s." Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,"
Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, No. 3 (Summer 1983), 222.
4. Democratic states have a unique peace between themselves because they are perceived as
dovish, which decreases the uncertainty of actions; therefore increasing how secure democracies
feel when dealing with other democracies, "We should begin the common assertion that
democracies are inherently more peaceful or `dovish' internationally because of the political
culture favoring the peaceful resolution of disputes, or because the democratic processes
produce restraint by the general populace which will have to pay the price of war in blood and
money. Individual examples of the operation of these factors can be easily found. Over the
course of a long war democratic governments may experience seriously eroding domestic
support for the war effort, and may feel constrained, if they do go to war, to pursue strategies
designed to minimize their own costs, especially in casualties." Bruce Russett, Grasping the
Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993), 30.
5. "Political structures shape political processes, as can best be seen by comparing different
governmental systems." Kenneth N. Waltz. Theory of International Politics (New York: McGrawHill,
1979), 82. Also: "Political structure produces a similarity in process and performance so long
as a structure endures," 87.
6. Ibid, 87.
7. Ibid., 92-93.
8. Stephen M. Walt, "American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls," Naval War College Review
LV, No. 2 (Spring 2002), 9.
9. Waltz, Op. Cit., 114.
10. Some American scholars thought that Wilhelmine Germany was the very model of a modern
democratic state with a wide suffrage, honest elections, a legislature that controlled the purse,
competitive parties, a free press, and a highly competent bureaucracy. But in the French, British,
and American view after August 1914, it turned out that Germany wasn't a democracy of the right
kind. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War." International Security 25, No. 1
(Summer 2000), 7.
11. Ibid., 7. Also see: Ido Oren, "The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic' Peace: Changing U.S.
Perceptions of Imperial Germany," International Security 20, no. 2 (Fall 1995), 156-157.
12. Jack Snyder. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1991), 45.
13. Snyder discusses how cartelized powers can be propelled into conflict:"Cartelized politics can
produce somewhat different forms and degrees of overexpansion, depending on precisely which
groups are represented and on the strength of the coalition leaders who act as brokers." Ibid., 44.
14. Bruce Russett, "The Democratic Peace--And Yet it Moves," in Debating the Democratic
Peace, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1996), 350: "There is not need to jettison the insight of realism which tell us that power and
strategic considerations affect states' decisions to fight each other. But neither should one deny
the limitations of those insights, and their inability to explain many of those insights, and their
inability to explain many of these instances when liberal states have chosen not to fight or
threaten one another. The danger resides in 'vulgar realism's" vision of war."
15. After World War II, the United States led Europe in the post-war reconstruction efforts. See
John Ikenberry, "Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony," American Foreign Policy:
Theoretical Essays, ed. John Ikenberry (New York: Pearson Education, 2005,) 111-135.
16. Schweller discusses bandwagoning for profit, and forsecurity. Earlier in this article, several
papers were mentioned that dealt with bandwagoning and forms of appeasement. Randall
Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International
Security 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), 82.
17. "Anarchy is seen as one end of a continuum whose other end is marked by the presence of a
legitimate and competent government." Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Op. Cit., 114.
18. Oren, Op. Cit., 170-171.
19. Doyle, Op. Cit., 206-7.
20. Doyle, Op. Cit., 213
21. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 31.
22. Ikenberry, Op. Cit. Also see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical appraisal of postwar
American national (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 94, 190, 205-6, 319-26. In Gaddis'
book Kennan asserts that the Russian's had superior conventional military forces, and had
developed their atomic weapons program to the point where the Russians had neutralized the
U.S. advantages. Thus, it was tough to retain military primacy through the Cold War.
23. Waltz, Op. Cit., 60-64.
24. Doyle, Op. Cit., 223.
25. In Walt's "American Primacy," Op. Cit., 11-13, he states that American troops are there to
assure their security. Also see Ikenberry, Op. Cit., 115-131.
26. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay. America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 65-77.
27. See the White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
Washington, DC, 2002, 14.
28. Ibid., 15. Thomas Schelling discusses deterrence in Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1960), 6 -20. With deterrence, when properly applied, a state is deterred from
carrying out an action because of the threat of harm/war; the state is coerced, and thus
blackmailed.
29. See Norman Podhoretz, "World War IV: How it Started, What it Means, and Why We Have to
Win," in The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq, ed. Gary Rosen (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 112: "Irregular troops of a military alliance at war with the
United States."
30. See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, iv.
31. Ibid., 6, 15-16. Also see Podhoretz, Op. Cit., 126- 132.
32. Walt, Op. Cit., 9-12.
33. Ibid., 9.
34. Ibid.,10-11.
35. Ibid., 12.
36. Mearsheimer discusses blackmail "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics," Op. Cit., 152-3.
37. Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis
Group, 2005), 41. Ahmed discusses how Afghanistan supported bin Laden, as a consequence of
aiding bin Laden, the U.S. was attacked. "Throughout the 1980s religious extremists gained
ground against their moderate and secular counterparts within the Afghan Diaspora and
resistance, and after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, within Afghanistan itself. Following the Soviet
withdrawal, as the holy warriors fought among themselves for power, forging and breaking
alliances, another contender for power-the Taliban emerged in 1994. By 1996 this diverse group
of Pashtun military commanders and religious leaders and their students (Taliban) had gained
control over most of the state. It is these Pashtun commanders, clerics, and their cadre who
became bin Laden's hosts and protectors in Afghanistan." Samina Ahmed, "The United States
and Terrorism in Southwest Asia: September 11 and Beyond," International Security 26, No. 3.
(Winter, 2001-2002), 80.
38. Podhoretz, Op. Cit., 124.
39. Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (New
York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004), 98: "War is about changing peoples minds or at least their
behavior."
40. Walt, Op. Cit., 8-9.
41. Ibid., 8-9.
42. Podhoretz, Op. Cit., 18-35.
43. According to Podhoretz, "A strong adherent of the 'realist' perspective on world affairs, he
believed that the maintenance of stability was the purpose of American foreign policy, and the
only wise and prudential course to follow. Therefore, when Saddam Hussein upset the balance of
power in the Middle East by invading Kuwait in 1991, the elder Bush went to war not to create a
new configuration in the region but to restore the status quo ante." Ibid., 118.
44. The U.S. failed to garner international support for a Second U.N. Security Council resolution
after Security Council Resolution 1441. Iraq still posed a threat. As such, the U.S. intervened
unilaterally. Daalder and Lindsay, Op. Cit., 129-144.