US National Security Policy
Fall 2009
Masaryk University
Dave McCuan
Weeks 3, 4
Who Are the Terrorists? And, Is
Radicalization a "New"
Phenomena?
Placing Recent Terrorists & TerrorRelated
Events into the Context of
US Nat' Security Policymaking
How Do we Define Terrorism?
* Using Hoffman (1998, 2006) & the consensus of most academic
researchers on Terror, we arrive at this definition:
­ " ... anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action,
employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state
actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons,
whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of
violence are not the main targets (Hoffman, 2006:41).
­ Victims of violence chosen randomly (targets of opportunity)
or selectively (representative or symbolic targets)... serve as
message generators (Hoffman, 2006:41).
­ Communication processes between terrorist, victims, and
main targets... manipulate the main target (audience(s)),
turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a
target of attention, depending on whether intimidation,
coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought" (Schmid, 1988).
Does 9/11 signal the "Dawn of a New Era" of terror?
1. Reasons For: New type of "Asymmetrical warfare;"
2. New groups, new strategies, & new tactics adopted
by terror organizations;
3. Post-Cold War period characterized with the rise of
statelessness, & state failure.
4. Reasons Against: Historical periodization;
5. Antiquity;
6. Roman Era;
7. French Revolution;
8. The modern era & escalations in conflict.
*What has happened since 9/11 that also may signal the
"Dawn of a New Era?"
Let's Continue Thinking About Placing
"Terrorism" Into Further Context
A Change in Our Understanding of Others?
A Change in Our Understanding of Others?
A "New Era" with "Old Rules?"
Around an Area of Traditional Focus for Western
Policymakers
With New Challenges Into the Mix
World Order: The Promise of Past Conflicts
* Peace of Westphalia
­ Territorial Integrity
­ Political Independence
­ Equality in Law & Recognition of the Rule of Law
­ Inherent Right of Self-defense
* World War I: "Sue for Peace"
* World War II: Stretch of war across a newly created
"middle class"
* United Nations: Democratic visibility; smaller world;
diversity of nations, numbering between 150 &
approaching 200
Significance of the End of Cold War
* Loosed tensions originally confined by a bi-polar
world
* Weak states foster crime and conflict
­ All conflict becomes a breeding ground for corruption,
organized and transnational crime, and terrorism
* Balkans, Iraq, former Soviet client states, African conflict
areas
* The Fall of the Wall added to tensions:
­ Created additional space for OC which became
increasing transnational
­ Privatization permitted corruption
­ Started the trend toward open borders
­ Opened door to tensions b/t Geneva Convention (GC)
and the LOAC
Today's Threats are Transnational
* From 1648 until Post WWII, threats to
security were defined by borders
* Aggressor states no longer the primary
cause of transnational problems
* Threats exist in weakened states
* Gives rise to our distinction today between:
­ State-supported/sponsored terrorism; and
­ State-sanctioned terrorism
Add'l Contemporary Threats
* International
Terrorism
* "Official" Corruption
* Environment
* Natural Disaster
* WMD/Proliferation
* Genocide
* Inter-State Conflict
* Espionage
* Economic Espionage
* Transnational
Organized Crime
* Supply Chain
* Front Companies
* Cyber Threats
­ Virtual Reality;
­ Uncertain Violent
Impact
"...warfare seeks to conquer territories and
capture cities;
...terrorism seeks to hurt a few people and
to scare a lot of people in order to make a
point" NY Times, 1/6/2000
"Putting the horror in the minds of the audience, and
not necessarily on the screen"
Thoughts on  in Conflict & Terrorism to This
Point for US Nat'l Security Policymaking
Fear always springs from ignorance.
Emerson, 1837
Early History of Terrorism
Terror long has been used to achieve
political ends and has a long history
As early as 66 ­ 72 A.D., resisting Roman
occupation, terrorists killed Roman soldiers
and destroyed Roman property.
Terror was used to resist occupation.
Early History of Terrorism
Suicidal martyrdom represented being killed
by invaders which resulted in rewards in
heaven. It dates back thousands of years
in most societies and religions.
Terrorism against the enemy is often viewed
as a religious act.
Modern History of Terrorism
The term "terrorism" was coined in the French
Revolution's Reign of Terror (1793 ­ 1794). .
This was the birth of Government-Sponsored
Terrorism
The line between terrorism and political
violence is often blurred
Goal: of State terrorism was to eliminate
opposition, consolidate power, e.g., the
Vanished in Argentina
Modern History of Terrorism
Anarchists were seen in the late 19th
century
Individual terrorism
The use of selective terror against an
individual in order to bring down a
government, e.g. Lincoln assassination
Propaganda by deeds ...terrorists acts
Terrorism became tool of communication,
propaganda
Modern History of Terrorism:
Middle 20th century, terrorism became a tool
used by both sides of colonial conflicts.
The last 20 years of the 20th century
religious based terrorism became more
and more frequent.
Another format is economic terrorism, which
destructs industry and agriculture system.
Modern History, cont'd
Terrorism is Asymmetric Warfare (AS):
Asymmetric Warfare (AS) is the use of
apparently random/unpredictable violence
by an weak military against a stronger
military to gain advantage. (Allen, 1997).
The key of AW is using unexpected,
unconventional tactics in combat (Craig,
1998).
Our Terrorism Conclusions: One Month In
Terrorism is an ancient tactic.
Terrorism is a mode of communication.
Terrorism is a special type of violence and
Asymmetrical warfare.
Terrorism is used in times of peace, conflicts
and war.
Terrorism is designed to make a point, through
socio-psychological & media covered means in
order to incite fear.
Terrorism is a political act.
Terrorism is designed to be promulgated
rationally.
Why did Terrorism Draw
Considerable Attention in 2001?
The risk of dying from terrorism was extremely
low in 1990s, and was still relatively low
compared with some diseases in 2001
But the death rate increased by 500 times in
2001 due to Sept. 11
Overall the death rate of terrorism has not been
high
Despite the low risk, shock, surprise and fear
engulfed the United States and world
Part II
Placing Terrorism & Political
Violence Into Context:
How Terrorism is Rational
ˇ Is there a common structure of modern warfare that remains more or
less constant across diverse wars that affects national security?
* Aside from the inherent interest of this question, the answer can
have important implications for the practical conduct of war,
including Counter-Terror (CT) response strategies by policymakers,
policy planners, and students of IR and of US politics.
* What is the relationship between terrorism and modern warfare?
* The distinction between the two is often blurred, e.g., in the concept
of the "war on global terrorism". But there does appear to be a real
relationship there and knowledge of its nature will be very welcome.
Introduction, Part II
ˇ There are remarkable regularities and similarities in the size
distribution of violent events in Colombia, Iraq, Afghanistan,
Indonesia, Israel-Palestine and Northern Ireland
* Even in minor (?) or "unknown" conflicts, we have similar results,
with interesting variation. Take the cases of Casamance (Southern
Senegal, former Portugese colonial area, near Gambia, subject to a
separatist movement for the independence of the Casamance & the
ethnic group of the Jola through the insurgency efforts of the
"Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance"), and global
terrorism in general, or the US Civil War, and the Spanish Civil War.
* We can understand the findings for modern wars in terms of a model
of the coalescence and fragmentation of insurgent groups.
* One can learn about the nature of an insurgency from studying the
size distribution of casualties that it throws up.
Introduction, Part II
ˇ Hammes (2004) argues that typical wars these days are irregular,
guerrilla, or terrorist-type affairs. Pentagon planners are trapped in a
time warp, preparing for increasingly irrelevant conventional wars in
his view.
* Lind et. al. (1989) wrote earlier of "Fourth Generation War" (4GW)
marked by greater battlefield dispersion, importance of small,
manoeuvrable groups, diminished need for centralized logistics,
blurred distinctions between military and civilian targets, parallels
with terrorism and emphasis on breaking the will of the enemy.
* A key idea here is that there are important commonalities that apply
across a range of modern wars.
Introduction, Part II
Thinking About "Generations of Warfare"
War & large-scale conflict has emerged in a systematic manner & can be
placed into stages or generations.
Modern war begins with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia in which European
states claim a monopoly on waging war.
A. First Generation War (1GW) - War of the organized line and column; in use
from 1648 to 1860.
B. Second Generation War (2GW) - Attrition warfare characterized by
massive firepower and extensive casualties. Prototype is World War One; in
use from 1860 to present. Militaries are vast, bureaucratic and slow-moving.
C. Third Generation War (3GW) - Maneuver warfare, best characterized by
the German World War Two Blitzkrieg. Used from 1940 to present. Rapid
and mobile warfare that inflicts psychological as well as physical damage.
D. Fourth Generation War (4GW) - Irregular warfare. Also called asymmetric
war, guerilla war, terrorism, low-intensity conflict, etc. Often waged by nonstate
entities such as tribes, clans, families, criminal organizations, religious
groups, ethnic/racial groups and related. In use currently, date of creation ?
Putting the Puzzle Together, Part A
* How thinkers have conceptualized "war" & "conflict:"
A. Sun Tzu (~400 B.C.) - Know yourself and your enemy; use
deception and subversion to be enigmatic to your enemy. Shape his
perceptions and manipulate him. Employ the expected and
unexpected. Strive to defeat your enemy before fighting him.
B. Karl von Clausewitz ("On War" ~1832) - Obstacles to employing
military force: friction, uncertainty, and inflexibility.
1. Friction - errors and miscues which affect all armies.
2. Uncertainty - What are your forces doing; what are those
of the enemy doing?
3. Inflexibility - the larger the force, the more inflexible it is;
large formations have fire power but are difficult to move.
C. Pentagon Thinkers, Cold War Era: Von Clausewitz devoted effort to
reducing these effects on his forces, but not on multiplying them in the
enemy as Sun Tzu recommends.
Putting the Puzzle Together, Part B
* Revolutionary Socialism of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (mid-1800s):
A. Corrupt capitalist societies of 1800s: privileged elites exploit the
masses; such societies can be toppled from within.
B. Misery of masses and unwillingness of elites to address it will
lead to a precipitating event - or crisis - which enables the
revolutionary vanguard to lead the masses to destruction of the old
state and creation of the new.
C. Boyd: Crises and Vanguards are the 'golden keys' to unlocking
the power of insurgency, guerilla war and revolution.
D. Mao Zedong unites revolutionary socialism, guerilla warfare
methods, conventional war and Sun Tzu into a powerful new
form of guerilla warfare. Wins Chinese Civil War and drives
Nationalist forces out of mainland China.
Putting the Puzzle Together, Part C
Historical practitioners of guerilla warfare: T.E. Lawrence Lawrence of
Arabia, Allied Resistance Movements of WW2, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh
& Vo Nguyen Giap in Vietnam. Lawrence, in The Twelve Pillars of
Wisdom, writes of guerilla war:
* Guerillas must operate among the people and hide among them
* He is inconspicuous, and does not afford his enemy a clear target; he is
"everywhere and nowhere."
* The guerilla movement should possess a sanctuary in which to train, refit
and plan operations.
* The guerilla engages the enemy at the time and place of his choosing.
When the enemy is strong, retreat; when he is weak, attack.
* The guerilla can win if he outlasts a foreign invader; he is in his own
country and the enemy must eventually return to his homeland.
* The guerilla does not have to win militarily; he has only to convince his
opponent to abandon the fight.
* Conventional forces and guerillas can be used together in the open
when both are strong enough and have the advantage.
Fourth Generation Warfare ­ Post-Vietnam Thinking, in Pentagonese
How could the U.S. be perceived as losing the war in Vietnam despite
overwhelming military superiority?
Was it all politics back home?
We know previous contributions: T.E. Lawrence, Chairman Mao, General Giap
and the others had shown him the answers. In Vietnam, America had been
beaten by a sophisticated 4GW opponent, and not merely a bunch of simple
peasant guerillas.
The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had operated inside the American
psyche using this knowledge to "out-spirit," according to these Pentagon
thinkers, our war efforts at the moral-mental-physical levels, thereby
defeating us. Moreover, they concluded:
* Western militaries focus on the strategic-operational-tactical levels of war.
* There is a "New Trinity:" people-ideas-technology, and he believed wars are
fought, in order of importance, at the moral-mental-physical levels.
* Their conclusions: "Machines don't fight wars - people do. And they use
their minds."
* Most western armies are focused on "breaking things and killing people,"
the physical side of war. This is exactly opposite of what should be
emphasized - the moral, then the mental, and then the physical.
Application of this Learning to The Long War, the GWOT, & Terrorism,
Part D
* Why is Fourth-Generation War so difficult to understand and defeat?
"At the heart of this phenomenon, Fourth Generation war, is not a military but a
political, social and moral revolution: a crisis of legitimacy of the state. All
over the world, citizens of states are transferring their primary allegiance
away from the state to other things: to tribes, ethnic groups, religions,
gangs, ideologies and so on. Many people who will no longer fight for their
state will fight for their new primary loyalty."
- William Lind *
Military force alone is incapable of' restoring legitimacy to a state, so there
can be no purely military solution to the problem of 4GW.
* The central paradoxes of 4GW: What works at the strategic or tactical level
often fails at the moral level. Moreover, weakness is actually strength much
of the time in 4GW.
* Appropriate analogy of 4GW: "David vs. Goliath"
ˇ Previous work by Clauset and Young (2005) has used the MIPT
database (now START database) and found "power laws" in
terrorism.
* This research found coefficients of 1.7 for G7 targets and 2.5 for
non-G7 targets.
* Recently, scholars used the ITERATE database & sifting through the
records of major international terrorist attacks, 1968-2004, finding
similar results.
* Thus, non-G7 terrorism looks much like a new war and G7 terrorism
looks much like an old war.
Terrorism as a Tactic: Rationality in Action
Log-Log plots of 1 ­ the Cumulative Distribution Function for
Severity of Events for non G7 Terrorism
Log-Log plots of 1 ­ the Cumulative Distribution Function for
Severity of Events for G7 Terrorism
Log-Log plots of 1 ­ the Theoretical Cumulative Distribution Function
for Severity of Events for old wars, new wars and terrorism
Log-Log plots of 1 ­ the Theoretical Cumulative Distribution Function
for Severity of Events for old wars and new wars (without Iterate)
Part III
Where does this leave us?
How are we to conceptualize this moment in
history and the importance of
terrorism/political violence in this era?
An Introduction To
Asymmetric Warfare (AW), 4th Generation
Warfare (4GW), and the 5th Wave of Violence
Credits needed here.
Sources:
http://www.picsearch.com
http://www.cs.cas.cz/ hakl/ Art_Galery/ Caravaggio_Michelangelo, _1573-1610
Asymmetric Warfare (AW)
Asymmetric Warfare (AW)
* What is it? Traditional examples:
­ David and Goliath warfare
* Unsophisticated vs the sophisticated (technologically)
* Poor countries or entities against rich countries or rich entities
* Threat can be internal or external (i.e. Israel, Vietnam or
Afghanistan)
­ Often state sponsored/supported
­ Attacking opponent via indirect means such as
* Terrorism
* Critical infrastructure attacks
* Avoids combat w/ conventional forces
* Tends to have a purpose that focuses on a force, but not always the
case
* Misc. unconventional means i.e., poisoning water/food supplies,
exploitation of media by staging scenes to sway public opinion.
* Examples? Vietnam, Hannibal, A-bomb, War & Peace tactics
(Tolstoy), computer hackers, deception tactics (i.e. Serb/Iraqi
decoys against coalition aircraft); use of children, non-traditional
combatants as soldiers.
Asymmetric Warfare (AW)
* Why is it used by actors against "superior" forces?
­ Exploits over-reliance on technology
­ Attacks "superiority" belief that homeland is an open society & belief that the US
is impervious to a foreign attack. "Complacency kills"
­ Can hit anytime, anywhere, anything
­ Used to exploit greed or selfishness; legal & illegal businesses turning the blind
eye to activities that could harm the security of the US i.e., immigrant smuggling,
drug dealing, money laundering, illegal selling of technologies and equipment.
­ Uneducated advisors to senior government officials, or the officials themselves,
who deploy forces w/out long-term considerations.
­ Superior Nation's forces deployed for perceived "quick fix" ops forces become
isolated from the local populace over a period of time, eventually becoming a soft
target because of the force being perceived as an occupation force vice a
helping hand. Examples: US forces in Vietnam; Somalia; Soviet forces in
Afghanistan; potential exists for forces stretched out all over the current Balkans
region i.e. Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia.
4th Generation Warfare (4GW)
* Formless and most deadly kind of war
* 4GW ops are intelligence driven (i.e. WTC attack; China's
hacker attacks on US.) Countering the threat requires an
intensive intelligence effort to drive counter-4GW ops.
* Requires constant preparation and resourcefulness
* Distinguishing a combatant from a non-combatant can be
extremely difficult (i.e. use of mosques or churches to plan
terrorist attacks - Levant/Asia; refugees/displaced persons
infiltrated w/ agent provocateurs - Balkans; exploitation of
fragmented cultures w/in a country for purposes of breaking
down a society - al-Qa'ida vs US; exploitation of rules of
engagement as in Somalia.)
4GW ­ Pentagon Thinking
"Fourth generation war will require much more intelligence
gathering, analysis, and a greater dissemination capability to
serve a highly flexible, interagency command system. At the
same time, the fact that fourth generation war will include
elements of earlier generations of war means our forces must be
prepared to deal with these aspects as well ... therefore, it will be
essential for leaders to make an accurate analysis of the war they
are about to enter. The complex mix of generations of war with
their overlapping political, economic, social, military, and mass
media arenas makes determining the type of war we are entering
more critical than ever".
-Col T.X. Hammes, USMC, "The Evolution of War: The Fourth
Generation," (see http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/hammes.htm)
4th Generation Warfare (4GW)
* What is it?
­ Stateless, or can be state, supported warfare w/ possible
interstate spillover
­ Hides behind religion/ideologies
* Examples? WTC; anthrax attacks; EMP/FRY weaponry; US vs.
Iraq
* Why dangerous?
­ Current us forces designed to fight against a nation state
­ Our over-reliance on technology
­ War and transnational crime intertwined - hard to see enemy
(gangs, mercenaries, narco-traffickers, religious extremists,
rogue states, and mafias)
­ Can hit anytime, anywhere, anything and anyone
Sources Of AW & 4GW Conflict
* Lack of resources
­ Growing population (4 billion early 70s; now 6 billion)
­ Lack of water
­ Lack of arable land
­ Lack of food
­ Lack of land
­ Lack of minerals
­ Information/technology i.e. China
* Examples of all the above Israel, Syria, Jordan, Haiti, Africa and
Afghanistan. Haves and have-nots
­ Especially multi-ethnic areas i.e. Liberia, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia
and Somalia.
­ Nepotism - clans taking care of their own
Sources Of AW And 4GW
Conflict (Cont'd)
* Major trends
­ Fragmentation - large nation breaking down into smaller states.
­ Integration - global networking in terms of international commerce,
communications, and production of goods. "Blurred distinction of war
and peace"
* I.e. WTC, anthrax attack.
­ "Technology's role - The technologies which support globalization of
commerce are recognized and exploited by 4GW actors.
* WWW and global financial networks have established "lines of
communication" (LOC) for export of western culture and free markets.
* 4GW actors with a little funding can use these LOCs as avenues of
advance/attack.
* Exploitation of websites that contain sensitive unclassified information; and
* Exploitation of websites that contain classified information, but posted on the
Internet because of a strong belief in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA.)
Tactics Of AW / 4GW
* Ethnic cleansing
* Human shields
* Attacking C4I networks
* Exploitation of Rules of Engagement (ROEs) / Laws of War, Laws of Armed
Conflict (LOW / LOAC)
* Exploitation of US laws/US Constitution and presence of vague laws to fight
the GWOT, i.e. John Walker Lindh & Jose Padilla & the presses abused
right to freedom of speech
* World Trade Center
* Employment of WMD
* Exploitation of humanitarian relief orgs i.e. Red Crescent, CAIR, etc...
* Flooding refugees into neighboring countries (regional instability)
Objectives Of AW / 4GW
* "Objectives of 4GW - varies, but includes:
ideological objectives (i.e. Islam, neo-Nazis)
and destabilizing states by force for gain (i.e.
drug cartels)" -- Major Chris Yunker, USMC,
Joint Staff
* Can be revolutionary (complete overthrow or breakdown
of a government)
* Can be sub-revolutionary (changing portions of a
government to suit the groups objectives)
­ Political objectives (IRA)
­ Cultural/ethnic objectives (Kosovo)
Modern Terrorism: "The Four
Waves" Thesis
* Put forward by Rapoport (Attacking Terrorism:
Elements of a Grand Strategy, 2004) who
argues that:
­ Key catalyzing events signal a shift, uptick in terror
behavior & orientations;
­ Terror activity, thus, has had historic ebbs and flows,
as part of a broader "ocean" of movements signaling
a struggle among independence movements, calls for
colonial ties to end, etc.;
­ The level of activity for insurgent & guerrilla efforts
mark this rise and fall of activity;
­ International in scope in terms of trend activities.
Modern Terrorism: "The Fifth
Wave, New Tribalism" Thesis
* Argument here is that:
­ Many movements do not fit Rapoport's "wave" thesis;
­ There is, recently, a "new tribalism" movement where
common calls and bonds, across insurgent actors,
delineates how groups have allied & partner against a
common enemy.
­ Recognizes a disillusionment with prevailing int'l orgs.
& support networks, including NGOs.
­ Radicalization is the norm, & this norm is local,
intense, and seeks in one generation, broad change in
the nature of relations among nation-states & NSAs.
­ See Jeffrey Kaplan (2007), "The Fifth Wave: The New
Tribalism" in Terrorism and Political Violence 19:545-
570, 2007.
Still More Terror Research Outlets on the Web