between organizations SAGE Publications London • Thousand Oaks • New Delhi Orgunuutionui :,daui^ -3 ORGANIZATIONAL CENTAURS Acting on behalf of organizations When we talk or write about organizations it is all too easy to use a language that describes organizations as actors. We say that a political party expresses its views, a car factory produces cars, a theatre stages a drama, a state declares war etc. Yet in the.true sp ise of the term only human beings have the ability to act. .c is easier to say that the organization makes a statement than to say that these individuals representing this organization made a statement that was, decided by a majority of its board. In order to understand what happens in and around organizations, however, it is misleading to regard organizations as actors. In organizations there „are resources and rules. But organizations cannot speak or move; they have no legs to walk with, and no eyes to see with. When organizations do something it is always individuals who act. They do not act on their own account, but on behalf of the organization. All affiliates of an organization act both on behalf of the organization and on their own. Everything that is done in organizations is enacted through the bodies of its individual affiliates. The organizational centaur is the embodiment oi both actions on behalf of organizations and actions on behalf of the natural person; it is part organization, part human. When individuals act on behalf of organizations they act as. part of the organization, but since they are humans they invariably supersede the organizational context. The organization supplies the actor with resources, tasks, goals, motives, knowledge etc., while the individual contributes muscles, brain, eyes and voice, a face and a body. An organization 'is made up of persons, but not of whole persons; each one enters into it with a trained and specialized part of himself (Cooley, 1914: 319; cf. Barnard, 1968: 16-17; Keeley, 1988: 231; Coleman, 1990: 543). Erving Goffman has penetrated into the relations between individuals and organizations. Although he is not clear in his writings about the concept of organization as such (see chapter 1; Burns, 1992), he has made important contributions to the understanding of what he describes as 'dual involve-menf (1959: 169). In his book Asylums he expresses this predicament in the following way: 'Our sense of being a person can come from being drawn into a wider social unit; our sense of selfhood can arise through the little ways in which we resist the pull' (1968: 280). When individuals act on behalf of organizations, which they often do, they also to some extent perform a personal act. The first kind of actions Goffman calls 'expressions given' and the second kind 'expressions given off. Expressions given pertain to actions on behalf of the organization such as the job a waiter or a policeman has to do. Expressions given on>, on the other hand, pertain to personal traits and feelings of the actor. They 'involve a wide range of action that others can treat as symptomatic of the actor, the expectation being „that the action was performed for reasons other than the mfnWnation conveyed in this way' (1959: 2). far as policemen, are concerned, 'expressions given off consist in letting off lightly a person who has committed lor offence; or it may be a case of taking bribes or of eating a particular person because he or she is a mer. A waiter who is personally acquainted with a "may act differently towards him than to an unknown fmer, LXiy of the examples that Goffman give in The Presentation 30 Social organizations of Self in Everyday Life are from service occupations or occupations such as teachers and doctors. Their jobs, that is, their organizational affiliations, can be regarded, according to Goffman, as interaction constraints, which transform the activities of an individual into performances. In later works Goffman called expressions given off either secondary adjustments (1968: 172) or role distance (1972; cf. Burns, 1992:137). With the concept of role distance it will be possible to deal with 'the divergence between obligation and actual performance' (1972: 102). This is a way of describing the action of organizational centaurs and the fact that a dual involvement is always there when we try to understand organizational action. Individuals do things, but often not wholeheartedly; they even do things that they do not believe in. They do it routinely on behalf of an organization while their minds are on something-els^- People may act on behalf of organizations and believe that what they do is the best and most rewarding task there is. Yet, they may feel the need to express a role distance. An example is the recently converted person who has joined a political party or church and distributes pamphlets in the. street for the cause. When he meets an old friend, his boss, or a teacher, his behaviour changes. He may feel the need to say something disarming or apologetic, (p When individuals act on behalf of organizations they only to a limited extent decide thems^ves what to do. Thus, when acting on behalf of an organizatiou you cannot change your mind on your own, at least not on major issues. You have to refer to others, and it is far from certain that they will accept your proposed changes. This is a major strain in acting on behalf of organizations and accounts for the tension between obligation and actual performance. The ideal image of human interaction is a dialogue of two persons who listen to each other, react on what they hear and modify their behaviour accordingly. This is an unusual situation. People have their hang-ups and ties. Spontaneous reactions are rare. There are always the others, your affiliates, who have to have their say and are easy to blame. aniz ü ce 's '■ In interaction on behalf of organizations people interact face to face and talk to each other, but there is no directness in the relation since people cannot change their minds immediately in response to the other person (see R. Johansson, 1992). Reactions are conditional; they have to follow a rule or be approved by the organization - by a boss, other members, a spouse, parents, etc. Moreover, the same individual is probably affiliated with several organizations. Other affiliations and loyalties create tensions in actions on behalf of organizations. Relations to relatives may override loyalty to an employer, generating nepotism. Our argument is that interaction on behalf of organizations is the most common form of human interaction when we regard a family as an organization. Affiliation to a family, i.e. being married or being a child, gives the same kinds of constraint on interaction as being employed in a shop or being a representative of a political party. Goffman made this point many times (see for instance 1959: 78-9). There are three forms of interaction between organizational centaurs: (1) interaction between individuals within the same organization, for instance interaction between a supervisor and his or her subordinates; (2) interaction between individuals representing different organizations in, -for instance, business negotiations, wars and soccer games; and (3) interaction that takes place outside the immediate realm of an organization, but where different organizational affiliations of individuals interacting considerably affect their interaction. (1) Inside organizations interaction between individuals depends upon their position in the organization. Individuals are given resources and authority according to the division of labour in the organization. In this respect the interaction is predetermined by the organizational setting. Now, all research experience from inside organizations has shown that formal aspects are not enough. Informal, personal and bodily attributes and characteristics are essential in many situations. Certain people, perhaps of the same age or sex, 32 Social organizations may find it easier to talk to each other and understand each other. Individuals in the same position interact out of the organizational context creating their own interaction patterns (see Lysgaard, 1961; Burawoy, 1979), Yet, organizational motives and resources always play a role. The point is that it is mixed. Even though personal qualities and characteristics are important, there are always constraints on interaction between people due to their respective positions in the organization. (2) In interaction between individuals representing two different organizations this is even more obvious. Moreover, in such situations it becomes clear that the concept of role is not enough to cover the importance of specific organizational positions and affiliations. Two businessmen from different companies or two politicians from different parties, for instance, have the same roles, but the content of these roles cannot explain their interaction. It is first of all determined by the power resources and activities of each company or party. The outcome of the interaction is also conditional on their positions, that is, their authority to make decisions. Apart from different organizational affiliations and resources, there are personal qualities that can influence the interaction between two indidivuals from different organizations. Conditions such as types of personality, if they know each other from previous occasions, if they come from the same geographical region, if they have common acquaintances etc., can be decisive for the outa ne of the interaction. Interaction between organizational cei,:aurs depends both on their organizational bonds and on their personal traits, and it is often hard to distinguish between them. Clearly, interaction of this type cannot be comprehended only in terms of roles. It is necessary to take the organizational context of roles into account. It is the specific organizational affiliation and concomitant resources and goals that matter in interaction between representatives from different organizations. Inside organizations roles are turned into positions with specific tasks and resources. Affiliation implies a position for each affiliate within the organization. Paul DiMaggio has pointed out the neglect of the concept of organization in most efforts to treat relations between 'micro' and 'macro' in social theories (1991: 78), DiMaggio connects organizations with roles, and he also writes about resources and control. However, he does not draw the full conclusions of the relationship between organizations and roles. The relationship between general roles such as businessman or politician and actual organizational positions is the same as that between institutions and organizations. Just as organizations are realized or materialized institutions (the idea of family as compared to an actual family), organizational affiliation and positions are realizations of roles. Institutions and roles give general ideas and knowledge about how to do things whereas organizations and positions supply the materializations and embodiments as well as the resources. (3) The importance of organizational affiliation and particular organizational resources stretches outside the immediate organizational context. When people meet and mix in semi-organized fields such as cocktail parties, restaurants and bars, people often ask about the organizational affiliations of other people. If you know that a person is employed by a certain company or university your interaction with this person is affected. A person's position and behaviour to a large extent rests on his or her organizational affiliations and resources, such as a wealthy family, an important company or a famous university, even though he or she does not at that occasion act on behalf of the organization. Even children playing in the playground know such things. They may, for instance, tell a playmate not to hit his antagonist because they know that he has two big brothers. Even among children the organizational affiliation and resources make a difference. Practically everybody has at least two forms of affiliation -citizenship and kinship. Most people have more. Besides their parents and siblings, they may also have a family of their own, with a spouse and children. They may have a job 34 Social organizations and are perhaps members of one or several voluntary associations such as a party, a trade union, a church or a sports club. All affiliations set constraints on the interaction with other people. The first things people want to know from you are often your organizational affiliations: where do you work, to whom are you married, what is your citizenship? And even if the others do not know them, your organizational affiliations still put constraints on your options - you have times to keep and you have to account for how you have used organizational resources. Are there any actions that are not partly on behalf of organizations? Actions where people do not ask where you come from or where you belong? Actions when nobody will ask where you have been, what you have done, what did you do with the money, why did you not come back in time, what did you achieve? Actions you do on your own responsibility with resources you dispose of quite on your own? Hobos and outlaws are figures often regarded as symbols of freedom and independence, but they are not common. Other examples may be poets and artists. Still, they all have their affiliations, such as family and citizenship, which they cannot totally escape unless they find themselves a sanctuary somewhere. To get away from theii affiliations people sometimes try to change their identity md their physical appearance, or even have themselves declared dead. Now, this is not a matter of either/or. Organizational affiliation constrains interaction with other people in shifting degrees in different situations. It varies with the life cycle. Children and middle aged people tend to be more constrained by organizational affiliations than adolescents and pensioners. It is particularly among the latter two categories that we notice a trend in some affluent countries of an increased share of single households in the population, which denotes a relative independence of affiliations in their social lives. A more typical image of human behaviour would be in Organizational centaurs 35 terms of action on behalf of organizations than an image of autonomous individual actions. In interaction with other people it is more common that people excuse or blame their decisions and actions on their organizational affiliation than make their decisions on their own. T can't come, I have to go home.' 'No, I don't have time, I have to go to work.' 'I would like to go there, but my kids don't like it.' Acting on behalf of organizations is not necessarily bad or negative. It is not that such action is enforced action whereas other forms of action are free. People choose to act on behalf of organizations, since it can be incredibly funny and exciting. It enables people to do things they would not otherwise dream of doing on their own such as being an astronaut and flying to the moon or playing in the final of the world championships in soccer. This is in the idea of collective resources. What you gain in access to resources and possibilities by organizational affiliations you lose in autonomy and independence. In organizations you can do things you would not be able to do on your own, but you cannot quite choose when you would like to do it, or how often or how much. The organizational context implies a particular rhythm of doing things. Often it means to do things faster, more regularly and more often. What you win in terms of access to resources you lose in spontaneity and autonomy. Organizations may become traps. Generally it is too strong to say that people act against their will when they act on behalf of organizations. On the other hand, it is rarely accurate to say that they act according to their will. Actions on behalf of organizations are normally, although not necessarily, characterized by a dual involvement; a duality of action, A dual involvement may be expected to be more obvious in relations of employment, when people get paid to do things. But even members of voluntary associations now and then do things on behalf of their organizations that they would rather not do. In social sciences there is a tendency to see human actors as either determined by a social structure or culture or as 36 Social organizations rational and free individuals (see Granovetter, 1985). The fact is that though in principle people are free to choose and act, they seldom do, and there are few opportunities to choose organizational affiliation. People are selected into organizations. The social world is certainly made by people, although not according to their own will, but rather through doing what other people tell them to do and often while thinking of something else. This is not the whole picture. There are moments when people experience a self-realization through acting on behalf of an organization together with friends or colleagues, and there are moments when people are really forced through threats of violence to act against their own will. And sometimes people refuse to obey orders and stop or leave. Part organization . . . When people act on behalf of organizations their abilities and scopes are enhanced; they get extraindividual strength as well as goals and motives. Their behaviour, however, also becomes less human. Yet, it is not possible to eliminate the human part altogether. The strategy of organizational coordination is usually to minimize the human part to be able to increase control and predictabiHty of actions. Which human qualities are relevant for the action on behalf'of the organization varies with the kind of activities involved. People search for the right person for the right job, that is, a person whose human qualities and character fit in with the organizational position. This is not always an easy task. Sometimes physical qualities are decisive, such as strength, sex, or appearance. The leader of a party should have the proper political opinions, le. Personal affection or dislike between party leaders may t í important in establishing or preventing cooperation between two parties. In actions on behalf of organizations the organization determines with whom to interact, with whom to be friendly, whom to help, but it is far from certain that these are the people with whom you would choose to interact if you had your own choice. Human capacities and needs that are not satisfied or used may give rise to unintended forms of interaction, parallel to, or instead of, action on behalf of the organization. Such interaction may be little things like people sitting around talking to each other instead of working, or people going to political meetings not to discuss politics but to meet friends and gossip. This kind of interaction may certainly be productive and even be encouraged. Generally, though, from the point of view of the organization, it is a disturbance. Informal relations may also arise in relations between staff and inmates or clients. It is well known from many studies how prison officers develop patterns of interaction with prisoners that deviate from official rules; patterns that give them mutual advantages. Goffman (1968: 89, 184) reports from his study of 'Central Hospital' how the staff used patients as baby-sitters, gardeners or for house painting. Some affiliates have to interact with representatives from other organizations as customers, business partners or negotiators. Such interaction may lead to close contacts but it must not become too close. As an employee you are expected to be friendly to customers, but you should not become their friend. Organizations have to take measures in order to Organizational centaurs 47 prevent affiliates in such positions from taking advantage of their contacts. An example of such a gain is a bribe. Several writers have pointed out the importance of personal relations, that is, networks, in contacts between organizations. Salespeople often know each other well. 'In a general way, there is evidence all around us of the extent to which business relations are mixed up with social ones' (Granovetter, 1985: 495). Granovetter argues against a simplified way of looking at distinctions between markets and hierarchies. According to him, they are both embedded in social relations. But this argument cannot be taken too far. If organizations are too embedded in networks they will be dissolved. There is a limit to the embeddedness of organizations. Even in situations when representatives from different organizations are expected to fight each other they may refuse and start to cooperate. This rarely happens in soccer, although there have been cases of fixed matches. Axelrod (1984: 73-87) gives the example of the trench warfare during the First World War, where German and French soldiers cooperated in not opening fire against each other. It happens that troops refuse to shoot at demonstrators or protesters, since they identify themselves with the protesters. One example of this was the failed coup d'etat in Moscow in August 1991. In order to avoid refusals from subordinates commanders may recruit troops from other parts of the country, who may even be unable to speak with the protesters. That is one strategy to minimize the influence of the human part of soldiers. In families sex and sexuality are explicit parts of the organizational schemes. In this respect sex is 'part organization'. Sexuality is in a sense turned into action on behalf of the organization, actions that spouses expect of each other. In several other types of organization sex and sexuality are used to design tasks and positions or to attract customers or .spectators. 'The "sexy" uniform of a club waitress, for .instance, exploits for profit both her female sexuality and the ;;male sexuality of the clienť (Cockburn, 1991: 149). 48 Social organizations When sex is not explicitly part organization it is part human, and as such it plays a role in many organizations in the interaction between affiliates and in relations with customers or clients. Cynthia Cockburn writes: "All organizations must generate policies for handling sexual affairs and marriages among their employees if they are to avoid disruption, loss of output and failure of managerial control' (1991: 151). In her book In the Way of Women, Cockburn discusses sexual harassment in work organizations as a way for male employees to assert their position of power (1991: 64, 142). The mix of men and women in similar positions affects actions on br\alf of organizations. When the proportion of women is small their visibility as women increases. They become tokens as part human and not as part organization (see Kanter, 1977: 207-12). Likewise in relations between affiliates and clients there may occur situations where sexuality impinges upon the organizational interaction. Patients may ask nurses for sexual services. In psychotherapy it happens that the close relationship between the therapist and the client is changed into a relationship of love and sexuality, which often leaves the client in a worse state than before the therapy started. In interaction between neighbouring families there are often informal rules prohibiting too close relations between the husband of one family and the wife of another. It is very rare for a man to be able to call on a'woman in a neighbouring family if she is alone at home (see Rosengren, 1991). The human part of the organizational centaur sets limits to demands on actions on behalf of an organization. Affiliates cannot be made to do anything or act against personal convictions. Political parties often compromise about their demands, and politicians now and then have to argue in favour of decisions they do not embrace themselves. Sometimes a member of a party or a government may think that compromises have gone too far, and as a result he or she leaves the party. Sometimes employees quit their jobs when conditions become unbearable even though they do not have Organizational centaurs 49 a new job to go to. Reactions of this kind may also be collective, such as in wildcat strikes. There is always a tension between organizational demands and the human mind and body. When and how people react to such tensions is contingent on the exact situation and constellation of other organizations. The threshold to leave an organization is lower the more alternatives there are, and the lower the dependence on organizational resources is. Dependence on organizational resources within families can be seen as proportionate to the incomes of the spouses (Hobson, 1990), and this often affects divorces. Reactions of dissatisfaction may be discussed in terms of exit and voice (see Hirschman, 1970, 1981; see also Ahrne, 1990: 84-90).