polish i(i37)'°i sociological review ISSN 1231 - 1413 IRENEUSZ KRZEMIŇSKI Warsaw University Polish-Jewish Relations, Anti-Semitism and National Identity Abstract: The article presents the results of surveys done on anti-Semitism in Poland in 1992, which in part were compared to results from a 1996 survey. The group, under the author's direction researched anti Semitism in the context of Poles' attitudes towards other nations, as well as in terms of their own national identity. Two types of anti-Semitic attitudes were observed: traditional, religiously grounded anti Semitism, and anti-Semitism rooted in anti-Semitic political ideology, of the type that has developed since m the French Revolution. Traditional anti-Semitism occurs only among older people who are not well educated and live in rural areas; increased education results in the disappearance of this type of anti-Semitism. Modern anti-Semitism, on the other hand occurs among both the lowest and most highly educated groups in society. Moreover, from 1992 to 1996, the percentage of the respondents declaring anti Semitic views increased. At the same time, however, there was also a larger increase in the number of respondents declaring anti-anti-Semitic views, which has meant that there has been a clear polarization of attitudes. Having a university education makes a person more likely to be ill-disposed toward anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, the attitude of Poles toward Jews cannot be described simply on the basis of anti-Semitic attitudes. The researchers noted that there was also an attitude of "not liking Jews", which was less engaged than the anii-Semitic views, and to a large extent a result of the content comprising Polish national identity. The model of Polishness assumes a Romantic-Messianic image of the Polish nation. According to this model, Poles see themselves as being distinguished by their noble fulfillment of obligations, even when it is to their own detriment, particularly with respect to symbolic Jews and Germans. Researchers also assumed that there was a particular kind of competition between Poles and Jews with respect to the moral superiority of their respective nations. The results from 1992 in part confirmed this hypothesis. Keywords: Polish-Jewish relations, anti-Semitism, national identity, national stereotypes Research Assumptions and Aims of This Article This article attempts to assess the current state of anti-Semitism in Poland, and to describe how Poles view Polish-Jewish relations in an everyday context. This article will refer to the results of two surveys. The basic survey was conducted by the team under my direction in 1992, and was titled "Poles, Jews, and Others."1 In 1996, however CBOS [Social Opinion Research Centre] carried out its own survey on Author's Address: Institute of Sociology, Warsaw University,. Warszawa 64, Poland; e-mail: krzemire@is.uw.edu.pl 1 This project was financed by the KBN [State Committee for Scientific Research] and implemented by the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw. The research group consisted of.Alina Caia, Helena Datner, Ewa Koiniiriska-Frejlak, Andrzej Žbikowskí, and Iírzysztof Witkowskí, who served in a technical capacity. Stanislaw Szwalbe helped to write up the results. I would like to thank sincerely all those who participated in the preliminary phases of research. * 26 IRENEUSZ KRZEMIŇSKI Polish-Jewish relations, in which it repeated several questions from previous study in 1992.2 This article will discuss both. An analysis of the dynamics of social attitudes and opinions, made possible by a comparison of the results of these two surveys, will allow me to develop earlier theses further. In addition, I .would also like to present a hypothesis regarding national identity as one of the co-determining factors of how Polish-Jewish relations are perceived, an aspect that has not yet been fully included in previous work on the subject. In this study, the phenomenon of anti-Semitism was examined in the broader context of attitudes toward current ethnic minorities and other national groups, especially those bordering on Poland. The portrayal of Poles' historical relationship with those neighboring national groups was also considered. In keeping with the view of current scholarship, it has been assumed here that, anti-Semitism whether of individuals or groups, is a specific phenomenon to be distinguished from other attitudes toward other groups or national stereotypes.3 The historical context of the 1990's, marked above all by the transition to a democratic system, has also been taken into account. The Carmelite convent adjacent to the Auschwitz camp was a pressing issue then, inciting the first wave of the anti-Polish campaign abroad. In Poland itself, on the other hand, many anti-Semitic and anti-Jewish slogans could be heard in public rhetoric, especially during the first democratic presidential and parliamentary elections in 1990. Ever since, the world has come to accept the negative stereotype of Poland and of Poles as "traditional anti-Semites", particularly in the United States. Jn 1998, the events in Oswi^cim (Auschwitz) involving the crosses at the gravel pit next to the camp were vividly reminiscent of the situation just a few years before. Those events have prompted scholars to ask basic questions, such as: what kind of anti-Semitic attitudes are we dealing with in Poland, and which type of anti-Semitism can be identified as most common? After 1989, in the United States the topic and slogan of "anti-Semitism without Jews," persistent in Poland despite the fact that today the Jewish community here is very small, has remained very much alive. Some would argue this suggests the existence of a special kind of anti-Semitism peculiar to Poland.4 The question of "anti-Semitism without Jews" and the use of anti-Jewish "labels" in politics there has prompted us to search for explanations in categories founded in historical experience, - Žyäzi t Polacy w opinii badaných [Respondents' Views on Jews and Poles], Research report (Warsaw: CBOS, November 1996). 3 This is illustrated well by the texts that are included in the first two volumes published in: Current Research on Anti-Semitism. Vo\.\,H.Vem{zá.),TIiePersistingQuestiort: Sociological Perspectives and Social Context of Modern Antisemitism, New York: De Gruyter, 1987; Vol. 2, W. Bergmann (ed.), Error without Trial: Psychological Research on Anti-Semitism, New York: De Gruyter, 1988. In an older work, Anti-Judaism: a Psychohistary, Chicago: Perspective, 1975, E. A. Rappaport traces the historical development of anti-Jewish attitudes. 4 In his discussion, for example, Abraham Brumberg considers the accusations made against anti-Semitic Poles very carefully, clearly going against the grain of American. Jewish opinion. Cf. Abraham Brumberg, "Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Poland," in R. L. Braham, Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Eastern Europe, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 143 ff. POLISH-JEWISH RELATIONS, ANTI-SEMITISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 27 - and in national identity.. The results of studies that have not been evaluated up to " now will prove especially useful. Before embarking upon this subject, however, it is first necessary to define the terms "anti-Semitism" and "anti-Semitic attitude." First, our team's research distinguished "anti-Semitic attitudes" from "anti- \ Semitic ideology," as well as from "anti-Semitic" ("anti-Judaic") theological beliefs. The ideological (political) content of anti-Semitism, and religious anti-Judaism man- i* jfested in the form of a worldview can both serve as the basis for—or at least as an 1 intellectual explanation for—anti-Semitic stances. Second, anti-Semitism is sometimes treated very broadly in research and interpretations. This is because the dangerous phenomenon of anti-Semitism—rightly blamed for the most horrific crime of twentieth century—could potentially be lurking behind any negative judgment of Jewish traits or behavior.5 Our understanding, however, differed slightly: we assumed that Polish stereotypes of Jews and Jewish culture should be distinguished from anti-Semitism in the proper sense of that word. Anti-Semitic attitudes manifest themselves as an obsessive animosity and hostility towards Jews, requiring a certain mindset, which nevertheless always finds its representatives. These people find a universal justification for their "vigilant" stance, which becomes an essential component of their personality. In this case, as Helena Datner has done, one can speak of "an individual's cognitive patterns," which are rooted in broader, coherent systems of religious and ideological beliefs.6 Not every negative assessment of Jewish behavior or traits is an expression of anti-Semitism, however; it nevertheless can be, if we have ascertained that it has stemmed.solely from a hostile attitude toward Jews that has been adopted regardless of a given situation. Jewish stereotypes, which can also-include negative features, are often distinguished from "anti-Semitism" in the strict sense. Alina Caia, who in no way can be accused of having nationalistic sympathies or being tolerant of anti-Semitism, has done so convincingly in her work on the representation of Jews in Polish folk culture.7 Through national.stereotypes, collective experience shows a group's positive features as well as the negative ones, though on the whole this is not done very fairly. The ideology of anti-Semitism lacks this dichotomy. In this way, we can immediately recognize that it differs from a national, or ethnic, stereotype of Jews. Therefore it should be stressed that not every negative opinion about Jews deserves to be deemed a symptom of anti-Semitism: it may simply be one facet of a stereotypical group representation describing Jewish characteristics as positive, negative, or morally neutral. 5Helen Fein's definition seems.to be so broad and "morally" restrictive that each manifestation of negative Jewish stereotyping becomes a manifestation of "anti-Semitism", cf. H. Fein, "Dimensions of Anti-Semitism—Attitudes, Collective Accusations and Actions", in Hie Persisting Question..., op. cit., p. 67 ff. _ fi H. Datner-Špiewak, "Struktura i wyznaczniki postaw antysemÍckich"'[The Structure and Determinants of Antisemit«: Attitudes], in I. Krzemitiski (ed.)j Czy Polacy sq antysem'ttami? [Are Poles Anti-Semites?]. Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 1996, p. 31. ■ 7 Alina* Caia, Wizenmek tyda w palskiej kulttirze ludowej [The Image of Jews in Polish Folk Culture]. Warszawa: Plus, 1988, pp. 101-102 and Summary. 28 : IRENJEUSZ KRZEMINSKI Such images of other ethnic groups often serve as a mirror for one's own group. In light of the degree to which stereotyped images of other nationalities are prone to perpetuate fears and aggravate the unresolved problems of one's own group, we can use G. Langmuir's description of these stereotypes as being "xenophobic" and "non-xenophobic".8 "Xenophobic stereotypes", however, are not products of the imagination, but from generalizations and, in particular, ungrounded generalizations based on specific individual and group experiences. These stereotypes can provide simple and convincing explanations for an ethnic group's own difficult and unresolved problems. Moreover, stereotypes help heal old wounds by promoting a positive image of one's own group, thereby reinforcing fundamental societal bonds by blaming "others" for "our" dilemmas (i.e. blaming a scapegoat). However, says Langmuir, historical truths sometimes actually provide rational justification for ethnic stereotypes that perpetuate attitudes of distrust towards other ethnic groups: historical experience has shown that those nations (i.e. other nations should be perceived as a potentially dangerous enemy of one's own group. Only historical research, free of those stereotypes, allows them to be evaluated properly. Langmuir contrasts this with the presence in cultural experience of images unconfirmed by any real incident, albeit a single, isolated one, not even when the accusers themselves attempt to find empirical confirmation to back up their own charges. Langmuir calls this kind of stereotype content "chimerical": a significant portion of anti-Jewish accusations belongs to this mysterious set of wild, hostile images that are attributed to groups of "others". A special instance of this is the centuries-óld ritual murder accusation against Jews, which at its very core is the charge that Jews need "blood for matzoth" a product of inimical chimerical fantasies.9 Langmuir's ideas and typology were one of the theoretical inspirations behind the 1992 study, inasmuch as we were looking for ways to distinguish the various forms of fears and hatred in inter-ethnic relations present in stereotypes. This was necessary in order to provide a detailed picture of Polish-Jewish relations. Moreover, we wanted to place Polish-Jewish relations in their historical context of Polish-German, Polish-Russian, and Polish-Ukrainian relations. In order to do so, we assumed hypothesis regarding the relevance of the content of ethnic identity for attitudes toward other nations, and that it would prove similarly significant in Polish-Jewish relations. Types of Anti-Semitism in Poland Our first hypothesis assumed two different anti-Semitic attitudes, each having its own rationale.I0 Based on the classical definition of "attitude," one can say that in each B Cf. G. I. Langmuir, "Toward a Definition of Anti-Semitism," in: Tiie Persisting Question, op. cit. See also Gavin I. Langmuir, History, Religion and Anti-Semitism, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. 9 Cf. G. I. Langmuir, "Toward a Definition of Anti-Semitism," in: Tfie Persisting Question, op. cit. For a discussion of ritual murder accusations against Jews, and the official position pf the Pope in this regard within the context of our current research, see I. Krzemmski, "Polacy i Žydzi w swietle badania socjologicznego" [Poles and Jews in Sociological Research], Kultura iSpoleczeňstwo no. 3 (1995): 104-105. 10 Stefan Nowak, "Pojede .postawy w teóriách istosowanych badaniach spolecznych," [Meaning of an Attitude in Theories and Applied Social Sciences] in: S. Nowak (ed.J, Teorie postaw [Attitude Theories] (Waŕszawa: PWN, 1973).. í POLISH-JEWISH RELATIONS, ANTI-SEMITISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 29 ",~ case, different stereotype contents make up the cognitive content of each, defining /i' and/or justifying an individual's attitude toward Jews.11 "^ *• Helena Datner-Spiewak, who analyzed this issue, formulated a typology of the *ľ two basic kinds of anti-Semitism: %' 1 Traditional anti-Semitism—based on religious beliefs t^. i 2 Modern anti-Semitism—based on an anti-Semitic political ideology, developed af-"J-! ter the French Revolution, subsequently "stabilized" in the late nineteenth century (£" thanks to numerous parties and mass political movements.!2 jL We included questions in our survey that helped formulate indicators for both **", types of anti-Semitic attitudes.I3 What follows is a description of each, with specific ř reference to the 1996 CBOS survey. J Indicator for modern anti-Semitism (i.e. "political"). A factor analysis confirmed £ that the use of questions about the influence on a national and international level """ of Jews and individuals with a Jewish background was justified, eliminating other T questions, as an indicator of modern anti-Semitic attitudes. In the 1992 survey, we 1 í asked, "Do Jews have too much influence in Poland on: a) politics; b) economics; \ c) the press, radio, and television. J We included these answers with" those about whether "Jews have too much influ- * ence in the world." Over half, 55% of those surveyed in 1992, agreed with the thesis i that Jews have too much influence internationally (exactly, we'd used expression: "in [ the world"). Only 16% of those questioned disagreed with this, and approximately ■»ť 3% of respondents strongly disagreed. ,i We took answers agreeing with the thesis that Jews have too much influence as sociological indicators of anti-Semitic attitudes: they were associated with a sinister anti-Semitic ideology and hostility. The stereotypical conviction that "Jews secretly ', rule the world" has nonetheless become a justification for one of the most terrible crimes in the history of mankind, known as the Shoah, or Holocaust. The answers to specific questions were tabulated in 1992, and create a unified indicator for attitudes which can be considered to be ill-disposed toward Jews to a greater or lesser degree. Three possible kinds of answers were counted separately: a. answers agreeing with the question's thesis (Jews have too much influence), which we decided were indicators of an anti-Semitic attitude; b. answers disagreeing with the question's thesis (not true that Jews have too much influence), whose meaning is not completely clear; c. middle-of-the-road answers, or those which avoid giving a clear answer (don't know, don't care, undecided, hard to say). 11 Cf. W. Bergmann, "Attitude Theory and Prejudice," in: Error without Trial, op. cit., pp. 271-301. 12 Cf. Helena Datner-Špiewak, "Struktura i wyznaczniki postaw antysemickich," in Czy Polacy sq anty-semttami?, op. cit. 13 The statistical analysis of these indicators, as with all scales and calculations done on the basis of these indicators, was done by Jerzy Bartkowski." The empirical analysis corroborates the theoretical assumption that there are two types of anti-Semitism, which have either religious or ideological bases. A factor analysis determined the final choice regarding questions that would "act as indicators of these attitudes, cf. H. Datner-Spiewak, "Struktura Í wyznaczniki..." ["Structure and Determinants"] in: Czy Polacy sq antysemitami, op. cit., p. 60, Table 1. 30 IRENEUSZ KRZEMINSKI Since there were four questions, the scale went from 0 to 4. We used only two scales: anti-Semitism (answers indicating anti-Semitism) and anti-anti-Semitism (disagreeing with the question about whether Jews are too influential). Helena Datner, who drew up the criteria for the scales, defined the latter as an indicator of a pro-Jewish attitude, i.e. philosemitic, as opposed to anti-Semitism. She decided on this criterion based on the fact that the respondents having less well-defined views or more ambivalent views had three different possibilities of expressing them. According to Datner, those who disagreed with the theses presented in the questions were more inclined to be positively disposed towards Jews than antagonistic towards them, or to be impartial observers, which is why she opted for the term philosemitism. Although these two diametrically opposed answers have strong judgmental and emotional components, they are nevertheless not completely equivalent—in cognitive terms, either. Disagreeing with the statement that Jews have too much influence on the Polish media, or too much influence in the world in general, is not only a statement of fact. It is at the very least also a denial of those opinions about Jews suggesting that they in fact occupy these special positions. This is why such views can be considered philosemitic. Without denying the importance of this, my focus here will be instead on the scale of anti-anti-Semitic attitudes. - Technical considerations also influenced our decision to treat answers supporting and disagreeing with the theses separately: for example, the ability to conduct uniform statistical operations. This explains our decision to create two different scales for anti-Semitism and anti-anti-Semitism, measuring a complex issue from two angles. The starting point (zero on the scale) in the first case (the anti-Semitism scale) comprised all the answers not agreeing with the idea that Jews have too much influence; in the second case (anti-anti-Semitism), this included all the answers not disagreeing with the idea.that Jews do wield special influence. Each respondent was thus classified ona scale of modern anti-Semitism and modern anti-anti-Semitism, whose scale, as mentioned already, can be interpreted as an indicator of pro-Jewish attitudes. Unfortunately, in the 1996 survey, only the questions on Jewish influence in Polish politics were repeated verbatim, and it did not include a question on Jewish influence in the world, which was an important component in our "strong" indicator of anti-Semitic attitudes. While the comparison of attitudes across time is thus incomplete, it nevertheless remains worthwhile. For.the 1996 results, H. Dätrier developed an indicator analogous to that in the 1992 study, though simpler, which tabulates the positive and negative answers. Over half those surveyed in 1996 (56%) did not give any anti-Semitic answer; the three answers expressing agreement—strong anti-Semitism—were selected by a quarter of the respondents. (24.2%). The number of pro-Jewish answers (anti-anti-Semitic) was also high: 23.4%. Sixty percent of those surveyed, however, did not give any pro-Jewish (anti-anti-Semitic) answer. In 1992, this kind of answer, though complemented by a question that was not repeated in th6 later survey, was given in 57% of the cases, somewhat less frequently. a POLISH-JEWISH RELATIONS, ANTI-SEMITISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 31 Table 1 Jewish Influence in Different Areas of Life in Poland. • Data are given in %* In our country, Jews have too much influence on: 1992 1996 A. Politics 1. Strongly agree, agree 35 39 2. Strongly disagree, disagree 27 29 3. Hard to say 37 31.5 B. Economy 1. Strongly agree, agree 36 37 2. Strongly disagree, disagree 25 32 3. Hard to say 39 31 C. Press, radio, television 1. Strongly agree, agree 21.5 28 2. Strongly disagree, disagree 32 34 3. Hard to say 42 36 'Without the percentage of lack of answers. Interesting conclusions can be reached by comparing the results of the two surveys. First, within the sphere being compared, we can see an increase in the number of answers indicating an anti-Semitic attitude. At the same time, there was also an increase in the frequency of anti-anti-Semitism (or hypothetical pro-Jewish attitudes). Second, the data from 1996 indicate a leveling-off in the percentages of anti- and pro-Jewish attitudes. Thus, the results indicate attitudes are becoming increasingly polarized, something confirmed by the significant decrease in the percentage of those answering "hard to say". (There was in particular a marked increase in the number of respondents who believed Jews did wield an influence on the Polish economy.) Indicator of traditional anti-Semitism (i.e. "religious"). In the 1992 survey, we also asked whether or not Jews' problems were God's punishment for their crucifixion of Christ, and whether or not Jews "are themselves to blame for what happens to them." Theanswers to both questions have turned out to be clear indicators of an anti-Semitism basing itself on religious arguments—traditional anti-Semitism. Factor analysis has confirmed this interconnection. Just as with the previous indicator discussed here, each respondent's answers to both these questions was tallied, which determined the degree of traditional anti-Semitic attitude. As with the previous indicator we obtained the indicator of traditional anti-anti-Semitism from the answers disagreeing with the theses of the questions (pro-Jewish attitudes).-. Seventeen percent of those surveyed agreed with the opinion that "Jews' problems are the result of God's punishment", of which 8% strongly disagreed; 35% of those questioned agreed with the statement that Jews "are themselves to blame" (the same percent, however, said "no" in 1992). . Only the second of these questions was included in the 1996 survey, which resulted in fewer positive answers and more negative ones. 32.5% of those surveyed agreed with the opinion, that "Jews are themselves to blame for what happens to them", and 32 IRENEUSZ KRZEMINSKI 45% disagreed with that statement (almost 10% more than in 1992). In 1996, the percentage of those answering "strongly disagree" was higher, but the percentage of those with no clear answer was also lower (7% fewer answered "hard to say")— indicating a tendency toward polarization of the issue. From what has been said up to this point, we already can see that in Poland modern anti-Semitism is more common than traditional anti-Semitism (see Table 2). Table 2 Anti-Semitism Indicators. Data are given in % for the 1992 survey Modern anti-Semitism—anti-Jewish attitudes Anti-Jewish answers ■ Percent of total No anti;Semitism Strong anti-Semitism 0 1 2 3 4 38 23 8 14 17 Traditional anti-Semitism—Anti-Jewish attitude Anti-Jewish answers Percent of answers No anti-Semitism Strong anti-Semidsm 0 .1 2 59 29.5 11.5 If we were to dichotomize the results above and assume that individuals who in both cases answered most antagonistically toward Jews were expressing a clearly anti-Semitic attitude, then in 1992,17% of respondents would have been traditionally anti-Semitic, and 11.5% would have been traditionally anti-Semitic. It is worth pointing out, however, that nearly 60% of those questioned did not show any signs of traditional (religious) anti-Semitism at all, while 38% of those in the category of "modern anti-Semitism" were also traditionally anti-Semitic. Based on the simplified and—for our purposes—incomplete indicators from the 1996 survey, the percentage of modern anti-Semites grew to 24%, while traditional anti-Semites, judged on the basis of just one question, however, remained at a similar level (increasing from 10.9% to 11.5%). From a comparison of the modern and traditional anti-anti-Semitism scales, we can see even more clearly the different degrees to which both kinds of anti-Semitism are present (see table 3). Based on a simplified version of the 1996 indicators, the situation looks like this: Since only one of the questions comprising the traditional anti-Semitism indicator was included in the 1996 questionnaire, those calculations could not be analogous to those in 1992. it is worth noting, however, that over 45% of the respondents either "disagreed" or "strongly disagreed" with the statement that "Jews are themselves to blame." Regarding our imperfect comparison of pro-Jewish attitudes according to the modern anti-Semitism indicator, we see that in 1996, the percentage of answers not supporting Jews grew by 3%, while at the'same time the percentage of strongly POLISH-JEWISH RELATIONS, ANTI-SEMITISM AND NATIONAL IDENTliY J J Table 3 Anti-Anti-Semitism Indicators. Data in To. 19!>2 1. Modern anti-Semitism—pro-Jewish attitude Number of pro-Jewish answers r,o of respondents No support (for Jews) Strong support (for Jews) t) 1 i 3 4 57 16 6 13 8 2. Traditional anti-Semitism—pro-Jewish altitude Number of pro-Jewish answers c,b of respondents No support Strong support n i 2 37 35 29 Table 4 Modern Anti-Anti-Semitism Indicators. Data given in To. 199G Modern anti-Semitism—pro-Jewish attitude Number of pro-Jewish answers % of respondents Lack of support for Jews Strong support for Jews 0 1 2 3 61 9 7 23 pro-Jewish answers also grew, and did so significantly: from S% in 1992, to 23% in 1996. Interpreted within in the context of the first question and the research hypothesis on types of anti-Semitism in Poland, these results indicate clearly: anti-Semitism in Poland is for the most part of the modern, ideological kind, which is comprised of a characteristic group of views that are to be found not only all over Europe, but all over the world, as well. We do not find anything "typically Polish" in this respect.u Traditional anti-Semitism, on the other hand, which has its roots in religion, could be treated as more specific for Poland, because is rather very rare in the other European countries: within it, one can find age-old arguments that are completely at odds with postwar Catholic theology, particularly post-Vatican II theology. In traditional anti-Semitism, the image of Jews is linked to the Catholic tradition in Poland. As a result, for traditional anti-Semites, no one born to a Jewish family '■í It is worth noting that anti-Semitism lias been observed recently in Japan. The United States, where public opinion is particularly prone lo accuse Poles of "traditional anti-Semitism," has itself never been free of modern anti-Semitism, as the results of public opinion surveys show, cf. R. Wutnow, "Anti-Semitism and Stereotyping," in: The Persisting Question, H. Fein, op. cit. See also H. E. Quinley and C. Y. Glock, Anti-Semitism in America. New York: The Free Press, 1979; G.J. Selznick and S. Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice: Anti-Semitism in Contemporary America. New York: Harper & Raw, 1969. Currently.unti-Semilism among African-Americans is becoming a serious issue for human rights advocates, cf. N. Perlmutter and R. A. Perlmutter, The Real Anti-Semitism in America. New York: Arbor House, 1982, the chapter titled "'Blacks' and 'Jews'": 34 IRENEUSZ KRZEMINSKI could ever be a Pole, simply due to his or her "otherness." Apparently, "traditional Catholicism" can still be found among Poles today. The data, however, indicate that traditional, religious arguments have primarily been preserved in the consciousness of a strictly defined category of people, specifically: among older people with limited educations, living in rural areas or smaller towns. In 1992, religious faith, as an independent factor, did not help to explain dislike of Jews and anti-Jewish stereotypes in 1992. The most important factor, together with religiosity was education. Especially important in terms of accepting or strongly rejecting traditional anti-Semitism was the respondent's educational background. A respondent with more education was less likely to accept traditional anti-Semitism, and vice versa: less education meant he or she was less likely to have an anti-anti-Semitic (pro-Jewish) attitude. Table 5 Education, Religious Practices, and Traditional Anti-Anti-Semitism. 1992 Education/Religiosity Practicing regularly Practicing, not regularly Sporadic Not practicing Elementary 0.6881 0.8174 1.2500 1.5000 Basic vocational 0.8041 0.9687 0.7600 1.3333 High school 0.86S3 L1053 1.3474 1.0226 Some college 1.4505 1.0450 1.1854 1.4255 University 1.2549 1.1562 1.333 1.2500 /j=0.0000 Although results of the 1996 survey are not comparable, the percentage of people with university (holding a master's degree) or elementary school education accepting the statement that "Jews are to blame" was identical, whereas rejection of this statement increased along with educational level: 58% of university-educated respondents rejected the statement, compared to 38% of those with an elementary school education. For the most part, the results of both surveys confirmed the fact that the younger the respondent, the lower the level of anti-Semitism, and the more likely he or she is to have a pro-Jewish attitude. This includes both very strong traditional and modern anti-Semitism. Table 6 Age and Average Level of Pro-Jewish Attitudes—Traditional Anti-Semitism Indicator. 1992 (maximum indicator value = 2) Age (years) r(average) 18-24 . .25-39-40-59' "59+ 1.5020 • 1.0171 0.8734 0.7755 p=0.0000 N=1013 0.9271 POLISH-JEWISH RELATIONS, ANTI-SEMITISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 35 In the 1992 survey, we saw certain anomalies in the tendencies determining traditional and modern anti-Semitism levels. Most importantly, whereas increased education was a decisive factor in the diminishing of traditional anti-Semitic attitudes and declaration of pro-Jewish attitudes (at least in the areas covered by our questions), the tendency towards modern anti-Semitism turns out to remain uninfluenced by education. Anti-Semitism was found both among respondents with limited educations as well as those who were highly educated. For example, the percentage of respondents answering "Jews have too much influence on politics in Poland" was almost the same in both the low-educated and highly-educated groups: 36% of individuals with an elementary education, and 3S% of university-educated respondents. We thus discovered, however, that education has a very clear impact on the development of anti-anti-Semitic attitudes (pro-Jewish). Table 7 Educational Level and Average' Level of Pro-Jewish Attitudes. 1992 (maximum indicator value = 4) r (averages) N (number) some elementary 0.S148 40 elementary 0.7799 316 basic vocational 1.0179 251 some high school 0.6136 66 high school 1.0872 97 post-secondary (vocational) 1.4194 42 some college 1.5000 27 college 1.528S 70 Total 0.9S73 p=0.0000 The 1996 study confirmed this tendency (see table 8). Table 8 Education and Average Values of Anti-Semitic and Anti-Anti-Semitic Attitudes (pro-Jewish)—Modern Anti-Semitism. 1996 (Maximum indicator value = 3) Education/Average Anti-Semitic views Pro-Jewish views Total Elementary 0.97 0.62 376 Basic vocational 0.88 1.17 289 High school 1.21 1.10 346 College 1.22 1.23 8(1 Not only does this table demonstrate that anti-anti-Semitic (pro-Jewish) views become more common as the level of education increases, it also shows the group of university-educated respondents is more polarized on this issue. In 1996, this group' value for a simplified version of the indicator for modern anti-Semitic attitudes was the highest, although at the same time the average for anti-anti-Semitic (pro-Jewish) attitudes also was at its highest. Thus it is quite clear that increase in anti-Semitic attitudes (modern anti-Semitism) in the late 1990's also holds true among intellectuals. At the same time, here one can Illlillliffiliifii m 36 IRENEUSZ KRZEMINSKI also see an increase in the numbers of those who are not prone to anti-Semitic attitudes, and who are more positively inclined toward Jews. The growth of anti-Semitic attitudes among intellectuals is, however, a disturbing tendency, since well-educated individuals determine the tone of cultural changes, and this kind of polarization of attitudes among the intellectuals—who after all help mold public opinion—indicates that attitudes in broader social groups have undergone petrification. In addition, the views of some leaders help to perpetuate these old attitudes. The following anomaly is related to the effect of the age factor. In general, the younger the age of the respondent, the lower the anti-Semitism indicator, and, for the most part, vice versa: the older the respondent, the more likely he or she was to have anti-Jewish attitudes. Already in 1992, however, we discovered an anomaly in this rather simple dependency: it has turned out—in relation to both traditional and modern anti-Semitism—that the oldest respondents, 65 years old or older, are less anti-Semitic than younger age groups. This pattern was confirmed later in the 1996 study as well: "individuals-from the oldest age cohort (65 years old or older) are less anti-Semitic and more philosemitic than individuals from the second oldest age group (55-64 years old)."15 Finally, from the 1996 study we can see that respondents' church attendance patterns have a clear effect on their'level of anti-Semitism, whose dependency—not taking into account educational level—was riot important in the study done in the early 1990's (see Table 9 below). Helena Datner-Spiewak, who elaborated the CBOS results, points out that individuals who do not attend church demonstrate the lowest level of anti-Semitism and the highest level of anti-anti-Semitism, i.e. of pro-Jewish attitudes. "able 9 Church Attendance and Average Level of Anti-Semitism. 1996. Simplified Modern Anti-Semitism Indicator, Maximum value = 3 Church attendance: R (average) N (number) Several times a week 1.16 49 Once a week ' 1.01 609 Several times a year 1.12 316 Does not attend 0.91 115 The CBOS study also made it possible to examine the dependency between general political orientation and the level of anti-Semitism and pro-Jewish attitudes. As it turned out, those on the political right demonstrate the highest level of anti-Semitism and lowest level of pro-Jewish attitudes. Those on the left, on the other hand, demonstrate high levels of both anti-Semitism and anti-anti-Semitism. Supporters of the left are thus clearly divided into two groups: anti-Semites and anti-anti-Semites. Among those who in 1995 voted for the current Polish president, Aleksander Kwasniewski, a left-wing politician,. 66% did not display anti-Semitic attitudes, and 15 Žydzi t Polacy w optnü badaných [Respondents' Views on Jews and Poles], Research report (Warsaw: CBOS, November 1996), p. 19. i . 1 -* J POLISH-JEWISH RELATIONS," ANTI-SEMITISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 37 Í*4fi9é showed the highest level of anti-Semitism. Among the more right-wing support-ŕs of-Lech Walesa, on the other hand, the proportions were reversed: 34% and 54%, ispectively. . , This data lends strong support to our thesis that the polarization among intellec-tals is unusually strong", since it is individuals with the highest educational levels who ost often declare their political beliefs and participate in elections. The significant role that church attendance played in the late 1990's in the formalin of anti-Jewish views clearly suggests that the Catholic Church has had a negative fluence on attitude formation. In 1992, it seemed that post-Vatican II trends were iving a positive effect on the Polish Church. After analyzing the results of the 1996 udy, however, this view must be modified: the atmosphere has clearly changed. Re-jiosity seems to encourage negative feelings and anti-Semitism, albeit in its modern, jhtical form. In the early 1990's, it seemed that despite the presence of anti-Semitic ^s priests, church attendance did not have much influence on anti-Semitism. Andrzej **. Zbikowski, analyzing methods of socialization that give rise to anti-Semitism, clearly *t showed that in 1992, the Catholic Church was not active in trying to convey and e perpetuate anti-Semitic attitudes.16 i ' ; Currently more care needs to be taken in formulating such optimistic conclusions: r support for anti-Semitic, ideology can be found among some of the Polish clergy, j, including bishops. It must also be pointed out, however, that over the last two years, , the Polish Episcopate has approved important documents condemning anti-Semitism * and calling for an ecumenical attitude towards their "elder brothers in faith." This expression, coined by the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz, has been used, following the ' example of the Pope himself, who has been using this phrase recently, such as during 1 his pilgrimage, to Israel in March 2000. The bishops also apologized in the name of the Church for anti-Semitism during the Jubilee celebrations in 2000, all of which suggests a polarization of attitudes and views may be present within the Church itself. The Poles' National Identity, Views, and Attitudes toward Jews The next question we shall discuss here is an intriguing one. Demonstrating that the most common variety of anti-Semitism in Poland is not the traditional, religiously-inspired one, but rather the modern, ideological Variety, whose concepts are the same in Poland as they are anywhere else in the world, proved rather easy. In the studies we reviewed before embarking on our own project, we were struck by to what degree Poles kepttheir emotional distance from the subject, and by their tendency to declare their "dislike of Jews." We were left with the problem of how to explain this. The following views constitute the framework oi anti-Semitic ideology: 1) "Jews have most of world finance in their hands"; 2) "Jews always support each other" (with the understanding that this is to the detriment of those among whom they are living); and 1(1 A. Žbikowski, "Žródla wiedzy Polaków o Žydach: socjalizacja postaw," [Poles' Sources of Knowledge about Jews: The Socialization of Attitudes] in Czy Potacy sq anlysemitami..., op. cit, p. 65 ff. Cf. also I. Krzemiriski, "Polacy i Žydzi w swietle badania socjologicznego," ["Poles and Jews in Sociological Research"] Kultura i Spokczeňstwo no. 3 (1995): 103, Table 1. 38 ' IRENEUSZ KRZEMIŇSKI 3) "Jews secretly strive to rule" (in any situation, but with the tacit understanding that they want to rule the world). These elements were very clearly present in the 1992 study, confirming the sense of modern anti'semitic attitudes. The questions on this subject were not repeated in 1996, but we can assume that the content of antisemitic beliefs did not change significantly. Regardless of whether or not the individual tended to believe the above statements or not, he or she could express a "dislike" of Jews. In 1992, we asked respondents about this directly, and received the following answers: 46% of respondents agreed with the statement "Poles do not like Jews," whereas only 25% disagreed with the statement. Thus, there must be an entire group of attitudes which nevertheless can be described as "dislike" although they do not deserve to be called "anti-Semitic" in the strong sense of that term adopted in our study: they are manifestations of rather negative feelings toward Jews, or suspicion of them. Using Langmuir's terminology, this "dislike of Jews" would be linked to a xenophobic stereotype connected with them. The hypothesis that we have formulated in order to explain this phenomenon is a rather complex one. First, it assumes the view presented in the first part of this article that not every manifestation of dislike and criticism of Jews deserves to be called "anti-Semitism" (we based ourselves on G. I. Langmuir, cited above). This inclined us to construct a hypothesis linking attitudes toward Jews with the content of national identity. Formulating one of our study's main hypotheses, I assumed that Poles consider Jews to be an ethnic group, or rather nation, and as such are defined in both cultural and religious terms. Something that may be termed the "deep structure" of Polish national identity, and thus as the "core" of Poles' own understanding of themselves and of the Polish experience, is based on opposition to the image of the Jews, and an opposition of who they are and what they are like. I assumed this opposition was not the only one essential to defining this "core" of national identity, and that an opposition to the Germans also played an important role, but that the opposition to Jews has had a more fundamental significance. ■ The hypothesis also assumed that the opposition to the Russians, though especially significant in the definition of "Polishness," setting its Western European, Roman Catholicism against Russia's Orthodox Christianity, did not translate into a day to day comparison of Poles and Russians. In everyday terms-—except of course for situations during wartime and political opposition—such as during the 1980's, for example—the attitude toward Russians has not.so important in terms of defining "Polishness" as the 1992 survey seems to suggest. Emotions associated with the Russian stereotype tum out to be much weaker than we had expected, and weaker than those associated with the German and Jewish stereotypes. Coming back to the definition of a national identity: in short, we may assume scholars investigating the question of identity distinguish for the most part between its two levels. One of these is more incontestable and unchanging* whereas the second one continues to change. For example, Pawel Boski, in his study of the changes in national identity among emigres, distinguishes between a clear, unchanging level of "criterial identity" and "correlative identity," with respect to both "individual iden- I 1 - POLISH-JEWISH RELATIONS, ANTI-SEMITISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 39 tity" and "social identity/'17 Our "core" of Folishness would correspond to "criterial Identity/' or would be its determinant. 1 " .From our perspective, Pawel Boski's research on national identity had interesting results he found that the content of Poles' national correlative identity has been j tl established on the basis of an opposition of certain value categories. Positive features \ ^jiav&been attributed to the "good Poles," and the negative features to the "bad Poles," I "as-well as to representatives of other nationalities (in Boski's research, these were 1 Americans and Canadians).18 Without delving into the content of those images just yet,'I would like to note that the image of one's own national identity was established , by those interviewed through axiological oppositions that define a scale of values, ^confirmed for the most part by our intuition, as expressed in the hypothesis. , *V Our hypothesis assumed that the definition of "Polishness" is not something openly „ tdeclared, rather, it falls into the realm.of the unconscious as understood by Freud, or V,,thät of Jung's "collective subconscious." Moreover, "Polishness" is in part defined by - competition with Jews to be "better," or morally and culturally "superior," as a people. 7 ,/rhte would be the sense of taking the "core of identity" to be self-definition in relation »' % to others In anthropology, research on ethnic identity, and thus on national identity, /ilhás assumed that a group's own identity is defined in opposition to others, as in rViEredenc Barth's classic work."19 Zbigniew Bokszafiski cites Eisenstadt and Giesen,20 f I who argue that collective identity is understood as something created through the "»^construction of borders or divisions,21 an idea very similar to our description here. ^'important is that the categories of opposition in Boski's research describing one's ^j)Wn identity in contrast to the "Other" clearly contained a moral component, which ..H-also is in keeping with the assumption of our hypothesis. ^t1 Here, however, my concept differs slightly from that of Boski. Basing himself on Z Antonina Kloskowska's theoretical reflections, he sees criterial identity as an effect Jf ^of culturalization, built upon indisputable knowledge about cultural symbols. This ; would mean example, taking the Wawel castle, the Marian shrine at Jasná Góra, or the holidays of November 1st (All Saints' Day) and 11th (Poland's Independence Day) ~ as symbols of Polishness.22 In other words, our "core of Polishness" would not be an 17 Pawel Boski, "O byciu Polakiem w ojczyiznie i o zmianach tožsamosci kulturowo-narodowej na obczyznie,' [On Being a Pole in Poland and On the Changes in Cultural and National Identity among 1 Emigres] in P. Boski, M. Jarymowicz, and H. Majewska-Peyre, Tožsamašč a odmiennošč'kulturawa [Identity and Cultural Otherness], Warszawa: 1992. Description ofthis issue on pp. 92-93,98-101, and 101-102. Cf. i also P. Boski, "Remaining a Pole or Becoming a Canadian: National Self-identity among Polish Immigrants to Canada," in Journal of'Applied Social Psychology 21, no. 1 (1991): 41-77. IB P. Boski, op. cit., pp. 138-141,143.- 19 F. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1954. 20 S. Eisenstadt and B. Giesen, The Construction of Collective Identity, cited by Zbigniew Bokszariski, '"Ibžsamošc aktora spolecznego a zmiana spoleczna" [The Identity of Social Actors and Social Change], in: J. Kurczewska, ed., Zmiana spoleczna: teória i došwiadczenie polskie [Social Change: Theory and the Polish Experience] Warszawa: Instytut Filozofii i Socjologü PAN, 1999. 21 Ibid, p. 68. ~ A. Kloskowska, "Kultury narodoweinarodowa idenryfikacja: dwoistošcfunkcji," [National Cultures and National Identification] in: A. Kloskowska, (ed.), Oblicza polskosci [Aspects of Polishness]. Warszawa: University of Warsaw, 1990. 40 IRENEUSZ KRZEMIŇSKI | image of our own group with moral content; but rather a representation in individual | consciousness of symbols having an unquestionably national character. J Correlative identity would be subject to the process of socialization, on the other | hand—and it is that identity which is founded on what [Boski] calls "hidden nor- | mative assumptions," basing himself on J. Reykowski. These are understood in the | form of opposition, which, once again, is in keeping with our concept here. Boski, í without referring to psychoanalytical concepts, understands the normative content of } correlative national identity as for the most part unconscious, and not even subject to reflection, or a conscious, intellectual "treatment."23 i In such an understanding, the indisputable, unchanging symbols of national identity represent something highly intellectual, a subject of reflection and careful consideration. The content of correlative identity, on the other hand, has a normative character, and is thus morally "charged," having been created on the basis of experience. Thus, by definition it is subject to change and external influence. Why, however, would correlative identity represent such an inherent part of a person that only in exceptional situations would it be subject to reflection and conscious intellectual "treatment"? Such a supposedly fundamental difference in these two types of identity is difficult to accept, which is why at this point our concepts clearly diverge from Boski's. 'My assumption is that the "core of Polishness," corresponding to criterial identity, is comprised of normative assumptions that are not entirely conscious ones. These determine the evaluative, emotional character of the content that constitutes Polish identity. The moral, evaluative, and emotional components of one's sense of identity hamper intellectual attempts to understand it. At the same time, the more "external" layer of identity, subject to change (for example national stereotypes that might be voices, as well as the Polish auto-stereotype) is not only easier to consider, but is to a significant extent modified on a day to day basis—here Boski argues the opposite. Upon reflection, people may reconsider the elements of this layer of identity, making the symbols chosen as the unquestionable signs of one's own nation subject to change. Our main hypothesis, based on theoretical intuition, linked Polish-Jewish competition—and Poles' resultant self-definition in opposition to Jews—to the Romantic vision of Poland as the "Christ of nations." By "intuition," I hoped to express . the difficulty of a clear operationalization (to put it in sociological terms) of the perceived contents of national identity, despite the fact that people somehow succeed in communicating it to each other. Pawel Boski also notes this difficulty, recognizing his reconstruction of the content of national identity as being rather arbitrary, though not entirely. Boski writes: "The simplest answer to the question of how we came up with the test [measuring correlative national identity—I.IC] is: 'from our own observations and experiences,' complemented by suggestions from, other emigres' (...)."24 Other authors, such as Marcin Fryb'es and-Patrick Michel, have attempted ground their reconstruction of Polish national identity in Romantic and 23 P. Boski, op. cit, p. 102, and his later discussion there on the content of national identity. 24 P. Boski, op. cit., p. 119. AJsd P. Boski, Remaining a Pole..., op. cit. POLISH-JEWISH RELATIONS, ANTI:SEMrTISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 41 [sjeo-Romantic nineteenth-century literature. In their opinion, this literature contributed to. the framework by which "Polishness" is experienced and understood, and whose relevance persists today, even when people are not aware of the significance of In how they construe their own experiences. Their analysis is basically in agreement With the one presented here, although they used a somewhat different terminology: ihey take the Romantic myth of the Polish nation as the basis for national identity ' J ch we call the "core of Polishness").25 Iistorical experience, fundamental to a nation's survival and its various "traits," d thus be included in this mishmash that is auto-definition, something which 'cannot be fully expressed. This would provide the basic content for national identity's core ' It would assume an image depicting Poles as having lofty morals, and selfless in their most essential motives: without regard for their own interest and pressures of i